



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Per. 3977 or. 62
3rd. 123-4

THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

LITERARY MAGAZINE:

DEVOTED TO THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,

AND TO THE PROMOTION OF SELF-CULTURE AND GENERAL
EDUCATION.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PREVALEBIT."

VOLUME III.—THIRD AND ENLARGED SERIES.

LONDON:
HOULSTON AND WRIGHT,
66, PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCCLX.

LONDON:
J & W. RIDGE, PRINTERS, 14, BARTHOLOMEW CLOSE.



PREFACE.

HOWEVER greatly polemical writers may differ in their opinions, they generally admit the importance of careful research and impartial examination. The duty of proving "all things" is now theoretically admitted by most, though still practically ignored by many. Unsatisfactory as this state of things must be, it is an advance upon that in which free inquiry was dreaded, and calm discussion was impossible. A great point is always gained when we have a duty admitted, because, with every true-hearted man, it will be followed by an effort for that duty to be discharged. Hence the intimate connection between truth in theory and truth in action; and in the majority of cases where we discern the former, we may hope, ere long, to discover the latter. It is therefore the source of no small satisfaction to us, in continuing to devote our time and attention to the arduous labours connected with the conduct of this serial, to know that we are thus not only carrying out universally admitted principles, but adopting the surest means of promoting mental enlightenment, and, with it, moral improvement.

It will be perceived, on examining the contents of this, the Twelfth Volume of the *BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST*, that there is no diminution in the importance of the questions which are here discussed, and no lack of ability in their treatment. In both these respects the present will, we believe, bear favourable comparison with any previous volume. In Theology, we have a debate on a question which involves the fundamental point of difference between the two great sections of the Christian world; and this debate is sustained by *bonâ fide* Catholic and Protestant writers, who have brought to bear upon it deep earnestness, extensive erudition, unmistakeable talent, and an unexceptionable spirit. In Politics, the subject of the Opium Trade, in relation to the British Government, is very fully debated by men who have given much attention to it, and some of whom have formed their opinions from personal

observations made in the distant empires of India and China. The question of Trades' Unions, as discussed under the head of Social Economy, is of vital importance in the present day, and demands the careful consideration of all who are in any way connected with the great manufacturing interests of this country; and while in these pages intelligent workmen have met, on equal terms, with extensive employers, all have, "without let or hindrance," made their statements, brought forward their arguments, and now appeal for a verdict from thoughtful men of every class.

The purely literary portion of this volume requires but little special notice; suffice it to say, that we believe it will be found to contain many articles replete with instruction, and inductive of thought. The sombre, funereal character of some of these papers, remind us that death has been unusually busy among the great and good. Rarely has it fallen to the lot of writers for the periodical press to have in so short a space of time to chronicle the decease, and to embalm the virtues, of so many illustrious men. These facts read their own homilies to all respecting earnest efforts and active lives; but they speak to the young, with more than ordinary emphasis, about solemn obligations, and lofty destinies. And as there is many a vacant space on the muster-roll of Truth, and many an unoccupied position in "the world's broad field of battle," we would urge the ardent spirits with whom we rejoice to be associated,

"In youth to stand upon the mountain's brow,
Look on life's valley, rough and rent below;
One hour of stillness, while they think on *how*,
Then, steeled with forethought, down to deeds to go,
Burning to fell the hundred-handed foe."

But we must check our prelective tendency, and with warm and heartfelt thanks to those who have assisted us to make this volume what it is, we commend it to the attention of all inquiring and truth-loving men.

June, 1860.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Epoch Men.

GEOFFREY CHAUCER.—THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

"The first finder of our language."—*Oocleve.*

"Of our language he was the lode-ster."—*Lydgate.*

"Lingnam qui patriam redegit illam

In formam."—*Leland.*

"Dan Chaucer well of English undefyled."—*Spenser.*

In the south aisle of Westminster Abbey, one fine old Gothic piece of ornamental sculpture stands out, distinguishably from all others for its look of hoar antiquity, though little more than three centuries have elapsed since, as a labour of love, "one Nicholas Brigham" erected it. *That* marks the burial-place of Chaucer, the first true distinctively English poet,—the first tenant, too, of this transept, which, on account of the poetical dust enshrined in it, is now called Poets' Corner. Though "black oblivion's rust" has played "fantastic tricks" with the singer's effigy, it has little dimmed his fame; for the preservative magic of genius has been thrown around it in undecaying spells, so that "near it there may never come suspect or danger." This, however, was not the earliest memorial of

"The noble rhetor poet of Britain,
That made first to distil and rain
The gold dewdrops of speech and eloquence
Into our tongue;"

for Carton (who collected, edited, and printed an issue of the *Canterbury Tales*) placed above his grave a slab with this inscription, written by a learned Milanese:—

"Gulfredus Chaucer vates, et fama poesis
Materas, hac sacra sum tumulatus humo."

Of one to whom such unwonted honours had been paid, it would be fair to conclude that there was warrant in his life, works, and influence for them all, and that those dear "remembrances of the

dead " were but indications of the worth of the living. Nor would the inference be uncorroborated by the fact. Chaucer's life was eventful ; his works have even yet a living interest for living men, and his influences pulsate even now in the heart of modern civilization. In the morning of our English life this keenly nationalized poet became not only the exponent of the buxom age of Edward III., but also a marked leader in that progress party whose genius insinuates the principles of development into their own generation, and thus become the progenitors of the progress of after times. He is a great, healthy, vigorous soul, whose Norman nature had been thoroughly impressed in the Saxon mint, and who issued the " coinage of his brain " in the despised vernacular currency of thought in actual life ; broke the Latin moulds and the French dies in which language was then cast or pressed ; and touched with everlasting nationality the form and substance of our English speech.

To those who rightly comprehend the immense importance of a pure and noble language in bringing about and sustaining a healthy and generous nationality of thought and feeling ; who look upon literature not only as one of the issues, but also as one of the communicators of life ; who trace the influence of words upon the natural and spiritual energies of man ;—it will appear at once an invaluable service done to our race, to suffuse and vivify the expressions which men must use with the dyes of poesy and the formative activity of genius. The testimony of centuries unanimously accords to Chaucer the glory of having been the masculine factor in the evolution and begetting of our present English speech ; and, as the father of *English* literature, he merits acknowledgment as the creator of an epoch from which men date the birth and uprise of an English language and an English nationality ; for then, indeed, did the antagonistic forces which, since the invasion of the Norman conqueror, had kept the races which peopled England asunder, coalesce and co-operate, till they became a new unity, and attained a unique individuality and being—a being which is one and indivisible with the rich traditions of our past history, and the freshest facts in our present literature. To the life and times of this " our morning star of song," a little attention may be not unprofitably or uninstructionally devoted, if we have hearts alive to the admiration and emulation of the great forefathers of our country's glory.

The name—Chaucer—is decidedly Norman in *form*, and it occurs in Battel Abbey Roll,—a list of the men of note who accompanied William the Conqueror to England, 1066. We read also of one Joannes Chaucer, civis Londinensis, in 1299 ; and we know on the best authority—his own statement—that Geoffrey Chaucer was born in " the Citee of London," which, he says, " is to me so dere and swete, in which I was *forth growen* ; and more kindly love have I to that place than to any other in yearth,—as every kindly creature has to that place of his kindly engendure—and to virtue, rest, and peace in that stede to abide." The date of his birth, 1328, has been usually *construed* from the inscription, said to have been placed on the

earliest monument, which asserted that he "died in 1400, aged 72;" and though an attempt has been made to upset, or at least invalidate, this chronology by reference to a document in the Heralds' College, bearing date 1386, wherein Chaucer, upon oath, *inter alia*, deposes that he was then "of the age of forty years and upwards, armed for twenty-seven years," we see no good ground for unsettling the concurrent belief of centuries. The poet does not here seem to be attesting his precise age, but to be merely and formally asserting that he is *above* that age, *below* which testimony regarding points in heraldry would be possessed of little reliability. If this were his exact age, he must have borne arms when little more than thirteen, and been then engaged in the French wars, which is rather improbable. We accept, therefore, and homologate the current synchronism, that Chaucer was born seven years after the death of Dante (1265—1321) and that he was the junior by four years of the reformer Wycliffe (1324—1384).

It has been matter of dispute whether Chaucer's father was a knight, a merchant, or a vintner—a matter of no great importance to us. The balance of probabilities inclines to the conclusion that his parents were in easy circumstances, within the then pretty wide limits of the court circle, and that he was educated with a view to diplomatic or at least civil service life—as if, indeed, his education was to be his outfit for the world. We never hear of his having any patrimonial inheritance or other resources than those conferred on him by State grant, or derived from government appointments. That his education was carefully conducted, assiduously forwarded, and well taken advantage of, we have the best of proofs—in the multifarious erudition which his works display. He was early fitted for commencing a university career, where "he might lere gentillesse aright," which he began, it has been generally believed, at Cambridge. This appears highly probable, for in his poems he is minute in his Cambridge localization; and he speaks of himself in "The Court of Love,"—his earliest poem, written in his eighteenth year—as "Philogenet of *Cambridge*, Clerk;" but we do not know whether at the

"Gret college

Men clepe the Soler Hall at Cantebrige,"

or elsewhere. The universities were not in those days frequented by the sons of the nobility, nor had they that air of wealthy luxury which they now have and aspire after. They were then the resorts rather of the middle classes, as is manifest from the fact that in the youth of Chaucer—we have the statement on the authority of Fitz-Ralph, Archbishop of Armagh, before Pope Innocent VI., in 1357, at Avignon—the University of Oxford had about 30,000 students. The proverbial adjective of *poor*, so often and so truly predicable of scholars, was then an almost unexceptionable connotative term. Chaucer's own maxim, "Sondrie scoles maken subtil clerkes," may be one of those unconscious autobiographic strokes which few writers

have been able altogether to avoid giving; for Wood records a tradition that he was a pupil of Wycliffe's; and Leland—who is, however, not over trustworthy—talks of his being, on leaving Oxford, “an acute, logical, and pleasant speaker, a poet, a grave philosopher, an ingenious mathematician, and lastly, a sound theologian.” It is even stated that his studies were finished at Paris, whence, after travelling through France and Holland, he returned about 1355, and commenced, as is supposed, a course of readings in the law. While spending so many years in the pursuit and acquirement of knowledge, in a seemingly omnivorous gluttony of books, and in the attainment of a manifold experience of men and their ways, besides employing himself in the making,

In the flowre of his youthe,
In sondrie waies as he well couthe,
Of dytyes and of songes glad;

we cannot but suppose the poet, either consciously or unconsciously, to have been engaged in meet preparation for the great tasks which lay before him in life. In his power and inclination to work his own experience into verse, Chaucer is quite Goethean, and the myriad phases of existence which he paints are our chief key to the peculiarities of his age. He was implicated, complicated, and entwined with much of the thought and action of his century, and he touched and impressed it with a vigour and energy which made a distinct and lasting mark on the future of the nation. It was an age of rare vitality and variety of event. There was a hearty, healthy, home-felt, emphatic enthusiasm in it. The differing streams of race were now confluent and neighbourly. The strippling king—Edward III.,—who but a year before the birth of Chaucer had set his step on the throne of his murdered father, as his years increased, displayed a self-willed ambition, a chivalry and gallantry, which endeared him to his subjects, while it added to the glory of their country. The stout, stubborn, politic course of his grandfather fired him to emulation, while the vanity and luxuriousness of his nature led him to indulge in costly pageantries and dainty banquets, in emblematic jousts and well-consorted shows. In his court, therefore, there was a sort of spring-tide life,—young, lusty, free, showy, though unripe. Before Chaucer had reached his thirtieth year, the king's crown was encircled with the laurels of Halidon Hill (1333), Sluys (1340), Crecy (1346), Calais (1347), and Poitiers (1356); and his queen Philippa had shown the heroism of her disposition at Nevil's Cross (1346), and the kindliness of her heart at Calais. And at this particular time, wherever the British forces

“do tread the measures of their tragic march,”

victory smiles upon their “painful traffic,” and bestows upon them the bloody glory of success. Though the foetid vapours and putrefic malaria of the Black Death had swept with mysterious and

relentless destructiveness through the land, prosperity seemed to favour the sovereign who had so encouraged industrial pursuits as to welcome and befriend those skilled in the processes of textile manufactures. "The Order of the Garter" (1344) had been instituted within the castle of Windsor, which, under the careful eye of William Wykeham, had lately been built as a fit residence for an English sovereign, with a pageant of unparalleled grandeur, and a liberality and gorgeousness such as had never before been seen in the memory of man. The Commons of England were gaining a voice in public affairs, and, acting on the maxim that "the sovereign's exigencies are the subjects' chances," were striving after a constitutional form of government, and the realization of a distinct and self-contained nationality.

Would we be far wrong, remembering the tradition of the occasion of its origin, to suppose that the "Court of Love" was suggested to the young poet by the grand ongoing of the institution of the Order of the Garter, and that it was intended as a delicate allusion to, and celebration of, the splendid ceremony with which it was inaugurated? We know that the court was not entirely insensible to literary merit; for Queen Philippa was the patroness of Froissart (whose "Chronicles," extending from 1326—1400, rather more than cover the entire era of Chaucer's life), and that he held an office in the household of Edward III.; we have besides good reason to believe that Chaucer, though mainly valued on account of his excellent and rare business capacity, was somewhat favoured, too, in consideration of his poetical abilities. But of this more anon!

Perhaps the next occupation of our author was the translation of the "*De Consolatione Philosophiæ*" of Boethius—a work previously translated into Saxon by Alfred the Great, and subsequently into modernized English by Elizabeth,—the favourite classic of that age, and a favourable specimen of the prose style of this "garmaner of Englishe rude." To this period, also, is generally ascribed the production of "*Troilus and Cresseide*," a work of singular excellence, as might indeed be inferred, if from nought else, that its rhythm and rhyme have been imitated during Shakespeare's apprenticeship to the muses, in "*The Rape of Lucrece*," and in 1609 was made the foundation of one of his favourite plays. Chaucer seems at this time to have been diligently and purposely engaged in the polishing and modulation of the English tongue. This is made particularly evident from the anxiety which the poet exhibits towards the conclusion of the poem, regarding his work, and how it might be transcribed or recited, saying,—

"And, for; there is so great diversitie
In English and in writing of our tong,
So pray I God that none miswrite thee,
Ne thee mis-metre for default of tong.
And redde wherso thou be or else song
That thou be understood, God I beseech.
But yet to purpose of my rather [early] speech."

This poem is still further interesting, because it enables us to have a glimpse at the companions Chaucer at this time had, and what sort of men he valued in the days of his youth. This we learn from the following dedicatory lines :—

“ O moral Gower, this booke I direct
To thee and to the *philosophical* Strood,
To vouchésauf there need is to correct
Of your benignities and zealés good.”

The friends here referred to were men of condition and repute, with whom he had acquired acquaintanceship, perhaps in Oxford, or at the Inns of Court. The former is a famed contemporary poet, and the latter a “most excellent philosopher,” whom, in after days, Chaucer intrusted with the upbringing of his favourite son. We may further infer, from the double and distinctly specific ascription, that its author was pretty equally divided between philosophy and poetry, at the same time that we learn most expressly that a larger ambition animated his breast; for the following are the terms in which he dismisses his literary labour :—

“ Go, litel booke! Go, litel tragedie,
There God my Maker yet ere that I die,
So send me might to make some comedie.
But, litel booke, make thou thee none envie,
But subject ben unto all poesie;
And kiss the steps whereas thou seest pace,
Of Virgil, Ovid, Homer, Lucan, Stace.”

Chaucer, as we learn from the preceding quotation, was not unacquainted with the best classics procurable in his day; he was conversant also with the works of many of the Latin Fathers, the Schoolmen, and the mediæval Romanticists. His erudition appears to have been not only wide but deep. The plot of “Troilus and Cresseide” is, he informs us, taken from Lollius (an author of whom nothing is *now* known). It is similar in outline to the “Filistrato” of Bocaccio, who mentions the story as having its original in Greek. Translation is almost invariably the form in which art influences a language; and imitativeness, no less than originality, belong to the true poet. Dante, addressing Virgil, says :—

“ It is from thee alone that I derive
The graceful style which gains me such applause.”

Dante (1265—1321), Petrarch (1304—1374), and Bocaccio (1312—1375) undoubtedly influenced Chaucer and his contemporaries; the Elizabethan writers were touched by the music of Tasso (1544—1575), and Ariosto (1474—1533). Corneille, Racine, and Molière, affected the age of the Restoration; the writers who flourished up till the time “when George the Third was king,” stimulated the German school, which, beginning with Klopstock, culminated in Goethe; and these again wrought upon Scott, Words-

worth, and Byron; and in all these ages translation preceded actual originality, and transplanting preceded propagation. Chaucer was not, therefore, singular in the mode he took for working out an acceptable national speech, by reproducing reputed and reputable poems from the Latin, French, or Italian, rather than by throwing the whole energy of his thought into new poems of his own. By the former method he asked acceptance for the *language* only, yet prepared the way for the introduction, in good time, of a fresh and home-grown literature, such as the age required, national in thought, feeling, allusiveness, and speech.

It was a far-thoughted and patriotic purpose to detach his native country from intellectual dependence upon France; to supply an instrument for the interchange of opinion, the promulgation of knowledge, and the business wants of society, which should be the nation's own, one not borrowed from aliens and enemies, and to provide a vesture for thought in which the bounding and abounding life, energy, and intellect of his age might dress itself, and be known as distinct and different from that country with whom England was waging war. It was courtierly, too, thus to second the desire of the king's heart, by a move of so resistless a nature, and by an agency so effectual. It was a wise and diplomatic scheme, furthering at once the best interests of the nation, his own fame, and the policy of his sovereign. So, for the promotion of his design, he translated into "numbers touched with harmony," some of the more popular classic tales, that the language might be purified and individualized; and that the disjunction of the nations might be facilitated, he took one of the most popular of French poems, "The Romaunt of the Rose," and transferred its wondrous allegories into the form of speech current in his days. He thus not only complied with, but led and directed the spirit of the time, gratified his own taste, and extended his own fame, while he cultivated, by assiduous labour, the power of expression, and the polish of diction.

It is probable that Chaucer kept always within the range of court, and had a due diplomatic acquaintanceship with its modes, fashions, and ongoings; for about this time he was the recognized friend and associate of King Edward's third son, John of Gaunt, then Earl of Richmond, though subsequently Duke of Lancaster, who married (Blanche, afterwards mother of Henry IV.), 19th May, 1359. In celebration of the courtship of this pair, Chaucer had produced a poem, entitled "The Parliament of Birds," a fanciful allegory. "The Complaint of the Black Knight," a defence of Gaunt from some aspersions thrown on his character; and "The Dream of the Dutchesse," an epithalamium on the union of John and Blanche, are also referable to this period. The minuteness with which Chaucer describes the localities of Woodstock has given rise to the supposition that he resided there,—

"Within a lodge out of the way,
Beside a well in a forest,"—

and was a retainer of the happy bridegroom, whom he accompanied to France in the autumn of 1359, in a military capacity, along with the army of Edward III., one of the greatest and best which had then left the English coasts.

A hundred thousand men, in a thousand ships, left England,—in the capital of which the king of France was then a prisoner,—and landing at Calais, marched with triumphant, though hardily resisted tread, as far as Rheims, in which Edward III. hoped to place upon his brow the sovereign circlet of France. The place was well fortified, and defended bravely. Edward beleaguered it awhile, but ultimately raised the siege and retired—losing *prestige*, however, by the act—to try his success on Paris. Here the fates were equally unpropitious, and he fell back towards Brittany. Hunger, fatigue, superstition, and storm fought against him. As he became depressed, the French got elated, and though unable to venture into the open field, they endeavoured by harassments in flank and rear to secure the chance of victory their new allies had given them. In one of these forays, near the town of Retiers, in Brittany, Chaucer had the sad hap to be taken prisoner. This, in addition to his own share of the former hardships, was a sufficiently bitter taste of war's woes. How long his fortitude and powers of endurance were tried by captivity, we cannot tell; but we hope that the peace of Bretigny, signed in 1360, would, among other things, secure his freedom.

In "The Dream of the Dutchesse," Chaucer indicated that a lady had charmed his heart; and we learn that on 12th September, 1366, a pension of ten marks (£120) was granted to Philippa Chaucer, one of the ladies of Queen Philippa's household; so that we must suppose he was married prior to this date, and was now leaving, or had already left, her Majesty's service. The wife of Chaucer was, according to the best authorities, Philippa Pyckard, daughter of Sir Payne Pyckard de Rouet, Guienne king-at-arms, sister of Katherine Swyneford née Pyckard of Rouet, and subsequently wife of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, and Regent of Guienne; and of that Henry Pyckard, Lord Mayor of London, who had welcomed the Black Prince with the captive King John, on their arrival from France after the battle of Poitiers. The duties he performed meanwhile may be guessed at from the next notice we have of him as receiving—June 20th, 1367—from the king, for former and future service, under the designation of "our well-beloved yeoman," (*dilectus valettus noster*), an annuity of twenty marks (£240). On Christmas, 1368, his wife received a robe in gift from the queen. In 1369 both Queen Philippa and the Lady Blanche of Lancaster died, and Chaucer wrote a lament for the latter, entitled "The Death of Blanche the Dutchesse." On 20th June, 1370, he received letters of protection from the king, that he might go abroad, though for what purpose we know not, in his service. In 1372, a more important commission for him [and for us] was intrusted to him, viz., to form, along with John de Mari and James Pronam, a committee of

investigation in Genoa, regarding the English port, which might be most advantageously used by the Genoese in furtherance of their commercial pursuits. While occupied with this mission, it is said that Chaucer had the good fortune to be introduced to

"Francis Petrark, the laureat poet,
Highte this clerk, whose rhetoric sweete
Enalumined all itaille of poetrie,"

and there to have heard from "the lover of Laura" the tale of the patient "Griselda." This is neither impossible nor improbable—indeed, quite the opposite. Petrarch was then (1370-4) residing, an industrious invalid, at Padua, and had completed his version of Boccaccio's famous story from Italian into Latin—published under the title, "A Myth on Wifely Obedience and Fidelity,"—in June, 1373. Nothing could be more natural than that the chief poet of England should endeavour to see "the first real restorer of polite letters,—him who gave purity, elegance, and stability to the Italian language." Now, as Chaucer was seemingly not well versed in Italian, is it at all unlikely that their conversation would be holden in Latin, of his proficiency in which Petrarch prided himself, and Chaucer had no need to be ashamed? In the currency of such talk, what more probable than that Dante and Boccaccio should become the subjects of mutual criticism, and that Petrarch should reckon it a privilege to rehearse his version of his friend yet rival's beautiful and unexceptionable story, and that thus "he learned at Padowe" the tale he has embalmed in ever-living verse, in his favourite metre, and with the utmost elegance of style, regarding the patience and fidelity of "Griselda." The thought of such an intercommunication and fraternization is too sweet to be lightly given up, and we cling to the belief most fondly, though we trust not irrationally. Chaucer returned to home and country in February, 1374, and on the 19th of July Petrarch was found in his library, with a book before him, dead, "his wordes and his work" done, and remembrance of him only left for the world. There is surely some trait of personal grief in the kindly way Chaucer speaks of him, and in the attachment to his notice of the interview of the morale, which reads like an involuntary and self-referent sigh,—

"But Deothe, that wol not suffre us dwellen here,
But as it were the twinkling of an eye,
Him now hath slaine, and alle we shal die."

S. N.

Religion.

IS THE BIBLE ALONE A SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE position which I occupy in opening this debate upon the Rule of Faith is, I feel, one of great responsibility. The subject upon which I enter is not of a trivial character, but of vast moment, and is, therefore, "not to be enterprised nor taken in hand unadvisedly," or for mere discussion's sake. If it be a matter of vital importance to the mariner that he should be furnished with chart and compass of sufficient correctness to guide him across the pathless, perilous deep, then it is also a matter of vital importance that the voyagers on the perilous flood of time should have a chart and compass to guide them, and such as they can rely upon, that they make not shipwreck of their soul; in other words, they should have a rule by which their moral life may be directed both as to matters of faith and practice, and they should understand clearly where that rule is to be found.

It is evident, and will be conceded by my opponent, and, therefore, needs no demonstration, that the light of nature, or reason and conscience, are not capable of guiding men aright through this world to a better. If there be a God, then it is reasonable to expect that he would cause a light to shine from heaven upon the darkened paths of men; that he would give unto them a revelation of his will; that he would declare what was necessary to be believed, in order that men might be saved. This reasonable expectation God has fulfilled. He has given us a rule to follow, and our only concern is to discover where that rule is to be found; or, in the words of the proposition which stands at the head of this article—"Whether the Bible *alone* (which, I presume, we all acknowledge to be a revelation from God) is a sufficient Rule of Faith?"

I take my stand, according to the sincere conviction of my heart, upon the affirmative side, and shall be prepared to maintain my position by argument.

In order to clear the way, I think it needful to state what I consider the meaning of terms contained in the proposition before us.

By the term "Bible" I understand those several books of the Old and New Testament, written by divers men in divers ages, but all under the inspiration of the Spirit of God, which, with the sanction of the Christian Church from the earliest times, have been collected together, and designated, by way of dignity, the Bible.

By the term "Rule" I understand a *measure* or standard by

which we may compare or try a thing, thus testing its correctness. A Rule of Faith, therefore, must be that *measure* by which we are to regulate not only the *agenda*, or things to be done, but also the *credenda*, or things to be believed.

Having thus briefly indicated what I consider the meaning of these terms, in order to avoid any further *logomachia*, or battle of words, between myself and my opponents, I advance at once to the subject under debate.

I assert that the Bible alone is a sufficient rule of faith, and I arrive at this conclusion for the following reasons:—1. Because the Bible bears testimony to its own sufficiency as a rule of faith; and the Bible being the word of God, its testimony must be true.

I have already observed that I thought it reasonable to expect that God would give unto man a revelation for his guidance; I further remark that it is also reasonable to expect that God would set his seal upon his own rule, that it might be known to be his, inasmuch as it is a device of the devil to counterfeit the true by the setting forth of the false.

God has indicated the true rule which men are to follow, and this he has done by the inspired pen of the Apostle Paul. Thus:—*"All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works."**

A man cannot go beyond the point of perfection. That rule, therefore, which, if followed, is sufficient to make him perfect,—perfect as to doctrine and practice, must be of itself sufficient, and needeth no additions; but scripture is profitable for doctrine, that the man of God may be furnished unto all good works; scripture, therefore, or the Bible, according to its own testimony, must be "alone a sufficient rule of faith."

The same inspired pen yet again declares, and that more conclusively, writing to Timothy;—"From a child thou hast known the holy scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus."† Now I ask, what is the great end, the aim, the design, the termination of faith? Peter answers the question, and says:—"Receiving the end of your faith, even the SALVATION OF YOUR SOUL." The salvation of the soul then is the great end of faith; and I say, fearless of contradiction, that that rule which maketh a man wise unto salvation is and must be of itself a sufficient rule; but the Holy Scriptures, according to the teaching of the inspired Apostle, are able to make wise unto salvation; they, therefore, must be "alone a sufficient rule of faith."

I might safely hang the whole controversy on these two texts, so explicit are they. But I pass from these, and pass over other texts of a similar kind, to advance my second reason for the conclusion I have arrived at, which is:—

* 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17.

† 2 Tim. iii. 15

2. Because our Saviour made the *written word*, and not any unwritten tradition, the ground of his appeal in all questions of dispute.

Thus when Christ, the lawful Prince of this world, stood face to face with that usurper, the Prince of Darkness, what was the weapon wherewith he smote him? Was it not the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God? Did the devil tempt him to turn the stones into bread? "It is written," was the rebuke given. Did the devil strive to persuade him to tempt God's providence? "It is written again," was the decisive answer returned. Did that evil one try his power once more by causing to flash before his eye the glories of the world, and promising the gift of all these if he would but fall and worship at his feet? "*It is written*," was the repeated reply, and the successful termination of these futile attacks. Thus through the potent pen of inspiration, and not by the voice of tradition, did Christ overcome the devil. It was by an appeal to the written word of God that Christ silenced all his questioning adversaries. Did the Pharisees murmur when they saw him eat with Publicans and sinners? He referred them to the prophet Hosea, where they would find a sufficient vindication of his conduct.

Again, were the disciples of Christ accused by the Pharisees of breaking the sabbath because they had plucked ears of corn on that day? Jesus defended them by referring the Pharisees to the first book of Samuel, saying: "*Have ye not read what David did when he was an hungred?*" &c. Here again the appeal was to the written word of God.

So also when the Pharisees, seeking to entrap him, inquired concerning divorce, he did not refer them to the "*Mishna*," but to the Bible, saying, "*Have ye not read?*" are ye not acquainted with the scriptures? if ye are, then ye ought to have understood the question ye propose for my solution. And not to multiply instances, let us take one example more, which is certainly a case in point. We read that a young man came to him, anxious for the salvation of his soul, and wishing to know what he should do to secure it. Now here was the Bible on the one hand, and here were the traditions of the elders on the other. If he had put his question to the Pharisees, like the Pharisees of modern times, they would have said: Listen to the voice of the Church, adhere strictly to the traditions of the elders, and thou shalt be saved. But what said Christ? "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." And where were these commandments to be found? On the page of God's written word. Yes! whatever may be the case of others, Christ always honoured the scriptures. When he first commenced his ministry, he unrolled the inspired volume, and read aloud some of the prophecies of Isaiah. When tempted by Satan, "*It is written*," and not "*It is spoken*," were the words he used. When his conduct was assailed by the Pharisees, or when his doctrine was called in question by the Sadducees, his appeal was ever to the holy scriptures; and what he did himself, he recommended unto others. If

the Jews had any doubt about the authenticity of his mission, as the Messiah, then said he, "*Search the scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me.*"

If Christ, then, accepted the Bible as a sufficient rule as it regarded himself—if he recommended the Bible as a rule of faith for others, I have the highest authority on my side I could have, and feel myself justified in saying that "the Bible alone is a sufficient rule of faith."

3. My third reason for the conclusion at which I have arrived is, because the Apostle Paul sanctioned that which our Saviour recommended, viz., the investigation of the scriptures for a knowledge of the truth.

The Apostle Paul passed from Thessalonica to Berea, where he entered the synagogue, and taught. The Jews heard attentively the word he spake. They were not hasty in their conclusion, but compared the doctrines of the Apostle with the revelations of the written word, and finding a harmony between them, they embraced the Christian faith. Now these people brought the teaching of the Apostle to the test. They had a rule, and to that rule they appealed, and were glad when they found the teaching of the Apostle agreed with that. But what did the Apostle say to all this? Did he tell those Bereans that they had no right to possess copies of the Bible; that they had still less right "to search them daily;" that it was not for them to interpret scripture, that they must receive all that he said as true, and ask no questions about it; that they were to resign their reason to his keeping, and trouble themselves no more with investigation; was this the language of St. Paul?

This would have been the language of those who have boasted themselves to be somebody in later ages; but Paul was "the least of the Apostles," "one born out of due season." A humble man was he; while the others claim to be God's vicegerent, Christ's vicar upon earth, yea, enthroned as God, to receive the homage of idolatrous multitudes. But what of the Bereans, who made the Bible their sole Rule of Faith? It is written, "*These were more noble than those of Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the scriptures daily, whether those things were so.*"

4. I advance, as a further reason for the conclusion I have come to, the fact that the early fathers of the Christian Church acknowledged the sufficiency of the Scripture as a Rule of Faith.

Thus we learn from St. Hierom that there were heretics in those days, who spake (as the Roman Catholics speak in our day) and said, "We are the sons of the wise, who did from the beginning deliver down to us the apostolical doctrine." But what was the declaration of the father himself? It was this:—"That the true sons of Judah adhere to the Scriptures." Can a Protestant go further than this?

St. Chrysostom testifies to the clearness of the Scriptures on all essential points, saying:—"All things in the Divine Scriptures are plain and straight. Whatsoever things are necessary, are manifest."

This declaration is confirmed by the Roman Catholic historian, Dupin, who observes, "that the perusal (of the Bible) seldom causes any but the learned to fall into error; and that generally the simple have found in the Scriptures only instruction and edification."

St. Austin further declares the Bible's sufficiency when he writes: "Among those things which are plainly set down in Scripture, *all those things are to be found which comprehend faith and good manners.*"

The judgment of Constantine, as pronounced before the Council of Nice, was this; that "the books of the Evangelists and Apostles, and the oracles of the old prophets, do evidently teach us what we are to think of the Divine Majesty. Therefore, laying aside all seditious contention, let us determine the matters in question by testimonials out of the Divine writing."

What says *Irenæus* upon the point in dispute? "The method of our salvation we have not known by any others but those men by whom the gospel came to us, which then they preached; *but afterwards, by the will of God, delivered it to us in the Scriptures, to be for the future the foundation and pillar of our faith.*"

What says *Tertullian*? "Let *Hermogenes*, out of his storehouse of learning, show that it is written. If it be not written, let him fear that woe which is destined for those who either add to, or detract from, the Scriptures."

Out of the many that might be brought forward, I will call upon only one more witness, and that shall be *St. Cyprian*. What says he? Being opposed with an argument from tradition, he demands, "Whence have you that tradition? Comes it from the authority of the Lord, and of the Gospel, or from the Epistles of the Apostles? For God testifies that we are to do those things which are written, &c. If it be commanded in the Gospel, or contained in the Epistles or Acts of the Apostles, then let us observe it as a Divine and holy tradition."

These citations need no explanation, and no comment;—they are as clear and conclusive as can be. If they are not sufficient in numbers, then consult the unanswerable treatise of Tillotson, on the "Rule of Faith," from which source these quotations are mostly drawn, and you will find plenty and to spare. If it be objected that I have drawn from this writer, instead of going to the original, then I answer, You have to do with the citations themselves, and not my means of procuring them. Prove, what no one has yet proved, that the quotations are false, and my proposition falls to the ground. But if you cannot do this, be careful how you despise the voice of these ancient worthies, whom you profess to esteem. Ye who venerate the unauthenticated relics of the departed, cast from their jewelled shrines those trifles they contain, and learn to venerate rather *the opinions* of the holy fathers of the early Church, and enshrine *them* in your memory; and if you are not prepared to brand those fathers as heretics, then you must be prepared to assert

with them that "The Bible only is a sufficient Rule of Faith," for such we have found them to declare.

I have now consulted the mind of God upon this fundamental subject under dispute. I have found that His *written word* bears clear and decisive testimony to its own sufficiency as a Rule of Faith. I have shown that it was the practice of our great example, Jesus Christ, to appeal to the Scriptures in all matters of dispute; and that he recommended the study of the Scriptures to those who were in doubt as to the truthfulness of his mission. I have pointed out the fact that those who brought the teaching of the Apostle Paul to the test of the written word, and who studied the Scriptures in private, were commended for what they did. I have proved that the early Fathers made the Scriptures the ground of their appeal in all religious controversy, and that they acknowledged the excellency and the sufficiency of the written word. With such an array of witnesses at my side, I can take a bold and determined stand against those who would detract from the dignity and authority of God's own Book, by denying that it is of itself a sufficient Rule of Faith. Let my opponents silence the Spirit of God; silence Christ; silence his Apostles; silence the early Fathers of the Christian Church; and then, and not till then, will they silence me. H. B.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

AMONG the many topics which are the subject of controversy between Catholics and Protestants, there is, perhaps, not one which receives so little attention at the hands of the latter, as that of the Rule of Faith. And this is the more remarkable, since here is the very root of the differences which unhappily exist between us; so that, until this question is settled, it is quite useless to discuss others. Everything which is believed by either must be ultimately referred to the authority upon which it is believed. If a Protestant is asked for a proof of the doctrine of the Atonement, he instantly refers you to the Bible—his sole Rule of Faith. If a Catholic be asked the same question, he refers to the Church.

Here, then, is the explanation of the division of Catholic and Protestant. One rests his faith upon a book; the other, upon a body of men.

But Protestants are, in general, much more ready to argue about transubstantiation or indulgences than the Rule of Faith; and for the simple reason, that one is so much easier than the other,—since they do possess some documentary evidence respecting the former, while they are totally destitute of any divine proofs of the latter. They habitually overlook any discrepancy in their own line of argument, and are usually only anxious to bring the Catholic to the test of the Bible, or rather—what is really the fact—their own interpretation of it.

The Church of England, in her Sixth Article, expresses most fully and clearly the Protestant belief on the subject. "Holy Scripture

containeth all things necessary to salvation ; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation."

The concise and popular method of expressing the rule—"The Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants"—has passed into a "text;" and is quoted against "Papists" and "Puseyites," in sermons, lectures, books, and newspapers, as quite indisputable; indeed, from the manner in which some use it, one would really suppose that it was a veritable text of Scripture, instead of being merely the dictum of one of the greatest religious weather-cocks that ever lived, viz., Chillingworth.

I propose to prove, in the following article, that the Bible only is not a sufficient Rule of Faith, for four reasons; and I confine myself to the consideration of only this much of the question, as I should otherwise greatly exceed the limits which must govern writers in this Magazine. My reasons are—

- I. The Bible was never intended to be the only Rule of Faith.
- II. The Bible was not at first regarded as the only Rule of Faith.
- III. The adoption of this Rule in the early ages was, humanly speaking, impossible.
- IV. As a matter of fact, Protestants do not make it their only Rule of Faith.

I. The Bible was never intended to be the only rule. Had it been so, we should have had some record of the fact in the Book itself. But what is the state of the case? You will not find the slightest hint, either from our Lord, or from his apostles, which would lead us to infer that Christianity was to be promulgated by means of any book, or rather, by the series of books of which the Bible is composed. Instead of sending his apostles armed with Bibles, our Lord commissioned them to "*preach the gospel to every creature.*" The idea of compiling a book, which should contain all Christ's doctrines, never seems to have entered the minds of the Apostles. Had they believed, or could have possibly believed, that which Protestants now assert, that nothing but an inspired volume was to enlighten the world on the subject of Christianity, they would have taken the utmost care to commit to writing all the words and all the commands of our Lord, and to diffuse the book containing them throughout the world, to the utmost of their power; and to some church which they founded, they would have addressed epistles containing such clear summaries of Christian doctrine, that no schism could possibly have occurred.

But that all our Lord's sayings were not recorded, is proved, uncontestably, by St. John, who distinctly declares that "there are also many other things which Jesus did, which, if they were written every one, the world, I think, would not be able to contain the books which should be written." St. John xxi. 25. Nor is there the slightest ground for supposing that the Epistles supply this deficiency.

All the books of which the New Testament is composed are

simply four Gospels, several letters to churches and individuals, a record of some of the travels of St. Peter and St. Paul, and a book of Revelations. The Apostles, so far from considering a written rule absolutely necessary, neglected entirely, with the exception of two of their number, to record a single word or act of our Lord. Two of the Gospels are by parties who were not apostles at all. One of the writers (St. Luke), who probably never in his life saw our Lord, writes only at the instance of a friend, who wished to know something of the history of Him whose religion St. Luke professed. And even St. John, the beloved disciple, actually defers writing *his* Gospel until within six years of his own death, when his labours were finished, and his course nearly run. His Epistles are limited to three very short ones, neither of them containing much information respecting Christianity; and one of them merely a private letter. St. Peter, the chief among the Apostles, writes no gospel at all; neither has he written anything, but two short Epistles. Fourteen out of the twenty-one Epistles contained in the New Testament were written by one who was neither of the twelve, nor an immediate disciple of our Lord; and a cursory perusal of these writings will suffice to convince any one, not disposed to prejudge the question, that scarcely any of them would have been written at all, but for the existence of abuses in the churches to which they were addressed.

And so far were the Apostles from believing, or having any anticipation of their writings becoming the sole Rule of Faith to a body of Christians, that St. Paul absolutely refrains from writing on some subjects, on the ground that he would be able to express himself more fully and satisfactorily when present. In 2 Cor. xi. 34, he says, after giving several directions concerning the government of that church: "The rest I will set in order *when I come*;" clearly meaning that if he had been with them, he would not have written at all. Again, in writing to Timothy (1 Ep. iii. 14), "These things write I unto thee, hoping that I shall come unto thee shortly." St. John, in his third Epistle, chap. i. 13, 14, says: "I have many things to write unto thee, but I would not with pen and ink write unto thee. But I hope speedily to see thee, and we will *speake face to face*." Of course it will be admitted that what St. Paul would say to the Corinthians and to Timothy, and what St. John would say to Gaius, would be quite as much inspired as what they wrote; and from the tenor of these Epistles, we may conclude that the most important things were not touched upon in the letters at all; again demonstrating that these Apostles never intended their writings to be the guides of any but those to whom they addressed them; and even then only under peculiar circumstances.

In Heb. i. 2, St. Paul says: "(God) hath in these days *spoken*," *not written*, "to us by His Son." In Matt. xxviii., Christ does not say, "Go, write Bibles to all nations," but "Go, *teach* all nations." In St. Luke x. 16, he does not say, "He that readeth, or heareth the Scripture, heareth me," but "He that *heareth you*, heareth me."

In Matt. xviii. 17, he does not say, "He that will not *read the Scripture*," but "He that will not *hear the Church*, let him be unto thee as a heathen man, and a publican."

What is to me quite conclusive in the matter, and to which I would particularly direct the attention of Protestants, is this important fact,—that every single Epistle which we possess was addressed to *Christians already fully instructed in the faith*;—persons to whom a volume of doctrinal instruction was perfectly unnecessary.

II. The Bible was not at first regarded as the only Rule of Faith. This is so obvious, as scarcely to need any illustration. The practice of the Apostles is a complete confirmation of it. Our Lord, shortly after he began to preach, sent forth seventy disciples, and not one of them was supplied with any document whatever. Their mission was to *preach*; not to distribute Bibles. Our Lord himself preached. He wrote no new law. Most of his Apostles wrote no books; nor did they direct their followers to do so either. St. Paul, writing to Timothy, does not tell him to record carefully, in writing, what had been delivered to him; but, "The things which thou hast *heard* of me, before many witnesses, the same commend to faithful men, who shall be fit to *teach* others also," 2 Tim. ii. 2. And in his first Epistle to Timothy, he several times repeats, "These things teach and exhort;" "These things command and teach." 1 Tim. vi. 2; iv. 11, &c., &c. This hardly bears out the Protestant theory.

We find, too, the early Christians utterly opposed to writing down anything at all, lest it should be made a subject for mockery by the pagans. All their instructions were by word of mouth. When a pagan desired to become a Christian, he was not furnished with a Bible (indeed, it would have been impossible to supply him with one, as the books of which it consists were not collected for four hundred years after the ascension of our Lord), but was sent to the clergy, and instructed in some of the primary doctrines of Christianity; nor was he fully instructed until he had been baptized for some length of time; and even then no Bible was given to him. Probably one of the Gospels, or one or two Epistles which the church to which the convert belonged possessed, were lent or read to him; but certainly nothing further, in the way of written teaching, was supplied to any one. And from the extreme paucity of the Epistles, and the small number of writers, may we not conclude that the early Christians, when it was discovered what use the pagans made of their writings, were instructed to commit to writing nothing but what was strictly necessary?

A single fact, worth hundreds of arguments, may be mentioned. The whole of the then known world was converted during the first four hundred years, entirely without the Bible. Nor do we find a single writer, prior to the Reformation, advocating or broaching the opinion now held by Protestants, that the Bible was, or ought to be, the sole Rule of Faith.

III. The adoption of this rule in the early ages was, humanly speaking, impossible—impossible to have been the rule during the first century, as the Bible was not complete; and equally impossible during the first four centuries, since the books composing the New Testament were not collected into one volume, and very few copies of individual books existed, and these written, of course, with the pen. We have no evidence, nor have we, consequently, any right to assume, that any portion of the Bible was, during that period, translated into any language, to facilitate the spread of Christianity. Would this have been neglected by the Apostles and their followers, had they been Protestants? Until the art of printing had been invented, it was practically impossible to multiply copies of the Bible to the extent which, on Protestant grounds, it would have been required for the evangelization of the world. And during the first fourteen hundred years of Christianity, the labour of translating the Bible was so great, that copies of it were rarely seen, except in monasteries, and other religious houses, or in the residences of opulent men.

Now, if it had been the intention of our Lord to have had his religion diffused by means of the Protestant Rule of Faith, would he not have devised some means for carrying out his will? Either he would have suggested himself (I speak with all possible reverence), or have inspired some of his followers with the idea of printing, or, if possible, with a still more expeditious means of supplying the world with a book which should contain all that he wished to be known of the religion which he taught. He imparted to his Apostles the gift of tongues, and they were, therefore, able to supply the world with true translations of the book.

Let Protestants decide for themselves how far the result has fulfilled the original intention of our Lord, if it was what they would have us believe.

IV. As a matter of fact, Protestants do not adhere to the Bible as their only rule. If I succeed in proving this proposition, I presume none of the Protestant readers of the *British Controversialist* will be disposed to prolong the discussion. For if they themselves, in any particular, positively ignore the only rule by which they will permit their religion to be judged, and by which they affect to judge others, it plainly shows that the question we are discussing is decided by their own practice, notwithstanding any assertion to the contrary.

What Protestant was ever taught his religion by the Bible alone? Was he not in his childhood first instructed by his parents, at school by teachers, and later by tutors who, whenever he met with passages which clashed with his Protestantism, gave him their interpretation of it? The Bible, in the hands of young persons, is a mere history. The theology which it contains is incomprehensible to them. And not until his religious convictions are formed, the Bible is to him an enigma. He is taught in his childhood that there is a God, the creator of all, and that He is

one in three persons. But where do they find this fundamental truth of Christianity laid down? Is it sufficient for them to go backwards and forwards, from verse to verse, and chapter to chapter, and stringing together several texts, declare that they sufficiently prove the doctrine of the Trinity? What says the Unitarian? Why, that the Bible teaches the very reverse. Such is the decision to which he comes in his examination of the Sacred Volume. He finds nothing whatever respecting the three persons in one God, nor any proof of the divinity of the Son: but many texts speaking of the absolute *Unity* of God; and others, such as "My Father is greater than I;" "I live by the Father;" "My work is to do the will of Him that sent me:" texts which seem to imply that the Son is inferior to, and dependent upon the Father. It is, of course, utterly useless to quote in support of the Trinity the solitary text, "There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. And these three are one;" for he will immediately, and with a considerable display of reason, object to the genuineness of the words which proclaim the unity of the three persons. And he will also tell, what is moreover strictly true, that the dogma of the Trinity is nowhere explicitly laid down in Scripture: and declare that it is a Romish corruption, and mention the date when the Church defined the corruption. (A.D. 325.) Protestants have been content to take this, as well as whatever else is *positive* in their creed, in trust from the Catholic Church.

The observance of Sunday is nowhere commanded, although that of Saturday is. Yet Protestants, while professing to believe and practice nothing but what the Bible sanctions, ignore the scriptural command to keep the Jewish sabbath, and that, "*from even to even*," and follow the traditions of the Catholic Church by observing the Sunday instead. And it must also be observed, that although we have scriptural evidence, though very slight, that the Apostles and their followers hallowed in some way the Sunday, yet there is not the slightest hint, nor have we any right to expect it, since most of the Christians at that time were Jews, that the observance of the sabbath was neglected. It most probably died out with other Jewish observances, such, for instance, as circumcision, which was most certainly practised, and to some extent insisted upon, by St. Peter. But where is the Protestant authority for neglecting Saturday? I challenge them to produce one.

It is a common practice with most Protestants to baptize infants; but what scriptural proof exists that the Apostles even admitted one not arrived at years of discretion to baptism? or what command is to be found for the practice? The Baptists, grounding this portion of their belief upon four or five isolated texts, assert that it is absurd to require or expect a profession of faith from one who is utterly unable to comprehend the most simple article of that faith; also, that as our Lord has said, "he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved," it is evident that belief, or faith, must precede baptism; children, not being capable of believing, are neither capable of being

baptized. Protestants are again, in this instance, manifestly guilty of departing from their own rule of faith.

In Acts xv. 29, there is a clear command to "abstain from eating blood, and things strangled." How many Protestants obey this?

In St. John xiii., our Lord commands his followers, that "if they would be his disciples, they must wash one another's feet." Nor should they receive what they term the sacrament, "in the morning, but as Christ and his disciples received it, in the evening, and after supper.

In St. James v. 14, 15, there is a command that if there are any sick, they shall send for the presbyters,* and shall *anoint them with oil*, and if the sick man be in sins, they shall be forgiven him; and the prayer of faith shall save him. How many Protestants obey this behest, or ever think of resorting to such means of salvation, either of soul or body? The Catholic Church has always, and does still practise it, and terms it "extreme unction."

I think it will be admitted, in the instances I have adduced—and I could assuredly multiply them—that Protestants reject some things which are contained in Scripture, and profess others that are nowhere discoverable in that book.

In conclusion, I will ask my opponents to point out a single clear text, that in the remotest manner supports their theory. I ask not for a text which says that the *Old Testament*, by testifying of the Messiah, is able to make him who studies it wise unto salvation; nor a text which commends persons for testing the truth of our Lord's mission, by searching the *Old Testament* scriptures; nor yet one which advises Jews to search those books, the authority of which they admit, for proofs of the same; but a single clear passage that informs us that adhesion to a written rule, of which the *New Testament* forms part, is our only hope of salvation, and divergence from the meaning of that book, a heresy.

POPE GREGORY.

Politics.

OULD THE INDIAN OPIUM TRADE TO BE SUPPRESSED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

OF all narcotics, none produce such powerful, mysterious, and fatal effects on man as opium, the inspissated juice of the white poppy. Small doses stimulate and intoxicate; the frequent repetition requires increase of quantity to produce the desired exhilaration, and soon results in loss of digestive power, decline of vital

* This is the word in the original Greek. In the Protestant translation it is "elders;" in the Catholic, "priests."

energy, derangement of the nervous system, and premature death, after ten years' indulgence in the fascinating vice. The fitful and distorted activity given to the intellect at first is succeeded by listless dreaminess, and soon sinks down into hopeless idiocy. The basest passions are stirred up, and, according to the temperament, appear in disgusting sensuality or fierce cruelty. All sense of honour or duty, and every natural affection, is lost, and the whole nature, physical and moral, is enthralled by the new-created, uncontrollable appetite or craving for more of the destructive narcotic. In the vain attempt to satisfy this feeling of want, and to allay the pain of attendant disease, the wretched victim will sacrifice fortune, family, character, and even commit theft and murder, to obtain the drug. So powerful is this appetite, that, if once fixed, it can hardly ever be cured: the strong-willed Anglo-Saxon can rarely master it, much less the feeble Asiatic.

For ages Christendom has proudly expressed pity and contempt for the infatuated opium eaters of Turkey, attributing to Mahomet's prudent prohibition of alcoholic liquors the existence of a form of intemperance more debasing and less remediable than any that prevails in the West. Strange that during the present century its most enlightened nation should have lent its wealth, science, and arms, to transport the opium mania to the far East! Under these auspices, the vice has extended so readily and so rapidly, that among the tribes of India and China there may now be found a million victims for every thousand that disgrace Western Asia.

All who have described the state and customs of the six hundred millions that inhabit India and China have given unanimous testimony that intemperance was not found among their vices; but, shortly after the English had obtained power, the attempt was made to reproduce the European system of deriving revenue from intemperance, with this essential difference, that while at home there might have been a propriety in taxing already existing habits, in the East they had to be originated and fostered in order ultimately to obtain the revenue. For some years the servants of the East India Company traded in intoxicants as individuals, for their own personal benefit, protected by a system of restrictions, limitations, and prohibitions, which produced bloodshed, confusion, and distress in districts that had flourished in peace under the native rulers. At length the attention of the Court of Directors at home was awakened to these abuses, and in 1773 the opium monopoly was assumed by the Indian Government, since which time the direct responsibility of the evils resulting therefrom has rested upon it; though the Government and people of this country cannot plead exemption from the guilt, for they might have successfully resisted any such measures; on the contrary, they have remained indifferent spectators of deeds entirely at variance with the national profession of justice and fair dealing.

The evils of the trade in opium may be considered under three aspects,—1st. As they affect the people of India; 2nd, as they

inflict injury on China; and, 3rd, in their effects upon the commerce and influence of England.

I. The character and results of the growth of opium in India.

The history of the means adopted by the Company to obtain a supply of the drug, and the laws and penalties devised to secure the monopoly of it, presents a host of injuries inflicted upon the peasantry, in their fields, families, and morals, that forcibly call to mind the workings of the Inquisition. The changeless character of Indian agriculture was forcibly broken, and the rich plains of Bengal, that had produced rice, sugar, silk, and cotton for two thousand years, were covered, by compulsion, with the poppy. Its growth, and the gathering, inspissating, storing, and delivering of its juice, was watched by corrupt and oppressive officials, lest any portion should be lost to the Company. The poverty of the producers has been proverbial; for besides the precarious nature of the growth of a delicate plant, for which the climate is not favourable, scarce one-third of the price paid by the Government ever reaches the peasant.

Though direct compulsion has ceased, and the laws regulating the growth, &c., have been lately much modified, still they are most severe, as they must ever be so long as the article is so high in price, and the monopoly remains entire. About one hundred thousand acres of rich land in Bengal are thus occupied; and yet only furnish two-thirds of the whole quantity sold by the Company: the remainder being grown in Malwa, and the subsidiary Rajpoot states, under stringent treaties, by which all they export must pass through the hands of the Company, and pay a high duty.

It is impossible, even if it were attempted, to prevent the use of opium where it is grown. The vast population of India has been already demoralized by this and other intoxicants, produced and sold by licence from the Government. Mr. Sym, who was eleven years at Gorakhpore, an opium district, writing in 1840, says:—"The health and morals of the people suffer from the production of opium. Wherever it is grown it is eaten, and the more it is grown the more it is eaten. We are demoralizing our own subjects in India; one-half of the crime in the opium districts, murders, rapes, and affrays, have their origin in opium eating. Both Hindoos and Mussulmen eat the drug, and its pernicious effects are visible, particularly in the neighbourhood of the depôts. One opium cultivator demoralizes a whole village."

In the last volume of Parliamentary papers on the Opium question, may be found a remarkable memorandum of Mr. St. George Tucker, who twice filled the office of Chairman of the Court of Directors. It is as follows:—

"Ever since I had the honour of being a member of this Court, I have uniformly and steadily opposed the encouragement given to the extension of the manufacture of opium; but of late years we have pushed it to the utmost height, and disproportionate prices

were given for the article in Malwa. We contracted burdensome treaties with the Rajpoot states, to introduce and extend the cultivation of the poppy. We introduced the article into our own districts, where it had not been cultivated before, or where the cultivation had been abandoned; and we gave our revenue officers an interest in extending the cultivation in preference to other produce much more valuable and deserving of encouragement. *Finally, we established retail shops, which brought it to every man's door.* How different was the policy of Lord Cornwallis, Lord Teignmouth, Lord Wellesley, and Lord Minto, who circumscribed the produce within the narrowest limits, confining the cultivation of the poppy to two of our provinces, and actually eradicating it from districts where it had been previously cultivated. How fatal have been the consequences of a departure from this wise and humane policy! Is there any man still so blind as not to perceive that it has had a most injurious effect upon our national reputation? If a revenue cannot be drawn from such an article, otherwise than by quadrupling the supply, by promoting the general use of the drug, and by placing it within the reach of the lower classes of the people, no fiscal consideration can justify our inflicting upon the Malays and Chinese so grievous an evil."

Is no class has the rapid progress of intemperance become more apparent than among the three hundred thousand Sepoys employed till lately by the Company. If any difficult or dangerous duty was to be done, opium and bang (the juice of the Indian hemp) was freely taken, and no doubt the atrocities committed by these fierce fighters in the Affghan, Burmese, and Chinese wars, and more fearfully in the late mutiny, may be traced, especially in their most horrid forms, to the infuriating power of these drugs. It was in the opium districts that the mutiny raged most terribly, and many of its victims were the very persons whose office it was to encourage the growth and use of the destructive poison.

It is difficult to reconcile these statements with the ordinary notion that opium is mainly sedative. It is true that Turkish opium is possessed of this beneficial quality in a degree that makes it most valuable as a medicine; but Indian opium has in it naturally more of the narcotic or intoxicating quality; and the peculiar processes to which it is subjected in the Company's factories at Patna and other places, where it is specially prepared with a view to the depraved appetite of the consumers, in a great measure unfits it for medical use. According to Sir George Staunton and others acquainted with the process of manufacture, the opium becomes entirely deleterious; it is no longer a medicine, but more intensely a poison.

In trying to estimate the extent of these evils in India, we are sorry to find that it is not only in Bengal that the injurious effects of opium are observable. An ever widening extension of this vice accompanies the British power. On the other side of the Ganges. Oude numbers its victims. In Rees's "Personal Narrative of the

Siege of Lucknow," we read,—“Opium was an article as extensively used in Lucknow as in China, and the sudden deprivation of this drug was most severe upon the poor opium eaters. Many who could not obtain it at the increased rates actually cut their own throats in desperation.”

The introduction of opium to Burmah was strictly prohibited by the native rulers, as it is also in Siam, Japan, and other countries. Dr. Duff, the eminent missionary, states, that since the conquest of Pegu by the English, the cursed vice is fast spreading there.

Mr. Bruce, the superintendent of the tea plantation in Assam, says,—“That dreadful plague, the opium mania, is depopulating this beautiful country, and has degenerated the Assamese from a fine race of people to the most abject, servile, crafty, and demoralized race in India. Few but those who have resided long in this unhappy country know the dreadful and immoral effects which the use of opium produces on the native. He will steal, sell his property, his children, the mother of his children, and finally commit murder, for it.”

Can any one, after these statements, question the truth of a saying of the late Archdeacon Jeffreys, for thirty-four years resident in India, “that for one native we have gained over to our religion, we have made a thousand drunkards”? But what are such considerations, when the profits of the traffic form the largest item of Indian revenue save one, viz., the land tax?

II. We must examine the effects of this opium traffic on the Chinese.

Almost within the last hundred years the only opium taken to China consisted of 200 chests a year, imported by Portuguese merchants from Turkey. This could only be regarded as medicinal, and was freely admitted by the Chinese on payment of a small duty. As soon as the East India Company had assumed the opium trade, they began to carry it to China. Money was borrowed to carry on the trade, and ships were freighted with opium, and sent to China; but so little demand was there for it in China, that the trade never yielded to the Company any considerable profit. As lately as 1781 the Company freighted a vessel with opium to Canton, but was obliged to sell the lot of 1,600 chests at only 200 dollars a chest; and yet even this small quantity, at so low a price, could not then be sold in China, and was re-shipped to the Straits. So slow was the increase of the demand at first, that from 1767 to 1820 (a period of fifty-three years), it only rose from 1,000 to 4,000 chests a year. Though small in quantity at first, the injurious effects upon the people of China soon attracted the attention of the authorities of that country, and in 1800 the trade in opium was declared illegal: the edict assigns reasons for its prohibition—“That it was wasting the time, and destroying the property of the people, and leading them to exchange their silver and commodities for the *vile dirt* brought by the foreigner.” This did not deter the English from still bringing the article; depôts were established in armed vessels at Whampoa,

and afterwards at Macao, and ever since at Lin-tin, at the mouth of the Canton river. Thus has the name of England become dishonourably associated with the most powerful systematized smuggling that has ever appeared in any age. The Chinese continually appealed against this practice to the recognized laws of nations; and having justice on their side, their remonstrances became more and more embarrassing to the East India government. A new policy was adopted, by which the Company ceased to carry opium to China in its own ships, merely manufacturing the drug, of the required quality, and packing it in chests suited to the increasing difficulty of landing it in China; and then selling it by auction at Calcutta and Bombay, to merchants who took the whole risk of the contraband traffic upon themselves; but were, at the same time, bound by the Company not to trade in any opium but theirs. The English authorities were thus enabled, under the thin veil of diplomatic dishonesty, to ignore any direct connection with a trade by which the Chinese have, ever since, been annoyed and injured.

The character of the traffic became increasingly violent and reckless: heavily armed opium clippers brought the drug from India; the receiving ships were strongly manned; and frequently, when the revenue junks of China attacked them, bloodshed was the consequence. Never have British merchants appeared less noble; never have more corruption and violence been mixed up with British trade! It was extended all along the coast; and though its introduction to new districts was invariably attended at first with loss, still the demand was soon created; the vice rapidly extended, and now, instead of 4,000 chests, as in 1820, the enormous number of 80,000 chests have lately been sent into China in one year! The weight of the opium balls so imported to China, in one year, exceeds 10,000,000 lbs., for which £7,000,000 sterling were received from China, in tea, silk, &c., £2,000,000 of which are appropriated by the merchants, the rest by the Company. It is expected that the annual import will soon exceed 100,000 chests.

The mode of using this drug among the Chinese enables them to become intoxicated by a very small quantity. It is not eaten, nor is it smoked, but the fume, produced by the heat of a lamp, is inhaled by the lungs, where it is retained as long as possible, and thus directly affects every delicate nerve in those organs, and enters into the blood which is passing through them. In an instant the blood conveys the poison to the brain, and the whole body and mind is affected. All the fatal effects we have described in speaking of the people of India, are seen in China, only the victims are far more numerous. Though it is impossible to arrive at any exact calculation of their numbers, it is supposed that there are quite four millions of opium drunkards in China. Though they are said to die at the rate of half-a-million each year, their numbers increase. All the sea coast teems with them; the open ports are full of them; and they are fast extending inland. In spite of the cautious policy of the Chinese Government, which has generally avoided conflict

with foreigners, after continued and ineffectual remonstrance, the opium of the English merchants was seized in 1839, by order of the Emperor, and destroyed, to the value of nearly two millions. It is true that the English Government, through Lord Palmerston, had declared that "no protection could be afforded to enable British merchants to violate the laws of the country to which they trade;" it is true that the language of the British people generally was, that "the opium merchants deserved punishment, instead of redress, and would receive reprobation, instead of sympathy;"—the powerful influence of the East India Company, and of the merchants, forced a war with China, in which thirty thousand of the people were slain, chiefly by the Sepoys of the Company. China was prostrated. She paid the compensation demanded. She has not since dared to interfere with the opium traffic; and after twenty years of diplomacy, and two wars, she has been forced, at last, to legalize it.

III. We shall rapidly glance at the influence exercised by the opium trade on the commerce and character of England.

What a magnificent market for every article of British manufacture might have been expected in China! But hitherto little more than two millions' worth a year of British goods have been taken from England by China. The amount does not increase, though every year we receive from China more tea and more silk. The only sufficient reason assigned for this unsatisfactory state of trade is the increasing export of opium from India to China, which excludes British manufactures, and interrupts the proper exchange which would otherwise be established, to the mutual advantage of England and China.

To understand all the bearings of this difficult question, we must keep in view the fact that the English have really two empires,—their Indian dominion being carried on entirely on different principles to those that prevail at home. Frequently the policy and interests of the two Governments have been as completely opposite as if they had represented different nations. Almost at the same time that the Home Government agreed by treaty to discountenance the opium traffic to China, the East Indian authorities had ordered an enlarged growth of the poppy, and were preparing for a greater sale of opium in China. This double policy has given rise to wars with China, which, though carried on in the name of England, were mainly intended to support the East Indian traffic in opium, which has been upheld in preference to the claims of honour and honesty, and the interests of the merchants and people of England. The good name of England has been dishonoured in the eyes of other nations; continual misunderstandings have occurred between the Chinese and ourselves, which could hardly have arisen out of legitimate commerce; instead of obtaining an abundant supply of cotton and sugar from India, we are driven to the slave systems of America and Cuba; the progress of religion is obstructed, both in India and China; and, at home and abroad, every principle of duty and interest requires the suppression of the Indian opium trade.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

A GLANCE at the flaming pamphlets and newspaper correspondence upon this most intricate question at once shows the extent to which the advocates of the suppression of the opium trade are either ill-informed, or misinformed. The thrilling declamation against the iniquity of the trade, and the solemn appeals made to the conscience of the Christian, and the sense of honour in the Briton, do more credit to the heart than to the judgment of the pamphleteer. Their moral sense has been excited by the recital of the miseries of the opium smoker, and shocked that the East India Company should be the monopolists of the traffic in a drug so pernicious in its abuse as opium; and the shock has affected the intellect. Hence, in the ardour of their zeal, they have advocated a course partly impossible, and partly conducive of the indefinite multiplication, not only of the evils deprecated, but of evils not foreseen. Some of them propose the absolute suppression of the traffic; others would tolerate the production of the drug, but forbid the trade in opium; others again would allow the production and the sale, but wish to deprive the government of India of their monopoly in both the cultivation of the poppy and the commerce in the inspissated juice. Each party has been led to the agitation of the question by the desire to accomplish a twofold object, without perceiving that success in one direction was inevitable disappointment in the other. To protect the miserable smoker in China, and to remove the stain from the British Government, through its monopoly, form their double object. If British national connection be the scandal—and of this there can be but one opinion—then to attempt to abolish the monopoly is laudable. If to deprive the Chinese of the means of indulgence in their favourite narcotic be the end proposed, then the object, however impracticable, is sufficiently philanthropic to command the attention of many in this age and country. The agitators have, however, combined the two, without seeing that success in one of them is inevitable defeat in the other. To abolish the monopoly is to remove a national stigma; but, on the well-established principle of free trade, you give the very facility which you wish to destroy. The removal of restrictions upon any article of commerce is the extension of its production, the diminution of its cost, the improvement of its quality, and, consequently, an indefinite increase of its consumption. You save British honour, but, if opium be an evil, you do not benefit China.

If our amiable declaimers can pursue two necessarily antagonistic objects without seeing their incompatibility, we cannot be surprised that they should laugh at the difficulties which beset each of the objects proposed. For years past the Directors of the Company were embarrassed by serious deficits in their revenue. Their only consolation was the rapid increase in the opium traffic. Some five millions of pounds annually flowed into their exchequer from their profits on opium. Twenty millions had been laid down at once to liberate the slaves in our West India islands, and it was proposed

to the Directors that they should sacrifice the five millions from a sense of honour and humanity. Like the West Indian planters, the Company asked for a compensation, and there appeared no Wilberforce to raise the sum required. Statesmen and able financiers saw no mode of extrication, and shrank from the difficulty. The philanthropists were not to be silenced. Uncharitably imputing the obstacle to the heart rather than the head of our ablest legislators, the agitators renewed the agitation from time to time. To compel them to exercise their inventive faculties, the attempt was made to show that the trade was *illegal*. No Company could establish a monopoly without an act of parliament, and no such act, they said, could be produced. The act of 1833, which was passed in the first reformed parliament, and which destroyed the Company's monopoly of trade with China, declared that the East India Company should henceforth cease to be a trading and commercial corporation. This enactment in their renewed charter precluded, it was affirmed, their trade in opium. The law officers of the Crown would not endorse the opinion. In innumerable cases, extending over 150 years, the judges of the land had invariably decided that dealing in the produce of one's own lands was not trading in the eye of the law. Without violating the provisions of their charter, the Company held salt pits, and monopolized the sale of salt. They might, therefore, deal in opium grown upon their own territories, without infringing the law. There was, moreover, a loop-hole in this, as in any other act of parliament. It contained a clause which virtually settled the question in their favour. They were to cease to be trading and commercial, except so far as it related to what was "for Government purposes." The five millions derived from the opium traffic *was* for Government purposes, and there was an end to all efforts to suppress the traffic on the ground of its illegality. To the difficulties of the financier were added the technicalities of law, and the quibbles of the lawyer. Because the Company dealt in the produce of their own lands, they were not traders; and if they were, it was in their capacity as governors, and not merchants. The trade was not a trade, and as a trade, it was not illegal.

But again, as a trade, and as an illegal trade, it could not be suppressed without injuring vested rights of long standing, without violating compacts with various native princes, without deranging the Indian finances. Our statesmen saw, in the confident air and the tone of the agitators, that difficulties were no more difficulties with the philanthropists than trade was trade with lawyers. They could see no means of reorganizing the Indian revenue, minus the five millions paid by the Chinese smoker; but, said they to the agitators, you do, and we hand over the difficulty to you. Their representatives in parliament came forward with certain resolutions, which Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington affirmed to be the assertion of mere abstract principles, and legislators wanted practical suggestions. A Commission of Inquiry was proposed, and fell to the ground, because such commissions were expensive in both

money and time, and would, after all, elicit nothing new. Nothing daunted, the advocates of China analyzed the question, to make it practical. It has a territorial and a commercial aspect. Viewed commercially, the Company were producers and venders of the drug, and it was thought their end would, in part, be secured, if the Company's monopoly in opium were abolished. Viewed territorially, the Company might, to compensate the loss to their exchequer, tax the growth of the poppy, and levy an impost upon its exportation. That this would remove the stigma upon Britain was clear; but how it would benefit China was never explained. The taxed opium, if still produced, would still find its way to the smoker. Supposing that Bengal was the only opium-growing country, the tax would amount to a prohibition, but a prohibition only to the very poor, who already cannot afford the indulgence. The richer and luxurious classes would, in the case supposed for argument, continue the consumption. That the impost would limit its use to these classes, is not true. Among the evils of the practice, we are told, the greatest is the strength of the passion for its indulgence when once the habit has been formed. The opium eater, or the smoker, will, in the last extremity, sell even his wife and children to obtain opium. To make the article dearer by an impost would, therefore, simply hasten on the last extremity to which the sot is conducted by the habit. A prohibitory impost would not stop the abuse among the rich, for they can afford the dearer article; nor among the habitual smoker, for he would sell his wife and children to buy opium; nor among the very poor, for they already cannot afford it. The effect of restrictive legislation would, after all, fail to benefit the Chinese, even on the supposition that Bengal was the only country where opium was produced.

Before we glance at the other bearings of the question, it will be well to consider more fully the fact, that a fiscal restriction upon the trade would not prevent the *extension* of the Chinese habit of smoking or eating opium. The mass of the population of the "Celestial" empire are on the verge of pauperism. The lower classes cannot indulge in an infusion which is drunk by old women in our almshouses and workhouses. If they cannot afford to purchase the leaf grown at their very doors, it is absurd to suppose that the mass of the "Celestials" can indulge in a drug grown in India and Turkey, to such an extent as to call for British interference. From all our consideration of the question, we must exclude the masses of China. If prohibitory duties have any effect, it will be among the classes above the labourer in that country. Now the hankering after stimulants, of one kind or another, is universal among mankind. Forbid man the indulgence of this desire in one direction, and he will gratify himself in another. The Mohammedans are by the Koran forbidden the use of intoxicating liquor, and they have, in consequence, everywhere taken to the use of narcotics, either tobacco or opium, as the substitute. The Chinese are generally dram drinkers, for Confucius did not interdict spirits.

But they prefer, and if they must have something to stimulate, they wisely prefer, opium to alcohol—a milder to a stronger stimulant. Deprive them of the drug, and they will as generally betake themselves to spirits. Drunkenness, with its greater evils, would take the place of opium smoking with its milder evils, in the Chinese provinces, as in the Mohammedan territories. To propose the suppression of the opium traffic is to substitute a trade in spirits, wines, and beer. This would, as facts prove, convert the comparatively sober Chinese and the Turk into drunkards like Englishmen. It is, however, a useless attempt to wage war with the universal desire in man to indulge in stimulants. But:—

The prohibitory duty is proposed, also, as a means of compensating the Indian financier for the loss of five millions annually. If the poppy flourished nowhere but in Bengal, the tax might answer the end proposed. It is, however, grown in large quantities in Turkey. It is extensively cultivated in the Mahratta states, which are not British territory; and in China itself,—in the provinces of Chekeang, Fukheen, Kwantung, Kweichow, Shangtung, and others equally unpronounceable. A prohibitory duty would be in favour of producers in China, Turkey, and the free states in India, and ruinous to British subjects. It would, in fact, be a law handing the production and sale over to foreigners. The untaxed article would drive the taxed article out of every market in the world. A valuable commodity in commerce, used either as a luxury or as a medicinal drug, would soon cease to be produced in Bengal. The agitators tell us, Cease to trade in opium, and for the loss in the revenue, compensate yourself by taxing the article as it is grown, and as it passes through the custom-house. But to tax the production of the poppy, and the export of the drug, is to root the plant out of our Indian possessions altogether. The proposal, as we have shown, would in no way benefit the Chinese, who would be supplied from other quarters; and it would not compensate the loss to the Indian financier, for there would soon be no opium in Bengal *to be taxed*. But the proposal would benefit the foreign producer and trader in an article which, either as a luxury—if not abused, or as a medicinal drug, is a perfectly legitimate source of gain.

The objection to the proposed remedy is so self-evident that no illustration is absolutely necessary. To show, however, that we are not imagining things improbable, we adduce an illustration from unquestionable facts.

The East India Company opened the trade in the year 1815, when they established the monopoly. It may be noticed, in passing, that before 1767 opium was used in China, though in comparatively small quantities. The Company, however, ultimately monopolized the growth of the drug so far as the Bengal produce was concerned. They paid the cultivators £14 for the amount they sold in China and the Indian Islands, for a sum varying from £200 to £400. Their monopoly really enhanced the value of the drug, and to so

great an extent, that the Americans ventured into the markets, and sold Turkey opium at a much cheaper rate. The monopolists, against whom there has been such a loud and continuous outcry, really accomplished the very object desired by their opponents—they made the drug scarce in China by making it expensive. The free-trading Americans made it cheaper,—the very thing which our agitators against the monopoly would be the last to desire. In Malwah, and other Mahratta states, opium used to be sold at twenty-five per cent. below the Bengal drug. The Americans offered £60 and £70 for the Malwah opium, while the Company was paying for an inferior article only £14. The effect of the American competition in the market was the enhancement of the price in India, and its diminution in China. The quantity produced in India was increased seven-fold in five years, and the quality was so improved, that it fetched in China and the Indian islands £14 per cent. higher than the Company's opium. During thirty years the monopolists could not materially extend their traffic. The free-trading Americans raised the amount sold from 2,500 chests to 10,000 annually. The very charge of national dishonour is founded upon ignorance of the natural and opposite effects of monopoly and free trade. The supposed evil was really a benefit to China. The supposed remedy was no advantage to the Chinese, but a favour granted to foreigners. And the remedy for the loss accruing to the Indian financier would be ultimate and certain ruin to the revenue. So much for zeal without discretion, and philanthropy without political economy!

POPPY.

Social Economy.

ARE THE OPERATIONS OF TRADES' UNIONS BENEFICIAL TO WORKING MEN?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE right of the working man to dispose of his labour with the greatest benefit to himself will not be disputed; and to enable him to exercise this right, Trades' Unions have been established. Great aims generally require corresponding modes of action. One man, standing alone, can do little in the advancement of his fellows; association, of some sort or other, must be brought around his effort, or the effect will be of small importance. The British and Social Science Associations, and the United Kingdom Alliance, are great in their effects, owing to the associative element in each. One link is of comparatively little value, but the entire chain will enable the stately ship to ride safely in the storm. The *right* of disposal being undisputed, the *means* to effect that disposal is the point at

issue. There seems to be an unwise and bitterly antagonistic feeling on the part of masters towards those who strive, by legal actions, to protect their rights against encroachment. Justice, it seems to me, accords to masters the right of organization, and the *same* justice bestows a like privilege upon working men. If the accumulator needs protection against the worker, so, in like manner, the worker requires protection against the accumulator. At first sight it would seem inevitable that antagonism must spring from this necessity; but this ill-feeling is a mistake, and is not a proper interpretation of the principle involved. It no more affects the right element in unions, than does the bloodshed and persecution exercised by sects toward each other affect the good and true in morality and religion. I fully understand the evil that would ensue were working men in a position to ride rough-shod over the claims of the employer; as strongly do I condemn the effort of employers to trample upon the rights of the employed. To suppose for an instant that masters and men can ever so far change places, as to allow the working man unjustly to dictate, is simply ridiculous. Our toiling millions are too well-informed ever to aim at such a false position. Trades' Unions, in the main, seek protection under the guidance of legality and justice: and it were well to bear this in mind; for if driven from so fair a stand point, one cannot tell what would be the next move. Tyranny and oppression have oftentimes driven men to desperation. A general effort towards associated industry might bring tyrannical employers, confiding too much upon capital, to regret their mistaken views of justice. Whatever is right must, sooner or later, permanently affect mankind for good. When we consider the many difficulties and trials against which working men have to contend in the "battle of life," we feel convinced that associative influence is necessary for their wellbeing. The principle of union, it seems to us, is in comparative infancy, so far as trades are concerned. When lamenting the effects occasioned by strikes, we should remember that the present generation of working men are very different from those that will follow. As the present educational influences bear fruit in the future, so will working men be capable of understanding the great principles upon which alone capital and labour can work with mutual ease. Small benefits accrue, in the actual present, to the toilers who dare insist upon their claims upon justice and humanity; but every firm stand now made upon right breaks up so much hitherto undisturbed soil; and the men of the future, enjoying their meed of justice, will bless the heroes of the present, who nobly sacrifice their bread in the cause of justice. Who can predict the mighty change that will be wrought in the working men of twenty years hence, by the mighty press of the present? We hold, then, that for the future great benefits may be predicted from the unions of the present. Suffering and hardship are the common lot of those who herald into the world a true principle hitherto withheld or untaught. The accoucheur of truth is often a martyr.

"But truth *shall* conquer at the last,
 As round and round we run;
 The *right* shall yet come uppermost,
 And *justice shall* be done."

But we contend that, at the present time, many benefits accrue to working men from Trades' Unions.

1. *Mutual sympathy* is educed. The struggle in London has called forth sacrifices in the provinces: in order that the weekly pittance turned aside from our metropolitan brothers may be less missed, humble toilers of all trades and callings have manfully stood forward, contributing their mites, awaiting in eager, warm-hearted expectation the issue of that great struggle.

5. *Progress* is indicated in the conduct of the unionists. Formerly rioting and wanton destruction formed part of the strike; now, although the comparatively innocent were cruelly thrown upon the world, in order the more effectually to extinguish the organization, still humble, trustful submission was shown by these glorious martyrs, who quietly turned from their workshops on the "lock-out" Saturday night, not even assembling in groups outside to converse upon their prospects; and thus possibly afford the police the (by some wished for) opportunity of a rough "move on," to preface an open disturbance. We cannot too highly commend the solid manhood of those who thus acted: their unimpeachable demeanour has added no small lustre to the climax of the struggle, wherein legal opinion is declared to be favourable towards the principles upon which most unions are based.

3. *Self-reliance*, "man's true interest," has been evoked. The curious bearing of our Government, respecting this question, has occasioned some surprise. "Consistent *non-intervention*" seems an unequal line of policy, when we reflect that the struggle, as a whole, is between wealthy and educated *versus* comparatively poor and ignorant. Such a course of conduct would be condemned in any individual having the power, who would quietly witness an encounter between a skilful duellist and one wholly unacquainted with the practice of arms. Yet after all, this course, though calculated to alienate the sympathies of the toiler from the Government, turns him back upon his own resources, and he will perhaps reflect that his aim must be to win power by all just means; and possessing this, it will in the main rest with himself whether a paternal or an unfeeling House of Commons shall legislate upon his surroundings; whether right shall not be represented rather than monetary power and class interests. Let the toilers of our country pay scrutinizing attention to political and social questions; let them *act* upon the principles they conscientiously feel to be right; and ere long they will be enabled to look upon the Government as a sympathizing adviser and teacher, rather than a cold, stultified spectator, fawning upon and flattering stale class prejudices, rather than studying to strengthen the sense of justice in those for whom they profess to act. Sir G. C. Lewis lately told us that the ministry were "not

unconcerned spectators" of the strike and its ramifications. How magnanimous! A question involving some of the highest principles of "peace and good-will" amongst men, upon which our rulers are "not unconcerned"! but decide to "leave both parties to adjust their differences according to the natural law of supply and demand." Why not at once say, "We *could* interfere, counsel, and advise; we *could* teach the humbler section in this dispute political and social knowledge; but struggle on as you best can; let your ignorance force you in painful discipline; let your poverty compel you to yield, whether right or wrong. But experience which is forced upon our working men will, I trust, evoke stern and unflinching self-reliance, and excite in them deeper interest in all political and social questions, and thus permanently and effectually benefit and elevate humanity. With such issue in prospect, I have no hesitation in concluding that the "operations of Trades' Unions" are "beneficial to working men."

M. A. X.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"There was a time when all the body's members
 Rebell'd against the belly; thus accused it:—
 That only like a gulf it did remain
 I' the midst o' the body, idle and inactive,
 Still cupboarding the viands, never bearing
 Like labour with the rest; * * * *

Your most grave belly was deliberate,
 Not rash like his accusers, and thus answered,—
 'True is it, my incorporate friends,' quoth he,
 'That I receive the general food at first
 Which you do live upon; and fit it is;
 Because I am the storehouse and the shop
 Of the whole body. But if you do remember,
 I send it through the rivers of your blood,
 Even to the court, the heart,—the seat o' the brain,
 And, through the cranks and offices of man,
 The strongest nerves, and small inferior veins,
 From me receive that natural competency
 Whereby they live; and though that all at once
 You, my good friends," (this says the belly, mark me)—

"Though all at once cannot
 See what I do deliver out to each,
 Yet I can make my audit up, that all
 From me do back receive the flour of all,
 And leave me but the bran."—SHAKESPEARE.

THE commencement of another year again introduces us to our friends with new hopes and new aspirations. The kind companionship of ten years has created many bonds of attachment, uniting the *British Controversialists*, both readers and writers, more intimately by the ties of truth and affection than is usual in these days of periodical literature. Our aim has been to attain truth, and to com-

municate truth. We have endeavoured to utter our honest convictions independently, manfully, but with kindness, courtesy, and urbanity. Of our shortcomings none are so painfully sensible as ourselves; but of the purity of our motives and the honesty of our intentions, we ourselves cannot doubt, neither can we hesitate to believe that in these respects we possess the full confidence of our readers.

While according to our opponents at all times a wide range for the independent expression of honest convictions, we have with deep regret observed the obtrusion of rancorous personalities on recent occasions, we trust that we ourselves may never become so heated by the exciting nature of any subject, as to forget the amenities and courtesies of literary elegance and respectability. Unmerciful severity against error, but kindness and respect towards persons, has been our rule; and we feel assured no opponent, who has entered the lists against us, has had his feelings wounded by our remarks, although he may not have considered our arguments as sound, or most conducive to the discovery of truth.

Deeply interested in the subject of labour, wages, and capital, we enter upon the study of the present question as truth-seekers. It is a question, to our thinking, of paramount importance, involving as it does the very existence and daily comforts of many millions of our fellow-countrymen. It is, then, incumbent upon us that we should study this question seriously and calmly, free from the excitement of partizanship, or the influence of party interests.

Man is God's chief handywork, a wonderfully ingenious microcosm in His great universe of existence. The creative power of Deity has endowed man with a mysterious nature, far-reaching intellect to discover, to know, to understand; emotional faculties, varied and delicate in their sensibilities, to desire, to love, to hate, and physical powers to possess, to do, to enjoy, and to suffer. With this gift God has imposed the moral obligation to employ this nature, with all its susceptibilities, rightly and truthfully. From the constitution of our nature, it is self-evident that man is an independent but responsible being, and is bound to employ all his-faculties to secure the greatest amount of happiness in this his present place of abode. In the exercise of his faculties he is responsible to no other of his fellow-men; in them he has an indefeasible right; none possess the right to deprive him of them, nor to limit his exercise thereof, whilst that exercise of his own natural powers accords to his fellow-men equal rights and equal freedom for the exercise of their natural powers and faculties. He can be, do, and say as he pleases, at the dictate of his own unfettered will, with this limitation only, his will cannot authoritatively deprive others of the like freedom.

By the exercise of his powers, man possesses himself of those natural products with which a bountiful Providence has furnished this world, and by the exercise of his faculties, he adds new value to these, his acquired possessions,—hence arises property; nature has given him the power to labour; nature and his own labour gives him property; and when this property becomes more abundant than is

requisite to supply his ever-recurring necessities, it assumes the nature of capital.

The simplest form of society wherein man is found has at all times presented a sufficiently varied condition of the desires, wants, and necessities of the separate individuals of that society, and of the possessions of those individuals, as to render some species of interchange of their respective possessions a matter conducive to their general happiness: hence barter or exchange has arisen as the mode by which mutual conveniences have been adjusted, and labour has been given for food, clothing, shelter, comforts, and luxuries; and these means of happiness have been exchanged for each other, according to the relative value set upon them by each individual possessor. Hence we observe the normal condition of those emphatic technicalities—labour, wages, property, and capital; to these elemental considerations we shall have occasion frequently to advert in our subsequent remarks.

In the present advanced and complicated system of society, so great are the supplies of and the demand for labour, that great bodies of men are found devoted to special kinds of labour: the generic appellation by which society designates this portion is—the working class. The members of this working class have for many reasons thought it prudent to form themselves into compact bodies, called Trades' Unions, with the design to afford protection to the whole class, and to its individual members. *Whether such combinations, as they at present exist, and do operate, are beneficial to the working class, is the question we have to consider.* We believe they are not beneficial, and entreat the reader's attention while we show reasons for our belief.

The objects which Trades' Unions seek to obtain, and by which they are commended to the working classes, are various, some openly stated, others only implied, and still more, secretly understood to be acted upon according to the judgment and discretion of the ruling officers of each society, or of the union with which it is associated. It will suffice for our present purpose to name a few,—relief to members during sickness, and to their families at death; relief when out of employment, and assistance to obtain employment. These are wise and prudent objects, worthy of union, and as such are adopted as the chief inducements for the establishment of Trades' societies; but others of a less wholesome character are united to them, which vitiate the whole system, and make it the curse of the working man.

For instance, Trades' Unions seek to regulate the number of labourers by limiting the number of persons educated and employed in each trade, and by prescribing the amount of initiatory labour necessary to fit a person to become a member of the trade. This is a direct infraction of the liberty of the citizen of any free state. As we have before seen, man has by nature an indefeasible right to that exercise of his natural powers which shall, in his own estimation, be most conducive to his happiness; and no one can with justice

authoritatively interfere with the exercise of this right. But the Trades' Union says, "You shall not exercise your right to labour in any trade but by our permission." Therefore the Trades' Union deprives the working man of his birthright, and forbids him to sell his labour but at the will of others.

This will allow of further illustration. If it is right and just for the Trades' Union to forbid the workman to labour in one trade, it may with equal justice forbid it in another, and even in every other trade. Thus at the mercy of the irresponsible officers of the union, the worker seeking employment may be reduced, by his utter helplessness, to starvation and death. This conclusion is not affected by the age of the labourer seeking employment; he may be ten years old or he may be fifty, the principle and its consequences are precisely the same. The union assumes to limit the number of persons employed in any trade; it therefore arrogates to itself the power to drive the would-be labourer away from the labour market, which is to him virtually—death. By prescribing a fixed period of probation for any trade, it assumes a power which is contrary to natural right. The individual selling and the individual buying the labour are the only persons interested—they are the persons making an exchange of their natural rights, and it is for them to agree for themselves upon the terms they shall make in this respect. For a third party to impose conditions upon the seller or the buyer of labour is a species of tyranny unequalled under the most despotic forms of civilized society.

Trades' Unions seek to regulate the rate of wages and the hours of labour. These two points are only different phases of the same principle. An increase of wages is equalled in its effects by a decrease of labour. A decrease of wages is the same as an increase of labour. We shall consider this principle under the one formula, that unions claim to regulate the amount of wages for a certain duration of labour. In the first place, this is unjust and tyrannical to the workman, for it deprives him of his natural right to dispose of his labour as he pleases; it deprives him of his free will and of his power to dispose of his only possession; it limits the value of his labour, by excluding him from the full benefit of open competition in the labour market, and virtually says that he shall not sell his labour as dearly as he can, but only at the stereotype price fixed by the union tyrants. The practical evils of this principle are legion; the clever and industrious man cannot earn more than the fixed wages; hence his aspirations for a better condition are restrained, his superior ability is repressed, his energies are forcibly subdued, and he must drag on a miserable existence of unrequited toil, or sink into irrecoverable idleness and stolidity. Such flagrant injustice, such oppressive tyranny, is only endurable, when self-imposed, through the medium of a Trades' Union. This oppression is, if possible, more insufferably felt by the less-gifted workman, the poor man who, from inefficient education, want of physical strength, or intellectual ability, or the necessary expertness demanded by his

calling, falls below the average of his fellows, becomes of necessity a *pariah*, an outcast from society, his only refuge being the cold, but still more just and charitable poor law union. He, with his known deficiencies, presents himself for employment; the employer is willing to give him employment at the full value of his labour, but the starving wretch dare not receive less than the fixed rate of the Trades' Union; his labour is deficient either in quantity or in quality, the employer cannot give the full rate without sustaining loss, because he has to enter into competition with other producers whose workmen are of the average skill; hence he is obliged to refuse the workman, other employers do the same. The workman dare not enter another trade, as such a course would incapacitate him from again working in his own trade—he would become “a black leg,” or a “rat,” and a worse mark than that of Cain would banish him from his fellows, a more fearful anathema than “bell, book, and candle,” or the terrific inventions which a dark superstition, hurled at its victims, would rest upon him, till a pauper's grave closed over his emaciated frame.

It has always appeared to us that a law beyond the power of human control regulates the rate of wages and the relations of wages and labour.

It is a law of nature that he who will live must labour. The elemental condition of wages is the actual necessities of the labourer. Nature does not spontaneously offer to man food, clothing, and shelter; these he acquires by his labour. Unremitting industry gives an excess beyond the necessities of the day; this excess forms a capital for the future supply of the labourer; this excess is a constantly increasing quantity, and becomes the fund which in its natural and legitimate use influences the future productiveness of labour. The laws influencing its increase are beyond the control of man, equally with the primal law which necessitates labour. Hence the nature of these laws, and their influence in determining the rate of wages, are of vital importance to the labourer.

The greater the produce from any given amount of labour, the greater the excess beyond man's necessities, which form not only capital, but means of comfort and luxuries; and the greater the proportion of this excess to the necessities of the labourer, in like ratio is the prosperity of the labourer; but should the number of labourers increase faster than the production by which their necessities are supplied, their prosperity decreases, want and destitution ensue; hence population, or the number of labourers to be supplied with the products of labour, becomes an important factor in this social problem.

Let us categorize these observations. All men must labour to live; the greater the surplus of labour's products or capital, the greater the prosperity of the labourer; and the more numerous the population, the less the prosperity of the labourer, other things being equal. Hence, when capital increases more rapidly than population, wages will be higher; and when population increases faster than capital

wages will be lower. The former of these conditions is evidently that most beneficial to the working class ; and how any Trades' Union or any other body of men can by the mere aggregation of numbers, or the fulmination of edicts, accelerate so desirable a consummation, we are at a loss to imagine ; for these are laws as far beyond the control of any man or number of men as the laws of gravitation or cohesion. Cold and heartless these laws may be designated, by the unthinking partisan of a vicious system of chicanery and fraud ; but we can in justice no more quarrel with them than with any other of Nature's laws : it is our duty to study them, to trace out their workings, and, by an accurate knowledge of them, adopt their influences for our own good and the amelioration of the sad lot of the sons of toil, upon whom presses so heavily the consequences of our first parents' fault, " By the sweat of thy brow shalt thou earn thy daily bread."

We have seen that Trades' Unions are unjust, because they infringe the rights of labour by depriving man of his free will, his personal liberty, and his right to sell his labour wherever he pleases, when he pleases, and to whom he pleases ; that they are false in principle, and pernicious in their operations ; that they are opposed to the laws of nature, and therefore weak, futile, and inoperative for good ; that they repress ability, cramp energy, annihilate industry, and starve the indifferent workman. Space precludes our proceeding to illustrate their bearings upon the social life of the nation, their political inconsistencies, their contrariety to sound justice and true morals ; these topics we must reserve for future occasions. Meanwhile, we hope to have done some good service to the cause of those least able to save themselves from the tender mercies (!) of enemies who, wearing the mask of friends, lead their too successful dupes into the strange belief that the operations of Trades' Unions are, or can be, beneficial to the working classes. L'OUVRIER.

The Essayist.

THE OBJECTS AIMED AT IN A DISCUSSION SOCIETY.

Discussion societies are co-operative associations, in which each member is expected to give his quota of thought if he can,—of silence, if silence be better than his thought. They are visible expressions of the law of mutual self,—not media for personal display. In them, the miserable vanity of those who pretend only to be teachers is out of place ; whilst it is equally wrong, though not offensively so, to appear only as the *taught*. Those who care *only* to improve themselves scarcely comprehend their duty ; whilst those who aspire solely to improve others are wanting in that salutary modesty which it is well ever to cherish with respect to our own knowledge. There are no limits to the increase of wisdom

which can justly operate against continued exertion ; for however much a man knows, there are always things unknown, whilst the powers of mental acquisition are as enduring as life. It is always possible for the wise man to learn something from others ; their blunders may encourage him ; their successes stimulate ; from their follies and ignorance he may gather knowledge ; and, by observing their stumblings, learn how to guide his own steps. The *first* object aimed at is " to encourage thought."

It is an honour and a blessing to be enabled to think. There is something in the silent processes of the mind, which, to a man who turns his eye inward, is as marvellous as are any of the wonders of the outer world. And when a man can be led to think so as to realize the fruits of his thinking, as he contemplates the actual creations of his own mind, there is a pure pleasure in the very idea of such progress, in the very exercise of the faculties themselves. For as a man in the full vigour of physical life rejoices in the buoyancy of health, and in the free play of limb, so a man, whose mind is in healthy action, will exult in the consciousness of his powers. One object, then, in meeting for discussion is, that mind may stir up mind, and in the healthy stimulus of mutual inquiry, thought may become free and spontaneous, and men may realize themselves in their awakened and active energies. There needs no proof of the proposition, that mind bears in itself the proof of its own purposes, and demands exercise and freedom that it may live.

Again, a second purpose is, that "thought may learn how to express itself." Those unaccustomed to the enunciation of their own opinions are unaware of the help to thought itself which every attempt to put it into shape affords ; but it is true that when a man sees his own thoughts struggling into life, clothed in words, the very effort to bring them forth imparts a vitality to mind itself. A man who should be condemned to perpetual silence would be ignorant of his own powers of articulation ; and every faculty of mind receives stimulus in proportion to the efforts made to communicate the results of its activity. Free speech, then, is one of our objects, partly because of the advantages gained by mutual intercourse, partly because of the reflex influence of such efforts upon the powers of thought themselves. Let a man try to shape the thought that is in him ; let him resolutely determine to say what he has to say, and no more, and he will find the effort he must necessarily make so to do, operating beneficially upon himself. We may often understand *ourselves* better through our efforts to impress our thoughts upon others ; and as we bring forth our own conclusions one by one, we have the advantage of looking them severally in the face, and of cultivating much closer acquaintance with them than we should were they to be locked up within the chambers of our own souls ; whilst if we desire to fulfil the duties of life, the ability to set forth our opinion before others will add to our power and influence. Some, perhaps, might object, and say, "Nay, we don't want a nation of talkers ; let us have workers rather." I know

there is much in this objection. just because there is much empty talk in the world ; but then talk is work after all, and *proper talk* stimulates men to work, and the greatest of all benefactors are those who, by the power of speech, can rouse other men to action and daily toil for life and home, inspiring them with a love for duty, and a desire to achieve a glorious destiny. There is, indeed, much wasted speech, much murdering of language, as well as utterance of crude thought. These can be pardoned if they occur in the process of working out success, but not when they result from the foolish attempt of men to perform a task for which they are endowed neither by nature nor grace. The blunders of a self-educator may be pardoned, but the follies of a fool, whose way is right in his own eyes, are despicable. Perhaps it is as common a thing to meet with pretenders now-a-days as anything else. There are many who are but skimmers of books, and who, by an unlucky fatality, seem never to get the cream ; others who know the outsides of books better than their contents, who know topics better than the ideas written respecting them. Now, by reason of a law of vanity, which impels men sometimes to advertise their own folly, the Discussion Society becomes the arena for such, and mere blatant talk usurps the place of truthful, thoughtful speech. I would not be mistaken here, so as to lead any to think that only the *wise* should be members of such associations. Nay. We want the learners, and don't object to the ignorant who pretend to be teachers. We do not object to blundering speech if it be that of one seeking for something better, aiming at something higher. The child creeps and crawls, tumbles about, and bruises itself often before it learns to walk, and must needs do so ; it has to struggle into active life, and so, with many contortions and zigzag progresses, it advances.

So will mental vigour and maturity come, and the soul has its infancy, its reverses alternating with success, ere manhood be attained. Here, then, is the arena ; here we meet to tell that which is within us,—to indicate our attainments in knowledge, and, by submitting our thoughts to the criticisms of others, see them in various lights, and estimate their value. The sympathy thus evoked will be useful in stimulating the efforts we must put forth, will have a reflex influence, and our mental strength will increase. Besides these advantages, meeting thus, we gain the opportunity of *criticism*. Let it be noted that criticism is not equivalent with *fault-finding* ; any man's capacity is equal to the latter, but it is not every man who is capable of being a critic. This requires discrimination enough to detect beauties, which are not always as glaring as faults,—keen-sightedness enough to occupy the stand-points of the writer, and note that which he has overlooked. Let it not be supposed that an evening is spent in vain in a Discussion Society, where there has been nothing said to which we can object. We shall not find ourselves best able to build ourselves up by pulling others down ; objecting to the wrong thoughts of others does not necessarily furnish us with *right* ones. At best, it may only serve to corroborate those

we already possess. But to acquire must be our aim as well as to defend. And again, may we not substantiate ourselves in the possession of any truth, as much by listening to the cogent expression of it by another, as by refuting its opposite? To criticize well, we must analyze and amplify that which we have before us, follow out the train of thought suggested, and estimate its relations and consequences. Thus, to enforce a truth, as well as to refute an error, becomes the work of the Discussion Society. This follows from the consideration of the ultimate end in view, viz., the realization of truth. This could not be done by a man who was always in the combative mood, who saw a possible adversary in every essayist, and a snake in the grass in every sentence. Truth, and freedom by the truth, are the things we should aim at, and in every blow we aim, strike for truth's sake, rather than for victory. It is not enough that we plod our little round of daily toil, that we exercise our intellect merely in gathering our daily bread; we are not beings with bodily wants merely, though some seem to consider their souls as little worth, except for bread purposes. They forget the ancient truth, "that man shall not, cannot live by bread alone." Duty and privilege unite in the work of mental progress. It cannot be a matter of option, whether a man employ his powers, and make the best and the most of them. It seems incumbent, from the very fact of their possession. And yet how few cherish aims and cultivate habits in full harmony with the capacities they possess. They suffer them to lie dormant, or use them only for base and ignoble ends. This should not be. Let it not be so with us. Let us fix upon some field in which we can labour, some subject which we can master. Let us realize the freedom which is in thought. Little need be said about the *methods* of obtaining the *objects* specified. The *methods* of truth-seeking must reveal themselves to us by patient thought; our ingenuity will develop as we think, our wisdom will grow with the opportunities we give it. Evidently enough, we cannot have thoughts unless we think, nor utter them unless we try. To criticize aright demands not so much knowledge as a clear eye, not pre-arranged and settled opinion so much as capacity for judging well the opinions we hear. Thought, vigour, progress, will not come to us unsought, will not woo us in our leisure hours, nor distil sweetly upon us, do we rest at ease.

Let us beware of a vagrant mind, wandering everywhere, yet gathering honey *nowhere*. The necessary business of our daily life will partially unfit us oftentimes for other kind of thinking; yet let us look upon the world as ours, and step out of the little daily circle of our labour life. If we have opportunity for meeting where others gather to discuss their thoughts, let us give our contribution, though it be small as the widow's mite. "From little beginnings come great endings," the old proverb says. Thinkers, orators, critics, *all* have had their little spheres, ere the great world's ear has been open to their voice; but in the end, the circumference of their opportunities has increased. Without, then, being buoyed up with vain or

factitious hopes, let us not deem ourselves *fated* to run in the common ruts, but making for the open field before us, let our steps be guided by wisdom and stimulated by hope. Methods, then, I say, must be discovered by us. General principles only can be laid down. Let us not be afraid of *thinking*. There are other kinds of cowardice than physical. Let our intercourse be free and frank. Let us be outspoken and fearless, condemning and acquitting, as conscience and reason command. Then our efforts will not be fruitless. The play of thought, the interchange of opinion, the flow of sympathy, the exchange of feeling, will tend to oneness in the cause of truth, will remove the isolation of silence, and develop the *idea*, and realize the *fact* of fraternity. D. W.

The Reviewer.

Self-Help, with Illustrations of Character and Conduct. By SAMUEL SMILES. London: John Murray. Price 6s.

WE have here a new book on an old subject, written in a very interesting style, and replete with wholesome counsels and invigorating examples. Mr. Smiles is already favourably known to many of our readers as the author of that excellent Biography of George Stephenson, of which it is enough to say, that it is now in its fifth edition.

The popular proverb, which declares example to be more powerful than precept, expresses a fact which gives to biography its great value, and renders the lives of conspicuous men so powerful in affecting, for good or evil, the characters of others. Susceptibility to this kind of influence is one of the special characteristics of youth, and this should ever be borne in mind by all who seek to stimulate them in a course of self-culture, or to acts of benevolence and philanthropy. This consideration appears to have had due weight with Mr. Smiles, and hence his judicious precepts are profusely illustrated by the most interesting and stimulating facts. It is of great importance that, in the sweet tones of persuasion, the young should be urged to strive after intellectual attainments and social advancement; but it is essential that our appeals should be backed by reference to the examples of those who, starting from the lowest positions, have carried on their efforts to the most successful issues. There is something contagious in example; and we feel convinced that what to others once in our condition has become actual, is possible to us. It is this that has given to some second class books so much value, and made mere compilations of facts more productive of good than many a learned treatise. That well-known work, "*The Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties*," presents a case in point; for the beneficial effect its perusal has had

on hundreds of youthful artisans can scarcely be over-estimated; and many a man who now occupies a position high in honour and influence has attained it through that ardour which was first excited by its pages. To say that "Self-Help" is worthy of being regarded as a companion volume to the "Pursuit of Knowledge," would be no faint praise; but it is this, and much more; for it belongs to a higher grade of composition, has far greater literary merits, and will exert, if possible, a more healthy tendency.

The origin of this book may be told in the author's own words.

"Some fifteen years since, the author was requested to deliver an address before the members of some evening classes, which had been formed in a northern town for mutual improvement, under the following circumstances:—

"Two or three young men of the humblest rank resolved to meet in the winter evenings, for the purpose of improving themselves by exchanging knowledge with each other. Their first meetings were held in the room of a cottage in which one of the members lived; and, as others shortly joined them, the place soon became inconveniently filled. When summer set in, they adjourned to the cottage garden outside; and the classes were then held in the open air, round a little boarded hut used as a garden house, in which those who officiated as teachers set the sums, and gave forth the lessons of the evening. When the weather was fine, the youths might be seen, until a late hour, hanging round the door of the hut like a cluster of bees; but sometimes a sudden shower of rain would dash the sums from their slates, and disperse them for the evening unsatisfied.

"Winter, with its cold nights, was drawing near, and what were they to do for shelter? Their numbers had by this time so increased, that no room of an ordinary cottage could accommodate them. But they were youths of pluck, and determined to go forward with the work they had taken in hand. They resolved, therefore, to hire a room; and, on making inquiry, they found a large, dingy apartment to let, which had been used as a temporary cholera hospital. No tenant could be found for the place, which was avoided as if the plague still clung to it. But the mutual improvement youths, nothing daunted, hired the cholera room, lit it up, placed a few benches and a deal table in it, and began their winter classes. The place soon presented a busy and cheerful appearance in the evenings. The teaching may have been, as no doubt it was, of a very rude and imperfect sort; but it was done with a will. Those who knew a little taught those who knew less—improving themselves while they improved others; and, at all events, setting before them a good working example. Thus these youths—and there were also grown men amongst them—proceeded to teach themselves and each other, reading and writing, arithmetic and geography; and even mathematics, chemistry, and some of the modern languages.

"About a hundred young men had thus come together, when, growing ambitious, they desired to have lectures delivered to them; and then it was the author became acquainted with their proceedings. A party of them waited on him, for the purpose of inviting him to deliver an introductory address, or, as they expressed it, 'to talk to them a bit,' prefacing the request by a modest statement of what they had done and what they were doing. He could not fail to be touched by the admirable self-helping spirit which they had displayed; and, though entertaining but slight faith in popular lecturing, he felt that a few words of encouragement, honestly and sincerely uttered, might not be without some good effect. And in this spirit he addressed them on more than one occasion, citing examples of what other men had done, as illustrations of what each might, in a greater or less degree, do for himself; and pointing out that their happiness and well-being as individuals in after

life, must necessarily depend mainly upon themselves—upon their own diligent self-culture, self-discipline, and self-control—and, above all, on that honest and upright performance of individual duty, which is the glory of manly character.”

Under such training we are not surprised to learn that these earnest youth “went forward in their course; worked on with energy and resolution; and reaching manhood, they went forth in various directions into the world, where many of them are now occupying positions of trust and usefulness.” We cannot but express the hope, in passing, that the experiment thus recorded may be repeated, again and again, with the like results; and that we may be permitted, in these pages, to register “the rise and progress” of many a *Self-Help Society*.

Our author’s personal interest having been thus excited in the subject of self-help, he made additions, from time to time, to the memoranda from which he had addressed these young men; and these, in a revised and connected form, constitute the attractive volume which he now gives to the public.

Mr. Smiles commences his prelections by quoting the well-worn maxim, that “Heaven helps those who help themselves;” and he remarks that “the spirit of self-help is the root of all genuine growth in the individual,” and “constitutes the true source of national vigour and strength.” This spirit is a marked feature in the English character, and furnishes the true measure of our power as a nation. In confirmation of this assertion, the testimony of foreigners is quoted; and the undisputed fact is triumphantly referred to, that some of the greatest men in science, literature, and art—“apostles of great thoughts, and lords of the great heart—have sprung indiscriminately from the English farm and the Scotch hill-side, from the workshop and the mine, from the blacksmith’s stithy and the cobbler’s stool.” Illustrations of this are very numerous, and Mr. Smiles finds them in all the higher walks of life: pointing to the legislature, he says—

“The House of Commons has always contained a considerable number of such self raised men,—fitting representatives of the industrial character of the British people; and it is to the credit of our Legislature that such men have received due honour there. When the late Joseph Brotherton, member for Salford, in the course of the discussion on the Ten Hours Bill, detailed with true pathos the hardships and fatigues to which he had been subjected when working as a factory boy in a cotton mill, and described the resolution which he had then formed, that if ever it was in his power he would endeavour to ameliorate the condition of that class, Sir James Graham rose immediately after him, and declared, amidst the cheers of the House, that he did not before know that Mr. Brotherton’s origin had been so humble, but that it rendered him more proud than he had ever before been of the House of Commons, to think that a person risen from that condition should be able to sit side by side, on equal terms, with the hereditary gentry of the land.

“There is a member of the present House of Commons whom we have heard introducing his recollections of past times with the words, ‘When I was working as a weaver boy at Norwich,’ and there are many more who have sprung from conditions equally humble. But perhaps the most interesting story of difficulties

encountered and overcome by manful struggle, is that of the present member for Sunderland, Mr. W. S. Lindsay, the well-known shipowner. It was told by himself, in his own simple words, to the electors of Weymouth some years ago, in answer to an attack which had been made upon him by his political opponents. At the age of fourteen, he said, he had been left, an orphan boy, to push his way in the world. He left Glasgow for Liverpool with only four shillings and sixpence in his pocket; and so poor was he that the captain of the steamer had pity on him, and had told him that he would give him his passage if he would trim the coals in the coal-hole of the steamer. He did so, and thus worked his passage. He remembered that the fireman gave him part of his homely dinner, and never had he ate a dinner with such relish, for he felt that he had worked for it and earned it; and he wished the young to listen to his statement, for he himself had derived a lesson from that voyage which he had never forgotten. At Liverpool he remained for seven weeks before he could get employment; he abode in sheds, and his four and sixpence maintained him, until at last he found shelter in a West Indianman. He entered as a boy, and before he was nineteen he had risen to the command of an Indianman. At twenty-three he retired from the sea; his friends, who, when he wanted assistance had given him none, having left him that which they could no longer keep. He settled on shore; his career had been rapid; he had acquired prosperity by close industry, by constant work, and by keeping ever in view the great principle of doing to others as you would be done by.

* Titus Salt, M.P., of Bradford, the builder of Saltaire, and founder of the Alpaca branch of manufacture, is the son of a small farmer at Crofton, near Wakefield. When a boy he went to school at Wakefield, walking four miles there and four miles back daily, carrying upon his arm a little basket, containing a bottle of milk, and a bit of fruit pie for his dinner. He now occupies Mexborough Castle—the family mansion of the Earl of that name,—situated not far from the humble farm cottage where he was born. Titus Salt, as every one who knows him will bear witness, has won his way in the world by dint of industry, enterprise, and sterling integrity; and he well deserves the fortune he has earned."

But not only does our author speak of men who have succeeded; he attempts to show others how they may succeed too. Industry forges the key which will unlock the treasure-house of success. Right effort, sustained by patience and perseverance, will never be put forth in vain. Genius, according to Buffon, is only patience. John Foster held it to be the power of lighting one's own fire; and another distinguished man has spoken of it as "the power of making efforts." So, then, we may conclude with our author, that "the great high-road of human welfare lies along the old highway of steadfast well-doing; and they who are most persistent, and work in the truest spirit, will invariably be the most successful."

Another important element in a successful career, though one frequently overlooked by young men who have a taste for literary pursuits, is attention to business. Mr. Smiles very properly insists upon this, and discusses with spirit such commonplace subjects as attention to small matters, accuracy, method, promptitude, economy of time, punctuality, energy, tact, and integrity.

Our author favours us not only with judicious counsels, but with timely cautions. He reminds us that self-culture includes the education of all parts of a man's nature, and that, therefore, the intellectual must not engross attention to the exclusion of the physical and

the moral. The success of professional and business men is very much a question of health; and health depends, in a great measure, upon judicious bodily exercise. Two living examples are referred to—

"The marvellous and still juvenile vitality of Lord Palmerston has long been a matter of surprise. But it was his pride and pleasure, as a youth, to be the best rower, jumper, and runner; to be first in the sports of the field as he has since been first in the senate; and to this day his horse and gun are invariably resorted to in his hours of relaxation. As for Lord Brougham, legends of his enormous powers of labour and triumphs over the frail physique of humanity, have gathered round him like a Hercules; and with reference to him and others of his class, the observation of a public writer is doubtless in a great measure—true, that 'the greatness of our great men is quite as much a bodily affair as a mental one.'"

Passing on, we have a chapter on the Facilities and Difficulties in the pursuit of Knowledge peculiar to the present day: and here many "a wise saw" is illustrated by a "modern instance." Advancing to a still higher position, Mr. Smiles discourses on that hackneyed but never-to-be-worn-out subject, the force of example, and the power of conscious and unconscious influence; and then comes the concluding and crowning chapter of the work, on "Character—the True Gentleman." In it we are reminded that—

"Though a man may have comparatively little culture, slender abilities, and but small wealth, yet, if his character be of sterling worth, he will always command an influence, whether it be in the workshop, the counting-house, the mart, or the senate. You may admire men of intellect; but something more is necessary before you will trust them. Hence Lord John Russell once observed, in a sentence full of truth, 'It is the nature of party in England to ask the assistance of men of genius, but to follow the guidance of men of character.' This was strikingly illustrated in the career of the late Francis Horner—a man of whom Sydney Smith said the Ten Commandments were stamped upon his countenance. 'The valuable and peculiar light,' says Lord Cockburn, 'in which his history is calculated to inspire every right-minded youth, is this. He died at the age of thirty-eight; possessed of public influence greater than any other private man; and admired, beloved, trusted, and deplored by all, except the heartless or the base. No greater homage was ever paid in Parliament to any deceased member. Now let every young man ask,—how was this attained? By rank? He was the son of an Edinburgh merchant.—By wealth? Neither he, nor any of his relations, ever had a superfluous sixpence.—By office? He held but one, and only for a few years, of no influence, and with very little pay.—By talents? His were not splendid, and he had no genius. Cautious and slow, his only ambition was to be right. By eloquence? He spoke in calm, good taste, without any of the oratory that either terrifies or seduces.—By any fascination of manner? His was only correct and agreeable.—By what then was it? Merely by sense, industry, good principles, and a good heart—qualities, which no well-constituted mind need ever despair of attaining. It was the force of his character that raised him; and this character not impressed upon him by nature, but formed out of no peculiar elements, by himself. There were many in the House of Commons of far greater ability and eloquence. But no one surpassed him in the combination of an adequate portion of these with moral worth. Horner was born to show what moderate powers, unaided by anything whatever, except culture and goodness, may achieve, even when these powers are displayed amidst the competition of jealousy of public life.'"

And of what is the character composed that commands this homage? Mainly of such simple elements as Truthfulness, Integrity, and Goodness,—all of which lie within the reach of every man, and the non-possession of them has ever been regarded as a crime and a shame. Such a character as this, allied with strength of purpose, will secure for a man success in life, or make him illustrious in adversity. When Stephen of Colonna fell into the hands of his assailants, they derisively asked him, “Where is now your fortress?” “Here,” was his bold reply (calmly placing his hand upon his heart); and *he* can never be really weak or poor who is strong in rectitude, and rich in deeds of love and mercy.

We have noticed this volume more fully than is our wont, because we have perused it with deep interest ourselves, and because we were anxious to direct to it the early attention of our readers. Without laying any claim to prophetic power, we may record our belief that the book before us will, ere long, find a place in the libraries of all literary societies, and be regarded as a hand-book to all interested in the work of mental improvement and self-culture.

Mengé, the Mineralogist. By W. A. CAWTHORNE. Adelaide: J. T. Shawyer. 1859.

WERE it not for the intense interest pertaining to the subject of this volume, we would deem ourselves unpardonably capricious in reviewing a book, emanating as it does from the other side of the world! Our own side is so very fecund in book matters, that it is altogether unnecessary, for the sake of such, to transport anything from so great a distance, unless it be, indeed, of special interest. Of such certainly is the life of Johann Mengé.

Mr. Cawthorne merits our heartiest thanks for this volume. He describes in a popular and interesting manner the peculiar habits and dispositions of the great linguist and mineralogist. Containing much that is praiseworthy, the chief fault of the book lies in its want of detail. This arises from the fact that Mengé always, with studied care, concealed his history, and is not attributable to Mr. Cawthorne. The book is an account of what Mengé *was*, rather than of what he *did*. Only two or three incidents of his life are spoken of with anything like preciseness; yet we have a sufficiency of information to enable us to form a clear estimate of the abilities, capabilities, and general character of the *man*. His favourite study was mineralogy, in pursuit of which, “he had travelled very extensively throughout Germany (his native country), in the Alps, in Siberia, in Iceland, in England, in France,” and in Australia. It is said that there was scarcely a hill or a gully in the latter with which he was unacquainted. An idea of his habits may be formed from the following extract:—

“His life in the hills would be a most interesting episode; but, unfortunately, he always declined entering into any details on this or any part of his romantic and singular career, putting off all inquiries by saying, ‘By-and-bye I’ll write my

life, but at present I am busy with a plan for a mining school,' or a 'Chinese College.' He was the first European that wended his way from Mount-Lofly to Cape Jervis without compass or guide—a feat of extraordinary boldness,—through pathless forests, and hostile natives. Where the shades of night found him, there he slept, and to stay the cravings of hunger, he dined and supped on wattle gum. . . . He was accustomed to descend the most precipitous places in a kind of semi-flight; i. e., by a series of bounds—flying, as he called it—he would leap down with the most fearful rapidity, by the aid of a skilful management of his geological hammers, which he thus described:—He swung his arms to and fro; and so timed it, that when he leaped down his arms would be in the rear, and when he reached the ground, they would be in the air: this method he learnt when he travelled in Europe as a mineralogist."

He had a curious way of classifying his minerals according to his ideas of their natural relationship, which reminds us of a mode of teaching grammar that an eccentric student of our acquaintance once adopted: prepositions he called *spacers*; conjunctions, *joiners*; interjections, *shouters*; and so on with the other parts of speech.

"Our readers must suppose Mr. Mengè surrounded with numerous *broad* palings loaded with specimens, a tub of water, and a brush, busily engaged in cleaning them. 'Well, Mr. Mengè, what do you call this specimen?' 'Oh, that's the grandfather of opal.'—'And what do you call this?' 'That's the mother of copper.'—'An! this?' 'That's the great grandfather of iron.'—'And this?' 'That's the child of oxygen.'—'And this?' 'That's the aunt of jasper.'—'And this?' 'One of the family of lime.'—'And this?' 'The daughter of slate, and the granddaughter of clay.' And so on."

Mengè must not be understood, however, to have been ignorant of the scientific names of the various stones, for no man knew them better than he, and whenever he sold a hundred specimens, he gave the scientific name to each. He was the *discoverer* of precious stones in Australia, and his splendid varieties of opal, emerald, and beryl, &c., &c., attracted great attention in the Great Exhibition of 1851.

As a linguist his attainments were also very extensive. It has been reported that he knew twenty languages. Mr Cawthorne says, "He knew Hebrew, Persian, Arabic, Greek, Latin, French, Russian, Icelandic, and English, besides a smattering of two or three others." He used to say that everybody should learn Hebrew, "because that is the language spoken in heaven." "When in England, he had been offered the professorship of Hebrew at Oxford, but he refused it; he would teach Hebrew to the world, not to a selected few." He was often solicited to fill lucrative posts, but he always declined. A college for China was the purpose of his life. "What, he would say, is the value of a few hundred weights of paltry emeralds, diamonds, or opals, to the welfare of 300,000,000 of Chinese, with a glorious literature, and wonderful social institutions?" He never had any desire for money. "When £300 were presented to him for pointing out in the early days of the colony the splendid special survey of Angus Park, and Flaxman Valley, he forthwith spent it in tobacco, cigars, &c., which he dis-

tributed among his German friends. On another occasion he got £50, which he transformed into reams of paper, in order to print six languages in comparative tables. We draw this notice to a close by the following graphic description of Mengè's dwelling-place:—

"In a stifling hot and dingy garret, with the bare shingles of the roof for a ceiling, up a dark, rickety, angular staircase, which to ascend you went sideways, and put your hands up to feel for the next step; squeezing through a rheumatic door, that even could not open to its legitimate width, you entered a wretched little room, by knocking your head against the rafters. Beneath could be heard the unceasing wail of a baby, and the heavy thump, thump of a primitive cradle; the industrious father of this early and late warbler, with a lapstone on his knees, and pipe in his mouth, joining in with his son and heir in the daily concert of his life: odours of soap, fumes of tobacco, and the peculiar scent of ironing and drying, found their resting-place in the shingles, in the furniture—such as it was,—in the bed, in the floor, in the old coat on the nail, and the bundle in the corner of Mengè's room. Behind a dim, smoky lamp, and on a pile of reams of printing paper, beside another pile of the same material for a table, near another pile that acted as a dumb waiter, Mengè could be seen, dressed in a faded morning gown, pipe in mouth, and pen in hand, and on a huge sheet of paper writing his comparative grammar of six languages; isolated reams stood for chairs, for washing stand, for footstool,—in a word, for any domestic purpose. Too bulky to carry about, Mengè was compelled at last to abandon them, as well as his grammar; and I believe they fell to the lot of the unfortunate printer of the six languages as a legacy."

Concerning Mengè's belief in evil spirits—his belief in *motion* as an infallible cure for every ill—and the circumstances of his death, which took place in the winter of 1852, we have not left ourselves room to say anything. C-R-G-S.

Lectures on English History. By the Rev. B. WILLMORE. Cornish Brothers, Birmingham. 1859. Price 4s.

THIS is in all respects a highly creditable performance. It sets forth, in a simple and unpretentious manner, all the material matters in English history, as they are viewed and described by our latest and best writers. As Mr. Willmore addresses especially those to whom the high class histories are inaccessible, his work is free from that searching anatomy of motives, that severely analytical scrutiny of minute details, which frequently interrupt our best histories, and often without adequate result. The division of the subject is a happy one, and consists of a chapter on each of the peoples who ruled this country before the Norman Conquest, and subsequently to that event; the deeds, good, bad, and indifferent, of the Plantagenets, Tudors, Stuarts, and the rest, are discussed impartially in one or more chapters each. The value of the work is enhanced by an earnest, christian tone which pervades it. We sincerely wish it may be as popular in its present published form as the lectures were when delivered last winter by Mr. Willmore—the fact of their deserved popularity then, is indeed the best justification of their publication.

The Long Bow of the Past: the Rifle for the Future. Reprinted from the *Cambridge Chronicle*. 1859.

WE have rarely met with a more complete or interesting account of the usages of archery than that furnished by this "Long Bow of the Past." For the want of a spirited tractate of this kind, the subject has been allowed to be neglected, for, as our author remarks, "there is little at the present day in England to afford any adequate idea of the high importance, the great skill, and the distinguished renown of the English archers." Now that the formation of volunteer rifle corps appears to be the order of the day, we have much pleasure in suggesting to any of our gallant readers who are contemplating the musket, that they should read this very instructive and interesting history of the progress of archery in our sea-girt isle. The reader will find the Acts of Parliament relating to archery, which have been by no means few, given in many cases *verbatim*, and in the old style, thereby considerably adding to the amusement of the work.

The Cornhill Magazine. No. I., January, 1860. London: Smith, Elder, and Co.

W. M. Thackeray, aided by his publishers, places before the reading world the best and cheapest periodical of the day,—the best in matter and in manner; the writing is good, and the "getting up" equal to it.

Much as this work has been talked about during the last few months, it certainly exceeds all expectations, and is in its first number a decided success. It opens with an agreeable instalment from Anthony Trollope, entitled, "Framley Parsonage," of "Barchester Towers" notoriety. The politics of ecclesiastical preferment appear to be the most prominent feature of the novel.

Sir John Bowring is supposed to be the author of an article on "the Chinese and Outer Barbarians," which advocates a peaceful policy, energetically carried out, as the happy medium for securing prosperous and permanently useful relations with the Celestial Empire. Sir John Burgoyne, with his large experience of military matters, explains what may be made of "Our Volunteers."

Mr. Thackeray himself appears in a new novel,—"*Lovel the Widower*,"—which promises a profitable exhibition of English life in the nineteenth century. The editor's pen also sends forth some agreeable gossip in his own way in the "*Roundabout Papers*." In both he has employed his pencil with appropriate illustrations. "*Studies in Animal Life*," by G. H. Lewes, are pleasing and popular illustrations of the wonders revealed by the microscope respecting the mysteries of physiological science.

The inaugural ode, by "Father Prout," to the author of "*Vanity Fair*," is rich, racy, and laughable.

Leigh Hunt is delicately estimated by his son, Mr. Thornton Hunt, in "*A Man of Letters of the Last Generation*."

An officer of the "*Fox*" gives from his private journal a very interesting paper on "the Search for Sir John Franklin," which is admirably illustrated.

Beauty, simplicity, and music flow with graceful ease in "The First Morning of 1860," by V., and a woman's aspirations for peace are seen in these lines, from the author of "Paul Ferroll."

We looked for this periodical with great interest, and if this, its first number, may be regarded as an earnest of its subsequent ones, we can foresee that it will become, *the Magazine par excellence*. So great a quantity of first class writing, so well and so cheaply provided for the public, will not only go far to make the reputed 60,000 copies of No. I. a permanent issue, but will do much towards elevating the national taste for first class literature. We wish a long life and great usefulness for the *Cornhill Magazine*, with a still increasing fame for its gifted Editor. L'OUVERIER.

Macmillan's Magazine. No. I. November; No. II. December, 1859. Cambridge: Macmillan and Co.

The general excellence of this new magazine has already attracted to itself a large share of the attention and support of the periodical reading public. Mr. Masson, its able editor, is well known as the author of a, as yet, unfinished "Life of John Milton," as a critic of unusual ability, and also, to a smaller circle, as a good poetical writer. He is supported by a large staff of talented contributors, among whom we must not omit to mention the author of "Tom Brown's School Days."

The first number is a good one, and the second quite equal to it.

Poetic Section.

BRITISH POETRY.

BALLADS.

In literature as in life, great pretensions die violent deaths, whereas unassuming endeavours not only endure of their own vitality, but are carefully nurtured and developed by that good old gardener, "the world."

The heavy epics of a few hundred years ago are now confined down in leaden slumbers, and a valiant man I trow is he who would have the temerity to disturb the dead. But the lightsome ballads of our remotest literary era are read even now with avidity, and, when read, remembered with no common pleasure. For it is unquestionably true in this as in every age, "that what we want is not so much light for the intellect as *dew upon* the heart;" and herein lies the secret of literary life. The brain never gives impulse to one tear to flow or one smile to beam. Dry facts soon become dry fossils. It is the *heart* that stands sentinel at every avenue of

sorrow, pity, and pleasure. It is the heart that enjoys and that endures. Therefore that which can pass in at its well-guarded wicket learns at once the secret of immortality.

A ballad is a popular epic. The ballads of a people are the expression of its undisguised life. In them no pretence is made to classical refinement. On the broad highway of common sympathies they make right for the heart-home of *the people*. The ballad-writer must be the man of the many, not the exponent of party views. He need not be richly endowed or highly learned, yet must be learned enough to know how to ring diamond thoughts in golden settings. It is his to be the priest of nature, and wed all that is simple, lovely, and pure in thought, to all that is manly and heroic in word and deed. An artless thought given in artless words is more beautiful than far-fetched imagery encased in curiously wrought language, just as a pale, fair maiden wrapt in pure white robes is more lovely far than a dazzlingly gorgeous lady, enamelled, powdered, and rouged, velvet-clad and jewelled; and so a ballad makes no artful pretences, but by its own merit stands or falls.

It must be inferred, from all historical antecedent, that in the early infancy of our civilization, ballad poetry had greater influence on the nation's political growth than had professed political diplomacy. Until the era of the printing press, our history was conserved in ballads. History-makers, whether by song or octavo, wield a mighty influence over their country. In that olden time the minstrel might be kind or malicious, of a usefully forgetful or a painfully retentive memory, a gentle flatterer, or a keen satirist, a powerful friend or an implacable enemy, qualities that of course no modern painters of a Tell or a Frederic ever abused. Ballads mostly appertain to the common people, and men of genius never have despised these.

Some of England's bravest, noblest, and wisest sons have written ballads, as many others have written in their praise. To imitate or rival the minstrels of the olden time is even now the effort of good, great, and wise men.

Sir Philip Sidney wrote,—“I never heard the old song of Percy and Douglas that I found not my heart moved more than with a trumpet; and yet it is sung but by some blind crowder, with no rougher voice than rude style, which being so evil appavelled in the dust and cobwebs of that uncivil age, what would it work, trimmed in the gorgeous eloquence of Pindare?”

Walter Scott, as is well-known, devoted the whole of his poetic power to ballad writing. Coleridge, Wordsworth, Southey, and Mackay, have done good service. Lord Macaulay has written “*Lays of Ancient Rome*,” which everybody has both read and admired; and the other day, Gerald Massey, in his “*Babe Christabel*,” produced a ballad not excelled by any.

As occasionally we return in our architecture to the Gothic or mediæval, so we return in our poetry to the bard, and the scald, and the minstrel. Relaxing from the strain of the university odes, as

superbly classically cold, we are glad to listen awhile to the prattle of the unpolished muse of our bookless ancestors.

Minstrels accompanied the Conqueror from Normandy. It is recorded that at the Battle of Hastings Tallifer sang the *Chanson de Roland*, rode in the foremost rank, smote the hardest blows, and died the bravest death.

The minstrels were skilled musicians, and in process of time became also declaimers of their own compositions. Le Grand says, "They could declaim, sing, compose music, play on several instruments, and accompany them."

Relative to these there are some curious facts on record.

In the privy purse expenses of Henry VII., payments are made, from which we select the following:—

1492. Feb. 4. To the childe that playeth on the records, £1; July 8. To the maydens of Lambeth for a May, 10s.; August 1. At Canterbury. To the children for singing in the gardyn, 3s. 4d.; 1493, Jan. 6. To Newark for making a song. £1; Nov. 12. To one Cornysse for a prophecy, in rewarde, 13s. 4d.

By the laws of Wales, a harp was "one of the three things necessary to constitute a gentleman or a freeman; and none could pretend to that character who had not one of these instruments, or could not play on it. To prevent slaves from pretending to be gentlemen, it was expressly forbidden to teach or to permit them to play upon the harp; and none but the king, the king's musicians, and gentlemen, were allowed to have harps in their possession. A gentleman's harp was not liable to be seized for debt, because the want of it would have degraded him from his rank, and reduced him to that of a slave.

In the twelfth century minstrelsy flourished. Richard I., of romantic temper and musical ear, patronized not only the warrior, but those who made warriors famous. His love for song was, as is well-known, the cause of his release from the Austrian dungeon of Durrenstein.

In the reign of Henry III. (A.D. 1252) Master Richard, the king's harper, received from the king forty shillings and a pipe of wine, also a pipe for Beatrice, his wife.

In the reign of Edward II. (A.D. 1309) at the feast of the installation of Ralph, Abbot of St. Augustine's, at Canterbury, seventy shillings was expended on minstrels,—seventy shillings at that time being equal to about £52 10s. of ours.

From the hurried glance we have taken, we will see that up to this time the poet was much in request. He was the novelist of the age, the type of our modern novelists—for is not a first-rate novel truth poetized? He was as necessary at a feast or public gathering of the olden time as is a lord mayor or alderman at one of to-day—occasionally useful, always ornamental. The finest collection of ballads is that made by Percy; in fact, most of our recent compilations are pillaged from his enchanting volumes. The most beautiful ancient songs, such as *Chevy Chase*, *Sir Cauline*, the

marriage of Sir Gawain, and others, are too long for insertion, we must be content with one or two shorter specimens.

GENTLE HERDSMAN, TELL TO ME.

GENTLE hearsdaman, tell to me
Of curtesy I thee pray,
Unto the towne of Walsingham,
Which is the right and ready way?

"Unto the towne of Walsingham
The way is hard to be gon;
And verry crooked are those pathes
For you to find out all alone."

Weere the miles doubled thrise,
And they never soe ill,
Itt were not enough for mine offence;
Itt is soe grievous and soe ill.

"Thy yeeares are young, thy face is faire,
Thy witts are weake, thy thoughts are greene;
Time hath not given thee leave as yett
For to commit so great a sinne."

Yes, hearsdaman, yes, soe woldest thou say,
If thou knowest soe much as I;
My witts, and thoughts, and all the rest,
Have well deserved for to die.

I am pot what I seeme to bee,
My clothes and sexe doe differ farr:
I am a weary woman, woe is me!
Borne to greeffe and irksome care.

For my beloved, and well-beloved,
My wayward cruelty could kill:
And though my teares will nought avail,
Most dearly I bewail him still.

He was the flower of noble wights,—
None ever more sincere colde bee;
Of comely mien and shape hee was,
And tenderlye hee loved mee.

When thus I saw he loved me well,
I grewe so proud his paine to see,
That I, who did not know myselfe,
Thought scorn of such a youth as hee,

And grew soe coy, and nice to please,
As woman's lookes are often soe;
He might not kisse, nor hand, forsooth,
Unlesse I willed him soe to doe,

Thus, being wearyed with delayes,
 To see I pittyed not his greeffe,
 He gott him to a secrett place,
 And there he dyed without releeffe.

And for his sake these weeds I weare,
 And sacrifice my tender age;
 And every day Ile begg my bread,
 To undergoe this pilgrimage.

Thus every day I fast and pray,
 And ever will doe till I dye;
 And gett me to some secrett place,
 For soe did hee, and soe will I.

Now, gentle heardsman, aske no more,
 But keepe my secretts I thee pray;
 Unto the towne of Walsingham
 Show me the right and ready way.

Now, goe thy wayes, and God before!
 For He must ever guide thee still;
 Turne down that dale, the right hand path,
 And so, faire pilgrim, fare thee well!

Goldsmith's "Edwin and Emma," as also Percy's "Friar of Orders Gray," are adaptations and enlargements of this ballad. For others of equal and superior power, we must refer the reader to the "Reliques of Ancient Poetry," to Ellis's "Metrical Romances," Mallet's "Northern Antiquities," and similar works bearing on our subject.

From the study of early ballad poetry, we see on what foundation the elaborate system of modern poetry is built, and learn anew the lesson we so often unlearn,—that noble endings must have small beginnings; that PERFECTION is no sudden blaze caught from heaven and flashed upon earth by the sudden inspiration of transcendent genius—but is rather the outgrowth of centuries of toil; the jubilant freedom earned after many cycles of trembling endeavours, and of faltering hopes.

We learn, also, of what stuff our ancestors were made; and, spite of all our self-love, and all our exaltation of our highly flattered and most dearly beloved nineteenth century, we are forced to admit that they were (are we?) good men and true.

We learn what things were held most in repute, what virtues were most virtuous, and what morals most approved; and, spite of the coarseness of their language, and the undisguised nakedness of all their thoughts, whether good or bad, we are fain to admit that the old English oak was as strong, as beautiful, as useful, and as durable, before French polish was laid upon its surface, as it is now, or perhaps ever will be.

We learn that ladies were skilled in surgery. Now, if we were American born, it would be easy to earn laurels by using this fact

as the key-note of an impassioned ecstasy on woman's rights; but being this side of the land of dollars, we say what we believe, and that is, that in binding up wounds, and administering medicines our dead and gone Crystabelles, Annettes, and Rosalindes, did well. Now, surgery is a science excelled by no other, demanding nerve, strong intellect, and the unwearied devotion of a lifetime. Therefore, now though women could do well, men can do, because they can endure, much better. It is woman's duty to make a heaven of her home. Hospital practice is no mission of hers. When men are so scarce that none can be found to amputate a limb, or trepan a broken crown, then it will be woman's turn, but not till then. We learn that ghosts were an institution, and had privileges allowed them quite equal to the requirements of so respectable a *body*, if, indeed, such a spiritual corporation can be called by so earthly a name. A landscape gardener can tell you how to produce a delicate tint on the rose; a student of acoustics can explain the philosophy of echoes; a geologist will account for subterranean fires, and volcanic eruptions; an entomologist will tell how industrious spiders weave their curtained tapestries on moonlit nights; but if you go back to the fifteenth century and the troubadours, you will find that Venus, hurrying barefoot through the woods, gave from her bleeding feet its crimson blush to the rose. When the nymph pined for love, her voice was left on earth, and still, under the name of Echo, she fondly repeats each earth-born accent that she hears. When the heavens thundered, angels were fighting in the upper air; and when, on a rimy morning, the silken gossamer hung like a veil over tree, and leaf, and flower—it was the dwarfs and fairies, who had been busy decorating the groves for midnight revelries.

Now, all this was very pretty, although, of course, you will say, very foolish. Decidedly prettier than table turning,—not nearly so foolish as spirit rapping. Does it not seem that we move in a circle? Fashions, fears, and prejudices, ride their hobbies, and pay their pennies, and have their jaunt on the great merry-go-round in Vanity Fair; and another crowd waits for its turn, and another, and another, and though the weather may change, the round is kept up, and all have their rides, and pay their debts.

The philosophy of history is poetry; the philosophy of poetry is love; and this is what we learn pre-eminently from the study of poetry in history,—that men have always loved true nobleness, true chivalry, true endeavour, and true intent; that faults are to be contrasted with virtues, and not erected above them; that the past and the present are not chasmed asunder, but are parts of one harmonious whole, which futurity shall complete; and that the ages die not, but live in each other, the darkness of to-day blending with the light of yesterday, the picture ever growing more beautiful under the Master's hand. We learn that life will be beautiful if it is true; and that simple wants and simple pleasures go ever with noble sympathies and holy resolves.

F. G.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

64. Will some friend be good enough to inform me, through the *British Controversialist*, the origin of the title "Pope?" and how it came to be applied to the head of the R. Catholic Church? S.

65. Perhaps one of your readers will give me a philosophical solution of the supposed supernatural appearance observable in graveyards, which tend so much to confirm the credulous in their superstition?—G.

66. *Kaleidoscope*.—From what is the term kaleidoscope derived? Who was the inventor, and what is the object of this instrument?—G. H.

67. Having frequently, in the course of my reading, met with a mathematical statement to the following effect, viz:—"That two lines may be drawn from any two points, in such a manner, as that the more they are produced, they shall approach nearer and nearer; and yet, though produced *ad infinitum*, they shall never meet." I would esteem it a great favour if one of your learned correspondents could help me to a solution of the difficulty. I have no doubt whatever that such is the fact; but, as yet, to me it belongs to the domains of the incomprehensible.—ELECTIC.

68. Will any of your readers skilled in meteorology kindly inform me through the medium of your pages, of a good work on that science, with its price? Should treatises on the subject happen to be very costly, perhaps there may be a small work explanatory of the action of barometers, anemometers, thermometers, &c, which would answer my purpose almost as well. An early reply will confer an obligation on

T. P. T.

69. Can any reader of the *British Controversialist* furnish information as to the process or art of exhibiting "Dissolving Views," or refer me to any

literary work on the subject?—G. A. H. E.

70. Dr. Spring, in his "Obligations of the World to the Bible," has this passage, in speaking of the Hebrew; he says:—The whole language is contained in the Bible, and no other book contains in it an entire language. Dr. Clarke, in his "Commentary," has this passage:—"As the English Bible does not contain the whole of the English language, so the Hebrew Bible does not contain the whole of the Hebrew language." Will any of your correspondents give me some light on this subject?—P. M. L.

71. To have a thorough knowledge of the Greek Testament, is it necessary to learn Latin?—P. M. L.

72. Are there any elementary books in Greek on the same principle as Akiu's elementary books in French? or what is the easiest or best Greek book for a learner to get?—P. M. L.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

58. *Profane History and the Miracles of the New Testament*.—We do not find fault with "A Doubter" for doubting, since Christianity appeals to our reason as well as to our faith, but we cannot account for the supposition that his question, which is treated by Dr. Lardner in eleven octavo volumes, can be answered in the Inquirer's columns of the *Controversialist*. If he has read Lardner's "Credibility," Paley's "Evidences," Adams and Campbell on "Miracles," Leslie, Douglas, and others, and is not convinced how can he expect satisfaction from an answer in these pages? If he has not read such works, it is rather too early to proclaim his doubts. We assume, again, that he opposes "history" to the "New Testament" inadvertently; for there is no history better attested than the four gospels. It would have saved some

trouble if he had defined the *kind* of history from which he is desirous to obtain "corroborative" evidence. If he questions the credibility of inspired writers, we assume he would not thank us for a reference to the ecclesiastical historian, Eusebius.

He seems to put faith in *pagan* historians, and to please him, we will say a few words on this class of writers. Why does the "Doubter" think that such a man as Tacitus is more entitled to confidence than the evangelists? He was not an eye-witness of what occurred in Judea—the scene of the miracles which are cited—whereas the evangelists were eye-witnesses. Tacitus, then, could only have written from hearsay. The reports must have come through either the friendly, the unfriendly, or the indifferent, to Christianity. The report of the first would have been no better to "A Doubter" than what he already discredits; that of the second would have been objectionable to a candid and honest doubter; and of the third, worthless to an intelligent doubter. Why, then, does the inquirer look to second-hand statements for testimony to the miracles of Christ?

Tacitus was, in point of time, nearest to the age of miracles, and is undoubtedly one of the best of pagan historians. Assuming that he had undertaken to give to the citizens of Rome an account of Christianity, as he did an account of the Jewish religion, what "corroboration" Tacitus would have furnished, may be judged from the fact, that he gravely tells his countrymen that the Jews were in the habit of worshipping the effigy of an ass! This ridiculous slander is repeated by Plutarch. Tacitus, again, describes Christianity as "a pernicious superstition." Does "Doubter" find anything in the New Testament of which this description is a "corroboration"? Pliny came into closer contact with Christians than any other pagan whose works are extant. He wrote more than 240 letters to the emperor Trajan, and in two of them finds fault with Christians for worshipping a man

not recognized in Roman polytheism, and for emptying pagan temples in Asia Minor; for being more moral, more honest, more faithful, and kinder-hearted than heathens were in general. A system founded on the miracles of Christ, and which made its advocates what Pliny describes them to have been, Tacitus pronounces to be "a pernicious superstition." Cannot the "Doubter" extend his doubts a little?

Why, again, does he prefer the pagan to the Christian historian? It cannot be on the ground that the former would have discarded the miraculous; for the history of Livy abounds in prodigies. Porphyry—a mortal enemy to Christianity—wrote a miraculous history of Pythagoras; and Tacitus relates two miraculous cures wrought by Vespasian. Speaking of these cures, Tacitus observes—"They who were present relate them, even at this time, when there is nothing to be gained by lying." This remark is worth the consideration of the "Doubter." The same historian records the punishment of Christians as "a set of men of a new and magical superstition." These men, wherever they went, called upon all to believe in their "magical superstition." They had "nothing to gain by lying." They had everything to dread from persisting to maintain the truth of the miracles, or the magic, as Tacitus chose to describe them. A little "doubt" would have saved their lives, and have placed them in the same position of ease and safety in which the question we are trying to answer was penned and sent off to the *Controversialist*. Pliny attests the honesty and fidelity of this "set of men." Could honest men have promulgated falsehood? If they were under a delusion, the man, who informs us that the Jews worshipped an ass, and that Christianity was a "pernicious superstition," was not the man to prove that they were deluded. If they were deluded, it is because that they were superstitious and credulous. This must not, however, be assumed, but proved; and proved not from their detractor, Tacitus,

but from their works, which everywhere overturned superstition; and from their writings, which give no evidence of credulity.

The notices we have in heathen or anti-christian writers are few, vague, and disdainful. Christianity came from Judea, and everything Jewish was scornfully treated. Its advocates declared an open war against Greek and Roman idolatry and polytheism. They were put to death, but their doctrines were not examined. Had the pagan writers said more than they did, it must have been from either a study of the gospels, which the "Doubter" can do, without asking what pagans thought of them; or from hearsay, which would have added nothing to the testimony of eye-witnesses. Had they written more, and more candidly, we may judge how their testimony would have been treated. Josephus once speaks of Christ "as a wise man, if he may be called a man; for he performed many wonderful works," and, after being crucified, "on the third day appeared alive again to his disciples." Doubters have done all they can to discredit this passage; and we wonder that our "Doubter" asks for more of the same kind.

The miracles of Christianity rest, directly upon the credibility of the gospels, and indirectly upon the credibility of a miracle itself. In reference to the former, Paley's "Evidences" and Lardner's "Credibility" should be studied by every honest inquirer. As to the latter, let every "Doubter" read Hume's attack upon miracles, and then Paley, Campbell, Douglas, and others, to see if the philosophical sceptic really brought his usual sagacity and wit to bear upon the subject.—M. H.

58. "Doubter" will find, more fully than we can give in these pages, the information for which he asks, by a reference to the following books:—The Introduction to Trench on the "Miracles;" Paley's "Evidences;" Horne's Introduction; or, if these cannot be conveniently consulted, that invaluable little work, "The Bible Hand-Book," by

Dr. Angus, will throw light upon the subject.—J. H. G.

64. *The origin of the title "Pope."*—It is generally agreed that a certain degree of deference was paid to the church at Rome and the christian societies dispersed throughout the empire in the primitive ages.

St. Peter appears to have held a certain pre-eminence among the apostles; and to his see was allowed a moral superiority. The title of Pope, or Papa, is assumed by the Bishop of Rome, as the head of the Roman Catholic Church. The word "Papa" is used, by the Greeks, to denote a presbyter. In the earlier ages the title was given to bishops in general; but Gregory VII., A.D. 1076, decreed that the title of Papa should be given only to the Bishop of Rome, as a mark of superior respect.

According to the chronology of the Roman church, St. Peter was the first Bishop of Rome, and suffered martyrdom A.D. 57. He was succeeded by Linus, who died A.D. 68, and was followed by Clemens Romanus. Evaristus was Bishop of Rome about the year 100; and Alexander I. about 109. The chronology, however, of the earlier Popes is often obscure, and the dates uncertain. By some authorities it is stated that Hygenus was the first Bishop of Rome who took the title, in 138. The Pope's supremacy over the christian church was established by Boniface III. in the year 677. The first Pope that kept an army was Leo IX., 1054. G. S.

65. *Supernatural Appearances.*—It is difficult to create a disbelief in the supernatural; but we may mention that from some experiments of the Baron von Reichenbach, it seems probable that, wherever chemical action is going on, light is evolved; though it is only seen by persons possessing peculiar (though not very rare) powers of sight, and by them only under peculiar circumstances, that it can be seen. It occurred to him that such persons might, perhaps, see light over graves in

which dead bodies were undergoing decomposition. He says:—"The desire to inflict a mortal wound on the monster, superstition, which, from a similar origin, a few centuries ago, inflicted on European society so vast an amount of misery, and by whose influence not only hundreds, but thousands of innocent persons died in tortures on the rack and the stake:—this desire made me wish to make the experiment, if possible, of bringing a highly sensitive person by night into a church-yard." The experiment succeeded; light "was

chiefly seen over all new graves; while there was no appearance of it over very old ones." The fact was confirmed in subsequent experiments by five other sensitive persons. G. S.

66. *Kaleidoscope*.—The name is derived from the Greek, and signifies literally, "beautiful forms to see." It was invented by Dr. Brewster, of Edinburgh, and is intended to assist jewelers, glass painters, and other ornamental artists, in the formation of patterns, of which it produces an infinite number. SIGMA.

The Topic.

ARE THE REVIVALS IN THE NORTH OF IRELAND THE RESULT OF REAL RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Religious hypocrisies are incomprehensibilities, and there is great unlikelihood that the revivals are such. "Sin, Satan, the world, and the flesh," do not often fight amongst themselves; nor is the devil remarkable for dividing his house against himself. Hence the Irish revivals are either the results of real religious convictions, or Satan has become a missionary of Christ.—TOUCH.

"The peaceable fruits of righteousness," which have been exhibited by the converts in Ireland, and the statistics of morality in the neighbourhood, are indubitable evidence of their reality and beneficiality.—PRO DEO.

Though Satan may occasionally transform himself into an angel of light, he does not often reform himself; nor is he generally in the habit of inclining his followers to follow righteousness, and live at peace with all men. *He* must have changed his tactics, or *God* must have worked this work; and therefore it is real.—SPERO.

The Spirit and power of God has, in all times, been poured forth effusively in reviving the holiness of nations;

and it may, therefore, be presumed that *now*, also, He is graciously and really converting the people.—TRUE.

The number, character, ability, and disinterestedness of those who give evidence of the "real religious conviction" of many who have been brought under the influence of the Irish revivals, make their testimony unimpeachable.—P. L.

The very interest taken in the question, and the strong impression it has made on the public mind, are witnesses to the reality of the revivals. "Not for nothing" has the land been agitated throughout its whole bounds by news of the conversions and changes effected among people who have hitherto been possessed only of a *name* to live, but who have now given well-grounded proof of their renewed and revived nature.—EX.

The suddenness, the efficaciousness, the extent, and the propagative energy of the Irish Revivals, prove that they must be the work of the Spirit,—that they must, therefore, be the result of real religious conviction.—R. B.

The Pentecostal instantaneousness and ready submission of its subjects to

religious propriety, show that the revival is real.—Q.

That the Irish revivals result from genuine conviction may be, if from nothing else, deduced from this—

"That neither evil tongues, harsh judgments, nor the sneers of selfish men"

have been able to prevail with their subjects to give up their cheerful faith that they have known Christ savingly.—DEEM.

Simultaneous, wide-stretching, and troublesome hypocrisy is improbable; and hence the Irish converts are more likely to be honest than deceiving.—PALM.

That a great movement, most important, if genuinely the result of conviction, has taken place in the western world, the North of Ireland, and the South of Scotland, there can be no doubt. I think the revival real and *bona fide*, on these grounds:—1st. Great changes in the moral life of these parts have occurred. 2nd. Considerable sacrifices have been made. 3rd. Much ridicule has been borne. 4th. Most cheering correctness in ascribing their illumination to the operations of the only Comforter, has been shown by the converts. 5th. The pathos and the power of the prayers of these people have been such as could not have been expected, unless resulting from the "dayspring from on high."—CREDO.

Religion is a personal matter; it must have its origin, humanly speaking, in the individual heart. Truly its source is from God. History furnishes many instances in which Divine influence has been exerted in opposition to the tendencies of the subject of religious awakenings, e. g., Jonah, St. Paul. These influences have been developed in the purified, sanctified life of the subject thereof. Recent revivals, although not attended by miraculous interpositions, have manifested a changed character—a purer moral life, and a stricter discharge of social duties; a greater love for truth, holiness, and religious exercises. Hence they must

be considered as coming from God.—PATRIE.

God's Holy Spirit, like "the wind, bloweth where it listeth. So is every-one that is born of God." The Holy Spirit is the effective cause of all true conversion; therefore, as the present revivals give instances of true conversion, they are not only truthful, but from God.—VERITAS.

Religious revivals may, by the coincident affection of many persons, in a similar manner produce upon others an appearance of true conversion, only which, being evanescent in its nature, soon results in relapse, when the exciting cause, viz., numbers and association, has ceased; but this pseudo-conversion is not a valid objection to the truthfulness of any revival, because such relapses being the exception, and not the rule, cannot affect the truthfulness nor sincerity of the many who believe, through grace, to the saving of their souls. Hence all revivals must be from God, and are a blessing to the church and the world.—DUX.

The Universal Church believes in the efficacy of the means of grace—reading the Scriptures, private and social, the preaching of the Word. The Catholic Church has its special missions; the Protestant Church its days set apart; and Dissenters have their special services for the attainment of more true-heartedness in religious duties. God has uniformly blessed such means. Hence revivals are to be encouraged by the Church.—ALPHA.

Religious revivals appear to indicate extraordinary instances where God, in His providence, pours out His Spirit upon men, in copious showers of mercy and grace. The Day of Pentecost is such an instance; and if men in great numbers are awakened from the torpidity of insensibility; are aroused from indifference to religious truth; are made sensitive to the calls of mercy, and the heinousness of sin; are quickened to the perception of the truth, beauty, and love manifested in redemption, purchased by a dying Saviour;—if men,

we say, are thus affected in sincerity in these days of ours—we must conclude that pentecostal blessings have not ceased; that the God of old times, the God of our fathers, is the God of their children. The present revivals exhibit these effects; therefore they are true revivals, and from God.—PAX.

When the wicked forsake their wickedness, and the scoffer becomes ashamed of his scoffing; when the liar, the idle, the profligate, find their peculiar vices unsatisfactory, in a moral sense, and seek for pardon and peace, through Jesus' blood—that secondary cause, or the means by which such a result is brought about, must be of God. The revivals, for some time past before the public notice, have evidenced changes like these; therefore these revivals are a means by which God is increasing the number of His faithful children.—BETA.

The ways of God are mysterious in their mercy, grace, and love. But their mysteriousness cannot be proof against their worthiness of reception. The same wind which dashes one vessel to destruction, may waft thousands to the haven of joy, the port of safety. If the Holy Spirit, striving mightily with the cold, indifferent, unknown, and lethargic; with the profane, the sensualist, the breaker of all laws, human and divine, and subdues many to a loving obedience, a gracious walk and conversation in daily life, what objection can it be if some, being tempted of the Evil One, fall into despondency and despair? Such cases cannot be brought as objections against the conversion of the many. Hence true conversions are proof of a true revival.—OMEGA.

The subjectivity of religion in the individual is created by God acting upon the free will of the subject. Evidence of the will being religiously affected, is evidence that God is working in the soul. Therefore true religion is evidence of christian revival.—OMICRON.

"By their fruits shall ye know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or

figs of thistles?" Is it possible for us to gather good fruit from the tree of evil, or evil fruit from that which is decidedly good? Certainly not. Therefore, this revival movement, which has had such a visible effect on the community, in checking drunkenness, vice, and immorality, must be the result of genuine religion. Try to account for it in any other way, and you fail; for its fruits plainly declare it to be the work of God, drawing men unto Christ. Its results are a serious and deep conviction of sin; and the only object by which you can gain their attention is Christ, and him crucified; and the only subject by which you can interest them, is Christ their Saviour. Sure evidences these that the revivals are the work of the Spirit; that they have arisen in deep religious convictions, and are progressing in the same.—J. T. K.

The present consideration of the revivals appears to us well-timed. Their novelty has passed away; the movement has now spread through the length and breadth of the land, and sufficient reports of the proceedings in the North of Ireland having appeared, a pretty accurate opinion may now be formed regarding them. Yet several causes conspire to lead the superficial observer astray. A portion of the press has derided the movement, because it numbers among its converts many who have not enjoyed the advantages of education. Were this a valid objection to revivals, it would apply equally to every religious belief, and even to such evident truths as two and two make four; because many know this truth, who could not express it either by letters or numerals. The undue prominence given to the physical manifestations led to the idea that the movement could be resolved into one of mere nervous excitement, and that it was a sort of hysterical epidemic, induced by a particular condition of the atmosphere. This error lay in mistaking an accidental for an essential quality; the number so affected having been small compared with the number awakened:

and revivals having taken place where no such appearance presented itself; though where it does, it may *generally* be considered as a proof of the genuineness of the work. As in the parable, we find tares have sprung up among the wheat in the present harvest. The socialist has rejoiced over these impostors, few though they be. An infidel lately declared that one such case disproved the truth of the whole movement: if this were correct, the first infidel who forsakes his unbelief will prove infidelity to be "a pretence, a delusion, and a snare." As, in a court of justice, the witness who prevaricates damages his own evidence only, not that of the other witnesses, so also in this case; and, therefore, the objection may be dismissed. And now, when we consider that intemperance and immorality have been checked; that crime has diminished; that religious books are eagerly sought after; that nightly churches are filled till a late hour; that prayer meetings—meetings that had formerly but an occasional and thin attendance of elderly females—are crowded morning, noon, and night; when we consider that this is not a spark fanned into flame by priestly art, but is a work commenced and carried on principally by laymen, embracing all classes within its influence, the old, the young, the rich, the poor, the literate and the illiterate, we are driven to the conclusion that it is divine in its nature, and is the result of real religious convictions.—NOMA.

That the revivals in the North of Ireland are the result of real religious convictions, we think there can be no reasonable doubt. Not that we regard the movement as accompanied with anything supernatural; for beyond the number and character of the persons converted, there is nothing strange or uncommon in the movement. That a great number, if not the majority of the cases are sincere, we have good reason to believe. The greater part of those who have been "converted" are of a class who have not been in the

habit of attending any stated place of public worship; and are thus, for the first time, made acquainted with, or brought under the influence of, the gospel. The services being conducted in a simple but impressive manner, all can take part in them;—and when the consciences of the hearers are touched, they are constrained to cry out, "What must we do to be saved?" That there have been and are instances of deception and imposture, we cannot deny, for corruption and imposition will creep into everything, more especially when the matter is of a religious nature.

With respect to what are called "physical manifestations," we think every means should be taken to guard against, and discountenance them, as they give scope to ridicule and fraud, and are frequently attended with lamentable consequences.

These "manifestations" are nothing more than symptoms of hysterical seizures, consequent upon an overwrought condition of mind, and an enfeeblement of the body, due to prolonged abstinence and great mental excitement; and, therefore, fraught with serious possible consequences to body and mind, occasionally resulting in insanity and death. That these are the natural symptoms of an "overwrought condition of mind," and not peculiar to religious excitement, individual temperament, or physical or mental defect, is beyond doubt. For if any subject be allowed to take undue possession of the mind, the mightiest intellect must bend, and reason yield her seat. Therefore, though we do not see in the "manifestations" anything supernatural, still we consider them to be the best proof of the reality of the "convictions." For what, in the present instance, is occupying their minds, and causing them to be in this "overwrought condition," but anxiety and concern for their soul's salvation? That this concern or conviction is *real*, we have the best proof in the *reality* of its painful effects.

"By their fruits ye shall know them,"

—and that the revivals have wrought a beneficial change in the character and morals of great numbers is generally allowed; thus showing the danger of forming a hasty or adverse opinion of them. "For if this work be of man, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it."—J. M.

NEGATIVE.

Conversion is not an *impression*, but a *change*.—P.

The suddenness of the apparent effect is neither a proof of the divineness of the cause, the reality of that effect, nor of the likelihood of its continuance.—OWEN.

To be a *revival* indeed, Christ must give his good Spirit, and must create the nature anew, and sanctify the life; but the *showy* religiousness of the North of Ireland revivalists does not seem to indicate that they have partaken of that renewed nature which teaches us to "walk humbly."—B. F.

Conviction is not in general an *act* but a *work*.—S.

To touch is not to change, and to be stricken down is not necessarily to be raised again to newness of life in Jesus.—A. B. C.

We are not warranted to believe that in any great measure the ordinary operations of grace will be superseded by the extraordinary agencies of the Spirit. We are told to use the means, but what means can be used, if all means be set aside?—THREE.

The extraordinary beating up of the clergy of all denominations for something startling and Spurgeonic, and the turning of all eyes upon the extreme religious fervour of the Irish, is quite enough to account for the generation of that impious pretentiousness to piety which has been shown in such abundance among the convertites, *alias* "convicts."—C.

Trustworthy evidence of "real religious conviction" can only be obtained by the testimony of a life, not of a few months. Call no man blessed till he dies.—X. Y. Z.

There is nothing *comic* in any of the

conversions of which we have notice in the Scriptures; but the absurdities of the Irish revivals have required their advocates to become also their apologists, and they are therefore not likely to be real.—D. V.

Revivals, like small-pox, fever, and cholera, are *epidemic*; they are not, therefore, *special*, though they may be *beneficial* manifestations of the laws, order, and government of God.—RIGHT.

We all know how often, in particular districts and at particular times, *tendencies* of thought develop themselves, and spread by a sort of spontaneous growth, but with little or no root in the heart or mind; *e. g.*, the Rebeccaites in Wales; the Joanna Southcoteites, the Thomists of Canterbury, John Wilkism, &c., &c., which have now no abiding in men's minds. It seems to me that the Irish revival is a species of moral insanity, superinduced by a perverse and perverted notion of the true means of salvation, which gives peace to the conscience and joy to the Holy Ghost, instead of the disturbing and disturbance-raising influences which the prayer meetings of the sister island have exhibited. There is too much surface sentiment in this as in everything else. "Still waters run deep," and *vice versa*. This is a cheap and easy way of rehabilitating one's character, to wear a white neckcloth, attend chapel, and say long prayers, that we may be seen of men; but it is not true religion to neglect the *true* duties of life—the home and homely requirements of the gospel—to noise and pray in words. *Laborare est orare*.—DON'T IT!

The physical prostrations which have been observed so frequently, as an accompaniment of the revivals in the North of Ireland, are regarded by many as a great argument against the movement being of the Spirit of God. We think that though in many instances the deep conviction of sin has been sincere, and has produced that prostration of the frame of theretofore strong and healthy individuals already alluded to,

that by far the larger part of those so-called conversions are but the result of a certain fashion or mania, which is to be found in religion as in other departments. We shall look forward with anxiety to the returns from the inspector of prisons' office for this year in the revival districts, as one of the sure tests of the permanent and scriptural character of the movement; but we cannot help thinking that what originally may have been the work of God's Spirit, has been made a trade capital of by men whose duties to themselves, their people, and their God, would have been better discharged by consistent attendance upon their ordinary labours, before the revival panic had seized upon their minds. When we find men trying to "get up" a revival in a place, just as a showman would try to get up a good piece of machinery or performance, we are not inclined to estimate the work in the light which probably it, in itself, ought properly to be regarded.—G.H.S.

We think that real conversion of men, from a state of ungodliness to a state of godliness, comes not suddenly, but by slow and almost imperceptible degrees. The Spirit, which alone can convert men, works inwardly, and effects a change silently, without noise or outward show—as the seed which is cast into the earth, after months, perhaps years, of seeming unfruitfulness, in due season bursts forth—grows gradually, and yields fruit. So is it with man. In our opinion, the so-called revivals of the present day, like those of the past, are not the result of real religious convictions, but merely the result of a physiological disease, which is accompanied in many cases by hysterical, cataleptic, apoplectic, and prostrating pantomimic exhibitions—an insane enthusiasm, heightened in most cases by the ignorance and superstition of the parties foremost in the movement; that real christian feelings are not the basis or the cause of the revivals, must be acknowledged simply from the fact of the "noise," the clamour, the outward and visible "parade" show accompan-

ing them,—the belief the revivalists possess as to their superiority in a spiritual point of view—"their self-righteousness,"—the idea they have that those not possessed of the same infatuation as themselves will be among the lost. In none of this is exemplified the teachings of the gospel, or the feelings which should actuate and permeate true Christians. That a physiological disease is the cause principally of the mania, there can be no doubt, when we examine the absurd revelations and statements made by the individuals who suppose themselves "struck." Religion, instead of producing unhappiness, mental derangement, lowness, or despondingness, has quite the opposite effect; for a religious person, in whatever position placed—whatever trials and afflictions he has to contend against—is always happy and contented, being sustained by God. In Belfast and the neighbourhood, prostrations, fits, &c., are looked on as signs from above; to those that look upon them as such, in the language of Scripture we would say, "O ye hypocrites, who seek after a sign; and there shall be no sign given, but the sign of the prophet Jonas." "Ye Pharisees, make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness."—GEORGE.

The revival mania, recently begun and carried on in the North of Ireland to an amazing extent, is a movement originating in the weakness of human nature, wrought upon by artful and designing men, who consider that they are the viceregents of the Deity, from whom they have received their mission. Hysterical, not sound religious convictions, constitute the *malady*, which is no harbinger of genuine and durable conversion. The origin of these ravings is evidently traceable to the source assigned, and not to the workings of the divine Spirit.

Upon the authority of the Ven. Archdeacon Stopford we may compile a *critique* upon the movement in ques-

tion. The archdeacon investigates the revivals, and, in the course of such inquiries as were calculated to arrive at a veritable conclusion, assigns the causes of the movement to *hysteria*. And according to the descriptions of the converts after being "struck," no person of ordinary discernment will pronounce otherwise than that they are more fit for *medical* than *religious* treatment. The archdeacon, in his description of what transpired before him, where the most remarkable cases took place, interprets the cause from the effects; for physical prostrations thus, in the absence of great strength of mind, the terror-striking tones and accents of the preachers, were calculated to alarm any one. The archdeacon himself confesses his inability to restrain tears, on account of such an extent of human delusion and suffering, yet he remained self-possessed. The scenes are so graphically described, that none can hesitate to aver that they are the temporary excitements of the moment, rather than the evidences of sound conviction, and the harbingers of a genuine repentance.

The archdeacon charges the preachers with duplicity and craft; as they appear, he says, to understand the sources of the *malady*, and so work upon their hearers' weakness to produce their contemplated designs. The account given of these deluded beings, after their removal from the congregation amongst whom they had been "struck," is most melancholy to recite, viz., *delusion, delirium, complete madness*. Two cases are reported by the correspondent of the *Daily News*. The frenzied feelings being at the zenith, one woman plucked out her right eye deliberately, requesting her husband to do the same, that they *might enter the kingdom of heaven*. She subsequently made attempts to bite off her right hand, and, lockjaw supervening, she died. Another refused to receive nourishment, alleging that she had been informed that she was then in a better condition for heaven than she would be at any other time, as the

Holy Spirit was freshly poured out upon her!

What are the descriptions the archdeacon gives of this *modern pentecost*? We will here introduce a short passage. "It is notorious that hundreds of mill girls, in Belfast, have *prayed* and *are praying* to be "struck." This was acknowledged to me by an elder or office-bearer in the place of worship famous for such conversions. It was also told me by several of the mill girls themselves. I need hardly say that such a prayer answers itself. I say they learn in places of worship to offer such prayers. I was myself present in a Presbyterian meeting-house, at a prayer offered with the most frenzied excitement and gesticulations, that God would *then* and *there* descend and *strike* all unconverted to the earth. This was the most frightful scene I ever witnessed in life. No such scene would be permitted in *any Babylon upon earth*. It is *shocking to hear this well-known morbid sympathy mistaken for the mutual love of God's children*."

We think we have done enough in the way of transcription to inform our readers that the revivals are hypocrisy on the part of the priesthood, and delusion on the part of the converts. We have been witnesses of similar revivals, when children have prayed to God to "touch their parents' hearts," and when these exclamations have been vociferated by a shrill voice, the most awful responses and hideous noises have been made. Soon after these *fervent and successful prayers*, the converts relapsed, and soon were accounted the most reprobate and abandoned. "Every tree is known by its fruits," but these revivals are not, in our estimation, the signs of genuine piety, neither are the preachings of the ministers in accordance with the doctrines of the lowly Jesus, who said, "Come unto me, all ye who are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest."—S. F. T.

The apostles of the Irish revivals have predicted, in glowing language, the dawn of a new era. They have

loudly announced that the present supposed outpouring of the Spirit is a sure sign of the latter days; the "struck" and "awakened" as the real converted; their writhings and contortions as the purifying of their souls from all uncleanness; that the reign of perfect peace was begun; that charity, the greatest of all the graces, will henceforth be the guiding angel of Ireland's chosen people. But in vain do we look for the "earnest and foretaste" of this; in vain for that "perfect love that casteth out fear." "Can the atmosphere of the mind in a state of storm"—rent and torn; its very citadel tottering on the verge of insanity—be taken as evidence of real religious conviction? Can a blasted fig-tree produce fruit? Can the weak in imagination, and the feeble in will; invalids and fanatics, whose minds have been debilitated, be capable of imbibing real religious convictions? Yet these are the saints they would have us imitate,—to throw down the strong fortress of reason, and give full scope to the wild play of sympathetic delusion, and call it the workings of the Spirit. "The will is the natural faculty of the soul, by which it determines in favour of what appears to it either true or good." The will in relation to the Irish revivals appears utterly powerless; the ephemeral excitement of the feelings is the only characteristic of it: the entire absence of will by the "struck" is proof that the noblest part of our nature is set aside—that the unreasoning for the time reigns supreme. Well-meaning but misguided men, both lay and clerical, have thrown themselves into the vortex of delusion with more zeal than prudence; they have encouraged it, by every means in their power, to increase the number of the "struck." We heard an illiterate man praying in a crowded assembly, calling upon God to "strike down twenty or thirty." In their zeal for the supposed good work, they have not been troubled with scruples. The most ignorant and unthinking were objects of special interest; those who never thought, never read, of the glo-

rious truths of the gospel, were suddenly awakened to the full realization of perfect bliss in Jesus. One minister boasted, in vindication of the revivals not being confined entirely to the ignorant and careless, of *one real lady being "struck;"* and, that there might be no mistake about her being a lady, he told his audience "that she had on a fine silk dress, and a real gold chain." Such artifices are a mockery, and unworthy the high and holy calling of a minister of Christ's gospel, and go far to throw ridicule upon our holy religion. "It would be well for some who have taken upon themselves the ministry of the gospel, that they would first preach to themselves, and afterwards to others." The pure and simple truths of Christianity have been twisted and distorted for the purpose of making them tally with their supposed real religious convictions. "They have fashioned a god stern and sullen, retiring in awful gloom from His creation;" not to be approached but with shrieks, groans, and convulsions; the noblest faculty of His creation torn from its seat, and trampled in the dust by the spasmodic tortures of a disordered mind. Can these be the result of real religious convictions?

Every age of the world has given examples of revivals; and the inferences to be drawn from them are not in favour of spiritual outpouring, but rather the madness of bodily weakness, or a high state of nervous excitement. It sometimes, as in the "great French revolution," assumes a political madness; or in that of the present, the religious madness of the Irish revivals.

The North of Ireland revivals have risen on the surface of society, like the white spray on the crested waves of a stormy ocean; but when it resumes its former level, there will be seen on its bosom, not the gallant bark, freighted with the precious souls of the genuine converted, but the mournful wrecks of a morbid insanity, tossed to and fro, the only remnant left of the hallucinations of the nineteenth century.—D. R. R.

The Societies' Section.

Camden Debating Society. — On Tuesday evening, November 29th, 1859, a meeting was held in the City of several young gentlemen who, residing in Camberwell, and being engaged in the City during the day, are anxious to secure some occupation, instruction, and amusement for the winter evenings. It was resolved to form a debating and mutual improvement society, bearing the above name. A code of laws was then drawn up and resolved upon for the government of the society. The Camden Debating Society is to hold weekly meetings throughout the six winter months, viz., October, November, December, January, February, and March, and at each meeting a debate is to take place, and one or more lectures and recitations delivered by the members. Some of the leading reviews and periodicals are to be subscribed to and distributed among the members for reading, *pro rata*. A library will also in due time be formed. It was resolved that at the next meeting Mr. H. Edwards should open a debate or discussion; subject—"Is capital punishment expedient?" Mr. J. Langton will deliver a lecture on "*Trade winds*," and Mr. A. E. Mollett one on "*Recitation*." This society has good prospects of success, for no place is more deficient in such aids to improvement and instruction than Camberwell.

Weston-super-Mare Working Men's Institution. — On Thursday evening, Dec. 8, 1859, Mr. Macready gave one of his readings from the English poets to the members and friends of this institution. In the course of his opening remarks he made a suggestion, to which a wide hearing should be given:—Before entering on the subject selected for reading that evening, it would not be considered out of place if he made some slight reference to that art by which they endeavoured to convey to their hearers not only the words but the inner feelings of the heart. It might, perhaps, appear to some that he

set too high an estimate on dignifying that as an art in which no one confessed to a deficiency. Every one could read; but, he asked, could every one listen to their reading? For his own part, one of the greatest of intellectual luxuries was to listen to the powerful reading of the eloquent utterances of their great writers. It might be asked, where did they hear this? and too often it was the echo that returned the answer. It would grieve him to offend any of the fair portion of his audience, by telling them that there might be more charming and more genuine music from their sweet voices in reading than from their singing an air of Verdi or Mozart. Every one could lend his ear to strains of music, but it was not every one who could appreciate a noble passage of poetry. Nevertheless, in what is considered the fashionable world, the intellectual was made subordinate to the superficial and the non-essential. Let him put in a word for reading as an accomplishment. He believed it was an accomplishment which required as much time and practice for its acquirement as the music of their first composers. Excellence was never obtained without labour. It was only conceit and pretension that would presume to claim the time and attention of those who knew time's worth. In the case of music, little distinction was made between those who could play and those who could not play—those who had ears, and those who had none. All were brought up to the sacrificial altar, while those who stood around were unable to remonstrate. While contending for reading, he yielded to none in his love for music—good music.

Whitby Institute.—The fourteenth annual soirée was recently held in St. Hilda's Hall, when upwards of 300 persons partook of tea, gratuitously provided; after which the chair was taken by the Right Hon. Sir George Hamilton Seymour, G.C.B., late ambassador to the Court of St. Peters-

burgh. Mr. Isaac Bate, the secretary, read the report, which was of the most cheering character. The number of members of the institute was 271. The issues from the library had been 3,240. Ten pounds had been expended in supplying new books; and, since the printing of the catalogue (two years ago), 116 more volumes had been added to the library. Two donations, each of £5, had been presented by his Highness the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing. A life-like and admirably executed portrait of Dr. Scoresby had been presented; and, by subscription, was purchased a portrait of Mr. Robert Hamilton, one of the founders of the institute. A portrait of Captain James Cook (whose maritime career commenced at Whitby) was painted and presented by Mr. T. H. Readman, an amateur portrait painter. The evening classes had been well attended. The general instruction

class numbered 42 members, a French class 15 members, and a design class, though commenced late in the season, made great progress. A local committee was formed to obtain candidates for the Society of Arts examination, but was not successful. The lecture department was in a very languid state, and the directors felt they were not sufficiently sustained by the attendance of the members generally. The meeting was addressed by Thomas Chapman, Esq., F.R.S., F.S.A.; Mr. Thomas Clegg, Rev. Thos. Keane, M.A., M.A.S.; George Hitchcock, Esq., and Edwin Cockburn, Esq., both of London; John Buchannan, Esq., Rev. J. C. Potter, Rev. Joseph Hughes, M.A. Miss Newbound was engaged for the musical department, and added much to the pleasure of the evening. The singing of the national anthem terminated the proceedings.

LITERARY NOTES.

PETER BAYNE, Esq., Author of the "Christian Life," a volume of "Essays," successor of the late Hugh Miller as editor of the "Witness," is to become conductor of *The Dial*, which is announced to appear on the 7th inst., as a weekly newspaper.

Arago's works are now complete, in eighteen volumes, at Paris.

A *People's College* is projected at Ely, under the auspices of the Dean.

Among the candidates for the Professorship of Logic and Rhetoric, vacant by the death of William Spalding, of St. Andrew's, the following persons are mentioned, viz.:—Herbert Spencer, author of "Principles of Psychology," "Social Statics," &c.; Alexander Bain, author of "The Senses and the Intellect," "The Emotions of the Will," &c.; John Veitch, the translator of "Descartes," and sub-editor of "Sir William Hamilton's Lectures;" John Nicholl, son of the late Professor of Astronomy, in Glasgow, author of a volume of "Poems;" and Samuel Neil, author of "The Art of Reasoning," "The Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

Death has been reaping rich harvests

of late. Washington Irving, the Goldsmith of American literature, died on 28th November. Thomas De Quincey—almost the Cicero of modern letters—expired in Edinburgh, on 8th ult., having just concluded the revision of the proof sheets of the fourth and last volume of his *Selections*.

Miltonic illustrations are multiplying, and are likely to give hard work to the hard-working editor of *Macmillan's Magazine*—David Masson. Mr. D. Hamilton has recently published some, and S. L. Sotheby is preparing others.

Rev. P. Blackburn, of *The Athenæum*, has committed suicide.

"The Leader" is to add "The Saturday Analyst" to its title; and, taking a leaf from the *British Controversialist*, is about to confine itself to the essence of the press.

MR. ALLEN, of Birmingham, has brought out a facsimile reproduction of the Hamlets of 1603 and 1604, in antique binding, and on specially prepared paper.

A (posthumous) History of India, by the recently deceased Hon. Mount-

STUART ELPHINSTONE, is likely seen to be published.

An important work—"The Life of Professor John Wilson" (*Christopher North*), is understood to be engaging the attention of THOMAS AIRD. No man is better fitted for the grateful and the genial task.

Several hard facts against "Rare Ben Jonson" have of late appeared in the *Athenæum*; and we fear that the proofs of his being a spy and informer are too strong for contradiction, however desirable. A copy of an information tendered by Ben against Zouch Townley, a friend and defender of his own, is quoted in issue of 5th.

LORD BROUGHAM is about to issue eleven "Tracts, Mathematical and Physical," in one vol., dedicated to the University of Edinburgh, of which he is Chancellor.

The "Memoirs and Remains of Professor Edward Forbes" are left incompletely prepared for the press, by the death, on 22nd November last, of his friend and fellow-Professor, George Wilson. The author of "*Horæ Subsecivæ*" is likely to finish it, and to write a biography of the Edinburgh Technologist.

Mr. Wilkie Collins's "Queen of Hearts" is a set of diamonds out of the mines of "Household Words," put on a new thread.

The MS. of an "Essay on Dreams," given in to Professor Dugald Stewart, in 1796, by Henry (now Lord) Brougham, has recently "turned up."

"Household Words" is to yield other selections, one in especial, from the pen of its sub-editor, W. H. WILLS.

The "Literary Gazette" has passed into the hands of a body of gentlemen, who propose devoting a large capital to its improvement and extension. Arrangements are in progress for securing the services of experienced writers in the musical, dramatic, scientific, and literary departments. After the 1st January, 1860, the "Gazette" will be permanently enlarged.

Mr. Buckle has nearly ready for publication the second volume of his valuable "History of Civilization." In this volume, the mode of arrangement is much superior to that adopted in the previous volume.

Mr. W. H. RUSSELL, the *Times'* correspondent, is said to have received from the Messrs. Routledge, £1,500 for his Indian Diary.

"CORNHILL MAGAZINE."—It is said that the first order given to the printers by the publishers of the "Cornhill Magazine," was for 60,000 copies.

MR. NEWBY AND THE ADAM BEDE SEQUEL.—We hear that Mr. Newby has decided that it is better, "under existing circumstances," not to publish "Adam Bede, Junior: a Sequel." We see that Mr. Newby announces "Honesty is the Best Policy," in two vols.

"MACMILLAN'S MAGAZINE."—"The Sea-Dreams: an Idyll," which Mr. Tennyson is to contribute to the January number of "Macmillan's Magazine," and for which he is to receive 250 guineas, will not, it is said, exceed 100 lines. 250 guineas for 100 lines! It is something for a penny-a-liner to meditate on. For his "Grandmother's Apology," published in "*Once a Week*," the Poet Laureate received only £100.

MR. SMILES, the author of "The Life of George Stephenson," and "Self Help," is engaged in writing a life of James Watt. From his position on the South-Eastern Railway, Mr. Smiles not only understands the theory on which Watt and Stephenson worked, but the practical part of their lives, and this makes him better qualified to speak on such men than any writer of the present day.

We hear of a "Manchester Review," about to be started on the plan of the *Saturday*. The editor is a gentleman who has had varied experience in connection with the press, both of Manchester and London; and among the contributors mentioned is Professor Scott, of Owen's College, of which institution he was formerly Principal.

Epoëy Men.

LORD MACAULAY.

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH, AND A CRITICAL ESTIMATE.

At Holly Lodge, Campden Hill, Kensington, "blithe Christmas" was spent amid "the fairy graces of domestic life," and it seemed as though "the sullen evenings of the closing year" had only come to

"Repair the wither'd verdure of the mind,
And thus, to fresher life and brighter hue,
Each languid hope and faded joy renew."

Lord Macaulay had been ill, but it was fondly hoped that he would still and for long continue

"To trim the taper o'er the page
Where lives the mind of poet and of sage."

But the woeful impotence of life was destined only to receive a new illustration. On the 28th of December he suddenly died, and now

"The pliant muscles of the various face,
The mien that gave each sentence strength and grace,
The tuneful voice, the eye that spoke the mind—
Are gone;"

and in the south transept of Westminster Abbey—"that temple of silence and reconciliation, where the enmities of twenty generations lie buried" he already reposes—beside the father of English Literature,

"Who left half-told
The story of Cambuscan bold;"

—his life (but not his life-task) finished. The pen of the historian is laid aside, the harp of the poet has become tuneless, the tongue of the orator is mute, the heart-beat of the essayist is still, the brain of the statesman is schemeless now, and the glory of the legislator is only a memory.

Changeful Death has snatched from earth a large-minded, widely-cultured, sympathetic, and nobly-ambitious soul, whose energies were looked upon as far from being spent, and whose peculiar powers had given a singular interest to the annals of our country, and imparted a rich breadth and luminousness to the records of the past. The conscientious toil of years, with all their accumulations of ripe wisdom and ready specificality; the results of a multifarious and almost omnivorous course of reading and study; the brilliant combinations of a vividly pictorial fancy, and the exquisite skill and mastery of language which had been acquired by continued assiduity, were all expectantly devoted to the production of a work in which the new forms of political life consequent on the era of the Commonwealth might have been placed before the reader with graphic elaboration and substantial rehabilitation; but the chisel has been stricken from the artist's grasp, and the chill of the grave

restrains the only hand which could sculpture the splendid *torso* into the semblance of the foregone realities of Time. It is with no "fantastic sorrow" that such a loss must be mourned, and that hunger-pinched Hope should grieve for the sudden abstraction of that great though invisible wealth of thought, in which for many a future day it trusted to rejoice. The heart must thrill with pain when such a bereavement compels the world to utter the solemn requiem of sorrow.

We cannot do amiss—even though sitting in the shadow of a nation's grief—by striving to recall, in one continuous chronicle, the achievements which the might and potency of a strong will and endeavour enabled Lord Macaulay to accomplish; for we shall best put to its true uses the present lesson of Death, if we can cast the lustre of his example upon those who are now and still

"Toiling o'er Life's stormy main,"

so that in the voyage it lights no longer, his life may be communicative of heart and hope, of encouragement, and, if need be, of warning. Thus only, as generations press on generations, is the progress of humanity secured, and the grave becomes a teacher of charities and hopes, which the pulsing haste of life makes us too ready to forget or disbelieve.

"To write History respectably—that is, to abbreviate despatches and make extracts from speeches, to intersperse, in due proportion, epithets of praise and abhorrence, to draw up antithetical characters of great men, setting forth how many contradictory virtues and vices they united, and abounding in *withs* and *withouts*—all this is very easy: but to be a really great historian is, perhaps, the rarest of intellectual distinctions . . . We are acquainted with no history which approaches to our notion of what a history ought to be—with no history which does not widely depart, either on the right hand or on the left, from the exact line. . . . A perfect historian must possess an imagination sufficiently powerful to make his narrative affecting and picturesque. Yet he must control it so absolutely, as to content himself with the materials which he finds, and to refrain from supplying deficiencies by additions of his own. He must be a profound and ingenious reasoner. Yet he must possess sufficient self-command to abstain from casting his facts in the mould of his hypothesis."*

So wrote Macaulay, in his twenty-eighth year, when, as

"Coming events cast their shadows before,"

his mind seems to have become instinctively conscious of its vocation, and he had begun to imp his wings for a flight into that transcendent region of endeavour, in which "such a happy and delicate combination of qualities" is required, that "those who can justly estimate *its* almost insuperable difficulties will not think it strange that every writer should have failed either in the narrative or in the speculative department." At that time the *ideal*

* *History*, "Edinburgh Review," May, 1828.

existed in his thought unhampered by the *real*; and the long reach of a life-time of unintermitted labour appeared to lie before him, sunned only by the glow of hope, and all undimmed by sorrow, sickness, or care, and not even specked, much less gloomed, by political partisanships and disappointments, official routine, and the multitudinous fatigues of investigative research.

The glare of this paper lay like a lane of spears across Macaulay's life; and the fact that—though it is one of his most brilliant and telling articles—he has never assented to its republication, may enable us to guess that he was scarcely willing, when time had mellowed and matured his thoughts, and experience had moderated the zeal of his hot youth, to undergo the scriptural ordeal, "With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." Nor shall we, at the outset and on the threshold of our memorial of his worth and greatness, attempt to show how far and how sadly he has departed from this lofty theory of historic authorship, nor how much, by the radical vices of his theory, the practical utility and the permanent value of his noblest life-labour has been marred and injured. We shall better measure the issue of his life, by first tracing the growth and uprise of his being, from its early prime to its somewhat premature collapse and close. To this, therefore, we must devote a brief space.

In the island of Lewes—one of the outer Hebrides—laved by the Minch and washed by the Atlantic, peopled by a short, hardy, robust, Gaelic-speaking race, whose ancestors were Celts and Scandinavians, the forefathers of Lord Macaulay long dwelt; and there, for generations, they acquired and displayed that irrepressible energy and combative indefatigability of character which has as yet no name except a quasi-Latin one,—*perseveridum ingenium Scotorum*. In the ministry of the Church of Scotland his grandfather and uncle found outlet for their energy and scope for their genius, and both receive kindly mention in Dr. Johnson's "Tour in the Hebrides." He met them at Inverary, of which the Rev. John Macaulay was then, 1773, incumbent, though he died 1789, minister of Cardross, in Dumbartonshire. Zachary, son of the Rev. John Macaulay, born 1768, was sent at an early age to the West Indies, where he was trained to commercial life. He subsequently became a merchant in Jamaica, where he heard the wail and saw the sorrow of slavery, and became convinced that its entire abolition was a necessity. For years he strove to ameliorate the condition of the negroes by and during a residence in Sierra Leone, and, on his return to the mother country, he associated himself with Wilberforce, Clarkson, Stephen, and others, in an agitation against "the trade of man in man." He became a member of what has been derisively called the Clapham Sect,* and editor of the "Christian Examiner." He married Miss Selina Mills, a quakeress, the daughter of a bookseller, a pupil of Miss Hannah More, and then a schoolmistress in Bristol. His sister had been married to Thomas Babington, Esq., of Rothley

* See Sir J. Stephen's paper, "The Clapham Sect."—*Edin. Rev.*, July, 1844.

Temple, M.P. for Leicestershire; and so it turned out that his son, Thomas Babington Macaulay, was born 25th October, 1800, at his uncle's residence, and bore his uncle's name with him from the font. The strict religiousness and formalism of the parents were little adapted to the training of a frolicsome and precocious boy of some forwardness, and with much of the flexible trickiness of boyhood. They early led him to the study of the Scriptures, compends of Calvinistic theology, and restricted him to religious reading; but this (perhaps too) rigid training gave an additional zest to the enjoyment drawn from the "stolen waters" of fiction and poetry, and caused the semi-conventualist to luxuriate with keen relish in the marvels of the "Arabian Nights," and in the magic evoked by the wand of the Wizard of the North in the "Waverley Novels." His early education was carefully superintended at home, with such results as to make him a widely-read and well-informed lad, before he was placed, for preparation for the University, under the care of a Mr. Preston, at Shelford, in Cambridgeshire, under whose tuition he seems to have progressed favourably, for he "entered" at Trinity College, Cambridge, in his eighteenth year. His career was pre-eminently brilliant. He gained the Chancellor's gold medal in two successive competitions,—in 1819 for a poem on "Pompeii," and in 1821 for one on "Evening." Both of these productions have been published in a collection of University Prize Poems, where they hold their place worthily beside those of Heber and Keble. They are smooth, flowing, and facile, tintured but not imbued with learning, indicative of some study of Pope, and considerable admiration of Campbell, but not at all gushing with energy, or flooded with "brave translunary things." About the same time, however, he made one of those important tentatives in literature which often bear rich fruit. By adopting Niebuhr's ballad theory, then unhackneyed, that the early history of Rome had been constructed out of pre-historic legendary poems, he set himself to reproduce such semblances of these ballads as might afford at once delight to the fancy and ground of experiment to the reason. These and other early contributions were first published in an almost forgotten magazine—"The Etonian,"—edited by W. M. Praed and the Rev. J. Moultrie, and in Charles Knight's "Quarterly Magazine," a defunct periodical, in the five volumes of which there are many unforgettable things. In 1821 he gained the second Craven scholarship, graduated B.A. in 1822, and M.A. in 1825. Though, through distaste of and deficiency in mathematics, he did not compete for honours, he was elected a fellow of his college; and, having previously entered himself of Lincoln's Inn, he was called to the Bar, 1826, almost immediately after taking his mastership in arts, and then he chose, we believe, the Northern Circuit for the scene of his practice. During this time he was an active, promising, and prominent member of the Union Debating Society, where his studies in oratory found inducement and endorsement. His first public published speech, one in favour of the abolition of slavery, was delivered in 1824, and was noticed with praise in the "Edinburgh Review."

Perhaps this induced him to make his first bold essay in literature, by forwarding to Jeffrey his paper on Milton, which appeared in that renowned Whig journal in August, 1825.

The acute editor of the "blue and yellow" saw at once the mark and likelihood of the new adventurer, and hastened to secure his adjuvancy. The son of one of the purest and most zealous of Scotch Whigs, himself a literary man, and wielding in some measure the influence of his sect; the favourite nephew of an M.P. of some standing; Fellow of the University, and a barrister, a popular Unionist, a practised writer, and a rising man,—who could neglect? Certainly not Jeffrey, at such a time, when all forces were mustering for the effectuation of that great reform in Parliament which was shortly thereafter (1832) consummated. This paper, though its author has since more than half retracted it, by its brilliancy and power, the happy figurativeness and the gorgeous drapery of its language, the curious compositeness and well-balanced melody of its phraseology, crowded with literary allusion, and graphically scriptural, and the grand Miltonic swell and sweep of its argument, caught the public ear immediately, and gave him a stand-place at once among the men of note in his party and in literature. It echoed over the Atlantic, whose waves, next year, brought back that magnificent though sectarian counter-production from the pen of W. E. Channing, "Remarks on the Character and Writings of John Milton," with which it must now always stand in comparison. In the moorland solitude of Craigenputtock it struck Carlyle; and Robert Hall, at the age of 60, is said to have studied Italian, though racked by continual pain the while, that he might be able to read the "Divine Comedy," and so satisfy himself of the justice of the contrastive parallel Macaulay had therein instituted between Dante and Milton.

For a time he endured "the law's delay" to give promotion—balancing between a literary and a political life—unable to determine for either, anxious to pursue and enjoy both. Besides continuing to supply those dashing and glowing, rhetorical and ornate, full-crested and potent "essays," on which for a long time his reputation rested, he attempted to write leading articles for the *Morning Chronicle*; but in this he was generally esteemed unsuccessful, as he had neither the tact, the facility, nor the lightness of manner requisite for the daily production of readable matter on the temporary affairs which interest the age. The intense and painstaking elaboration with which he composed was not suited to the ready and rapid reading which newspapers receive, nor could they be produced with sufficient haste and immediate appropriateness,—one might almost say, improvisation. He apparently devoted as much time to the preparation of one of his papers for the "Edinburgh Review," as Shakespeare or Massinger required for the production of a new drama. Yet he could dash off merry and stinging squibs and *jeux-d'esprit*, lightsome and nettley enough to be mistaken for Moore's, and of such merit as to find admission to the columns of the *Times*; and furnished fashionable rhyme for the

popular Annuals of the day. A splendid and deep-rooted article on Machiavelli (March, 1827); the paper on History (May, 1828), from which we have already quoted, and the discriminating and keenly critical estimate of Hallam's "Constitutional History" (Sept. 1828), occupied the leisure he was able to afford from the duties of a Commissioner in Bankruptcy, to which his party had recently elevated him. A paper of his on the ballot attracted the notice of Lord Lansdowne, who immediately singled out the writer for patronage, and introduced him, at the new election consequent on the death of George IV. (1830), into Parliament as member for the ancient borough of Calne, in Wiltshire, near which is his Lordship's residence—Bowood Park. The seat was then, as now, virtually in the gift of the Marquis, and it was in recognition of this service on the threshold of his public career that Macaulay (1854) dedicated his own revised edition of his speeches to the noble lord, whose motto is, "*Virtute non verbis*," By worth, not words. He took a specially prominent part in the debates on parliamentary reform, and, though elaborate, print-like, pointed, and prim, his speeches were clever and taking,—full of life, merit, and dash. He was nominated by the then newly enfranchised borough of Leeds, though connected with it neither by personal nor political interest, and through mere admiration of his earnest advocacy of reform, and carried into the new House of Commons (1833) triumphantly as their representative. He was almost immediately chosen Secretary to the Board of Control, and both astonished and displeased his radical constituents by accepting an appointment as legal adviser to the Supreme Council of India, with a salary of "ten thousand a year." It has been frankly avowed that the chief inducement to the proposal and acceptance of this appointment was the securing of a competency such as would enable him to devote his after years to labours of greater moment for his party and mankind. He was exempted from all share in the administration of affairs, had four assistants allotted to him, and the special duty with which he was charged was to prepare a penal code for India. He took out with him an immense and admirably selected library, with which he almost continually occupied himself, prudently husbanding not only his time but his resources; he saw little company, and interchanged few hospitalities. Many of his best essays, *e. g.*, those on William Pitt, 1834; Mackintosh, 1835; Bacon, 1837; Sir William Temple, 1838; were forwarded from Calcutta. The labour he went to perform he accomplished; on his return to England, 1838, his Indian Penal Code was published. It is a great and important work, but it is regarded as cumbrous and impracticable—a monument of industry and talent misapplied, because no other feasible plan appeared so likely to save a mighty mind from daily drudgery for daily bread. It has never gained legal enactment or practical embodiment. Indeed, the attempt to carry into effect some of its provisions tended greatly to the infuriation of the people, which resulted in the late serious mutiny in our Eastern empire. Much of the pith and value of this code (such as it is) is due, we believe, to a Mr. Cameron, Macaulay's im-

mediate subordinate in office, whom he ultimately saw well cared-for.

During Macaulay's homeward voyage, his father died (1838); his merits and goodness have since been honoured by the erection of a monument to his memory in Westminster Abbey. This event saddened his home-coming, though it left him more at liberty to pursue his own literary inclinations, unhampered by his father's anxiety to see him a statesman.

"He went to India for fortune, and came back to England for fame." At the time of his appointment he was called "lucky Tom." "Did he not," said Richard Lalor Sheil, "make four speeches on the Reform Bill, and get £10,000 a year?" The truth of the designation may be questioned. It is almost certain that he brought home with him the seeds of impaired health, and of that chronic cough from which in his latter years he suffered so much; and it is quite evident that in unhinging himself from his party, and casting himself aloof from the activities of political life,—during the best years of his manhood, and while the sharp contests of differing administrations were elaborating, and adapting the forms of government to the new conditions of affairs—he virtually renounced all chance and hope of attaining the highest honours of statesmanship, or the most remunerative and substantial offices in the ministry. It is quite true, nay it is highly probable, that he may have now reached the conclusion that books and study were more congenial to him than the routine of office, and the transient glories of oratory; or felt within himself the throbbings of an ambition to be more than the mere occupant of place or expectant of pension. Indeed, we fancy that he had accurately observed the intractable nature of his own mind, which fructified profusely in the study, but withered in St. Stephen's.

It is difficult, however, to tear away ambition from the heart; and the excitement of public life is so pungent and peculiar, that it is akin to an impossibility to relinquish, much less to abandon it. He still seems to have believed it possible to act a part in statesmanship, and yet not to "suffer political avocations so entirely to engross him, as to leave him no leisure for literature and philosophy." There was peculiar fitness in the constituency of Edinburgh—to the power and popularity of whose *Review* he had contributed so much—returning him triumphantly, and all but expenselessly, as their representative, shortly after his return (1839). He was appointed Secretary at War in the renewed Melbourne ministry of that year, and went out with his party, when ousted by Sir R. Peel, in 1841. In 1842, he published those vividly picturesque and pregnant glimpses of antique Roman life, "*The Lays of Ancient Rome*," which prove how suggestive, fecund, forceful, and ripe, were the energies out of which they flowed, and how much he sympathized with the spirit which animated the old Romans, and the bravery which glowed on the banks of "the tawny Tiber." The dates of his several essays show that during these years of office his efforts were unrelaxing in adding to the glory of

his party, by placing in their fairest light some of the great men it has numbered in its train.

In 1846, Macaulay received from Lord John Russell, then prime minister, the semi-sinecure of Paymaster to the Forces. About this time the Anti-Maynooth Endowment agitation had begun to be waged with some zeal, if not fury; and Mr. Macaulay had the honesty (his opponents called it tamerity) to maintain—in opposition to what he designated “the bray of Exeter Hall”—the opinion he was well known to entertain, that religious differences ought not to entail civil disabilities; and thus won for himself the enmity of the shabby sectarianism, so much abounding in Edinburgh, which, while it swallows government money for its own denominational glorification, with the quenchless greed of the daughters of the horseleech, would try to wring proselytes out of the Church of Rome, by closing the exchequer to the claims of their Catholic fellow-subjects to education equally with themselves. With a petty malignity, of which “the remorse of ages” cannot *wholly* wipe away the stain, a mob of zealots banded themselves together to thrust him from his seat, when in 1847 the election of a new parliament became necessary. It is true—and a hopeful and pleasing fact it is—that Edinburgh redeemed itself somewhat from this disgrace, and had the finger of scorn withdrawn by subsequently re-electing him—though he, strong in the integrity of a manly nature, held himself coldly and silently apart till the reparation, which indicated repentance, was offered—in 1852. But we have yet to learn that the removal of the burden of shame *was* due to the sects, and was not mainly effected by the knitting together of many who longed to show that they had really no intention, part, or lot, in this premeditated political assassination.

Everywhere the palliatives of considerate notice were applied to the heart-wounded ex-M.P.; and he had a splendid revenge on the hooting and hooded owls of 1847, when in 1848 he placed before the public,—but not as M.P. for Edinburgh—the two first volumes of “The History of England, from the Accession of James the Second,” a work which, within six months, went through five editions, amounting in all to 18,000 copies, in this country, while innumerable reproductions of its contents, in all forms and at almost every price, were sown broadcast throughout America. Fame sung descants of approbation of it everywhere; the chorus was universal; and scarcely a pen was raised but to pour out rapture at the manner in which the attempt to widen and deepen the channel of historic truth, as well as to purify the waters that swept along it, had been made. And though a soberer estimate may now be formed, and bills of indictment upon several points have since been filed against the author, it would be difficult to name any modern work in which the stores of information are so gigantic, the several parts so well arranged, their general teachings so pleasingly and accurately brought out, and in which the patriotism and the rhetoric are so pure and indubitable.

The students of the University of Glasgow, with the generous

ardour of youthful enthusiasm for learning, elated him to the office of Lord Rector; and on the 21st March, 1849, he delivered that eloquent Inaugural Address, which equals Cicero's noblest efforts in copiousness, brilliancy, sparkle, and excels them in scope, sweep, grandeur, and comprehensiveness. In this speech, too, he quietly rebuked the Anti-Maynoothites, by giving a grand panoramic sketch of the three centuries of time which had intervened between the hour when Pope Nicholas affixed his seal to the instrument which called that college into existence, and spoke of the stability of our national institutions as such, that they would "still stand august and immoveable, while dynasties and churches are lying in heaps of ruins around us."

In that same year (1849) he was chosen a bencher of Lincoln's Inn; honoured with LL.D. by his university; and elected Professor of Ancient History in the Royal Academy. In 1852, as we have already noted, repentant Edinburgh doffed her "sackcloth" and brushed away her "ashes," and recalled their former haughty, honest, and magnanimous representative to his place in the House of Commons; and in the autumn of that year he delivered there a most effective oration, which confessedly paved the way for the Aberdeen-Russell-Palmerston coalition, which was formed at the close of that year. In 1853, the King of Prussia conferred on him the Order of Merit of that nation; and on the demise of Professor John Wilson, in 1854, he was chosen President of the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh—of which association he was always a liberal patron, and to which he was in many respects a benefactor; in that same year too he issued a revised edition of twenty-nine of his most elaborate speeches—of which his inaugural address, at the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh, forms one.

A lapse of seven years, a great portion of which was passed in unforced retirement from political life and strife—for many constituencies would gladly have reposed the brilliant historian, the marvellous essayist, and the choice orator, on the benches of the House of Commons—enabled him to produce two other volumes of that History which had filled the world with admiration by its harmonious and perspicuous blending of minute, varied, and important materials and details, with warmth of fancy, sequence of reasoning, and vigorous reproductivity of imagination. These were much more rigorously reviewed, more carefully studied, more closely and fastidiously examined, and more thoroughly as well as more perseveringly submitted to the microscopic inquisitiveness of professional critics; more sharply censured; more lustily decried, and yet more widely circulated and more enthusiastically read, discussed, and marvelled at. And we are told that a cheque for £20,000 at one time gave him the most unmistakable evidence of the success of his new venture.

In February, 1856, Mr. Macaulay resigned the trust reposed in him as member for Edinburgh to the hands of its donors, and formally announced his withdrawal from the perilous vortex of a parliamentary career, and his determination to devote such impaired

energy as was now left him to the hastening on of the great task for which he had been, during many years, sedulously preparing himself. From this he only occasionally turned aside to contribute a few pleasing, useful, and admirable contributions, e. g., Atterbury, Bunyan, Goldsmith, Johnson, Pitt, &c. to the "Encyclopædia Britannica." On 10th Sept., 1857, a royal patent, elevating him to the peerage of the United Kingdom, with the title of Baron Macaulay of Rothwell, was issued, and the nation not unwillingly recognized the appropriateness of thus rounding off an illustrious career with the highest distinction conferable on one who had so well won it, by many and valuable political and literary services.

His Indian residence, political disappointment, and the intense sedentary labour of literary research, combined with the effects of some of those vicissitudes from which human life is seldom entirely exempt, had brought him within very close view of the grave, in 1852. The circulation of his blood was then extremely languid, and organic disease had begun to manifest itself in the tissues of the heart; but a chronic cough, from which he suffered much, annoyed and distressed him most, as it interrupted him both in public and in private speech. From a paroxysm of this cough, which seized him unexpectedly, he expired, Dec. 28th, 1859, with no one to see his last moments, or to catch his latest whispers. His sister, Lady Charles Trevelyan, had been with him during the greater part of the day, had left him in little worse than his ordinary health at four o'clock P.M., and on her return, at eight, having been suddenly called to see him, she beheld him in his chair—dead. The throbbing brain was idle, and the vital heart-beat was still. The sad event only became known late in the succeeding day, and few heard of his demise without an effort at disbelief. He had little more than entered his sixtieth year; and he had so much to tell that all men longed to hear!

It would be a difficult task, here and now, to estimate and characterize fairly the several efforts—poetical, oratorical, critical, political, and historical—on which his name and fame must now rest. He was exceedingly chary of republication, especially of his earlier and apprentice papers. From the *Etonian* and *Knight's Quarterly Magazine* he has redeemed only one or two stray gems; from the *Edinburgh Review* he has hardly rescued any of his most vigorous and effective political papers—he expressly withdrew those on the Utilitarian Philosophy—and from the daily press he has not recalled and acknowledged aught save a few of those perplexing puzzles of oratory which men scarcely know whether to recognize as essays in disguise, or harangues of such peculiar and delicate elaboration as to lose their very nature by becoming political treatises, historical pamphlets, or moral and literary disquisitions. His own selection of "Essays," and the edition of his Speeches, which was "revised by himself," must always be held as authentic, and as forming a portion of his "Works." His literary contributions to the *Encyclopædia*—which may most probably be soon separately republished—bearing, as they do, his name in the publishers' lists, must likewise be deemed part and parcel of these productions of his of

which the critic should take account. His "History," so far as it is advanced, and free from editorial supervision, and his "Lays," will also form items—large, valuable, and difficult to adjudicate upon—for the formation of a judgment. But it is obvious that no final decision can be arrived at yet—the pulsations of sorrow are too recent to leave the reason unaffected. Some approximation to an honest criticism may, however, be made, and, indeed, seems needful; for the interest felt in the author's personal, political, and literary position is so great, as to occasion on all hands inquiries such as cannot be fittingly answered except by some endeavour to look—though it should be even through tears—at the achievements of the man whose demise has occasioned a grief so wide-felt and so serious. And this we shall briefly yet deferentially essay.

By uniform and universal consent he has been described as kindly, loveable, and frank in ordinary intercourse; as highly gifted with the power of fascinating and informing in conversation; as ready in alms-deeds, and studiously solicitous of befriending his less fortunate co-members of the republic of letters. In statesmanship he was a sincere, if not an earnest, well-wisher to public liberty—fearless in the advocacy of what he regarded as the rights of the people, though possessing but little fellow-feeling with the crowd. His name is associated with several political ameliorations, but consociated with none. He was useful to his party, and yet never rose to high office in its ranks—though this may have resulted from his greater devotion to literature than to politics. Though a profound theoretical legist, he seems to have failed in the crucial department of practical legislation. His learning was vast, yet neither ponderous nor heterogeneous; his vivid fancy interpenetrated it all with life, and the activity of his associative faculties made it all subservient alike to the wants of the moment or the labour of years. The treasures of his mind were almost sumless, yet he could remember and use at once the most trivial or the most important item of them all. The sceptre of his memory seemed to be an all-compelling wand, which no slave-thought could either escape or disobey. He held them, each and all, in the subordination of perspective; and suffered none to bulk too largely or to loom in haze.

The consummate artistic skill and graphic imaginativeness, the vivid vigour, apposite picturesqueness, and antique simplicity of phrase displayed in his poems; the age-moulded ornamentation with which they are encrusted; the masculine force and majesty of the thoughts contrasted with the severe simplicity of the style, and the chastely chosen terms in which the spirit of the old Roman life is uttered and embalmed, make them extraordinary productions in themselves; but they become more strikingly so when considered as repoetizations from mere historic hints—as glimpses of the life of the past, caught through a mere chink by a seer but not an onlooker—as readings of the under-writing of the palimpsest of History.

His oratory is less fluent than affluent. His speeches instruct rather than move; impress rather than convince; sparkle, and glow,

and astonish more than they persuade. Admirable in arrangement, lucidly reasoned and rhetorically expressed, they lack only the abandonment and frenzy which flashes the electricity of oratory from heart to heart. They dazzled but did not decide; they were bur-nished, but they did not burn; they were prolific in fancy and power, but not in effect; yet there was a statesque grandeur and attractive-ness in his manner which controlled respect, and often compelled acquiescence. He wanted the flexible grace, the ready energy, which communicate life, from moment to moment, to the marvelous outflow of thought to which a real orator gives utterance. In his orations he neglected his own axiom, "The mother tongue of the passions is the best style."

His essays may for the most part be regarded as sketches and preliminary preparations for his history—as experiments on and tentatives of public taste—as foreshadowings and pioneers of that work which ultimately became "the business and the pleasure of his life." They are remarkable for fullness, suggestiveness, epi-grammatic piquancy, deliberate and artistic grouping and pictoriality—an objective and impressive power of concrete representation, and a perfect profusion of allusive illustration and insinuated thought. The language is choice, well polished, exquisitely arranged, modu-lated and attuned to the very thought with which it co-operates, and from which it takes its form; and yet these essays are much more narrative than reflective, and *tell* more than they define or criticize. Extending as they do over twenty years, they show, if read aright, the gradual ripening of the author's powers, and enable us to observe the processes by which the historian was nurtured and trained.

It is in this latter character that he has aimed highest and achieved most,—indeed, acquired a popularity and fame more extensive and true than most authors of our day, and gained the unchallengeable admiration of all readers, whether friends or foes of the opinions he expresses, and espouses. The freshness and vigour, the rush and passion of life, the manly and flashing ardour which he poured into historic literature, were alike wonderful and praiseworthy. He seems to have imitated the sagacious selectiveness of Thucydides more than the sketchy garrulity of Herodotus or the romanticism of Xenophon; and to have relished the skilful delineativeness of Tacitus more than the pamphleteering cleverness of Sallust, or the exuberant imaginativeness of Livy. Without the cold, terse, passionless logic of Hume, the austere straitness and close-eyed accuracy of Robert-son, the far-fathoming philosophy of Grote, the judge-like impar-tiality and quietude of Mill; the frenzied earnestness and one-sided-ness of Carlyle; the prim dignity of Milman; the legal acumen and keen critical faculty of Hallam; the suffusive religiousness of Arnold; or the exotic luxuriance and grandeur of Gibbon,—he has so much of the true historic instinct, tact, culture, sympathy, and studiousness, as to have a full right to be numbered among the greatest of the workers of Clio.

It is true, as Carlyle asserts, that "history is the essence of in-

numerable biographies;" but we do not think that Macaulay is right in asserting that "facts are the dross of history." We think he is far more accurate when he says, "The dramatist *creates*, the historian *disposes*," and we perfectly coincide with the opinion that "history, at least in its state of ideal perfection, is a compound of poetry and philosophy," though we see the danger that opens before the writer who adopts this view;—on the one hand, he may construe it into fiction, on the other, into theory. We certainly believe that history may—nay, ought,—to be "as pleasant as a novel, and as exciting as a drama," and that the intense interest of a nation's history may be heightened by luminous expansion and perspicuous suggestiveness; but we suspect that the flux and reflux of events is too potent and subtle to be successfully exhibited in the pre-Raphaelite style in which Macaulay has endeavoured to show it. Its brilliancy, attractiveness, fascination, unparalleled picturesqueness, we admit, but the genuine truthfulness of relation is, in our opinion, somewhat lost sight of when the chief aim is to produce blaze, bustle, epigram, caricature, and the restless and unflagging interest of fiction. In this we think Macaulay erred; but inasmuch as he drew men's thoughts to the glorious deeds done by men like ourselves in not distant though "ancient days," he was a mighty benefactor to "our noble England," and deserves no cavil at our hands. Read reverently and thoughtfully, his works cannot fail to transfuse wholesome patriotism and nationality into the soul. The whole history must be characterized as a grand theoretical essay on the post-Cromwellian history of England; but it is so imbued with genius, permeated with love of country, graphic in detail, sumptuously prodigal in learning, that a nation's admiration is a tribute scarcely sufficient to attest its value and utility.

Let us reverently regard him, "whose coffin was lately borne to a grave in that renowned transept which contains the dust of Chaucer, of Spenser, and of Dryden," as one of the glories of our race—as one of the great lessons our history teaches—that to culture, industry, persevering worth, copious intelligence, and fidelity to the deep-felt convictions of our nature, no position in life, literature, or human respect is closed; and that "the tears and praises of all time" await, as a reward, those noble souls who, by the glorious martyrdom of intelligence, enrich and vivify the universe with such examples, efforts, and results as touch the souls of others to sympathetic strivings, and cause the hearts of after-generations to glow with the heat of a new life, and pulsate with the ardour of a fecund exemplariness, to enrich the past, affect the present, and bless the future.

If we are endowed with the sweet danger—*dulce periculum*—of superior power of wealth, position, intellect, or faith, may we so use our gifts as to acquire the sorrow of friends, the regret of our fellows, the peaceful recognition of all who know us, and the favour and friendship of God.

S. N.

Religion.

IS THE BIBLE ALONE A SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul:
 The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.
 The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart:
 The commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes.
 The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever:
 The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.
 More are they to be desired than gold, yea, than much fine gold:
 Sweeter also than honey and the honeycomb.
 Moreover by them is thy servant warned:
 And in keeping of them there is great reward.”—*Psa. xix. 7—11.*

ON the importance of the present question it is not necessary that we should dwell, for this is admitted by all, whether from a consideration of the intrinsic value of the debated question itself, or from its history, as being one of the chief (if not, indeed, the very chief) point of difference between the two great sections into which we find that professed Christians are at present divided, viz., Protestants and Roman Catholics. At the period of the Reformation, in the sixteenth century, the sufficiency of Holy Scripture in its integrity, as the sole authoritative rule of faith and doctrine, was asserted by the Reformers in opposition to the dictum that had obtained reverence for ages, that to Scripture was to be added the oral traditions of the Church, in order to complete the Rule of Faith, or standard of appeal, in all questions of a religious nature. But, by the noble Reformers on the continent and in our own country, this excrescence of tradition and superstition was cut away, and the Bible, and not the decrees of popes and councils, was proclaimed by them as the only legitimate authority, from which there could be no appeal, and whose voice ought not to be set aside in all disputed or disputable questions of doctrine or practice. “To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them,” *Isa. viii. 20.* In our day this same battle for truth still goes on; but the weapons that we employ are not those which have disgraced a former age, as the rack, the prison, or the stake, but an earnest appeal to the mind and conscience of every man as a moral, responsible, and intelligent being. Speaking “as to wise men,” we call on each to

"judge" what we say. If it be error, let it be denounced in the light of day; if truth, let it be accepted and honoured as such.

The sufficiency of Scripture as a Rule of Faith, we observe, will be apparent from a consideration of its character as a revelation of His will from God to man.

Reasoning *a priori*, we should expect that a professed revelation from God, a Being infinite in all perfection, should exhibit something of this characteristic attribute of His nature; that, like its Author, it would be perfect; that of itself it would be sufficient to attain the desired end, and instruct us in everything that is essentially requisite for us to know, in order that we may be "wise unto salvation." To affirm the contrary were to make God the Author of an imperfection, and that in the important matter of a revelation of His will unto us—a supposition so absurd, that it requires but to be mentioned, to be pronounced untenable. Perfection we see written upon all the handiworks of God in the world of nature, whether in the starry firmament above, or in the vegetable and animated kingdoms around us. This perfection in the material universe alone leads us to look for a similar perfection (or complete adaptation of means to the end) in the moral system or revelation of His will. Nor are our anticipations in this respect disappointed, on an examination of the volume of inspiration. The language of the Psalmist, which we have prefixed to this article, affirms this perfection of the law of God: that His "testimony" is "sure," not uncertain; His statutes also are "right," and his "commandments pure;" and that their legitimate influence is to "convert the soul," make "wise the simple," "rejoicing the heart," and "enlightening the eyes." Were there no other description of the character of Holy Writ than this, it would be sufficient to commend it to our supreme affection, as being of itself all-sufficient to instruct us in everything necessary to salvation. Universal experience also testifies to the truth of the Psalmist's impassioned estimate of the Word of God here and elsewhere. "I have seen an end of all perfection: but thy commandment is exceeding broad," *Psa. cxix. 96*. St. Paul also commends Timothy, in that "from a child" he had "known the holy Scriptures;" and also fixes the highest estimate upon their influence, when he affirmed that they were "able to make" him "wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus." He further affirms the divine fountain of Holy Writ as being "given by inspiration of God;" and its sufficiency may be inferred from the fact, that it is also "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect"—the legitimate result of the study of a perfect rule, and thereby "thoroughly furnished unto all good works," *2 Tim. iii. 16, 17*. Here we have not the least intimation that anything but the Word of God alone was to be studied as our Rule of Faith, or that its teachings were to be at all modified by any oral traditions, which latter are far more likely to be corrupted than any written document. That the Scripture to which Paul

here refers were the books of the Old Testament, will be acknowledged by all; that the Apocrypha* is not to be included is also evident, from the fact that the Jews never did view it as the result of inspiration, and consequently it was by them always carefully excluded from the sacred canon. We may, however, understand as coming within the meaning of the term Scripture, as used by the apostle, the genuine Gospels and Epistles which were written by the evangelists and the apostles up to the time when he wrote to Timothy, and any that might be written afterwards by inspired penmen. The same great apostle also affirms that "whatsoever things were written aforetime (not *spoken* merely) were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope," Rom. xv. 4. St. James also admonishes his readers to "lay apart all filthiness and superfluity of naughtiness, and receive with meekness the engrafted word, which is able to save your souls," Jas. i. 21. The 119th Psalm is a psalm by itself, in its thorough praise of the law, or Word of God. Its entire scope and design appears to be to "magnify the law, and make it honourable," to set forth the excellency, sufficiency, and usefulness of the divine revelation; and it is also further recommended to us for our practice by the Psalmist's own good example.†

In the next place we would remark, that the Bible ought to be read by all, and that it is the bounden duty of every man to judge for himself as to its true meaning. Under the Old Testament dispensation we find an express command to this effect:—"And these

* The word Apocrypha is derived from the Greek word signifying "to conceal," and was doubtless applied to certain books, either because their authors were unknown, or their characters suspected; and they were never exhibited by the ancient Church, either Jewish or Christian, as part of the standard of saving truth, and were by them deemed *uncanonical*. Their names are,—*Esdra* 1, 2, *Tobit*, *Judith*, *Chronicles of Esther*, *Wisdom of Solomon*, *Ecclesiasticus*, *Baruch*, *Song of the Three Children*, *History of Susanna*, *Bell and the Dragon*, *Prayer of Manasses*, and *Maccabees* 1, 2. These books are rejected by Protestants, because they have no authority for admission into the canon. Not one of them is extant in Hebrew, the original language of the Old Testament; they were written after the cessation of prophecy, and before the gospels; not one of the writers directly claims to be inspired; they were never received as canonical by the Jews, and were rejected by Christ, being never once quoted by either Him or His apostles. The early Christian fathers do not quote them as being on a level with canonical Scripture, but rejected them as uncanonical during the first four centuries. They contain fabulous matter, *Esther* x. 6; 2 *Mac.* i. 19–22; ii. 4: contradictory statements, compare *Tobit* i. 12 with xii. 15: doctrines contradictory to Scripture, 2 *Mac.* xii. 43, 44; *Wisdom* viii. 19, 20; 1 *Esdra* vii. 33; *Tobit* xii. 8, 9; *Eccles.* iii. 3, 30; vii. 20; xiii. 24; xxxv. 3: commend immoral practices, 2 *Mac.* xiv. 41–46; *Judith* ix. 2–9; *Tobit* vi. 16, 17: and contradict profane historians without good evidence, see 1 *Mac.* i. 6, 7; viii. 16.

† On this part of our subject consult also Jer. xxiii. 29–32; Luke viii. 11, 12; xi. 27, 28; John viii. 32; xx. 30, 31; Rom. i. 16; x. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 1, 2; Ephes. vi. 17–19; 1 Pet. i. 23; ii. 2; 2 Pet. i. 19–21; iii. 1, 2; 1 John i. 1–5; v. 13.

words which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart: and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand, and they shall be as frontlets between thine eyes. And thou shalt write them upon the posts of thy house, and on thy gates," Deut. vi. 6—9 (see also xi. 18—21; xxxi. 11—13), a command doubtless expressly intended to enforce and recommend the diligent study of Scripture. Joshua himself was also commanded by God to "meditate" in the "book" of His "law day and night," and to regulate his conduct thereby, "according to all that is written therein," Josh. i. 7, 8. The Psalmist also pronounces him blessed "whose delight is in the law of the Lord," Psal. i. 2; cxix. 97—104 (see also Rev. i. 3); while his son, the wisest of men, testifies that "whoso despiseth the word shall be destroyed: but he that feareth the commandment shall be rewarded," or, as it might be rendered, "shall be in peace," Prov. xiii. 13 (see also Matt. vii. 24—27). By the prophet Isaiah we are exhorted to "seek out of the book of the Lord, and read," &c., Isa. xxxiv. 16. Christ commanded His hearers (and consequently us also) to "search the Scriptures," John v. 39; while Paul bestows the highest eulogium on the noble-minded Bereans, "in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, to see whether those things" which they had heard from him "were so," Acts xvii. 11. Further, writing to the Thessalonians, he thus concludes:—"I charge you by the Lord that this epistle be read unto all the holy brethren," 1 Thess. v. 27; whence we may very fairly infer that this production of the inspired apostle ought to be read to, indeed *by*, all Christians of every succeeding age, for their instruction and edification in religious truth, and so may, very properly, form a part of their sacred canon, or "Rule of Faith." Again, by the same apostle, and in the same epistle, we are enjoined to "prove all things," and to "hold fast that which is good," 1 Thess. v. 21; and this we are to do by comparing creeds, theories, doctrines, opinions, and practices with Scripture. In his controversy with the Sadducees, Christ appeals to the scriptural knowledge of His interlocutors, "Do ye not therefore err, because ye know not the Scriptures, neither the power of God?" &c., Mark xii. 24. Here is no reference to tradition or vague opinion of the Church, but it is the Scripture that is solemnly appealed to, and we should hesitate very much before receiving anything that is not supported by, or is opposed to, its teachings. The same privilege, duty, and obligation of every man to examine the Scriptures, and regulate his conduct by them alone, is also taught in the close of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus:—"Abraham saith unto him, They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them," Luke xvi. 29—31. The solemn consequences attendant upon this examination of the sacred Word are also urged upon our notice by Christ, and were doubtless in-

tended as a powerful argument to stir all men up to an anxious study of its precepts; "He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him: the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day," John xii. 47—50. (Consult also Josh. xxiii. 6, and Neh. viii. 1—8.) It were a useless quibble to object here that the words *spoken* are not *all* included in what is *written*, for it is evident that none are "written" but what were also "spoken" by our Saviour. The evangelist himself confesses to this omission, while at the same time he gives as his reason why any were written,—“That ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through His name,” John xx. 31. “There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written,” xxi. 25.

It is certainly a remarkable fact that Jesus himself did not write a single word of any of His sayings or doings while on earth; but the existence of this peculiar feature in the Divine plan does not warrant us in supposing, as our opponents would have us to do, that other doctrinal teachings, besides those which are written, were committed to the care of the apostles, and by them entrusted to their successors, to be taught to converts when the latter were fit to be entrusted therewith, and which important secret doctrines were all included in that vague class now known as the oral traditions of the church. Such an idea, we always conceived, savours somewhat of the priesthood's notions of their superior dignity, and reflects anything but honour on the wisdom of the great Author of Christianity. This brings us to notice, in the next place, that so far from being regarded as on an equal footing with Scripture, tradition is always to be rejected, if opposed to the plain teaching thereof.

In the fourth session of the Council of Trent, it was declared that “they” (the traditions of the church) “have come down to us, either received by the apostles from the lips of Christ himself, or transmitted by the hands of the same apostles, under the dictation of the Holy Spirit; that these traditions relate both to faith and morals, have been preserved in the Catholic church by continual succession, and are to be received with equal piety and veneration (*pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia*) with Scripture; and whosoever shall knowingly and deliberately despise these traditions is accursed.” What are the teachings of these traditions it were hardly necessary, we opine, to mention; they must be, most of them, familiar to our readers, and their opposition to Holy Writ will doubtless be equally well remembered: we will only mention a few tenets, viz., that Peter was chief of the apostles, and was appointed head of the church upon earth by Christ himself; that the Pope is his successor, and that the belief of this is necessary to salvation; that the Church of Rome is infallible; that baptism and regeneration are identically the same; that sin is divisible into two classes, “venial” and “mortal;” that man is saved by works and not by grace; that justification and sanctification are one pro-

cess; that we must confess our sins to a priest, who has absolute power to grant or withhold forgiveness thereof; that there is a purgatory after this life, where venial sin may be expiated; that we should pray for the dead; the doctrine of transubstantiation, and that the cup must not be given to the laity; that the mass is a true sacrifice unto God for sin; that there are seven sacraments; that the marriage of clergymen (*i. e.*, the priesthood), is unlawful; that saints, relics, and images are to be honoured with worship; that the Virgin Mary ought to be worshipped; and, finally, that there are other mediators for us besides Jesus Christ. Such are some of the teachings of tradition, opposing and setting aside all the fundamental doctrines of Christianity; but we are warned against giving heed to its seductive voice, which would allure us from the "more sure word of prophecy." When the Pharisees found fault with Christ's disciples for eating with unwashed hands, he replied, "In vain do ye worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, as the washing of pots and cups: and many other such like things ye do," Mark vii. 5—13; Matt. xv. 1—9 (consult also Deut. iv. 2, and xii. 32; 2 Thess. ii. 8—12; 1 Tim. iv. 1—3). Again, St. Paul solemnly affirms the exclusive claims of the truths he taught,—“But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed,” Gal. i. 8; and the volume of inspiration is closed and sealed against all interpolators, or so-called improvers, by an awful threatening against those who should dare to “add unto” or “take away from the words of this prophecy,” Rev. xxii. 18, 19. Surely, then, before we turn from this Rule of Faith, or pronounce it insufficient or incomplete, coming as it does with so many solemn asseverations of its sole and undivided Divine authority, we should be very careful to examine and inquire if, to a certainty, the authority which claims an equal share upon our reverent attention does truly exhibit *equal* credentials of supreme authority to challenge our belief. Where, then, must we look for this supplementary aid, or rather for that which imparts of *its* superior authority to the written record, and so bestows upon the latter all the *little* authority it can be supposed to possess? Is it to oral tradition? This is worse than a broken reed, and would require the united labours of many herculean theologians to sift and present it unto us in anything like a tangible form, so multifarious and conflicting are its testimonies, even according to those who hold its supposed authority.* If not to tradition,

* While the Bible is the only Rule of Faith and morals with Protestants, “to the Scripture the Roman Catholic adds, first, the Apocrypha; second, traditions; third, acts and decisions of the church, embracing numerous volumes of the Pope’s bulls, ten folio volumes of decretals, thirty-one folio volumes of acts of councils, fifty-one folio volumes of the *Acta Sanctorum*, or the doings and sayings of the saints; fourth, at least thirty-five volumes of the Greek and Latin Fathers, in which he says is to be found the *unanimous consent of the Fathers*; fifth, one

because of its uncertainty, shall we look to the decrees of popes and councils? Here, alas! we shall find ourselves lost amid contradictions, many and vehement. Pope we behold excommunicating pope, and one council after another condemning the decrees of its predecessor on questions of doctrine and practice, so that *which* can possibly be in the right, it is vain for the unlearned (or indeed the wise) to think to determine.

Unto the opinions of the Fathers of the Christian Church, as adduced by H. B., we do not mean to add much, but will notice only one or two. Clement of Rome, in his letter to the Corinthians, praises them for carefully attending to the word of God. "Take the epistle of the blessed Paul. What did he first write to you in the beginning of the gospel? Look into the Holy Scriptures, which are the true words of the Holy Ghost. Ye know there is nothing unjust or counterfeit in them. For ye know and well understand the sacred Scriptures, and have searched unto the oracles of God."* Polycarp also thus estimates the inspired writers,—“Neither I nor any other like me can come up to the wisdom of the blessed and glorious Paul, who, being among you, taught accurately and soundly the word of truth; who also, being absent, wrote to you letters, to which, if you bend your attention, you will be able to build yourselves up in the faith given to you.”† Justin Martyr also thus testifies:—“Be it known unto you that whatever we say, we have learned from Christ and the prophets that were before Him; these things alone are true, and older than other writers. For there were among the Jews certain men, prophets of God, by whom the prophetic spirit told beforehand what would come to pass.”‡

Again, Irenæus says, “I have heard from a certain presbyter (supposed to be Papias), who had heard from those who saw the apostles, and learned of them, that to the ancients the reproof given in the Scriptures to those who did things without the council of the Spirit, was sufficient. Thus we are not to censure them further than by following the Scriptures, well knowing that the Scriptures are perfect, as being dictated by the word of God and His Spirit; that a heavy punishment awaits those who add to, or take from, the Scriptures; we, following the one and only God as our Teacher, and having His words as a Rule of Faith, do always speak the same things concerning the same things. A sound mind—that is, sober, discreet, and a lover of truth—whatever God has put in

hundred and thirty-five volumes folio add to the chaos of unwritten traditions which have floated down to us from the apostolic times. But we must not stop here; for the expositions of every priest and bishop must be added. The truth is, such a rule is no rule, unless an endless and contradictory mass of uncertainties could be a rule. No Romanist can soberly believe, much less learn, his own Rule of Faith.”—*Elliott's Delineation of Romanism*, p. 13. London. 1851.

* Clement's "Epistle to the Corinthians," chaps. 2, 4, 5, 47, and 53, as quoted by Dr. Bennett in "Theology of the Early Church," lect. ii.

† "Epistle to the Philippians," chap. 3. *Ibid.*

‡ Dial., p. 225. *Ibid.*

the power of men, and made knowable by us,—these such a mind will study, and improve in them, rendering the knowledge of them easy by daily exercise. And the things which we may know are those which fall under our sight: and whatever are plainly, clearly, and expressly spoken, in the divine Scriptures. Such a one will be well satisfied of these things, if he also diligently read the Scriptures, with those who are presbyters of the church, with whom is the apostolic doctrine, as we have shown." *

The wisdom of this last counsel is apparent, when we reflect how scanty were its opportunities for studying the word of God in the primitive church, compared with those enjoyed by us in these times; and it is also evident that ministers were designed to assist the faithful in the study of the sacred writings. Yet again, once more, Tertullian says to Hermogenes, "Whether all things were made of subject matter, I never yet read. Let the shop of Hermogenes show where it is written. If it be not written, let him fear that woe that is destined for those who add anything to the word of God, or take anything away."† He also maintains the sufficiency of Scripture with a high hand, when he says, "It denies what it does not denote;‡ and when he further exclaims, "I adore the fulness of the Scripture."§

Such are a few specimens of the opinions entertained by the Fathers in the primitive church of the first three centuries, and which might be multiplied manifold, did time or space permit. What, however, has been adduced will suffice to show the supreme deference that was paid to the written word in the first ages, to the complete exclusion of tradition, as being of any like authority. Indeed, the very contrary opinion was held respecting tradition to that adopted by our opponents. The word tradition, like many others, has, in the lapse of ages, acquired different senses; so that the meaning which was attached thereto, before the Scriptural canon was complete, is very different from that now adopted and fondly cherished by the adherents of Popery. In Paul's epistle, it signifies whatever is *handed down* to us, "whether by word or epistle." It therefore thus includes Scripture. Eusebius informs us that "Ignatius exhorted the churches through which he passed to hold the traditions of the apostles, which he thought necessary, as a faithful witness, and for the sake of greater security, to attest by committing it to writing."|| Thus did Ignatius, by his conduct, destroy the credit of unwritten traditions, at the time when the Scriptures had not obtained universal circulation; since he judged it the duty of a faithful witness to commit to writing what he knew. Justin Martyr also, as we have seen, appeals not to tradition, but

* "Advers. Heres.," lib. iii.

† "Theology of the Early Church," lect. 2.

‡ "Negat. Scriptura quod non notat."—De Monogamia, c. 4.

§ "Adoro Scripturæ plenitudinem."—Advers. Hermog., c. 22.

|| Eusebius, book iii., ch. 36.

to the Scriptures alone. Thus it is evident that the earliest Fathers understood by the word "tradition," what the apostles evidently intended to mean by it—mere "handing down"—including the books of Scripture themselves, and the report or testimony that they came from the apostles, as inspired and authoritative teachers of the church. Irenæus looks upon tradition as the refuge of the heretics, who say, "The truth cannot be learned from Scripture, but by those who are ignorant of tradition." And again: "When we challenge them to come to the tradition from the apostles, preserved by the succession of the presbyters in the churches, they oppose tradition, saying, 'they are wiser than apostles, who mixed up legal things with the words of the Saviour.'"^{*}

Here we again perceive that tradition, with the Christian Fathers, was that they had handed down from the apostles, viz., the inspiration and authority of Scripture. "The heretics thus first appealed to tradition, pretending to have received information that the Scriptures, being no infallible guide, were to be corrected from some higher source of wisdom; to which the orthodox opposed the tradition which had come to them by a succession of presbyters in the churches, that the Scriptures alone were pure authoritative truth."[†] How this practice and pretence exactly agrees with that of our opponents, we will not stay to point out; it appears self-evident; and the description given of the practice of these ancient heretics reads as though we were listening to a modern Jesuit arguing against Scripture. "When the heretics," says Irenæus, "are convicted from the Scriptures, they turn to accusations of the Scriptures themselves; as that they are not correct; and are not from authority; and because they are variously expressed, and because the truth cannot from these be formed by such as are ignorant of tradition."[‡]

Much more to the same import might be adduced from the earliest Christian Fathers to show what meaning they attached to the word "tradition," and in what estimation those unwritten traditions were held by them, when opposed to the teachings of Scripture.

We must now hasten to examine the article of "Pope Gregory," which will not, however, require to be very extensive, as the chief points in dispute have been already anticipated and dwelt upon. The first point which claims our attention is the assumption, taken for granted and built upon by "Gregory" and others of the same way of thinking, that the communion to which they belong is not merely the only true church, but identically the same with the one established by Christ and his Apostles. This position, however, we must at once venture to question. Where is the resemblance between the Church of the first century and the Church to which

^{*} *Advers. Heres.*, lib. iii, ch. 2. *Ibid.*

[†] Dr. Bennett. "Theology of the Early Church,"

[‡] *Advers. Heres.*, lib. iii., c. 2. *Ibid.*

Gregory belongs? We confess that we can trace very little likeness of the first in the latter; but we do perceive many glaring differences, some even amounting to positive contrasts, a few of which we have already noticed. If we were asked who had the greater right to claim affinity with the early Church in the first and second centuries? we should certainly reply, that the reformed Protestant Churches showed the clearest evidences of kindred to so illustrious an ancestry. If asked how it is that the Church of Rome has fallen from her first estate? we should reply, that in our opinion it was because she gradually forsook the light of the written Word, and instead of the commandments of God, taught the traditions of men, "departing from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils; speaking lies in hypocrisy," &c., 1 Tim. iv. 1, 2. Whether we are right in this our opinion, our readers themselves must judge by the facts of history.

The first argument of our opponent is that "the Bible was never intended to be the only rule," a position which he supports in his own specious way; but so transparent and feeble are some of his arguments, that we cannot believe any of his readers will be misled thereby. It is quite true that Christ commissioned His disciples to preach; but what?—hidden traditions? No; the Gospel: and the substance of this they, as wise and inspired men, afterwards decided upon committing to writing, that so we might "know the certainty of those things wherein" they instructed their hearers, Luke i. 1—4. St. Luke, who seems to stand very low as an authority in "Gregory's" estimation, distinctly affirms that he "had perfect understanding of all things from the very first," a qualification which must eminently have fitted him to the task of recording a history of Christ and His doings while on earth. Matthew and John were both Apostles, companions of our Lord, and eye-witnesses of the events which they record. The reason why John wrote his Gospel he tells us himself; it was to show "that Jesus was the Christ, the Son of God," in opposition to the contrary errors that were beginning to prevail. Mark, though not an Apostle, was long the companion of Peter; and the testimony of the early Fathers is that he was the *interpreter* of Peter; that he wrote this Gospel under Peter's eye, and with his approbation; and that it was a record of the facts which Peter stated in his ministry: and, consequently, that it is an inspired book has never been questioned. But it surely is not requisite that we should produce the evidences in existence to prove the inspiration or authority of any book of the New Testament, in reply to "Gregory's" insinuations. It is, indeed, quite true that, probably, few of the Epistles would have been written, "were it not for the existence of abuses in the churches to which they were addressed;" but this does not make them any less valuable as part of the Rule of Faith, seeing that human nature remains the same now as in the days of the Apostles. The feeble puerilities that follow on this head by "Gregory," do not require serious refutation; nor even the "conclusive" fact in "the matter, that every

single epistle which we possess was addressed to *Christians already fully instructed in the faith*," an opinion which does not seem warranted by many expressions in the epistles (see Heb. v. 11—14; 1 Cor. iii. 1—3; Gal. iii. 1, and v. 7); or if they were so instructed, the rod of an Apostle was often requisite to stir the primitive Christians up to their duty, and doubtless may also be as often required in our own time. St. Peter, however, urges his readers to "desire the sincere milk of the Word," not any mixture of Scripture diluted with tradition, "that they may grow thereby," 1 Pet. ii. 2. To say that a "volume of doctrinal instruction was perfectly unnecessary" to the first Christians, is an assertion at complete variance with the facts of history; indeed, they all point the other way, as any attentive reader of the New Testament will at once readily perceive. Indeed, the wisdom of the Divine Author of Christianity is more clearly seen when we remember the circumstances which called forth the several apostolic epistles of the New Testament.

His second argument, that "the Bible was not at first regarded as the only Rule of Faith," is simply untrue, as is evident from a consideration of the opinions we have quoted as being held by the early Fathers: they always appealed to Scripture as the final authority; Irenæus declares that "those things which the Apostles taught, they afterwards delivered in the Scriptures, the foundation and pillar of our faith."* When, therefore, the Scriptures were thus delivered, they must have superseded unwritten traditions, for Irenæus further pronounces the Scriptures to be "perfect, as derived from the word of God and His Spirit." Eusebius also testifies that all things, which Polycarp professes to have derived from the Lord, were in every respect conformed to the Scriptures. Irenæus further remarks, "If the Apostles knew recondite mysteries, which they taught to the perfect in secret, apart from others, they would have delivered them to those most especially to whom they committed the churches."† The circumstances of the case necessitated much *viva voce* instruction in the early Church; and while the books composing the Bible were scarce, and learning uncommon, it is not to be supposed a matter of wonder that such was the case, nor yet that such a practice has the greater claims upon our commendatory notice. The early Christians, like ourselves, were doubtless left to find out, and put in practice, those means which, in their view, appeared best calculated to secure the spread and triumph of the truths of Christianity: to insinuate, therefore, as "Pope Gregory" has done, that our Divine Master should have suggested to some of his followers the art of printing, as the most expeditious way of accomplishing his plan, is only another way of casting a scornful reflection upon the idea that God has chosen to work by human means, and that He chose to work just as He has

* *Advers. Heres.*, lib. iii., cap. 4. See Bennett's "Theology of the Early Church."

† *Advers. Heres.*, lib. iii., cap. 1, 2, 3. *Ibid.*

done, when, possibly, *our* wisdom would have suggested another and a better way.*

"Gregory's" next argument, that the "adoption of this rule in the early ages was, humanly speaking, impossible," because it was not complete during the first, and because, during the succeeding two or three centuries, the books of the New Testament were not collected into one volume, may be a very profound argument, but we confess that we do not really see the point of it upon this present question. Because the early Christians did not possess the complete Bible, are we, therefore, to assume its insufficiency? Because they possessed but a few fragments of this heavenly gift, are we to despise the whole treasure, and prefer in its stead the vague, corrupt, spurious traditions of men? We pity the mental wisdom of the man who should thus choose the beggarly crumbs of tradition in preference to the Word of Life.

We now come to our opponent's fourth argument, and which is, doubtless, intended as a poser to us Protestants; "We do not," he says, "adhere to the Bible as our only rule." Indeed! We always

* "The time and occasion of the formation of the Christian canon, and its general reception in the Church, are questions as difficult as they are interesting and important. That the beloved disciple, John, as the survivor of the Apostles, authoritatively closed the canon, has been asserted, and it may surely be pronounced the most natural hypothesis; but it is still a question of fact, at what period, and to what extent, this decision was known and prevailed among the churches. It cannot be ascertained that the apostolical Fathers possessed even the Gospels as early as we should have expected. When Clement of Rome quotes the Old Testament, he says, 'Thus it is written;' but he adopts another style concerning Christian verities, saying, 'Let us be mindful of the words of the Lord, teaching mildness;' 1 Epist. ch. xiii. And Ignatius quotes what certainly does not exist now in either of the Gospels,—'Handle ire, and see that I am not an incorporeal dæmon;' Epist. to Smyrna, chap. iii. Polycarp also says, 'Let us serve Christ with fear and all piety, as He himself commanded, and the Apostles and Prophets who preached before the coming of our Lord;' Epist., chap. vi. Luke, in his introduction to the Gospel which bears his name, intimates that there were then extant many gospels, not of Divine authority, but neither also of heretical pravity, and from some of these the early Fathers appear to quote. All this must naturally have occurred. But strong suspicions are excited that the early Christians, satisfied of the truth of those things which the Apostles preached, were negligent of the canon. . . . But when in the second century, Marcion, after his teacher, Cerdo, had appealed to Scripture, the Fathers were roused to the discharge of a sacred duty, to form or procure a collection of the sacred writings, first of the Gospels (and to that of Luke was appended the Acts), and, afterwards, of the apostolical Epistles, which were followed by the Revelation. Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Origen, Tertullian, then begin to speak a different language, referring to the four Gospels, and to the Epistles, not omitting the mention of the Revelation. In this, as well as other instances, the heretics served the cause of truth, which they laboured to destroy."*—*Theology of the Early Church.*"

* This subject is ably discussed by Campegius Vitringa, the worthy son of a justly celebrated father. "Dissertationes Sacre," edited by Venema, Franeker 1731.

thought that all true Protestants ever did. But let us hear in what matter it is that we depart therefrom: and first, it is because we presume to *teach* our children and explain the Bible so as to be comprehended by their limited understandings, instead of telling them to *read and find out*, what it is desirable they should know, *by themselves!* Really "Gregory," this is a joke; you cannot be serious. But we pass on to doctrine. The doctrine of the Trinity, he affirms, we owe to the traditions of his church. We may here remark, that if it were not plainly taught in the Bible, it would cease to be a Protestant doctrine. Every intelligent Protestant can deduce it in a legitimate manner from the language of Scripture, without being obliged to "take it, as well as whatever else is positive in their creed, in trust from the (Roman) Catholic Church." It is a Protestant doctrine, not because it is a Roman Catholic tenet, but because it is a truth of Scripture; and in reference to the case of the Unitarian who is referred to by "Gregory," we may remark, that we cannot understand how it is that men who can reason as other men do, on other questions, reason quite differently when the doctrine of the Trinity is the subject of debate. So also with regard to infant baptism and the observance of the first day of the week;—every intelligent Protestant is satisfied as to his duty in these matters, by legitimate inference from the recorded facts of the New Testament, and the practice of the Apostolic (not the Roman Catholic) Church. The Apostle's command in Acts xv. 29, had reference to the peculiar views of the Jewish converts relative to things non-essential, and cannot be considered binding upon all Christians, except where the *moral law* is infringed. In St. John xiii. 14, after the example of humility our Lord had given His disciples, in condescending to perform the menial office of a servant, He says, "If I, then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet; ye also ought to wash one another's feet:" not that they "*must*" do so literally, "if they would be His disciples," as "Gregory" expresses it, but that the spirit of the act should enter into, and be cultivated by them towards each other. Receiving the Sacrament in any other part of the day than the evening, does not seem to us of so much importance as it appears to be to our opponent. The celebration of any event can be observed at any other diurnal time than exactly the same as the original, if the object of the celebration be not lost sight of. St. James's advice (v. 14, 15) was given with the view of healing the sick, and not as the Roman Catholics administer extreme unction as the final preparation for death: according to the Apostle, the "prayer of faith" was to "save the sick" from death, the "Lord raising him up" in answer thereto: a result never contemplated when the priest enters the sick chamber in order to administer "extreme unction."

Thus have we cursorily noticed the various arguments advanced against the sufficiency of the Bible as the sole Rule of Faith, by our opponent "Pope Gregory." At the close of his article, he asks for "a single clear text that in the remotest manner supports"

our theory. During the treatment of our subject, we have quoted many passages of Scripture, and referred to many more, all of which bear, either more or less, upon the question at issue: if this is not sufficient, we must now leave both him and our readers with the language of St. Peter:—"We have not followed cunningly devised fables,"—as are traditions,—but we have "a more sure word of prophecy; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in your hearts; knowing this first, that no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation.* For the prophecy came not at any time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," 2 Pet. i. 16—21.

CLEMENT.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It was proved in the first negative article, that Protestants, whatever they may assert about their being guided by "the Bible only," do not, as a matter of fact, use the sacred volume as their exclusive Rule of Faith. It is my intention, in the following pages, to inquire into the cause of this glaring inconsistency; and I hope to make it clear to my readers, that Protestants do not observe their first principle, for this very simple reason, **THEIR RULE OF FAITH IS QUITE IMPRACTICABLE.**

I do not think that any of my readers will be disposed to quarrel with me, when I assert that the Protestant Rule of Faith requires that all conviction in religious matters should be based on individual research and individual satisfaction, and that all ecclesiastical authority should be rejected. This is the very essence of Protestantism. On this principle, therefore, every Protestant is obliged to satisfy himself by individual research—1st, of the existence of a revelation; 2ndly, that such revelation is really confided to man in that collection of works called the Bible, and there only; 3rdly, that each and every one of the books of the Bible is divinely inspired, and that the book, which is called the Bible, is really the whole Bible and nothing but the Bible; 4thly, that each book of the Bible was written by the person whose name it bears, and has been handed down without any material corruption; 5thly, that the translation which he uses has been so correctly made, that he can rest confident that in reading it, he is reading the words which the Spirit of God dictated to the Prophets and Evangelists; 6thly, as many parts of Holy Scripture "are hard to be understood, and are apt to be wrested by the unlearned and unstable to their own perdition," each person must see that he understands the Scriptures rightly; for "Holy Scripture is Holy Scripture only in the *right sense* of Holy Scripture."

* By "private interpretation," the Apostle evidently refers to the practice of explaining isolated passages in such a manner as to support some pre-conceived theory, instead of comparing Scripture with Scripture, and so making the Bible its own interpreter.

Such is the complicated and laborious inquiry which the Protestant Rule of Faith, theoretically speaking, imposes on each individual; I ask, then, is not a rule, which requires all its adherents to pass through such a labyrinth of difficulties, quite impracticable to the majority of mankind? Can it be the Rule of Faith which God has given as a guide to the poorest, simplest, and most illiterate of His creatures? It is quite absurd to answer, as some do, that the learned can make these researches, and the unlearned must be guided by the voice of their pastors, for you thus create two rules of faith, one for the learned, and another for the unlearned; besides, as experience has shown, it is impossible for any one, on Protestant principles, to arrive at any *certain* result on many of the points which I have enumerated.

As my space is necessarily very limited, I will confine myself to an examination of the difficulties which would beset a Protestant in his examination of the third point, which has reference to the canon and inspiration of Holy Scripture. As Protestants profess to rest their whole belief on the Bible alone, saying that they will believe implicitly every doctrine which it inculcates, and reject every doctrine which "is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby," it must obviously be a matter of the highest importance to them to ascertain, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that nothing has been admitted into that volume which ought to have been rejected, and nothing left out that ought to have been inserted; for, in the first case, they might believe some important doctrine on human authority only; and, in the second case, it might happen that some doctrine or practice, absolutely necessary to salvation, would be entirely neglected. They must, therefore, be able to prove to their own satisfaction, and to the conviction of their adversaries, that each and every one of the books in their Bible is inspired; that no merely *human* production has found a place in that volume; and that no part of what was really written under Divine inspiration has been rejected as of no authority. But how many of those who profess to hold the Bible in such great veneration, and proclaim that it is their only guide, are able to do this? Not one. I fearlessly assert that, on Protestant principles, it is an impossible task. The canon and inspiration of Scripture cannot be proved without reference to the traditions and decrees of the Catholic Church; at least, there must be some infallible authority to reveal to us which are the books that have been written under Divine inspiration. "If the books which compose the canon of Scripture are not revelation, *then we have no revelation*. If the canon be not established to us as a matter of revelation, the books of which it is composed are not so established; *and if the books be not so, then not one doctrine or precept, which they contain, comes established to us as a revelation.*"*

Nothing but a Divine authority, some revelation or commu-

* Haldane, a Protestant, "On the Genuineness and Authenticity of the New Testament," p. 379.

niation from God, would be sufficient to guarantee this Divine fact of the inspiration of the Bible. It is a fact not cognizable by human reason, which could only be known to God in the first instance, and to man only in case God should have communicated it to him either directly or through an infallible church. Even supposing Protestants take the Old Testament on trust from the Jews, a Divine witness is still required to attest the fact of the inspiration of the New Testament. No proof of the inspiration of the New Testament can be drawn from the Old, and no proof can be drawn from the New Testament, since it cannot give witness to itself.* But Protestants acknowledge no Divine witness but the Bible; and as nothing less than a Divine witness is required for the fact of inspiration, it follows that Protestants have no grounds for believing in the inspiration of the New Testament. Hooker, who is a great authority with Protestants, says in his "Ecclesiastical Polity," book ii. No. 4, "If any one book of Scripture did give testimony to all, yet still that Scripture which giveth testimony to the rest, would require another Scripture to give testimony to it, neither should we come to any pause whereon to rest, unless, besides Scripture, there was something else acknowledged." This is quite conclusive about the Protestant doctrine of the "Bible and the Bible only." But I have heard some Protestants say, that *faith* proves to them the inspiration of the Scriptures; that is, *faith* proves to them the inspiration of the volume upon which alone they profess to build their faith! Is there not a vicious circle here? If there be any among my readers who rely upon this argument, I would ask them, how would they proceed in trying to convince a pagan? Others, with a greater degree of plausibility, say that they know what books are inspired, by what they are pleased to call "internal evidence," which is equal to saying that they have, in their own minds, a rule whereby to test all books for which inspiration is claimed, and distinguish between such as can and such as cannot make out their claim. I will merely ask them to compare Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon, which Protestants believe to be inspired, with the Book of Wisdom, which they reject as apocryphal, or the Epistle to Philemon with the Epistle of St. Barnabas. Others, again, have attempted to prove the inspiration of the Bible from the holy doctrine it contains; the change of life in many sinners after perusing it, and similar arguments. By proving too much, this argument proves nothing at all; for on the same principle, most sermons, commentaries, and religious books, might be proved to be inspired. Some will give as their reason for believing in the inspiration of the New Testament, that it was written by the Apostles; and yet receive as inspired the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke, who were not Apostles, and reject the Epistle of St. Barnabas, who was an Apostle (Acts xiv. 13), in the

* Our Lord even could not give testimony of Himself; "If I give testimony of myself, my testimony is nothing."

same position as St. Paul, and who is declared, in Acts xi. 24, to have been "*full of the Holy Ghost, and of faith.*"

It may be remarked, also, that those who have recourse to this line of argument would require some infallible assurance that the books of the New Testament were really written by the persons whose names they bear; for it is obvious that in this case the historical evidence whereby we know, for instance, that Horace wrote the "*Ars Poetica*," would be insufficient as a foundation for the Divine faith. The other method, which some Protestants adopt, of looking upon the Bible as a whole, and arguing from one book to another, saying, for instance, that the Epistle of St. James must necessarily be inspired, because Isaiah contains true prophecies, is so absurd as not to require any notice. For my own part, I can only say with St. Augustine, and I am sure every Catholic will say the same, "I would not believe that the Scriptures were inspired, unless the Catholic Church informed me of the fact."—(*Contra Ep. Fundam.*)

I will now say a few words with regard to the canon of Scripture. For sake of brevity, and also not to prolong this discussion by the introduction of the controversy about the so-called Apocrypha, I will confine myself entirely to the New Testament. It was about ninety-seven years after the birth of our Lord, before the Gospel of St. John appeared.* By this time there were more than twenty gospels current among the faithful; there was an epistle by St. Barnabas, another by St. Clement (Phil. iv. 3), and another work called the "*Shepherd*," by Hermes, one of St. Paul's friends (Rom. xvi. 14). Several of these gospels, and all the epistles, are still extant, and may be bought as "*The Apocryphal New Testament.*" There were also many other writings attributed to the Apostles and their contemporaries, which have not come down to us,—such as an epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, which was written *before* that which is now called the *first* (1 Cor. v. 9), and the Epistle to the Laodiceans, which St. Paul commands the Colossians to read (iv. 16). Now, many of the treatises which I have mentioned were accepted in various parts of the early church as the inspired word of God; and many of the books which Protestants now receive, such as the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistles of St. Peter, St. James, St. Jude, the last two of St. John, and the Apocalypse, were rejected in some churches as not inspired. Ample evidence of this fact may be found in Eusebius, or any of the early ecclesiastical historians. During the first three centuries, we have as many as fourteen or fifteen lists, drawn up by eminent authors, of the books which they conceived to constitute the sacred Scriptures. Scarcely any two agree, and, what is most remarkable, not one ancient author can be quoted, who enumerates precisely the same books which Protestants now enumerate as making up the Bible. The Lodi-cæan canon, which comes nearest to that of the Church of England,

* St. John's Gospel was written after all the other books of the New Testament.

admitted Baruch, and excluded the Apocalypse. None of the authors I have mentioned assert that their canon was the *only true one*; they might lawfully differ on the question, for it had not yet been defined by the Church. I ask, then, how on Protestant principles could all this variety of opinion come to an end? On Protestant principles, I do not see how it ever could come to an end; in fact, I do not see how it ever came to have a beginning; for if the Bible was really designed by God to be the sole instructor of mankind, it is surely not too much to expect that He would not have left Christians during a period of three or four centuries in a state of utter uncertainty as to what really *was* the Bible, and left them, moreover, without any means of coming to a *certain* decision about it. He would have set some mark upon every part of His written word, so that it should have been recognized at once and without dispute; whereas, all that we know concerning the Christians of the first four centuries, shows that there was nothing upon which there was so much difference of opinion as this very point. They all held the same faith and believed the same doctrines, but were not agreed as to the number of books which constituted the canon of Scripture. Moreover, if the Protestant doctrine, that the Bible is a sufficient Rule of Faith, be true, it is impossible that they ever should come to an agreement on this matter, since the Bible nowhere gives a table of its own contents; and so this controversy regarding the very foundation of the faith must needs remain for ever unsettled. The controversy *was* set at rest by the unerring voice of the Catholic Church, and was not renewed until the period of the Reformation. Protestants having then rejected the tradition and authority of the Catholic Church, were of course exposed to the most hopeless uncertainty. Luther rejected the Epistle of St. James and the Apocalypse; and were all the books, which were rejected or doubted by the Reformers and their followers, expunged from the canon of Scripture, very little of the Bible would be left. But, providentially, the majority of Protestants have been content to leave the decision of the Catholic Church, on the New Testament at least, unquestioned. I defy any of my Protestant readers to show that they have any other basis whereon to rest their belief in the canonicity of the various books of the New Testament, except the authority of the Catholic Church. Curiously enough, some of the most eminent Protestant writers have been forward in avowing this. Luther, in his Commentary to the 16th chapter of St. John, says, "We are obliged to yield many things to the Papists; with them is the word of God, which we received from them, otherwise we should have known nothing at all about it." Bell, in his "Downfall of Popery," p. 134, says, "As the Papists admit the Jews' tradition of the canon of the Old Testament to be God's word, and withal refuse many other traditions of theirs, so Protestants admit *this tradition* (the canon and inspiration of the New Testament), and reject all others. Chillingworth, in his "Religion of Protestants," says, in chap. II., No. 25, "We do not believe the Scriptures to be canonical because

they say so, . . . but upon the credibility of *universal tradition*." And again, in No. 27, he says, "The question whether such and such a book be canonical Scripture, though it may be decided negatively out of Scripture, yet affirmatively it cannot be decided, but only by the testimony of the ancient churches." To crown all, Hooker, in his "Ecclesiastical Polity," book ii., sec. 14, says, "Of things necessary, the very chiefest is to know what books we are to esteem holy, which point is confessed impossible for the Scripture itself to teach." The Rule of Faith, then, adopted by Protestants condemns itself; their own conduct, and the confessions of their most eminent writers, show that the Bible only is not a sufficient Rule of Faith. Protestants must have recourse to tradition for the most important article of their belief.

But let me not be misunderstood. I am not blaming Protestants for acting in this matter on the true and right principle, that is, on the Catholic principle; what I blame them for is not their inconsistency in acting occasionally upon a right principle, but their adoption, as a general rule, of a false one. They say that the Bible *alone* is a sufficient Rule of Faith. They know, therefore, what books are inspired, either from the Bible alone, or from some other unerring authority. If from the Bible alone, where is the list of inspired books given in the Bible? If from some other authority, do they not deny that the Bible only is a sufficient Rule of Faith? Let Protestants, if they can escape from this dilemma,—let them show that they have any real and trustworthy grounds whereon to rest their belief in the canon of Scripture. Until they do this, all their appeals to the Bible are vain. They are fighting with armour which they have not proved, and which they cannot prove; they are building before they have laid the necessary foundation; they appeal to the Bible, and yet are unable, on their own principles, to prove that what they call the Bible really is the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible.

IGNATIUS.

Politics.

OUGHT THE INDIAN OPIUM TRADE TO BE SUPPRESSED ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE remarks of "Poppy" on this question, in your last number, are so full of mis-statements that it would take more time and space than we have to refute them. The principal points only will now be referred to. "Poppy" says that the Chinese are dram drinkers, that drunkenness produces greater evils than opium smoking, and that if we take from them the opium pipe—the lesser evil, we drive them to the dram glass—the greater evil.

Now, allowing that every nation must have its stimulants, and remembering that opium smoking in China is not 100 years old, whereas China as a nation is about 4,000 years old, how did the people exist without opium so long? The answer to this is that they have had their legitimate stimulants in tea, tobacco, and wine, from time immemorial, and that opium is a modern exotic, which is fastening on the vitals of the nation like a cancer. As for spirits, they are very moderately used indeed, and, in spite of Sir J. Bowring's statement to the contrary, it may safely be affirmed that dram-drinking never has been a Chinese vice.

"Poppy" affirms that in China the poorer classes cannot afford to use tea, and therefore it is absurd to suppose that the masses in China can afford to smoke opium, and hence it does not call for British interference.

Notwithstanding this thorough-going way of disposing of the question, it is an undeniable fact that from the highest to the lowest the Chinese enjoy the luxury of tea; and as to their use of opium, the *Times*' correspondent, writing from China, observes:—"In the first house we visited, no man spent on an average less than 80 cash a day on his opium pipe. One man said he spent 120. The chair Coolie spends 80, and his average earnings are 100 cash a day. English physicians, unconnected with missionary societies, have assured me that the Coolie opium smoker dies not from opium but from starvation. If he starves *himself* for his pipe, we need not ask what happens to his family."

To prove the evils of opium smoking one has only to turn to the testimony of every impartial witness from China,—the opposing testimony is invariably from interested parties. "Poppy" says that opium "as a luxury (if not abused), or as a medicinal drug, is a perfectly legitimate source of gain." Of course it is, "if not abused;" but, unfortunately, its entire consumption in China, with the smallest possible fraction of an exception, is abused, and therefore it is not a legitimate source of gain. But, in spite of this, Christian Britain supplies Heathen China with the means of indulging in a vice which is sapping the foundations of health, wealth, and morality.

But "Poppy" appears to hold that zeal, and philanthropy, and even Christianity itself, although very good things in their way, have no right to interfere with his favourite science of political economy. Now, it must never be forgotten, that political economy is only to be trusted so long as it is content to remain the humble handmaid of religion and morality, and the moment she disowns these as her superiors, she becomes a mischievous, self-conceited jade, that will inevitably lead her votaries into error. What is wrong in the region of morality can never be right in the region of political economy.

Opium smoking is rapidly spreading in China, and in other parts of the East—like a moral cancer, producing unmixed evil—and it is, therefore, wrong for Christian Britain to pander to the vice by

producing the article. It might also be shown that as the end of all production is consumption, if that consumption is absolutely pernicious to the human race, then all the labour spent on the production of the article and the bringing of it to market is not political economy but political waste.

We go a step further, and affirm that the question, whether the vice can or cannot be prevented now in China, has nothing whatever to do with the other question, whether it is the duty of Britain to sever her connection with the trade. "Poppy" smiles at such weakness, and seems to think it quite enough to warrant our continuing in the trade, that if Britain gives it up, others will reap the profits instead. But there is a higher and a more profitable morality, which says,—“Woe to the world because of offences; for it must needs be that offences come, but woe to that man through whom the offence cometh.”

Having shown that the evils of opium smoking demand the abandonment of the trade by Britain, we have next to consider how this should be done.

The only effective method of suppressing the Indian opium trade is to suppress the cultivation of the drug, with the exception of a small quantity in Government hands for legitimate purposes. “Poppy” is quite right in saying that free trade in opium would, of course, deluge India as well as China with the drug. But to suppress the cultivation is to destroy the revenue, and he says we cannot afford that. Nay, but who ever prospers on illegitimate gains? Certainly India has not, and never will;—she must lay her account for an Afghan campaign, or a Sepoy rebellion, every few years, costing the country from ten to twenty millions sterling, besides keeping up an expensive armament in the intervals.

The suppression of the cultivation is the only safe and honourable course. The monopoly was originally intended to restrict the use of the pernicious drug. This plan has failed: the temptation to earn a large revenue was too strong for the Indian Government to resist. Nor need we fear even a deficit in the Indian Treasury from the course now proposed.

It is a well-known fact, that as the price of opium rises in India the consumption is checked at once in China. Acting on this principle, I would propose a gradual suppression of the cultivation, to extend over five years. Reducing the production by one-fifth each year, for the first three years the diminished production would continue to yield an undiminished revenue; by the fourth year it would materially fall off, but meanwhile substituted sources of revenue might be expected. These will be found in the taxation of the wealth of the town populations, improved systems of customs and licences, the extension of canals and roads, and the encouragement of European settlers. The appointment of Mr. Wilson as Financial Secretary for India will, we may confidently hope, produce an entire revolution in the mode of raising Indian revenue. Now, therefore, is the time to adjust the question of the opium revenue.

That the opium trade has been destructive of the trade in British manufactures to China is another branch of the subject, on which we cannot enter, beyond observing that it has been ably handled in an article in the *Scottish Review* for January. SINIM.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WE have in the first negative reply argued the question as it stood before the dissolution of the Honourable East India Company. It has now entered upon a new phase. The monopoly was doomed when Lord Canning proclaimed the sovereignty of Queen Victoria over our Indian empire. The question will be simplified and narrowed to the one point, "Ought the Indian opium trade to be suppressed?" For some years to come the subject will be vigorously agitated, and the readers of the *British Controversialist* will do well to take a more dispassionate view than will be given by well-meaning but ill-informed authors, who address themselves rather to the feelings than the judgment of the English nation.

The strength of the opposition to the trade has been drawn from misconceptions of the characteristics and effects of opium. We are told that "beer, wine, and spirits are not poisons in themselves,—their abuse, not use, kills; but opium is a poison in itself,—its use kills."* Here we have an assertion of what is true of neither relatively. Alcohol and opium are both virulent poisons in large doses, though they act differently. Alcohol acts directly upon the nerves, but opium indirectly through absorption. Alcohol introduced into the *stomach* will prove more speedily fatal than opium; and opium will sooner destroy life if introduced into the *blood* in the carotid artery. They differ in their mode of action, but not in their effects on the animal system. This is equally true of the essential oil of a variety of narcotics. Sir Benjamin Brodie has proved that the oil of tobacco instantaneously affects the *heart*, while the infusion affects the *brain*. Three drops of the essential oil injected into a wound, or dropped upon the tongue of some animals, will produce almost instantaneous death. The essential oil of even *tea* is a powerful narcotic; and, in large quantities, would be as fatal as any poison. But these facts prove the pernicious effects of abuse, while experience shows that the use is not prejudicial to health. To say nothing of luxuries, there is no article of diet, and there is no infusion or fermented beverage in general use, which is not injurious if taken to excess. It is intemperance, and not moderation, that converts every dish, and every cup, and every luxury into a poison.

Dr. Oxley, a high authority, knew a man who had used opium for fifty, and another for eighty years, "without any evil effects." In his descriptive account of the Indian islands, Mr John Crawford declares that "the utmost that can be charged against it is that it is more seductive than other stimulants;" and that he "knew of no person of long experience who had not come to this common-

* "The Opium Trade. Appeal to the British Nation," &c., p. 31.

sense conclusion." Sir B. Brodie denies that it stimulates when eaten. In general, "it soothes the nervous system," and the exceptions are exceedingly rare in which it excites. As a set-off against its greater seductiveness, it should be noticed that, while ardent spirits incite to lust, violence, and crime, opium makes the eater "useless, but not mischievous." It is, therefore, a philanthropy as quixotic as inconsistent, which would make opium contraband in China, and yet license beer houses and gin palaces in Britain. We can admire the motive, while we disapprove of the policy, of the attempt to establish a Maine Liquor Law in England by Englishmen; but it would amaze us to hear that the Americans had called upon their President to lay waste their sugar-cane plantations, because the British sailor stupified himself with rum. And yet we are told that it is the solemn duty of christian England to uproot the poppy from Bengal, because some Chinese sots stupify themselves with our opium.

The inexpediency and impolicy of the traffic have been urged as another reason for suppressing the commerce in opium. A zealous advocate was informed by a Coventry merchant that he had to pay, in one year, £40,000 for tea. The reason assigned is, that the Chinese correspondent of his firm said that the natives "did not want British goods, and would not take them." Thus, through the opium traffic, we are informed that "our country is drained of her money, and our looms are standing still. The Chinese are losing their health, and habits of industry;—they are also being drained of their wealth."* Out of some thousand merchants, one—and he in one of our smaller towns—sends £40,000, in one year, to a country being drained of its wealth! The fact is, that, but for the opium trade, our country would have been drained of her silver. They will not take our goods, but they will our opium. We will take little else from them than their tea. We pay hard cash for tea; they repay it for opium; and, *through India*, it finds its way back to London. But for a trade denounced as commercially ruinous, we should have drained ourselves of millions for tea, which we have virtually paid for in opium. The reason, again, why the Chinese refuse our goods, is confessedly that they do not want them; and the reason why they prefer the drug is, that they do want opium. Is it the duty of a christian legislature to compel foreigners to change their tastes and habits, that our looms may be set at work? We purchase wine from the French, and not their hardware, because, while we have a Birmingham and a Sheffield, we have no vineyards. It would cause a smile of contempt if we heard from the *Times'* correspondent in Paris that the French iron masters were urging the Emperor to destroy the vineyards in the South, to compel the British to take their hardware. The Chinese might as foolishly turn the tables upon us, and argue—"These outer barbarians have a strange relish for our tea, and the demand from

* "The Opium Trade: an Appeal," &c., pp. 12, 13.

England so enhances its value, that our poor countrymen can never taste the leaf grown under their eye. Let us stop the trade. The barbarians live on barter, and must take something else from us, if they cannot have our teas. The essential oil is a violent narcotic, and our green tea shatters the nerves of hundreds in their obscure corner of the world. We have nothing more to do than forbid tea, and offer birds' nests, which they will soon learn to relish as a delicacy, and suffer no evil effects from the luxury." The fact is, that all foolish meddling with trade will no more compel the Chinese to prefer our cottons to our drugs, than they could compel us to prefer their gilt slippers to their black or green tea.

It is, again, a mistake to suppose that the Chinese passion for opium is the reason why we cannot introduce our cottons and hardware. "China contains 350 millions of people, and only three and a half to four millions are at present making use of opium."* The proportion of smokers to the mass of the population is, then, about four millions to four hundred millions, or about four to four hundred. It appears, therefore, that only one out of every hundred refuses our cotton through the habit of smoking. The "they" who are "losing their health, and their habits of industry," means *one* in every hundred. It is not, then, opium that prevents the ninety-nine from dealing with us. Even the one must be considerably reduced in the argument. Opium is taken to China from Turkey, as well as Bengal, by foreigners as well as Englishmen; and it is grown in China itself. It is more likely that not one in a hundred and fifty is indebted to Bengal for the drug. If we declined the trade, others would supply the wants of the natives. The smoker would refuse or take, as he now refuses or takes, and not a yard of cotton, or a nail, or a screw, or a pin more would be taken from us.

The asserted immorality of the traffic is another reason for its total suppression. It is immoral in two respects. It is a fruitful source of vice in the consumer. This may be admitted; but it does not follow that, therefore, the trade should be suppressed. Opium is a medicinal drug, and we cannot, for the benefit of the intemperate classes in China, deprive the world of a valuable drug. We are told that, as we restrict the sale of arsenic and laudanum, *we* ought to restrict its use in China. What we do in England, the Chinese government should do for its subjects. We might, as suggested,† label every chest sent down the Hooghly from Calcutta, and be laughed at for our pains. The opium smoker knows more about the drug than do our pamphleteers, who confound use with abuse. Out of the 400,000,000 of consumers scattered principally over Asia, we are informed that about 4,000,000 exist in China. There 400,000 are said to 'die annually through its use. There are elsewhere 364,000,000 of consumers. If the fault be with the drug, and not with the Chinese sot, we should have the most terrible accounts of

* "The Opium Trade: an Appeal," &c., see p. 5.

† *Ibid.*, p. 29.

the ravages it causes universally among Asiatics. But who hears of the dreadful effects in Constantinople, Damascus, Smyrna, and elsewhere? Long before the age of Clive and Hastings, myriads used it, in enormous quantities, in the Deccan, and other Indian provinces. It will startle some out of their dreams of horror to learn that, so little did Heber, the late Lord Bishop of Calcutta, see of its evils, that in his "Journal," there is a plan proposed for indefinitely multiplying the quantity raised in Bengal. Indigo is the only staple production to which the late Company allowed British skill and capital to be applied. The quality had, in consequence, been improved, and the quantity amazingly increased. His lordship argued that, if the monopoly were abolished, the same result would be seen in connection with opium; and for this very reason wished his countrymen to engage in the cultivation of the poppy! An eye-witness of its effects among the myriads of Hindostan wished to increase that very trade which our writers passionately desire to suppress altogether.

To trade in it as an article of luxury cannot, again, be immoral. As such it is used in all Mohammedan states, in Persia, in the Indian islands, as well as in China. The betel nut is taken as a narcotic among 100,000,000 of human beings; hemp among some 300,000,000; and tobacco among some 800,000,000. About 400,000,000 persons expend £20,000,000 in *their* favourite narcotic—opium. We do not see that, on the ground of christian morality, we are called upon to make war upon the indulgence in opium, any more than in wine or tobacco. If our missionaries, adopting the motto of one of our noblest of noblemen, Lord Shaftesbury, that "opium and Christianity cannot enter China together," were to denounce the indulgence, instead of the abuse, they would be soon answered by any intelligent mandarin, with an *argumentum ad hominem*. "Your countrymen," would be his retort, "spent, in the year 1849, £7,500,000 in tobacco; £24,000,000 in ardent spirits; and £25,000,000 in beer. You are only 30,000,000 in number: we are 300,000,000 and more; and in the same year we spent only £5,000,000 in opium!" If Christianity and opium cannot enter China together, we are sure that no *English* missionary will introduce it by a Utopian effort to uproot a natural and universal desire for stimulants. It is not the drug that he should denounce, but the folly and madness of intemperance. Persons both in Britain and China get drunk, and the remedy is neither a Maine Liquor Law for Britain, nor a Maine Opium Law for China. What is needed is the power and influence of a pure and prevalent Christianity, to teach, there as well as here, that "no drunkard shall inherit the kingdom of God."

It is, again, immoral to introduce into China what its government forbids. If people would take things by the right handle, they would not add, that therefore the opium trade should be suppressed. The remedy for the evil complained of is, the dissolution of the connection between the traffic and our government. But why did the Chinese government make it contraband? It was simply with a

view to monopolize the cultivation and the revenue derived from the sale. The native cultivation and consumption could not be suppressed; but what the barbarians pocketed, the celestials hoped to put into their own purse. It was for this reason that the commissioner Lin sunk so many thousands of chests of opium. In his proclamation to foreigners, in 1840, the use as well as the abuse of the drug is slightly noticed; but the drain of "Sycee silver" was made the burden of complaint. To restore the balance of trade as against them, the foolish mandarins took a step which led to the Chinese opium war. In a morbid state of feeling, a class of the British public are ever inveighing against their countrymen, and extolling the morality and humanity of the semi-civilized nations of the world. With them the Cossack lance kills Englishmen with more humanity than the English bayonet stabs Russians. Even the atrocities of the Indian rebellion were denied, because the Hindoo was more humane than the ruffians who left our shores. In keeping with these strange fancies, our agents were regarded as nefarious smugglers, and the Chinese authorities were represented as yearning over the miseries of the opium smoker. The low and suicidal cunning of the mandarin was sublimed into philanthropy and morality. The celestial government legalizes infanticide, which strangles annually myriads of new-born babes. Commissioner Yeh could boast, with complacency, that he had beheaded 90,000 of his countrymen. And when the authorities, in ignorance of the principles of political economy, and insolent defiance of international law, seized British property, to ruin foreigners, and to enrich themselves by monopolizing opium, we heard from many a lip that they were patterns of a parental government.

Leaving their motives out of consideration, there, we are told, is the fact of Chinese prohibition, and that to trade in opium is to encourage smuggling. To remedy the evil we are to suppress the traffic; that is, we are to put the cart before the horse, and whip away. It is the prohibition, and not the trade, which causes smuggling; and the cure is to legalize the traffic. The trade cannot be suppressed; to make the article contraband is to create smuggling. If it be wrong for us to allow the importation, it would be equally wrong to allow it to be exported from the Hooghly, knowing its destination to be Canton and Hong Kong. Under the supposition, we must establish a system of revenue cutters along some two or three thousand miles of coast on the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. To make the naval blockade effectual, we must establish a cordon of military posts and custom-houses all along the borders of Nepaul, Assam, Siam, and Burmah. The system which has made every Chinese river, bay, and creek swarm with pirates, must be introduced into our splendid empire in Asia, to back the stupidity of the mandarin, and after all to no good purpose. The desperation of the smuggler would rise with the extent of our success. Scarcity would make every chest of opium a dazzling prize. The Chinese authorities have found it impossible to seal their

coasts. They have made "death by strangling" the penalty, and yet the importation has steadily increased.

According to Sir J. Davis, our late plenipotentiary, opium is sold in the streets, and smoking rooms are publicly opened, in the teeth of the law declaring it illegal. The prohibition so enhanced the value of the contraband that even the highest officials became virtual smugglers. Now, we are called upon to do for China what its own government cannot achieve for its subjects. If prohibition be obligatory, it is their duty, and not our business, so long as our government is no party to the disgraceful practice of smuggling. But we are required to attempt impossibilities. The late Duke of Wellington, and Lord Ellenborough, stated in the House of Lords that the Indian government had placed restrictions upon the traffic without success. They found it hopeless to legislate against the private interests of merchants, and the trader at last had it all his own way. British goods are to this very hour smuggled into Spain. Five-sixths of the goods are smuggled in. Under our eye the system is conducted at Gibraltar, under whose guns the smuggling clippers take shelter when pressed hard by the Spanish revenue cutters. No one is wrong-headed enough to call upon our Premier or Foreign Secretary to see that no goods shall be shipped in the Thames, Mersey, Tyne, or the Clyde which are intended for the Spanish smugglers. The more common-sense view is taken. We endeavour to induce Spain to legalize the traffic, to put an end to smuggling. There is no other remedy for smuggling in China. In 1736, our legislature enacted a Maine spirit law for London, then with a population of only six or seven hundred thousand. To omit from consideration the evil of public informers, and the perils of the revenue officers, drunkenness increased, and the consumption of spirits rose in the teeth of the law to 7,000,000 gallons. The distillery laws of Ireland were found to be as cruel in their operation as they were ruinous to the morals of the populace. It is a wilful closing of the eye to the experience of the past to suppose that any government can succeed in a war upon the tastes and habits of their subjects.

Assuming, however, that *we* could suppress the trade in opium in *Bengal*, the duty, once admitted, would lead us to a course of philanthropy run mad. It would be our next duty to prevail upon the free native princes to suppress it in their own states. If they were willing to sacrifice the revenue drawn from a staple commodity, they would soon require our help to put down rebellion among their subjects, or smuggling on their frontiers. We must repeat the same course in Assam, Siam, and Burmah. We must next treat with the Sublime Porte, and fill Turkey with smugglers and preventive officers. Here we should come into constant collision with Greek and American merchants on sea, and wage a perpetual war with wandering hordes in Syria, converted into contrabandists on land. Sheer consistency would conduct us further still. The Emperor of France, and the rulers of Spain, Portugal, and the

Italian states must be called upon to exterminate the vine, because our middle and upper classes intoxicate themselves with wine; and as they would naturally be deaf to our entreaties, we must blockade their coasts, or renew the terrors of old English smuggling. We should next prohibit the growth of hops and barley, because the lower classes stupefy themselves with beer; and of oats, because gin and whiskey make sots of the Irish and Scotch. We must, lastly, destroy the sugar-cane plantations in our West India islands, and have them destroyed in the United States, because the English sailor debases himself with rum. Well may a Peel and a Wellington ask of a Shaftesbury for something more practical than has ever yet been suggested by the opponents of the opium trade. If any one objects to the above, that wine, spirits, and beer are made from products which could be applied to useful purposes, and that we may suppress the manufacture of ardent spirits, without destroying vineyards, sugar plantations, and fields of barley and oats; we reply, that the same applies to opium, which is a valuable medicine.

On a review of the whole subject, we decidedly give a negative reply to the question, "Ought the Indian opium trade to be suppressed?" Government connection with the traffic in China is in direct violation of treaties; and the sooner that connection is dissolved the better for our national honour. The difficulties which formerly beset the question may now be removed by the abolition of the East India Company. But the evils so loudly bewailed will certainly be increased with the change. The traffic cannot be suppressed. Smoking and eating opium will increase, as British skill and capital improve the quality and extend the quantity producible in India, and cheapen it in China. There is only one remedy for the *abuse*, and that is, the moral elevation of the myriads of China, by the prevalence of a pure and powerful Christianity. POPPY.

Social Economy.

ARE THE OPERATIONS OF TRADES' UNIONS BENEFICIAL TO WORKING MEN?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"MAN is a clubable creature." Trades' Unions are clubs. They were called into existence by the requirements of that section of society to which they belong. They are based upon instinct, sanctioned by reason, vindicated by experience. They have for their object, firstly, the protection, enlightenment, and elevation of those who belong to them; and, secondly, the amelioration of the condition of the working classes in general. This object they have

accomplished. The operatives of this country have been benefited, morally, socially, and financially, by the agency of Trades' Unions. By instructing the working man in the duty of fidelity to his brother operative—quickenng, cultivating, and strengthening his sense of honour—his Club or Trade Society has elevated him in the moral scale. By teaching him to dispose of his labour to the best advantage, enabling him to repel the unjust aggressions of a tyrannical employer, and habituating him to united and simultaneous action with his fellow-operatives, his capabilities for civilized society and christian citizenship have been trained and developed. By their constant appeal to his responsibilities as a man, a brother, and a member of society, his Trades' Union prevents the operative from becoming the slave of those vicious and expensive animal indulgences, which in too many cases obtain the mastery over those workmen whose sense of manifold responsibilities is allowed to slumber, owing to the absence of some such fearless monitor as is supplied by the Trade Society. The financial benefit resulting from this is manifest and unquestionable.

The proof of the usefulness of Trades' Unions is to be found in their existence; in their gradual and unintermittent growth; in the undoubted popularity which they enjoy amongst the toiling and wealth-producing millions.

Trades' Unions, be it borne in mind, are voluntary associations. They do not exist in virtue of any Act of Parliament. No man is compelled to belong to one of them. No legal pain or penalty attaches to the violation of their rules. Separation from them involves neither the loss of wealth nor the forfeiture of social position; and in the event of any member or members of one of these associations, through an excess of zeal and a mistaken sense of duty, attempting, by actual or menaced personal violence, or by the damaging of his property, to force a man to become a member, the law of the land is clear and stringent enough, and its administrators sufficiently able and willing to punish such over-zealous and mistaken Trades' Unionists, and to afford to the injured or threatened operative ample protection or compensation. Without the voluntary support of their members, Trades' Unions could not exist. That support is freely and cheerfully given, from the conviction, based on the experience of several generations, of millions of workmen, that the Operations of Trades' Unions are beneficial to their "order."

The accusations against Trades' Unions proceed from three kinds of persons. First, those who know little or nothing of the regulations or doings of those societies; secondly, bad or stupid masters, whose tyranny or rapacity those societies have checked; and thirdly, a few workmen, who, either owing to the consequences of their own misbehaviour, or it may be to the unjust conduct of some isolated and exceptional Trades' Union (for infallibility is not claimed for these associations), have conceived and nurtured a grudge towards them. The opposition and misrepresentations of

such parties are no more than what might be expected, or than have been experienced by all the societies—social, theological, literary, political, or scientific—that have ever existed.

The positions taken up and maintained in the *Controversialist* by the writer of the article affirmative of the beneficial effects of Trades' Unions are, in my humble opinion, really impregnable, and are not even touched, far less demolished, by "L'Ouvrier," in his assault on these associations. This gentleman's ("L'Ouvrier") impression of the nature, character, and action of Trades' Unions is obviously obtained at second hand. He has allowed his mind to become the receptacle of the assertions of the ignorant or interested assailers of these societies. Hence it is that all his charges against them consist of the old friends or foes (without the fresh faces sometimes assumed by such acquaintances) familiar to the members and defenders of these maligned associations.

When "L'Ouvrier" asserts that "the less gifted workman, of inefficient education, want of physical strength," &c., is ignored by the operation of Trades' Unions, he asserts not only that which is not the fact, but what is the very opposite to it. Trades' Unions have for their object the protection of all their members, and that of the weaker and less capable workman in a pre-eminent and peculiar degree. Why, it is one of the stereotyped charges against these societies, that they endeavour to prevent an inferior workman from falling to the depth of penury to which his unaided weakness naturally gravitates. Trades' Unions are denounced as antagonistic to the laws of political economy, because they inculcate on their members the christian duty of self-sacrifice. Because they, in effect, say unto the superior workman, "For the sake of thy weaker and less skilful brother thou art morally bound to submit to certain trade regulations and restrictions, which have for their object the protection of thy poor, weak brother from the rapaciousness or heartlessness of an employer."

Thus we have two self-contradictory and mutually destructive accusations advanced by the enemies of Trades' Unions. By one party they are charged with depressing the inferior workman, whilst by another they are blamed for unduly raising him, at the expense of the more skilful and competent operative.

Now, it is self-evident that both charges cannot be true; but it is not by any means impossible that they may be both false. And false, indeed, they are; for while Trades' Unions endeavour to prevent the weak workman from sinking, they do not attempt to stop the upward progress of his stronger and more gifted brother operative. To the former they say, in effect, "Thou shalt not, if we can hinder it, sink lower than this level. Thy labour is worth so much to the employer. He may attempt to obtain it for less; but we will do all in our power to enable thee to get the fair marketable price for it. We know that thou art not in a condition to negotiate an equitable bargain with the employer. He is a powerful capitalist, blessed with abundance of food, fuel, clothing, &c.,

for himself and family, and can afford to wait for days, weeks, and even months, without engaging in any business. Thou, on the other hand, art a poor, weak, working man, almost, if not altogether, destitute, impelled by thine own and thy family's most crying and urgent wants to accept employment upon any terms he may choose to offer thee, such acceptance being the only visible escape from starvation. To rescue thee from this compulsion by starvation, and enable thee to hold out for some time longer, and thus obtain from the employer something like a fair remuneration for thy toil, the Trades' Union, out of the contributions of thy fellow-workers, will allow thee a certain sum for the sustenance of thyself and family. Of course, as a man and a Christian, when thou art in the receipt of wages, thou wilt deem it thy duty to give of thy money for the support of thy similarly circumstanced and hard-pressed brother working man." The superior worker is, in the same spirit, informed that he is under a moral obligation to help his weaker brother, and that it is his duty to see to it, that his greater ability as a workman is not, through the unscrupulousness of employers, converted into an engine for the oppression and degradation of his comparatively helpless fellow-operative. Unless the presentation of this and kindred duties to the reason and the conscience of the able workman be considered a restriction of his liberty, then, as far as Trade Unions are concerned, he is left to rise as high in the social and intellectual scale as the free and unfettered use of his God-given faculties may be able to carry him.

"L'Ouvrier" repeats a tissue of hackneyed calumnies against Trades' Unions, that have been disproved and exploded hundreds of times. His article is also profusely interspersed with assertions, in the form of general principles or propositions, every one of which is open to question, and many of which are notoriously erroneous. Several of these are of so suggestive a character, so pregnant with pernicious consequences, in the event of their meeting with public credence and national application, and altogether so temptingly provocative of controversy, that, if time permitted, I should like to deal with every one of them in the order of their occurrence. As it is, I shall only instance two of them, and these rather as samples of the big but baseless assertions on which "L'Ouvrier's" denunciation of Trades' Unions is principally founded.

At page 36, "L'Ouvrier" lays it down as a "self-evident" proposition that "man is an independent but responsible being." Now, if this be "self-evident," I should like to know what those propositions are which, in the opinion of this gentleman, stand in need of proof or demonstration? For my part, whilst admitting the "responsibility," I deny the "independence" of man. He is, on the contrary, the most, or well-nigh the most, dependent of all created beings. He is primarily and perennially dependent on DEITY; he is secondarily and subordinately dependent on and indebted to his fellow-creatures, living and dead; on the laws, customs, manners, and institutions of his country; on the seasons, on the climate, on his own

organization; on the wants, wishes, caprices, virtues, and wickednesses of his contemporaries; and, in fine, on more conditions, influences, and agencies,—all of them external to himself,—than it would be possible to specify or enumerate in an entire number of this magazine.

A few lines further on, "L'Ouvrier" makes the assertion that "in the exercise of his faculties he (man) is responsible to no other of his fellow-men." This, as every one knows and feels, is contrary to experience. As a matter of fact, man is responsible to his fellow-men for the use or abuse which he may make of his faculties.

At page 39, "L'Ouvrier" asserts that "all men must labour to live." This will be news to many of the readers of the *Controversialist*, and prompt them to ask the question, How it comes to pass that if "all men *must* labour to live," so many thousands of men *do* live, and that too in rather a superior style, and yet do *not* labour?

In conclusion, I have only to repeat that the vindication of Trades' Unions is to be found in the experience of the working classes, and that when they have ceased to be beneficial to the "order" for whose protection and elevation they were founded and are conducted, they will perish of their own accord.

GEORGE POTTER.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN our previous remarks, we have shown that Trades' Unions contravene the laws of nature affecting the principles, relations, and operations of labour, wages, property, capital, supply, and demand: in doing so, we have had respect only to the elementary considerations or fundamental bases on which these principles develop themselves in civilized society. We have now to show the bearings of Trades' Unions upon the social life of the nation, their political inconsistencies, their contrariety to sound justice and true morals.

Our first duty, then, is to show how Trades' Unions operate in social life. And we find they engender a spirit of antagonism between the employer and the employed. It is evident to all who reflect upon this subject, that the relation of employer and employed is one of mutual interest, in which the personal interest of each is governed by considerations and laws beyond the control of either. The employer has interest in his labour and in his capital; the employed has interest in his labour only. These two interests, although apparently opposed, are not so in reality, because, whatever may tend to injure the personal interest of either, must inevitably tend to injure the personal interest of the other. If capital is destroyed, labour is unemployed, and, therefore, unremunerated; if labour is not employed, is not actively productive, capital is consumed, is not productive, or is not accumulative; hence the interest of employer and employed is necessarily prosperous or adverse in the united and compound ratio of the intensity of its mutuality. This is a law of nature, and cannot be violated without causing greater or less misery, according to the extent and power of the violation.

Trades' Unions have uniformly ignored this mutuality of interest, because they have fixed, and their main object is to fix, what quantity of labour shall be given for a stipulated amount, irrespective of the skill and ability of the workman, or of the interest and inclination of the master to pay the amount fixed for that quantity and quality of labour. This practically reduces the employer to a condition of slavery—it deprives him of his free-will, and ignores his right in his capital, and it prevents him buying labour of the best and cheapest in the market. Such conduct cannot otherwise than create a spirit of antagonism in the mind of the employer, as it is, in fact, antagonism itself on the part of the employed. Cases to illustrate this are sown broadcast over the annals of Trades' Unions and strikes, and the case of the Wolverhampton tin-plate workers is one so recent and so well known, that it cannot be questioned. The manufacturers and their workmen were at peace; no cause for complaint existed; the workmen were willing to work, and were satisfied with their wages; but an emissary from the Trades' Union came from a distance, and insisted upon masters and men adopting their *dictum* without question. Dissension was thus sown between men who had lived and worked happily together for many years; the men had to strike; the masters repudiated the authority of the union; large pecuniary interests were at stake; ruin stared the masters in the face, and in self-defence they employed foreign workmen; these were surreptitiously spirited away, and the most angry antagonism resulted; not because the men were dissatisfied with their wages or their masters, but because the union, in its legitimate (!) action, interfered between them.

The Trades' Unions call into existence a desire on the part of the capitalist and the non-union workman to be freed from the thralldom of combined labour and its laws, which excites a constant effort to become independent of their influences; and this constantly results in permanent injuries to the interests of the labourer. The capitalist, feeling the insecurity of his capital from the inevitable influences of Trades' Unions, is naturally impelled to the adoption of all means within his reach to counteract their pernicious effects. He thus encourages all labour-saving machinery, seeks employment for his capital where labour is not combined, and upon those products which are least subject to the fitful fancies and arbitrary edicts of an irresponsible power, shrouded in darkness and secrecy.

The non-union workman, being evicted from the ordinary markets for his labour, is incited by the necessities of his nature to seek employment in the spirit of antagonism, not from an innate enmity to his fellow-workmen, but from mere self-defence. In all cases where it is possible he becomes, in his own person, both master and workman, exercising his skill in his own trade. He goes with the product to the same market as the capitalist to sell; his necessities being more immediate, he is obliged to sell for prices below those of the capitalist; hence he is encouraged by the buyers,

the capitalist is injured, and through him the general trade. The society men are injured, either by scarcity of work or reduced prices for their labour. This is a consequence the Trades' Union cannot affect or control, because the imperial laws of the State protect the non-union workman in his right to sell the products of his labour.

We have, in the course of a long experience, observed many cases bearing this character, and can point to many large manufacturers who can date their origin to the fact that they were non-society men, and being possessed of indomitable energy, what was intended by others as their curse became their blessing. In some towns we could name, there are to be found great numbers of small tradesmen who have thus been forced into a position they never thought to occupy; and doubtless these localities owe great part of their material prosperity to the energy and industry of these *pariahs* from the Trades' Union *casts*; while the victims of the unions, who have remained beneath the iron despotism of their own officers, drag on a miserable existence, equally on the verge of starvation, the poor-house, or the grave.

Trades' Unions inflict misery on the families of the workman. The recent strike of the building trades has so forcibly illustrated this topic, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it, for we have seen that thousands of families have been dependent upon the miserable dole of the executive committee of the Trades' Union. The contribution thus meted out to the workman has been insufficient to buy even the necessaries of life for himself; hence the family dependent upon him have suffered unknown miseries, private and public charity having, in many instances, redeemed the starving families from a miserable death, to drag on a still more miserable life. When the great day of account shall come, who among these tyrants of their class shall be able to answer for the crimes engendered and the deaths prematurely caused by their oppressive and tyrannical proceedings?

Not only have the families of men on strike been made to endure undeserved misery, but all classes of workmen connected with Trades' Unions been made to suffer the loss of many comforts, if not necessities, from the heavy contributions demanded of them to support the trades on strike.

Trades' Unions, moreover, contract the income of the workman by the demand for periodical payments, fines, and penalties, for union purposes; and hence they deprive him of comforts and necessities his unrestricted labour would provide for himself and his family.

They injure trade, by diminishing the productiveness of labour, and deteriorating the quality of the products of labour. It is one of the chief objects of Trades Unions to regulate the quantity of work to be done by the workman for a stipulated price, and this quantity is the minimum capable of being performed by the most incompetent labourer; hence the capabilities of the workmen in

any trade are limited by the Trades' Union—are bound down to the lowest limit of their productiveness. Now, it is at once conformable to reason and science, that the greater the productive ability of any class, other things being equal, the greater is the prosperity of that class; but the union laws say the lowest capability shall be the measure of labour; therefore the Trades' Union is injurious to the working class. But we have said they deteriorate the quality of the products of labour. This follows as a necessary consequence of the law which makes the meanest capacity to labour equal with the highest and most cultivated skilful workman. When the lowest is made the standard of excellence, all abilities are dragged down to the lowest level; all inducements for effort are withdrawn; all the incentives suggested by emulation, advancement, and honour are withheld; universal deterioration are the natural and necessary consequence.

Trades' Unions keep numbers of workmen in a state of unproductiveness as their officers, and expend the fruits of labour in an unproductive manner. The salaries, fees, and support of these officers are so much drawn from the income of the labourer, and they are expended upon objects not only not productive, but positively injurious to the labourer, as they are chiefly directed towards curbing productiveness, and expended upon matters inimical to the well-being of the labourer, for whom they are ostensibly employed.

Trades' Unions restrain the accumulation of capital. Now capital and its accumulations is the fund from which labour is necessarily paid. Whatever, therefore, tends to restrain the accumulation of capital, must of necessity be injurious to the working man; for it must be self-evident to all that the greater the fund available for the payment of labour, the more prosperous must be the condition of the labourer; and that the operatives of Trades' Unions do necessarily restrain the accumulation of capital is equally self-evident, if we only consider the spirit of antagonism to capital which is the foundation principle of all Trades' Unions. They constantly exhibit capital to the workman as the hydra-headed evil against which all their efforts and energies are to be directed; they uniformly seek to indoctrinate the workman with the notion that capital is the source of all the wrongs and miseries to which the workman is subjected, forgetful of the old fable, of the boy who killed the goose which laid golden eggs, thinking thereby to have all the golden eggs at once; he rued his folly when too late, and we fear the dupes of Trades' Union mongers in many instances have shared in a more miserable disappointment, because they have been victims of a sadder practical folly.

In fine, Trades' Unions are the curse of the social life of the people. The society man feels himself to be everlastingly under the surveillance of his fellows. He dare not speak, he dare not act, he cannot work, but according to the arbitrary rules of the secret committee. A system of espionage of the most oppressive character is ever surrounding him; fines, penalties, and suspensions

dog him at every step, at every act, at every word. Where can slavery and tyranny to equal this be found? Political tyranny of class over class calls for just and indignant reprobation from every Englishman; but social degradation is suffered by the workman of England from his fellows, through the medium of Trades' Unions, without repugnance, without a murmur; nay, is even loved and cherished with all the earnestness due to a great blessing. Infatuation parallel to this is not to be found on the face of the whole earth.

Let it not be thought, for one moment, we have hastily expressed crude thoughts and prematurely formed judgments. We would appeal to the enlightened portion of the working classes themselves for confirmation of our views. Our experience has led us to a practical acquaintance with the formation, conduct, and effects of Trades' Unions. We have both seen and felt the evil of that spirit of antagonism, which is the constituent element of Trades' Unions. We have, in the formation of Trades' Unions, laboured to annihilate this evil spirit, by an endeavour to embody masters and men, the capitalist and the labourer, in a union for the protection of their trade; and all our efforts to secure unity of interest, purpose, and action with perfect mutuality, have been ineffectual, although ably and heartily supported by the wise and the good of both classes, the one source and sole cause of failure having uniformly been this spirit of antagonism. We, therefore, are led to the conclusion that until men, both capitalists and labourers, are thoroughly convinced—not theoretically convinced, for we remember that

“He who is convinced against his will,
Retains his old convictions still,”

but practically convinced—that whatever is good for the master is good for the man; whatever makes the capitalist to prosper makes the labourer to prosper; that capital and labour prosper and decline together;—until, we say, this is heartily believed by the great masses of the people, Trades' Unions are, and must continue to be, injurious to the whole community, but more especially will they manifest themselves as *the curse of the working man*.

We have spoken the honest convictions of our own hearts. If we have erred, we shall be happy to be set right by others better informed, or more highly gifted, than ourselves. Our experience in such matters has been long and large; we have slowly come to our conclusions; we could wish they were otherwise. Such as they are, we entreat the young men of our nation thoughtfully to consider the subject before committing themselves to any active participation in the tyranny and oppression of Trades' Unions.

L'OUVRIER.

The Essayist.

IN MEMORIAM MDCCCLIX.

SINCE 1832—when the myriad-minded Goethe; the mighty jurist, Bentham; the naturalist, Cuvier, and “the wizard wight” of Abbotsford, were called from among men—Death has made no swoop over the fields of literature and science so fell as that for which 1859 has to mourn. Over the closing year of the preceding decade, a dirge-note was fittingly sung, for during its currency Hartley Coleridge, the weird and wayward rhythmist; Elliott, the corn-law rhymers; Tytler, the Scottish historian; the industrious Maunder; the cautious utilist of imagination, Maria Edgeworth; and Bernard Barton, the Quaker poet, were withdrawn from visible form, and became the subjects

“Of the stern agony, the shroud, the pall,
And breathless darkness, and the narrow house.”

The *quantitative* loss was greater then, but the *qualitative* loss will bear no comparison with that which we have suffered. The opening months of 1850, too, in the demise of Jeffrey and Wordsworth, gave ominous presage of the future; while the decease of Talfourd and Wilson, Lockhart and James Montgomery, Kitto and Forbes, made 1854 sad some and gloomy. Subsequent years have peopled the cold, silent, companionless house of Death with Samuel Rogers, Charlotte Brontë, and C. J. Hare (1855); the keen-thoughted, multi-learned Sir William Hamilton; the observant Buckland; Miller, the Shakespeare of geology (1856); ingenious Conybeare, scholastic Bloomfield; Jerrold, the earnest wit, and Croker, the unsparing satirist (1857); Combe, Ford, and Hayward (1858); but 1859 has had the bearded grain of genius and learning remorselessly put to the sickle.

That year was, but young when Henry Hallam, more worn out even by the griefs of private life than by the sedulous studies of long years, found a sepulchre in the chancel of Clevedon Church, beside “the babbling Wye,” and followed his “nearest and dearest” to “the gathering in the heavens.” He had long before bound up his sheaves and folded his hands from labour; for Destiny, in some fit of strange unkindness, had made him, like Burke, “live in an inverted order: they who ought to have succeeded him had gone before him.” He attained the age of 81. His eldest son (on whom Alfred Tennyson composed “*In Memoriam*,” the noblest *Morte d'Arthur* in the range of poetry) little more than completed his 23rd year, and his youngest son predeceased him in 1850. He bitterly experienced the saddest evil of a long life—to be left alone. We had no more to hope for him; he was bowed and broken, waiting in

silent foresight for the summons of "Death, the skeleton;" and surely he heard a voice saying, "*Vattene in pace, alma beata e bella*,"—Depart in peace, soul blessed and beautiful."

The children of his intellect, however, while the great ages roll onward, shall be his witnesses to posterity. As a student of Eton and Oxford, he acquired his Byronic designation "Classic Hallam;" in the *Edinburgh Review* he won his early honours, and in his "*View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*" (1818); "*The Constitutional History of England, from Henry VII. to George II.*" (1827); and the "*Introduction to the Literature of Europe*" (1838), he proved himself to be one of the nobles of the court of wisdom—profound, impressive, grave, masterly, logical, and perspicuous. His works are more critical of principles than of men; their truthfulness, their stern justice, their accuracy in fact and inference, have scarcely ever been impugned. Neither the massive learning, the manifold reading, the pure and melodious repose, the condensed succinctness of style, the self-possessed superiority to personal feeling, the calm, judicial dispassionateness they display, marvellous though they all are, mark him out as the possessor of the might and majesty of mind, so much as his clear-sighted exposition of the true underlying force of all political motion or stability—reflective thought; and his constant observance of the glory due to those innovators from whom new (if beneficial) manifestations of spiritual power proceeded. The surface phenomena of life—the crust and husk of history—occupied his attention less than the grand sources of change and progress—thought, education, and religiousness. He is a thinker for thinkers, and a man whose influence might become "a lever to uplift the earth."

"Ill news travels quickly," and we had scarcely heard of the closing of Hallam's grave, when the language of regret and grief reached us from the Western world. There William H. Prescott had been, with stunning abruptness, palsied by Death, among his books and his labours, leaving one everlasting fragment. In semi-blindness,—for an accident to his eyesight marred the execution, though it did not change the nature, of those high aims which, in the prime of every faculty, he had formed,—he worked with an industry from which ordinary men shrink, and enlivened the dusky day of his life by the vigorous efforts of an enthusiastic mind, and of an imagination of considerable reach, power, and fervour. Though, fortunately, inheriting from his father, a lawyer and judge of some eminence, a moderate competency, he scorned the ignoble luxury of indolence or self-indulgence, and has added to the sumless wealth of literature treasures of no small worth. He is not only a master in the art of narrative, and a graphic delineator of events; he is also a clear-minded expositor of causes, and a captivating unraveller of the tangled skeins of motive and intent. Copious and exact in references, impartial in judgment, and fluent and trustworthy in his relation of facts, he is a historian whose enduring fame is certain. "*Ferdinand and Isabella*" (1838) is minute yet comprehensive, bears few traces

of the elaborate compilation it received, and is replete with various interest. *The Conquest of Mexico* (1843), while less attractive in subject, is in breadth, brilliancy, and beauty of descriptive writing, as striking and charming. *The Conquest of Peru* (1847) is well-told and exact; and *Philip II.*, though unfinished, exhibits the author's ordinary lucidity of statement, artistic grouping, industrious research, and free-handed style of pictorial descriptiveness. He was only sixty-three when Death brought the message of Destiny, and touched him into immortality.

The buds of April were greening near Cannes while De Tocqueville, the Montesquieu of the United States, strove against the unlovely hand which came to arrest his grasp at greatness. His thoughtful and suggestive work, entitled *Democracy in America* (1835—1840), has acquired citizenship through translation into the literature of every country in Europe. It has not only been crowned by the *Académie Française*, but by the appreciative admiration of many of the wisest statesmen of Europe. It is weighty in thought, vigorous, and well composed, honest, unflattering, and unfaltering, full of acute discussion, rich in observations on men, nations, morals, laws, political systems, and the tendencies of the times. He is worthy of welcome to the fellowship of our souls, not in hours of leisure only, but in hours of study too. He was as honest as well as a distinguished statesman; and his demise, aged fifty-three, ought not to be a cause of regret to France alone, but to Europe and America.

Dr. Dionysius Lardner, though only sixty-six, had added to the library of self-instructors many a valuable tome. His adroitness and tact in popularizing the most recondite themes was all but unique. There was no fascination in his style, except the simplicity and clearness with which he unfolded the truths of science,—almost free from formula, but distinct and comprehensible to the merest tyro. In an age when such demands for the enlightenment of the masses are made, he was a most serviceable pioneer in the mazes and intricacies of science and art; and his multifarious writings possess not only an intrinsic value, but this extrinsic recommendation. His industry was almost a marvel; and the extensive range of study, of which he has become the expositor, is a monument itself, which will preserve his name from mingling, like his frame, with perishing things.

The ageless Lady Morgan, vivacious if not frolicsome, chatty, genial, talented, and racy, was a novelist and traveller's tale teller, whose works entitle her to mention and regret,—to mention, as a woman of great personal influence, of unflagging perseverance and *esprit*, who had the capacity, as she chose, "to make the sad man merry, the benevolent one melt into tears;"—to regret, as one who, though possessing and employing great natural gifts of wit and wisdom, failed to inform them with a lofty and holy purpose, and to distinguish, till near its close, at the age of eighty, between life a masquerade and life a tragedy. The curtain has fallen with its

impenetrable folds over it, but the angel of hope appears on the drop-scene.

May had little more than brought the academic year to a close, when the Very Rev. Principal Lee, a man of immense erudition in out-of-the-way tracts of ecclesiastical lore, was summoned away, and the hived hoards of a life-time were carried off to the secret keeping prison-house of Death, and a life, comparatively profitless—except as a lesson of warning against procrastination, and the gratification of a selfishly insatiable curiosity—was terminated on the very verge of fourscore years.

Greater and nobler was he who shortly afterwards expired at Berlin. His name—Humboldt—is in itself a very encyclopædia of suggestion and marvel; the pregnant symbol of scientific sagacity, mature thought, extended culture, far travel, lengthy experience, laborious compilation, unshrinking research, inborn wisdom, transcendent observativeness, noble genius, and reverent religiousness. What a name! What a man! to whom the *Kosmos* seemed to unveil and reveal itself as one “entire and perfect chrysolite;” and the visible creation showed itself as the forthgrowing of the ideas of *the Infinite*! This *Colossus*, that bestrode the real and the ideal worlds—with equal mastery and sovereignty over each; that saw the billows and great waters of thought heaping, and swelling, and surging in strange unrest, and flashed peace upon them at once by the motion of his quill; that threw the bridge of science from the physical to the metaphysical hemispheres of inquiry, and in the multiplicity of their most intricate and seldom-trodden paths found safe and free passage for his pioneer thought—was known in a former age, and revered, on this side of idolatry, in ours. He had set the seal of science upon many truths in pre-revolutionary times, before the Napoleonic meteor had flashed on the battle-field, or pale on St. Helena’s wave-lashed shore. The “*Basalts of the Rhine*” was published in 1790. Since then dynasties have fallen, war has drenched the earth with “red rain,” commerce has floated her merchandise into new seas; the theoretic and applicative sciences have multiplied discoveries, and teemed with inventions. Religion itself has found fresh settlements on which to plant “the standard of the Cross;” yet through the whole extent and evolution of these changes—this transit and progress of men and ages,—the spirit of Humboldt has been flowing over into, and mingling with the course of events, and with persistent force has been striving to bring life and faith together, into safe anchorage in the harbours of science. He dropped like a ripe fruit, almost unshaken, into the hand of the shadowy messenger of Heaven’s King, and, in his ninetieth year, he exchanged the serene contemplation of the Invisible in *the seen*, for the eye to eye evidence of eternity.

“The way to dusty death” was taken by Leigh Hunt (aged seventy-five) before the August breezes were altered into September’s blasts, as if, with his usual coy reluctance, he had shrunk from the unpleasant months of the approaching winter. The genial and

refined sympathy, the tasteful enjoyment, the power of finding "good in everything," which formed the substantial and permanent in his character, made him loving, loveable, and loved. The graceful though somewhat frostwork-like fancy, the quaint raciness and picturesqueness of his style, the vivid simplicity and aptitude of his allusions and illustrations, the palpability and visibility he imparted to his most out-of-the-way conceptions, the pleasant human enjoyability he poured over all nature, give his works an exquisite mannerism that gratifies yet does not cloy. He inspirits the material with so much dear delightfulness, that sensationalism seems charming, and pantheism becomes all but fascinating. He fills and crowds, and actually enlivens earth with so much *communicable* joy, that it seems too much and too good for mortals such as we are, even though "there were nothing *beyond* the boundaries of this life." He sought, with kindly aim,

"To sing in thoughtful ears this natural song,
Indoors and out, summer and winter,—*mirth*."

An honest man, an exquisite essayist, a pleasing poet, a chatty and informing companion, an appreciative commentator, a graceful translator, a somewhat successful dramatist, a sketcher of much fancy and feeling, a critic of keen though peculiar discriminativeness, and a friendly, kindly egoist, rather than egotist—let us here grant his heart's request,—

"I pray thee then,
Write me as one who loves his fellow-men."

Sir James Stephen had long expended the energies of a vigorous and cultivated mind upon the duties of Under Secretary for the Colonies—onerous, important, and beneficial. In the *Edinburgh Review* he published many essays, since collected, on ecclesiastical biography and kindred topics, which entitled him to rank among the enrichers of the race. Perspicuity and perspicacity, combined with candour and dispassionate judgment, a well-balanced and well-stored mind, clear definiteness of purpose, sympathy with popular enlightenment, and a *copia fandi* almost inexhaustible, induced admiration and respect. But when, on deeper reflection, one saw how kindly he had grafted his recondite learning and solicitous integrity of thought upon the main stem of common sense, admiration heightened into wonder, and respect developed into reverence. His lectures on historical and literary subjects, several of which have been published, were characterized by an adaptation to their purpose, and a considerateness for his audiences, that indicate how much he was impressed with the desire to be useful rather than famed. Indeed, the tact and uniformity with which he causes the true, the sublime, and the beautiful, to mix, unintentionally, as it seems, yet certainly, with the useful, and co-operate with it in bringing about results, form the chief grounds for our appreciation of the late Professor of Modern History in Cambridge, whose kindly

thoughtfulness, urbane habits, and ready enthusiasm in the progress of knowledge, seventy years of life had not been able to impair. Yet he, too, now is a name and a memory only—one of the treasures of Death.

Full of years, full of honours, full of faith, rich in good works done, remarkable for a saintly and sanctifying use of life, the Rev. John Angell James "entered into rest" on the first day of October. In the pulpit, on the platform, by the pen, among the many Christian associations of the age, he exercised an influence both powerful and wholesome. The apostolic catholicity of his opinions, his single purposed self-renunciation, his devotedness to duty, and the thorough pervasion of his whole nature with manly and Christian zeal, made him a man of mark in all sections of the church. Of his several works—varying from tracts to volumes—upwards of 3,000,000 copies have been circulated. Profoundly sad was the shadow which darkened the heart, as the tidings of his demise were heard by the churches; but the unimaginable sunshine of that hope which points to fadeless life goldened, if it did not gladden, the thought of his death. Kindly to man, pious before God, earnestly watchful over his own soul and the flock he tended, the unfailing charm of his holiness eclipsed in men's thoughts the successes of his career, the multiplicity of his gifts, the usefulness of his life, the potency of his intellect, and the fame of his ministrations. A great and good man, he fulfilled his course in person, but the results of his life and labours are the treasures of many souls. In the history of *character* his name will stand higher even than in the chronicles of religious literature, labour, or love. *Requiescat!*

Professor John Pringle Nichol, though he had little more than completed his fifty-fifth year, had done noble service to science, literature, philosophy, politics, and education. He was one who wore the most liberal of hands, and the warmest of hearts. His impulses were loves. His greetings, even in the market-places of the world, were events to be remembered for their dash, kindliness, brusque intellectuality, and genial heartiness. His appearances on the political platform were radiant with patriotic fervour and manly vigour. His speech had the fire and brilliance of the early orators, and the far-seeing reach of philosophic statesmanship in it; and his opinions on European affairs were dashed from his pen with the readiest speed, to fill the pages of reviews, and excite in their readers wonder at the keenness of political insight with which affairs so distant had been scanned. But it was as the missionary of Urania that he charmed and shone. How he used, in his popular lectures on astronomical subjects, to breast immensity "like some strong swimmer, in his agony," to glow, and greatness, and dilate, as his thoughts clove their way far into the infinitudes of space, and the limitless glories of the sphere of stars! He was no calm on-looker, or cold and silent critic of the divine manifestations that blaze in and whirl through the epochless vastitudes and trackless distances of the sky, but an intuitive recognizer and worshipper of

the infinite and eternal Father, whose workmanship they were, and by whose omnific pulses they are and endure. To him they were symbols of life, love, will, and legislative omniscience, tokens of guidance and guardianship, not confined to the orbits of stars alone, but inworked with the very tissue of creation, and operant on man in chief; and as such, he, with wondrous interpretative skill, made each listener feel and acknowledge them. The power and range of his expositive faculties fitted him well for the high and holy task of tracing the wisdom written into the swift-changing yet everlastingly stable, the majestic, and strangely energized phenomena which formed the syllables upon the mighty scroll of the midnight sky; and to expatiate upon the ceaseless lapse of evolution through which creation, to him, seemed to be passing, with matchless enthusiasm and grandeur. His adventurous thought had not merely gone forth upon the far night-journeys of astronomical speculation, discovery, or research; he had attempted to learn the genesis of human knowledge, from the potential germ to the actual fruit—from the imageless instinctivity of preconscious being to the gorgeous statesque or panoramic creations of imagination in Art or Poetry—from the earliest organic sensitiveness to the wide-visioned receptivity of the man of Science, and the many avowed consciousness of the Statesman; and he had thrown out from his own soul bright, anticipatory gleams into the dim-lighted regions of Psychology. He was our friend, and in the brotherhood of our soul we held him dear and loved. Can it be wondered, then, that

"Our hearts are bowed with a sublime distress,"

as we reckon up the losses of the year in which he died?—

"Yet Death, how beautiful! if its sight reveal
A mooned and starred eternity of light!"

Though William Spalding's name has been but little noised abroad by Fame's hoarse heralds—the critics,—it was not for lack of worth in him, but of sight, insight, and foresight in them.

"Strongest minds
Are often those of whom the noisy world
Hears least;"

and Professor Spalding was one of those who had that self-denying reticence, which contents itself with being useful without a greedy longing after fame. Though possessed of the fine felicity of genius, he had little opportunity of displaying it in any unnecessitated task of his own choice. From a life that flickered for years along the margin of non-being, he had wrung, by dint of industry untiring, and a model instantaneousness of decision, a quantity of work that is almost incredible, of a quality, for the most part, far above mediocrity. Few publications of any note exist to which at some time his pen has not contributed; and the amount of drudgery which he went through complacently would startle many of those who fancy

that authorship is inspiration. His acquaintance with the facts of biography, with the best productions of many ages and countries, his chaste taste, and mildly emotive nature, have made him an authority in every encyclopedia. Everything he did was able, careful, excellent; but his "Introduction to Logical Science" is replete with erudite reference, sound critical sagacity, acute co-ordination, eclectic subtlety, and unostentatious originality. Students could ill spare a man so well qualified to exemplify in life and literature the pleasures of intellectual effort. Half a century of laborious life has now resulted in *rest*.

Though we dare only name here the mightiest theorist in mechanics—Brunel,—and the noblest impracticalizer of it—Stephenson,—we cannot forbear a word of memorial to the rarest of technologists—Dr. George Wilson,—a man whose pure and unselfish personal qualities, and earnest, Christian life, made him admired and loved by all. A genial, sunshiny disposition, obliging to his own hurt, a fresh fancy, clear scientific conceptiveness, ingenious zest-giving humour, and trustworthy knowledge, made him a lecturer on science at once instructive, attractive, fit, and simple. His life was a struggle against death; and an early grave—he was only forty-one—closed upon this loving and earnest revealer—

"Of God's deep wisdom in the natural world."

Little of his mind had been embalmed in books, though he has written on several subjects with talented truthfulness. In his influence among men, "it is," to quote his own latest published words, "the writer that shall be immortal, not the writing."

Washington Irving has been a voluminous author, and the charms and graces of his compositions are known and felt. He invented that dry, graphic, somnolent, yet exaggerative humour which has immortalized *Knickerbocker*; yet his pen did not falter in sketching the gorgeous picturesqueness of "The Alhambra," nor fail in suffusing with the interest of reality "The Conquest of Granada," in investing with their own sublimity "The Life and Voyages of Columbus," or in drawing *the Life of Washington*, with the vigour and distinctness, and in the manly proportions, of the heroism of truth. The fertility of his fancy is only less wondrous than the immense productiveness of his industry; and the tasteful ornateness of his diction, which is all in all with some writers, is in him only the setting of long toiled-after facts and genuine creativeness. Work upon work for forty years has been issued from the press; he has levied reputation from Momus, Clio, and Minerva. The merry England of the olden time, and life in all epochs of the Western world, have been described by him in all moods and modes. Though the gentle affections and domesticities gratify him most, he is neither unwilling to waken a smile or startle a tear, and grisly war itself cannot blanch him into fear, to cope in narrative with the deeds he perpetrates on the field. He had woes in his early life, and trials in mid age, but kindly time had somewhat toned the tenor of his

sadness before he left his Sunnyside on earth for, it is to be hoped, the sunny side of heaven.

De Quincey, the dithyrambist, the inventor of impassioned prose, the exquisite thrill and melody of whose writing, once felt, can never be forgotten, is also among those to whom the long resting-place of a grave has been given. The admiration of nations kindled at his name, though all the articles he has written were but sparklets struck off the large mass of his intellectuality. He was the tutor of a race of rich, rare, and promising spirits, many of whom outwore their bodily frames by thought before their master's tense, attenuated nerves yielded to the touch that made them inflexible. Sustained, sauntering, strange, sinuous, sounding sentences; uniquely literate and singularly alternated forms of thought, running in continual mazes of paradox and cunning labyrinths of curious speculation; flashes of logic clear as lightning; humours somewhat unwieldy and pedantic; learning as various as the ways of Death; the power of harmony, and the deeper power of seeing far and well into the life of things, distinguish his writings from all others. They have a "sweet music that no ear can measure," as

"He traced an ebbing and a flowing mind,
Expression ever varying."

Much of life's energy was wasted in sicklied and in desperate effort to regain the self that he had sacrificed to the opium fiend.

But the strong soul, the self-constraining will, never became his; his fine, winsome nature was essentially weakened and withered. "The *shaping* mind" he had not, though he possessed in powerful plenitude "the daring ken" that looked *into* and saw the meaning of the forms of nature and the forms of thought and being. In converse he was more copious, versatile, informing, fascinating than even in his works. His fine-edged sympathies gained new sharpness from personal contact; and his mind became toned as well as stimulated by the visible presence of friends and listening auditors. Now he is gone from among men, and the still, sad music of his sinewy though sinuous thoughts is to be found in his writings, not in him. In seventy-three years of life he produced stones for a cairn, but could not build a monument. Had he but possessed the resistive conscientiousness which counterworks, defies, and vanquishes

"Whatever hinders or impedes
The action of the nobler will,"

how different might his existence have been for him—for us! But the grave is sealed, and the past is changeless, and "no device or work" is now possible to *him*, and all such reflections are idle as the summer wind, but for their application to us, who are spared "to cope with time" our little day.

The greatest loss came last and most unexpectedly. The promise of new treasures, snatched from the past and perishable, and endowed with the life which genius gives, was just passing from lip to lip, and expectancy was a-tiptoe, when suddenly intelligence spread

that "the wand of the enchanter was broken,"—that Macaulay was dead! It seemed as if a friend had died, so dully fell the news upon the ear, so startledly unwilling was the mind to trust the message and announcement. The toilsome accumulation of years, the cherished purpose of a life, the hope and joy of a nation, the priceless reflections of a mind of might, the wisdom garnered from the fields of storied time, were swept away at once. Though an argosy has been engulfed in a calm sea, astonishment could not have been more intense.

"Ah! thou hast stolen a jewel, Death!
Shall light thy dark up like a star."

Not as the checkmate of seasonable joy, in the forgetful time of stir and merry-making, under the pressure of our first sad some thoughts, nor in the hopeless sombreness of funeral preparations, have we sought to state and estimate the losses of the bygone year; but now, in no unseemly haste, we have endeavoured, so far as memory served and space permitted, to bring before our readers the chief names in literature and science with which we had become familiarized year after year, who are now on earth no more than names and fadeless influences.

It would be well if we who, for the present, remain, would seriously regard the past as a lesson written "for our learning," that it may induce us to *work* while our day lasts, knowing that

"The heights by great men reached and kept,
Were not attained by sudden flight;
But they, while their companions slept,
Were toiling upward in the night,"

to prepare for the inevitable hour when we too, ripe or unripe, must be bound up in the sheaf of Death, and carried to his garner; to look "through the haze of present life into the calm of eternity," and hasten our fitness for beholding and enjoying its supernal brilliancy; and to do *now* the offices of love, charity, friendship, duty-becomingly, earnestly, and well, so that in the future it may be ours to see the hitherto Invisible, and in the vast homes of our Father's love,

"Quiver with joy in the great jubilee"

of timelessness, sinlessness, and deathlessness.

S. N.

The Reviewer.

Discourses by William Anderson, LL.D. Second Series.

London: Ward & Co.

THIS is one of the few volumes of Sermons which vindicate the nobility of true religion. Repudiating everything like unmanly weakness, Dr. Anderson speaks of the world not only as it is, but as it might be, and so applies religion to life, in all its phases, as to

show that, without its hallowing influences, the heart must remain loveless and hopeless, although gold be plentiful and barns be full.

These are not mere strings of quotations, headed by another quotation called a text. They are chapters of hard reasoning, bound together by strong faith. A true appreciation is shown of all that affects man's moral and physical, as well as his spiritual comfort.

"Reflect that, to cherish a charitable frame of spirit, and cultivate a candid frame of speech, is our greatest wisdom in respect either of inward peace or outward comfort.

"INWARD PEACE.—What a miserable existence a suspicious temper occasions a man! It utterly incapacitates him for friendship, through the ever-recurring reflection, quenching any rising emotion of natural, genial fellowship, that he is possibly deceived, and practised on by his companions;—that the world being so full of guile, the best prudence is to have doubts of every man you meet; and treat with a large measure of reserve even your most intimate acquaintances—even your wife, if unfortunately you happen to have been bound to one. It is a dangerous alliance; beware of communicativeness. With a corresponding reserve every one learns to treat *him*. He defies familiarity. So he passes through life without any enjoyment of one of its sweetest pleasures—hearty social intercourse, and the intimate sympathies of friendship. Rather resign yourself to a foolish, promiscuous confiding in every man with whom you may fall in by the way, though you should suffer a little by it, than have your life soured by a universal misanthropical distrust of your species.

"OUTWARD COMFORT.—If candid and gentle in the treatment of others, you will rarely fail of obtaining a return of love; but if conspicuously or enviously censorious, you will as rarely escape retaliation; when forth will be dragged to light something discreditable in your early history, which you imagine is forgotten, or something in your present habits to which you imagine no one is privy, so as to overwhelm you with confusion, and humble you to the dust. Oh, that all of us would have the prudence to bridle our saucy tongues! or rather, that we would all admit grace to purge our saucy hearts! How much discomfort we would be saved!"

We strongly recommend this volume to our readers. It is thought-inducing; and thus, in its character, partakes as much of the essay as the sermon. In being purely logical, it differs widely from the rhetorical chapters of Dr. Guthrie, and will doubtless reach the heart by its subtle processes of argument, just as surely as others take the heart by storm by their dazzling flashes of eloquence.

Talk and Talkers. An Essay. London: J. F. Hope. 1859.

To say the least, the appearance of this smartly written essay is well-timed, for never were empty nothings vapoured forth more plentifully, never were exaggerations more wilfully coloured, never were egotists more egotistical, hypocrites more studiously disguised, or scandal-mongers more vicious, than at the present time. Sins of the tongue are so seldom denounced from the pulpit, or lampooned from the platform, that we are glad to find the subject has been taken up with such vivacity, and yet with such good temper, as in the essay before us.

Lectures on Redemption. By JOHN HOWARD HINTON, M.A.
London: Houlston and Wright.

What may sound unfavourable is in reality the best thing we could say in praise of the volume of Sermons now before us ; that is, that unless the preacher had an uncommonly good manner in their delivery, they must have been uncommonly heavy to listen to. What is called "good preaching"—preaching that is popular—seldom reads well when put into print ; whereas, on the other hand, preaching from which the majority of people turn away as dull and sleep-producing, will often bear close analysis.

Mr. Hinton's little book is so exceedingly good that it demands frequent perusal to appreciate its merits. We may venture to say that in some particulars the sermons it contains are superior to any we have read of either Guthrie or Robertson, but they are particulars which commend themselves to students of theology, rather than to the general public. Here you have divinity clearly taught, yet taught in a form so technical, so free from any approach to the illustrations common to Guthrie, or the analysis of Robertson, as would be sure, from any one else but the venerable author, to render these lectures but slightly popular in the delivery, though greatly instructive in their present shape.

We cannot help noticing Mr. Hinton's wise and lucid discrimination on some doctrinal points, concerning which there is in many minds not a little confusion. In the second lecture, on "The Procuring Cause of Redemption," a very clear distinction is drawn between the character of God as a Father and as a Judge. The common error on this question is shown by a quotation from the Hymns of Dr. Watts, in which God is represented as a "consuming fire." There follows the verse,—

"Rich were the drops of Jesus' blood,
That calmed His frowning face;
That sprinkled o'er the burning throne,
And turned the wrath to grace."

Mr. Hinton observes :—"The radical mistake and infelicity of the verses lie in attaching the severity which is appropriate to God's official character to His personal character, to which it is not appropriate ; or in confounding the Father with the Judge. As a Father, God never had a 'frowning face,' requiring to be calmed by 'drops of blood ;' nor did He ever cherish 'wrath,' to be by such a process turned to grace. Rather our Father, though justly offended, was always infinitely kind. His holiness required the interposition of a Mediator, indeed, but nothing more ; and the Mediator, far from inspiring His mercy, is but the representative of it."—(Lecture ii., pp. 41, 42.) It is greatly to be regretted, that with all that may be said in favour of Dr. Watts's hymns, they contain so many lines, if not as untrue in sentiment as those to which reference has been made, at any rate as offensive to good taste.

We heartily recommend all who wish for clear and correct views in theology to obtain Mr. Hinton's book.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

73. Will any of your readers, versed in Geology, kindly inform me through the medium of your valuable Magazine, of a good work on the above science for beginners, with its price?—J. B. S.

74. Will one of your readers please inform me, if a copy of the first Protestant translation of the Bible is in existence, and, if so, where it may be seen?—NESCIO.

75. I have noticed how promptly and ably some of the readers of the *British Controversialist* reply to the interrogations of the "Inquirer,"—shall I ask the favour of one giving me some information respecting Almanacks?—EH?

76. The solution of my question is not asked of any unfortunate depositor in the British Bank, but of some kind reader of the *British Controversialist*, so I may anticipate some satisfaction. Banks—how were they originated?—DISCIPULUS.

77. Having lately read the "Laird of Logan," I came upon several allusions and expressions which were new to me, and which I did not understand. I will be obliged by any information thereon from the readers of the *British Controversialist*. They were as follows:—1. The word "Scestus" applied to Paisley dandies. 2. The expression "a son of Sneddon" applied to a citizen of Paisley. 3. The name "Sawney" applied to a Scotchman. 4. "Bien" apartments, speaking of a tavern. 5. A "cock Laird." 6. An allusion to "Lesmahago with the mad dog," occurring in the sentence, "He resolved, like 'Lesmahago with the mad dog,' to turn upon their pursuers, and fight them with their own weapons." 7. The concluding part of the following sentence, "A minister who had a guid gift of the gab, delivered a sermon

which delighted the mob, as a tub does a whale."—ADOLESCENS.

78. In the biographical sketch of Archimedes in Beard's "Biographical Dictionary," it is said that "he raised the enemy's vessels in the air, and dashed them on the sea, and set them on fire by burning mirrors." Never having otherwise read of him I would wish to know more particularly as to this, and will be obliged by any information on the subject, or being referred to any book containing it. I would also be obliged with information as to the story of Mahomet's coffin being suspended "between heaven and hell;" as to the story of Fortunatus and his wishing-cap; and as to where I will find a life of, or anything of interest connected with, Diogenes. I have often heard Mahomet's coffin and Fortunatus' cap mentioned, but am not aware of the stories.—ADOLESCENS.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

57. *Riding the "Black Lad."*—Traditional usages and popular customs, having their origin from some circumstance or historical occurrence of a remote bygone age, are not unfrequently regularly observed by the local populace resident in the several particular districts in which such traditional lore is preserved. To one of these your correspondent A. C. has referred; for as a certain class among the inhabitants of Cockaigne regularly amuse themselves with a live "Jack in the Green;" and as the rustics of a district in Berkshire occasionally "scur the White Horse," commemorative of King Alfred's victory over the Danes at Ashdown; so, in the ancient town of Ashton-under-Lyne, the inhabitants are annually edified by the riding of the Black Knight (or, as the local idiom expresses it, the "*Blake Lad*"), in memory of a personage who has long since left the scene of his doings in this sublunary sphere; and

the ceremony is observed after something of the same fashion (only for a different reason) as the citizens of Coventry honour their long deceased lady benefactor. We therefore purpose, for the amusement and instruction of our readers, to inquire into the history of the Black Knight of Ashton, and then notice the manner in which his memory has been, and is still, commemorated.

According to popular oral tradition, "once upon a time," during the feudal ages, when might was submitted to as "right," and when law and justice were seldom thought of or practised, a tyrannical knight held possession of the manor of Ashton, who scrupled not to take for himself the property of his inferiors, in various ways oppressing their persons, often imprisoning them in a part of his fortress known as the "dungeons" (and which, with their two round towers, still remain to interest the stranger), until his pleasure decided upon either their release or conveyance for punishment to a place which, until very recently, was still known by the expressive cognomen of "gallows field."

The death of this tyrant knight, says oral tradition, happened on an Easter Monday, in consequence of his being shot by some disaffected person while perambulating his customary rounds for the purpose of exacting fines, tribute, or men pressed into his service; and so great was the joy of the people when this event freed them from the tyrant's yoke, that it was resolved to keep his memory alive unto future ages by the observance of some annual custom; and thus, ever since that time, as the years have rolled on, has the effigy of this tyrant knight been paraded through the town on Easter Monday, made the gazing stock of an execrating mob, and summarily disposed of by being shot and torn to pieces at the old market cross.

Such is the oral traditional story of the Black Knight, *alias* "Blake Lad," and which was listened to by us, in our early boyhood, with mingled feelings of

awe and indignation; and, in substance, is doubtless still related to the "young ideas" of Ashton," when, prompted by curiosity or love of information, they put the question, "Who was the Blake Lad?"

We will now inquire what local history says upon the subject, and learn what authentic facts are supposed to lie at the foundation of this ancient local tradition and custom.

In his "History of Manchester and the Surrounding Country," Aiken informs us that "in the reign of Edward the Third, surnamed of Windsor, lived Thomas Asheton, of Ashton-under-Lyne, and of whom nothing but the following particulars are known. In the year 1346, when the king was in France, David, king of Scotland, brought an army into the middle of this kingdom, and at Neville Cross, near Durham, Edward's queen, with the Earl of Northumberland as general, gained a complete victory over the Scots, about the same time that her husband obtained a victory in France. In this battle Thomas Asheton, one of her soldiers, but in what station is not known, rode through the ranks of the enemy, and bore away the royal standard from the king's tent, who himself was afterwards taken prisoner. For this act of Asheton's heroism, when Edward returned from France, he gave him the honour of knighthood, and the title of Sir Thomas Asheton, of Asheton-under-Lyne; and to commemorate this singular display of his valour, and its reward, he instituted the custom referred to, and left the sum of ten shillings yearly to support it (within these few years reduced to five), together with his own suit of black velvet (whence his name of the Black Knight), and a coat of mail, the helmet of which is still remaining." In reference to this account of the origin of "Kiding the Black Knight," we will only remark that, *if correct*, it was certainly a strange and singular custom to institute by way of commemorating a singular act of heroism achieved by the founder, and

one which we should not have thought would have been hit upon, even by a knight in the middle of the fourteenth century.

The "Custom Boil and Rental" of the manor, drawn up by Sir John de Assheton, seventy-six years after the battle of Neville Cross (in 1422), is destitute of any mention of the custom. From this silence it appears reasonable to infer that the custom had not then commenced; yet "Rauf of Assheton" (afterwards Knight of Middleton, and whom Dr. Hibbert supposes was the original of the personified Black Knight) was living at this period; but probably those appalling acts of his tyranny—if he was the execrated one, and the memory of whom still remains, after the lapse of near four centuries—had not then been perpetrated. Referring to this custom, Douce, in his MS. Notes, thus speaks of it:—"It is said to have arisen from there having formerly been a black knight residing in these parts, holding the people in vassalage, and treating them with great severity."^{*}

The following, however, is the more popular, and, we have no doubt, the most authentic, account of the origin of this ancient custom. In his Illustrations[†] Dr. Hibbert remarks, with respect to the "Riding of the Black Knight," that, "in the rent-roll of Sir John de Assheton, mention is made of a grant to 'Rauf of Assheton and Robin of Assheton,' and merits much attention. It is stated that they have the 'sour-carr,‡ guld-rode,§ and stane rynges,||

* "History of Ashton." Butterworth.

† "Illustrations of the Customs of a Manor in the North of England." By Dr. Hibbert, of Edinburgh.

‡ "The 'sour carr' was a large extent of low, wet land in the vicinity of Ashton, and which was overrun with corn marigolds in the days of Sir John of Ashton."—*History of Ashton*.

§ "This is the ancient Scottish custom of guld-riding as it is still retained at Carr-gill, in Perthshire, at the present time, and was a perambulation by the lords of manors, or their representatives, to examine the lands of the tenantry in search of the weed 'guld,' or 'gool' (corn-marigolds), and to punish, by fine, the farmers who suffered their

for the term of their lives,—'Rauf, of the gift of John of Assheton, knight, the elder; and Robin, of the gift of John of Assheton, knight, the younger.' From this it appears that Rauf, or Raphe, of Ashton (Sir John's son by a second marriage), and Robin his brother, were on a certain day in spring, invested with a power of riding over the lands of the carr, named the Carr-guld-rode, levying fines for all gulds that were found among the corn; and, until the penalties were paid, of punishing transgressors, by putting them into the stocks, or stone rings, as also by incarceration.

Aiken further remarks—"It appears that Raphe of Assheton became, by his alliance with a rich heiress, the lord of a neighbouring manor named Middleton, and soon after received the honour of knighthood; being at the same time (1483) entrusted with the office of vice-constable of the kingdom, and, it is added, of lieutenant of the Tower. Invested with such great authorities, he committed violent excesses in this part of the kingdom. In retaining also, for life, the privilege granted him in Ashton, of guld-riding, he, on a certain day in spring (supposed to be Easter Monday) made his appearance in this manor, clad in black armour (whence his name of the Black Boy), mounted on a charger, and attended by a numerous train of his own followers, in order to levy the penalties arising from any neglect of clearing the land from gulds. The interference of so powerful a knight, belonging to another lordship, could not but be regarded by the tenants of Assheton as the tyrannical intrusion of a stranger; and as Sir Raphe, sanctioned by the political

growth, their existence being considered very destructive to the cultivation of the genuine corn. The words 'guld-rode' might indicate a tenement overrun with guld, and he'd by Rauf and Robin; yet 'rode' is generally to be taken to mean 'ride.'—*Ibid*.

|| "'Stane rynges,' or Stone rings, were instruments of punishment similar to the stocks, the use of which was vested in the hands of 'Rauf and Robin.'—*Ibid*.

power given him, exercised his privilege with the utmost severity, the name of the Black Knight in the district, even at the present day, is regarded with no other sentiments than those of horror. Indeed, tradition has perpetuated the prayer that, in his day, was fervently ejaculated for a deliverance from his tyranny:—

'Sweet Jesu, for thymerey's sake,
And for thy bitter passion,
Spare us from the awe of the Tower,
And from Sir Raphe of Ashteton.'

"Upon the death of the guld-rider of Ashteton,* Sir Jehn's heir and successor abolished the usage for ever, and charged upon the estate a small sum of money, for the purpose of perpetuating, in an annual ceremony, the dreaded yearly visits of the Black Boy. The custom is still kept up at the present day: an effigy is made of a man in armour; and since Sir Raphe was the son of a second marriage (which, for this reason, had been esteemed by the heir of Sir John as 'an unfortunate match'), the back of the image is deridingly emblazoned with some emblem of the occupation of the last couple that are linked together in the course of the year." (Thus, if it happened to be a tailor, his goose, shears, thimble, &c.—if a mason, his mallet, trowel, square and chisel, &c.—and so with other trades,

* Bell's "Gazetteer" states that "Sir Raphe of Ashteton was shot as he was riding down the principal street of the town, on one of his Easter Monday visitations, and the inhabitants to have taken no trouble to discover the assassin." How far this may be correct we have no means to determine, as the manner and exact time of his death is not, to our knowledge, anywhere recorded.

† Butterworth, in his "History of Ashton," says that it was "Sir Thomas's heir and successor who abolished the custom of guld-riding," and "not Sir John's, as is usually supposed." This Sir Thomas was the son and successor of Sir John; the latter died in 1438: the date of Sir Thomas's death is not found in the genealogies. Sir John, his eldest son and successor, died in 1508, and he is supposed by the historian of Ashton to have abolished the custom in question; and his son and successor, Sir Thomas, was the last male representative of the family of the Ashtons of Ashton-under-Lyne.

were portrayed on the back of the effigy, together with the initials of the names of these unfortunate persons, unless they compounded all such questionable honour by means of a "pecuniary consideration"). "The Black Boy is then placed on horseback, and after being led in procession round the town, is dismounted, hung up at the market cross, and made to supply the place of a shooting butt, when, all firearms being in requisition for the occasion, he is put to an ignominious death by being shot away in the presence of a large concourse of the neighbouring people, who always attend to be spectators of the exhibition."*

On comparing these researches into history with the popular oral tradition, it will be observed that while there is a resemblance which may indicate oneness of origin, there still remain some minor differences; which, however, may only be the natural tendency to exaggeration of oral tradition, coming down, as it does, through so many generations. But after all the profound and elaborate reasoning of Dr. Hibbert and Aiken on the subject, there is yet room for additional research. The result of their investigations we have given above; and though supported with great apparent probability, it is difficult avoiding the conclusion that a mere atrocious act than extirpating corn-marigolds must have led to a practice so deeply marked with expressions of abhorrence to him whose infamy has thus been perpetuated for centuries. Mr. Baines very properly observes, "Supposing this account to be correct, it is manifest that the offence of Sir Raphe, in obliging the farmers to keep their grounds clear from weeds, was not of so heinous a nature as to require to be expiated by centuries of execrations; and the solemnity might now be permitted to cease, without any detriment to the moral feeling of the place." †

* Aiken's "Manchester and its Neighbourhood."

† Baines's "Lancashire," 12me. edn., vol. i., p. 494.

It is allowed by all that the origin of the custom is involved in obscurity and uncertainty, though this last account doubtless appears by far the most probable.

With Mr. Baines we agree, and may further remark that, in our opinion, it seems very strange that a man's character should be so publicly stigmatized, and his memory preserved from merited oblivion, to be the more detested throughout so many ages, if the only crime of which he was guilty, was too strictly looking after "carr-gulda." Even allowing that he rigorously exacted enormous fines, and inflicted various severe punishments, still, it was with the avowed intention of extirpating a noxious weed; and his memory being preserved, and held up to public execration for near four centuries, seems a punishment unduly disproportioned to the magnitude of the offence. Few, indeed, are the tyrants on a large scale, in the world's history, who have received a similar proportioned merited retribution, in a memory kept alive but to be execrated, as is the fate of this old knight of Ashton; so that we cannot but conclude, from our consideration of the best and most probable account of the origin of this singular custom, that it may fairly, and with certainty, be traced to an ancient feeling of the inhabitants against the excesses of tyranny, and that it was instituted by them to mark with detestation the wanton acts of a cruel tyrant, which happened to be perpetrated when the arbitrary sway of the feudal system was gradually disappearing before the growing power, greater freedom of speech, and comparative independence of the great middle class.

Aiken, as above quoted, says that the custom of riding the Black Knight was still observed at the time when he wrote (1795); and the helmet, which was then remaining, was still in existence, the writer of this article remembers, until about some fourteen or sixteen years ago, when it mysteriously disappeared, and the Black Boy several

times made his appearance in the rather un-knight-like costume of a sorry hat of the present tile-like shape, and with stumps of arms stretching out at right angles, into the ends of which were stuck bunches of heather broom. From the riotous character of the proceedings attending the celebration of this annual custom in those years, the more respectable portion of the inhabitants had long looked upon it as a practice that would be more honoured in the breach thereof, than in its observance. Indeed, on these occasions, it was rather dangerous for a well-dressed person to approach too near the scene of the Black Knight's execution; for it was almost certain he would be smeared with sludge, or some filth, if not otherwise abused; and, in consequence of such practices, it was without regret anticipated by many, that now the helmet, the last relic of the original suit of armour handed down through so many ages, had gone the way of all things, that the custom itself also would soon die out, and be forgotten. But this was not its destiny: its end was "not yet." It has seen a revival, and bids fair to outlive the present generation. The causes of this change have been various. A better and more efficient local government has provided a check to any tendency to tumultuous disorder, while the growing intelligence of an increasing community frowns all such proceedings down. The railways, also, have opened up to the pleasure-seeker and holiday spender, by cheap and easy access thereto, many beautiful spots of more or less interest, arising from either situation, or associations connected therewith; and as other places have their attractions for visitors, why should not Ashton also have one, in its ancient custom of riding the Black Knight? These, and similar considerations, induced the resolution that the Black Knight should be re-furnished by subscription, and the annual celebration of his visit more properly conducted; and as the consequence of such decision,

the custom has not died out. So far from that, it shows still more vigorous signs of life. For some years past, the appearance of the Black Knight has been heralded by placard, his equipments described, manner and route of procession detailed, and the use of fire-arms strictly forbidden; and the result has been, that while the custom has still been observed, the obnoxious, riotous conduct of the mob has been restrained, though we have an idea that, after having paraded the town, and been divested of his outer habiliments,—helmet, armour, cloak, &c., in some quiet corner, away from the surveillance of the "Bobbies" (*Anglicæ*, police), the straw-stuffed carcase of the Black Lad is remorselessly consigned to the tender mercies of the devouring element, amid such complimentary epithets, and other demonstrations of respect, as we rather think would not be esteemed very flattering by the individual whose memory the people thus "delight to honour."

On the occasion of celebrating this custom during the past year, there were no less than three Black Lads exhibited to the thousands of strangers who crowded the streets of the town last Easter Monday (25th of April). We cannot say much for the artistic taste displayed in the make-up of these several effigies; but each was represented as a warrior, or tyrant bearing a sword, axe, or some other emblem of a tyrannical age. The proprietors of each also appeared to reap a good harvest, by begging, as the effigy passed along,—a custom recently introduced, and which, doubtless, has its natural effect, in a business point of view. The one owned by the "Chalsteawn Lads" (from a noted district of the borough Charlestown) appeared to receive the largest amount of pecuniary patronage from the public. The third was the real, or original Black Knight, and which had been announced by placard (the others were merely speculations—

rivals in his peculiar line of business, to compete for a share of the attractive profits), and was preceded by a band of music. Unlike the others, who were on horseback, this was seated in a car (again, rather unknight-like), was clad in a coat of mail, with helmet and feather, sword and battle-axe, and with a black velvet cloak over his shoulders. The day was fine, and passed over very quietly, notwithstanding the great influx of strangers, who all appeared to enjoy their holiday, with the sights witnessed, and made us half-wish that all tyrants were, in a similar manner, carried round in effigy near the scene of their cruelties and oppressions of their fellow-men.

Falling into a philosophic mood, we found ourselves framing the question, as to what influence such an exhibition would have upon a population just emerging from a state of serfdom, and beginning to exercise their own duties of free citizenship. This problem, however, we could not satisfactorily solve, and will not, therefore, trouble our readers any further with our feeble efforts in that direction; but we trust that each will be able to arrive at a satisfactory solution thereof in his own mind. We may, however, remark, that perhaps the strong feelings of indignation against all tyranny, the feeling of independence existing among the population of this district, if not the originating cause of, has doubtless been fostered by, this annual custom; and if so, all who agree therewith will also join us in the hope that in the future, such anniversary, as it is celebrated, will never be marred with any disgraceful, disorderly conduct, but exert as its chief, if not sole influence, a beneficial effect on the popular and youthful mind, by animating them with a hatred of injustice and tyranny of all kinds, whether domestic, social, ecclesiastical, or political, and encouraging a love of truth, justice, and liberty.

C

The Societies' Section.

THE LITERARY INSTITUTIONS OF LONDON.

ONE of the most prominent advantages on which this "great city" may justly pride itself arises from its numerous and varied institutions for the encouragement of mental improvement and literary power. The importance of these institutions, especially to the young, can scarcely be over-estimated. To him who is just commencing to do battle with the world and life's stern realities, they are eminently advantageous. He has, perhaps, left his school or college with honours, and his friends regard him with admiration, as possessing more than ordinary abilities. This is not, perhaps, distasteful to the lad himself, and no wonder if he becomes full of self-conceit and vanity. But if, at this period, he should enter a literary institution, expecting still to maintain this (to him) proud pre-eminence, he will be grievously disappointed, for he will find that he is but one unit of the vast armies who are daily combating with the world for pre-eminence, and he will discover, that to retain anything like distinction he must not be content with those (now) trivial honours he has gained, but he must read, study, and labour.

This may be at first discouraging to him, but it will have a bracing and invigorating effect upon him which we cannot value too highly. It is this which has in many instances given young men the first impulse to embark on that then almost unknown and shereless sea of literature.

At the present day, the principal object sought by literary institutions is the culture of the mental powers, by stimulating the efforts of the student himself by the aid of tutors, or by the mutual counsels and examples of the members themselves. True, these institutions do not in every case realize this object, for we must acknowledge

with pain that there are in them two distinct and totally different classes of members.

If we enter the room set apart for those who desire quiet study and reflection, we see there earnest-souled high-minded students, who, though they may have only just left the desk or counter, are energetically and successfully overcoming the difficulties in their way to the bright goal of knowledge.

But, if we turn aside into the news room, we shall probably find some who spend their whole time, from their business hours to the closing of the institution, alternately between sleep and newspaper! These members, it is true, may derive some benefit from their connection with the society, but it will be far less than what it might or ought to be.

A "debating" or "discussion and essay" class, in conjunction with an "elocution" or "reading" class, we view as amongst the most useful agencies connected with these institutions. We can scarcely over-estimate the good which can be effected by a judiciously conducted class of this description. Apart from the personal improvement of the members, what is the grand object of all discussion and controversy? The elimination of truth. And is not this the greatest of all objects, both in philosophy and religion? And as it is after this that every man is striving, we cannot, in this day of new and strange theories, place too high a value upon any agency, be it ever so humble, that aids in the solution of this grand problem.

Speaking of the institutions and societies of London, we must, for the sake of brevity, classify them; and we have—1st, The literary institution, including also mutual improvement societies, literary clubs, and debating

societies; 2nd, Mechanics' institutions, working men's colleges, and institutions of a similar character.

Literary Institutions.—The year 1808 ushered in a new era of literature. The oldest "literary institution" now existing in London was then founded, and called by the name which it still bears, "The Russell Literary and Scientific Institution." On its roll of earliest members we find the names of some remarkable men, such as Sir Samuel Romilly, the celebrated equity lawyer, whose ancestors were originally French Protestants, who fled to England for asylum on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, a descendant of whom—Sir John Romilly—is the present Master of the Rolls; Francis Horner, the eminent financier and eloquent member of Parliament; Mason Good, the literary physician; Henry Hallam; and Lord Abinger; all now no more. Possessed of a fine and attractive building, eminent patrons, a library of 16,000 volumes, and situate in a central position in London, the "Russell Institution" ought to exercise great power and influence.

In the city of London and its immediate vicinity are—"The London Institution," in Finsbury, founded nearly of the same date with the "Russell;" the "Crosby Hall Institution," in Bishopsgate, held in the ancient parish of Crosby; and the room designated the "Crown-room" in its days of palatial dignity, now reverberates to the voices of the young men of London; the "East-on Polytechnic Institution," Leman Street, Whitechapel; the "Young Men's Societies Union," at 11, St. Benet's Place, Gracechurch Street; the "Jews and General" in Essex Hall, Leadenhall Street; the "Philosophical Institution," Basement Square, Mile End, more generally known as the "Besenmont," combining scientific pursuits with more secular amusements. Within the legal and ecclesiastical precincts of Doctors' Commons is the "Literary and Scientific Institution." The "Literary Institution" in Aldersgate Street, once known as the "City of London Literary and

Scientific Institution," now under the management of the committee of the "Young Men's Christian Association," shorn of many of the ornaments of a "literary institution," and sinking as it does in many respects below the majority of the institutions of London in its lectures, it yet possesses many advantages over them in regard to its situation and accommodation.

The "Young Men's Christian Association," whose head-quarters are in Aldersgate Street, as we have already mentioned, has enlarged itself gradually from the one room in which its promoters originally met, some ten or fifteen years ago, to the position which it now occupies. It has thrown out its branches east, west, north, and south, over not only the metropolis and its suburbs, but there is scarcely a town in England in which may not be found a branch of this association. But it professes itself to be occupied with a higher mission than that of "literary" institutions, and *that* the promotion of religion among young men. As a means of enticing the young from "the evil snares surrounding them," some of its branches hold out the inducements of secular classes, but others do not. There is also the "Church of England Young Men's Society," having its rooms at 169, Fleet Street.

Special provision for Sunday school teachers is made by the Sunday School Union, in its noble building, 56, Old Bailey, and by the Church of England Sunday School Institute, at its rooms, 41, Ludgate Hill.

The literary institutions in the western districts of London are numerous. They are the "Russell," already referred to; the "Calthorpe Institute," Calthorpe Terrace, Gray's Inn Road, partaking more of the nature of a "christian association" than of a literary institution—it is under the patronage of Lord Calthorpe and Lord Ebury; the "Metropolitan Institution Company, Limited," Howland Street, Fitzroy Square, the object of which is by shares and donations to erect a large and commodious hall, to be called the "Hall of

Science and Literature," which will be devoted to the ordinary objects of a literary institution, but will also combine in some degree the advantages of a "mechanics' institution." We may perhaps mention, as an indication of its character, that on its board of directors occurs the name of Mr. E. Truelove, the now celebrated bookseller of Temple Bar. "The Whittington Club and Metropolitan Athenæum," in Arundel Street, Strand, has again arisen, phoenix-like, from its ashes, under the presidency of Mr. Alderman Mechi. It possesses the elements of a club for both ladies and gentlemen, a literary institution, and an assembly and ball-room. The "Marylebone Institution," in Edward Street, Portman Square, was established on the 23rd of April, 1832; its patron is that learned and indefatigable peer, Lord Brougham, and it has a library of 6,000 volumes. These, with the "All Souls' Mutual Improvement Institution," in Duke Street, Manchester Square; the "Craven Street Mutual Improvement Society;" the "Highgate Literary and Scientific Institution;" the "Great Western Railway Literary Society;" the "Kilburn Institution," Springfield Gardens; the "St. Mary's Institution," Upper York Street, Bryanston Square; and the "Westbourne Athenæum," Paddington, compose the list of our western institutions.

In the southern suburbs of London we have the "Angell Town Institution," at Brixton, which appears to be devoted solely to the delivery of lectures; the "Walworth Literary Institution," in Keene's Row, Walworth, established in the year 1845; the "Clapham Literary Institution," in Manor Street, Clapham; the "Southwark Literary Institution," in the Borough Road, Southwark, with its library of 5,000 volumes, Lord Brougham as its president, and Sir E. B. Lytton, the celebrated novelist, one of its patrons. The year 1859 gave birth to the "Chelsea Athenæum," similar in most respects to the ordinary literary institution. The name of Thomas Carlyle heads the list of the vice-patrons of this new society. The

"Battersea Literary and Scientific Institution," King Street; the "Belmont Mutual Improvement Society," Lawn End, South Lambeth; the "West Brompton Literary and Mutual Improvement Society;" the "Camberwell Literary and Scientific Institution;" the "Hackney Literary and Scientific Institution," Church Street; the "Hammermith Institution;" the "London and South-Western Railway Literary and Scientific Institution;" the "Islington Literary and Scientific Institution," Wellington Street; the "Poplar and Limehouse Literary and Scientific Institution," Hall Street; the "Sherwood Mutual Improvement Society," York Place, Battersea; the "Tailors' Labour Agency Literary Institution," Newington Causeway. These, with the "Literary and Scientific Institution" at Dalston, and the "St. John's Wood Literary and Scientific Institution," in Blenheim Place, which is now nearly seven years old, comprise, we believe, the whole of the institutions of this nature in London and the suburbs. In addition to these institutions, there are many societies connected with places of worship, which are working in a quiet, unostentatious manner, but which are doubtless benefiting a large class of young men, and preparing them for usefulness in the church and the world.

Mechanics' Institutions, including also Working Men's Colleges, and institutions of a similar character.—On the 2nd December, 1823, the "London Mechanics' Institution," in Southampton Buildings, Holborn, was founded by the late Dr. Birkbeck. This institution was the first of the kind established in England, yet now, only some thirty-six years from its establishment, there are about six hundred similar institutions in existence in England. The trustees of the London Institution at the present time are Lord Brougham and Joshua Walker, Esq., and we are told that since its foundation in 1823, "more than forty thousand persons have availed themselves of its advantages, of whom many are at the present time distinguishing themselves in various branches

of the arts and sciences, a knowledge of which they acquired in this institution." The advantages offered by these institutions to the working classes are undoubtedly great. They comprise classes for the study of the English, French, German, and Latin languages; discussion and essay, singing, drawing, elocution, and chess classes; good libraries, reading rooms well supplied with every style of literature, with good and generally entertaining lectures, by popular lecturers. We cannot enumerate the whole of these mechanics' institutes, but may mention the "Pimlico Literary, Scientific, and Mechanics' Institution," in Belgrave Place, Pimlico; the "Mechanics' Institute," Deptford; the "Finsbury Mechanics' Institute," 60, Bunhill Row; and the "London Compositors' Library and Reading Room," 3, Raquet Court, Fleet Street; as following in the footprints of the "London Mechanics," already mentioned. We may also notice as one of this class, "The Institution," in Cleveland Street, Fitzroy Square, which, besides its regular week-day lectures to the working classes, gives Sunday evening lectures on "various literary, scientific, social, and political questions;" and, further, step and figure dancing, and quadrille classes, on week days. It has a class for instruction in the French language on *Sunday* mornings! The "Working Men's College," in Great Ormond Street, Bloomsbury, of which the Rev. F. D. Maurice is the principal, has been established upwards of five years, and is devoted, as its name implies, to the strict uses of a college for working men and women. There are now numerous "working men's" institutes and colleges in and about London. The objects of these institutions are "the attainment of useful knowledge and mental recreation," and the means by which these ends are proposed to be accomplished are, "as far as circumstances admit, reading and news rooms, evening classes, a library, lectures, and such other means as may by the committee be deemed advisable." Of these institutions are the "Bermond-

sey Working Men's Institute," 99, Bermondsey Street; the "Workmen's Institute and Benefit Club," York Road, Lambeth; the "Hackney Working Men's Institute," West Street, Triangle Square, Hackney; the "Islington Working Men's Institute," 1, Wellington Street; the "St. Bartholomew Working Men's Institute," Calthorpe Place, Gray's Inn Road; the "Agar Town Working Men's Lecture and Reading Room;" the "Lewisham Working Men's Institution;" the "Norwood Working Men's Association;" the "People's Institution," Holborn Hill; the "St. George's Lending Library," Hanover Square; and the "Westminster Public Library," 7 and 8, Great Smith Street.

And now, if there should be among the readers of this article any student disheartened in his efforts to attain knowledge, to such we say,—Take courage and persevere, for with energy, and a strong will, though you lack what the world calls "genius" or "talent," you must and will finally succeed. Let us take advantage of all the means of improvement, however humble they may be, remembering that the path to learning is not to be trodden by the mere wish, or by a few spasmodic attempts at it, but by serious and resolute efforts.

In conclusion, let us all remember that self-improvement is a duty which we owe not only to ourselves, but to our country, and from the discharge of it we should not shrink. Death is making continual havoc amongst men great in the legislature, in science, literature, art, and their places must be refilled if we wish England to maintain her wonted supremacy. To the work, then! There is more pure and real pleasure in an hour's hard study, by which we gain something, than in a night's enervating amusement, amid the dazzling glare of the ball-room, or the tinelled grandeur of the theatre. True, we cannot all be great in the world's eye, but we can all be useful in our various spheres. Let us not despair, then, but ever remember that **KNOWLEDGE IS POWER.**

HENRY KEEBLE.

LITERARY NOTES

We understand that the autobiography of the Dr. Carlyle, who was the friend of Hume and Horne and Burns—which was left by its author under the charge of the late Principal Lee, of Edinburgh, in 1805, will shortly be published.

Junius, the problem of the eighteenth century, is still a shadow. Mr. Joseph Parkes, father of Miss Bessie Parkes, is about to add to the cumulative evidence of Sir Philip Francis being *the* man.

To the roll of ennobled men of the Court of Saxa-Weimar, have recently been added—by the bestowal of the "Order of the Falcon"—the names of GERVINUS, the Historian, and THOMAS CARLYLE.

Carlyle, Froude, Massey, and Buckle, are each reported as having volumes *in the press*.

CHARLES DARWIN, author of "The Origin of Species by Natural Selection," a book of the "*Vestiges*" type, is grandson, and heir (to the genius, at least) of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, author of "The Botanic Garden" and "Zoonomia."

The heroine of Longfellow's "Hyperion" became his wife.

An entire uninjured copy of "Coverdale's Bible," 1535, has been discovered, among many other rare books, in a recently opened closet at Willscot, Oxon.

Three vols. of "*The Occasional Works*" of Bacon, chronologically arranged, connected by narrative, and annotated, are *in preparation*.

Sir Henry Havelock's brother-in-law, J. C. Marshman, is preparing a memoir of that Christian hero.

A "Private Life of Washington" has been left among the papers of G. W. P. Custis, a descendant relative of the first President of the United States Republic.

SIR A. ALISON, Bart., the Historian of Europe, was presented with a bust of himself by the faculty of Procurators, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his appointment as sheriff of Lanarkshire, 29th Dec., 1859. "Another copy was placed in the library of the faculty.

The Roxburghe Club intend to erect in the metropolis a splendid monument in honour of WILLIAM CAXTON, the first British printer, of whom Mr. William Blades is preparing a biography.

Lord Macaulay expired, aged fifty-nine, on 28th December. Life ends, though labours last, and history continues. A Titanic fragment of our national records has been left by him; but, like Cambuscan's, in it our story is left "half told."

Shirley Brooks is editor, and Edward Walford sub-editor, of *Once a Week*.

HOOD, the British Heine, has been translated into German.

PRESCOTT's "Philip II." has been published by Messrs. Didot, in French.

"*St. Stephen's*," a poem in "Blackwood," looks as if its author did not need to ask "*What will he do with it?*" or to name it "*My Novel*" endeavour.

A new series of "The Bibliotheca Indica" is to be issued by the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

J. W. Gilbart, author of "The Logic of Banking," &c., has retired from the management of the London and Westminster Bank.

John Craig, a writer on political science, died on the 5th ult., aged ninety-four.

A memorial statue of Lord Clive is to be inaugurated at Shrewsbury.

Professor Owen, whose great work on "Palaeontology" is just published, has announced in *The Lancet*, that he is about to issue the MS. productions of John Hunter, the originals of which were destroyed by Sir Everard Home, from copies made by a Mr. Clift, formerly curator of the Hunterian Museum.

R. W. EMERSON is about to teach "The Conduct of Life" in a new vol., announced by Messrs. Ticknor.

Ernest Jones has a new poem, "*Corayda*," dedicated by permission to Sir. E. B. Lytton, *in the press*.

A. K. H. B., of "Fraser's Magazine," is the Rev. A. K. H. Boyd, of St. Bernard's, Edinburgh, son of Rev. Dr. Boyd, of Tron parish, Glasgow.

Epoch Men.

GEOFFREY CHAUCER.—THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

"Chaucer, the Homer of our poetry, and the true father of English literature."
—*G. L. Craik.*

FROM the era of the Conquest (1066) till the days of Chaucer the literature of England consisted almost entirely of translations or imitations of Norman chronicles and romances. It was French in style, idiom, and material.

Though an Anglo-Saxon literature, of considerable power, talent, and value, had previously been current, it shortly thereafter declined in favour and influence, and sunk, though it did not perish, under the rivalry of the imported and enforced civilization and culture of the Normano-Franks. The haughty aristocracy of conquest could not employ the language of the servile throng, and insisted on the general use of the Norman tongue by the vanquished. The steady undercurrents of common daily life, however, gave the Anglo-Saxons sufficient opportunity for keeping in living usage the speech of their forefathers. Ceasing, by the gradual force of circumstances, to be embodied in writing, or employed in popular public converse, the strict grammatical forms of inflection and syntax were neglected, or forgotten: language became simpler and looser in texture by becoming wholly oral. In this stage of transition it is now called semi-Saxon. For a time, the exotic tongue appeared likely to get acclimatized; and great care was taken to aid its dissemination and growth. Children were taught in French, that they might know French, and that, by this early training, their vernacular might be supplanted, not only in favour, but in use. Though this was done, we have it on the authority of Robert of Gloucester (about 1272)—

"Ac lowe men holdeth to Englyss and to their kin speech;"
yet Robert of Bourne (about 1330) writes his chronicle

"For tho[se] that in this land wonn (dwell)
That ne[ither] Latin ne[r] Frankys conn (know)."

This persistent and almost revoltful adherence to the vernacular was carried further by "John Cornwaile, a Maister of Gramer," who, about three years after the publication of Chaucer's "Court of Love," began to teach children to construe their Latin into English, instead of (as had been the wont), into French. His example was quickly followed by others, and became all but universal.

As a general summary of the facts of history, it may be affirmed that [1st] from the Conquest till the demise of Stephen (1154), the French language was forcefully maintained as that of the court, the law, and the ordinary intercourse of the conquerors with their vassals; [2nd] from the accession of Henry II., till the close of the long reign of Henry III. (1272), the native Anglo-Saxon existed in revolt against, and in spite of, the Norman influence used for its suppression; and [3rd] during the reigns of the three Edwards (1272—1377), the "Dame's tongue" of England regained its olden power. The French became thereafter only a graff into, not the root-stock of the speech of Englishmen.

Various political events conduced to this end, and acted as auxiliaries to the sturdy persistence of Saxondom, in the employment and retention of the national language. The wars of the kings made the people's attachment to their persons and plans necessary; and hence leniency was extended to the silent and boastless infringement of such laws as did not essentially inhere in the feudal system. The growth of trade increased the power of the Commons, and the need of their wealth led to many concessions of the (so-called) prerogatives of sovereignty. The contests which arose between England and France occasioned a feeling of enmity for everything French, which materially influenced both nobles and people, and quickened where it did not originate the sentiment of nationality in all classes. In these and other ways, the Normano-Frankish language lost dominion, and a free field was left for the careful culture of the native language of England.

Chaucer was a far-seeing, forethoughtful man, who kept his eye well fixed upon causes, and was quick and sure at tracing their effects. His contemporary, Gower, in the uncertainties of the time, gave hostages to fame, and made appeal to posterity in the three prevalent languages of the period, viz.—of the church and learning, Latin; of the court and fashion, French; of the people and progress, English;—but Chaucer had no such hesitancy. Though skilled in the learned tongues, he placed himself unreservedly at the head of the minstrels of his native land, with his earliest poem, and he continued to aim at and to seek popularity and influence throughout the years of a long life by the production of distinctively English

"Bokes, songis, and dities;"

by giving the colloquial forms of his own land's language permanency, consistency, and literary existence; by applying the conserving magic of genius to the speech of the people, and by saturating and colouring the words of the common vocabulary of his time with the imperishable hues of thought, sympathy, life. Thus he became the ancestor of that long line of descendants who have planted "the seeds and pregnant forms" of thought "that make the life of souls" in the fields of English literature, and cause them to be fertile with "a life beyond life."

Not long after that defeat which Edward III. endured in France, the hostility of England took the form of an Act of Parliament (1362), for the discontinuance of the use of the French language in the pleadings and impleadings of the courts of law. There can be little doubt that Chaucer—if not as a courtier, at least as a poet, who had proven the scope, sufficiency, and capability of English for the utterance of the whole spirit of life—had considerable influence in effecting this enactment of that recently-instituted but essentially English body—the House of Commons.

English was no more to be the *patois* of serfs, but the speech of free-men. Conquerors and conquered had now grown into one people. The indomitably sturdy Saxon had risen from the crush and pressure of foreign domination, and took with him, into the spheres of his activity everywhere, that rude mother-tongue, inflexible, and rudely welded together as it was, in his ascent. The fine, quickening impulses of patriotism, the flushing animation of martial enthusiasm, the prophetic, far-forecast shadows of a Reformation, the pomp of chivalry, the grandeur of a mighty court, the intense activities of commerce, the thronging might of a fresh and active lifehood, played in and upon the poet's heart with their mystic influences, and stirred its depths of affectionate thoughtfulness to effort and success.

Chaucer, in an era of unshapen and formless speech, rung out the great thoughts of his intellect in brave, bold, homely, hearty, vivid, vigorous words,—

“And as much as then
The English language could express for men,
He made it do,”—

by following his own common-sense maxim, “Let us show our fantasyes in such wordes as we learneden of our dames tongue.”

Chaucer's practice “jumped” at once with the policy of the king, and the wishes of the people. He did not sculpture into statesqueness from a single material—Parian or Pentelic marble, like the Greek of Homer—but fused into one composite mass the courtier's French, the scholar's Latin, and the people's Saxon, and cast them into grace, beauty, *vraisemblance*, form, and life-like reality, in the moulds of his ingeniously conceptive mind. If the result is not pellucid and unstainedly white and flawless, the gray lines and the spotty graining of the amalgam only serve to heighten our ideas of the power and genius which wrought together into such proportionate harmoniousness elements so seemingly diverse and infinite. In his hands English ceased to be a dialect, and became a speech. It was fitting and right, then, that a mandate should go forth from Britain's highest legislative councils that the laws of England should cease to be appealed to or enforced in an alien tongue, which had “become much unknown in the realm.” We can almost fancy the great delight with which he,

“Who first enriched our English with his rhymes,”

would listen to the compliments of Petrarch upon this point of comparison between Dante, "the great poet of Itaille," and himself, viz.,—his being the creator of the literary language of his country.

It is only fair to believe that the talent and genius displayed by the client of the Duke of Lancaster were somewhat recognised and valued both by Sovereign and people, and that they operated as prevailing circumstances, in addition to his excellent business habits and ability, in his court appointments; and indeed we shall soon show reason for receiving this supposition as highly probable, if not actually proven. But we must, at present, continue our narrative.

Chaucer's Genoese mission must have been managed to the king's satisfaction, for almost immediately after his return, he received a grant—23rd April, 1374—from his regal employer, of a pitcher of wine (about a gallon) daily; and in June of the same year he was appointed, by royal patent, comptroller of the customs on wool, hides, &c., in the port of London. And that it might be expressly seen that this was not a "job" invented to provide a sinecure office for a needy, greedy hanger-on of courts, but a *bona fide* transaction, acknowledging and requiring business integrity, punctuality, and capacities, it is ordained "That the said Geoffrey Chaucer write *with his own hand* his rolls touching the said office, and continually reside there, and do and execute all things pertaining to the said office, in his own proper person, and not by his substitute." Here we find it *implied* that there was some known quality in Chaucer which rendered this injunction needful,—not for his discouragement, but for the maintenance of honest conduct in the public service. This very prohibition is an attestation of the Court's knowledge of Chaucer's literary labours, and the popularity of his writings. In 1375, Edward III. conferred on him the wardenship of the heir of Sir Edmond Staplegate, with a salary (£104) equivalent to £1,872 *per annum*. The Duke of Lancaster endowed him with an annuity of (£10) £180; and in 1376, he got a grant of forfeited wool to the amount of £1,262 of the present currency (£71 4s. 6d.). Of his "manner of life" at this period we get the following autobiographic glimpse from the "Book of Fame" (which dates about this time), Book II., in which the living golden eagle says:—

"Thou wilt make
O' nights fall oft thine head to acke;
In thy study so thou y-writest
* * *

That no tidings comen to thee,
Not of thy very neighbores
That dwellen almost at thy doors.
* * *

For when thy labour all done is,
And t' hast made all thy reckonings,

Instead of rest and of new things,
 Then goest home to thine house anon,
 And all so dumb as any stone,
 Thou sittest at another book,
 Till fully dazed is thy look."⁴

Chaucer and Froissart were fellow yeomen of the court prior to 1368, when the latter quitted England. From the French poet and chroniclist, the author of "The Flower and the Leaf" *may* have received the ground-thought of that poem in a description of the floral games instituted in 1324 by Clementina Isaure, Countess of Toulouse. Chaucer, at any rate, alludes to a song of that quaint, garrulous old fellow's, in that poem, which was probably written about this time of learned and leisurely competence, when daily duty only gave zest to creative fancy. It is possible, however, that Chaucer, in his continental embassages, may have been not merely a spectator of, but a sharer in, these affected and at that time fashionable sports.

The diplomatic services of Chaucer were twice called into requisition in the early part of 1377, on secret affairs for his Majesty. We have it, on the authority of Froissart, that one of these missions—for which letters of protection were granted—was the negotiation of a treaty of marriage between Richard, Prince of Wales, and Mary, daughter of Charles V., King of France (1364—1380). The persons employed in this important embassy were Sir Guichard D'Angle, afterwards Earl of Huntingdon, Sir Richard Sturry, and Geoffrey Chaucer. The former were evidently the show ambassadors, and the untitled gentleman was as plainly the worker—the managing partner of the firm. During these absences, he appointed his fellow-poet, Gower, and one Richard Forrester, his legal representatives in matters of business.

In this same year (1377), Edward III. died at Richmond, June 21st, and Richard II., his grandchild, son of the Black Prince, who had died in the preceding year, "reigned in his stead," though only in his eleventh year. A council of nine was appointed to manage the affairs of the nation, but his uncles, the Dukes of Lancaster, York, and Gloucester, had the real direction of affairs in their hands. It is scarcely to be wondered at, therefore, that Chaucer's annuities and offices were confirmed to him by the new sovereign, and

* To this extract may be added the following, from the prologue to "The Legende of Gode Women," viz.:—

"On bookes for to read I me delight,
 And to them give I faith and full credence;
 And in mine heart have them in reverence
 So heartily, that there is game none,
 That from my bookes maketh me to gone."

In the "Dutchesse," he says that reading is—

"Better play
 Than either at chess or tubbes."

that his services were again employed as a diplomatist in Lombardy, in 1378. How long he was absent, we cannot learn; but we do know that, during the three following years, England was in a strange religious and political ferment. By Wycliffe's advice, the Commons had refused to pay the papal toll called "Peter's pence." Five bulls had been fulminated against the reformer; and he had successfully resisted, by aid of Lancaster, Percy, and the Earl Marischal, one attempt to subdue him, at an episcopal tribunal. Another attempt at coercive jurisdiction was quashed by the queen mother, in 1378. In 1379, he was stricken by paralysis, but he continued to toil on in the good work, and in 1381, published twelve theses against the doctrines of the Church of Rome. Chaucer's patron, Lancaster, was Wycliffe's chief protector, and there can be no doubt that the poet ardently sympathized with the reformer.* We know that he used his brilliantest weapon, ridicule, against the errors of the church and its officials; and his noblest verses have been given to the description of a "Poore Parson†—of which there was then only one illustrious living exemplar—Wycliffe himself," although the "poore priests," whose views accorded with his, were even then well and numerous scattered through the country.

In the same year, 1381, the Saxons thought the time to "strike for freedom" had arrived, and under the leadership of Wat Tyler, John Ball, and Jack Straw, an agitation for the abolition of serfdom and villenage, of imposts and tolls obstructive to commerce, and for the maintenance of the power of taxation among the Commons, was begun. Unfortunately, the mob was turbulent, and the leaders were incapable of organizing the insurgents effectually, or of restraining their excesses, so that the movement, justifiable in itself, was suppressed. It did, however, procure some ameliorations, and it indicated the power and energy of the peasant population.

It is quite possible that Chaucer, as Comptroller of the Customs, and therefore personally, as well as officially, interested in the matter, may have been present at the conference in which the treacherous and lean-witted Walworth, with the argument of a sword's point, answered the complaints of Tyler, and left the mob

* Of this point the following may be regarded as the chief proofs, viz.:—1st. The general anti-papal tendency and tone of Chaucer's poems. 2nd. The story of his flogging a Franciscan friar in Fleet Street. 3rd. The keen Wycliffism of his patron. 4th. Cardinal Wolsey (1471-1530) interdicted the publication of "The Pilgrim's Tale," and objected to "The Ploughman's Tale." 5th. Fox, the martyrologist (1517-1587), says, "I marvel to consider this—how that the bishops, condemning and abolishing all manner of English books and treatises which might bring the people to any light of knowledge, did yet authorize the works of Chaucer to remain. So it pleased God to blind then the eyes of them for the more commodity of the people." 6th. The prevalence of the opinion that the monks foisted a retraction of his "Enditings of Wordly Vanities" into the concluding paragraphs of "The Canterbury Tales."

† To this portrait, Dryden, Cowper, Crabbe, &c., have each been indebted.

leaderless, until the young king, emitting one spark of fellow-feeling, exclaimed, "Tyler was a traitor!—I myself will be your leader!"—a noble sentiment, which was ignominiously evaded.

"Old John of Gaunt, time-honoured Lancaster," had married, in 1372, Constance, eldest daughter of Peter the Cruel, King of Castile and Leon, and had led an army into Spain, to assert his right, through his wife, to the sovereignty of Castile; during his absence a strong contest had arisen between the court party and the commissioners of regency; and wary steps were required to keep free from danger and loss. Chaucer seems to have tried policy, but did not succeed in passing through the ordeal scathelessly.

Richard II. had married, 1382, the daughter of the Emperor Charles IV., Anne of Bohemia. She, it has been conjectured, is complimented in the character of Alceste, the Queen of Love, the emblem of truth of womanhood, in "The Legend of Gode Women;" and it has hence been inferred that this poem was written at the suggestion of her Majesty; and in the Prologue the poet is commanded to present his composition to the Queen "at Eltham or at Shene." At any rate, we know that, four months after the royal marriage, Chaucer was made comptroller of the minor customs of London, in addition to his former offices, and with the further privilege of performing his duties by deputy. He appointed a permanent substitute in 1383.

Thus high went the flow of the tide; the ebb began at last, however. In 1384 two candidates for the mayoralty of London were proposed, one by the officials of the court, headed by De la Pole and De Vere, another by the popular or Lancasterian party. This was the time (according to Andrew of Wyntoun)

"When of Lancastre the duke
Refute intil Scotland take,"

to escape a conspiracy that threatened his life. John of Northampton was a Wycliffite, a man of integrity and ability, and under the patronage of the duke. Chaucer took his patron's side, and Lancaster's enemies included all his supporters in their list of malcontents. By the use of a military force, and after a city riot, Sir Nicholas Brember, the court candidate, was elected, and Northampton was imprisoned, tried, and (in August, 1384) sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. Chaucer fled first to Hainault, then to Zealand, taking his wife and children with him. Here "beraſte out of dignite of office," in which he "made a gathering of worldly good," he spent some time in difficulties, and "with dangers compassed round." On his return, he was for a short time exposed to persecution; and he complains, "For richesse have I povertie; for dignitie now am I enprisoned; instede of power, wretchednesse I ſuffre; and for glory of renown, I am now despised and foullie hated." In his durance he wrote that imitation of Boethius, entitled, "The Testament of Love."

His humiliation, however, did not last long, for in 1386 the men

of Kent chose him as their representative in parliament, and as a knight of that shire he sat in Westminster. In 1387 he lost his wife, perhaps outworn with the privations, the pinching pain of poverty, these years of woe necessitated; and in 1388 he was obliged to sell his annuities to one John Sealby. Gaunt returned to England in 1389, and at his instance Northampton was released, and Chaucer was repensioned, besides being appointed Clerk of the Works at Westminster, Windsor, &c., in which office he materially furthered the interests of architecture. In 1394 John of Lancaster honours or favours him with a pension, and he is still in receipt of his salary as one of the king's esquires, but of other offices he seems to have been deprived. About this period, however, he is believed to have been again settled in poetic retirement near Woodstock, the place of his manhood's early happiness, his dreams, ambitions, and endeavours. This is rendered all the more probable by the fact that his "Astrolabie," written for the education in astronomy of his favourite son, "litel Lowys," is compounded for the latitude of Oxford, and was therefore most probably written in the neighbourhood of that ancient seat of learning. The composition of this work for the special purpose assigned seems to indicate the possession of learned leisure and homely competence, as well as fatherly interest, and the exercise of so many of the sweet domesticities of life as were possible to the widowed and work-worn poet. He is at this time again made a pensioner of the king to the amount of £20, equal to £360 of our present currency—enough, in addition to other revenues, for comfort, if not for competency. This pleasing outgrowth of parental fondness, written in "lithe English," does not profess to be original. Its author says, "I ne assure ne to have founden this werke of my labour or of mine engin. I am but a lewde compilatour of the laboure of olde astrologiens, and have it translated into mine English onely for thy doctrine, and with this swerde shall I slay envie." It proves, however, that he "was well grounded in astronomie." There are some kindly, fatherly phrases in the dedication which delight us much; *e. g.*, "I perceive by certain evidences thyne abylyte to lerne scyences touching numbers and proportions, and also well consider thy beaye prayer in especyall to lerne the trefte of the astrolabye." He writes it in English, "for Latine ne canst thou not yet but small, my litel sonne." He prays "every person descrete that redeth or heareth this litel trefte, to have my rude entending excused, and my superfluite of wordes, for two causes. The first cause is for that curious endyting and harde sentences is full hevy at once for such a child to lerne. And the second cause is this, that soothely me seemeth better to written unto a child twice a good sentence, than he forget it once." These thoughts, this delicate considerateness, throb out of a fine fatherliness of heart, and from a clear, well-furnished understanding. Sixty-three years of busy life had not cooled his sympathy with boyhood, and even the pet little prodigy which his wife had left him as a legacy of love is

sensibly though kindly dealt with. There was sunshine in the old man's soul.

We do not know that it has been before remarked that the works of Chaucer, prior to the issue of "The Testament of Love," are courtly, *debonnaire*, fretted with fantastic fancies relative to chivalric customs, and generally, in spirit, style, portraiture, taste, and machinery, refer to and embody the graces, habits, and finicalities of life among the upper grades of society; but now, when leisure lay before him to make his grand adventure for fame, he turned himself from the circles of vague punctilio, *bienstanced*, and noble gentility, to the whole breadth of life as it was in his age, and then, in—

"Legends blithe
He sang of love or knighthood, or the wiles
Of homely life, through each estate and age
The fashions and the follies of the world
With cunning hand pourtraying"—

with all the spirit, zest, humour, facile changefulness, and descriptive skill in picturing the motleyneess of custom and costume which then prevailed, of one who "in the original perused mankind."

From Gower's mention of Chaucer's work, "The Testament of Love," in the "Confessio Amantis," published in 1393, and his speaking of him as being "in his dayes olde," it has been generally inferred that "The Canterbury Tales" were commenced about this date, and were not included in those "dytyes and songes" of his with which, at this time, Gower says—

"The land fulfilled is over all."

This, we believe, is a rather hasty conjecture, not supported by fact, and scarcely supportable by inference. For instance, in "The Legend of Good Women" (1382), we find it asserted that—

"He made the boke that highte 'the House of Fame,'
Eke 'the Deathe of Blanche, the Duchesse,'
And 'the Parliament of Foules,' as I gness,
And all 'the Love of Palamon and Arcite,'
Of Thebes, though the story is knowen lite,
And many an hymne."

Now, "Palamon and Arcite," the Iliad of English literature (the original of which seems to have been derived both from Statius and Boccaccio), is the topic of "The Knight's Tale," the first of the series; it occupies no fewer than 2,239 lines, and we have no other work of Chaucer's in which it appears. It seems far more natural, therefore, to suppose that the plan had been gradually built up in his mind from the suggestion afforded by Boccaccio's "Decameron" (1350), and that he interlaced in the grand web of his thoughts many of those precious threads of narrative which had been circulating for years among his friends and fellows of the court. That, however, the series had not attained its present form,

nor been wrought into consecutive homogeneity prior to 1393, is perhaps true; for in "The Man of Law's Tale," after giving an *index rerum* of his "Legend," he takes up the story "Of thilke wicke ensample of Canace" from the work of Gower, of which we have spoken. On this supposition we have only to regard the prologue and the interjacularive jokes and conversations which so dramatically occupy the spaces between the tales as necessarily new, though we may acknowledge it as highly probable that, prompted by the exigencies of the plot, he may have added many touches to the old poems, and added several fresh, though winter-flowered, products of constructive fancy to the garland he was engaged in arranging. This inference seems to be borne out by the fact, that the prologue is the most finished, most delicately and characteristically managed, the broadest in outline, freest in pencilling, and most minute in delineativeness of the whole poem, and that the keeping of the several members of the singular and varied pilgrimage are Shakesperian in distinctness of characterization and sustained representativeness. It is too much to suppose that such vastness of design and variety of executive skill, as well as voluminousness of invention, could have been crowded into the seven closing years of the venerable bard whose life and mind had been so active in youth and manhood, and who bore the lines of nearly half a century of authorship carved into his broad and thoughtful brow. We incline to believe, then, that with an author's cherishing love for the offspring of his thoughts, he gathered together all the "storial thing" of his bygone and unarranged authorship into one liberal offertory for posterity. The prologue is immeasurably superior in taste, humour, interest, probability, feeling, and *vraisemblance* to that of the prototype poem, "The Decameron:" the plot is better sustained throughout; there is greater congruity between the narrations and the narrators; the colouring and types of life are more varied; the classes, company, and individuals are better specialized; and the whole plan is more happily and more artistically conceived. The mere general form is copied, but the characters, scenery, management, interest, sentiment, style, dramatic adaptiveness, pictoriality, and satiric *bonhomie* are all original; the glow of personality, life, sociality, station, and spirit—in one word, *Englishness*—is upon them all, and the

" Nine and twenty in a compaignie
Of sondrie folk by aventure y fall
In fellowship,"

in the Tabard, at Southwark, are brought before the vision in the palpable and unsophisticated distinctness and reality of health, and strength, and truth, and are presented in—

" A spirit of life so gay,
That still they live and breathe in fancy's view,
Fresh beings fraught with Time's imperishable hue."

No exhaustive criticism of Chaucer's intensely picturesque and

vividly individualized poems can be undertaken in a mere interpretative life-sketch such as this, in which it is chiefly intended to indicate or suggest the special characteristic which the man displayed in his age, and the peculiar influence he brought into such forceful activity, as to have affected his own era, and to have impressed the future with it. This chief, guiding, and, as it were, key-aim of Chaucer's life we find and signalize in his definite and persistent culture of the English tongue, a mark which differentiates him completely from any contemporary, and which makes him worthy of a place among those who have initiated and confirmed specific changes in the mode and fashion, the form and pressure, of the life of their age or nation. If through him the English language, as Leigh Hunt beautifully expresses it, "burst into luxuriance like a sudden month of May," and attained its June in Spenser and Shakespeare, Taylor and Barrow,—and those men

"Must be free or die who speak the tongue
That Shakespeare spake,"—

how great must be our debt to the first mighty master-spirit, who poured the vast life of his soul into this English tongue with such sincerity, continuousness, straightforwardness, beautiful transparency, plenteous volubility, earnest thought, and copious versatility of inventiveness! It was right that the crowning work of his active life should be one in which the capacities of the language should be tested to the utmost by the width, scope, variousness, and multiplicity of the matters brought into the harmonies of verse, and so be proven to be wanting in nought that pertained to the genuine life of his nation. The flux and uncertainty, the fitful literary usage of our speech was at once terminated by its being shown that profound learning, chivalric fantasy, true womanliness, perfect gentility, civic needs, and homely wants, could all find expression in a national language formed, like the people who spoke it, out of the prime materials that all other nationalities could furnish, worked, kneaded, vitalized by something more than even Promethean heat—the breath of the soul of genius.

Through the changeful vicissitudes of a changeful time Chaucer held consistently to the political and religious views of his mature manhood, and kept faith with his earliest patron, John of Gaunt. During a number of years this nobleman had held the affections of Chaucer's sister-in-law, the widow of Sir Hugh de Swineford—who had been governess to the daughters of the Duchess Blanche—in thrall. That he really loved her, though unlawfully for some time, for she had borne him three sons and a daughter, was shown by his taking her to wife in January, 1396; by acknowledging her children; and by his securing their legitimization by act of parliament in the following year: at which period Lancaster had recovered his influence both with king and people. Chaucer was thus more closely allied to the Lancastrian party, and was more likely to have such influence as it possessed for the advancement of the

interest of himself and his children. In accordance with these natural inferences, we find several antiquaries recording a tradition that he resided in Donnington Castle, Berkshire, during the latter few years of his life; and Mr. Grose, on the authority of a MS. in the Cotton Library, asserts that he was the purchaser. Perhaps the expense of this "romance in stone and lime" hampered his means, or excited the envious hatred of his enemies—persons whom successful merit seldom want. At any rate, we find that in 1398 he received a grant of the king's protection from arrest and prosecution for two years, as one engaged on urgent business for his Majesty. In 1399, too, he got a grant of a pipe of wine annually "in the port of London, from the king's chief butler or his deputy." Thomas Chaucer, the poet's eldest son, was at this time chief butler to the king. On 3rd February, 1399, John of Gaunt died, and Richard II. appropriated his estates. Henry Bolingbroke, the young duke, then in exile, determined to resist the confiscation, and during the absence of the king in Ireland landed at Ravenspur, in Yorkshire. He seized Richard on his return, carried him captive to London, and extorted an abdication on a charge of misgovernment and breach of constitutional right. On Richard's deposition, September 29th, 1399, he claimed to be (and was) crowned, October 13th. One of the earliest acts of the young king was to confirm the grants of annuity and of wine to our poet, and to add (as a solatium for the losses sustained by Lancaster's death?) an additional annuity of forty marks. On 24th December, 1399, Chaucer took a long lease of a house in Westminster, in the garden of the old convent, on which the chapel of Henry VII. is now built, from the Abbot, named Robert Humodesworth, and there he appears to have resided till his death, October 15th, 1400.

If we believe what Shakespeare makes Chaucer's patron say, that—

"The tongues of dying men

Enforce attention like deep harmony:

Where words are scarce, they're seldom spent in vain;

For they breathe truth that breathe their words in pain.

He that no more must say, is listened to more

Than they whom youth and ease have taught to glose.

More are men's ends marked than their lives before."

How much ought we to value the "Gode Council of Chaucer," written on his death-bed, when that solemn hour had come, in which resignation and composure are most required, and the light of heaven enters the soul through the chinks disease has made! These are the sober, sensible, impressive, but not sombre, thoughts which he left as a parting legacy to his posterity, to us, and ours:—

"Fly from the press, and dwell with soothfastness,

Suffice unto thy good though it be small;

For hoard hath hate, and climbing tickleness,

Press hath envy, and weal is blent o'er all;

Savour no more than thee behoven shall;
 Rede well thyself, that other folk canst rede,
 And Truth thee shall deliver 'tis no drede.
 Pain thee not each crooked to redress
 In trust of her that turneth as a ball;
 Great rest standeth in little business:
 Beware also to spurn against a nalle:
 Strive not as doth a crooké with a wall;
 Deem thou thyself that deemest other's deed,
 And Truth thee shall deliver 'tis no drede.
 That thee is sent receive in baxomness;
 The wrestling of this world asketh a fall;
 Here is no home, here is but wilderness;
 Forth, pilgrim, forth, O beast out of thy stall;
 Look up on high, and thank thy God for all;
 Waive thou thy lust, and let thy ghost thee lead,
 And Truth thee shall deliver 'tis no drede."

He was the first of the "sovereigns of intellect" who tenanted in death the south transept of Westminster Abbey, since fittingly named Poets' Corner. Caxton, the earliest English printer, erected a monument over the resting-place of the first English poet, to

"Protect his memory, and preserve his story."

His son, Thomas Chaucer, held many honourable offices, and was highly successful as a diplomatist; his daughter, Elizabeth, became a nun in the Priory of St. Helen's, London; but of the fondling, "lil' Lowys," we have no history. It is to be feared he was too precocious, and faded early, and that his virtue, worth, and sweetness were not long held back, after his father's death, from the dull grave that hushes all,—“the fairest oft the fleetest.”

Life's mutations, great and many though they were—student, lawyer, courtier, soldier, prisoner, ambassador, financier, exile, the friend of princes and kings, the companion of the noble, the patriot, and reformer, but above and excelling all, the poet—came to an end. A fadeless glory is round his memory, and his words, like the soul they issued from, are immortal. Imagination, humour, satire, sagacious observativeness, the very ethereal essence of sociality and song, were in him. The freshness of a May morning is over all his works. They are prolific

"Of more proverbs

Than in this world there growen grass or herbs."

The learning in them is deep, wide, and masterly. They are quaint, *naïve*, and (if rightly read) musical. They are full of the thought-life of a true man and Englishman, and they are the "heirs of the invention" of the father of the language of "nobleness and chivalrie"—the strongest, richest, most elegant and valuable of the languages of men.

S. N.

Religion.

IS THE BIBLE ALONE A SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III,

IN reviewing the previous part of this debate, I find that the arguments of H. B. have not been replied to; that those of "Pope Gregory" have been, to a great extent, ably answered by "Clement," who has likewise greatly extended the defences around this bulwark of Protestantism; and that "Ignatius," taking up the cause of "Gregory," endeavours to clinch the nail of the latter, without giving a single glance at the article of H. B. It will be my endeavour to review a little further the arguments of "Gregory;" and, as far as time and space will permit, the paper of "Ignatius."

I fully agree with "Gregory," that "everything which is believed by either must be ultimately referred to the authority upon which it is believed." Hence the Roman Catholic must refer to his Church, and the Protestant to his Bible. Now the authority of the latter is as free and open to our opponents as it is to ourselves; it can also be consulted at all times. But this cannot be said of theirs, since they cannot tell *what* constitutes their authority, nor *where* it is to be found. All Roman Catholics acknowledge the infallibility of their Church; but when questioned as to *where* this infallibility resides, whether in the people, in the Pope, or in councils, they are utterly disunited. It is not in the people, because the government of the Church is monarchical; the Jesuits, and almost all the Italian Roman Catholics, acknowledge the Pope alone to be infallible; while the French Roman Catholics generally deny it.* But, as a sort of compromise, others say that the Pope and a general council agreeing are together infallible; and to get out of the difficulty of there being no general council now at Rome agreeing with the Pope, it is said that though there is no council in their persons, yet there is in their writings; and the Pope, agreeing with these, is infallible. Hence our opponents are driven to the necessity of appealing to the writings of men to decide whether the Pope be infallible or not. It appears, also, that the Pope without a council, or these writings, would be fallible; and the council, or the writings, without the Pope, would likewise be fallible; but the moment the Pope and council agree, they become infallible; and

* Bellarmine, "De Pontifice," l. 4, c. 2.

the moment a Pope agrees with these writings, *he* becomes infallible. Now, since the writings cannot alter, it must be the Pope on whom this wonderful change is effected. So that it is the writings of men that make the Pope infallible; and they are really the true judge of controversies, although the Roman Catholic doctors generally acknowledge that no writings can be so. Costerus calls the Scriptures, in contempt, "paper and parchment." His words are these, "God would not have his Church now depend upon paper and parchment, as Moses made the carnal Israelites."* Surely the writings of those "who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," ought to claim the pre-eminence over all writings concerning the salvation of man. However, until our opponents show us *what* constitutes their authority, and *where* it is at all times to be found, my conviction will remain, that the "Bible alone is a sufficient Rule of Faith."

The proposition, that "the Bible was never intended to be the only Rule of Faith," is not proved by the statements of "Gregory." I deny the position he *assumes* by saying, "Had it been so, we should have had some record of the fact in the book itself." We well know that quacks and impostors are bold in affirming the infallibility of their nostrums; and had such a statement been made in plain language, men generally would have justly suspected the writers of quackery and deception. But, though the absolute necessity of such a record does not exist, yet there are statements which tend to show that the inspired *written* Word should be the only standard of appeal to decide matters relating to man's salvation. I need not stay to enumerate them, as they are fairly exhibited in the articles of H. B. and "Clement." But the fact of our Redeemer always appealing to the *written* Word, and condemning the traditions of the Jews; and that the apostles invariably followed his example, appealing to the Scriptures to decide all disputed points; at the first council deciding according to *what was written*,—"And to this agree the words of the prophets, *as it is written*," Acts xv. 15;—is enough, to unprejudiced minds, to settle once and for ever this disputed point. It would have been well for Christianity if all the other councils had acted in a similar way, and decided according to *the written Word of God!*

Our friend "Gregory" says that had the apostles believed that the Bible was to be a sufficient Rule of Faith, "they would have addressed epistles containing such clear summaries of Christian doctrine, *that no schism could possibly have occurred*. That is to say, these epistles would have been such infallible guides in all matters relating to the salvation of mankind, that it would have been impossible for men to have erred concerning them. Now, according to "Gregory," what these epistles *would have been*, the Church of Rome *claims to be*. Let us judge her, therefore, by "Gregory's" rule. Has she prevented heresies and schisms? Whence arose the Arian heresy and schism? Did she prevent the

* "Enchiridon," c. 1.

schism in the midst of her own bosom in the fourteenth century, and which lasted upwards of one hundred years, when one Pope set up against another Pope, each one pretending to be the true Pope, and disannulling all the acts of the other; and the people divided, some cleaving to one, and some to the other? Either the Romish Church is not infallible, or "Gregory's" assertion is false, and proves nothing against the Bible alone being the Rule of Faith.

It is somewhat singular that the passages of Scripture, brought forward by Roman Catholics to support the dogmas rejected by Protestants as unscriptural, are either irrelevant, or they prove too much for them. The passages adduced by "Gregory" have been answered in a general way by "Clement:" but I will examine one more particularly, as a sample of the rest. "Gregory" observes, "Matt. xviii. 17, He does not say, 'He that will not *read the Scripture*,' but 'He that will not *hear the Church*, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican.'" Now if the passage, of which the above is only a small part, be relevant to the subject, it proves that every Christian has a right of private judgment, and a *right to be heard*, as well as the Church. The entire passage is this, "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him of his fault between thee and him *alone*: if he shall *hear thee*, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not *hear thee*, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to *hear them*, tell it *unto the church*: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." The passage does not relate to matters of doctrine, but of discipline; and as the Romish Church does not claim infallibility except in matters of doctrine, it cannot relate to our present subject. But, such as it is, I will give "Gregory" the full benefit of it, seeing that each private member has a right to be *heard*, before the Church has a claim to be heard in the matter.

The following assertions of our friend "Gregory" claim a little attention. He says of the early Christians, "*All their instructions were by word of mouth.*" And again, "A single fact, worth hundreds of arguments, may be mentioned. The whole of the then known world was converted during the first four hundred years *entirely without the Bible.*" And further on, "We have no evidence, nor have we any right to assume, that any portion of the Bible was, during that period, translated into any language, to facilitate the spread of Christianity." That the above assertions are not supported by historical facts, I need only refer to the testimonies of the ancient Fathers adduced by H. B., pp. 13, 14, and to those of "Clement," pp. 92, 93. The following quotation from a modern author, on this point, will be useful. Speaking of the primitive Christians, he says, "The Bible was the book which they prized above all other learning, and which they never wearied in reading, or hearing read; philosophers, abandoning the language and speculations of the schools, as only 'darkness visible, gave

their days and nights to inquire after the wisdom from above; men of taste and literature found Homer and Virgil, Demosthenes and Cicero, jejune, insipid, and unedifying, in comparison with the Psalms of David, and the Epistles of Paul; and the whole society of Christians laboured and delighted in exploring the mine of Scripture, where they found that the deeper they dug, the richer was the ore, and the higher the reward.* I shall leave the reader to judge of the veracity of the assertions of "Gregory," by simply stating, in addition, the fact, that Origen, who was born A.D. 185, published the *Hexapla*, that is, the Bible, in *six* different languages, and to which St. Jerome was probably indebted when he revised the many Latin translations, and formed the original of what is now called the Vulgate.

The puerile remarks of "Gregory," when trying to show that "Protestants do not adhere to the Bible as their only rule," have been well answered by "Clement:" but to his answer I would add that the Bible, though it is the sole judge of controversies among all Protestants, and the rule by which we examine all that our ministers say, yet it does not profess, nor do we profess for it, to make all men see and think alike on every subject relating to Christianity. If true religion required uniformity of opinion on everything connected with it, in order to salvation, how would our Roman Catholic friends fare in the matter? Do they, under the "motherly" care of their "infallible" guide, always see and think alike on all subjects? Certainly not. The puissant Emperor, Charles the Fifth, could not make his subjects do so, though under the especial protection of the "infallible" church, any more than he could make all the clocks he manufactured keep the same time. If it be true that the Bible is not a sufficient Rule of Faith, because all men do not think alike on every subject taught therein, it is equally true that the Romish Church is not an infallible guide, because all men do not think alike on everything she teaches. I have proved this to be the case respecting the fundamental doctrine now under debate; but is it not true that, in all controversies between men and men, the party who will not submit to any judgment but his own, is generally suspected to be wrong; while he, who is willing to refer to a third indifferent party, is generally presumed to have the best cause? Now, the Romish Church will not submit to any judgment but her own. She must determine whether she be a true church or not; whether she be pure or corrupt; or whether she be infallible or not. But Protestants do not make themselves and their church the only judge; but they willingly submit to be judged by the Scriptures, in the same way as the apostles submitted to be tried when at Berea, and for which they commended the Bereans. What I have just advanced will show that the remarks of "Gregory" respecting Protestants not

* "The Manners and Trials of the Primitive Christians. By the Rev. Robert Jamieson," p. 46. Second Edition, 1841.

adhering to the Bible as their only rule, will tell with equal weight against his own church; and that the Protestants are presumed to have the best cause, because they submit to be judged by the Scriptures, while the Romish Church declines all judgment but her own, which is against the common sense of all men.

I shall now briefly consider the paper of "Ignatius." He says: "It was proved in the first negative article that Protestants do not use the sacred volume as their exclusive Rule of Faith." If, like "Gregory," he believes that Protestants nullify their rule, because men do not think alike on everything taught therein, he *may* consider the above charge against us proved; but, at the same time, he *must admit*, from what has been said, that the Romish church cannot be infallible for the selfsame reasons; but if he maintains that a difference of opinion on some subjects is consistent with the infallibility of his church,—and this he must do, to maintain his ground—then the charge of "Gregory" *has NOT been proved*, because a difference of opinion on some subjects in the Bible is quite consistent with *its* sufficiency as *our* "only Rule of Faith." But we hold that we *do* use the sacred volume as our *exclusive* rule. This is, in fact, the honour of our religion, that we are allowed to examine all that our ministers teach by that rule; while the cause of the Roman Catholic Church *is such as dares not abide the trial*. I have thus swept away the foundation of "Ignatius," on which he has endeavoured to show that our "Rule of Faith is quite impracticable."

Before proceeding further, we must try to escape from a dilemma in which we are apparently placed by "Gregory" and "Ignatius." On page 16, "Gregory" says that had the Bible been intended as the only Rule of Faith, "we should have had some *record of the fact in the book itself*." On page 101, Ignatius says, "No proof of the inspiration of the New Testament can be drawn from the Old; and no proof can be drawn from the New Testament, *since it cannot give witness to itself*." Both these statements cannot be true. Yet, on page 104, "Ignatius" says, "They say that the Bible *alone* is a sufficient Rule of Faith. They know, therefore, what books are inspired, either from the Bible alone, or from some other unerring authority. If from the Bible alone, where is the list of inspired books given *in the Bible*? If from some other authority, do they not deny that the Bible only is a sufficient Rule of Faith? Let Protestants, if they can, escape from this dilemma." From this it will appear that "Ignatius" not only contradicts his friend "Gregory," but himself too, and that he does not seem to understand *what* constitutes a "Rule of Faith;" for he insinuates that if we derive our list of canonical and inspired books from any other source than the Bible itself, we "deny that the Bible only is a sufficient Rule of Faith;" and that if the Bible contained a list of its own inspired books, it would prove nothing, because "it cannot give witness to itself." Let "Ignatius," if he can, escape from the dilemma of inconsistency.

Again, "Ignatius" says that "nothing but a Divine authority, some revelation or communication from God, would be sufficient to guarantee this Divine fact of the inspiration of the Bible. *It is a fact not cognizable by human reason, which could only be known to God in the first instance, and to man only in case God should have communicated it to him, either directly, or through an infallible church.*" Of course the Romish Church claims this infallibility; and, consequently, she must have received this revelation from God. She is, therefore, able to determine the true meaning of the Scriptures; consequently she is "deeply guilty of uncharitableness, or envy, or cruelty to souls, that she doth not put forth a clear and infallible comment upon the whole of the Scripture, but still suffers the whole world to live in contention about the true meaning of hundreds of texts of Scripture." But I must here ask "Ignatius" *when* the Church of Rome received this revelation? and *where* a record of this fact is to be found? I find that the Popes Sixtus V. and Clement VIII. speak rather differently from "Ignatius." They appear to have adopted precisely similar means as other men do to ascertain what is Scripture, and its true meaning. Pope Sixtus V. tells us, in the preface to his translation of the Bible, that he "picked out of the cardinals, and almost out of all nations, a college of learned men, who advised him in the work." "They," says he, "consulted, and I chose that which was best." He adds, also, these remarkable words: "*It is most evident that there is no surer nor stronger argument than the comparing of ancient and approved copies.*" This translation he put forth "to be followed, without adding, or diminishing, or *altering*, under pain of excommunication." But about two years after, up came Clement VIII., who put forth another edition and translation of the Bible, differing from and contrary to that of Sixtus V., in about two thousand places. And, what is more remarkable, the preface to the last edition of Clement contains the following words:—"Receive, Christian reader, this old and vulgar edition of Scripture, corrected with all possible diligence, which, though in respect of human weakness, it be hard to affirm that it is every way complete, yet it is not to be doubted but it is more pure and corrected than all that hath gone before it." I think this is sufficient evidence to show how great an error it is to pretend that the Pope is an infallible interpreter of Scripture. Here we have exhibited one of these infallibles contradicting and upsetting another infallible; and instead of Divine infallibility being claimed by the Pope, we have a public acknowledgment of his imbecility. He cannot presume to affirm his work to be perfect, which it must have been, had he been infallibly guided in it by "some revelation or communication from God," which "Ignatius" says is necessary "to guarantee this Divine fact." Since, then, these Popes, being translators and editors of the Word of God, do not claim "infallible" guidance in doing their work, it must follow that either the Roman Catholic Church cannot be certain of possessing the Bible, or that a "reve-

lation or communication from God" is not necessary "to guarantee this Divine fact of the "inspiration of the Bible." I shall now leave "Ignatius" and his friends to choose which alternative they please. I regret that my time and space are exhausted, or I would examine other points touched upon in the article of "Ignatius."

THEOPHYLACT.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It has been already advanced in this debate that the Creator has given to man a rule both of faith and practice. I go a step farther, and assert that the Divine Rule of Faith must necessarily be both *clear* and *infallible*. A guide, which is not clear, cannot be safe; and if not infallible in its results, must be attended with danger.

In considering whether the Protestant Rule of Faith (*i. e.*, private interpretation of the Bible) possesses these characters, I shall not suppose any disputes to exist as to the fact of the Bible being the inspired Word of God. Disputes as to the number of canonical books will be alike disregarded.

Does the Bible require an interpreter? If so, it is not *clear*. If not, there is but one method of treating it, which is—to attach no other meaning to any passage but that which is conveyed by the literal expression of its words. If the Bible is intended to be a sufficient Rule of Faith, the latter mode is surely the most reasonable. But it is needless for me to quote a single passage, in order to prove that it is not intended to be understood altogether literally, because no one has ever ventured to adopt this view. It must, then, be acknowledged it needs an interpreter; and the question arises, Who or what this interpreter is to be? None can be relied on, save the same Holy Spirit who dictated the writing; hence it is only an *infallible* guide to those who are taught the meaning of its passages by the power of the Holy Ghost.

The Bible alone, then, is not a sufficient Rule of Faith, because, in addition to it, we must have an infallible interpreter, *viz.*—the Holy Spirit. This is beyond dispute; and therefore if a person, after reading any part of Holy Scripture, feels convinced he has interpreted rightly what he has read, this conviction must be accompanied with the belief that the Holy Ghost has directed his interpretation. But if *any single* individual were thus guided, his interpretation would be *infallible*, because it would be the interpretation of the Holy Spirit. If, on the other hand, the Almighty has left His written word to be interpreted by each one for himself, the words of our Lord to his apostles, "But when He, the Spirit of Truth is come, He will teach you all truth" (John xvi. 13), would have been unnecessary.

Now we know that the inspiration of the Prophets was the work of the Spirit of Truth. Supposing, therefore, His work was to be only what it had hitherto been, how could our Lord have described Him as one who was to come? Dare any of us neglect to obey

the command of God under the Mosaic dispensation, to keep the *seventh* day holy, if we did not believe the command abrogated by means of the Holy Ghost, although not found in the *written* word? If the Almighty has made no revelation of His will to man, except by means of the *written* word, then this command is set aside merely by *human* authority.

But there are those who say that all which is absolutely necessary to believe is clear enough to the human understanding; all which they consider necessary for salvation being the doctrine of the atonement. St. Peter declares that in St. Paul's epistles "are certain things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction:" from which it is quite clear that something besides a simple faith in the atonement is included in the doctrines of Christianity; and that unlearned persons, by putting their own constructions upon some passages, may be the means of their own destruction. This alone should make Protestants pause in their headlong course of interpreting Scripture so as to support a preconceived opinion, or to evade that sense which the Catholic Church, in all ages, has attached to it.

But how can it be said the doctrine of the atonement is clear? Even upon this point the greatest contention is raised; for one will argue that our Saviour died for all, while another will say He died for the elect only. Both can appeal to the Bible in support of their assertions, and both are of themselves equally fallible in their interpretation. If we do not believe in the existence of a living, infallible authority, we have no right to condemn the human judgment of either. But the Spirit of Truth, who inspired the writers of Holy Scripture, is unchangeable; and, therefore, one only of these constructions can be correct. Surely it must be on account of such differences as these that so many are, unhappily, content to take no notice whatever of many of the Divine commands, as if they were not absolutely imperative. "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved," is not a whit more plain and distinct than "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day." (John vi. 54, 55.) Here are words which my opponents will readily tell me require interpretation; but then they expect me to take the interpretation which they are pleased to put upon them. They, like myself, are but fallible. The written Word of God assures me there is a way, and even "fools shall not err therein" (Isa. xxxv. 8); while, on the other hand, it is written, "There is a way which seemeth just to a man; but the end thereof leads to death." (Prov. xiv. 12.) I ask—Can fools be secured from error by interpreting Scripture for themselves?

That the will of God is capable of being preserved by tradition, is evident from the fact that the Almighty was pleased to have it

manifested in this way during the patriarchal dispensation, without resorting to other means, as the Holy Scriptures themselves testify. This cannot be denied, without asserting that a part of the written word was destroyed in the first ages of the world. It is generally admitted that the book of Job was written centuries before Moses wrote the Pentateuch. This book, then, was the first instance in which God made any revelation whatever by means of writing. Yet Job is there described as being possessed of a clear knowledge, not only of virtue, but even of the resurrection. Was not the means, by which such important truths were preserved, of Divine origin? Most certainly; for we read in Holy Scripture itself that there was a time when the Almighty was Himself pleased to declare that by the aid of Divine tradition alone His will should be preserved. In speaking of the patriarch Abraham, He says, "For I know that he will command his children, and his household after him, to keep the way of the Lord, and to do judgment and justice: that for Abraham's sake the Lord may bring to effect all the things he hath spoken unto him." (Gen. xviii. 19.) Nothing can be clearer than this; the children of Abraham would "do judgment and justice, and keep the way of the Lord,"—not by following the instruction of the written word, for it had not pleased Him at that time to make any revelation by that means—but by following the *unwritten* word revealed to Abraham.

Moses was afterwards commissioned to write the law, where it is said, "Ye shall not add unto the word that I speak unto you; neither shall you take away from it." (Deut. iv. 2.) But this applies to the *law* only, not to *faith*: for all that was promised to the Jews for their obedience consisted of temporal blessings, and the punishments with which they were threatened were of a like temporal nature. It may easily be argued, from the Mosaic law, that there is no future state, for it is nowhere explicitly mentioned. Their greatest rewards would seem to be in their days "being long in the land;" and their greatest punishment in being "cut off from Israel." Unquestionably the Jews, in our Saviour's time, believed in the resurrection, as we may gather from his condemnation of the Sadducees, who rejected tradition. But this knowledge was not derived from Scripture, but from the "unwritten tradition" of which "Clement," in his article, speaks so disparagingly. During the Babylonish captivity, the Jews lost the use of the Hebrew language. When they returned to Jerusalem, they spoke Syriac, and were in consequence, for the space of fourteen generations, without the Holy Scriptures in a tongue which the multitude could understand. This is proved by the evidence of Protestants themselves.* If the Protestant theory were true, the bulk of the people must all this time have been without a knowledge of the Divine truths.

"Clement" (who certainly does not seem to have noticed the

* Baycroft's Edition of the Bible.

editor's request, that writers should confine themselves to about six pages) quotes Scripture at random to prove the truth of his assertions, and appears quite to lose sight of the fact, that the Old and New Testaments are *separate* collections of books, and that when one is referred to it does not necessarily include the other. Throughout his article Old Testament texts are very numerous; indeed, out of about thirty texts which he adduces in the first five pages of his article, no less than thirteen are drawn from that portion of the Scriptures; and out of the entire number, only one has the slightest reference to the New Testament. As a specimen, however, of "Clement's" system of text quoting, I will take the following:—"By the prophet Isaiah we are exhorted to 'seek out of the book of the Lord, and read,' &c., Isa. xxxiv. 16."—(p. 89.) Now, to what, reader, think you this refers? Doubtless to some persons who had neglected the Scriptures, or who had departed from the doctrines there laid down. Or, perhaps, some one who had set up tradition in its place. Nothing of the sort. The headings of the chapter are, "The judgments wherewith God avengeth His Church; the desolation of her enemies; the certainty of the prophecy." The verse he quotes and the preceding one are, "There shall the great owl make her nest, and lay, and hatch, and gather under her shadow: there shall the vultures also be gathered, every one with her mate. Seek ye out of the book of the Lord, and read: no one of these shall fail, none shall want her mate: for my mouth it hath commanded, and his spirit it hath gathered them."

"Clement's" next mis-quotation is a text very frequently applied by Protestants to those who do not happen to agree with them:—"To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them," Isa. viii. 20. This, of course, refers to those who do not make the Bible the only Rule of Faith: is it not so, "Clement"? It shows how the Papists err when they declare that "this word" (which Protestants, of course, understand to be the Bible) does not contain all that God has revealed to His Church, or that His Son taught. Now, if Protestants would not take anti-Catholic arguments for granted, but just examine them for themselves, they would at once discover how they are imposed upon by those who pretend to quote the true sense of Scripture, while they garble or pervert it.

The text above mentioned is simply this:—"And when they shall say unto you, Seek unto them that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards that peep, and that mutter: should not a people seek unto their God? for the living to the dead? To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them," Isa. viii. 19, 20. According to the heading of the chapter, it refers to "great affliction to idolaters," and the previous words are warnings to the Jews for their disobedience and idolatry. If it is possible for "Clement" to be mistaken, I think he will in these cases admit, either that he has been so, or has endeavoured to mislead his readers. In any case, such care-

lessness, or something worse, should render him less positive for the future, and more willing to grant that others besides himself *may* be right after all.

The rest of the texts cited by "Clement" have reference to the old law, and its sufficiency as such for the Jew: such, for instance, as that which he quotes from Deuteronomy, in which the Jews are commanded to teach it diligently to their children, and write it upon their gates—and so forth. But when David declares him blessed "whose delight is in the law of the Lord" (Psa. i. 2), I should hardly imagine any one could suppose David referred to one who loved the "books" of Holy Scripture, but rather practised the doctrines they contained. I cannot see, either, why the fact of extolling the written Word of God is to be considered as a declaration of its all-sufficiency.

It must be seen clearly, after an examination of the passages quoted by "Clement," that he has totally failed in his endeavour to prove the Old Testament a sufficient Rule of Faith. It remains to show that neither "Clement" nor H. B. have been more successful with their texts from the New Testament.

The first he quotes are the following:—"All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works," 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17. "From a child thou hast known the holy scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus," 2 Tim. iii. 15.

It may be inferred from these words,—

1. That Timothy knew the Scriptures of which St. Paul is speaking "from a child."

2. That these same Scriptures, which Timothy had known from a child, were "able to make" him "wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus."

3. That all Scripture (or *every* inspired writing, as the Vulgate and some of the Greek manuscripts read it) is *profitable* (not sufficient) "for doctrine, for reproof, for instruction in righteousness." Now, what Scriptures had Timothy known from a child? Of course, the Old Testament only. This, St. Paul informs Timothy, is able to make him "wise unto salvation." H. B. says, "fearless of contradiction, that that rule which maketh a man wise unto salvation is and must be of itself a sufficient rule; but the holy Scriptures, according to the teaching of the inspired apostle, are able to make wise unto salvation; they, therefore, must be alone a sufficient Rule of Faith."

It would follow from this argument that the Old Testament contains a complete code of Christian doctrine and morals, which is absurd; the first premise, therefore, of H. B.'s syllogism is faulty; making wise unto salvation through faith in Jesus Christ, and being a sufficient Rule of Faith, are not synonymous terms. With regard to what follows, it merely asserts that Scripture is *profitable*

for certain purposes there mentioned. *Profitable* is the exact word which the Catholic theory requires. Had St. Paul been a Protestant, he would have said *sufficient*. H. B., to support *his* theory, finds himself compelled to substitute the word "sufficient" for "profitable in his argument (page 11, line 26). He also dwells very much upon the circumstance that our Lord appealed to the written Word in all questions of dispute. I answer, these appeals were made, not because any word proceeding out of His mouth was less infallible, but because, by so doing, His enemies were condemned by their own profession. They would not believe Him to be the promised Messiah, therefore He appealed to authorities which they professed to reverence, and which in reality confirmed the truth of His statements. The following, which H. B. quotes as a proof that our blessed Lord "accepted the Bible as a sufficient Rule as it regarded himself," is an illustration of this:—"Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me." This text may be translated, "Ye search the Scriptures," what can my opponents make out of it then? If it be, according to the common rendering, a command, it was spoken before a word of the New Testament was written, and was addressed to the *Jews*, bidding them examine the law, the prophets, and the psalms, which speak of Christ. Undoubtedly the Old Testament, duly searched, would lead a Jew to recognize Jesus Christ as the Messiah. This is all that *need* be signified by the text. But if it does imply more, and is meant as a precept to Christians, what then? Would an injunction to search the Gospels imply that we were not to search the Epistles? Assuredly not. And neither does the duty of reading the Bible interfere with the other duty of hearing the Church. I, too, would say to a Protestant the same words, "Search the Scriptures," for they testify of the Church and her Divine Head, and which, if you reject your prejudices, "the traditions of men," will lead you into its fold. We are next told, that the Bereans were like good Protestants, that they brought everything that St. Paul said to the test of the written Word. All I can say is, that if they had done this, they never would have become Christians, for they had only the Old Testament to refer to. Could they find all the doctrines St. Paul taught in that? Why, then, was St. Paul sent to them? The merit of the Bereans consisted in their receiving the Word (that is, Christianity, which St. Paul preached to them) gladly; and the text merely bears witness to the piety of the Bereans, who, in their anxious expectation of the Messiah, were diligent in the study of the prophecies concerning Him (Acts xvii. 2).

One would suppose, from the argument of "Clement," when he quotes Rev. xxii. 18, 19, that St. John had before him a complete volume of the inspired Word. But there is every probability he never saw the greater part of the New Testament. It does not follow, because the Book of Revelation is placed last, that it was written last; indeed, there is sufficient evidence to prove that St.

John wrote the Gospel which bears his name at a subsequent period. Thus the "awful threatening" in this case applies to the Book of Revelation only; for St. John himself concluded the written Word, declaring that all the books in the world could not contain all the things which Jesus did. Many of the things which Jesus commanded, nay, all which are essential, and which were delivered during His sojourn upon earth, between His resurrection and ascension, although not written in letters of ink, have come down to us through Divine tradition. "You are our epistle, written in our hearts, which is known and read by all men. Being manifested that you are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart," 2 Cor. iii. 2, 3.

I now come to the extracts from the Fathers. Those readers of the *British Controversialist* who have not given much attention to the controversy between Catholics and Protestants have, doubtless, been greatly surprised to see testimonies in favour of Protestantism drawn from a source which they have always regarded as the stronghold of "Popery." They will ask themselves, Have we not seen Catholic controversial works compiled wholly out of the writings of the Fathers? Has not the Hon. and Rev. Baptist Noel written a work to prove that the early Fathers were all rank Papists? When a man begins to study the Fathers, do not people say, "He is on the road to Rome"? What was the origin of the Tractarian movement? What has been the story which the newspapers have told us about most of the four hundred clergymen of the Church of England who have become Catholics since the secession of Dr. Newman? Simply this, that at Oxford they took to the study of the Fathers, and professed to have discovered that their teaching—the teaching of those Christian authors who lived nearest to the time of the apostles—was identical with the teaching of the Catholic Church of the present day. Any extracts, therefore, in favour of Protestantism from such a source will be regarded with a *prima facie* suspicion; they *must* be garbled, or wrested from the context. And such, indeed, is the fact. The language of the Fathers which has been adduced in favour of the fulness of Scripture, is in every case restricted by the context to certain special topics which they are discussing. An example or two of this will suffice, space not permitting me to enlarge much upon this subject.

The hackneyed quotation from Tertullian's treatise against Hermogenes, which H. B. gives us at page 14, and "Clement" at page 93, is nothing more than that which I have described above. He is defending the Mosaic account of the creation against Hermogenes, who maintained that the world was formed out of some pre-existent matter. Tertullian shows that in relating the creation, the sacred

* "The First Five Centuries of the Church; or, the Early Fathers as Safe Guide." By Baptist Noel. London: Nisbet. 1839.

text always fully informs us when anything was made out of any previous matter. He instances the production of the green herb from the earth, the creeping creature and fowl from the waters, and so forth. He then argues, that if the Scripture so carefully informs us whence everything was produced, it would equally have made it known if the earth had been made of previous matter; then follows the extract, as "*Clement*" gives it. H. B. has taken it from some dishonest controversialist, who suppresses the first clause, upon which the whole sentence depends. I ask any of my readers, Does this extract prove that Tertullian held that the Bible contains all things necessary to salvation? or whether the following quotation is not undeniable evidence that he held the contrary opinion:—"What will you gain by recurring to Scripture, when one denies what the other asserts? Learn rather who it is that proposes the faith of Christ; to whom the Scriptures belong; from whom, by whom, and when that faith was delivered, by which we are made Christians. . . . Now, to know what the apostles taught, that is, what Christ revealed to them, recourse must be had to the churches which they founded, and which they instructed by word of mouth and by their epistles. For it is plain that all doctrine which is conformable to the faith of these mother churches is true; being that which they received from the apostles, the apostles from Christ, Christ from God; and that all other opinions must be novel and false."*

As H. B. disdains all references except to an "unanswerable" work of Tillotson's, to which I have not access, I must pass the remainder of his extracts from the Fathers over. I do not, however, think St. Chrysostom could have said, as H. B. makes him say, that *all* things in the Scripture are plain and straight, considering what St. Peter says in his 2nd Epistle, iii. 16.

Here is a passage from St. Chrysostom himself, which shows his theological opinions were very different from those of H. B.:—"Hence it is plain that all things were not delivered in writing; but many otherwise, and are equally to be believed. Wherefore let us hold fast the traditions of the Church. It is tradition; let this suffice."†

There is nothing in Clement's extract from St. Irenæus, at page 92, to show the sufficiency of the Bible as a Rule of Faith. There is a good deal in the very paragraph from which "*Clement*" quotes which might be used against Protestants of the present day. It is from a treatise on "*Heresy*." St. Irenæus was one of the most strenuous advocates for Church authority and traditions, as we shall presently see. Why does not "*Clement*" insert the usual marks, to show that he has made some omissions? His coolness in this respect is unparalleled. In page 92, he makes a *continuous paragraph* of a few words culled *here* and *there* from the 2nd, 4th,

* "Da Præscrip. Hæretic.," p. 334; ed. 1642.

† Hom. iv. in 2 Thesa.

5th, 47th, and 53rd chapters of St. Clement's "Epistle to the Corinthians"! Some of the extracts (see page 94) are absolutely in favour of Divine tradition; for when Catholics talk of tradition, they mean exactly what the early Fathers meant, viz., doctrines revealed by God, and practices taught by Christ and the apostles, which have been "handed down" to us. We reject the "traditions of men" as resolutely as any Protestant can wish. Are we not obliged to believe what God has revealed, whether it be written or not? I do not see the applicability of the passage which "Clement" quotes from St. Irenæus at page 94. For St. Irenæus is not condemning the Divine tradition held by the Church, but the traditions of Valentius, Marcion, Cerinthus, and Basilides; "for each one of them is utterly perverse, and does not blush to preach up himself, perverting the rule of truth;"* and then he goes on to say, in the passage given by "Clement," they oppose tradition to the heretics. This tradition "Clement," being guided by the work of Dr. Bennett, understands to be the Holy Scriptures; but "Clement," if he sought for himself, would have found that this could not be its meaning; for a little further on the Father says:—"It turns out, therefore, that they agree neither with the Scriptures *nor with tradition.*" "Clement" says, "The description given of the practice of these ancient heretics reads as though we were listening to a modern Jesuit arguing against Scripture." Indeed! then because Jesuits as well as all Catholics contend that *Divine tradition* must be obeyed equally *with* holy Scripture, they are said to argue *against* holy Scripture. Rather uncharitable this; but "Clement" will at least allow us to be classed with St. Irenæus, when he has read the next quotation from him. The efficacy of Divine tradition he thus proves:—"What! if the apostles had not left us the Scripture, should we not have had to follow the order of tradition, which they deposited in the hands of those to, whom they entrusted the Churches? Many barbarous nations, who have received the faith in Jesus Christ, have followed this order, preserving, without the help of an alphabet or of ink, the truths of salvation written in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, keeping with care the ancient tradition. . . . If any one, speaking to them in their language, was to propose to them the tenets invented by the heretics, they would immediately stop their ears, and fly away to a distance, not enduring to hear language so replete with blasphemies. Thus being upheld by the ancient tradition of the apostles, they could not admit into their simple minds the least resemblance of those monstrous errors."† Let it be remembered, this is the writing of the disciple of St. Polycarp, who was the angel of the Church at Smyrna, Rev. ii. 8, and one of those whom my opponents profess to reverence.

In conclusion, I repeat, the mere fact of the Bible requiring an interpreter proves that it is not alone a sufficient Rule of Faith,

* "Adversus Hæresis," lib. ii., ch. 2.

† *Ibid.*, lib. iii.

for that interpretation, whether human or Divine, must necessarily be a part of the rule. I have shown that the texts, which my opponents have produced in support of their theory, either do not apply to the debate, or recoil upon themselves; and, knowing the Church and the Bible alike to be the work of the same Divine Being, I exclaim with every Catholic, and therefore with every Father of the Church, in the words of the great St. Augustine, "I would not have believed the Gospel, if the authority of the Catholic Church had not led me."

A LAYMAN.

Politics.

OUGHT THE INDIAN OPIUM TRADE TO BE SUPPRESSED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

CONNECTED with the spread of the Anglo-Saxon family are two great evils, which stand conspicuous above the catalogue of benefits of which its extension has been the source, *i. e.*—African slavery, and the Opium Trade. The former, though uprooted from the old family stock, still exists in the household of its western relative. The latter still exists, permitted, by *our* indifference, to scatter its blighting influence over the races of the Eastern continent. It is with this latter evil that we propose to deal very briefly in the present article.

Firstly. The cultivators of the plant are not benefited by its growth and production. Only in Bengal, and in a few unimportant native states, is the growth of the poppy allowed. In the native states, previously to the drug being exported, it is subjected to a heavy duty by the Indian Government; and in Bengal, the principal opium district, very stringent restrictions on the grower are imposed. It is remarkable that the cultivation of a plant yielding some four millions annually to the Government should be constantly unprofitable to the ryot, or cultivator. Yet from the fact of the crop requiring and exhausting the richest soil, and from the extreme uncertainty of the harvest, none of the ryots would hazard the growth of the plant without an advance of capital on the part of the Government; an advance, the repayment of which is the exception, not the rule. The ryot is therefore placed, bound hand and foot, at the mercy of the Government. Another cause operates unfavourably to the cultivator. He is required to deliver all the produce to the Government, at a certain arbitrary sum. The chief element of all business transactions is thus abstracted, and anything like pecuniary success placed entirely without the question. A bad harvest is synonymous with complete ruin. From these premises

it cannot be inferred that the suppression of the trade would operate unfavourably to the ryot; on the contrary, the substitution of the growth of rice, cotton, and the sugar cane, would meet with a very general welcome.

The main point of the negative defence, we apprehend, is the temporal loss to the revenue which would arise from the suppression of the traffic. The gross revenue now obtained from this source is £5,800,000, subject, however, to a deduction of the price advanced to the cultivator, the cost of collection, and several other contingent expenses, which would leave the net returns nearer £4,000,000. This revenue a war with China might entirely destroy, or, indeed, render the trade a mere instrument of loss; but on this we will not dwell. Can it be asserted that a trade in the mental and physical energies of a people will be eventually productive to the finances and prosperity of a country? Can we be told, without a comedy on reason, that it is advantageous to the well-being of a state that finances should be raised from a drug radiating wretchedness and misery alike to the consumer and producer, only for the purpose of carrying into effect the opposite qualities, the duties of all governments, viz.—the promotion of peace, order, and contentment? Strange absurdity! Machiavelli, we are inclined to believe, has not left us his mantle.

There admits of no dispute that the consumption of opium has the certain tendency of enervating a people, and of destroying their affluence. It is impossible to shadow forth the destitution and paralyzation of industry that would ensue, were there anything like a consumption of opium prevalent in our manufacturing districts. Are we, then, to expect that the finances of India, a country semi-civilized, will ever prosper whilst this source operates to destroy the industry of the people? Are we to expect that the plant of commerce will flourish, while its root is destroyed? The exchequer may well be in danger of bankruptcy, the revenue be naturally insufficient, and the prosperity of the country be blighted and destroyed, whilst this evil is allowed to remain? This fact is one of the pleaders for our case; and the want of an extended railway and canal system farther has proved a formidable barrier to the commercial prosperity of India. Exactly so long as commercial intercourse is difficult, so long may we expect a want of mercantile success. A further means of advancing the welfare of the country would be the encouragement of the growth of cotton. Were every possible inducement afforded to promote its growth, together with an extension of the railway system, and a prohibition of the poppy cultivation, a living principle would circulate through the whole empire, reorganizing and strengthening it in every part.

An inducement to suppress the traffic in opium presents itself to our home merchants. Some fifteen years ago our annual exports to China amounted to £1,987,016; a year or two previous to the commencement of the recent war with China, the average was

£1,964,242, showing a slight decrease of our exports to that country, whilst our total exports to other countries, within the same lapse of time, have been more than doubled. Our exports to the islands of Cuba and St. Domingo, with an insignificant population, are much larger than those to the extensive and populous empire of China. When, however, we state that our imports from China have, during the twelve intervening years, doubled, and that they are quintuple the amount of our exports, it is clear that some cause operates to produce so unnatural a discrepancy. This cause is found in the fact that the exports of opium from India have increased within that particular period from £5,000,000 to £8,000,000. Were this trade suppressed, at least £8,000,000 of value in honest manufacture would be annually required. We are thus continually suffering a pecuniary loss for the benefit of a trade in the most powerful of physical and moral poisons. The opacity displayed by such a course of conduct is perfectly astounding.

We feel a certain tenderness in dealing with our friend "Poppy." To his arguments against free trade in opium, or against the introduction of a prohibitory tax, we have really nothing to object. His paper contains many real crystals of thought, and the reasoning is exactly that of our own. "Poppy" deserves well for his painstaking. He has written an article on the subject—"Would it be beneficial if either Free Trade or a Protective Duty on Opium were adopted?" This being the texture of his article, there yet, at intervals, peep out some remarks to which we take decided exception. One of these "fitful will-o'-the-wisps" runs:—"The proposal would benefit the foreign producer and trader in an article which, either as a luxury, if not abused, or as a medicinal drug, is a perfectly legitimate source of gain." A perfectly legitimate source of gain! Listen. "While these notes were preparing, the writer had occasion to go into the city, and just inside the north gate, in front of a temple, he saw one of such destitute persons, unable to procure either food or the drug, lying at the last gasp. There were two or three others, with drooping heads, sitting near, who looked as if they would soon be prostrated too. The next day the writer passed, and found the first of the group dead and stiff, with a coarse mat wound round his body for a shroud. The rest were now lying down, unable to rise. The third day another was dead, and the remainder almost near it. Help was vain; and pity for their wretched condition the only feeling that could be indulged."

This is a single instance related by Dr. Medhurst. The other benefits from this "perfectly legitimate source of gain" may be described as murders, robberies, and gross licentiousness. The Rev. Alexander Williamson observes, "There is hardly an evil which I have not heard or seen perpetrated by these infatuated mortals." With respect to the influence in the neighbourhood of its growth, it has been remarked that, "One opium cultivator demoralizes a whole village;" but the evidence on this part of our subject is so undisputed, that we will not further dwell on it. We have, again, been

told that it is a luxury, if not abused. Dr. Little, the medical superintendent at Singapore, has observed: "I have searched everywhere for one who, with money, stopped short of partial insensibility. Many drink (alcohol), but do not abuse it; many smoke opium, but all abuse it." For purposes of medicine, it is entirely unfitted by its peculiar mode of preparation. "Poppy" is of opinion that the indulgence of opium is a milder evil than that of drunkenness. Again, the voice of testimony declares that the slightest indulgence in opium admits of no parallel, save of that with *drunkenness*. Nor do we admit, with "Poppy," that were the drug exterminated, some stimulant or other would be required to supply its place; or that it is a "useless attempt to wage war with the universal desire in man to indulge in stimulants." Neither the North American Indians, nor their ancestors, knew anything of the existence of stimulants, till the Europeans brought "fire-waters" among them. The numerous native races of Africa and of South America remain almost entirely unacquainted with them up to the present time. Entire races have lived and died, centuries have been buried in the past, and neither the desire nor its attainment has ever been felt. Again, we may ask, does any one, suffering from an inability to satisfy his usual craving for opium, recur to dram drinking? or does the reformed drunkard fly for relief to opium? These questions can only admit of one reply.

We have now, we believe, answered every remark in the first article by "Poppy," that could be construed to have a bearing on this question. We only wish that the subject which he has treated in so able and argumentative a manner may at some future period form one of the themes of discussion in these pages.

Already one war has been forced upon us through the traffic in the opium poison, to the complete dislocation of our trade in the healthy articles of commerce. How long this question is to remain an obstacle to our friendly relations with China, we cannot foresee. All that is particularly clear is—that the mercantile interests of England have suffered severely from this state of affairs. We emphatically ask—"Is this frightful evil to be allowed to work destruction in every direction?" Is it not enough that ruin should await the cultivator of the plant? Is it not enough that the district of its cultivation should be stained with crime? Is it not enough that pauperization and death should be caused among the subjects of another Sovereign, and against his strong opposition? There is a deeper depth still. War must be invoked in its behalf. Smuggling and piracy must meet with encouragement, and peaceful commerce, *pro tem.*, be annihilated. We appeal to the love of right that exists in every man. We appeal to the sense of justice, whose name is disgraced. We appeal to the judgments of reason, whose attributes are disdained. Its horrors, its crimes, its wrongs, its cause of bloodshed, and its creation of oppression, make the heart to sicken, and the mind to mourn. Not until the winds of public opinion are unloosed will the ocean tempest break with

destructive fury against those breastworks of evil and of wrong, which have hitherto withstood the milder influences of reason and of right.
S. E. L.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE very able articles which have appeared on the negative side of this debate have, I think, so successfully disposed of all the arguments advanced by the writers on the other side, that I feel that to enter into further reasons for giving a decided "No" to this question, is a work of supererogation, and I shall therefore; by way of *coup de grâce*, confine myself principally to the consideration of the sound principle which would be violated in agreeing to the proposed restriction on trade.

The article by A. is valuable so far as it furnishes the history and statistics of the opium traffic; and I accept as truthful the evidence adduced by him of the baneful consequences of an excessive indulgence in what De Quincey calls the "divine luxury of opium." But after performing this useful service, he and "Sinim" fail entirely of any attempt to show why, because of the abuse of a truly beneficial and mighty medicinal drug, the cultivation and sale thereof should be abandoned. It is not difficult to surmise the cause of this omission. Any reflecting person, at this part of the question, will be puzzled to assign any sound principle in political economy that is applicable to attain the end A. and "Sinim" have in view, which might not be applied, on some other occasion, to support what they would, perhaps, be the first to condemn as an infringement of civil or political liberty. Precedents accumulating constitute law; examples are supposed to justify the most dangerous measures.

The vice and misery produced in consequence of the abuse of alcoholic liquors in England is spread amongst an infinitely larger number of the population than is opium eating in China, with only four million votaries—a mere fraction of its countless population. "Suis cuique mos."* Man is a bundle of habits. Moreover, there is every reason to conclude that opium eating is, in proportion to the size of our community, equally prevalent in Britain as in China; therefore any principle that can be maintained for the prohibition of the drug into any Eastern country would equally apply to its exclusion from this island. Are our friends willing that the supply of wines, imported into this country from Spain, France, and Portugal, should be cut off, as an illegal and injurious department of commerce, because a large number of their countrymen take them to excess? Wines and other kindred drinks are, like opium, of essential value in not a few complaints; and I hold it is not unlawful to use them otherwise than as a medicine. All are aware that an attempt is being made by professed philanthropists to introduce the Maine Liquor Law into England—(how natural

* Every one has his particular habit.

that such a law should have sprung up side by side with slavery!)—notwithstanding the impracticability of executing such a law has caused its repeal in many of the States of America, which had adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name. The secretary to the “Alliance” formed for this object says, in justification of the project, “I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another. If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery I am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse.”

John S. Mill, than whom no more eminent thinker lives, remarks on this:—“A theory of ‘social right,’ the like of which, probably, never before found its way into distinct language, being nothing short of this—that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act, in every respect, exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof, in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty.” I can acknowledge the consistency of those persons who are willing to assent to the pernicious doctrines advocated by the association I have named above, being advocates also for the prohibition of the sale of opium to the Chinese; but there is a numerous class of Englishmen who deprecate the introduction of a stringent liquor law here, and yet are amongst the prominent disciples of the “Anti-Opium Committee.” How true it is that men are constantly

“Compounding for sins they are inclined to,
By damning those they have no mind to!”

The line of argument, in solving this question, that I wish to pursue, then, is this:—Opium is designed by the Creator as apparently the one sole, catholic anodyne, and by many degrees the most potent of all known counter-agents to nervous irritation; consequently its beneficent characteristics will at all times ensure its use among medicines. This being so, it will be necessary that every country shall be duly provided with the drug: and with such an immense population as that of the Celestial Empire, it is impossible (if desirable) to ascertain the quantity of this article yearly required for legitimate purposes. Acting on the principle of freedom of commerce, our merchants in India are only supplying the demand arising in China for this now legalized branch of trade; and I maintain that the responsibility for an improper use of opium lies at the doors, not of the exporters, but of each individual Chinaman

who revels in the fascinating indulgence—possessing, as he does, as full a consciousness of the ultimate misery it entails, as had Coleridge, Wilberforce, De Quincey, Macaulay, and other celebrated men, who were English opium eaters. If this leading principle can be controverted, I am willing to relinquish my allegiance to the negative side of the controversy; for if the prosecution of the trade is an offence against morality, no tenable defence can be offered for its continuance, on the ground of the large revenue it brings to our Indian exchequer.

The tendency of philanthropists in the present day is to destroy the individuality and responsibility of man, and instead of allowing him to be the judge and guardian of his moral actions, to seek to preserve him virtuous by enactments of the legislature, acting as a sort of moral police, by allowing no temptation to evil to cross his path. This is the well-intentioned desire of the Maine Law advocate, and the prohibitor of the opium traffic. These persons find a certain evil existing in the world, but losing confidence in the power of moral agencies to remedy the unsatisfactory state of society, they wish to try to regenerate the human family by a gross usurpation upon the liberty of private life. In thus proceeding, they act in a similar way to many a thoughtless currency reformer in every monetary panic, who recommends as a panacea that there should be an unlimited issue of paper money, which could only be an apparent relief, and would eventually be an aggravation of the crisis. This attempt to exert the authority of society over the individual, in forbidding the growth of the poppy in India, or by prohibiting the use of fermented beverages in England, I regard as one of the most dangerous doctrines that can threaten the liberties of any nation. It is an attempt to carry out still further the analogous opinions of those who fear that were not Christianity taken under the patronage of the State, as in the establishment of a national church, and supported by its funds, it would be in danger of losing its existence.

This class of philanthropists would bring our country into a state of moral purity no more real than there was reality about the sham villages which Potemkin got up to show to the Empress Catherine on her journeys, as evidence of the flourishing condition of her empire. The advocates of these restrictions have not yet learnt the maxim, "Not to do evil, that good may come," or they would not wish to violate a general rule for the sake of any particular good consequence they may expect. It has been said with truth, "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest." Each person is more interested in his own moral and physical well-being than any other can be; consequently, society is not warranted in coercing any human being to do otherwise with his life for his own benefit than he chooses, so long as his actions do not interfere with the rights of others.

Lord Stanley, when Indian Secretary, urged that there was no

argument in favour of the total abolition of the opium culture in Bengal, which might not be equally urged in favour of the introduction of the Maine Liquor Law into the realms of England. John Stuart Mill speaks in these terms:—"It is essentially a question of liberty; the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain the commodity. This interference is objectionable, as an infringement on the liberty of the buyer." Of Sir John Bowring's opinion (and he was accounted a philanthropist when he went to China) in favour of the continuance of the opium trade, the readers of this Magazine are already informed. The practical effect of our ceasing to send the drug to China would be that the white poppy would be cultivated within that empire, or else other foreigners would quickly grasp at so profitable a trade. It must, then, be the result of other agencies than the suppression of the Indian opium trade, if ever the opium smoking be discontinued in China.

The question of the limits of the power of society over the individual is likely to become the vital question of the future. Let us then, as a people, beware how we give heed to any threatened invasions upon the natural rights of man, for there can be no permanent greatness to a nation except it be based on freedom; and so long as we adhere to our old landmarks and experiences, so long may we postpone the decadence of our national grandeur, which our matchless historian has hinted at, when the New Zealander shall stand on the broken arch of London Bridge, and gaze on the ruins of St. Paul's. The penalty for any tampering with liberty inevitably comes sooner or later.

"The sword of heaven is not in haste to smite,
Nor yet doth linger."

R. R.

Social Economy.

ARE THE OPERATIONS OF TRADES' UNIONS BENEFICIAL TO WORKING MEN?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"The accumulation of that power which is conferred by wealth, in the hands of the few, is the perpetual source of oppression and neglect to the mass of mankind. The power of the wealthy is further concentrated by their tendency to combination, from which number, dispersion, indigence, and ignorance equally preclude the poor. The wealthy are formed into bodies by their professions, their different degrees of opulence called ranks, their knowledge, and their numbers."—Sir James Macintosh.

"L'OUVRIER" has taken the field as the Achilles of capital, and, like the Grecian hero, has done good battle in their cause; but, unfortunately for their perfect success, he has, like the son of the

gods, shown vulnerable points. However inaccurately or erring, we must bend our bow, and, in the cause of labour, send a winged shaft, which, if not deadly, may yet wound him, and strip him of some claim to having spoken all the truth. "L'Ouvrier," in our eyes, was a very giant of debate, courteous towards his opponents, yet firm in his purpose; despising the tricks of mere debaters, he stood manfully by his convictions, and, if not always successful, he could always command respect. But "how has the mighty fallen!" A worse case is hardly conceivable, or one more calculated to mislead the public mind, than the one "L'Ouvrier" has made out against the operations of Trades' Unions among working men. No capitalist, grasping at the product of his labouring man-machine, could wish in his heart a better advocate. Trifles with him are not light as air, but are made strong points in an uncompromising denunciation of Trades' Unions. The same arguments have been the stock in trade, for the last six months, from the "Thunderer" down to the great *Saturday Reviver*, and are now reiterated in the pages of the *British Controversialist*. "If there be any virtue," the employers have it; if there be anything hurtful, tyrannous, and oppressive, Trades' Unions have it. Might it not more truly be said of them, as a popular writer of the present day* says, "Let any man take the trouble to study the question honestly, and he will come to the conviction, that all combinations of men for the purpose of influencing the labour market, whether in the much and unjustly abused Trades' Societies, or in any other forms, have been defensive organizations, and that masters might over and over again have taken the sting out of them, if they would have acted fairly, as many of them have done? Whether it may be not too late now, is a tremendous question for England, but one which time only can decide." Masters, as a class, have never recognized their workers as men capable of meeting them on equal terms for the honest discussion of their respective rights. Over and over again have working men offered to leave their claims to neutral arbitration, and as repeatedly have masters refused to hold any terms with them; concession, nothing but concession, has ever been the demand of the masters.

Political economy is looked on, by those who take a pleasure in seeing nothing that is good in Trades' Unions, as embodying unchangeable and eternal principles, which working men, through their ignorance, are continually violating; that it is only by "standing firm on the principles of liberty" in labour that they can hope to be successful in raising themselves in the social scale. But let us see what is the condition of that portion of our labouring population who do stand by the principles of liberty in labour. We have sufficient proof of the woeful results of freedom in labour in the wretched condition of working men and women who are without the protection of Trades' Unions. The advocates for their abolition

* Author of "Tom Brown at Oxford."

talk of the tyranny of Union committees, and would, in the spirit of charity, wish to impress upon what they are pleased to call their dupes the necessity of freeing themselves from a self-imposed bondage: but they pass over in silence the many heart-rending examples given to the world every week of the advantage taken by tradesmen who claim to be considered respectable, and yet coin money out of the very life-blood of unprotected labour. Has the almost ceaseless and unremunerative labour of the needlewomen of this country not called forth from every section of the people (with the exception of those who make gain by the unholy system) the loudest denunciations? Are they not the sacrifice offered upon the altar of a remorseless political economy? Were their labour protected, would the slopseller have the power to extort fifteen hours' labour out of the twenty-four for sixpence? Would the "Song of the Shirt" ever have been sung had the needlewomen been united for self-protection? Theirs is labour at the mercy of capital; and to what capitalists have brought it, let our graveyards bear witness. It is easy for Dives to sit in his parlour, and preach extreme doctrines of supply and demand, but it is hard for Lazarus to understand it. By the same kind of reasoning, free trade could be shown to be freebooting. But we are told to believe that such are the inevitable laws of supply and demand. If such, they are opposed to all the laws of Christian morality. Then free trade can be carried too far, for the principles of capitalists would have working men "to put voluntary fetters on their feet, and manacles on their hands, and drink the bitter draught of passive obedience."

Examples are not wanting teaching the learned trades that in union alone lies their only safeguard. The fact of thousands who labour for their daily bread (when they can get it) being compelled to accept of the terms offered, or starve, proves incontestably the necessity of working men being united. In one point the capitalist is true to his principles. Where he can, he invariably does buy labour at the cheapest market, whether in accordance with political economy or not. The members of Trades' Unions well know that the fate of unprotected labour is theirs at no distant date, if they relinquish the power that union has given them; that capital, with its never enough, ever accumulating principle, would soon drive ruin's ploughshare over them, and sink them to a level with the wretched needlewomen and others whose weakness lies solely in their want of union. There is no stronger proof required in favour of Trades' Unions, than the tenacity with which working men cling to them, and suffer for them much obloquy and much misery, holding fast by what they well know is their only sheet-anchor against an overwhelming devastation—the entire sweeping away of every vestige of individual right and living manhood. What a dreadful state a country must be reduced to, when its over-supply population has to be got rid of by "poverty and famine, infantile diseases, and social epidemics!" Yet such are the laws printed on

the pages treating of political economy; and the writers talk even of a morality in connection with the science. Their morality is something like Pierre's definition of honesty—"it is a ragged virtue." Yet how many are sacrificed at its shrine! and men say it is all right, and in strict accordance with the eternal principles of political economy, and conscience is hushed.

Working men are, in the opinion of some, running counter to the wish and counsel of their best friends:—"Their skulls are so thick, that they are proof against all reason, and never crack but on the side just opposite to that against which the impression is made." Such is their lamentable state, if there is any faith to be put in the scribes who have of late been uttering prophetic warnings to Trades' Unions. Will working men never learn to be wise? Will they for ever despise the advice so lavishly bestowed upon them by their natural guardians? "They have forced themselves into an unnatural state," say the advocates of political economy, "by their Trades' Unions, and the wisest thing they can do is to give them up, and return to their proper position in the social scale. We know what is good for you, and can direct your obstinate and untractable natures as Rarey does that of a horse." Working men have reason to be truly thankful for the great interest their friends (?) have taken in their behalf; they have all of a sudden become their most serious advisers, saying the hardest things of them; thereby showing the strength of their friendship, and hoping ere long to see the fruits of such disinterested love brought to a successful issue in the total abolition of such abominations as Trades' Unions.

But the working men are determined to be obstinate still; determined to hold fast by what they have proved to be of vast and vital importance in advancing themselves in the social scale, and in resisting encroachment after encroachment attempted by capital on the rights of their order. They know, that but for Trades' Unions, the blessings they enjoy would never have been surrendered to them by their masters, nor have been the growth of a fabled supply and demand. They know, that "in a state of artificial society it is a law constant and invariable, that those who labour most enjoy the fewest things, and that those who labour not have the greatest number of enjoyments; that the blindness of one part of mankind, co-operating with the frenzy and villainy of the other, have been the real builders of this respectable fabric of society." Members of Trades' Unions want to be blind no longer; the increased and fast increasing intelligence of working men enables them to see with no mean discernment, in spite of all that has been said to the contrary, that union has been a good thing for them, and has been mainly instrumental in raising them out of a bondage more degrading than that from which Moses rescued the children of Israel. They believe in "that spirit which is now abroad, that must ultimately redeem millions of our population from the life-long prisons of the factory and the mine; and blending for them relaxation with toil, and the comforts and ornaments of life with

its labours, elicit, as it were, their smothered souls from out their galley-worn frames, and enable them to constitute a new and splendid era in the social history of our humanity. The few, as years roll on, will be induced, both by warnings from without and urgings from within, to sacrifice more and more to the many, and, by yielding up the monopoly of *all*, for ever secure the possession of a part; and out of that other part which they shall have relinquished, be amply repaid for its abandonment, by feeling more real safety and enjoyment redound to them, from the contentment and happiness of those to whom they have yielded it, even than out of that which they shall have still reserved for themselves."

D. R. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HAD this momentous question been examined in any influential Magazine that had come under my notice some fifteen years ago, I should certainly have taken the affirmative side; but calm reflection, mature deliberation, with bitter disappointments, have forced me to adopt the negative. And such is my conviction of the inutility of these combinations to produce the desired end, that I am prepared to show that the operatives, as a body, are positively injured by them, and that they always end in "vanity and vexation of spirit," and are of necessity a *waste of power*.

My sympathies, my hopes, and my prayers are for the happiness of the toiling millions of my countrymen; and to disseminate correct opinions amongst them is the apex of my worldly ambition.

"Born beneath the straw-roofed cot,"—

cradled in adversity, and put to regular work at five years of age,—having laboured for more than thirty years with my own hands, at ill-requited toil,—and being, for the greater part of that time, connected with "Trades' Unions," such was my zeal in their cause, that, upon one occasion, I travelled 180 miles, on foot, to represent my fellow-workmen at a meeting of delegates. It will therefore be conceded by the reader that I am not a *novice*, but a *Prud de homme*, in this one matter.

In order to elucidate the subject in hand, it is needful to examine both sides, viz., the interest of the capitalist, and the rights of the artisan. There are many who tell us that "these interests are *one and the same, reciprocal and mutual* ; because the well-being of one cannot be affected without the other deriving a corresponding benefit." This is a very plausible and agreeable conclusion, but it is radically wrong in point of *inference*.

It is the interest of the employer to get the largest amount of labour for the least amount of money; and it is the interest of the employed to get the most he can for the least amount of work. This admits of no dispute; but there can be no *mutual interest* between *parties*, when their direct interests are dissimilar. This is the case in every contract that is made for labour to be wrought by

one party, and to be paid for by another. Let us watch both these parties, as master and man, in their pursuit, and we shall soon divine the reason why one party (as a *rule*) succeeds, and the other generally fails.

The manufacturer is, generally, a man of superior education, much time and money having been spent to fit him for his calling. He has *one* object, before which all others must vanish—to get wealth; to equal, and, if he can, to outvie, his compeers, is the sum and substance of his desires: his mind is made up to win. He has learned something of the nature, power, and action, of mechanical forces, and makes use of his capital as a lever; and the greater his capital, the longer and the stronger that lever becomes. To effect his object, he rids himself of every incumbrance, and bounds over every obstacle that comes before him. An employer of labour is often considered to be a benevolent man, as is gathered from looking over the reports of religious and philanthropic societies. His subscription is often that of a gentleman; but when he enters into his counting house, he shuts everything else out but *business*. The etymology of this word, in the counting house, means to get *all* he can, and leave the operatives to do the same. To save a compound fraction is, with him, an object not to be lost sight of. His first inquiries are, How can I get my goods manufactured for the smallest amount of money? Where can I sell them so as to realize the largest amount of profit? What assistance can I do without? What new mechanical power can I introduce into my factory or mill so as to supersede or to displace human labour? For a capitalist to make infringement upon labour's reward and price is held to be allowable, and there is no law to prevent it. Public opinion winks at the depredation, and ignores the fact. A man of capital may sin against the laws of God, and crush his inferiors in social position, and yet be counted a man of honour still. These observations may seem to be severe, but facts cannot be gainsayed.

Then by what means is the toiling operative to obtain the *most* he can for the *smallest* amount of work? "By Union! by Union!" is echoed by ten thousand voices at once, which make the walkie ring. Have we not been told, that

"Worms may join, and grasp the poles,
And atoms fill the sea"?

"Does not a continual dropping wear away stone?" And does not M. A. X. tell us that the "British and Social Science Associations, and the United Kingdom Alliance, are great in their effects, owing to the associative element in each?" "If these great societies act upon the principle of combination, why should not we imitate their example?" Yes, that is true: but let us look beneath the surface; for the truth lies deep in the mine. If a power for good be directed the wrong way, it becomes a power for evil.

If any number of men combine their energies, capital, and skill, to carry out any great design, whether it be a railway, a tunnel, or

a bridge, or any other project, then their interests, hopes, and aims, *are one and the same*; every shareholder feels an interest in proportion to his stake in the general concern; then the stronger their unions are, the sooner will their ultimate designs be accomplished.

But in any question in which *labour* and *capital* are involved, there are *two parties* whose direct interests are at issue. These interests cannot be carried out by union; it is absurd to expect it; but each must try to carry out their own interest by *self-reliance*.

The rich and educated capitalist knows this, and invariably acts upon it, and, as a rule, succeeds. If a manufacturer is not rich enough to carry on his establishment, he joins with one or more persons whose *interests are the same*, upon the principle of limited liability.

But alas! the operative classes, as a whole, do not understand this most important truth, that only where the interests of the shareholders are *one and the same* can the principle of combination be acted upon with advantage.

We must notice the way in which the working man attempts to make the most of his *capital*, which is his *labour only*.

Conscious of his own unaided and individual weakness, it is only natural that he should look out for some external help; he has seen the greatest works imaginable achieved by unions, consequently it is his *dernier ressort*, never suspecting that the principle cannot apply to his case, *as one party only, connected with the labour market*; he never thinks there is *another* party, whose direct interests are the opposite of his own. He joins the Union:—and what then? He surrenders his most important trust into the hands of a secondary party, whose own interest has a prior claim upon their attention, which, if a master was to do the same, he would soon become a ruined man. The committee of management, whom he has chosen to transact his business for him, do not understand the position in which they are placed; or they dare not attempt to discharge their heavy responsibility, because they have no legal executive power. They may sit in council, issue their manifestoes, or edicts, and post their proclamations; but where is the requisite power to effect their object? The capitalists, whose direct interests are not one with their workmen, refuse to acknowledge the authority, and then the collision begins:

“When Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war.”

There is no other alternative for the committees but to recommend a *strike*, such as has cost the operatives millions of money, or money's worth. We must give these men the credit for doing all they could: had they recommended a surrender, they would have been driven into the land of Nod, or elsewhere. We have known several to be burnt in effigy for saying, “I think we had better not turn out; for we are not equal to maintain the expected contest.”

The situation of the leaders of these Trades' Unions is the most harassing and degrading that can be imagined. The basest of

motives are attributed to them by a vindictive press, which daily and weekly cries them down. They are all discarded by the employers, so that to attempt to earn their bread at their trades is out of the question. They are marked, and driven from the factory and the workshop, and are hereafter compelled to agitate for bread, or go without it. They are despised by their masters and the public for attempting to do that which is impossible; and abused by their fellow-workmen, whose business they have foolishly undertaken, for not succeeding in their futile attempts. The want of success is always attributed to their mismanagement, and the sins of others are laid at their door. They are often dismissed without a notice, tried without a jury, and condemned without an indictment or a judge. Some noted leaders have committed suicide; many have been exiled; and many others have died in the workhouse; *and not an instance can be cited wherein a leader has been benefited in his domestic condition.*

But as strikes *never* occur except by *Trades' Unions*, we must notice how they serve to promote the welfare of working men. The manufacturer tries, and succeeds, in increasing his capital, which is his commodity, by using it; the operative tries, and fails, to increase the price of his labour, his only commodity, by withholding the only article which he has to make money of; and not only withholds it from the market, but ceases to produce it, and thereby robs his fellow-man of the means of living, by withholding the materials for another to work upon to earn his bread. The same as if the occupiers of land should, through a dispute with their landlord, refuse to cultivate the ground. Every strike has a fearful tendency to *diminish* the amount of labour to be done in the market, and increases the number of empty hands that crave to do it, which must, in the end, run the price of labour down. So that *the operations of Trades' Unions are detrimental and not beneficial to working men.*

One of the most encouraging features in this literary debate is to see Mr. George Potter come out as the champion of the unionist, upon the affirmative side of this much disputed but very important question.

The official position of this gentleman entitles him to our most sincere respect, and every argument which he can bring to bear shall have its due weight, and shall receive our unprejudiced consideration.

If Mr. P. can demonstrate the proposition that the "*operations of Trades' Unions are beneficial to working men,*" to the satisfaction of the thoughtful, discriminating, calculating, and discerning readers of the *British Controversialist*, then a most important point will be gained. Mr. P. is in the "*right place,*" if he is but the "*right man,*" to set this troublesome question for ever at rest; and *now* is his golden opportunity to do so. The officers and members of the different unions will acknowledge him as a fair exponent of their principles, and they ought to confer all honour upon their

talented leader. But should he fail to satisfy his clients, and the clear-judging public, then, as an honest man, he ought to give up the *bell*, and say, "I am a wiser man than I was before; for I see 'a more excellent way' to secure to working men their rights, and to labour its just reward."

I have carefully read Mr. P.'s article, with the hope of finding some valid arguments to prove that the operations of these Unions are really beneficial to their members; but I have read in vain. It would profit no one to follow this writer *seriatim*, and I must allow his ravings with "L'Ouvrier" to pass for what they are worth; but my "impressions of the nature and character of Trades' Unions are not obtained at second hand;" they are the result of forty years' experience and constant observation.

Mr. P. says that these Unions are "*based upon instinct, sanctioned by reason, and vindicated by experience.*" It would be well if these assertions could be supported by matters of *fact*. Instead of this, "they are based upon" *ignorance* of the nature and the application of Unions, in attempting to bring its power to bear upon a principle to which it cannot act or coalesce, there being two separate and distinct parties engaged in the production of articles of commerce, whose direct interests are opposed to each other. Mr. P.'s assertions vanish when brought to the test of "reason," because that which is wrong in its parts must be wrong altogether. They are condemned "by experience," as very little but disappointment, vexation, and ignominious defeat, have attended their operations.

I do not write from hearsay, but state facts, which have taken place to my own knowledge, and can give names, places, and dates, in support of what I affirm, that "the operatives of this country have been 'injured,' morally," by Trades' Unions, and their inseparable concomitants, *strikes*. Many I have known, in the ten or twelve turnouts in which I have participated, to be morally ruined through them; the men have left their wives and children, and left them chargeable to the parish, and the youth of both sexes have taken their first steps in vice, which have ended in irretrievable ruin. Others have been socially and hopelessly bankrupt; they have lost their goods, chattels, and clothes, and never regained them. They have been injured "*financially*" by the pecuniary sacrifices they have made to support the Unions. By the loss of labour which a strike in one trade brings upon many others, the demand is stopped, and the rate of wages goes down. All this, and much more, has occurred through trying to apply the power of *union* where it cannot be made available.

Mr. Potter has indorsed the crude assertions of M. A. X., who says that "mutual sympathy has been eduuced by the Trades' Unions." Let him do as I have done, go into his workshop, and say to his fellow-workmen, "Well, I begin to think that our union is based upon a wrong principle, we do not clearly understand what we are about," and he will get a specimen of the "mutual sympathy" that has been "eduuced" by the Unions. Again, "*Progress*"

is indicated in the conduct of the Unionist." Is this the effect of the Unions, or is it attributable to the progress of general education, to the influence of the press, and to the determined vigilance of the powers that be?

Once more: "Self-reliance, 'man's true interest,' has been evoked." Wonderful! When a working man commits his most important business to be managed by another party, or assumed power, instead of doing it himself, or when he will submit to an infringement upon his wages, and then impeach his master to a committee who cannot legally take it up, is that self-reliance? The proof of the usefulness of Trades' Unions is *not* in their popularity with the toiling millions; for all history proves that the masses have been led astray by hypocrites, demagogues, and knaves. The people went wholesale to the Holy Land, to fight the Saracens; they pulled down the house of Dr. Priestley, because he sought the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts; they aided and abetted the government in the perpetration of cruel massacres and wars; and a thousand other flagrant acts have been prompted by the popular voice. I can assure Mr. P., and all the Unionists, that I have no grudge against Unions among working men, but my opposition arises entirely from seeing a constant misapplication of their powers.

But let not working men despair. "Knowledge is power;" and the best practical knowledge is beginning to be understood by them. Their remedy is in their own hands; let them not any longer pursue the fatal *ignis fatuus* of applying the principle of combination where it cannot be successful. They may concentrate their energies into one common focus, where their interests are *one and the same*: they may, if they will, become shareholders in a profitable investment, which cannot fail to succeed; they may unite to buy all their articles of daily consumption in the best market and upon the largest scale; they may unite to manufacture their articles of clothing, to build their own houses—in short, to produce everything they want. If the great mass of workmen in this land would do this, in some twenty or thirty years they might command the labour market themselves. The ability to labour they have, and the capital they would produce. A. F.

No kind of study or inquiry into fact is a proper object of contempt. It is not unfrequent to possess a passion for particular species of knowledge, but the understanding is scarcely in a proper tone unless information or truth, of every description, be seized with avidity. What Cicero describes as essential to the finished orator, acquaintance with the whole circle of learning, is not less desirable for all who aspire to the distinction of combined or comprehensive thought. Variety of studies and speculations, so far from weakening the faculties, is a powerful means of promoting their activity and growth. You seldom meet with persons of eminent capacity, whose range of reflection has been chiefly restricted to one department.—*W. B. Clueto.*

The Essayist.

WINTER, OR NO WINTER—WHICH IS BEST?

"WAS ever question more ridiculous?" we say now, in winter, when we are in the midst of it; nor shall we even consent to spoil our anticipation of summer by supposing that if we were in summer, we should wish for winter again. The cold and damp, the wind, and storms, and swollen rivers, the rain, the snow, the sleet, and the slippery ice; the dirty town, with its closed doors, and slushy streets; the silent country, with its wiry trees, its storm-staid cottages, and starving birds; and, worst of all, the desolate sea-coast, with its naked rocks and wrecks, and its screaming sea-fowl, flying at the storm, merely for something to do, in their idleness and despair;—who for a moment would think of comparing winter with summer?

Summer—how delightful the very idea! Its genial sunshine, and long daylight, of which nature, whether on sea or shore, is never weary; its luxuriant cornfields, already full of the promise of harvest; its shady groves, vocal with the sweet music of the woodland warblers, perched beside their prospering nests, on which the attentive dam is sitting all securely; its crystal rivers, rippling clear to the eye of the watchful trout, and meandering through the verdant meadows, more and more slowly, as if reluctant to leave the sunny landscape, or disturb the feet of the well-fed herds which have left their pastures, and for coolness are standing in the ford. Oh, gladsome summer! with its beautiful scenery, and its manifold amenities,—who would not wish for a perpetual summer? Or if there can be any other season that may for a moment compete with summer, assuredly that season is spring, or autumn,—not winter, at all events. No;—away with gloomy winter! or if it must be, then leave it to the suicide or the burglar, the gambler or the player, or to whomsoever courts darkness, or needs a false light for his deeds.

Such is the sad place that winter takes in our first thoughts and spontaneous feelings. We would bid it altogether away, if we could. We would call up the sun from below the horizon, and place him high in the celestial fields;—we would bring June into December. And yet, when the merits of the various seasons are looked into with the calm eye of reflection, it turns out to be quite a question which of the two is best, summer or winter. A perpetual summer, not less than a perpetual winter, tends to sink man to the grade of a savage, and to keep him there. Summer and winter are equally necessary for the full development of human nature. It is in the temperate zones that the highest forms of civilization have always been found in the past: and there is no

reason to doubt that there, also, they will always be found in the future. The banished duke in the forest was in the right, no doubt, when he assigned "the seasons' difference as the penalty of Adam;" but, as he has shown so beautifully, that penalty was not altogether for punishment, but for discipline, now rendered needful to raise again the creatures who had fallen.

It is quite remarkable how many of the arts and sciences owe their existence to the call of winter, urging man, from year to year, to provide against its rigours. But for the frown of winter, architecture would never be worthy of its name; and if it existed at all, would soon depart altogether from its true design. Instead of palaces and dwelling houses, we should have only large sheds and little sheds, and at best only solid pyramids and blind temples. Of ornament, there would be none, or if there were, it would be resorted to for its own sake, merely to flatter the eye; and instead of rising into the beautiful, it would be constantly straying into the fantastical. It is winter, through the cold and darkness, the rains and snows, which it brings along with it, that gives its true enhancement to the enjoyment of a fine day in summer, out of doors, and calls so loudly for everything which can minister for enjoyment in winter, within doors. Hence the real problem of ornamentation, that is,—to beautify the useful. Hence the fine features of a well-constructed staircase, apartment, or hall, preserving an ample area, and thus satisfying reason, while displaying beautiful proportions, and thus gratifying taste; and hence, also, the fine features of the palace, the mansion, the villa, where staircase, hall, and chamber, are so accommodated to each other, and combined, as to give every facility and elegance within, while they give a beautiful and picturesque structure when viewed from without.

It might, indeed, be logically contended that surely structures more truly beautiful might be expected, if beauty were the only consideration that needed to be attended to. But nature does not countenance attempts of this kind on the part of man. She seems to have reserved to herself the privilege of producing the purely or merely beautiful; and this privilege, which she claims for herself, she sanctions also, by doing it all without effort, and merely as her pastime. And hence we accept from nature, with thankfulness, the purely or merely beautiful, and are wholly satisfied with it when we behold it. But, with the productions of man, our feelings are different. We know the labour which a large building has cost, and we never fail to ask what is the use of it. In order to satisfy the beholder, a piece of architecture, in general, must be useful, as well as merely beautiful. The poet, the painter, the sculptor, we do indeed allow to bestow themselves upon the purely or merely beautiful; we are satisfied if they succeed, and we are thankful to them for the pleasure which their creations give us. There are some, indeed, who ask for more,—even a moral lesson, as well as enjoyment, especially from the poet. But however that may be, there can be no doubt with regard to the architect, that to secure a

unanimous vote in favour of his work, he must never lose sight of the useful. The idea of utility alone has weight enough, at least in this economic age, to vindicate the existence of that which obviously costs so much hard labour as the heaping of heavy stones above each other, in opposition to their natural tendency to be still, or fall down.

Now it is winter, with its bad weather, which demands these piles of stones so loudly. Winter, in fact, insists upon them not only as useful, but as indispensable. Winter thus opens, in reference to this art, a field for human industry, energy, taste, genius, in which civilization unfolds and maintains itself, and by which even nature is adorned by princely palaces and churches, lordly castles and towers, beautiful villas and villages, towns and cities.

To the same cause we owe the development of all those arts which deal with textile fabrics. The human form is in itself so much more pleasing to the eye than any trappings that can possibly be put over it, that but for the cold, people in general would care little for clothes. We are indeed wont to associate the idea of naked with that of savage; but the term nude (though it means the same) awakes quite other associations; and if there be any necessary connection between the absence of clothes and savage life, thanks to the winter that the approach does not extend to the civilized. It is only to provide against the cold that tailors and dressmakers find anything to do. Those who have been among the civilized races of the tropics, where there is no winter, and have taken notice of their costumes—as, for instance, in southern India—cannot fail in being convinced that a mere web of muslin as it comes from the bleacher, and that without the use of scissors or needle or even pin, may be wrapped about the loins, and brought over the shoulder, in such a way as at once to satisfy the most sensitive feelings of the most modest woman, and to form a drapery of the most perfect beauty. It is not to taste, nor is it to morality, but it is to the

“Icy fang, the churlish chiding of the winter’s wind,”

that we owe all those fabrics, and arts of ornamenting them, which engage such a considerable part of our population and of everybody’s thoughts, and which minister so much at once to our personal pleasures and to our national wealth. And if by these means, by the comfort and elegance of our homes, our warmly-covered walls, our curtains and carpets, our couches and bright fires, and brighter gas-lights within, and, when out of doors, our waterproofs, furs, mohairs, dreadnoughts, and whatnots, we succeed in mastering the cold, and even in enjoying it, what is this but a display of the latent energy of human nature, which winter has been the teacher to evoke and educate, what but an evidence that man is still good for his original mission to replenish the earth, and to subdue it.

Nor let us repine that such is our mission, or that we are appointed to an interminable war, the war of spirit against matter, of

liberty against necessity. If life were all one dulcet, piping time of peace, then how should we prevent that indolence and *ennui*, that impotence and sleepiness, that are too often apt to steal over us, even when there is a call to be up and doing? The war in which we are enlisted, by our very existence as men, is not an unequal war. On the contrary, man is appointed to victory after every struggle from age to age. The hostile powers of nature are not more numerous, nor are they stronger now than they were ages ago; while man, by the progress of the arts and sciences, has been gaining upon them. The Alps are no higher or harder now than they were in the days of Hannibal; but the engineer can tunnel them now right through, and shoot a train into Italy when he pleases. The Atlantic is no broader nor more stormy now than when Columbus first crossed it: but the sailor now, instead of having to wait, all anxious for a favourable wind, can go to sea when it suits him, and shape a straight course in his steamship, and keep to it all the way across, though right in the wind's eye. Nor needs the man of business or the errand of affection now even to wait for the post, though it travel so rapidly. With the speed of lightning his message may be sent thousands of miles in a few moments, and from extremest distances his answer may be received before the sun go down. Now of the "natural enemies" thus provided by our Creator to offer us battle, not to conquer us but to develop our powers and make us men, winter is one of the chief.

Nor is this mere argument and theory. To see how it goes with human creatures, when the climate where they dwell is without a winter, it is only necessary to inspect the condition of the native population in regions near the equator. There, of course, there is no winter. The sun rises and sets within a quarter of an hour of six o'clock morning and evening all the year round. The air is also generally moist, and there is a luxuriant vegetation every month in the year. Near the sea there is also an ever-blowing sea breeze, so benignant, that any one may sleep in it all night without risk. The name of winter is unknown to the natives, and there is nothing corresponding to the reality. The amenity of the climate is indeed perfect, and those who have resided there, and then have returned to this country, generally recall it to memory like a beautiful dream. Well; what of the natives there? their physical, moral, intellectual development in a region of nature that seems so enviable? Take the island of Ceylon, for instance. On the authority of Bishop Heber, who has been upon the spot, we know that "every prospect pleases;" but to this there is the sad addition, that "only man is vile." And it is certain that the native there is the very antipode of all energy, the very personification of apathy. His sleep is so profound that, though he commonly lies on the hard brick floor, with nothing softer than a mat for a bed, from which one would suppose that he would be easily woke up, yet it usually takes a good kick to start him. And when he is up and awake to the utmost, still he is not wide awake, and can never keep his own

He has been put down and ruled by races from wintry regions, one after another, from time immemorial. And although in the present day, through the goodness of the British government, which now holds the sway over him, he has generally a garden of his own, yet it is everywhere a garden of weeds; and he is content to subsist on the nuts and fruits of the trees which his father once planted, and which, though left to themselves ever since, have not yet ceased—so great is the bounty of nature, to yield such food as he deems good enough for him, year after year, nay, month after month, for half a century and more. Thanks to the weight of the nut (the cocoa) which he likes best, he has not to climb for it. The nut falls from the tree when it is ripe; and, in falling, makes a noise loud enough to awake him when he is sleeping in the shade beneath. And thus he is not without his dinner and his dinner bell; though the returns of the coroners shew that, in this way, not a few natives get their crowns cracked every year.

Europeans, when in these parts, experience the same effects of a perpetual summer. The most trivial action is found to require an effort, and to prove fatiguing. And not the chair but the couch is that piece of furniture which is most in demand; and stretched on which you are surest to find the party whom you visit. This effect may, perhaps, be ascribed to the excessive heat rather than to the perpetual summer. At the same time, it is not to be observed in countries where there is a winter, however oppressive the summer heat may be. Thus, in the United States, and even in Canada, the temperature of summer rivals that of India, and is much more oppressive; but there is a winter also, and of this the bracing effect appears to be such, that no constitutional languor is induced. Nay, where is such energy to be found as in the inhabitants of North America? In India, also, the same thing is to be observed. Those who can afford to spend a portion of each year among the mountains, or in any region where a winter cold can be reached, do not suffer the loss of their energy like those who continue to live in a perpetual summer. It is not the winter's cold alone, however, that is favourable to the maintenance of the tone and energy of the human frame, but also the variation, the change from the one season to the other, and the stimulus of the variety and novelty which this implies. Unless man is to lead a life that is purely inner and reflective, he requires external excitants to keep him alive and in due relation with the other beings and things around him; and of these excitants the revolution of the seasons, and the return of winter, is one of the chief. For a life of solid or fruitful reflection, indeed, not less than for a life of social activity and usefulness, these external excitants appear to be necessary. The philosophers of a perpetual summer, at least, the sages of India, have not made much of their thoughts. To them dialectics is everything; truth next to nothing. To them words are things, and things are of no account. The popular mind also displays a similar tendency. When we ask, and are eager to know, the cause of a phenomenon,

the natives of India merely wonder. Nor do they wonder long. Some one says it is magic, and all are satisfied. Nothing more difficult than to find an earnest man among thousands that may be around you. Or, rather, let us say that the mind of the population is like that of the clime—a perpetual summer, of which contentment with self is the sunshine, and every change unacceptable.

It might be even contended that it is in temperate regions, in regions diversified by the variety of the seasons, and where a winter annually recurs, that the Creator has provided, by anticipation, for the most powerful races of man. Thus, the family of the grasses, which includes all pastures, and all the most valuable kinds of vegetable food, attains its finest development in temperate regions; and for the maturation of the most valuable fruits and grains, a winter, or rather the anticipation of it, is indispensable. But here our argument opens in another walk, suggesting the propriety of bringing our present remarks to a close. M.

The Reviewer.

Seth Bede, the "Methody;" his Life and Labours. Tallant & Co., Paternoster Row. 1859.

THIS tract professes to give the real history of several of the principal characters in "Adam Bede," which we reviewed in our October number. We are not aware that it lies open to any objection on the score of correctness; however, we do object strongly to any one poaching on the literary preserve which belongs indisputably to another. The publication of this tract is scarcely less reprehensible than that of another, under the title of "Adam Bede, Jun." The object of both we conceive to be nothing higher than to extort money from a curious public; and, as such, we are glad to believe that both have proved failures. Moreover, we do not care to have the veil of fiction withdrawn from the characters which are immortalized in "Adam Bede." To us—and, we doubt not, to all other readers, as far as impression goes—the "true" history is fictitious, and the fictitious true.

Tweedie's Temperance Almanack for 1860. London: Tweedie, Strand. Price 3d.

A good almanack, accompanied with much information, which will be useful to all friends of the Temperance cause.

The Public Speaker, and How to Make One. London: Nisbet.

IN the preface to this book the author apologizes for sending it to the press, because there are several works before the public which treat of the same subject. He only mentions two, however,

one by Mr. Bantine, an excellent little work, recently noticed in our pages, and the other, forsooth, by Cicero! If other subjects were as sparsely written upon, we should soon have a cry of distress in the Row, and the able editor of *Macmillan's Magazine* could not speak of the seven thousand works of fiction which have appeared since the *Waverley* novels. We have always regarded with interest works on this much-neglected subject, and we desire to extend to the last arrival the consideration of our benevolent regard. The directions for acquiring the art of public speaking, so far as we can judge, may be acted upon with advantage by all persons of average ability, especially if they believe in the old saying, "*Orator fit, poeta nascitur.*" In the busy world around everything seems to come up and pass on before us in living forms, rather than in abstract teachings. The traveller's carriage is filled with patterns. The manufacturer's catalogue is not only priced, but often profusely illustrated; and yet where is the work on public speaking which is embellished with instances of the way in which the growth of this power in orators was developed? We should be sorry to be understood to find fault with this book, for it contains more of a practical and suggestive character than anything of the sort we know; but we should have preferred "Public Speakers, and how they became such," on the self-help principle. Examples of this sort would strike out and traverse the globe, carrying with them an influence far more weighty than mere precepts. Those who have neglected this matter will do well to act upon the suggestion, "Never too late to mend;" and we can promise them that, by following out the excellent counsel here given in so accessible a form, they will cease to be startled at the sound of their own voice, and will no longer be unable to utter six consecutive words when they assume the perpendicular before an audience. Had these things been attended to earlier, it would not now be true that Englishmen, so universally brave, should be so frightened at a few of their fellow-countrymen. Is it because we are so brave, that we are frightened at each other?

Fate and Discoveries of Sir John Franklin. By CAPTAIN McCLEINTOCK, LL.D. London: Murray. 1859. Price 16s.

FROM the time when, 300 years ago, John Cabot and his son, Sebastian, set forth in search of a North-West Passage, the subject of Arctic explorations has not failed to excite the interest of men of science, nor have those daring seamen, who have conducted them, lacked the sympathy and the admiration of a people with whom "pluck" is no "vanishing quantity." Other nations, however, have manifested a practical interest in these discoveries; for the voyage of the Russian navigator, Behring, in 1741, was not without its use in clearing up what had been attempted, and preparing the way for still more daring ventures.

Early in the reign of George III. (1773), an expedition was sent out under Captain Phipps (in which served Lord Nelson, then a

youngster); but this failing, Captain Cook was chosen for the endeavour to effect a North-East Passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean, which was also without the desiderated result. Fifty years now passed without any further attempt; and Sir John Ross, in April, 1818, sailed from the Thames, to return in October of the same year, scarcely having effected anything. His young lieutenant, Parry, took up the enterprise in the same year, and held on bravely, till his course was arrested by an immense body of immovable ice. The next year, finding further progress impossible, Parry returned to England, and his crew became entitled to the Government reward of £5,000. In the same year in which he started (1819), Franklin first undertook his terrible journey to the northern shores of America. He was three years absent, having endured unparalleled hardships, and travelled between five and six thousand miles. In this voyage he established the existence of an Arctic Ocean, which was apparently impassable for all purposes of navigation. Happy for Franklin would it have been had the subject of Arctic discovery never again been mooted; but in 1845, a long peace having closed almost every avenue to fame or promotion, public attention was once more directed to the Arctic voyages, and no sooner was it known that such an expedition was contemplated, than volunteers pressed forward eager for employment. The gallant veteran, Sir John Franklin, undertook the command, and the ill-fated *Erebus* and *Terror* left England, to become, with their heroic freight, frozen evidences of the severity of the climate. Since 1845, nearly thirty vessels, of various sizes and descriptions, fitted out by private and public means in England and America, have been sent forth in search of them.

This brief *résumé* of Arctic enterprise will show that the subject has not been over-estimated by a generous public, who are now rewarded by a narrative of the successful cruise of the gay little yacht *Fox*. Lady Franklin, than whom a nobler-hearted woman never lived, originated this last expedition, and may, indeed, be said to have the honour of the discovery of the North-West Passage, as but for her unshaken perseverance it would not have been satisfactorily ascertained that her husband had discovered it. It is a remarkable fact, that although the sterile and hopeless nature of Arctic voyages has long been known, they seem to have acquired a fascinating power over those who project or engage in them, which is heightened by the contest with almost insuperable obstacles. Captain McClintock, referring to his appointment to the command of the last expedition, says:—"As a post of honour and of some difficulty, it possessed quite sufficient charms to a naval officer who had served already in three consecutive expeditions, from 1848 to 1854. I was thoroughly conversant with all the details of this peculiar service; and I confess, moreover, that my whole heart was in the cause."

This spirited language is a fair specimen of the entire work, which gives one the impression that McClintock is a man of unob-

tentative valour, steadfast energy, and substantial capacity. He writes in the easy and natural style of an honest, open-hearted man, on excellent terms with everybody. Throughout his book he distributes, with no stinted hand, high praise to his brother adventurers, and compliments to those who have preceded him in other expeditions. That success should attend the heroism of this Havelock of the ice and his brave band is not to be wondered at, sustained as they were by the nobleness of their enterprise, and a chivalrous devotion to Lady Franklin, which is quite affecting; for with sailorly frankness and simplicity our author narrates how enthusiastically they drank her health, and talked of her, while they were fast locked in the icy jaws of the Arctic. The substance of the discovery now made is an important documentary record, picked up by Lieutenant Hobson in a cairn at Cape Herschel, a fac-simile of which accompanies the volume. Under date May, 1847, is a satisfactory statement of the success up to that time; but around the margin is written a very different tale. The ships had been beset in September, 1846, and Sir J. Franklin had died in June, 1847. Doubtless the writer of this sad story was one of those who subsequently succumbed to the same fate, or "dropped by the way, as they walked along."

The work has the literary merit of freshness, and its "get-up" does credit to the house of Murray, from which it emanates, being illustrated with a good map and many excellent wood engravings. Those of our readers who may not be able to see the work will find a graphic and ably written account in the *Cornhill Magazine*, No. 1, from the pen of an officer of the *For*, and some pleasing articles on the same subject, by Captain Shepard Osborn, in *Once a Week*.

Poetic Section.

ORIGINAL POETRY.

The Dead of 1859.

MACAULAY, JAMES, HUMBOLDT, STEPHENSON, DE QUINCEY,
BRUNEL, HUNT, IRVING.

Our comrades are promoted—wherefore grieve?
The dead are always with us in our hopes,
But these are pulsing in our living hearts.
Their footprints lie eternal on our souls,
And where they trod, bright flowers shall ever grow.
On Time's pale brow a crown doth henceforth rest,
Flaming with stars, their names,—Futurity
Owning them all her chiefest ornaments.
They have dropt down into the lake of Death,

But the ripples shall go widening evermore;
And the music of their fall go ringing on
For aye!

God's noblemen were they. So leal
To nature, man, and heaven, that we do blush,
And pale, and quiver, whilst love-wrapt we gaze.
Oh, but our world is glory-elad! Our earth,
Suffused with tears, yet throbbing with proud joy,
Still sends some grand memorial up to God!
The great man dies, and finds a double life—
The mantle falls to earth, the prophet soars!—F. G.

IN MEMORIAM.—WILLIAM THRELKELD EDWARDS.

(ACCIDENTALLY DROWNED IN THE CAM.)

CHANGE! change! How all things change in and around!
Life is all furrow'd o'er with Sorrow's lines,
Its glory, or its glow, no longer shines.
My pilgrim-thought still at *some* grave is found.
THRELKELD—that brother of my soul, is gone,
Lapp'd by the greedy waters of the Cam
Into the maw of Death. Could no one stem
Their current ere they vanquish'd such a one?
Vain thought! and wrong as vain. All-knowing God
To him the gradual lapse of years denied;
Gave Death in *one*, Life in *another* tide,
And early access into heaven bestow'd:
That from the common lot—"Do and endure"—
He might be freed—because in Christ made pure.—N.

SONNET.

BESIDE the lake we stray'd; the air was sweet,
With quiet warmth, the sun had scarcely set,
Flinging up wreaths of golden-glory yet
Upon the floating clouds so soft and fleet.
The mountains were in shadow, but the lake,
Sparkling and dancing, flash'd out in the light
Of the rich sky, and the spray glitter'd bright
From plashing oars of gliding boats, that wake
A living beauty in the picture fair
That smiled before mine eyes on that calm eve,
Set in a frame of branches arch'd, that leave
No space to let the eye rove here and there,
In fairy prisonment to see the rare
And glowing vision, through the boughs that interweave.

J. M. S. T.

A VALENTINE TO "SOMEBODY."

When I wander *alone* down the violet lanes,
And daintily scent the sweet breath of the pansies,
When the voices of song that so haunt our sweet earth
Fill my heart with strange joy, and my soul with weird fancies—
I think of thee.

When I combat *alone* with the sin-gilded world,
 And fight for my life with its false and cold-hearted,
 When I yearn all in vain for one brotherly glance,
 And sigh lest the angels from earth have departed—

I think of thee.

When I sit so *alone* by my bachelor fire,
 And long to look out on the life of "to-morrow,"
 When I parley with Fear, and weep welcomes to Hope,
 And would rainbow my heart o'er the flood of its sorrow—

I think of thee.

And my thoughts ever circling around thy dear name,
 Grow purer and fairer, even as thou art fairest,
 And when heaven whispers, "He that would know truest fame
 Must link Life most earnest with Love that is rarest"—

I think of thee.

F. G.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

79. There is a grammatical difficulty which I encounter almost every day, to elucidate or remove which I have searched every grammar that has come within my reach, and which difficulty, owing to my not being able to find a grammatical rule to explain the matter, continues to annoy me still. The following sentence will explain to you, or enable you to see, my difficulty. "When a *person* attains the age of fifteen or sixteen years, and *leaves* the Sunday school, thinking that *he* or *she* is too old to continue a scholar, *they* become liable to many temptations; and unless *they* continue to attend a place of worship, and to read the Word of God, *they* will, most assuredly, fall away from that religion which was before so great a blessing to them." The above sentence is most assuredly ungrammatical; yet how can the same meaning be conveyed in a grammatically correct sentence, without repeating the *he* and the *she* so frequently as to be annoying? Sometimes I have to continue a sentence of the above kind to a very great length; and then, as you may suppose,

my difficulty is very embarrassing, and I shall feel truly grateful to you if you will, in your next number, instruct me how to form such a sentence in a proper manner. In French, the matter is very easy, "*une personne*" being feminine, and requiring the verb in the singular, and also the pronoun "*elle*," all through the sentence. In Spanish and Italian the matter is equally simple, "*una persona*" being feminine singular, and demanding the pronoun "*ella*;" but in English I cannot get through such a sentence at all, without committing gross errors.—A PERSON.

80. I beg leave to trouble you with the following query, which I hope will be answered through the columns of the *British Controversialist*.—What books give the best account of the lives of the Popes of Rome, from their rise to the present time?—ROGER.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

45. *Theological Degrees of T. A.*—The statement of M. B. L. S. is utterly unfounded. The University of London not only does not confer any theological degree, but it is expressly disabled from doing so. The 45th section of its

charter empowers it to grant degrees (if thought fit to do so) "in arts, laws, science, medicine, music, and also in other departments of knowledge, *except THEOLOGY.*" There are voluntary "examinations in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, in the Greek text of the New Testament, in the evidences of the Christian religion, and in Scripture history," open to those who have taken the London degree of B.A.; but the only distinction conferred by these examinations is the award of £5 in books to those who pass in the first class.—ZED.

59. *Civil Service Appointments.*—These appointments require influence in favour of a candidate, though not necessarily that of a Member of Parliament. The civil service situations are given to those candidates who successfully pass the prescribed Government examinations, but none are admitted to those examinations except by a *nomination* from those who have the patronage of each particular department. Thus the right of nomination or patronage in the Admiralty belongs to the Lords of the Admiralty, many of whom are not members of Parliament. A candidate for an Admiralty situation must, therefore, have influence, direct or indirect, political or private, with a Lord of the Admiralty, in order to be admitted to the required examination. A similar rule holds good, we believe, in all cases but one, viz., that the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue annually places two nominations in the surveying department of the Excise at the disposal of the Council of the Society of Arts, who award them to successful competitors in the examinations instituted by that Society, of which C. R. G. S. has probably heard.—ZED.

59. Your correspondent will obtain the information he desires, and much in addition to it, by consulting Boulger's "Master Key to Public Offices," published by Houlston and Wright, price 3s. 6d.; or Hall's "Guide to the Three Services." Longmans. Price 2s. 6d.—X.

67. *A Mathematical Curiosity.*—*"Eclectic's"* reading must be of an extraordinary class, if he ever has met with such a marvellous statement as that which he professes to quote, viz., "That two lines may be drawn from any two points, in such a manner, as that the more they are produced, they shall approach nearer and nearer; and yet, though produced *ad infinitum*, they shall never meet"! Now, our old friend Euclid defines "*parallel straight lines*" by this very characteristic, that though "produced ever so far both ways,"—(i. e., *ad infinitum*), yet they "never meet." (See Def. 35, Book i.) It appears, therefore, that "Eclectic" has been reading about some parallel lines which, when produced, approach nearer and nearer: unless we suppose Euclid's celebrated definition to be positively false and absurd, and the whole system of geometry to be an utter delusion. We are, of course, aware that Euclid's definition has been deemed insufficient as a basis of reasoning (on the ground that it merely states a negative property of parallel lines), but we really were not prepared to find that it is a gross blunder! If "Eclectic's" favourite authors have, in very deed, discovered the art of drawing lines such as he describes, we think Dr. Cumming should take note of the fact as a remarkable proof that the "Great Tribulation" is nearer at hand than even he supposes. When the foundations of science, and the very axioms and definitions which we have hitherto regarded as necessary results and conditions of human consciousness, are thus upset, who can tell what may occur next? Suppose two and three should be found to make seven, and twice five to be nine and a half; or that the laws of gravity should turn out to be misapprehensions, and the rotation of the earth on its axis be put a stop to, just as peremptorily as Mr. Jelinger Symons stopped the rotation of the moon! We want re-assuring. Will "Eclectic" kindly give us a reference to the page, volume, and work whence he copied his quota-

tion, in order that we may investigate matters?

If there be no such reference, will our friend take a kindly hint for his own sake, and resolve *never more to apply quotation-marks to his own generalisations* of what he believes to be an author's meaning. In conic sections we meet with what are called asymptotes (*literally*, not falling together with, i. e., not coinciding with), to curves; that is, lines towards which a given curve is always approaching, but with which it never coincides. Thus, the hyperbola always has a pair of rectilinear asymptotes; while, on the other hand, the circle, parabola, and ellipse have no asymptotes. Again, among the higher order of curves, we find the cissoid of Diocles, the conchoid of Nicomedes, the witch of Agnesi, and the spiral of Archimedes, have rectilinear asymptotes, while some spirals have asymptotic circles to which they are always approximating. Hence, it appears that there often are two lines (one or both of them always being curved), such that they continually approach but never meet. "Eclectic" may have met with allusions to such instances; but a little thought will soon show him such *special and peculiar* cases of the properties of *some* curved lines are vastly different from his sweeping generality about lines drawn "from *any* two points," which simply means, all possible lines! The apparent impossibility of two lines (curve and asymptote) always approaching and never touching, may easily be illustrated, but is, of course, incapable of full comprehension. Take the fraction $\frac{1}{3}$ and try to represent it in decimals, and we have 3; 33; 333; 3333; and so on. At each step the decimal more nearly represents $\frac{1}{3}$, and yet it always falls short. We can be as accurate as we like to name, but we cannot be quite accurate. The laws, or essential nature of number make it impossible to divide 10 by 3, they place a limit to our efforts. Again, take the series $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \dots$, and for

finite; you may make the sum as near to 2 as you please, but never can make it quite 2. If the terms of the series be taken to represent the distance in inches travelled over daily by a mathematical point, it is at once obvious that such point may continue to progress, according to the same law of motion, throughout all the cycles of eternity, and yet never could pass over 2 inches. Our finite minds cannot trace the progress far; at the end of a month the position of the point would be ~~one-fifth~~ (or less than one five hundred millionth) part of an inch distant from the unattainable goal of two inches. Conception flags, fails, and yields helplessly in the attempt to imagine that so infinitesimal a space will not be passed over for ever. Yet reason acknowledges such must be the case. The law of motion is that the point progresses each day just half as far as it progressed the day before, or (which is the same thing) just half the remaining distance between its position and the limit. Hence, unless there be a distance whose half is equal to its whole, the limit never can be reached. One more illustration, and that addressed to the eye. Inscribe a triangle in a circle, and the difference between the two figures in area and in appearance is great and obvious. Inscribe a square in place of the triangle, and we find the difference in area between the square and the circle is considerably less than between the triangle and circle. Successively replace the square by inscribing a pentagon, hexagon, heptagon, and octagon; and, at each change, the difference between the circle and the inscribed figure, in point of area, becomes less and less; while the difference between their shape and boundaries becomes less obtrusive to the eye. It is evident that we may go on inscribing regular polygons until their sides become so numerous, that we could no longer distinguish their area or appearance from that of the circle. Yet here again, reason tells us, on the one hand, that there can be no limits to the number of sides

of a regular polygon, and that, therefore, we can make it as nearly coincide with the circle as we please; while, on the other hand, we know that no figure can be at once a polygon and a circle, so that we can never arrive at a polygon which actually coincides with the circle.

The doctrine of "limits" which we have thus attempted to illustrate is the foundation of modern mathematics in its higher branches, and it is there alone that "Eclectic" will learn at once its beauty, truth, and exquisite utility.—**AN ASYMPOTON.**

67. "Eclectic" asks a question in your last impression which I doubt not will be as fully and as satisfactorily answered as the celebrated question 140 of "Homo," contained in your 4th vol., First Series, regarding what is logically true and practically false; and I wish to refer him to that question, and the many interesting replies which it elicited in several successive Nos. of that vol.—**PADARNFAB.**

63. *Meteorology.*—We feel a difficulty in recommending a work on meteorology. The elements of the science are too simple, and lie in too small a compass, to require more than a short treatise, while its higher developments are far from being settled. Moreover, the subject is so intimately allied with other sciences, that it is needless to publish a separate manual, unless we could suppose that many persons are anxious to study meteorology, who are content to remain in the most abject ignorance of all other sciences. Thus the chemist must be well acquainted with the uses and nature of the thermometer and barometer; and again, since meteorology confines itself to the study of the laws of the atmosphere, which is a fluid, its chief principles (under the name of Pneumatics) form a portion of hydrostatics, or the science of fluids. Hence, if T. P. T.'s object be elementary information, he will find all he wants under one or other of the last mentioned heads in any manual of science, from Pincock's Catechisms or Joyce's Dialogues, up to the encyclo-

pædias. If, on the other hand, T. P. T. wishes to study such a subject as the "law of storms," he must prepare himself by a considerable range of scientific study, and then dive boldly into some very abstruse regions of conflicting arguments and theories. We should be inclined to advise T. P. T. to purchase Joyce's "Dialogues;" we believe there is no work more suitable for laying a foundation of scientific knowledge; and if he find that insufficient for his purposes, we would recommend him to consult one of the encyclopædias,—say the "Encyclopædia Britannica," article Meteorology; or the "Penny Cyclopædia," articles Thermometer, Barometer, Hygrometer, Atmosphere, Anemometer, &c. In these days of free libraries, athensæums, and mechanics' institutes, we presume he will have no difficulty in obtaining access to those works. I may add, in conclusion, that I consider a really simple, efficient, and trustworthy anemometer is yet a desideratum in science. Neither in management nor in construction are the existing anemometer instruments of much interest or utility to any but thoroughly scientific men. The thermometer and barometer are amongst the simplest of instruments, so that a child may be taught their use and construction in the course of a few sentences.—**ZED.**

71. *Latin not necessary to learning Greek.*—Certainly not. Hundreds of people in Glasgow, under the teaching of the Rev. Græville Ewing, studied Greek sufficiently to read the New Testament without any such preparation. Bagster publishes an "Analytical Lexicon," which contains every word in the New Testament, by the use of which, with a very small amount of grammatical knowledge, a mastery of the New Testament meaning may be gained.—**S.**

73. *Books on Geology.*—I beg to inform T. B. S. that the best works on the science of Geology for beginners are, Mr. David Page's "Introductory Text-Book on Geology," and his "Advanced Text-Book on Geology." In the pre-

face to the latter the Author states that the *Introductory* is meant to exhibit an outline of Geology intelligible to beginners, and sufficient for those who wish to become acquainted merely with the leading facts of the science; the *Advanced*, on the other hand, presents the subject in detail, and is intended for those students who wish to prosecute the study in its principles as well as deductions. I willingly endorse these words, and therefore confidently recommend the two works to any one wishing to become acquainted with this attractive science. The price of the *Introductory* is 1s. 6d., and the *Advanced*, 6s.—W. G. OLIVER.

74. *Translation of the Bible*.—The first Protestant translation of the whole Bible is considered to be the joint production of Coverdale and Tyndale, and it is said that only two perfect copies are in existence; one in the British Museum, and the other in the possession of Lord Jersey. This work has a wood-cut title, and is dedicated to Henry VIII.—SACRI CODICES.

75. *Almanacks*.—Almanacks in their present shape are comparatively of modern date. The first almanack in England was printed at Oxford in 1673. "There were," says Wood, "near thirty thousand of them printed, besides a sheet almanack, for twopence, that was printed for that year; and because of the novelty of the said almanack and its title, they were all vended. Its sale was so great, that the Society of Booksellers in London bought off the copy for the future, in order to engross it in their own hands."—GAMMA.

75. The word Almanack is derived from the Arabic article *al*, and *manak* to count, and was first brought into Europe from the East, and signifies a table, or calendar, containing the civil and religious divisions of the year, astronomical phenomena, and astrological prognostications, and other absurdities.

The date of their first appearance in Europe is shrouded in gloom; the earliest known are of the 14th century, almost all the astrologers of that period de-

voting their time to the compilation of almanacks which contained, with much that was useful, a great deal that was of a totally different character: so absurd, indeed, became the prophecies and astrological advice contained in these almanacks, that they awoke the anger of the great French satirist, François Rabelais, who ridiculed them by publishing his "*Pantagruelian Prognostications*," a novel of delicate and yet tremendous satire on the folly of astrological prophecy; yet Rabelais himself failed to have much effect on them; he therefore revenged himself by publishing every few years an almanack, in which he went far ahead of anything which the others had done, and "*out-Heroded Herod*" in his prognostications and advice.

Considering the thousands of prophecies made in the almanacks, it would be matter of great surprise if some of them had not come true. Unbelieving, common-sense anti-Zadkielites of the nineteenth century must not, therefore, be startled to hear that the death of Henry II. of France, the execution of our Charles I., the great fire of 1666, and the restoration of Charles II., were events foretold with marvellous accuracy in an almanack conducted by the celebrated astrologer, Nostradamus; this gave so great an impulse to the publication of almanacks that several French monarchs interdicted them.

In England almanacks flourished vigorously, that which constituted their chief attraction being the prophecies concerning the weather—"Moore's" and "Poor Robin's," two in particular; indeed, the former is, as I am given to understand, in existence at the present day. Some years ago, an individual named Murphy, who compiled a prophetic almanack, and was at that time in somewhat reduced circumstances, foretold a very severe winter for the following year (1837, I think), which taking place exactly as he had foretold, so raised the renown of his almanacks, that in a very short time he was in possession of an ample fortune. It is

matter of deep regret that there should be still so great a demand for the absurdities of astrological prophecy as to render the publication of prophetic almanacks at the present day a highly successful speculation.

Should your correspondent feel inclined to go further into the matter, an hour or two spent in the British Museum Reading-room would give some curious and interesting information on the subject.—PONTIFEX.

76. *Origin of Banks.*—Banks, now so essential, were of Venetian invention; and the first was contrived about 1150, to assist in the transactions of a loan, and called "The Chamber of Loans." It soon became the celebrated Bank of Venice, and conducted all money transactions. The plan was carried into foreign countries; and the projectors being called "Lombards," the great banking street in London is to this day called Lombard-street. Its celebrity led to the establishment of similar public banks at Barcelona, in 1401; at Genoa, 1407; at Amsterdam, in 1609; in London, 1694; at Edinburgh, 1695; and at Paris, in 1716.—G. S.

76. The invention of banking appears to be due to the republic of Venice. So early as the year 1171, Jews were accustomed to keep benches in the market-place of that state for the exchange of money and bills, and *banco* being the Italian for *bench*, banks may have taken their denomination from this circumstance.

In our own country the business of banking appears to have been originally carried on by the goldsmiths, and accordingly, we find it recited in an Act of the 22 and 23 Car. 11, "That several persons, being goldsmiths and others, by taking up or borrowing great sums of money, and lending out the same for extraordinary hire, have gained and acquired to themselves the reputation and name of Bankers." See Jacob's "Dict., in lit. Bankers."

Afterwards, in the reign of William and Mary, the project was conceived (in imitation, as it would seem, of the

banks of Amsterdam and Genoa already founded) of establishing in England a national institution of the same description; and in 1694 Parliament was accordingly prevailed upon, though with much difficulty (owing to the apprehensions then entertained of the policy of the measure), to pass an Act to sanction the creation of that great corporate body, which has since become so celebrated under the denomination of "The Governor and Company of the Bank of England."

The Act already referred to as the origin of the Bank of England, was the 5 W. and M., cap. 20.

Time and space will not allow of the enumeration of the several statutes subsequently passed relating to banks. Some of the before-mentioned statutes gave the Bank of England, excluding all other banks, certain privileges (popularly called the Bank Charter); and though they have since been in part relinquished, are also in part extant.

Subject, however, to the Bank Charter, as from time to time modified, the trade of banking has from its first introduction been always free, and other banks besides the Bank of England have consequently been long established, and that both in London and the country. In the year 1826 the Bank of England consented to an arrangement, by which it was authorized to extend the circulation of its paper by establishing in country districts banks of its own, managed by its agents on the spot, and called *branches*; while, on the other hand, it relinquished in part its exclusive privileges, so as to admit (within certain limits, and subject to certain conditions) the introduction of other banking corporations, and of banking companies not incorporated, even where the members of each of the latter exceeded six in number, with power to issue bills or notes, though payable on demand, or at less time than six months from the borrowing, which corporations and companies have been since commonly denominated *joint stock banks*.

By the effect of a certain statute, viz.,

7 Geo. 4, cap. 46, banks may be considered as consisting either of the *Bank of England* (including its branches), of *joint stock banks*, or of *private banks*.

—BIGGLESWADE.

78. A lengthened or elaborate reply to the above question, containing, as it does, so many minor queries, would involve too much of your valuable space and my time, to allow of its being given. I shall therefore content myself with giving a slight outline of the subjects on which your correspondent requests information, and refer him to some good works from which he may read them up at his leisure.

First, as to Archimedes.—Plutarch, Polybius, and Livy are the principal (if not indeed the only) writers who mention the great mathematician at any length; and not one word appears in them about his "burning mirrors;" from which we may, I think, safely presume that the tale is a fabrication, added by an admiring and imaginative posterity to the life of one of its scientific pets.

The raising the enemy's ships into the air is a story which rests upon a somewhat more secure basis, but even that is rather doubtful. Full and accurate information on the subject of Archimedes, may be obtained from the authors I have before mentioned, viz., Plutarch, Polybius, and Livy, all of whom are (I believe) to be obtained in an English translation, and a cheap form, of H. G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden.

*Mohammed's Coffin.**—Never, perhaps, in the whole history of human error did a story, so wildly improbable and utterly untrue, obtain so large a share of popular credence as that of Mohammed's coffin. The tale is this:—that his coffin is suspended in mid air, between the ceiling and the floor, by means of two powerful magnets,

* Mohammed is the correct orthography, as the word in Arabic is pronounced Muhammed, or Mohammed, and is derived from the past participle of the verb "Hamad," "praised," or "most glorious."—*Ockley's Hist. Saracens*, p. 1, note.

placed one above and the other beneath it. The facts are simply these:—Mohammed died at Medina, on the 8th of June, 632, and was buried in a grave dug beneath the bed on which he expired. For further information on the subject of this extraordinary man, see Ockley's "History of the Saracens," and Washington Irving's "Mahomed and his Successors," published in Bohn's libraries.

The next point on which "Adolescens" asks for information is, *Fortunatus, and his purse and cap*; and here I must plead almost entire ignorance; but with cloudy recollections of childhood's tales floating through my brain, I fancy that Fortunatus was the youngest, handsomest, poorest, and, of course, according to all the rules of fairy lore, the best of several sons of a rich gentleman; and that the said Fortunatus, being turned out of doors by his brother, was endowed by a good fairy with a wonderful cap, which had the power of transporting him wherever he pleased, and an equally wonderful purse, which would never become exhausted.

Such is the tale, as I remember it; but I by no means vouch for its accuracy. Any book of fairy tales would, I should think, satisfy "Adolescens's" curiosity on the subject.

Lastly, with regard to *Diogenes*. This eccentric cynic philosopher was a native of Sinope, from which he was compelled to fly, as his father kept the public bank, and had adulterated the coinage. He went to Athens, and became a pupil of Antisthenes, and there committed those eccentricities of behaviour which have rendered his name so justly famous. To enumerate them would be an endless task—their name is legion,—but they may be found, together with the most extensive and accurate information regarding him, in Diogenes Laertius's "Lives of Eminent Philosophers," of which a translation is published in Bohn's library.

And now I have, to the best of my ability, answered all the questions put

by "Adolescens." I have purposely abstained from elaborate replies, thinking that the better way would be for your correspondent to read up the subjects for himself. Should he, however, desire any further or fuller information on them, I shall be only too happy to give it, if it lays in my power so to do.

—PONTIFEX.

79. *A grammatical difficulty.*—"A Person" is informed that in sentences of the given form, the following methods are now most generally adopted, viz.:—1st, the nobler, i.e., the masculine gender, is held to include the inferior.

(The grammatical terms are used for convenience, not with any reference to the woman's rights question.) The use of "he" would, therefore, be sufficient. 2nd. When the verb cannot conveniently be made singular, the nominative should be pluralized. "A Person" would thus be changed into *persons* in the sentence given. These are, of course, only *excuses* of the difficulty, not explanations. It is an awkward construction, and we have no counsel to give more serviceable than the above.—N.

The Topic.

IS THE RIFLE CORPS MOVEMENT JUDICIOUS IN ITSELF, OR ADVISABLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES?

AFFIRMATIVE.

"The cheap defence of nations" is true patriotism and self-sacrificing exertion; these the rifle movement has elicited, hence it is judicious and advisable.—*MEX.*

That each man should be trained to wield the arms on which national safety now so much depends, as it multiplies the means and the chances of safety, is highly advisable, and so must be judicious.—*L. P.*

To train a man to feel the glow of patriotism, to prepare for the hour of danger, to devote himself to the service of his country, and to supply him with inducements to take eagerly to the healthy gymnastics of the drill, are all judicious objects; at least so thinks, Yours, &c.—*GOOSE STEW.*

Self-defence is the best defence; and hence the recent rifle movement, which places the defence of the country in the unshined bravery of the people, is a wise step, and worthy of encouragement.—*A. B. C.*

The formation of rifle corps throughout the country may, by presenting a guarded and determined appearance, save the kingdom from a disastrous

war. While Europe remains as it is, the surest guarantee that the devastating flood of invasion shall not reach our shores, is in our having an effective force of loyal British hearts, who, by their strength and readiness, shall deter any power from entertaining any such idea. The motto of rifle corps is, "Prevention is better than cure."—*L. W.*

The rifle corps movement is one of which every true Briton may well feel proud, exhibiting, as it does, the noble spectacle of a great and free people voluntarily and spontaneously arming for the defence of their country against foreign invasion. A movement which has elicited the respect and admiration of continental nations, and greatly increased our powers and influence abroad, must surely be judicious;—showing that though we are the inhabitants of a Protestant country, and have made some advance in literature, science, and art, and devote much attention to trade and commerce, still we are not "a nation of shopkeepers," but inherit the same brave and patriotic spirit for which our ancestors are so justly celebrated.—*J. M.*

At a time like the present it behoves us as a nation to be on our guard.

Therefore it is both meet and right that we should depend upon the patriotism of England's sons to come forward and voluntarily offer their services for their country. The rifle corps movement seems to be one of necessity, and is by all means advisable in present circumstances.—J. F. M.

I am of opinion that the rifle corps movement is a judicious one, inasmuch as it will bring into military training a large number of persons who otherwise would not have been fit for service in the hour of need; and that it is advisable such corps should be organized, knowing, as we do, the character of the French emperor, whose glory is in bloodshed on the battle-plain. His cunning and deceitful mind would at any moment he required contrive some artful scheme to upset what many now consider our alliance with him. A man who is in the hands of his soldiers cannot travel in his own track with the firmness and stability an emperor should do. As to an invasion, I consider nothing improbable from France, whose motto, graven on their hearts, is "Revenge!"—F. L.

A loyal, patriotic movement, affording a harmless, healthful, invigorating exercise—bringing the various classes of society more in contact with each other—eventually proving the means of a cheap and efficient mode of defence of our hearths and homes—and moreover calculated to make other nations respect us more than at present—must surely be judicious, prudent, and wise.

During the forty years of peace commercial pursuits have so engrossed our attention, that we have neglected our means of defence, and have fallen into a state of false security: some folks imagine the days of war have passed away, and the days of peace are to last for ever; but it is plain to all observant minds that such is not the case, that it is time for us to be up and doing, and prepared for whatever emergency may arise; therefore, under present circumstances the movement is advisable, and it is only right for us, holding the

proud position we do, to be always prepared for the worst; and the voluntary warlike attitude our country has assumed, through the rifle corps movement, is the means best adapted for that purpose.—GEORGE.

I do not share in the apprehensions so prevalent of late as to a foreign invasion, for I think that the time when such an attempt might have been made—and by France especially—is gone. Still I regard the enrolment of *volunteer* rifle corps throughout the country as eminently useful; because it is a movement which seems destined to give shape and practical development to the patriotism of the nation, and cannot but produce a great moral effect upon foreigners as well as upon ourselves. The spirit with which the movement has been entered on by the community at large will convince our "invasion-stricken" countrymen that there still exists amongst us that strong love of home and fatherland which can, when needed, raise a buckler over every hearth in the land; and it will also show observing foreigners,—would-be masters of our broad acres—that the defensive power of Britain is not to be calculated by the numerical strength of her regular army only. I think we are perfectly safe without the aid of rifle corps, but their existence will prevent even the possibility of danger to our realms from a foreign foe. I therefore think them judicious in themselves, and advisable, under present circumstances, for allaying the fears of our timid friends and dispersing even the suggested hopes of our home and foreign enemies.—G. H. S. *Dublin*.

I contend that the rifle corps movement is both judicious in itself, and advisable under present circumstances:—

Firstly, Because if there be no probability of an enemy landing on our coasts, still we may rest more safely, being assured that we have a number of able-bodied men to protect us and our homes from danger, should such an event take place.

Secondly, Because the formation of a

rifle corps must familiarize its members to the use of arms, and make them of greater service in the country's defence than they would have been under other circumstances.

Thirdly, It may be argued that we have our soldiers, who would, if called upon, be enabled to defend our country against the approaches of our enemies; but have we *sufficient* soldiers?—and, if not, can the country, under present circumstances, afford sufficient funds for the purpose of enlarging our armies? I think not; therefore, the formation of rifle corps appears to be the cheapest and best mode of ensuring the country's safety.

Fourthly, If the country has already sufficient defenders, an addition to the number can do no harm.

Lastly, The formation of a corps may prevent an enemy from landing.—
P. S. M.

We are of the number of those who entertain the belief that the rifle corps will not be required for *actual* service, and therefore that the duty they will have to perform will be in the nature of amusement, and of bodily exercise; in the latter respect very useful indeed. We trust we shall not be wrong in our view of this question, for peace is what we love and admire, unless there be *real* cause for war. However, for the same reason that many persons consider it right to keep fire-arms in their private residences, for the protection of their property from thieves and robbers, we consider it to be "judicious" to be prepared for the enemy who *may* intrude upon our country. That the rifle corps movement is also "advisable in present circumstances" we do not doubt, on the ground of the recent rumours of an interference with our just rights. Besides, the movement has pacified the fears of the timid and nervous, who never think themselves safe unless they are convinced by the adoption of more than ordinary means.—THE J.B.O.R.

The unsettled condition of the continent of Europe has caused great anxiety during the past year, and con-

tinues still to excite serious misgivings. We have seen a war, conducted with unusual vigour and brilliancy, abruptly concluded, while the object sought at its commencement was unattained, and the question it was to solve was only rendered more intricate. Since then an *ignis-fatuus* has been flitting before our eyes, in the shape of a Congress, where, in friendly conference, the great powers should unloose this Gordian knot. But the first rude gust of January blew it to the wind, and we are left in amazement to ask, What next? Will the affairs of Italy now be allowed quietly to subside? Or, if not, will the next appeal be to Mars or Minerva? Should it be to the sword, no more judicious step could have been taken by our countrymen, than that of drilling and arming themselves. By this means the security of the country is increased, the hands of Government strengthened, and the army rendered more effective; since, if needful, the home duties of a number of the regulars would be performed by volunteers. Britain will thus be more desired as a friend, more dreaded as an enemy, and, if neutral, more respected by all. Still more judicious is the movement, should the arts of diplomacy be employed. It will lend our representative greater influence; it will show him that the people have done their duty, and expect him unflinchingly to do his; while the sacrifice of time and money voluntarily made is an earnest of what the country can, and if necessary will do, which will cause his suggestions to be more aptly listened to.

Could we speak of the movement in more favourable terms, they should be applied to it as a permanent national institution. While it exists, we can give the lie to those who talk of Britain having reached her culminating point. The people who evince such love of liberty and country have youthful blood in their veins, and strength in their muscles. There is no position they cannot retrieve, and no crisis which their patriotism will not carry them

successfully through. Improving gradually in discipline, and increasing in strength, these corps will form a national bulwark. And should despots, leagued together, ever threaten our sea-girt isle — which Heaven forefend! — her sons, forgetting awhile the joys and fruits of peace and toil, will rally round her flag, and man her walls; they will draw the sword in defence of that liberty they have always enjoyed, inspired by the glory of their cause, and remembering that—

—————“Never did Britain's fame,
More brightly shine, than when she stood
alone,
Confiding solely in her own good sword.”

We cannot overlook the curious fact, elicited by the present movement, that two towns in England, Rochdale and Carlisle, are completely under petticoat government; and that the ladies have commanded their liege lords (?) to fawn on the French, and forget their duty. How unlike the matrons of Sparta and Rome!

To allay their apprehensions, we may tell them that a volunteer force will never do to make war with. It is like — to use a familiar example — the hedgehog's bristles, “united to protect, but not combined to injure.” And none is better aware of this than our ally, — their bugbear, Napoleon III. — NOW.

Under present circumstances, the advisableness of rifle corps is evidenced in the fact that our outlay for naval and military purposes is increasing, and has been increasing, from year to year; so much so, that the most unthinking stand aghast at the enormous sums yearly swallowed up for the support of these two branches. Still, in the face of so great an outlay, when danger is reported to be menacing our shores, our Government have had to acknowledge the humiliating fact of their utter inability to meet it with anything of a force at all adequate to roll back the tide of invasion. The judiciousness of rifle corps is not to be viewed in a spirit of patriotism alone, but likewise in a spirit of economy; it is not only a great

movement to insure internal quiet, and strike terror to the hearts of external foes, but it is a movement having at its root a great tax-saving principle. The volunteer corps have imposed a willing tax upon themselves; they have closed the avenue against Government asking for more money for army purposes. Should they do so, has the country not its answer? We war not for conquest, our principles are only those of self-defence. What need of an increase in our army — have we not an army of hundreds of thousands of volunteers, able and willing to defend home and institutions, from whatever source they may be assailed? The movement has a deeper purpose in it than John Bright's conceit about the press trailing a red herring before the eyes of the nation; it has a purpose identical with his own views of governmental economy; its very principle is the acknowledgment that freemen alone should defend their freedom; in fact, it is the first instalment of our assimilation to John Bright's model republic — it is the first blow struck at the folly of standing armies in this country, except for colonial purposes. It is a movement that a learned speaker said lately would “change the whole current of society.” It is no retrogression, but a progression. It has already had beneficial effects; it has imparted a firmer tone to our Government, and its influence has been felt in the silent cogitations of Europe's arbiter — he that utters his oracles in the palace of the Tuileries, on whose words the despotic rulers of Europe hang their fate, as upon the words of inspiration. Our volunteer movement has placed a barrier between him and this country of a character most consolatory to us, though to him most potentous.

Its judiciousness has been questioned but by a few, and their opposition has been of the most flimsy description. Under present circumstances it has wrought much good, and is destined to accomplish more. — D. R. R.

NEGATIVE.

Brag is not bravery; excitement is not courage; and vanity is not patriotism; but the volunteer movement seems more animated by the former than the latter of those qualities, and is not judicious, however advisable it may seem to the short-sighted.—**YELLUM.**

Fear is never judicious; and signs of fear shown to an enemy are never advisable. The rifle movement is objectionable on both of those scores.—**S. S.**

The aristocratic "bumme-ing!" which the rifle corps movement is receiving, makes one feel that it has begun under ominous patronage.—**E. H.**

"Hold ma, or I'll fight!" says the Dennybrook-fair Irishman, and he quickly misses the row he pretends to be anxious to avoid. Is the rifle movement not an imitation of this same folly?—**TOM.**

Preparations so preposterously palavered about as the rifle movement cannot really be advisable.—**TEN.**

All great things are quiet; but the rifle movement is blatant and blustering—a rash spring from the soil of vanity—not an oak planted in the plain of true courageousness. It mistakes drill for bravery, and the froth and effervescence of a panic for the fine frenzy of strong-hearted and lusty-spiced patriotism.—**L. L.**

It is incurring a tax on time, talent, temper, and labour, for which no adequate return seems get-at-able; and is, therefore, foolish charity-soldierhood and gratis-targets for Government,—the recruiting sergeant in disguise.—**EX UNO.**

The culture of the war-spirit leads to a desire for it, and therefore the rifle movement is merely a preparation for the revelry of devilry.—**ANGEL.**

Twenty-four days' drilling in solitary, two hours per day—can that enable an English rifleman to stand against the regularly drilled armies of France? If not, the movement is injudicious; if it is, what is the mystery of war?—**WM. M.**

Dependence ought to be well placed. National welfare and honour should not be jeopardized by a false and rainous trust in a new arm of defence, untried, and all but untrained. The peril is increased by the very falsity of the basis of dependence. A reed does not make a good lance.—**MUM.**

A voluntary conscription by which many men are brought under martial law, exposed to the temptation of a congregation of lazying and vain companions, and this at the characterless season of opening manhood, learning pretentious and ostentatious exercises, and gaining cheaply the credit of being a defence of order and his country, cannot be advisable at any time, and, least of all, in earnest times like ours.—**TWO AND TWO.**

Drill commences with the goose-step. Is it not likely to become, in the long run, goose-steps?—**Q.**

The corps are too far scattered—too much diffused—possess too little esprit, to be able unitedly, and so efficaciously, to obey any General's orders. A *mêlée* and confusion can only result in the hour of danger from the hastily gathered, separately drilled, and separately manoeuvred bands of volunteers who trifle with the rifle.—**PRESS.**

With regard to the first part of the question, we have only to look to France to see the evils which have been created by the cultivation of a military spirit among the people: and the formation of voluntary military corps is the first step, and a great one, towards promoting such a spirit here. With regard to the second part, we say that such a proceeding, which undoubtedly implies suspicion, cannot fail to impair, in some measure, however slight, the friendly relations existing between us and our neighbours across the Channel.—**PAK.**

This movement will produce and foster a military national feeling, which is at the present moment undesirable. It may tempt our statesmen to carry on wars which are purely *offensive*, as they will consider the rifle corps as a

home guard, and, therefore, may lead other nations to increase their army and navy. It will also have a strong tendency to draw the public from an agitation for Parliamentary reform. It will lead many young men from their evening educational studies to practise the baneful use of arms. It is an historical fact that, in accordance to a nation's strength *of arms*, is its character for insolence and disrespect of other nations' rights. As rifle corps will strengthen this country in a *military sense*, their effects are not beneficial to the character of the country; and should they become universal, they will be useless, as they will strengthen our enemies as well as ourselves.

I sincerely believe them to be unnecessary. If so, they are only to be regarded as a national weakness, and an enormous waste of money, time, and exertion. For the above reasons, I regard the rifle corps movement as injudicious, and not advisable in present circumstances.—EPILOGUE.

Whenever I see the riflemen parading our streets, I am reminded of an annual custom, that obtained in rural districts when I was a boy, of placing in the potatoe fields sticks clad with powdered rage, to defend the crop against any invasion from crows. These were called scarecrows, and, on their being first introduced, were amazingly successful. By-and-bye, however, in spite of the ominous smell of the gunpowder, the birds ceased to regard their imaginary enemies with fear, and the crows and the scarecrows were soon on the closest terms of familiarity. What are the objects of the riflemen, I do not pretend to know; but I am told by one of them that the majority of those abortive patriots in uniform, who are seen night after night "cutting a swell" in the streets, seldom or ever go to drill.

I do not believe that we have any reason to fear an invasion from the French; and if we had, is it likely that all the human scarecrows that our counting houses and drapery establishments could turn out would present any

obstacle to the French eagle, or divert him from his purpose? I should think not. The rifle corps movement is a mania, peculiarly adapted to the pride and love of superficial show, characteristic of the popular mind; it enables our fast young men to make an exhibition of themselves at a small sacrifice—to carry a sword with no anticipation of using it; thereby fostering their ostentation, which is the *summum bonum* of their existence.—C-R-G-S.

Before attempting a solution of this query, we must review the pages of history, both ancient and modern, in order to supply ourselves with facts, from which a veritable conclusion may be deduced. For 800 years, at least, the spirit of antagonism between England and France has had an existence. A French prince once assumed the dictatorship of "this neat little island"—in fact, it was a French province; whereas English armies subsequently marched through Paris, and portions of its territory were laid under contribution, and a king was captured and incarcerated as the trophy of Poitiers. Thus the wars of retaliation were conducted without intermission for ages, and even with the greatest animosity conceivable, in the face of an omnipotent scourge, more calamitous,—producing devastation, misery, and death—solely to satisfy the empty ambition of princes. I presume it is the tendency of suspicion, which has an eye to the French forts, fleets, and armies, that dictates the movement for voluntary drill in the use of arms of precision, with a view to defend. Since the visits of some of our wisacres to the fortress of Cherbourg, the tendencies of their animadversion have excited the fears of the pusillanimous, the ardour of the brave, and perhaps the pity of the wise. By what was enunciated, as a sequel to the visit, I imagine the fortress was not only impregnable, but it was to become either locomotive, or to be supplied with cannon of sufficient calibre and strength to throw projectiles to London. The *steam ram*, the increasing navy,

the numerous and *efficient army*, all were cited to produce commotion rather than serve the public weal. We should not allow ourselves to be lulled in lethargic slumber, by any friendships, however closely united, so as to disregard our national independence. In case we are to witness any attempts to subjugate our independence, we must not rely upon voluntary efforts for our safety. We must look to our Howards, Blakes, St. Vincents, and Nelsons, with their hardy companions on the main; should ever that arm of our defence be destroyed, our chances of salvation will be few and frail.

On reviewing history, we can point out the defeat of *British bowmen* of antiquity; and so it might be with the modern rifle volunteers. If we would place ourselves in a position of efficient self-defence, we must attend to our *naval reserve and volunteers*, so that our fleets may receive the complements of their crews on the slightest notice. This may be accomplished, providing a reserve brigade be properly formed. Let us take a view of the corps of volunteers, actively engaged in a campaign. Would they be efficiently supplied with the commissariat requisites? Would they not leave objects of endearment behind them, tending to alienate their ardour for conflicts, and turn it towards the target of domestic affections? Instances in domestic life could

be quoted, where fear has overcome duty; and many of this *raw material* would consider their duties of as little importance as a domestic affair, and in the face of a foe they would "parley for safety," and cringe to evade.

Contrast with the above view the wiry frame of the regular soldiery, who have entered the line as a life employment, and look to their duties, not as a pastime, but as an *obligation* imposed upon them by the acceptance of office, having no other object in view than the independence of their country. Such military attributes as the above, cemented by the hardihood of a veteran tactician possessing patriotism, will consolidate the whole into one mass of serried bayonets, impassable alike to every foe. From the above concatenation of sentiments, I infer that the movement is *injudicious* in its principle, and will not be of any efficient service to the country.

As to the desirability of the measure, I at present see nothing ruinous looming in the distance to excite our fears. I am apt to believe that the *policy of Austria is at this moment mischievously intriguing and endeavouring to inter-seminate the seeds of disunion and conflict between England and France*. That she will be successful is not at present at all likely, especially as we have the new commercial treaty now existing between us.—S. F. T.

The Societies' Section.

Stanley Green Lane Mutual Improvement Society.—This society held a meeting of a private character on Monday evening, January 2nd, at which a large proportion of the members, and a few friends, sat down to tea, after which the chair was taken by the president of the society, the Rev. W. Landora, who made a few appropriate remarks, and called upon Mr. Shield, who

gave an address on "Mutual Improvement Societies and their tendencies." Mr. E. Allison then gave a humorous reading from Fanny Fern; after which refreshments were handed round, and a few minutes allowed for conversation. Mr. Roberts then addressed the meeting on "Self-education," and touched upon various topics connected with this interesting subject; and, among other

things, he mentioned that courage and perseverance are two qualities which must be acquired before the mind obtains stamina for the great work of self-education. Mr. Ingham briefly suggested that ladies should be admitted to the regular meetings of the society; and it was left to be discussed at a future period. After a few remarks from Mr. Croft, and votes of thanks to the chairman and the ladies, the meeting closed at a reasonable hour. This society has been in existence little more than two years, and now numbers twenty-one members. The meetings are held in the vestry of the Congregational Chapel, Stanley, near Liverpool, though the society is entirely unsectarian in its character, and possesses members of every shade of opinion. During the present session papers have been given on "Literature and the Working Classes," "Patriotism," "Courtesy," "The English Language," "Infidelity and Christianity," and debates have taken place on "Communism," "The influence of the Sciences," and "the Maynooth Grant." The society is in a prosperous condition, both intellectually and financially.

London. St. Bartholomew's Literary Institute, Gray's Inn Road, Discussion Class.—This class, which but a few months ago was struggling for an existence, is now in a flourishing condition. Its progress will be best seen by the following figures. During the month of November, 1858, the highest number in attendance was twenty-seven persons, whilst the attendance in November, 1859, was as large as eighty. Not only has the attendance increased, but a marked improvement has taken place in the majority of its speakers. The discussions on "The Opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays," the attack on the Peiho; and the "Maine Liquor Law," were remarkable for a display of debating talent, which places the class amongst the first in London. So important and interesting have the proceedings of this class become, that a weekly report of its debates appears in

their local newspaper, *The St. Pancras News*. For the guidance of other societies and classes, we would say the only sources of its success have been a due observance of form and order, punctuality, and regularity of its meetings; the choice of interesting and popular questions; the admission of ladies to its meetings; added to the perseverance of and deep interest taken in it by the hon. secretary (Mr. R. B. Longland). The class is not thrown open to the public, but members of the Institute have free admission, with the privilege of introducing a friend. Its average attendance is 46 persons, making it the best attended class in London.

Young Men's Literary and Commercial Association, 12, Eastace Street, Dublin.—A special general meeting of the friends and members of this society was held in the Rotunda on Wednesday evening, the 2nd of November, when about 200 persons were present. The chair was taken by Arthur E. Gayer, Esq., Q.C., LL.D., in the unavoidable absence of the Right Hon. Joseph Napier, who had kindly consented to preside. After the proceedings were opened with prayer by the Rev. A. M. Pollock, the chairman made a few observations in reference to the benefits resulting from the operations of such associations, and to the time of study which their members ought to adopt. The secretary then read a short report, tracing the career of the society from its formation, nine years since, to the present time, and affording groundwork for anticipating future success. Mr. Charles Hendrick then read his essay on "The adaptation of the Gospel to the wants and conditions of all men," which had been declared entitled to the prize, offered some few months ago by one of the members, for the best essay on that subject. At its termination, the chairman, with a few appropriate remarks, handed the prize—*Athen's History of Europe*, 12 vols.—to Mr. Hendrick, who briefly returned thanks. The Rev. Mr. Pollock then handed the second prize—*Maryland's Essays*, and

The Rev. Sydney Smith's Works—to Mr. Walter Anderson, the writer of the second best essay, and took the opportunity of commending highly the style and christian character of Mr. Anderson's paper. Mr. G. H. Smith then proposed a vote of thanks to the gentlemen who had acted as adjudicators in the prize essay competition, the Right Hon. Joseph Napier, late Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and the Rev. A. M. Pollock; and also to the Rev. William P. Walsh, who had acted as referee, which, being seconded by Mr. Campbell, was passed unanimously, and the meeting shortly after closed with prayer. A further prize of £3 worth of standard works was announced for the best essay upon the subject of "The best safeguards for a young man," to be competed for by members of the association.

Biggleswade Mutual Improvement Society.—A want has long been felt in this town for a society of such a kind as would bring the young men together for their mutual improvement and mental culture. At length a number of those interested in the matter determined to take it in hand. A meeting was called at the Boys' British School-room, on Friday, 4th Nov., to take into consideration the advisability of forming such a society. The number present was about 22, and at this meeting and an adjourned one, held on Monday, November 7th, the rules were drawn up, and officers elected for the ensuing year. Our first discussion was held on Wednesday, November 9th, when the secretary read a paper on the subject, "Ought the State to educate the nation?" supporting the affirmative: the negative was carried by a majority of one. The society now numbers 34 members.

It is confidently expected that the society will be the means of doing much good among the young men of the town. One fact, which argues well for its future prospects, is the earnestness with which it has been taken up by those for whom it was intended.

Bambridge Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—On Wednesday evening, 21st December, 1859, the members of this society met in their rooms, Temperance Hotel, to celebrate the society's sixth anniversary. Supper having been served up, Mr. John Noble was called to the chair, and after a few remarks from him, the secretary read the report for the past year, from which we extract the following:—"Its active members are now double the number of any former time; and from this pleasant fact, in conjunction with the subscriptions having been, at the commencement of the present session of the society, wisely raised from 2s. to 4s. per annum, its funds have thus been so increased, that the committee have been enabled to rent a comfortable room in an eligible part of the town, and to establish a good and popular 'Reading-room,' for the special benefit of the members, and which, we doubt not, has contributed largely to the present flourishing state of the society." The following programme was strictly adhered to during the evening:—1st toast, "The Queen and Constitution," Mr. Maitland; song, Mr. Noble; 2nd toast, "The Army and Navy," Serjeant Paxton; song, Mr. Kennedy; 3rd toast, "Mutual Improvement Societies," Mr. McMullan; song, Choir; 4th toast, "Agriculture," Mr. James Frier; piece of recitation, Mr. R. Davidson; 5th toast, "The Linen Trade," Mr. A. Carson; song, Mr. Brownlow; 6th toast, "Arts and Sciences," Mr. J. Bambrick; song, Serjeant Paxton; 7th toast, "Ireland and the Irish," Mr. B. Linn; song, Mr. J. Bambrick; 8th toast, "The Ladies," Mr. R. Rea; song, Mr. J. Noble; 9th toast, "The Crozier Memorial," Mr. Black; piece of recitation, Mr. N. Glass; 10th toast, "Trade and Commerce," Mr. Pinckerton; song, Mr. Noble; 11th toast, "The Musical Talent of Ireland," Mr. Brownlow; dialogue, Messrs. Maitland and King; 12th toast, "Steam Communication," Mr. Barry; song, Mr. Kennedy.

An address was then read to Mr. James Frier, whose term of office, as chairman, had just expired. Mr. Frier had occupied the chair for nearly four years, and it was owing to his exertions that the society now presented so thriving and prosperous an aspect. Mr. Frier having responded to

the address in very suitable and feeling language, concluded by proposing a vote of thanks to Mr. Noble, chairman of the meeting, which was passed unanimously. The National Anthem appropriately wound up the proceedings.—J. A. B.

P.S.—The toasts were drunk with water.

LITERARY NOTES.

"A Man's Heart," a new poem, by Charles Mackay, is in the press.

A chapter of English History has been re-written by JOHN FORSTER, the historian of "*The Statesmen of the Commonwealth*," viz., an account of the "*Arrest of Five Members by Charles I.*" It will appear this month.

The articles in the January part of the *Athenæum* on BACON are deeply interesting to historic and philosophic students, as tending to take away the pith and point of Pope's characterization, "The greatest, wisest, meanest of mankind."

WILLIAM SPENCE, survivor of the entomological firm of "*Kirby and Spence*," died 6th ult., aged 77.

"Hamlet" and "Macbeth" have recently been translated for, and represented on, the Florentine stage. Commentaries on the same plays, besides the "Tempest," have been published in Dutch.

Goethe's "Faust" has been translated into the Hungarian language by Stephen Nagy.

The London *Liber Albus* of 1419, under Whittington's mayorate, is to be issued (translated) by Messrs. Griffin.

George Gilfillan is to provide us with "Alpha and Omega," soon.

A fund for behoof of the family of Bayle St. John, author of "Montaigne, the Essayist," &c., who died Aug. 1, 1859, is in process of collection.

A re-publication of the Shakespeare folio of 1623, in a page for page 8vo. form, is announced.

LORD BROUGHAM is preparing a "History of the British Constitution;" Lord St. Leonards, another handy law book; Lord Redesdale is to expound "English Prosody;" the Earl of Winchelsea is translating "Job" into English verse. We hope the latter is not to be suggestive or reminiscent of "The Deluge."

M. LEON DE WAILLY, the French translator of Burns, has just issued a translation of the minor humorous works of Swift.

The late W. C. ROSCOE's "Poems and Essays," edited by his brother-in-law, R. H. Sutton, are announced.

The eminent physiological author, DR. TODD, died 30th January.

A republication of the biographies furnished by LORD MACAULAY to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," is announced.

Civilization in Scotland is to be the topic of BUCKLE's second volume.

The author of "Adam Bede" is to tell the tale of "The Mill on the Floss."

The Hertfordshire incumbent of the *Times* is the Rev. J. W. BLAKESLEY.

SIR WM. NAPIER, the Xenophon of the Peninsular War, died, aged 74, on 12th ult.

REV. WHITWELL ELWIN, editor of "The Quarterly," is to issue, through the house of Murray, "Lives of Eminent English Poets," from Chaucer to Wordsworth.

E. MORITZ ARNDT, poet and patriot, died at Bonn, aged 91.

European Philosophy.

THE SOPHISTS.

"As Pythagoras (584 A.C.), declining the title of the Wise Man, is said to have first named himself *Philosopher*, or lover of wisdom, so Protagoras, followed by Gorgias, Prodicus, &c. (444 A.C.), found even the former word too narrow for his own opinion of himself, and first assumed the title of *Sophist*; this word originally signifying one who professes the power of making others wise—a wholesale and retail *dealer* in wisdom, a *wisdom-monger*, in the same sense as we say, an ironmonger. In this, and not in their abuse of the arts of reasoning, have Plato and Aristotle placed the *essential* of the sophistic character."*

Such is the statement of Coleridge regarding the characteristic quality of those who earliest bore the name—honourable in itself, but dishonourable in its connotation—Sophists—wise men; a statement which, though impugned by Hegel, Lewes, Grote, &c., we are afraid we must hold as substantially correct, if not entirely indisputable. We are in general no grave conservers of traditionalism; and yet, in this matter, we doubt tradition has been more accurate and truthful than is her wont.

It is needless, because useless, to enter here into any critically philological disquisition upon the primary signification and the secondary uses of the word *Sophist*.

Herodotus calls the Seven Sages, and Pythagoras, Sophists; and many other instances of its use in an honourable and reputable sense may be gathered from classic authors. But it is impossible to deny that it did ultimately fall to that low, disgraceful signification given to it by Plutarch, viz., "Sophists, that is to say, counterfeit wise men." This invidious connotation could scarcely have arisen causelessly, and might easily be paralleled by words in our own language which, in the universal proneness of mankind to drag downward everything noble, have degenerated, and become deteriorated, *e. g.*, crafty, demure, dexterous, officious, timeserving; all of which, originally paineworthy, tainted by man's depravity, are now expressive of blame.†

Mere philology cannot carry us far on the road to truth on this topic; and even a lengthy and discriminating induction, drawn from the elder writers—such as that contained in the brilliant chapter in which Mr. Grote discusses the social and philosophical

* S. T. Coleridge's "Friend," vol. iii., sec. ii., essay 3.

† See this illustrated in "Trench on the Study of Words," lect. ii.

position and character of these Athenian teachers,* or the excellent paper in which the Rev. E. M. Cope rebuts the arguments of the learned historian†—serves little purpose, and often leads to great misconstruction. The critical reader will, of course, peruse these disquisitions with delight and improvement, though they should not tend much to the elucidation of the subject: for they are composed with a breadth and exactitude of scholarship which cannot fail to gratify and instruct. But to a person desirous of taking a comprehensive survey of the transitions and progress of the human mind, the specious, if not special, pleading of the philologists is embarrassing without being pleasant, and puzzling rather than practically useful. There is, of course, no question but that, in a full view of the case, the philological, as well as the logical and the chronological, ought to have place; and, in considering this topic, we shall endeavour to bring each separately, and all combinedly, to bear upon the distinct appreciation of the personal position, social status, political significance, and philosophical aspect of that class of teachers which has been usually included under the generic title of the Sophists. We shall content ourselves with results rather than processes, and we shall prefer brief statement, though we shall refer to the sources in which the voluminous proofs of our abbreviated exposition may be found. We hope to place before the reader an idea of the Sophists succinct enough to be easily studied, clear enough to be readily understood, plain enough to show their point of departure from Zeno, their relation to Socrates, and their connection with Plato and Aristotle. While, however, the view we shall strive to give is, on the whole, original, in its several parts it has been admitted or adopted again and again. Truthfulness, however, is better than originality, and we shall willingly waive our claim to the latter if we attain the former.

Those who have read with any attention our previous papers on "European Philosophy"—a series of articles which are already beginning to make us feel aged—will easily remember the transitions by which the various inquiries of the intellect threw back the investigation into herself, and made the settlement of her forms and processes of procedure a necessary preliminary to all satisfactory thought. It would extend our present prelection beyond all reasonable bounds, to attempt any abstract of former theses on this topic. We must presume that our readers have followed the course of our historic sketch, from the first faint dawnings of philosophic thought, to the determinateness of aim it acquired in the exertations of Zeno; and that they have perceived, in the gradual forthgrowth of human speculation, the need arising for an investigation of all the possible forms and modes of reasoning, i. e., of attaining satisfactory deductions from admitted premises. It is obvious that before any science of reasoning could be finally, or

* "History of Greece," vol. viii., chap. 57.

† "The Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology," No. II.

even formally arranged, a vast latitude of experiment and of hypothetical endeavour was absolutely requisite; and we have now arrived at the era in which this singular, yet in itself safe and salutary, development of human thought had its period of activity, and it is our design to trace its course, show its reasonableness, advocate its utility, and plead for its aiders and abettors.*

The possession of a science of reasoning had become a want of the age of which we treat. Philosophical systems had multiplied, and schools had arisen, in distressing number and with opposing views. The one tendency of thought had now become an effort at self-mastery. The multitudinous miracles of objective existence were seen to be far less wondrous than the singularly involved and actively perceptive mind, which strove to unwind the mysteries of the outward world. This, the instrument of investigation, seemed in need of being more completely known, and more thoroughly tried, before it could work out all the beneficial projects which suggested themselves to thought. In working, its powers became known; and in practical efforts after the attainment of knowledge, the high worth of the agent of cognition was revealed to itself. Every variety of speculative system, then possible, had been drawn out and settled into form-dogma; every kind of acquisition the human mind could store within it was laid up—treasured; innumerable data had been accumulated, yet the primary principles of Truth were in dispute and conclusions were uncertain. Tentation was unproductive of the ripe and healthy fruit of knowledge; and it began to be felt that experiment was first requisite regarding the power of the mind to gain an acquaintance with the true and real. To accomplish this object, the discursive activities of thought required an opportunity of free and unrestrained exercise, of tense and intense excitement, of attractive and interesting achievement. Every turn, quirk, trick, process, and mode of thinking required to be tried, and so tried, too, as to have an interest issuing from, yet ending in, itself, independent of that arising from the pursuit of an object. The necessary multiplicity of experiments could only be made when the spirit of man was so placed as to be excited to find, or strive to see, a favourable and justifiable side in each given thought. The dialectic of Zeno was essentially controversial, was probing and testing—experimental—had for its object the determination of the conditions of right-thinking. He set before the mind crucial and puzzling problems—the solutions of which it was reserved for the present age to discover†—regarding the limits of the thinkable; and inaugurated an era of investigative debate. It was neither an art of lying, nor an art of casuistry, that the Sophists sought. It was an art of *knowing*. To discover the limits of human

* "Art of Reasoning," *History of Logic*, chap. i., pp. xi—xiii.

† See Cousin's "Fragments Philosophiques," vol. i., article, Zeno. Lewes's "Biog. Hist. of Philosophy," pp. 48—55. Mill's "Logic," book v. Spalding's "Logic," p. 311.

thought, to learn the true ordination of thought to thought, to assign to reason its due place—were only possible by wide and divergent experiment, excursion, and observation. These the Sophists made, and Aristotle summed up the whole theory of the Reason in his "Organon," a treatise whose consummate skill is at once a result and a proof of the Sophistic subtlety. Reflection became powerful and useful when wedded to ratiocination.

Society in Greece, but in Athens especially, had got into a state in which the political wants of the people coincided with the intellectual necessities of the age. Energy in action, and dexterity in speech, were qualities on either or both of which political position depended. Indeed, it might almost be averred that personal safety itself depended on cleverness of thought and fluency of talk. In the public courts of law, pleading and impleading were continually going on, and no one could foretell how soon he might be called before the arbiters of law, justice, or caprice. To be able, at the requisite moment, to turn the tide of passion, emotion, or feeling, into the current most favourable to one's own interest, became a necessity and a duty, deriving its sanction from the instinct of self-defence. Whether, therefore, for personal safety or aggrandizement, for patriotic purposes or for the attainment of the ends of justice, a cultured talent for debate, and a ready power of making the best possible use of the faculties of thought and speech, were needful, laudable. The only means of enforcing on the Demos of Greece the views and interests which seemed to any person to be desirable was dialectic skill—the capacity of being able to lead people to think with and along with you. In any strife or rivalry victory is sweet to the winner; but in the conflict of mind with mind there is a precious consciousness of power elicited, which, though it charms in and for itself, is tenfoldly enhanced when the plume of conquest waves on the helmet. Add to this subjective inducement the opportunity of gaining a name and fame—the distinctions of power or the gauds of glory, of working out measures of policy or polity, of spurring on the state to unreachd heights of prosperity, of knitting together confederacies or of unloosing alliances—and you increase the eager anxiety of the mind to drill itself in every art by which mind may overmaster mind. The frank and noble will culture their powers to the topmost stretch of endurance, that they may fight and foil the enemies of freedom; the restlessly adventurous will dash, with the might of daring endeavour, into the gymnasia where new flushings of excitement may be experienced, and fields of unexplored research are opened invitingly to their eager eyes; the selfish and vain would grasp, with the exhilaration of the heart, the weapons by which they might carve their way to the chief seats, or the possession of the lustrous emblems, of power or station. If in such circumstances a one-sided culture, a dishonest application, or a disgraceful use of the arts of reasoning be made, should it be wondered at more than mourned over by sensible men? That such unfortunate issues did flow from the conjoint tendencies of the intellectual and political

life of Greece at this period, it were impossible to deny; they may be accounted for though not defended, and we are afraid they must be reckoned among the inevitabilities of the progress of mankind from a lower to a higher grade of being. Even the lark, though it soars to heaven's gates, cannot avoid bearing with it some of the dusty stains of its lowlier dwelling.

We are not sure that our readers will assent to our subsequent proposition, and yet we fear we must press it on their acceptance, if we attempt to comprehend the true relationship of the Sophists and humanity at this peculiar era. It is that the moral, no less than the intellectual and political, condition of Greece necessitated the introduction of a sifting and testing power into the spirits of men—the culture of a dialectic.

Custom among men begets an implicit moral code, of greater or less soundness, according to the prevalent ideas of the time. By-and-bye the implicit code of custom becomes explicit as law. Often with the institution of the letter the spirit becomes effete, and the form of obedience satisfies the conscience, all the while that every possible evasion is practised. Traditional morality has but little power over passion, desire, caprice, and whim, when the imperial voice of conscience is disregarded. Morality is a spontaneity, or it is nought. Moral propriety *may* be exhibited in all the outward and ordinary concerns of life by a person who has moulded his habits merely by the customs of his day; but it is seldom that some unexpected temptation does not reach a man and hurry him out of the smooth-water coast-line of customary morality into the currents of vice or the deep sea of indifference; and then, unless a reasoning conscience holds the helm, wreck is imminent, and escape is almost an impossibility. In this case, the natural deceptiveness of the heart exerts itself to gloze over the iniquity of departing from the moorings of morality; or the necessities of the matter make it imperative to maintain a defence against the active dominance of public law.

The degeneracy of the times was not, as is commonly assumed, a consequence of the development of dialectics; it was an existent *fact*; and the earnest assiduity with which dialectics were cultivated, forms the best proof that the depraved Greeks seized upon this agency at once as a shield and a weapon, and employed the high and holy means of gratifying the love of wisdom into the instruments of a low and disingenuous logomachy. The apparent perfection of the form of a process of reasoning seemed to the luxurious, dissolute, loquacious Greek almost as important as the absolute perfection of the truth which ought to have been expressed or represented by it.

The use of *any* means of attaining success appeared justifiable to the descendants and imitators of those who rewarded Aristides and Themistocles with ostracism, and paid Miltiades with imprisonment and fine. To such men the form and appearance of truth seemed to be much more servicable than the real possession and use of it; and when the state of thought during the fifth century made experi-

mental reasoning a necessity, they were ready to apply the specious argumentation of the speculative thinkers to their own purposes; and gain, in a transition age, the advantage which a new art in the process of trial gave to the quick-witted and unprincipled.

If these three tendencies be regarded as they ought, it will at once appear that an extensive demand for instruction in dialectics was inevitable. Demand regulates supply. Numerous teachers at this time appeared in Greece, who, though they formed no school, and probably held no code of tenets in common, have been accurately enough differentiated from other philosophic teachers by the term Sophists, *i. e.*, "professors of wisdom, those who taught men to speak, think, and act." The emphatic protests of a higher morality and a more modern philosophy against the sophistic practices of the transition age, in which Socrates lived and moved, ought not to be allowed to "darken knowledge" regarding the true state of matters in the age of Pericles, when the rude, rough, stiff, antique forms of morality were changing into those throbbings of man's inner nature, which threw into the heart the renewed life of a nobler virtue, and the honourable rectitude of a resistent, consistent, and persistent faith, such as sustained Socrates and furnished to the heathen world the example of a man following an ideal aim into the region of the real.

The effrontery and imposture, the unphilosophical quackery and pretentiousness of the Sophists did not strike the Greeks of their own age with that positive and direct dislike which they did in after times. To them their rhetorical commonplaces were wisdom, and their subtle manœuvres with words did not so much appear the result of cleverness, dexterity, and affectation, as of acute and far-seeing thought, and a special skill in speech. They had not yet a test for fallacious or deceitful reasoning, and they were enamoured of the forms of wisdom with which their ears were tickled and their fancies pleased. We are not, therefore, to expect that in their own age the Sophists would be felt to have lowered the morals, and injuriously affected the philosophical tenets, of their contemporaries. They *seemed*, and were then believed to be, both wise and good.

Zeno, the promulgator of the earlier dialectic, and Aristotle, the analyst of the operations of the reason, are each free from the stigma attached to the intermediate thinkers of Greece, Socrates excepted. The former gave the first and initiatory offset to the movement, and the latter arrested, controlled, and purified the arts of ratiocination. In the transition era, Socrates antagonized the Sophists, both in the form and in the elements of their teaching; yet he pursued an art and method of reasoning which bears his name even now. Are we to believe, then, that the mode rather than the aim of the Sophists was erroneous? Certainly not. The mode, so far as it was common and uniform, was only following up in the pathway of experiment the theoretic deductions of Zeno, and preparing for the carefully co-ordinated science of Aristotle; but the aim took a differing point of departure from that of true philosophy, which is the love of wisdom for its own sake, not for the sake of the advantages it con-

fers, or the power it enables us to wield over the thoughts and passions of our fellows.

The Sophists were the advocates of what was *desired*, Socrates pleaded for the *desirable*. The two should be alike, but they are not. The ground-thought of the one is far more noble and praiseworthy than the other; the court of appeal in the one case is altogether on a lower level than the other. Socrates posits conscience, the Sophists custom, as the implicit law of human activity. They strive after, he strives against, subtle turns, dexterous quirks, involutions, and windings of thought; prescriptive right against rational right, the mighty right of passion against the serene might of reason,—these caused the chief antagonisms between the Sophists and Socrates.*

To deal in wisdom is not in itself a criminal act. To vend and sell "the long results of thought" are harmless. The mere act of disposing for money of such learning as travel, study, experience, and time can supply to one mind is indeed more praiseworthy than reprehensible. We cannot, therefore, think that the act of sale is that wherein the offensiveness of the Sophistic teaching is contained. That we look upon as a fair and honourable piece of dealing, provided it is uprightly proceeded with and honestly conducted. It is not so much, we fancy, in the act as in the accessories that the guilt lies. It is not so much the text as the pretext of the Sophists' system that is at fault. It is to the motive much more than to the doctrine that exception must be taken. If I make a mistake in reasoning, it is at once spoken of as a *fallacy*; but if it is wished to imply that I intentionally and wilfully introduced an illicit process into discourse, the matter is at once denounced as a *sophism*. The impudent delusiveness of the latter excites anger; the implicit weakness of mind which the former makes manifest induces vexation. Disapprobation is the highest form of opposing feeling to which the one can raise a man, but reprobation is the intense antithesis to which the other moves an antagonist, or even a listener.

Philosophy had never a finer or freer field for experiment than that which Greece at this time offered. The intellect felt its need of some check upon its vagaries and the wanton wooing of the *new*; the political condition of the confederation was one of weakness, distraction, and difficulty; the moral customs of society had relaxed their hold, and had a true philosophy then appeared as an angel of safety and help, her energies and her influence would have been blissful and beneficial. But Sophistry came, with the face of a friend and the heart of a traitor, and stole from the hopeless even the energy of despair. Instead of ennobling man, it overrated the sensuous and underrated the sensual in him, and the loftiest of human powers became the agent of man's debasement. It was a sad fault, only to be expiated by a long period of distrust and suspicion. The eclipse of philosophy was occasioned—like that of the moon—by the obscuring shadow of the earth. In a time of obsolescent creeds, of

* This will be more instructively shown in a future paper on SOCRATES.

beliefs effete and inefficacious, of customs deficient in vivifying power or regulative influence, of unsettled politics, and of ambitious aspirants to place, power, and pelf,—the arts of persuasion, of fluent talk, of rapidly and artfully confusing words and ideas, are always in demand, and pretentiousness is almost certain of ascendancy. The real wants of such a society are moral discipline, intellectual culture rightly directed, the excitement of motives having noble issues; and these philosophy should have supplied: and, indeed, in the person of Socrates, she did provide the precise medicinal and remedial agency;—but vanity and self-interest carried the day, and the false Florimel was preferred to the true.

In a future paper we shall pursue this subject farther and more minutely, endeavouring to mediate between the extreme views of antagonist writers, and to hold the balances as honestly as possible in weighing evidence.

In any age it is a sad thing to see the popularization of knowledge resulting in demoralization. In Greece, the desire for gainful influence created a supply of teachers for hire—no wrongous thing in itself, but fearfully wrong in its effects. The love of knowledge for its own sake is philosophy. The love of knowledge for its uses, its gains, its influence, for the sake of turning it to account, is something widely different, and leads quite elsewhere than to truth. The utility of knowledge is indisputable, and the utilization of knowledge is right; but the search after wisdom only that it may be made the bond-slave of passion, pride, or interest, is a kind of study which cannot be dignified by a title which so unqualifiedly implies the *love* of wisdom as philosophy. If we love power, station, wealth, influence, fame, &c., and employ study—the attainment of wisdom—as a means to the effectuation of our end, it is clearly a false pretence to say that we are actuated by the love of wisdom. This is a sophistry of the heart to which we are all prone. We often disguise with noble names ignoble aims. We often ridicule duty by the use of words of evil implication to express it. We avouch an outward aim which conceals an unavowed intention, and we plume ourselves on our skill in gaining double credit, and attaining a double purpose. The age of Sophists is not gone. There is in each one a sophistical inclination, against which it is his duty to guard. The historic period of rapid ripening into doubt, of speedy declension into scepticism, of fertile excusings of indefensible doings, of paltering with justice, truth, and right, of vain self-glorying and anxious hurrying towards aggrandizement, is acted over again in each breast. It will be well for us if, while the false and illusive lights of sophistry flicker before us, we look with gladness on the moral light which conscience holds up for us, and hasten on till the brightness of a reasoned-out faith replace that which we had given up. Though the Sophists strive to charm, may we listen rather to the Socratic teaching, labour to attain the elevated and passionate love of knowledge which Plato had, accept the careful guidance for thought which Aristotle offers, yet still press on, and pause not till light and immortality are brought to life in our souls by Christ.

Religion.

IS THE BIBLE ALONE A SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH?

'AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

SOME of the arguments advanced by "Pope Gregory" may be dismissed in a few words. Unitarians do not find a solitary text in proof of the Trinity, therefore he assumes that no Protestant can, which is strange logic. The Unitarian view is scriptural or not. If scriptural, it is no recommendation that Catholics are Trinitarians. If "Gregory's" assumption be correct, that Protestants are Trinitarians without support from Scripture, through the traditions of Rome, it simply proves that the blind have led the blind. To admit his premises, is to adopt Unitarianism, but certainly not Catholicism. "Gregory," again, quotes Mark xvi. 16, gives the Baptist version of its meaning, and jumps to the conclusion that all Pædo-Baptists have abandoned their Rule of Faith. If the Baptists are right, it follows that Catholics are wrong in sprinkling infants. Every man who admits the premises of "Gregory" will condemn the Catholic, and become a Baptist. If, however, one Protestant denies the doctrine of the Trinity, and another that of infant baptism, it does not follow that all other Protestants abandon their Rule of Faith in being Trinitarians, or in baptizing infants.

"Gregory," again, asserts that "Protestants ignore the scriptural command to keep the Jewish sabbath, and follow the traditions of the Catholic Church, by observing the Sunday instead." We profess to know something of the Bible, but have yet to find where such a command exists. If his representation be correct, it follows that Catholics, in defiance of our Lord's warning, have made the commandment of God of none effect by "their traditions," and have misled the Protestant, which is a singular way of asking Protestants to continue their confidence in Rome. It is, however, too hasty a procedure to "challenge" an authority for "neglecting Saturday," until chapter and verse are given in support of the assertion that the observance of *Saturday* is commanded. He admits that there "is evidence, though very slight, that the apostles and their followers hallowed in some way the Sunday," and this is enough to show that *they* knew of no command to keep "the Jewish sabbath." The command is to work six days, and to hallow the seventh. All evidence in Scripture and common history shows that they kept

every recurring seventh day, though called the *first* of the week, as the sabbath; and their practice is proof that the interpretation put upon the fourth commandment by "Gregory" is a gloss. He assumes the very thing to be proved, and asks for an authority in the very paragraph in which he supplies it. He admits the existence of evidence in Scripture to which Protestants appeal, and amuses himself with the idea that Protestants follow the traditions of a church which they despise or abhor, according to temperament. In his opinion, the command requires the observance *from even to even*. If so, the same rule is binding upon Protestants and Catholics, and both are wrong in observing their sabbath in any other way, and "Gregory" gains nothing by his argument. It is, however, very unwise in any priest to try to uphold Catholicism, by showing that a Scripture command is broken by Rome; and a strange notion of Christian obligations, to affirm that the practice of *Jews*, and not of the apostles, is a precedent for us. When he has proved that "abstinence from eating blood and things strangled" was enjoined upon Gentiles who had no *Jewish scruples* to respect; that Christ's washing His disciples' feet was ever understood by the apostles as a command, or that they ever practised it as recommended by "Gregory;" that the time when the Lord's Supper—which is irreverently described as "what they term the Sacrament"—was either insisted upon by our Lord, or observed scrupulously by the apostles; that the practice of anointing the sick with oil was an ordinance binding universally upon Christians, or that it and the "extreme unction" are one and the same thing;—then, and then only, will it be time for him to twist Protestants "with rejecting some things which are contained in Scripture, and practising others that are nowhere discernible in that book." It would have been better if he had repudiated all such artifices of rhetoric where the simple rules of logic alone should be observed. The freedom with which this writer jumps at conclusions, and the facility with which he misstates the opinions of his opponents, serve to endear the right of private judgment.

The off-hand treatment which inspired writers meet from "Gregory" will strike every Christian, who is not a Catholic, as extremely irreverent. If "two of the Gospels are by parties who were not apostles at all," they were still inspired penmen, which entitles them to a respect far beyond that claimed by a body of ecclesiastics who, with a thousand indications of their fallibility, declare themselves to be infallible. St. Luke, we are informed, "wrote at the instance of a friend who wished to know something of the history" of Christ. A glance at the preface to his Gospel will show that this short sentence is full of misstatements. St. Luke wrote because it "seemed good" to him, and not at the instance of his friend, and his friend did not wish to know *something* of Christ's history. Theophilus would not have been styled "most excellent," or described as "instructed," had he been as ignorant as "Gregory" would have us believe. St. Luke compiled

his Gospel because he felt that a *written* declaration, and a systematic "treatise" (compare Luke i. 1, and Acts i. 1), were essential to a knowledge of "the certainty of the things wherein" Theophilus "had been instructed." If the views of "Ignatius" (of whom more in a future article), be correct, St. Luke wrote to little purpose; and it would have accorded more with priestly designs, if, instead of writing a Gospel, he had told his friend to "hear the Church." We are told that "the idea of compiling a book, which should contain all Christ's doctrines, never seems to have entered the minds of the apostles." This will be taken for what it is worth, when we find St. Luke asserting, in the preface to the book of Acts, that his Gospel was a "treatise . . . of all that Jesus began both to do and teach, until the day in which he was taken up." One writer, at least, was inspired with the idea of compiling, not one, but two books; and, if inspired, it matters little whether he was an apostle or an evangelist.

St. Paul is lowered by "Ignatius" to the level of St. Barnabas, and is disparaged by "Gregory" as "not of the twelve," "nor an immediate disciple of our Lord," and as inferior to "St. Peter, the chief among the apostles." The *suppressio veri* here is glaring, for the truth kept back upsets every count in the charge. St. Paul "saw" Christ, heard Christ, conversed with Christ (Acts ix. 4-6; 1 Cor. ix. 1; xv. 8), and yet he was not "an immediate disciple"! A technical phrase, like "immediate," used after this fashion, may deceive some, but will not raise the reputation of a priest, who ventures to make such an use of it. All St. Paul's doctrines (Gal. i. 12; ii. 2) were expressly revealed to him by Christ; his movements were directed by Christ; and the ordinances instituted by him were delivered to him by Christ, 1 Cor. xi. 23; xv. 1-8. What more had St. Peter? He was, again, "not one of the twelve." Twelve what? Would any of the fourteen Pauline epistles have been more to the mind of the priesthood, if Judas, *one of the twelve*, had been its author? This *suggestio falsi* is not our only ground of complaint. There were schismatics at Corinth who endeavoured to lower the rank of St. Paul, and thus occasioned his question, "Am I not an apostle?" Whether it was St. Peter whom they exalted, we cannot say; but it is certain that St. Paul's twice repeated rebuke applies to the Romans of the present age,—"I ought to have been commended of you, for in nothing am I behind the very chiefest apostles, though I be nothing," 2 Cor. xi. 5; xii. 11. St. Peter was never at Rome, except in the imagination of Catholics. He was not commissioned to Gentiles, and could, therefore, have become the Bishop of Rome only by usurpation. To him was "given the Gospel of the circumcision," Gal. ii. 7, 8; that is, he was the apostle to Jews. St. Peter addressed no epistle to the Romans. St. Paul wrote a long and elaborate epistle to them. He, not St. Peter, resided at Rome (Acts xviii. 14-30); preached there, made converts there, established and extended the church there. It has always struck us as significant of the *Judaizing*

tendencies of Popery, that its contrivers preferred the apostle especially sent to Jews, to the apostle especially sent to Gentiles. "Gregory" informs us that "circumcision was, to some extent, insisted upon by St. Peter," but omits to give references, which are elsewhere given somewhat freely for a Catholic priest. Those references would have opened the eyes of his readers, who may happen to be ignorant of all the particulars of the case, to the fact that for temporizing with Jews, for "dissembling" as he did once before in the hall of Caiaphas (John xviii. 13—27), and for "not walking uprightly" (Gal. ii. 11—14), he was "blamed" by St. Paul, who "withstood him to the face." We miss all reference, also, to the council held at Jerusalem, and to the letter which began with these words, "Forasmuch as we have heard that certain which went out from us have troubled you with words, subverting your souls, saying, Ye must be circumcised," Acts xv. 7, 24. We have here a written document indited by St. Peter, showing that the extent to which he, according to "Gregory," insisted upon circumcision, to that extent he, according to his own opinion, *subverted the souls of men*. We have, in the circumstances connected with that council, reason enough to distrust men who pass themselves off for authorized teachers, and for demanding written credentials. We are informed by "Gregory" that "a cursory perusal of" some of the epistles "will suffice to convince any one not disposed to prejudge the question, that scarcely any of them would have been written at all but for the existence of abuses in the churches to which they were addressed." Precisely so: and an admission more fatal to the whole argument of "Gregory" and "Ignatius" could not have been made. But for abuses, no epistle would have been written; and but for those epistles, we should not have known how greatly they have been perpetuated at Rome. It is because *oral teachers* with high pretensions subverted men's souls that, at St. Peter's suggestion, an epistle was sent to substitute a written rule for traditional perversions of apostolic doctrines and practices. But for *this* abuse and *this* epistle, we should not have found it so easy to show to how great an extent "Gregory" leans to the failings, instead of the virtues, of the apostle who, of all his compeers, is the only one that, both before and after Pentecost, grievously committed himself.

St. Peter, again, "wrote no Gospel at all, neither has he written anything but two short Epistles." The inference is extraordinary. From the fact that only two of the apostles wrote *Gospels*, it is concluded that they were "far from considering a written rule absolutely necessary." It seems never to have occurred to this advocate that *four* Gospels, by *four inspired* historians, constitute a proof that a written rule was essential in the opinion of the Lord of the apostles. How far the opinion of the apostles and that of their pretended successors agree, may be seen by a glance at the writings of St. Peter. At the close of his second Epistle, he refers to his "beloved brother Paul, who had spoken of those things" which he had been noticing (2 Pet. iii. 15, 16); and at the beginning, that all

the authors of Scripture "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," 2 Pet. i. 21. If St. Peter wrote no Gospel, it was plainly because this honour was reserved for others; and if he wrote but two short Epistles, it was because he was not "moved" to write more. His reference to the "wisdom given" to St. Paul, as shown "in all his Epistles," is a humble acknowledgment of the superior gifts and honour bestowed upon the great apostle of Christ. The more scanty his writing, the more significant is the omission of all reference to "the keys" which he bequeathed to his successors, and to the "church," which his readers should consult for fuller information. Short as his writings are, the more remarkable is it that he could find room in them to declare that "prophecy," and not tradition, was "a sure word and a shining light, to which," despite the subtleties of "Gregory" and "Ignatius," Christians "do well to give heed," 2 Pet. i. 19, 20. Short as they are, the more significant is it that he could find room in them to give so unfavourable a view of tradition as to represent Christians as men "redeemed" by Christ "from their vain conversation received by tradition from their fathers," 1 Pet. i. 18. Short as they are, the more inexcusable is it that anything they contain should be overlooked by the "authorized" expounders of the Word. To take the most charitable view of the statement that St. Paul and St. John "never intended their writings to be the guides of any but those to whom they addressed them," we must assume that "Gregory" had entirely overlooked that, in St. Peter's opinion, *all* the Pauline epistles were intended for Christians indiscriminately. St. Peter's first epistle was "addressed" to "the strangers scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia" (1 Pet. i. 1); and the second was "addressed" still more generally, to "all them that had obtained like precious faith with" the apostles, 2 Pet. i. 1. In this last he refers to the writings of St. Paul as more fully treating of the things which he had but slightly noticed. In St. Peter's opinion, the church, or individual, to which an epistle was addressed, was an accident; in the opinion of "Gregory," it was everything. In St. Peter's opinion, the epistles addressed to particular individuals were the priceless property of "all that had obtained like precious faith;" and in the opinion of "Gregory," they would never have been written but for the existence of abuses. Medicinal applications would never have been devised had illness not existed; and therefore "Gregory" argues that medicines are not worth much! The epistle, again, to the Colossians was not "addressed" to the Laodiceans, and that to the Laodiceans was not addressed to the Colossians, and yet St. Paul directs the churches at Colosse and Laodicea to interchange their epistles, Col. iv. 16. With a solemn adjuration, St. Paul charges the Thessalonians, as if with a prophetic eye to the *later* practices of Rome, to see that his epistle was not withheld from any of "the holy brethren," 1 Thess. v. 27. It is as clear as needs be, that in the opinion of neither St. Paul nor St. Peter were the epistles limited to

any particular church or individual. It is equally certain that "Gregory's" notion is very modern, for all ecclesiastical history, and the writings of the Fathers, show that all Christians everywhere deemed the whole of the New Testament to be the common property of the whole Christian Church.

There are two passages in St. John's gospel which give the appearance of truth to the assertion, "that all our Lord's sayings were not recorded;" but it suited the purpose of "Gregory" to quote only one of them. His inference from John xxi. 25 is destroyed by chap. xx. 30, 31; hence the prudent omission of the latter passage. In the former it is declared that the world could not contain all the books which would be required to give a full account of all that our Lord performed, which is a sufficient reason why an epitome, instead of a detailed account, should be given. That this epitome is all that was necessary, is declared by the apostle, who observes that what *was* "written" was intended that men "might believe" and "have life." If what was recorded by one writer suffices to give faith and life, *a fortiori*, the four gospels and the rest of the New Testament constitute a sufficient Rule of Faith. The omissions, again, acknowledged by St. John, refer to "signs" and *deeds*; but "Gregory" jumps to the conclusion that all Christ's *doctrines* were not preserved. Even if the inference were not logically false, and if it could be proved—that no one can prove—that *doctrines* as well as facts were omitted, it does not follow that tradition can supply them, or that what "Gregory," contrary to all Scripture usage, calls "the Church," was made the depository of things inspiration deemed unnecessary to preserve. The rules of fair controversy, again, required that John xxi. 25 should have been compared with Acts i. 1, 2. If the former "proves incontestably" that *all* the acts of our Lord were not fully detailed by St. John, the latter declares that a perfect abstract of "all that Jesus began both to do and teach until" the ascension, may be found in St. Luke's gospel. The former passage by itself shows that, though there is a "deficiency," it is not of the nature which "Gregory" would have us believe; and the latter shows that what is termed a "deficiency" is supplied by St. Luke's "treatise," which contains "*all* that Christ began both to do and teach." It is no fault of the apostles that they do not supply what St. John declares, first, it would be preposterous to suppose could be supplied; and, secondly, what it was not necessary to supply. We have four gospels, the author of one of which declares that things are omitted, but nothing essential; and another, that all that Christ did or taught may be found in his treatise alone, that is, in abstract. If we had not St. John's gospel, St. Luke's would suffice to make us independent of tradition. If we were to lose three of these books, and retained that of St. John, we should be able to find our way to heaven without the officious help of Rome.

The reference to St. John's epistles is equally unfortunate. That "neither of them contains much information about Chris-

tianity" is beside the mark, unless it can be proved that "information" was the object of epistles. The complaint elsewhere is that they were written to correct abuses; here, that they contain little information: and in neither respect does the objector gain anything. On such principles, "Gregory's" article is worthless, because it contains but little "information" about the Pope; and his *epistle* to the editor of the *British Controversialist* is utterly worthless, because it was written to correct the "abuses" existing among Protestants. If they contain little information about Christianity, it is the more remarkable that they contain so much about anti-Christianity. Though "limited to three very short epistles," St. John's writings are sufficient to give us "fellowship with" the apostles, "with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ," 1 John i. 3, which prevents all uneasiness that we are outside the fellowship of priests, cardinals, and popes. What he had written was in order that our "joy might be full" (1 John i. 4), and, therefore, tradition has no deficiency to supply. What he had *written* was to teach us "not to sin" (1 John ii. 1), and thus to be on our guard against "indulgences" to sin, and against the ghostly advisers who define between venal and damnable sins. What he had *written* declares that our "sins are forgiven for Christ's sake" (1 John ii. 12), and not through the intercession of saints, or the Virgin; and if "forgiven," that we have no need of priestly *absolution*, which, curiously enough, must be *followed* by purgatorial fires. What he had *written* makes us "know Him from the beginning" (1 John ii. 13), and, therefore, the "positive in our creed" is not taken from Catholics. What he had *written* makes "young men strong," and "the word of God abide in them" (1 John ii. 14), and, therefore, they need no father confessors to initiate them into Divine mysteries. What he had *written* was "that which we have heard from the beginning" (1 John ii. 14), namely, that "in the beginning the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John i. 1); and, therefore, we know how to estimate the assertion of "Gregory," that the Trinity is founded upon a "solitary text" not worth quoting. What he had *written* was designed that the things we have received from the apostles "might remain in" us (1 John ii. 24), teaching us that only so can we "continue in the Son and in the Father;" and, therefore, that "all divergence from the meaning of that book" which contains their doctrines, is deadly "heresy." What he had *written* was to tell us that "the unction of the Holy One" was "the anointing" which Christians have received (1 John ii. 27); and that, therefore, the "extreme unction" of Rome is a pretence founded upon ignorance of the fact that "the unction from the Holy One" "*abides*" in Christians. What he had *written* was to guard us against "anti-Christ," and them that "seduce" us (1 John ii. 26). What he had *written* was to inform us that "no he is of the truth" (1 John ii. 21); to wit, in the opinion of all Protestants, and others besides, that a consecrated wafer is the very *flesh* of our Lord. What he had *written* was addressed to "fathers

young men, and children;" and, therefore, persons in every stage of judgment and experience were, in St. John's opinion, capable of solving that great enigma of "Gregory"—the revealed word of God. All this "information about Christianity" is contained in the first two chapters of the first of the "three very short epistles" of St. John; and it is a great deal too much for the pretensions of Rome.

The liberality with which our opponent "Gregory" refrains from asking "for a text which says that the *Old Testament*, by testifying of the Messiah, is able to make him who studies it wise unto salvation," will be taken for what it is worth by all who know that every Protestant child who has been trained like Timothy (2 Tim. iii. 15) can supply as many as the summers he has seen. But it is ignorance of not only particular texts, but of the spirit of the whole Bible, which prompted him to "ask for a single clear passage that informs us that adhesion to a written rule, of which the New Testament forms part, is our only hope of salvation, and divergence from the meaning of that book a heresy." It does not seem to have entered the mind of "Gregory," that it would settle the question in a few words, if he could produce one clear passage that allows of "divergence" from God's word, and another that condemns "divergence" from tradition. Among all civilized communities it is the "lex scripta," and not oral teaching—documents, and not reports—to which men are held bound. Among all ecclesiastical communities, with two exceptions, it has been thought absolutely necessary to have "a law and a testimony" to which both teachers and the taught might appeal. The Hindoo has his *Shastres*, the Mohammedan his *Koran*, the followers of Confucius have their nine sacred books, called the Ta-heo, and the "Choong-yong," and Budhists have their scriptures. The exception is the church of Rome. It is absurd to suppose that a *revelation* of the Divine will could be ever binding upon the conscience, if it had not been published; or that it could continue to be binding upon successive generations, if it had not been committed to writing; for it is to suppose that men know what is unknown, and to require them to be guided by what is no guide. It is still more preposterous to suppose, as "Ignatius" supposes, that God has made a revelation, and left mankind in inextricable doubt as to what He has revealed. or, as "Gregory" supposes, that the revelation, which describes itself as a "sure word," and a "light," is, after all, an "enigma," understood only by the initiated, and sure to mislead all but a privileged few; or that a book, addressed to the laity, and not to the priesthood, is safe or intelligible only in the hands of priests. It is as preposterous to suppose that the apostles laid down doctrines and appointed successors who were at liberty to "diverge from" their "meaning." It is not a "succession," but a revolution, when we find apostles showing, with great care, that they were but "witnesses" of what had taken place, and "ministers of the Word" which had been given to them, and which the Holy Spirit was sent to "bring to

their remembrance" (Matt. xxviii. 20; John xiv. 16); and their "successors" boldly avowing that the written rule of the apostles is *not* "our only hope of salvation," and to "diverge from the meaning" of what they wrote is *not* "heresy."

But set the rules of logic and the human reason at defiance; let assumptions stand for proof, and proofs have no weight; in other words, let the Catholic doctrine, that tradition must be the test of the meaning of Scripture, be more rational and scriptural than the Protestant doctrine, that tradition must be tested by Scripture; and it will follow, not only, as "Gregory" declares, that *some* of Christ's doctrines are omitted, but what are recorded are heretical. If there was one doctrine which Christ insisted upon more than another, it was, in the words of the Holy Spirit in Isaiah (xxix. 13), that to "teach the fear of God by the precepts of men" was the sure road to ruin. "Why do thy disciples" (in other words, Why do you, Protestants) "transgress the tradition of the elders?" was the question the Pharisees put to Christ, and Catholics are ever putting to Christians. "Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?" was the reply of the protesting Saviour, and is re-echoed by his protesting followers at the present time. The "authorized" teachers of his day traced their succession up to Moses, and the "authorized" teachers of our day to Christ, with equal success. The "church" of his day "laid aside the commandment of God" (Matt. xv. 2; Mark vii. 8), and "held their traditions;" and that the "church" of our day "make the word of God of none effect by their traditions," is boldly avowed by "Gregory" when he asks for "a single clear passage that informs us that adhesion to a written rule, of which the New Testament forms part, is our only hope of salvation, and divergence from the meaning of that book a heresy."

LEX SCRIPTA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I INTEND to test the Protestant principle of the "Bible, and the Bible only," by its results. In so doing, I think I am pursuing a course which cannot fail to be acceptable to the readers of the *British Controversialist*. Most of them, I presume, are thinking men, practical men, who, by bringing theories to the test of experience, judge a tree by its fruits, and who, therefore, will duly appreciate this method of proving that the Bible alone, interpreted by each one's private judgment, cannot be a safe and sufficient rule of faith.

In order to be as brief as possible, I will throw a veil over the daring blasphemies and fanatical excesses of which the Protestant rule of faith has been the prolific parent, from the days of Stork and Muncer to Johanna Southcott and the Agapemone, and will confine myself almost exclusively to the effects of the rule on the maintenance and propagation of the Christian faith.

I. It cannot be deemed that our Lord intended that peace and union should reign for ever in his church here below, and that all

his followers should believe the same truths, and regulate their lives by the same laws of morality. Having said that "every kingdom divided against itself shall fall," He would naturally remove far from His people all that could tend to sow dissension among them, and split them into hostile factions. Indeed, He made the unity of His followers the subject of a special prayer,—“And not for them only (the Apostles) do I pray, but for all those who through their word shall believe in me, that they may be all *one*, as Thou, Father, in me and I in Thee, that they may be *one* in us, that the world may believe that Thou hast sent me. And the glory which Thou hast given me I have given to them, that they may be *one*, as we are one. I in them and Thou in me, that they may be made perfect in *one*,” S. John xvii. 20—23. The apostle tells us, that all the faithful are called to make part of *one* body, which is the church (Col. xiii. 15); that all are but *one* body in Jesus Christ (Gal. iii. 28); that all are united in *one* spirit according to the faith of the gospel (Phil. i. 27); that all have been baptized to form together *one* single body (1 Cor. x. 17; xii. 13); and that there is *one* faith, one Lord, one baptism (Ephes. iv. 5). And, mark, this unity is not to be difficult to discern; it must be a *visible unity*, a unity apparent to all the world; for our Lord himself tells us that this unity is to be the sign to the world that the Father had sent Him. “That they may be one in us, that the world may believe that Thou hast sent me.”

We should naturally expect, then, that our Lord would provide us with a rule of faith capable of securing this unity; we should expect to see the followers of this rule all believing the same doctrines, all participating in the same sacraments and sacrifice, all bound together in one communion, and not split into different sects, and all obeying *one* legitimate authority, capable of sustaining unity and harmony in all their movements. Has the Protestant Rule of Faith secured these ends? I appeal to facts. The reader need only look about him to see that it has not. The multitude of opposite sects in this country, and the still greater number in America, are my witnesses; that there is not a subject, from the fundamental doctrines of the Trinity, the atonement, or the nature of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, down to the most insignificant ceremonial detail, upon which those who appeal to the Bible as their sole rule of faith are not divided by most irreconcilable differences. By teaching that one man's interpretation is just as likely to be right as another's, Protestants, on their own principles, cannot condemn any sect, however absurd; provided they profess to take their religion from the Bible, they are good Protestants. Hence, there is no such thing as heresy, for the Protestant Rule of Faith justifies every heresy that has ever been broached. What each man finds in the Bible is right for him—truth is entirely relative and subjective; the Protestant rule destroys the objectivity of all religious truth.

II. I observed above, that the unity of the Christian church was to be the chief sign to the world of the divine mission of Christ,—

this leads me to speak of another practical test of the insufficiency of the Protestant Rule of Faith,—I allude to its spiritual sterility, its failure in its attempts to convert heathen nations.

Our Lord gave his apostles a commission to go into the world to preach the gospel to every nation, promising success and His divine assistance to the end of time. Hence it must be a most important criterion of which is the true rule of faith, delivered by our blessed Redeemer to His church, to examine with what particular rule His blessing has rested, and which is the rule which has always secured the enjoyment of His support. It is an undeniable *fact* that every single nation, which is now Christian, was converted by Catholic missionaries. *Not one heathen nation has yet been brought to a profession of Christianity by Protestants.* Nor is this from the want of material resources. Aided by the vast power and influence of England, Protestantism has had resources at its command, and fields for its operations, such as have not been possessed by any sect since the commencement of Christianity; yet, to use the words of Macaulay, "*Protestantism has made no conquest worth speaking of.*"* And what has the Catholic church done since the rise of Protestantism? To say nothing of the numerous dependencies of Spain and other Catholic nations scattered throughout the world, the whole of South America, with the trifling exception of Patagonia, has been converted to Catholicism since the Reformation. Macaulay says, in the Essay to which I have before referred,—

"The Catholic church is still sending forth to the farthest ends of the world missionaries as zealous as those who landed in Kent with Augustine, and still confronting kings with the same spirit with which she confronted Attila. The number of her children is greater than in any former age. Her acquisitions in the New World have more than compensated for what she has lost in the Old. Her spiritual ascendancy extends over the vast extent of countries which lie between the plains of the Missouri and Cape Horn, countries which a century hence may not improbably contain a population as large as that which now inhabits Europe."

We have the testimony of the Protestant Bishop Heber, that, in India, in spite of being discouraged by the authorities, the Catholic missionaries have made *thirty-five* converts to each single one made by all the Protestant societies put together; and it would not be difficult to show that in China, notwithstanding the bloody persecution to which Christians were till lately subjected, the Catholic church can point to more converts than Protestants of all denominations can show all the world over.

Protestantism has not been able to extend itself in Europe even.* No nation, which did not rush madly into the "new opinions" in the 16th century, has since embraced them; in fact, Protestantism has not been able to maintain its original conquests. As Macaulay truly says (*loco citato*),—

"Fifty years after the Lutheran separation, Catholicism could scarcely maintain self on the shores of the Mediterranean. A hundred years after the separation

* Essay on Burke's "History of the Popes."

Protestantism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Baltic. . . . At first the chances seemed to be decidedly in favour of Protestantism, but the victory remained with the Church of Rome; if we overleap another half century, we find her victorious and dominant in France, Belgium, Bavaria, Bohemia, Austria, Poland, and Hungary; nor has Protestantism, in the course of two hundred years, been able to reconquer any portion of what was then lost."

Protestantism is rapidly losing ground in England also. To prove this, I need merely point to the fact, that a Catholic movement has of late years sprung up within the very pale of the Establishment, which has supplied Rome with an immense number of converts, from all stations in life. The increase of Catholicism has been most rapid. In 1850 (the "Papal aggression" year), the number of Catholic churches and chapels in Great Britain was 680; in November, 1859, the number was 950, showing an increase of nearly 50 per cent. During the same period monasteries have increased from 11 to 37, and convents from 51 to 123 ("Cath. Directory, 1860"). According to the best authorities, there are at present, in the whole world, *five* Catholics to every single Protestant; so that the majority of Christians have already pronounced against private interpretation of the Bible as a Rule of Faith—nations have tried it, and found it wanting.

I would ask any Protestant to tell me candidly whether the failure of Protestantism in its attempt to convert the heathen, its inability to maintain the ground upon which it was originally forced, and its present rapid decline, do not prove conclusively that "the Bible only" principle is not that safe and sufficient Rule of Faith to which our Lord promised his assistance to the end of time?

III. I have now a more fearful charge to bring against the Protestant Rule of Faith:—*When freely carried out, it leads to infidelity.*

It will be recollected that the writer of one of the previous negative articles argued that, as Protestants acknowledge no other authority than the Bible, they have no means of knowing, with infallible certainty, what books compose the Bible. Moreover, as they are not obliged to believe any doctrine which does not come established to them as a revelation from God; and as they do not believe that God has ever, either directly or indirectly, through an authority which He has rendered infallible, pointed out what books are inspired, it follows that any Protestant is at liberty, on his own principles, to deny the inspiration of any book of Holy Scripture; as Luther, for instance, rejected the Epistle of St. James. Nay, the principle, when carried to its full length, would lead to the denial of the inspiration of every single book of Holy Scripture, which is equal to saying that infidelity, or at least its modern form, rationalism, is the legitimate development of Protestantism.

To prove this assertion, I intend to take the reader to the "cradle of the Reformation." In Germany, the very character of the people, the tone and structure of the national mind, their universal habits

of intellectual culture, and their seemingly constitutional tendency to abstruse and vague speculation, all caused them to enter into that religious inquiry which the Protestant Rule of Faith necessitates, with a degree of freedom and boldness which we look for in vain among their more plodding antagonists in other countries; while the long-protracted religious discussions, and the frequent religious wars of which Germany has been the scene several times since the Reformation, imparted to the inquiry, as conducted in that country, a greater degree of earnestness and warmth than we find amongst any other people. In Germany, then, if anywhere, are we to look for the full and unrestricted working of the first principle of Protestantism.

It is acknowledged by many of the German Protestants themselves that most of them can scarcely make any pretence to be called Christians at all. The Rev. H. J. Rose, a clergyman of the Church of England, in his work, "The State of Protestantism in Germany," page 1, says:—

"A very large majority of the divines of these churches rejected, in a word, all belief in the divine origin of Christianity, and anxiously endeavoured to instil into others the opinions which they had embraced themselves. They had possession of by far the greater number of divinity professorships in the universities of Germany, and they had almost exclusively the direction of the literary and religious journals,—a class of publications of more influence and importance in Germany than amongst ourselves. By the unsparing use of the means thus afforded them, and by an infinite quantity of writings, addressed to men of all classes, and all ages, they succeeded in spreading their views over the surface of society."

The Rev. E. H. Dewar, another clergyman of the Church of England, has also written a work on this subject. It is entitled, "German Protestantism, and the Right of Private Judgment in the Interpretation of Holy Scripture. A Brief History of German Theology, from the Reformation to the Present Time." London and Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1844. To this work, and to that of Mr. Rose, I refer those who may wish to see to what lengths the principle of "the Bible only" will take those who attempt to carry it out. The reader will find that the clergy not only tell their congregations in their sermons, and in their books, that they reject this or that book of Scripture, they scout the idea of inspiration altogether, and explain away everything that is miraculous in revealed religion. Mr. Dewar, page 144, gives an abstract of a sermon which he himself heard, in which the preacher "explained," as he termed it, the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves and fishes. "The explanation was simple enough. Many of the five thousand were provided with more food than was necessary for their own sustenance, and the example of Jesus distributing his store, as far as it would go, operated so favourably, that others, also, divided what they did not absolutely require; and thus was not only the whole multitude satisfied, but there remained twelve baskets of fragments which were gathered up."

Other miracles are "explained" in the same style. For instance, Heinrichs says that Ananias was probably stabbed by Peter; Theiss, that the cloven tongues were simply electric sparks; Neander, that the pool at Bethesda was a reservoir of mineral water; Ammon, that our Lord *swam*, and did not walk on the sea; and so on, with every other miracle of Scripture. Nor is this theology confined to a few. So effectually has Rationalism accomplished its fatal work, that an eminent Protestant writer, counting up, a few years since, all the professors of theology in the German divinity schools, "who could anyhow be considered orthodox, *i. e.*, who in any way contended for the doctrines of the gospel, or even for its very truth," was able to reckon, "in all Protestant Germany, *seventeen*." It would seem, too, that this rationalistic divinity has become popular; for those who believe what English Protestants would call the fundamental doctrines of the gospel, are cried down in the same manner that Tractarians are here, and are told that they ought to go to Rome; while some of the great lights of modern Protestantism in Germany seem to have come to the same conclusion as Burke, that "He is the most consistent Protestant who protests against Christianity altogether." The reader will best understand what Protestantism is in Germany, when he is told that a Dr. Strauss, who wrote to prove that our Lord was a mythical personage, like Hercules, and that the gospels were written in the second century, received, in consequence, an invitation to teach theology in one of the high schools.

The state of Protestantism in other parts of Europe is not much better. It is well known that the Protestantism of Switzerland and France is, for the most part, Socinianism; whilst among the Protestants of Holland and Belgium, the utmost latitudinarianism is the order of the day.

It may be asked, Why has the Protestant Rule of Faith not led to the same results in our country? I answer—for the very simple reason, that it has not been so fully acted upon. The church of the largest body of Protestants in this country has only partially carried out the principle of private judgment. In its twentieth article it gives the church authority in controversies of Faith; and in its thirty-third article, it claims the right of excommunicating those who do not obey its voice; it condemns those who reject tradition altogether (Article thirty-four); it has a Catholic form of church government; and has a Liturgy compiled almost exclusively from Catholic sources. The little leaven of Catholicism, which the Church of England retains, has not only preserved its own body from utter corruption, but has also acted indirectly on the sects which have separated from it, so as to have prevented them from following the example of their continental co-religionists. Many churchmen, no doubt, would like to see their liturgy revised in its more "Popish" parts; while a still greater number would hail with delight the abolition of the creeds, and especially the Athanasian; but depend upon it, it will be an evil day for English Protestants

when their wishes are complied with ; for along with the creeds will go the doctrines which they teach. This agitation for liturgical revision ; the general indifference to dogma which now prevails ; the breaking down of the old barriers between Churchman and Dissenter, between sect and sect, seem to indicate that English Protestantism is at present undergoing some important change. It is an ominous fact that Protestantism in Germany presented exactly the same appearance before it finally relapsed into Rationalism. Already there are not wanting indications of the direction in which British Protestantism is tending. I would point to the increase of the broad Church party, to the "Westminster Review ;" I would point to the spread of latitudinarianism at Oxford—always foremost in every religious revolution ; I would point to the rationalistic tendencies of the Bishop of Hereford (Dr. Hampden) ; to the sabellianism of Dr. Hinds (late of Norwich) ; to the historicism of Dean Close ; to the theology of Dr. Jowett, who "corrects the errors of St. Paul ;" to Dr. Donaldson, of Cambridge, who believes the greater part of the Old Testament to be allegorical ; to the Rev. Baden Powell, the Savilian Professor at Oxford, who, in his recently-published "Order of Nature," laughs at the miracles of the Bible ;—I would point to all these "signs of the times," and ask, Is there not every probability that Protestantism will resolve itself into Rationalism here, as it has already done in other countries ?

By teaching that all ecclesiastical authority is to be rejected, and that each one has a right to take the Bible and construct his own religious system upon it, all Protestantism is in principle essentially rationalistic. When one Protestant says that our Lord did not really change the water into wine at the marriage feast, and that he did not really feed the five thousand with a few loaves and fishes ; and another says that he did not really change the bread into his most sacred body, and that he does not still really condescend to be the food of the souls of millions of Christians ; they are both acting upon precisely the same principle, they are setting *their* reason above God's revelation, they are judging omnipotence by their limited understandings.

It may be objected that Catholics have become infidels. Yes ; but not by following out their Rule of Faith. Protestants, on the contrary, become rationalists by pushing the rule of private judgment to its ultimate development. Experience is rapidly showing, that to be consistent a man must either be Catholic or an infidel, and that Rousseau was, after all, right when he said to a Protestant who was arguing with him, "Show me that there is any such thing as revelation at all, and I will immediately become a Catholic."

IV. I find I have left myself very little room to answer the article of "Theophylact." Indeed, it scarcely requires an answer, for where it does not consist of mere cavilling and captious trifling, it is an attack on the Catholic Rule of Faith, which is totally out of place in this debate. The question is, "Is the Bible alone a suffi-

cient Rule of Faith?" It is the duty of the affirmative side to prove that it is, and of the negative to prove that it is not; hence I do not see that "Theophylact" has any more right to ask for the proof of the infallibility of the Catholic Church than he has to ask for the proof of transubstantiation, for instance. If "Theophylact" wishes to read a solution of his difficulties, I refer him to Cardinal Wiseman's "Sixteen Lectures on the Principal Doctrines of the Catholic Church."*

I must say that my opponent really expects too much when he thinks that the Catholic Rule of Faith ought to preserve unity among those who do not follow it; his own rule does not preserve unity even among its own adherents. I cannot understand the charge of inconsistency with which he taunts "Gregory" and "Ignatius." In the passages which he quotes, they are both speaking of different things, one of the *all-sufficiency* of the Bible, and the other of its *inspiration*. "Gregory" says that if all we are to believe is to be found in the Bible, we ought to find the Protestant Rule of Faith enunciated therein. "Ignatius" merely says that if any book were to claim inspiration, we should not believe it on its own testimony. The Koran asserts its own inspiration. Do we therefore believe it? Where is the inconsistency between the two propositions?

With regard to what he says about Pope Sixtus V., I answer, that that Pontiff did not compare his edition of the Bible with the ancient manuscripts for the purpose of proving its inspiration, but merely in order to secure the accuracy of the text. I cannot see how "Theophylact" can prove the inspiration of each book by this means.

As to "Gregory's" assertion that the Bible was never translated in the early ages for the purpose of diffusing Christianity, the context seems to me to indicate that he means that the apostles and their immediate successors, when they wished to add any new province to the church, did not first translate the Bible into the language of that country, as Protestants now do; the Bible was not translated "to facilitate the spread of Christianity." I should hardly think that "Gregory" meant to say that there were no translations at all, when every one knows that the contrary is the fact. The passage is, I admit, ambiguous.

"Theophylact's" question about "when the Church of Rome received this revelation," is out of place here. I will merely say, that he would not have asked the question if he rightly understood the Catholic Rule of Faith. Our Lord promised that after the Holy Ghost had descended at Pentecost, he would remain with the Church for ever. The Holy Ghost still teaches the world, through the Church; hence every decision of the Church is the decision of the Holy Spirit; and every dogmatic decree of the Catholic Church is prefaced, as at the Apostolic Council of Jerusalem, with the words, "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," Acts xv.

Whether this is the right belief is another question altogether. At all events, what I have said will be sufficient to show "Theophylact" how the Church of Rome came to know what books make up the Bible. Why has he not answered the question put by "Ignatius," How do Protestants know what books make up the Bible? A satisfactory answer to this question would settle the entire controversy.

J. H.

Philosophy.

IS THE POETRY OF TENNYSON AS HEALTHY IN ITS TENDENCIES AS THAT OF LONGFELLOW?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WHAT is poetry in its essential nature and various forms? What is the true province and proper mission of the poet amongst men? By what standard, and in what manner, are we to judge of poetry? How does it affect the different classes of society in any given age and country? What dynamic force and influence does it exert upon individual life and character? In what way is it modified by the advance of civilization, and the ever-changing aspect of the hopes and fears, the sorrows and aspirations, of humanity? And how does it, in turn, re-act upon these phenomena?

Such we conceive to be some of the most important questions raised by the present discussion, and demanding our consideration before we pronounce sentence in favour of either poet. We can well imagine that some ardent admirers of both the authors named will be ready to recoil from questions and considerations at first sight so dry and uninviting, so apparently prosaic and alien to what they deem to be the spirit of poetry. Not a few, perhaps, will be half inclined to look upon us as mechanical, cold-blooded critics, devoid of enthusiasm and inspiration, and utterly incapable of judging of the merits of—

"A poet hidden
In the light of thought,
Singing hymns unbidden,
Till the world is wrought
To sympathy, with hopes and fears it heeded not."

Many, doubtless, would prefer to be at once revelling among the beauties of their favourite poet, and pouring out the most imaginative eloquence and the most glowing rhetoric at their command in his laudation. Such a course, we admit, is very natural in early life, but we fear that it is not very wise, and that it affords but an indifferent augury as to the permanence of any really deep inner

feeling of love for poetry. Many persons speak, think, and write of poetry with a degree of extravagance and fervour very closely resembling the impassioned outpourings of those florid love-letters, which not unfrequently amuse the world in the shape of a report of some breach of promise case in the law courts. Reason must concur with passion, or we may safely predict that the latter will pass away, ere long, without leaving any permanent trace behind. Admiration is not criticism, and if we allow it to lead our judgment, instead of following, or, at least, of being founded upon it, we shall assuredly deceive ourselves, and lay up a store of future disappointment. Truly has Tennyson said that

"Beauty, good, and knowledge are three sisters
That doat upon each other, friends to man,
Living together under the same roof,
And never can be sundered without tears."

We cannot judge of beauty or of good by mere instinct. "Light, more light," was the touching, truthful cry of the dying Goethe. And ages before, old Homer penned that sublime prayer of Ajax, as he battled in the thick darkness :—

"Oh, break this darkness, let us see
That we may conquer in the fight;
Or, if thy counsels doom to death,
Yet, Father, kill us in the light!"

It is in the world of mind as in the world of matter—the dew will fall in vain if light be wanting. A straggling, sickly, colourless growth is all that can be realized, unless there be light around and above. We are continually overlooking these considerations in the present day; for ever "sundering" knowledge from beauty and from good, the intellect from the heart. Hence it is, we believe, that the current talk about, and taste for, poetry is so vastly disproportioned to its actual influence upon character and life; hence, too, that straining after something striking and effective which has given to the world so much morbid sentimentality and spasmodic poetry. Our decisions are too much in the nature of mere preferences; and yet a little thought will convince us that preferences, unless based upon reasoning and reflection, are nothing more or less than haphazard prejudices. We cannot judge of the value and tendency of literature, in its influence upon the world, by mere likes and dislikes, any more than we can judge of the suitability of food and medicine from their pleasantness to the palate. Unless we base our decision upon such considerations as those mentioned at the commencement of this article, is it not evident that a debate like the present will, of necessity, end where it begins, in the dogmatic expression of personal opinion? If we start up by foregone conclusions, and merely endeavour to bolster them up by selection and quotation from the works of the two poets, shall we not resemble children, one choosing an orange for

its golden hue, and the other preferring an apple for its red-cheeked beauty—each loud in praising his own choice, while, perhaps, secretly longing to change with his companion?

Let us consider, then, in the first place, what is poetry. The design of all written compositions may be classed under one of two heads; they are intended either to instruct or to please. The historian, the biographer, the essayist, the man of science, &c., all aim at conveying information and instruction; their chief object is to teach, and not to gratify. But the poet, though he may convey information, and may argue or persuade, always aims at conveying intellectual pleasure. Here, then, we have one ever-present characteristic of poetry. We might define it as *a species* of composition which has for its object the creation of intellectual pleasure, by addressing primarily the imagination and feelings rather than the intellect. If we are pleased with poetry, we term it *good* poetry; if we fail to derive pleasure from it, we condemn it *as poetry*, however pure in morality, and however instructive or profound in thought. To some extent, therefore, we agree with Coleridge, who says that "the antithesis to poetry is science." Still, there are other compositions besides poems which aim chiefly and invariably at giving pleasure. The humourist, the novelist, and the romance writer, may, or may not, aim at our improvement, but they *must* aim at pleasing us; if they fail in this latter respect, they fail wholly. Where, then, is their distinction from the poet? Evidently it must be in the manner in which they endeavour to please, that is, in the form or style of their composition. They write what we currently term prose, while the poet writes what we term verse or metre. "Any composition," says Archbishop Whately, "in verse (and none that is not) is always called, whether good or bad, a poem, by all who have no favourite hypothesis to maintain." We know that this decision will appear harsh to many, but we are assured that it is sound and necessary. In whatever way we approach the subject, we must, if candid, come to this conclusion. Poetry is *an art* of composition, bearing the same relation to prose that singing bears to speaking. In speaking and in prose, the ideas to be conveyed are the paramount consideration; in singing and in poetry, the first object is to please, by the *mode* in which the ideas, whatever they may be, are conveyed. The analogy is close in every respect. On the one side, we have written and spoken metre; on the other, unmetrical speech and writing. We may say of ornate and imaginative prose, that it is poetical; and, in like manner, we may say of persons with very sweet voices, and good intonation and modulation, that they speak musically. Just as passion and imagination in a prose writer lead him into the use of language closely approaching poetry, so in a speaker they lead to something closely resembling the recitative of the musician. In truth, this analogy is one of necessity, arising from the origin of poetry and music. Adam Smith says of music and dancing, that they are "the first and earliest pleasures of man's own invention.

No nation has yet been discovered so uncivilized, as to be altogether without them." And he proceeds to point out how poetry became the necessary consequence of music. The first of all musical instruments, and the only one always and everywhere at command, would be the human voice. We all know that children invent syllables in their singing; musicians have their *do, re, mi, &c.*; and our old ballads and popular street-songs abound in choruses of *Fa-la-la, Derry down down, Ri-fol-de-rol, &c., &c.* In fact, if we have not suitable words for singing, we must form some; it is irksome in the extreme to sing without using articulate syllables, either meaningless or meaning. In the earliest ages, singing would doubtless consist of syllables such as we have adduced above, but ere long it would be perceived that *ordinary words* may be so arranged as to be suitable for, and to coincide with, the time and measure of a tune. Such discovery was the invention of poetry; and it would be an interesting study to notice how (in the poetry of our own country, for instance) the defective art of the poet caused the introduction of those unmeaning syllables which abound so much in our early ballads, and to notice how gradually they have fallen out of use as the poet's art has improved. We think, therefore, that we have fully established the essential character of poetry, and justified our adoption of the definition of Archbishop Whately, that "poetry is *elegant and decorated language in metre*, expressing such and such thoughts." The poet, then, is essentially an artist, who deals with language as the musician deals with sound. Coleridge said well, when he declared that poetry was "the best words in their best order;" for the best words naturally are capable of the finest shades of expression, and their best order is when they are so arranged as to reach the highest point of melody and music. He strikingly illustrated this in his poem of "Kubla Khan," where the music of the verse is so exquisitely beautiful, as to charm the reader, and call forth his admiration, in spite of the want of anything like a definite meaning and purpose in the ideas conveyed.

We have said that the poet is an artist. Poetry is one of the Fine Arts, all of which concur in having for their primary object the production of intellectual pleasure. They deal with the Beautiful and the Sublime, and appeal to the imaginations, the emotions, and passions of mankind. They all address themselves to the spiritual nature; and hence, while each has a special department, they are all linked together, and their differences arise chiefly from the different avenues (so to speak) by which they seek approach to the soul. While poetry, dealing with language (a product of the soul, for the brutes have no language), is the more spiritual of the Fine Arts, and comes in immediate contact with our spiritual being, painting, sculpture, and music (to use the quaint language of Bunyan's allegory) enter the town of Man-soul through Eye-gate and Ear-gate. But we find that any of these arts may concur in conveying certain ideas to the mind; they are all imitative, and by

language, colour, form, or sound, they place images before us. This naturally results from their appealing to our immaterial nature. The soul of man cannot rest in empty, idea-less pleasures long. The child, as intelligence grows, wearies of nursery rhymes, and demands a poetry which shall convey ideas, and possess a more refined music than the mere jingle of strong accentuation and rhyme. Could the painter rival the prismatic hues into which the man of science resolves a ray of light, his skill would fail to please us unless he did more; the mere array of colours would speedily be regarded as glaring and wearisome. Were a sculptor to outvie Phidias in his powers, he could never rise to fame, if he sculptured here an arm and there a breast, without ever combining the creations of his chisel in one bust or figure. So, too, no lover ever would think of serenading his mistress with fife and drum, and no tootling of a love-song on the flute could inspire men, in the hour of battle, like the flourish of the trumpet, or the heart-stirring, measured beat of the war-march. The Fine Arts must be instinct with ideas. The artist of necessity becomes the teacher. Happily, man, though fallen, yet has the impress of Divinity in his soul. It takes a training in degradation before he finds real abiding pleasure in that which is low, sensual, and degrading. Intellectual pleasure cannot be refined and permanent without being moral. To quicken the imagination, and to stimulate the sensibilities of the heart, is to raise men to a higher moral condition for the time being, to lift them, in some degree, above the power of the senses, the narrowness of self, and the predominance of surrounding circumstances. Poetry may, like the other Fine Arts, be perverted to the service of vice; but so strongly is this felt to be unnatural, that we find no work has ever enjoyed enduring popularity which has not been essentially moral in its tendency.

We have seen what the poet is as a poet. He is a metrical artist. He seeks to work up language to its highest powers of expression and elegance, in the shape of that peculiar measure and melody which we term verse or metre; this is his distinction in respect of language. Again, his distinction in respect of thought and ideas is that he appeals directly to our sense of the Beautiful and the Sublime, to our emotions and passions, to the imagination and the heart,—in a word, to that side of our complex spiritual being which the Deity has endowed with the capability of receiving impressions of pleasure, and thus supplying us with active motives, as distinct from the pure convictions of the intellect, which are passive and complete in themselves. We next inquire, What is the legitimate province of poetry, and what is its true mission? "Poetry," says that great essayist, historian, statesman, and poet, around whose tomb in England's noblest abbey the regrets of a nation centre as we write, "poetry holds the outer world in common with the other arts. The heart of man is the province of poetry" (i. e., as a Fine Art), "and of poetry alone. The painter, the sculptor, and the actor can exhibit no more of human passion and

character than that small portion which overflows into the gesture and the face. . . . The deeper and more complex parts of human nature can be exhibited by means of words alone. Thus the objects" (or subject-matters) "of poetry are the whole external and the whole internal universe, the face of nature, the vicissitudes of man as he is in himself, man as he appears in society, all things which really exist, all things of which we can form an image in our minds by combining together parts of things which really exist. The domain of this imperial art is commensurate with the imagination." All that is, and all that imagination can create, fall within the province within which the poet may exercise his art. Whatever language can convey will be best conveyed by poetry (as the highest form of which language is capable), where the object is to gain access to the heart, or to the mind through the emotions of the heart—to sympathize with, or influence, rather than to teach in the way of express precept, or to pursue the researches of the intellect and reason alone. Such is the boundless province open to the poet; and his mission is worthily to fulfil that province, and earnestly to apply his artistic powers for the good of his fellow-men. Nature is seldom one-sided in her spiritual gifts; and with the genius for artistic skill, she gives a corresponding richness of imagination, and a depth of thought and breadth of idea, which, if duly cultivated by study, and taught to submit to the teachings of reason and the decisions of judgment, will place their possessor among the foremost ranks of the men of mind. The man who, having the ideas given, could write "*Paradise Lost*" as Milton has written it, is a man who, most probably, could think its ideas for himself. Poetry, as we have shown, and as experience will prove to any one, is the natural form to which language tends under the influence of strong passions and emotions. Hence, he who can speak that language in all its fulness is sure to be one skilled in the knowledge of the human heart—one

"Dowered with the hate of hate, the scorn of scorn,

The love of love;

Who sees through life and death, through good and ill,

Who sees through his own soul."

He who possesses that genius which would make him a great poet, will doubtless possess powers which would make him great as a patriot, a statesman, a scholar, or a divine, as Milton was great in all these respects. The two faculties (artistic and intellectual) generally go hand in hand, but are in themselves wholly distinct. *As a poet*, the poet's object is to give us intellectual pleasure, and to do so in metrical or musical language; *as a man* highly endowed, his object ought to be to make this poetic power tend to the doing good and increasing of wisdom. The *amount* of a poet's influence for good depends upon the way in which he exercises his powers, the thoughts he invests with the graces of poetry. The *secret* and *source* of his influence lies in the fact that he comes to us in the

guise of a friend and a minister to our pleasures. His is, perhaps, the most potent influence which man can have over his fellow-man, for he touches the hidden springs of our nature, and his responsibility, consequently, is proportionately great. It becomes his duty (because it is his power) to be the bard, priest, and prophet of the age in which he lives; to teach men to gather wisdom and inspiration from the past, and to emulate the lofty virtues, the chivalrous deeds, and the mighty struggles of "the brave days of old;" to give us a living insight into the present, denouncing its wrongs, showing us both its wants and weaknesses, and its elements of grandeur, heroism, and joyousness, and urging us to the work and worship due from us. And, having

"Dipt into the future, far as human eye can see,
Seen the vision of the world, and all the wonder that shall be,"

it is his to prophesy unto us of that bright coming future, that golden year,

"That unto him who works, and feels he works,
Is ever at the door;"—

of that happy era, when

"The temple again shall be built,
And filled as it was of yore,
And the burthen be lift from the heart of the world,
And the nations all adore;"

or to lead our thoughts upward to that higher glory in another world, when the redeemed soul of man, "made pure of sin," shall realize the beatitudes of heaven,—to sing to us of

"The sabbaths of eternity,
One sabbath deep and wide;
A light upon the shining sea,
The Bridegroom with his Bride."

It will appear from the foregoing remarks and arguments, that the works of a poet are amenable to two different species of criticism. We have to judge him æsthetically as an artist, and again morally and intellectually as a man and a thinker—to determine how far he ministers to our pleasure, and enchants us with his song, on the one hand; and in what manner and for what purposes he uses this power of enchantment, on the other. It will be seen that the latter of these inquiries involves within itself the solution of those questions (as to the moving or dynamic force and influence of the poet upon the individuals and classes of society, and his relations to the civilization and change of the age in which he lives) which we proposed at the head of this article; and we think that these matters will be most satisfactorily considered in connection with an analytical survey of the works of Tennyson. The former question, as to the nature of æsthetical criticism (both in respect to the form

of a poem, its metre and language, and to the quality of its ideas and imagination), requires some little previous consideration, inasmuch as we believe there is great misapprehension in the minds, perhaps, of the majority of people as to this subject. We are accustomed to speak of "taste" as the judge and arbiter in matters pertaining to intellectual pleasure and the Fine Arts. What is taste? Are we not in danger of mistaking mere inclinations and indefinite predilections for the decisions of taste? Popular opinion almost invariably regards "taste" as a separate faculty of our nature, an original inspiration, and heaven-born gift. There is certainly a great excuse for this idea. If we take the case of a savage, we find that in the most degraded condition of human nature there is a something which leads him to feel admiration, and express pleasure, at certain sights or sounds. He tattoos his skin, and though we deem the practice a cruelty and a disfigurement, yet we must admit that the patterns are not unfrequently graceful and beautiful. He carves his war-club, and both the execution and design are such as (fitly applied) would not disgrace our drawing-rooms. A plume of feathers alike distinguishes the Indian chief and the English warrior; and golden earrings and bracelets were the ornaments of the aborigines of America in the days of Columbus, just as they are those of the ladies of Queen Victoria's court at the present day. The objects which win the admiration of the savage may be uncouth to us, or the reverse: they may be useless to him, yet he deems them beautiful, prides himself in them, and delights in the ideas and sensations to which they give birth, without knowing why or wherefore. We see the same phenomena in children, in the earliest and most helpless condition of human nature. The love of ornament, and pleasure in brilliant colours and cradle-songs, are manifested long before reason attains its sway. All these facts seem strongly to point to the existence of a separate æsthetical faculty. We think, however, that reflection will show that such a conclusion would be mistaken and false. If the sense of hearing were such that a man could not distinguish a variation of a quarter-tone, he could not judge of music; if the eye were deficient in judging of proportion, there could be no taste in painting; if the imagination be dull, the conceptions of the poet will produce but little pleasure. Art is imitative; and to judge of imitation, we must be apt in comparing—that is, the judgment must be clear and acute. Again: a clown will admire a glorious sunset with very different feelings from a man of refined and cultivated mind; and a sensualist will gaze upon a lovely child or a beautiful woman with feelings utterly alien from those of a pure heart and loving soul. We conclude, therefore, that taste is no separate faculty, but consists in the joint action of the perception, the imagination, and the judgment, acting in accordance with the laws of our nature, upon the sensibilities of our emotional being. Thus taste depends upon the cultivation of *all* our powers under the presiding influence of Reason; and those

who fall back upon an imaginary æsthetical faculty, as the source of decisions for which they can give no reason, can only be right by accident.

We fear that some of our readers may think that we have wandered from our professed theme, and treated them to a very dry discussion. We felt strongly, however, that a very mischievous style, both of poetry-making and poetical criticism, is too much in vogue; that while poets swarm amongst us, really high poetry is very scarce; that fashion too much takes the place of true appreciation, until numbers really admire and praise they know not what or why. We ask any one thoughtfully to consider the vast amount of writing, lecturing, talking, and reading, of and about poetry, which now exists, and to say whether one of two things is not very evident,—either that poetry is very ill understood, or that it is very useless, and even injurious, as the cause of an immense waste of valuable time. It is startling to compare the theories of society with its practices. We hear of Chaucer, the “Father of English Poetry,” its “Morning Star,” the “pure well of English undefiled;” of his cheerfulness, his pathos, his humour, his satire, his keen appreciation of human nature; the exquisite freshness and beauty of his paintings from nature; the services he rendered in fixing our language, and paving the way for the patriots in state and reformers in religion who followed him; yet a few archaisms of phrase and of spelling suffice to shut him out of the libraries of nine-tenths of the nominal devotees of poetry. Nor does the gentle Spenser fare much better. In spite of the testimony of our greatest succeeding poets, and in spite of the common praise awarded to the prodigality of his fancy, the purity of his imagery, the ever-present under-current of piety and wisdom manifest in his works, the flush of colouring and of beauty, and the exquisite melody of his language, which breathes the very soul of music, it is hard to find a person who has read, or cares to read, much of his works. Far more surprising, however, is the treatment accorded to the mighty Milton. Common consent has placed him (next to Shakespeare) at the head of English poets, and yet even a casual acquaintance with modern society reveals the fact that Milton’s name and fame are upheld by the lip-worship of thousands who never read even once through his great epic! Within the last few years we have had a singular proof of the real character of popular taste. Introductions and notes by that hyper-florid writer, Mr. George Gilfillan, have made an edition of the British poets profitable to a Scotch publisher; while the scholarly and unobtrusive editing of Mr. Bell failed to remunerate the English publishers of a similar series. We cannot but attribute these paradoxical features of popular taste and opinion to the absence of anything like a due intellectual training and education of those faculties concerned in that compound decision which we term the verdict of taste; to a want of reflection on the nature, origin, and purpose of poetry; and to the perverse idea, that poetry concerns itself with the heart, to

the exclusion of the intellect. If we succeed in convincing our readers that the mere worship of beauty is bewildering, that the emotions and passions are blind, and all but certain to err, unless restrained by the conscience, and guided by the light of reason; if we lead them to strip off all enthusiasm of declamation, to pass by mere brilliant tributes of praise, and to seek for the grounds of it;—then we are assured that (though we laid aside our pen without one sentence in favour of our own opinion as to the relative merits of Tennyson and Longfellow) we should still have contributed to the formation of healthy and sound opinions in others, and to a juster, wiser, and more truthful appreciation of both these poets. We hope, however (in a further article), to have the opportunity of applying our ideas of poetic criticism, in the way of a brief analysis of Tennyson's poetry, and to show that he stands first of all living bards, both as a master of word-music, as a consummate artist of "imagination all compact," and as a wise, good, and deep-thinking man, who turns these noble gifts to the best and highest uses. For the present, space compels us to desist. B. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Among eminent persons, those who are most dear to men are not of the class which the economist calls producers; they have nothing in their hands; they have not cultivated corn, nor made bread; they have not led out a colony, nor invented a loom. A higher class in the estimation and love of this city-building, market-going race of mankind are the poets who, from the intellectual kingdom, feed the thought and imagination with ideas and pictures, which raise men out of the short-comings of the day, and the meannesses of labour and traffic. . . . But there is a class who lead us into another region, the world of morals or of will. What is singular about this region of thought is, its claim. Wherever the sentiment of right comes in, it takes precedence of everything else. For other things, I make poetry of them; but the moral sentiment makes poetry of me."—Emerson.

It is a hopeful sign of the present age, that a subject such as this finds a place in the pages of a popular magazine. It betokens a conviction, which we believe to be wide-spread, that men of lofty powers ought to be estimated not by the magnitude of their talents, but by the use to which they apply them. A great change has taken place since the day when Byron's brilliant genius found a multitude of worshippers; for great gifts, if perverted, can no longer exercise an undisputed sway. It is necessary now that a poet, in addition to high endowments, be possessed of an earnest spirit, and that his influence be pure and elevating. Men need poetry, especially when, as is at present the case, they are surrounded by strong materialistic tendencies, to lift them out of "the cares that infest the day," and above the domination of matter, into a purer element. "Poetry," says Channing, "reveals to us the loveliness of nature, brings back the freshness of early feeling, revives the relish of simple pleasures, keeps unquenched the enthusiasm which warmed the spring-time of our being, refines youthful love, strengthens our interest in human nature by vivid delineations

of its tenderest and loftiest feelings, spreads our sympathies over all classes of society, knits us by new ties with universal being, and, through the brightness of its prophetic vision, helps faith to lay hold on the future life." It is of the utmost importance to mankind that those who occupy the position of "the world's teachers" should answer to the above description, and worthily fulfil their high vocation. Perhaps no two living men more fully realize, in their poems, the conditions above laid down, than those with whom we have to deal—viz., Tennyson and Longfellow. In both there is the same intense love of nature, and the same devout admiration of the good no less than the beautiful. They treat very much of the same subjects. With each of them life wears the same earnest aspect, and is represented as affording scope for the highest purposes and motives. They equally inculcate purity and devotion to truth: but, with all their similarity, there is a great difference between them. If our present object were to prove which was the greater poet, undoubtedly Tennyson must take precedence of Longfellow, as possessing more depth of imagination and breadth of view, more subtlety of thought and delicacy of diction: but as it relates only to the influence they exert, Longfellow claims the first place, by virtue of the greater force of his enunciation. Tennyson is indeed more profound, but he lacks the simplicity and clearness which in Longfellow is the chief charm. Tennyson moves in a loftier sphere of thought, and has a wider range, but Longfellow shows a practical directness, which appeals to an extended circle, and thereby gains a larger audience. The former may captivate those of cultivated minds; but the latter, by his homeliness, reaches the masses, and more powerfully moulds for good the lives of ordinary men. The poetry of Tennyson is contemplative; he delights in abstract truths, and is fond of dwelling upon the mental phenomena, watching and recording their most fleeting phases. In Longfellow, every reflection is made to serve a purpose, and has an immediate connection with corresponding action. The teaching of the one resembles a beautiful and elaborate discourse, in which the loftiest principles are displayed in all their harmonious symmetry; that of the other a sermon, in which the application is the most prominent part. A truth is uttered by the one for its intrinsic value; with the other it is enforced for the sake of its stimulating power. The American poet betrays a more lively interest in the common course of events, and seems at home in the activities of life. The English poet, on the contrary, courts retirement, and would rather aspire to direct the current of the thoughts, than to guide the actions of his fellows.

This dissimilarity will be strikingly manifest if we compare "The Psalm of Life" with "The Two Voices." The "one clear harp with divers tones" of Longfellow gives no uncertain sound, but with a martial air stirs the soul; while the pensive sadness of the other leaves it vibrating between hope and fear.

Longfellow preaches self-conquest, and urges earnest endeavour

as the best antidote to melancholy musings. Tennyson rather dallies with the morbid fancies of the mind, and closes with but an indistinct utterance. Hackneyed as the verses of the "Psalm of Life" now are, it is impossible to read it without feeling new strength infused to fight "the good fight." Familiar in our mouths as "household words," it retains its vigour still, and will prompt to greater achievements than its more metaphysical rival can ever do. Turning from this invaluable "Poet's Song" to another by the same author, "The Light of Stars," we learn a lesson Tennyson does not teach us. Listen to its high moral.

"And thou, too, whosoe'er thou art,
That readest this brief psalm,
As one by one thy hopes depart,
Be resolute and calm.

"O fear not in a world like this,
And thou shalt know ere long.
Know how sublime a thing it is
To suffer and be strong."

What can be more calculated than this to revive the spirit of one whom sorrow has overtaken and depressed? That noble tribute to friendship—"In Memoriam"—has been justly admired, and, we venture to say, by no one more than ourselves; and yet, for "healthiness" of tone, it is inferior to "The Footsteps of Angels," where a similar grief is alluded to, and where the spirit of "the loved and lost" is represented as gently rebuking passionate sorrow.

Tennyson himself speaks, subsequently, of his own as the "wild and wandering cries—confusions of a wasted youth;" and, notwithstanding the fascination of the poem, it is easy to discern, in the impression it produces, a morbidity which is not beneficial. This tendency, manifest in the composition of which we speak, and in many other of his poems, to revolve and dwell upon pensive thoughts, is a dangerous one. Nothing is more baneful than for the mind to be continually occupied in watching its own motions. It is a fruitful cause of insanity, according to the authority of medical men, for the thoughts to be so introspective; and even where the habit does not result in so direful a fate, it often produces disease. If we would promote our intellectual health, we must seek to have a loving sympathy with the outward, and guard carefully against such self-absorption. The introverted gaze is apt to end in blindness. As we have remarked, Tennyson's poetry rather favours this propensity. Some men have a strong natural bias towards brooding; and with them, anything which tends to strengthen it would prove the most hurtful. Indeed, it may be said that all thoughtful men experience this more or less, it being the attribute of a deep nature. Hence the melancholy so frequently characteristic of gifted and susceptible men. It is impossible for such to rest satisfied with superficialities; and when the hollowness of the world's pleasures and pursuits are seen, the mind is likely

to turn away in disgust, and, shut up within itself, to become morbid and misanthropical.

In such a frame, it is probable Tennyson would be more congenial than Longfellow, and he would, we think, prove hurtful. His influence would increase the malady, and not remedy it. Supposing that some of Longfellow's smaller pieces, such as "The Ladder of St. Augustine," and "The Builders," were perused, they would be found, in our opinion, very counteractive to the unhealthy tone of feeling. In these two pieces, and in the "Goblet of Life," the inevitable sorrows and trials of humanity are recognized, and we are taught how so to use them, that they may become in our hands the materials wherewith to build up a lofty character. The importance of trivial things, the value of "each day's events," in moulding our dispositions, is forcibly put; and under the powerful and masterly touches of the poet, we see our ordinary duties shine with new light, and discern a nobility and grace in performing our lowest tasks with a high motive. In this teaching, Tennyson would agree with Longfellow. He also shows us that it is through struggle, and oftentimes defeat, that we must expect to rise; and, by a beautiful metaphor, pictures the mistakes and errors of the past, as affording a foundation for future progress:—

"I held it truth, with him who sings
To one clear harp in divers tones,
That men may rise on stepping-stones
Of their dead selves to higher things."

The chivalrous tribute to his brother poet, in the above, doubtless alluded to the "Ladder of St. Augustine," which commences:—

"Saint Augustine!—well hast thou said
That of our vices we can frame
A ladder, if we will but tread
Beneath our feet each deed of shame!

"All common things—each day's events,
That with the hour begin and end;
Our pleasures, and our discontents,
Are rounds by which we may ascend."

Another feature in Tennyson's poetry, which renders its influence less healthy than that of Longfellow, is its mysticism. What he means might have a good effect, if we could discover it. We are aware that this is an objection most frequently urged by shallow and careless readers; but after allowing that much that at first appears obscure, careful study would unravel, it must be admitted that much remains uncertain and indistinct. Again, Tennyson does not always make it manifest whether the sentiments he puts into the mouths of some of his characters are his own or not. "Maud," for instance, is full of fantastic passages, which, if accepted from so high a poet as his own convictions, would be very detrimental. It may be urged, in defence of Tennyson, that he is so thoroughly

artistic as to seek pictorial effect above all other things, and that these parts referred to are but the proper accessories to his scene, and give it its force of light and shade; but then we think *this purpose* should be made clear and distinct, that there may be no danger of our understanding what is intended merely to portray and be in keeping with the character of his figures, as the utterance of his own opinion. Tennyson is, indeed, more of a word-painter than any other living poet. In this respect, Longfellow cannot approach him. The description of scenery in the "Gardener's Daughter," and "The Brook," are pre-Raphaelite in their minuteness and delicacy of finish.

But we must forbear entering so tempting a theme, our present purpose precluding an examination of Tennyson's works, apart from their moral aspects. Before closing this article, it is imperative upon us to notice his recent poem, "The Idylls of the King." This we consider his greatest work, and its influence is as pure as its thought is elevated. The concluding "Idyll" is the gem of the book, and Arthur's manly and exquisitely pathetic address to his fallen wife is a noble lesson on forgiveness. If Tennyson's earlier poems were cast in the same mould, and breathed the same spirit, our present discussion would have been difficult indeed; but taking a survey of the whole of his works, and comparing them with those of Longfellow, we reluctantly give our verdict in favour of the latter. To Tennyson we owe the delight of many lonely hours, when we have had our minds elevated by communion with his soaring genius, our ears enchanted with the music of his verse, and our hearts beguiled from bitter thoughts by the play of his graceful fancy; but to Longfellow we are under a "deeper debt" of gratitude. He has taught us how to bear sorrow with patience; nay, how to extract from it strength for new struggles; and from his pages we have been sent into the active duties of life, inspirited and buoyant. From our own experience, therefore, as well as an examination of their respective works, we arrive at the conclusion that the poetry of Tennyson is not so healthy as that of Longfellow.

EDMUND.

Politics.

OUGHT THE INDIAN OPIUM TRADE TO BE SUPPRESSED?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

Few persons have been bold enough to assert that the habitual inhaling of the fumes of Indian opium, by the lungs of 4,000,000 of Chinese, is a milder kind of intemperance than that produced by alcoholic liquors in England. The uneasiness of the national conscience as to British connection with the opium traffic, and the expression of that feeling in numerous petitions for its suppression.

has called up such apologies for the opium merchant and smoker, as can only be equalled by those elaborate vindications of the slave trade, of the corn laws, of state lotteries, &c., which are now treasured as curiosities of old political literature. Can it be believed, that a high colonial official declares that "the introduction of opium to China has cured the people of drunkenness"? That another says, that "the superiority of opium over ardent spirits could not," he thought, "be questioned." How opposite to this was the opinion of Daniel O'Connell, that "whiskey was mother's milk to opium." If the effects of opium-smoking in China on the bodies, minds, and morals of the people, only come near those produced by intemperance in England, they may well awaken serious inquiry; but, according to the testimony of numbers of the most reliable missionaries, travellers, merchants, and medical men, the diseases, debauchery, violence, and speedy death, resulting from this habit, far surpass every other form of intemperance. Nothing can be more fallacious than to argue for the moderate use of this insidious and fascinating poison. Hardly any that begin its use can stop in the steep incline to destruction; they have no power left in them to desist! If once the taste for this drug gets established, an almost superhuman power of self-control and endurance of pain is requisite to recovery. Even in England the physician who administers it must exercise the greatest caution, lest the frequency of the dose should result in the formation of the appetite for it: if this danger is kept in view in a medical use of it, what must be the peril when it is taken without pretence of useful purpose, but only for sensual pleasure, and to stimulate to gross evil! Not only is the poison more exciting when prepared in the manner adopted in the British factories in India, but the mode of inhaling it brings it so soon into the blood and to the brain, that drunkenness is produced at once, and by so small a quantity, that a pin-head will take up enough of the treachery solution of opium to supply the pipe. If the Turk, by the use of his more sedative opium (which contains three times more morphia than the drug of Bengal) becomes an emaciated dreamer, "useless but not mischievous," the Malay and Tartar become thoroughly dangerous. Tae-ping-wang, the rebel leader, in his religio-political edicts from Nanking, includes opium-smoking with "amorous glances" and "libidinous songs," and prohibits it on pain of death. The writer was informed by an officer of the police force of Hong Kong, that the pirates who infest the Chinese seas inhaled it before attacking a ship, and under its influence committed the most shocking crimes. The physical evils of its use appear in loss of appetite, difficulty of breathing, chalky paleness, withered skin, dysentery, tottering gait, general emaciation, and death in ten years. Dr. Ball, an English physician who lived in China for several years, says:—"The practice of opium-smoking has extended itself along the sea-coast and up the course of the large rivers, just as far as the drug has been brought within the reach of the people by the smugglers. Throughout these districts,

and in all the towns, may be seen walking skeletons, and families wretched and beggared by drugged fathers and husbands; multitudes, who have lost house and home, dying in the streets, in the fields, and on the banks of the river." Mr. Lay, Her Majesty's late Commissioner at Canton, says "the opium-trade is hamstringing the Chinese nation!" Mr. Montgomery Martin, the former treasurer in China, said to a Committee of the House of Commons, "The opium-trade is desolating China, corrupting its government, and bringing the fabric of that extraordinary empire to rapid ruin." He declared that "the slave trade was merciful compared with the opium trade."

The proportion of opium victims is very great in the districts where it has been introduced. Taking the population of the whole empire into the account, there is one for every hundred people: this is a striking number, when the calculation is limited to adult males, and would almost equal half the proportion of drunkards in England; but the teeming millions in the interior of China have not yet become generally infected with its use. When the English shall have gained free access to the inner waters, and the traffic shall be fully legalized, what multitudes will fall before it! There are now 4,000,000 of opium-smokers in China, 400,000 of whom fall off by death each year: the mortality of the slave system can hardly surpass this. No medical purpose is aimed at in this fatal habit: if anodyne qualities are required for disease, Turkish opium is used; the opium-ball of India is unfit for medicine; it has no such beneficent destination; it is only a seductive poison, prepared for the purpose of debauchery; its effects on the health, prosperity, and morals of the people are not merely incidental or solely attributable to what is called excess or abuse, but are, as stated in the Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, "incontestable, and inseparable from the existence of the traffic."

The truth of these statements might be deduced from the strict measures which several Asiatic nations have adopted to extirpate and keep out of their territories this dangerous drug. It has been prohibited in Siam, Burmah, and Japan. Lord Elgin's treaty with this last country contains a solemn promise that the English shall not bring any opium there. The Sultan of Turkey has lately ordered the closing of a large building in Constantinople, which was the great rendezvous of opium-eaters, and had become an intolerable nuisance. No nation traffics in opium to any extent compared with the English: the Dutch do not export it from Batavia to China; nor the Spaniards from Manilla: for sixty years the emperors of China have prohibited the growth of the poppy, or the importation of opium, unhappily without the power of enforcing the law in either case. Surely these Eastern rulers must associate with the use of opium some serious evils, or they would not be so stringent in forbidding it. They may be condemned for holding barbarous prejudices by the disciples of the low utilitarian school of political economy, who, by perverting the noble principle of free

trade, would erect and uphold political Molochs, and sacrifice men, soul and body, for gain; but it is most unjust and ungenerous to attribute such restrictions and prohibitions to a "cunning, selfish wish to monopolize the cultivation of the poppy, and the revenue derived from opium, to themselves," or to prevent the drain of silver from their countries. When the Opium Trade was first made contraband in China, no mere financial considerations called for such a step; there was every proof of moral earnestness: the domestic laws against using it, and dealing in it, were as strong as the ordinance prohibiting its introduction by the English. No government has suffered more than the Chinese by their rigid adherence to this policy. Their authority has been weakened, and their officers corrupted, by the unlimited bribery, violence, and deceit, which were necessarily attendant upon the smuggling of opium by the English. The enormous and rapid increase of this traffic, the drain of silver from the country, and the daring insolence of its agents, at last stung the government to assert their right to seize 20,000 chests of the contraband article. Instead of selling this, and putting the proceeds into the treasury, they destroyed it. What European nation would have done so with smuggled goods? And after suffering a destructive war, and paying an indemnity of £6,000,000, they still resolutely refused to legalize the traffic, or derive a revenue from it. We are informed that, after the high Chinese commissioners had accepted the terms of the treaty dictated to them by the British envoy, "they eagerly requested to know why the British would not act fairly towards them, by prohibiting the cultivation of the poppy in India?" The British envoy replied,—“Your people must become more virtuous, your officers incorruptible, and then you can stop the opium coming into your borders. Other people will bring it to you if we should stop the cultivation of the poppy.” And in conclusion he added,—“You cannot do better than legalize it!” The emperor resolutely refused to do so.

Again, in 1853, it was proposed to the young Emperor, Hienfung, when he was involved in great financial embarrassment, that he might gain a revenue of a million or more by legalizing the trade; but, amid all his difficulties, he resolved to continue the cherished traditional policy of his predecessors. Could anything be more cruel and cold-hearted than the reply of the British envoy? What has ever destroyed the little virtue of the Chinese people so much as the trade in opium? What has so corrupted its officers? Other people did not bring them the drug before we traded in it. We created, fostered, and stimulated the traffic for our own purposes. We are known in China chiefly as a nation of opium merchants. This is our great trade there. Our enterprise in smuggling, our intrigue in diplomacy, our unscrupulousness in bribery, and our energy in war, have nearly all been exercised on behalf of this traffic. We are responsible for its appalling evils; and it is our clear duty not to cast the burden of remedy on the people we have

injured, but to take steps to suppress it ourselves by limiting, and at last entirely withholding, the supply. It is no argument for wrong doing that others would do so, if we did not. If other nations supply it, we are no longer responsible; but the moral influence of England, if she gave up the trade, would induce others to abstain from it. When England cleared herself of the slave trade, and declared it to be piracy, other nations followed her example, instead of trading in it more. Unhappily, the policy of England tends to extend the opium plague; for the most persistent efforts have been made by every representatives of England in China, from Sir H. Pottinger to Lord Elgin, to induce the Chinese to put aside the prohibitory laws against opium. There is too much reason to suppose that the hostilities commenced by the English at Canton, on the doubtful pretext of an insult offered to their flag, while flying on the mast of a lorcha smuggler, were chiefly intended to open up again the vexed question of British relations with China in this prodigiously increasing traffic; and ultimately to force upon a weak and disorganized government, even at the cannon's mouth, the old demand to legalize it. The opium merchant cannot put up with the stigma that he is only a smuggler, and that, at any time, his ship and cargo are liable to confiscation; and the Indian authorities do not like the repeated charge made against them, that they are breaking treaty engagements by growing, preparing, and selling an article which they know is specially intended for a country which has declared it to be illegal, and with which country they had entered into a solemn treaty to repress all smuggling on the part of their subjects—this opium being the chief smuggled article. Can it be wondered at that the treaty of Lord Elgin, which was forced upon the Chinese, under the pressure of fear, and which contained terms so humiliating to them, should find so much difficulty in gaining the required ratification?

It has of late been frequently asserted that the Chinese government has derived a revenue from the admission of opium. This is certainly not proved. Opium does pay a charge, but it is only privately, to the subordinate custom-house officials, who are thus systematically corrupted, and therefore allow the contraband article to pass in. In the same way, large quantities of goods are passed in without paying the full duty required by the government,—the officials being bribed to pass a bale of goods free, along with one paying the regular duty. No one can suppose that the government connives at this form of corruption in its officials, or derives any profit therefrom. On the contrary, the treasury is defrauded, the imperial authority weakened, and continual ill-feeling kept up between the Chinese authorities and the English traders. It may be true that several local governors, when pressed for money wherewith to carry on defences against the rebels, have laid a temporary tax upon opium; but this was done on their own responsibility, and under the pressure of danger, and was not authorized by the Court of Peking. If the Opium traffic be really legalized in China,

it is only by compulsion, dishonourable to the character of the nation that has exercised it. China has tried to rid herself of the evil ; she dashed down the poison-cup in an act of indignation ; she paid a terrible price for that act, in blood, treasure, humiliation, and probable disorganization. The might of England forced on her a greater stream of poison. What can she do but hate the name, religion, and commerce of her dictator ?

It must be expected that great difficulties will appear in any proposal to abolish the growth of the poppy in India, and to give up the immense revenue derived from opium. The suppression of slavery had no such difficulty as loss of revenue. Private individuals engaged in the trade, and the national honour, were thereby affected ; but the Government had no financial interest at stake. In the case of the Opium traffic, national character is directly implicated, and the responsibility of continuing it is more complete ; and while the duty of suppressing it is more imperative, the sacrifice to be made is greater. After a century of wrong doing, it is difficult to reform ; but surely this ought not to prevent earnest inquiry and effort for a better policy. The very existence of such a feeling is a healthy sign in the public mind, and ought not to provoke a sneer, or be imputed to want of true patriotism. Spain continued a wicked policy in Mexico, and elsewhere, without the corrective element of sensitiveness in the public heart ; and she has sunk down to a low state indeed ! A better destiny seems to be before England. Her errors in policy are discussed ; general conviction of the true course to be pursued takes hold of the national judgment ; and then some providential event happens, such as the potato-rot, or the greased cartridge, and a bad system is brought to an end at once.

The production of opium in India is so completely under Government control, that the difficulty of limiting it, if we see it right to do so, is very slight. No branch of trade could be more easily affected. We prohibit it in Bombay and Madras for convenience in our fiscal arrangements. No one can grow the poppy in Bengal but by licence ; all the drug must be delivered to us by the producer ; we make the advances for its cultivation, we manufacture it into the form suited to Chinese taste, we sell it at Calcutta to the merchants—in fact, we have the most complete power over it, in production, price, and every other respect. Our control over the opium produced in Malwa, and other subsidiary states, is almost as great ; we have fostered and promoted its production in these states by burdensome treaties, the very object of which has been the introduction in most instances, and the extension in others, of the cultivation of the poppy. No opium can pass from Malwa but through our territory, where we put upon it what duty we please. It can only be exported from Bombay ; and our political influence in these states being paramount, we could employ it in the opposite direction to its present one. It is well known that we carefully watch the state of the opium market, and if the price rises, orders

are given for an increased cultivation of the poppy; if it falls, the growth is diminished. Nothing appears easier than to contract the area of cultivation; and this might be gradually done, with a view to its ultimate extinction. Dr. Hobson, an eminent medical missionary in China, suggested this mode to Sir John Bowring in 1855. He says:—"The remedy in our hands is to discourage the growth of opium in India. The East India Company has ordered the production of opium to be diminished next year by 12,000 chests. Why, Sir John, should not the same quantity be diminished every year, and the fertile plains of Hindostan grown with cotton and other useful products?"

The mention of free trade as being violated by the suppression of opium in India is ridiculous. We forced its cultivation at first; there is not a shred of free trade in it. It is surrounded with restrictions, penalties, and continual interference. It must be always so, more or less: even in free England the people are not permitted to grow tobacco. They feel no hardship in this strict prohibition; so completely successful is the law on the growth of this plant, that few Englishmen know that it could even be grown in our island. The poppy is an exotic in India; the Hindoos knew nothing of it till lately; it is a plant of precarious growth in India. The cultivators are in the lowest condition of poverty and wretchedness; it would prove an incalculable benefit to them if the whole production was ended. They would be more prosperous in cultivating those valuable materials that our manufacturers so much want, which we cannot obtain in sufficient quantity, or at moderate price, while the poppy is fostered in Bengal. England pays more for cotton, rice, sugar, flax, silk, indigo, linseed, and spices, because of the growth of opium; and the peasant is too poor to take our manufactures, or to furnish any proper revenue to the Government. The cost of collection in the opium revenue is immense, averaging 25 per cent. of the whole amount. The loss, by the crimes, accidents, disease, and pauperism, traceable to opium, must fairly be added to the account. And who will say that the fields of Bengal would have been stained with English and native blood, as in the terrible mutiny, if they had produced such things as would have made the people prosperous and happy? The revenue from opium has many drawbacks, direct and indirect, both to the people of England and India, and calls for careful investigation.

A few words on the various shapes in which the trade has already appeared, and of those which some propose to give it, and we must reluctantly close this paper. The doubtful character of it has appeared in the frequent changes it has sustained. We find it first in the hands of the servants of the Company, who traded on their own private account, and only in India. Next we find Clive putting an end to private trade, but still making over the monopoly to some favourite of the Calcutta council. It is next assumed by the Government; it is then carried by them to China; they begin to force the growth of it in Bengal. It is declared contraband by

China, and the Company is made to occupy the position of smugglers. To avoid this, receding steps are taken, with the most unmistakeable political hypocrisy. The Company's ships must no longer convey opium to China, nor the officers be engaged in it; but the merchants to whom it was sold were bound to take to China none but that manufactured by the Company. If the Chinese remonstrated, the ready answer was given, that the Indian Government had no connection with the traffic! No cognizance was taken of piracy and bloodshed perpetrated by Englishmen in this reckless smuggling; no tribunal was ever established in China for the government of British subjects, till after the opium war of 1840-42; yet all this time our war vessels had the appearance, at least, of being in Chinese waters for the support of opium smuggling. What a position for a great and generous nation like England! The Chinese have repeatedly requested us, on the highest considerations, to put an end to this state of things; and, failing to secure any improvement, misunderstandings, wars, and frequent interruptions of commercial intercourse have resulted. Soon, the next phase of this traffic will appear in the removal of Chinese prohibition, and the honour of the British name will be apparently saved by this concession to it; but the vast spread of the vicious habit in China will add more guilt than ever. "Multitudes are ready," writes a missionary, "so soon as the road is open, to go with the opium chest to the utmost limits of the land." Whatever expectation we may have of a demand for our manufactures in the cities on the banks of the Yang-tse-Kiang will meet with disappointment, as they did after the opium wars. Take Indian opium there, and our goods will be excluded; keep that away, and a magnificent trade would soon spring up.

Equally wrong and disastrous would be the measure proposed by some, for the purpose of soothing conscience, viz., to cease to manufacture the drug, or to be connected with its growth, and leaving its production to every one who chose to engage in it, still to obtain a revenue by levying a duty on it. The dishonour of deriving a revenue from such a pernicious source would be the same as before, and the evil effects on India and China would greatly increase: the miseries from its unrestricted growth and use in Assam may well warn us against trying it elsewhere. No middle course was found practicable in the abolition of slavery, lotteries, corn laws, or any other evil. Whether a long or short period be requisite to accomplish the ardent wishes of the humane and virtuous in this matter; whether this evil is to be brought to an end gradually and quietly, or by some unexpected crisis, the clear duty of the British people (now that India is directly under their rule) is to condemn the opium trade, as opposed to the laws of religion, and the moral sense of mankind. It is unworthy of a great people to object only to its contraband character, or because it is held as a monopoly, or because it may not be technically legal. The clear, safe course, is to abstain from encouraging the growth of the poppy, except for medical use; from manufacturing it into an article of vicious indul-

gence ; from selling it, either for consumption in India or for exportation to other countries ; and from deriving revenue in any form thereby. A.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

It is far easier to attribute interested motives to an opponent, than to answer his arguments. "Poppy" appears to "Sinim" to hold "that zeal and philanthropy, and even Christianity itself, although very good things in their way, have no right to interfere with his favourite science of political economy." If the first article gave any ground for such an impression, it is to be hoped that the second has altered his harsh opinion of the writer. It does not follow that political economy "disowns religion and morality as her superiors," because it exposes the fallacies of those who advocate the repression of the opium trade. To show that the cure of a particular evil, recommended by those who feel more correctly than they think on the subject, ought not to expose the objector to the charge of scepticism. Undoubtedly the Bible is the test of the morality of the traffic in the drug ; but it does not follow that therefore the Bible vouches for the soundness of the conclusions which its sincerest admirers may form in relation to trade and commerce. If "Sinim" would dispassionately weigh the principles of free trade, instead of supposing a case in which political economy may become "a mischievous, self-conceited jade," he would abandon the false expedients adopted by his party. It is unwise in any Christian to denounce political economy, as if it and Christianity were antagonistic. I may learn from the apostle Paul what is morally wrong, and from Adam Smith and Richard Cobden, that the way in which "Sinim" and his party wish to correct it, will only aggravate it. The aim of the opponents to the traffic in opium may be intelligible and commendable, and yet the means advocated may be deprecated by those who believe in Paul, but not in "Sinim." We argue that the remedy proposed for China is not a remedy ; that to throw open the trade is, as time will show, to aggravate the evils complained of ; that while the extinction of the poppy in Bengal would not suppress its use in China (which is the thing desired), it would entail serious losses upon India, which nothing suggested will compensate ; and the answer is a quotation from Scripture, to the effect, "Woe to the world because of offences," &c. If a text is to be quoted, instead of refuting our premises, of course there is a speedy end of all reasoning on the subject. That the passage is misapplied is clear from the fact, that we might quote it against "Sinim." The plans proposed will indefinitely increase the evils sought to be removed ; hence, "woe to him that would multiply the offence."

Because "the entire consumption" of the drug in China, "with the smallest possible fraction of an exception," is abused, therefore it is argued, that the trade is "not a legitimate source of gain." The responsibility of abuse is, on this principle, transferred from the guilty to the innocent. It is not the intemperate consumer, but the producer and merchant, upon whom the guilt of any abuse is

made to fall. Our merchants are to be turned into the guardians of morals all the world over, and follow their goods into the remote corners of the earth, calculate the abuse of the articles in which they deal, and renounce the traffic. The Jamaica planter must refuse to sell sugar to any merchant who will not guarantee that no distiller of rum shall be a customer; or the distiller must see that the spirit shall not fall into the hands of such retail dealers as are licensed to make men "drunk on the premises." Our London and Burton brewers should, on such principles, decline offers from all who will not guarantee that their liquors shall be limited to medicinal purposes. It is, in fact, shifting the responsibility of abuse from individual inebriates to the shoulders of producers, merchants, and tradesmen. It is the Maine Liquor Law applied to opium; and we hold ourselves free to object to the principle, without being justly liable to the charge of advocating drunkenness by either stimulants or narcotics. The writer of the third affirmative article agrees with us in the main points of our argument, but objects to the view we take, that opium is "a legitimate source of gain," and supports the objection by an extract illustrative of the horrors of intemperance. We do not see the pertinency of such quotations, for they prove only what is not denied on our part. Both parties admit that opium abused is a fearful destroyer. One of them propose that the Chinese should be made temperate by legislation; the other object to compulsory abstinence, both on principle, as shown by "B. R.," and the impracticableness, as well as the principle of the expedients proposed by "Sinim" and "A.," as argued by us. There are 400,000,000 of consumers, scattered chiefly over Asia; of this vast number 4,000,000 are stated to be Chinese drunkards. Although every Chinese smoker abuses the drug, the traffic may be legitimate. The remedy is not a Maine Opium Law, but the diffusion and prevalence of christian morality. To deprive 364,000,000 persons of their favourite narcotic because 4,000,000 are found to abuse it, is to punish the temperate for the sake of the intemperate. When teetotalism has taken the place of Scripture precepts, which enjoin "moderation in all things;" when the human principle of governing mankind, which would enforce abstinence, has been shown to be either more effective or salutary than the Divine principle, which, by exposing mankind to temptation, trains men to resist and overcome it, then it will be time for us to review and abandon our views upon the question of the traffic in opium.

We have some ground of complaint against "Sinim," for asserting that "the remarks of 'Poppy' are so full of misstatements, that it would take more time and space than" he "has to refute them." No one should make such a charge without *finding* both time and space to substantiate it. We are not only open to conviction, but anxious to be enlightened on so vital a question as that which affects the honour of the British nation and the welfare of China. We have time, but are deprived of the opportunity, to consider the nature of the misstatements. His general and wholesale

accusation we have to bear in silence, necessary, but not contemptuous; and his reference to "the principal points" of our argument is all that we can notice.

His first question is, "How did the Chinese exist so long without opium?" We really cannot see the force of the question. We have nowhere argued that the drug was necessary to their existence. A question of this kind is easily shown to be illogical, by putting another as illogical,—“How have the Chinese existed so long without the cottons of Manchester and the hardwares of Birmingham?” If the drug is not to be imported into China because it is “a modern exotic,” there is an end to our trade in Chinese tea and silks—an end, in fact, to commerce altogether. His declaration, that “from the highest to the lowest, the Chinese enjoy the luxury of tea,” is true only of certain districts. Where the tea is grown, every cottager has his little tea garden, from the produce of which he supplies the wants of his family. The plant, however, flourishes only in certain provinces of the empire. In not only the favoured districts, but wherever it is within the reach of the poor, it is only the coarser kinds that they can use. Take up any work which professes to describe the manners and customs of the interior, and it will be found that the mass of the Chinese are on the verge of pauperism, and are compelled to adopt substitutes for tea. During Lord Macartney’s mission to Peking, the members of the embassy observed that the infusion of the dried leaves of the fern, known to botanists as the *aspidium fragrans*, was in common use among the poor. Quantities of the preparation were seen exposed for sale near the Poyang Lake. In reply to our statement, that poverty would prevent the prevalence of indulgence in a foreign drug by the people who could not afford tea grown in their own land, “Sinim” gives an extract from the *Times*’ correspondent, showing the extent to which coolies and others in seaports spend their wages in opium. We submit that the extravagance of a drunkard is no answer to our statement, that the masses are too poor to become opium drunkards. The wages of a labourer in a seaport are no test of the scale of wages in rural districts. The price of the drug, where it is unshipped, is not the price at which it can be sold after the heavy cost of transport, and the duties imposed on inland carriage, have been incurred. The labourer in a commercial town, or a seaport, is better paid, and has more to spend in the drug, where it is cheap, than the masses in the interior, where it is dear. To argue as “Sinim” does is fallacious, and does not dispose of our opinion that the fears of the repressionists, as to the wholesale demoralisation of China, are exaggerated. In his article “A.” refers to arrangements made by the East India Company to bring “the drug within the reach of the lower classes.” If in the locality where it is grown some such encouragement to its use among the poor was necessary, it follows that the mass in China, who have to pay a heavier price, will find it too expensive a luxury to adopt it universally.

The thorough impracticableness of the plans proposed is mani-

feated by "Sinim." It is, he observes, "a well-known fact, that as the price of opium rises in India, the consumption is checked in China. Acting on this principle, he "proposes a gradual suppression of the cultivation, to extend over five years." There are certain well-known principles of political economy, not to say of human nature, which the proposer should have studied before suggesting so futile an expedient. Bengal is the only opium-producing country. The destruction of the poppy there would be followed by its introduction into the Indian islands, and an indefinite extension of its cultivation in China itself. For a time the price would be enhanced, as he judges rightly; but that this would suppress opium-smoking in China can be conceived only by one who supposes that political economy may become a "self-conceited jade." Enhance its price by suppressing its cultivation in Bengal, and you supply a strong motive to foreigners to become cultivators. You will simply change the sphere of its growth, but will not, and cannot suppress its production. "A small quantity for legitimate purposes," again, is to remain in "Government hands." It does not occur to "Sinim" that no one will buy that small quantity from the Government, when the same article can be bought in larger quantities, and cheaper, elsewhere. How, again, is the Government to see that, when it is sold, it shall be purchased only for "legitimate purposes," by chemists, and not smokers; by doctors, and not by drunkards?

In all the affirmative articles, as in all the speeches on the subject, there is a manifest tendency to exaggerate. We before pointed out, that taking their own statistics, it is only one in one hundred Chinese who smoke, and yet the whole nation is represented as being demoralized; that if opium-smoking be the cause of the indisposition to purchase British goods, it can be only in the case of one in a hundred; and yet the limited commerce with China is attributed to the drug from Bengal. In his article, "A" indulges in the same disposition to argue from exaggerations rather than sober facts. The area of Bengal, for example, is nearly 100,000 square miles; of this vast tract, only about 100,000 acres are confessedly occupied as poppy fields; and yet "A." declares that "the rich plains of Bengal, that had produced rice, sugar, and cotton, for 2,000 years, were covered by compulsion with the poppy." The writer starts with an alarming statement, that "the plains of Bengal" are prostituted to the growth of a baneful drug; and ends by showing that about one acre to the square mile, or one acre in every six hundred and forty, has been given up to its cultivation. It is impossible to argue correctly, if the mind is allowed to run wild with such exaggerations. The "climate," again, is declared to be unfavourable "for the precarious nature of the growth of a delicate plant." If the climate of the country where it is indigenous be unfavourable, where is the climate that will suit it? If the representation were correct, how should we account for the fact that the Bengal opium is superior and cheaper than that grown elsewhere?

If the representation were correct, it would follow, that to extinguish its growth where its production is so "precarious," would lead to its introduction into a country more suited to the plant, and, consequently, to greater production at less cost. On his own views of the case, "A." should advocate the continuance of things as they are, if he would limit the supply.

We strongly object to the attempt made by all the writers on the affirmative side, to paint the conduct of the late Company, in the darkest colours possible in connection with the opium traffic. That the directors and servants of that Company committed grievous faults, we have no wish to deny. But that the British power is the great curse which "A." in common with a class of writers, seems to think, we cannot admit, with the ten thousand proofs we have of the great blessings that power has conferred upon India and the world beside. From his statements one would fancy that opium was not grown in Bengal till it became a British possession; and that intemperance in the East was not known till "originated and fostered" for the purposes of revenue. Immediately after stating that "the ever-widening extension of this vice accompanies the British power," he quotes from Rees's personal narrative of the siege of Lucknow, to show that "opium was an article as extensively used in Lucknow as in China." Till within the last few years Oude was not under British rule; British power had not extended to its metropolis; and yet the prevalence of opium-smoking there is adduced as the first proof of the remark that "the extension of the vice accompanies" our power. We are informed that opium was first taken to China by Portuguese merchants, and yet the East India Company is taxed with "originating and fostering" the taste for it. It was grown and used in large quantities long before Clive and Hastings founded our empire in Hindostan; yet we are told that "the changeless character of Indian agriculture was forcibly broken, and the rich plains of Bengal, that had produced rice, sugar, silk, and cotton, for 2,000 years, are covered by compulsion with the poppy." Among the Hindoo castes is that of the *distiller*, showing how ancient is the practice of distilling spirits in India. A variety of arrack is distilled from rice, molasses, spices and water. A spirituous liquor is drawn from a species of palm tree, which grows wild and extensively. Incisions in the bark in the evening will produce a liquor by sunrise which is easily and speedily fermented, and drank by no limited numbers. The orgies practised by the worshippers of certain female deities include libations and drinking of spirits to a shocking extent. Yet "A." informs us that "all who have described the state and customs of the 600,000,000 that inhabit India and China have given unanimous testimony that intemperance was not found among their vices; but shortly after the English had obtained power, the attempt was made to reproduce the English system of deriving revenue from intemperance; with this essential difference, that while at home there might have been a propriety in taxing already existing habits, in the East they had to be originated

and fostered in order ultimately to obtain the revenue." The very sentence in which this charge is made contains its refutation. Before the Company assumed the monopoly, it is declared that its "servants traded in intoxicants as individuals." Therefore the Company did not "originate" intemperance in India. Again, to tax an article is not, in these days of free trade, regarded as the way to "foster" its use. It is true that the Company introduced the system of deriving revenue from the use of intoxicants, but this is not to be confounded with originating or fostering them. That "the vast population in India has been already demoralized by this (opium) and other intoxicants, produced or sold by licence from the Government," is simply incorrect. The British Government has introduced *no* intoxicants among the natives which had not existed long before Julius Cæsar landed in Britain. The monopoly they assumed has not *fostered*, but checked an existing vice. The directors, as shown in the very passage we are referring to, did not "introduce the English custom of deriving revenue in order to originate or foster intemperance," but to put a stop to the "bloodshed, confusion, and distress," which existed before they monopolized the traffic.

The remark, that intemperance was not a vice among the millions of India and China, is again true only by comparison. The author of the "History of the Hindoos" was among the earliest of our Indian missionaries. "Two Brahmins assured" him "that drinking of spirits" was then "so common, that out of sixteen Hindoos, two drank spirits in secret, and about one in sixteen in public. Several of the Hindoo rajahs, who had received the initiating incantations of the female deities, are said to have given themselves up to the greatest excesses in drinking spirits." In this testimony we have proof that intemperance in India has an origin for which the British power is not responsible. We admit that drunkenness has never prevailed in India to the extent that it has done in the British isles. But the abstinence from excess does not arise from Hindoo superiority to the European. The climate is itself a check. The drunkard finds a grave more speedily in Bengal than in more temperate climates. But we totally dissent from the opinion that all India has been demoralized by the British power.

"Sinim" denies the correctness of the statement of Sir J. Bowring, that dram-drinking is a Chinese vice. If he speaks comparatively, his remark may be allowed to pass without a challenge. Taking, however, the climate and other things into consideration, it cannot be denied that no people upon the face of the earth are so little addicted to the drinking of simple water. The waters in the large rivers of China are notoriously impure. The British embassy described that of the Peking river as of "a milky colour." Several of its members were seized with illness after drinking it. In Bengal, and especially in China, the water cannot with safety be drank until it has been clarified with alum. The universal practice of drinking some infusion of tea, or fern, is by certain writers attributed to the unwholesomeness of that precious fluid in the celestial

empire. The Chinese, like the Indians, ferment the boiled liquor of rice, and distil a spirit, which, both in appearance and taste, resembles British whiskey; and which, in strength, is scarcely inferior to our proof spirits. It is by no means an uncommon practice to drink this spirit in small cups after dinner.

"S. E. L." does not admit that "if the drug were exterminated, some stimulant or other would be required to supply its place." This of course is a matter of opinion, and to be settled by an appeal to facts. His statement, that "neither the North American Indians nor their ancestors knew anything of the existence of stimulants, till the Europeans brought 'fire water' among them, was made in oversight of the fact, that tobacco was not known in Europe till introduced from North America. That 'numerous races of Africa and of South America remain almost entirely unacquainted with them up to the present time,' cannot be substantiated. We have never read of a savage tribe in Africa that was unacquainted either with roots from which a fermented liquor could be produced, or some leaf or drug which could be used as a narcotic. Tobacco and the palm tree flourish in South America, and wherever these are found, the natives, from time immemorial, have indulged in narcotics and stimulants. The fact that 'fire water' was unknown to the North American Indians does not refute the statement, that the desire for stimulants is universal in man. Where nature, by its vegetable productions, does not supply man with narcotics or fermented liquors, there the hankering after some stimulant will show itself by an ingenuity which teetotallers will describe as provokingly perverse. The inhabitants of Siberia, for example, and Tartars all over the steppes of Northern Asia, live in a region to which nature has denied the luxuries abounding in more temperate and fruitful climates; and yet they have compensated themselves for the absence of the usual stimulants elsewhere by distilling spirits of remarkable strength from mares' milk. The Chinese Tartars, again, to this day retain a strong predilection for spirits distilled from mutton broth. Even if it could be shown that certain savage tribes were unacquainted with intoxicants, it would be proof simply that they were so ignorant, as not to know how to ferment and distil; but certainly no proof that a desire for some stimulant or other was not a deeply-rooted principle of human nature.

We close our review of the affirmative articles by stating, in general, that we object to the principle upon which they proceed. That principle is, upon the well established facts of political economy, altogether unsound; and the attempt to show it to be sound, by an appeal to our moral sense of what is morally right and what is morally wrong, fails altogether; for we hold that the Bible imposes no duty which it is impossible to fulfil. We claim to be one with every man who would save the infatuated drunkard in Britain as well as in China; but hold ourselves at perfect liberty to scrutinize his opinions, without justly incurring the charge of impure or interested motives. Our veneration for the sublime and unflinching morality

of St. Paul is not to be questioned by those who, with equal veneration for the apostle of Christ, have yet to learn that the principles of Adam Smith and Richard Cobden may make them wiser men in relation to trade and commerce.

POPPY.

Social Economy.

ARE THE OPERATIONS OF TRADES' UNIONS BENEFICIAL TO WORKING MEN?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

IN concluding the affirmative portion of this debate, we have to tender our respectful thanks to those gentlemen who have so ably and earnestly opposed or supported us. We felt gratified and much interested in finding that "L'Ouvrier" had taken up this question; his talent in debate has frequently produced in us feelings of admiration and respect. We felt some pride, too, in finding ourself associated with Mr. G. Potter, whose manly action in the late "lock-out" has, we believe, won for him the life-long esteem of the working classes. Our task seems a most interesting and instructive one, and we hasten to pay due attention to the very able essay of "L'Ouvrier."

We can almost unexceptionably endorse his exordium, the "wise and prudent" objects of the Union, selected by our friend, neither of us question. It seems to us, in perusing the two paragraphs relating to "prescribing the amount of initiatory labour," that "L'Ouvrier" overrates the consequences of such procedure, on the one hand: and totally ignores the benefits accruing from it, on the other. He overrates the result in imagining a man "excluded from working at every other trade, driven at last from the labour market." There are numerous supernumerary positions and methods of earning a livelihood for the inadequate handicraftsman, in which his conscience will acquit him of having sought to undersell the skilled workman, with whose talent he is not fitted to compete. Then, respecting the benefits accruing, we would submit to our readers that this prescription, properly carried out, will eventually admit of only competent workmen being employed at branches requiring ability—that is, those who have during a proper apprenticeship familiarised themselves with the various branches of a profession or trade. This will produce satisfaction to the purchaser, and credit to the employer. Otherwise, in this money-grasping, labour-grinding age, unprincipled masters will engage individuals only imperfectly acquainted with the work to be performed; these, knowing their shortcomings, will gladly tender their services at a lower rate than their competent fellow-workers. But

for this salutary check to this mistaken course supplied by the Unions, the purchaser would suffer in receiving inferior workmanship; the employer would suffer in disposing of this unequal performance; and the skilled labourer would suffer, in finding himself driven out of the scale of adequate remuneration; possibly our whole country might suffer in the future, were we to become popular amongst foreign traders as slop-workers *only*. This underselling, if permitted, might re-act in another way,—parents, finding particular branches of trade deteriorating in value, might seek altogether other sources in which to frame the future of their sons; youthful talent might manifest itself most satisfactorily, but what true parent would ruin the future of his offspring in forcing him into drudging competition with the merest mediocrity?

It will follow, as a consequence, that if the intrusion of unskilled labour can only be checked by Union efforts, so the rate of remuneration must form an important subject of consideration. This latter is rendered necessary when we bear in mind the grasping conduct of many employers. The working man seeks a higher social and intellectual position; in so doing, he finds that a certain time is due to him by all the laws of humanity—his physical comfort, too, renders this imperative. But for these time and wages elements being pressed by the Unions upon the consideration of employers, workmen might jog on, ground down and starved by degrees, until they found themselves near that pauper's grave alluded to by our friend. Observe the results of the *absence* of Union elements in sundry callings, and especially in those followed by our female population; there the "justice" of employers, and the "liberty" of the employed, have had *unlimited* scope, and what are the results? "The garter-maker works from eight in the morning till nine at night, to earn about 4s. a week clear. The shirt-maker makes shirts for 2s. a dozen; her usual time of work is from five in the morning till nine at night, winter and summer; and for all this she earns on an average 2s. 10½d. per week, or *two shillings* clear, after deducting cotton and candle. The waistcoat maker's earnings average from 3s. to 4s. a week, out of which, all deductions made, she has about 1s. 10½d. to live upon. Of the workers for the army clothiers, the one working for the soldiers earns 2s. a week, and finds her own thread; the other, working for the convicts, earns 3s. a week when in full work, but has to deduct thread and candles, "which is quite half." The shoebinder works about eighteen hours a day, earning 1s. 6d. per week, out of which she has to pay 6d. for candles. The bracemaker earns from 1s. to 1s. 3½d. a week, working six days of twelve hours, and finding cotton and candles; she has three months slack in the year, during which she gets about 4½d. a week, paying a halfpenny for cotton."* Here then we may conclude that the utmost incapable has eked out a frightful subsistence, and the competent has been undersold; the results, it seems to us,

* Vide Mayhew's "Great World of London."

have tended towards the admission of the "slop" element in manufactures as a *necessity* rather than as a disgrace. "L'Ouvrier" attacks that portion of Union effort which seeks to distribute fairly the amount of labour; there is something so humane and considerate in this, something that must have so frequently won the gratitude of those who otherwise might have been driven to desperation, that I pass on.

By limiting the number of apprentices, and weeding trades from "slop" workmen, the Unions seem to me to obviate, to a great extent, the difficulty referred to by our friend; when he says:—"Should the number of labourers increase faster than the production by which their necessities are supplied, their prosperity decreases, want and destitution ensue; hence population, or the number of labourers to be supplied with the products of labour, becomes an important factor in this social problem." Now it seems to us that this "problem" is the very one with which Unions seek to deal; and certainly in their hands it becomes much nearer solution than if permitted to hurry the labourer on under what is, we think incorrectly, alluded to as "a law beyond the power of human control." The common idea of labour is, it seems to us, a mistaken one. "L'Ouvrier" alludes to it as "the sad lot of the sons of toil, upon whom press so heavily the consequences of our first parents' fault." Now we regard labour as "health, wealth, and comfort." Of itself, it is the interpreter of nature; but hitherto employers have held so tight a rein over it, that its guidance has been to ruin, tyranny, or destitution.

"L'Ouvrier" notices "a spirit of antagonism between employers and employed, as engendered by Unions." Now it seems to us that this spirit is generally evoked by the unfair demands of the masters. We admit there is a lack of knowledge of political economy and its many ramifications on the part of the working classes; but we believe the active representatives of the Unions are in the main too practical and too well experienced to foment dissensions causelessly. In passing, I may here refer to the much higher tone of reading permeating the masses, and note with satisfaction an admirable publication now issued for a few pence, entitled, "An Essay on Labour: its Union," &c.,* from the pen of John Scott, of Belfast; working men are seeking a more intelligible footing in society—right is becoming a study, and might must ere long only occupy its proper sphere. The overbearing demands of employers necessarily beget resistance; and, at last, our workmen are beginning to understand that they are not the mere machines of employers, but have a power of their own, liberty to use it, and reason to guide them. Now this reason teaches not only how, but when, to agitate for the betterment of their condition. Unions, it should always be remembered, are as yet in their infancy; experience will direct them in their course, and strengthen their influence for good. Our friend

seems all along to underrate the knowledge of our workmen. Surely in these days of press and platform our workers are not *totally* ignorant of the relations between employer and employed. We think the employer needs no incentive from the operations of Unions, in the adoption of machinery wherever available. Are there *many* instances, "L'Ouvrier," where masters, unaffected by Unions, have *consequently* declined the opportunity for supplanting manual labour? We think the instances of men *driven* to become petty masters are not numerous. From some little experience we can assure "L'Ouvrier" these parties are by no means such victims as he pictures; we have *always* had to pay full value for labour bestowed. We never heard of Unions preventing "indomitable energy" from rising to position, nor have we met with instances of injury arising to workmen from the successful exertions of their fellows. Employers "inflict misery on the families of the workman. The recent strike of the building trades has so forcibly illustrated this topic, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it, for we have seen that thousands of families have been dependent upon the miserable dole of the executive committee of the Trades' Union. The contribution thus meted out to the workman has been insufficient to buy even the necessities of life for himself; hence, the family dependent upon him have suffered unknown miseries, private and public charity having, in many instances, redeemed the starving families from a miserable death, to drag on a still more miserable life. When the great day of account shall come, who among these tyrants of their class shall be able to answer for the crimes engendered, and the deaths prematurely caused, by their oppressive and tyrannical proceedings?" See how aptly L'Ouvrier's wrath applies to the other side! These victims, in numerous cases, were entirely innocent; the masters, in most cases, by one brutal, tyrannical swoop, "locked out" their workmen, with whom they had no difference, solely with the view of following up a dispute with *one* employer: thus they thought to crush out the protective combination of labour. The result has been true to humanity—the Union still flourishes, and the masters have veered round, finding their scheme unsuccessful. By this inhuman combination of employers, "not only have the families of men" not "on strike been made to endure undeserved misery, but all classes of workmen connected with Trades' Unions been made to suffer the loss of many comforts, if not necessities, from the heavy contributions demanded of them to support" the victims of this tyrannical proceeding. Were Unions the tyrannical, extorting, injurious things drawn by our friend, we have such high opinion of workmen, that we feel assured the number of members would speedily fall to 0.

A. F. seems to overlook the fact, that the "interests, hopes, and aims" of Unions "are one and the same," viz., the disposal of labour. Combinations of masters are similar, viz., the disposal of capital. Wool brokers', ship owners' associations, and the like, aim at similar objects. We never yet heard of a Union legislating

without having in view the capital holder or employer. What noble leaders have the Unions, who will risk the trials ably enumerated by A. F., feeling that they fight for right against might! The "mutual sympathy" we alluded to was that evidenced in the hard cash freely and willingly contributed to the "lock-outs." "Progress" we considered manifest in the calm, unflinching bearing of those martyrs, "the effect" of advancing mind resulting from "general education," and a press free to judge who were the tyrants in the matter. "Determined vigilance" of the authorities was uncalled for, unluckily for the oppressors; the workmen were too wise to get up a riot. The remainder of A. F.'s paper seems to call for no further remarks from me. Permit me, in conclusion, to state that I have reaped great benefit from this discussion, and that I still believe "Trades' Unions are beneficial to working men."

M. A. X.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WITH considerable interest we have noted the progress of this debate. Its importance necessarily demanded our careful attention; but the desire for information and instruction, both for ourselves and others, gave increased interest to everything said, *pro* and *con.*, upon the point at issue. The conflict of opinions, and the clash of words, may be to some a species of gladiatorial contest, to prove which has the most fluent use of their mother-tongue. With such notions we have neither part nor lot. Our convictions are real, our arguments the result of thoughtful experience, and our aspirations for the amelioration of the working man's lot.

Our *nom du plume* is characteristic of our social position. It was with much care we selected it; and, after many years' constant use, we still glory in it, and count it one of our chief honours to be known to the many readers of the *British Controversialist* as "L'Ouvrier"—the working man. With the sins, the sorrows, the joys, and the aspirations of the working man, we are perfectly familiar. With the working man we have lived, do live, and hope ever to live and work while here below. To impute to us ignorance of the condition and relations of the working classes is a folly which no constant reader of these pages would have the temerity to attempt; and we can only suppose those writers on the affirmative of this question, who have thus erred, are new, both as readers and as writers; our pardon is, therefore, ensured to them for this their early *lapseus styli*.

We have carefully examined the production of M. A. X., hoping to find some argument in favour of Trades' Unions, but have to acknowledge our disappointment; the nearest approach to argument is given in the three sectional headings he has given on mutual sympathy, progress, and self-reliance. Mutual sympathy is truly educed by the operations of Trades' Unions, because of the wide-spread misery they have caused. The thousands of suffering victims, in their distress, know practically that "fellow-feeling

makes man wondrous kind;" the same secret vote of the Trades' Union committee having inflicted upon each one and all the same species of misery, suffering, and slavery.

Progress is indicated by Trades' Unions; for whereas formerly a few hundreds only were subject to the direct influence of secret tyrants, now two and a half millions of Englishmen are subjected to this worse than Egyptian slavery, more degrading than the plague spot on American freedom.

Self-reliance is evoked, but by a different mode and with different motives than M. A. X. would have us believe. The Trades' Union forces man to rely on himself, because he cannot rely on the Union itself. He asks for higher wages, or shorter hours—and the Union gives him *the strike*; he asks for subsistence—and they dole out the paltry pittance of a few shillings, a tithe of his ordinary earnings; he asks to work, that he may live—and they give him fines, forfeitures, starvation, and a pauper's grave. Truly, Trades' Unions do evoke self-reliance!

It is possible that the benefactor of mankind, in plucking those herbs nature provides for the healing of nations, may disturb some poisonous adder concealed beneath the leaves of the health-giving plant, and in its wrath much venom may be scattered about, to the alarm of the unconscious disturber of its secret hiding place. Apparently, the present question has placed us in analogous position to the benefactor, without the presumption on our part of assuming that position, since we are attacked by the hydra-headed evil of Trades' Unions themselves, personified by their chief advocate, Mr. "George Potter." But this fact does not excite our fears, nor make us to tremble for the consequences; it rather affords us satisfaction to know that we are combating the recognized doctrines of the highest authority connected with Trades' Unions, and it will give the greater power for good to our refutations of his sophistries, because there is no appeal from him to a higher authority, his *dictum* being the *ultima ratio* of Trades' Union authority, both legislative and executive.

G. P. asserts that our "impression of the nature, character, and action of Trades' Unions is obviously obtained at second hand." This is a species of declamation which no doubt he has found frequently to serve his purpose in his public harangues; but in these pages fact is regarded of more importance than a flourish of rhetoric, or mere wordy display at the expense of an antagonist. By the veracity of G. P. on this point we may fairly infer his veracity and credibility on other points. On referring to this proof, we are forced to speak of self, but this must not be construed into egotism, it is a necessity of the case. For twenty-five years we have known every position, feelingly, of the workman's lot; we have worked, we have "combined," we have "clubbed," we have helped to make Trades' Unions law, and have held official positions in connection therewith; we have now frequent intercourse with working men connected with Trades' Unions;

while the workmen with whom we are now associated are the happiest and most prosperous in their various branches of trade, yet not one is a member of a Trades' Union. Only a few hours since, we were in the company of a friend who was the workman employed by a Trades' Union to inaugurate a strike which caused as much noise in the world as any which has occurred for more than twenty years past. How far, then, is the assertion of G. P. correct? Can his other assertions be depended upon, when this, his grand onslaught, has broken down so completely?

G. P. affirms (p. 115, line 17) that we have asserted Trades' Unions ignore "the less gifted workman." If he will please refer to page 38, line 46, *et seq.*, he will find that we say the Trades' Unions do not ignore the less gifted workman; for our words are—"This oppression is, if possible, more insufferably felt by the less gifted workman," &c. The line of argument pursued in the paragraph from which this extract is taken is so plain and simple, that we feel somewhat astonished at the bold perversion of fact G. P. has made. Our observations clearly show that Trades' Unions prevent the clever man receiving more than the trade wages, and also prevent the less gifted workman receiving less than trade price for his inferior work; the consequence being, the inferior workman starves, and hence feels the oppression of the Trades' Union regulation more painfully than the clever man, who is forced to receive under value for his labour, or reduce the quality or quantity to the average of his inferior fellow-workman. How this line of argument can be designated an ignoring of Trades' Union operations, we are at a loss to know. G. P. may rant and bluster about "the christian duty of self-sacrifice;" but it will not gild the counterfeit which he attempts to pass current under its influence. Trades' Unions violate, under their present operations, one of the first laws of nature, and we have yet to learn that any christian duty requires the violation of nature's laws. It is nature's law that labour must be valued according to its intrinsic value, and the relative condition of supply and demand in the labour market. Trades' Unions repudiate the difference of value between the clever workman and his "less gifted" fellow. The former is dealt with unjustly, because he does not get the full value for his labour to which he is entitled; the latter gets nothing and starves, because he dare not take the full value of his inferior labour. Whether we heed it or not, of this we may be assured, nature's laws will be obeyed; if not cheerfully, they must be obeyed in suffering, as a punishment for our ignorance and obstinacy. It is as futile to deny the overpowering natural law of supply and demand regulating price, as to deny the natural law of gravitation. The false argument built upon this misstatement of fact is exceedingly specious; but vanishes as the baseless fabric of a vision, and leaves not a wreck behind. The weird spirit invoked by the declamation of G. P. vanishes into thin air before the simple truth of nature. We wish that time had permitted G. P. to favour us with the arguments he has not given

us. Doubtless we should have been but little benefited by the gift, judging by the miserable pretences for argument manifest throughout his paper. "The big but baseless assertions" we have made G. P. has specially noticed, and his notice is of a peculiar kind—he denies the "independence" of man (p. 116). We have said that man "is an independent but responsible being," and that, "in the exercise of his faculties, he is responsible to no other of his fellow-men," * * "whilst the exercise of his own natural powers accords to his fellow-men equal rights and equal freedom" (p. 36). This "big assertion," we affirm, is not baseless; and not only self-evident, but it is the recognized foundation principle of all political philosophy in all civilized communities. We speak of an independent power to think, to will, to do; of a responsibility to none but God for his acts, until those acts are found to interfere with the rights and liberties of others. To assert that man is not physiologically and socially dependent, none but an imbecile would think of himself or impute to others; such a dependence is not thought of until G. P. forcibly drags it into the subject, where it sits unnaturally, in a foreign garb, and feels uncomfortable, by reason of the unpleasant and ridiculous position in which it is placed by the unskilful G. P.

On p. 39 we have used the words, "all men must labour to live," in a logical synthesis of our argument in that paper. This sentence gives G. P. great umbrage; and here he has fallen, as is his wont, into a great blunder. We are referring to the normal condition of men as labourers, in the technical language of science, and the words are so general as designedly to include all men, even prior to the existence of capital or wealth; hence, our remarks would show that labour is necessary to create wealth; and that wealth, when created, may be consumed by idleness, is the purport of G. P.'s reply to it on p. 117. Of what value such a reply may be, we leave the reader to judge. To follow the course of D. R. R.'s remarks, would be to retread the ground we have now passed in review, and the reader may justifiably inquire, *Cui bono?*

In conclusion, we cannot do better than repeat the words of the *Edinburgh Review*, to show the magnitude of the evil with which, as political economists and philanthropists, we have to contend, and against which we have to guard the young men of Great Britain. The writer states, "That, according to the best authorities accessible in so obscure a case, the Trades' Unions in the kingdom are not fewer than 2,000, containing about 600,000 members, and commanding a fund of £300,000, destined chiefly for the support of strikes. Now, if we suppose each person to have three persons dependent upon him (which is a low estimate), it would appear that nearly two millions and a half of the working class of our population are governed in their most important affairs—their industry and its recompense, their social relations and personal fortunes—by laws and authorities not recognized by the rest of society, and not subject to public discussion or legal control. It must be considered,

also, that the two millions and a half constitute only a portion of the multitude whose fortunes are determined by the Trades' Union organization. The Unions are antagonistic, not so much to the employer of labour as to the labourers outside the body. The opposition to the masters is always put forward as the object of such Unions, and their most conspicuous action is in that direction. But the main purpose is to control the labour market, to keep up a monopoly in each trade, and drive off into other employments all the workmen who will not enter the combination." This extract shows, in unison with public and private history, that Trades' Unions create *imperium in imperio*, and hence are destructive of all that the patriot treasures most—the integrity of the constitution, the welfare of his fatherland, and the happiness and prosperity of the hardy sons of toil he delights to call his fellow-countrymen.

Having shown that Trades' Unions are politically, socially, and commercially injurious to working men, we have, by necessity, proved our thesis, that they are not beneficial. The verdict is now with the British Controversialists.

L'OUVRIER.

The Reviewer.

Modern Europe; a School History. By JOHN LORD, A.M.
London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. Price 5s.

WE have much pleasure in announcing the publication of the "ninth thousand" of this carefully-written work, the value of the present issue being greatly increased by the addition of three chapters, comprehending all the leading events which have occurred from the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, to the Peace of Villafranca, in 1859.

Notwithstanding the extent of territory over which the author ranges, and the fact that his history embraces the leading events in the last three or four hundred years, he is anything but a mere uninteresting chronicler of lifeless names and dreary dates. Mr. Lord has evidently carefully studied the subject on which he writes; has accustomed himself to take comprehensive and enlightened views of things; and, believing that "history is philosophy teaching by example," he is ever ready to enforce those moral lessons which all great events inculcate.

We feel much confidence in recommending this work to the notice of our readers.

Good Words. Part I. Edinburgh: Alexander Strahan and Co. Price 6d.

THIS is the first monthly part of a new religious magazine, edited by the Rev. Norman Macleod, D.D. It is got up in the style of the "Christian Treasury;" contains a large quantity of good letter-

press, and is filled with thoughtful, but rather sombre articles. We confess, however, that we are at a loss to discover in it any special claims for support; but we presume others have been more successful than ourselves, for it is reported that 30,000 copies of the first number have been sold.

The Good Steward; a Manual for Sunday School Teachers. By THULIA SUSANNAH HENDERSON. London: Sunday School Union, 56, Old Bailey. Price, cloth, 2s.

Margaret Penrose; or, Scenes in the Life of a Sunday School Teacher. London: Sunday School Union, 56, Old Bailey. Price, cloth, 2s. 6d.

THESE two new works will be welcomed by many of our readers who are personally connected with the great Sunday school enterprise.

"The Good Steward" is an essay written in competition for a prize of twenty-five pounds, offered by the Committee of the Sunday School Union, and it contains much information, and many suggestions that will be practically useful to the amateur teacher.

"Margaret Penrose" is a more sketchy, and therefore a more attractive volume than the preceding one. In very lively language it depicts scenes in the life of a Sunday school teacher, which are not of an improbable nature, and to which, therefore, the author has given an instructive tendency.

Lessons from Jesus. By W. P. BALFERN, Author of "Glimpses of Jesus." London: J. F. Shaw.

The readers of "Glimpses of Jesus," which has in a short time reached a third edition, will, we have no doubt, gladly avail themselves of the opportunity of procuring another work from the same pen. General theological literature scarcely comes within the critical range of the *British Controversialist*, but the little work at the head of this notice is so catholic in its tone, that we feel great pleasure in commending it to the attention of our readers. The author's views, though always boldly, are never dogmatically or offensively expressed. His object is to gain for the whole gospel a more affectionate and extensive reception. While his argument and style will procure for his book the favour of the thoughtful and inquiring reader, its pathos and affectionate address will make it even more welcome to a large class, to whom the gospel is no matter of inquiry, but of simple, earnest faith. We hope the success of Mr. Balfern's last work may not only equal but far exceed that of his first.

The Art of Writing; with a Course of Lessons on Penmanship. By J. A. Cooper. Third Edition. London: Houlston and Wright.

As this little work originated in an article prepared for our pages, we cannot but express our pleasure at the success which has attended it.

Poetic Critique.

Sea Dreams: an Idyll. By ALFRED TENNYSON.

Tithonus. By ALFRED TENNYSON. 1860.

Snowdrift. By CECIL DEVON. London. 1860.

The Poetry of Spring. By GOODWYN BARMBY. London. 1860.

The Artist's Dream. By GEORGE GIBBONS. Birmingham. 1860.

The Intermittent Fountain. By GEORGE SINCLAIR. London. 1859.

A Handful of Letters. By WILLIAM ORMOND.

Various Poems.

"Ye who write, make choice of a subject suited to your abilities, and resolve in your thoughts a considerable time what your strength declines, and what it is able to support. Neither elegance of style, nor a perspicuous disposition, shall desert the man by whom the subject-matter is chosen judiciously. To have good sense is the first principle and fountain of writing well. A mediocrity in poets neither God nor men, nor even booksellers, have endured."—HORACE.

MR. TENNYSON's last Idyll is by SOCIETY pronounced tame. Society, gossip, surface-opinion, or what you will, says "So! ho! Alfred Tennyson writing about a clerk, and a clerk's wife, and a clerk's baby! Why, what will poetry come to if *he* does this? if *he* lifts the goddess from the winged Pegasus, and sits her,—oh, poor degraded one! on—a donkey!"

A city clerk takes his wife and child to the sea. The city air has paled their faces, and the city wiles have embittered their lives. *He* broods continually over the loss of his hard-earned savings, lured from him by a smooth-tongued hypocrite. *She* continually whispers sweet words in his ear, the burthen of them all—"Forgive."

They both dream. *He*, of the mines in which his money is risked, of life and labour, and fleets of glass wrecked on reefs of visionary gold. *She*, of a low musical note, swelling up ever through the roar and thunder of breakers,—of men and women ever setting up their own gods, and ever reviling the gods of others; and the music ever swelled, and statues, saints and kings ever were falling, and the wailings ever kept tune with that one sweet note; and the wave of time rolled up and swept away men of flesh and blood, and men of stone, to the waste deeps together. Her thoughts ran on the *mystery* of life, his on the *misery*.

And they talk together; and the gentle wife tells her husband that she has heard that day that his enemy is dead—of heart disease. Saith he:—

"Dead?—*he*? of heart disease?
What heart had *he*
To die of?—dead?"

Saith she :—

“ Ah, dearest, if there be
A devil in man, there is an angel too;
And if he did that wrong you charge him with,
His angel broke his heart.”

And so they talk, and, talking too loudly, rouse the child. And so singing to it with her sweet voice, they become calmed and of one mind in forgiveness of evil, and they sleep.

How simple is all this, and how truthful, and how appreciable by you and me! And because so, how great a sinner is Tennyson for talking of our every-day life, and not using his fine powers to depict *real* heroes. Cloud-compelling Jove and white-armed Juno would have made splendid subjects, instead of a clerk and his wife. A blood-letting warrior, always in armour, and always killing somebody, and always escaping scathless, would have been infinitely finer than the villain hypocrite of every-day life. And a child, able to crush serpents, play with lions, and beard warriors from its birth, would be much more welcome to our classic fireside than that commonest of all common things—a common baby.

And so, the *impossible*, the unlikely, and the ridiculous are always to be our classical literature, according to high critics and antiquarian image-seekers. Yet for all this, England is building up even now classic literature of her own, quite as noble as the Greek, and much more natural; and Alfred Tennyson is no mean worker in this temple of her fame.

“TITHONUS” shows the writer’s power. It is as purely a classic of the old as is the “Sea Dreams” of the new school. Tithonus,—

“ A white-hair’d shadow, roaming like a dream
The ever silent spaces of the East,
Far-folded mists, and gleaming halls of morn,—

laments in the ear of Aurora, who loved him and obtained immortality but not eternal youth for him from the gods, his decrepitude and misery, and asks her to take back her gift and let him die :—

“ Let me go: take back thy gift;
Why should a man desire in any way
To vary from the kindly race of men,
Or pass beyond the goal of ordinance,
Where all should pause, as is most meet for all?”

That age loses sympathy with youth is told in this beautiful fable. Aurora comes, morn after morn, her bosom beating with a heart renewed, and Tithonus ever stands gazing with cold eye on the bright goddess, and he cries :—

“ Yet hold me not for ever in thine East:
How can my nature longer mix with thine?
Coldly thy rosy shadows bathe me, cold
Are all thy lights, and cold my wrinkled feet

Upon thy glimmering thresholds, when the steam
 Floats up from those dim fields about the homes
 Of happy men that have the power to die,
 And grassy barrows of the happier dead.
 Release me, and restore me to the ground;
 Thou seest all things, thou wilt see my grave:
 Thou wilt renew thy beauty morn by morn;
 I, earth in earth, forget these empty courts,
 And thee returning on thy silver wheels."

Here the poem terminates. The story is that Aurora, pitying him whom once she loved, turned him into a grasshopper.

For a student no finer model could possibly be found than this poem. The language is sweet as an Italian melody, and is a vindication of the beauty of our English tongue. The metre is so perfect that not a flaw is found to break its harmony. The fable is told as something with a meaning in it—and the meaning grows more vivid continually as you look, as should always be in a true poem. The creative faculty of the poet should awaken your creative power, that together, poet and reader, might see old things in a new light.

"Snowdrift; or Poems for the Christmas Hearth," by Cecil Devon, is a collection, some of which are little inferior to Gerald Massey, and are quite equal to Charles Swain.

We wish the author all the success of which promise is here given. Surely the man *who thinks as he writes* need not fear failure. We give one extract:—

BY THE SEA.

WHERE the salt weed strews the shingle,
 Where the shells and star-fish mingle,
 Where the dashing breakers tingle

In the throbbing ear—
 There lives Alice with her mother,
 And her brave, bluff fisher brother;
 Sweetheart Alice! for no other
 Lives to me so dear!

By the Sea, oh! by the Sea!
 A flower the weeds among,
 My darling bloometh bonnily
 Lulled by old Ocean's song.

Oh! 'tis sweet to wander when
 Sunset crests the Sea,
 All its farewell radiance then
 Glistening goldenly.
 But I mind me of the moonlight,
 When, one balmy, balmy June night
 Fell, its trembling lustre, strewn bright
 O'er the placid wave:

There, amid the silver splendour,
 Shyly stole confessions tender,
 As she did so fondly render
 Back the love I gave.

By the Sea, oh! by the Sea!
 Long we linger'd then—
 She told her tale so tenderly,
 I prayed for it again.

Break high on the shingly beach,
 Dream within the cove,
 Greybeard Sea! and carols teach
 To my listening Love:
 Sing of one who prayeth nightly
 When she rests, that sleep will lightly
 Bring to her dear spirit, sprightly
 Visions of a time
 Glad with wedding-joyance swelling
 Seaward from a fisher dwelling,
 Golden tales of home-joys telling,
 And Love's bridal prime.

Sing, oh! Sea, brave minstrel Sea!
 A pleasant bridal song;
 And let it carol gleefully
 Thy big blue waves among.

"The Poetry of Spring," by Goodwyn Barmby, comes into the world seasonably,—more than can be said of half our books, or works, or men. Moreover, it is a volume with not one page that the "captious critic" could wish blotted. To praise a weak effort is to weaken the weak, but to commend a healthy one is to nerve the strong—and heartily do we commend this; indeed, it seems a pity to have read through a whole book and not be able to say one stinging thing about it; nevertheless, this time our sting is drawn. The prophet voice seems to have spoken, and inspired the author of such poetry as this:—

Once in a vision, poppy crowned, and spelled,
 The spirit's eye, through slumbrous lids beheld
 Three children, fair as from life's fount were welled.

The one, a boy of dark eye and brow fair,
 Who rushed past, swift as meteor in the air,
 While the wild winds were toying with his hair.

The next: a delicate and graceful girl,
 As in sweet sorrow, moistened each bright curl;
 Sunnily smiling; in each eye a pearl.

The last: a little laughing blushing maiden,
 Blooming as flower or like a rainbow braiden;
 Like flower with sweets, like bow with sunshine laden.

Distinct each one—yet each a lovely thing;
 Of the three-ebord lute, to each a string:
 So lovely each, the Three months of the Spring.

A closer condensation of thought, and less profuseness of imagery, or, perhaps, we should say, no redundancy of word-painting, would perhaps improve the *tout ensemble* of the volume. We can recommend it to our readers as full of health, thought, and *poetry*.

The "Artist's Dream," by George Gibbons, is a prettily-constructed melodrama. Scarcely can it be called a *poem*, and therefore does not strictly come within the limits of our criticism. The poetic construction is good, and the poetic meaning clear. The "Curse of Drink" is the subject; and one or two clever songs are introduced. The following is very musical:—

By the tear of the orphan,
And sigh of distress,
By the curses that often
Succeed the cares,—
By the wail of the matron,
And shriek of despair,
I'll drink deeply of thee,
Bright goblet so fair.

Oh! the gay bowl of pleasure,—
Earth's nectar sweet,—
To us mortals a treasure,
With blisses replete.

Thine effects are Love's treason,—
Vice claiming her share,—
But I love thee, I love thee,
Bright goblet so fair!

By the crime and the shame,—
The spell of thy trance,—
By the loss of fair fame,
And death of thy glance,
By the cold voice of reason,—
Abstain then who dare,
But I love thee, I love thee,
Bright goblet so fair!

Mr. Sinclair favours us with Part II. of the "Intermittent Fountain." The philosophy section is more comprehensible than was that part of No. I. The original poetry is also much superior in tone and execution.

More observation and less speculation, in poetry and philosophy, would add beauty to the former, and power to the latter.

In a dream, the goddess Religion appears and sings:—

From heaven sent, at thy request,
I come to soothe thy troubled-breast;
Oil upon its waters throwing,
Till thy tears shall cease their flowing,
And thy heart rejoice in knowing,
How to be for ever blest.

High on Fancy's pinions borne,
Come with me, where blushing Dawn,
O'er the Eastern hills is peeping;
And her robe, the valleys sweeping,
Wakes the flowers from their sleeping.
Like a bride on marriage morn,
Half afraid, her veil she raises—
Kisses her affianc'd daisies,
And receives the lark's sweet praises.
As he rises from the corn.

Morning grows to perfect day,
And the sun holds kingly sway.

At his smile the corn is springing,
 Flowers abroad their scents are flinging,—
 All the woods with songs are ringing,—
 Flocks are sportive, children gay.

'Tis evening: westward turn your eyes,
 Gold and crimson deck the skies:
 The sun, on regal visits starting,
 Banquet holds, with pomp departing,—
 Glances kind on Dian darting,
 While as Regent forth she flies.

Now the Night, with sable dress,
 Covers Evening's loveliness:
 All the gems her garb o'ersprinkling,
 Seem in very pleasure twinkling,
 And the sober moon gives inkling
 That her mission is to bless.

Nature finds it sweet employ
 Thus to raise her songs of joy;
 Gladness fuller beam is gaining,
 Grief to lessening crescents waning:
 Cease, then,—cease thy sad complaining,—
 Join the general harmony.

Let not grief thy song inspire,
 Heaven will nobler strains require,
 Tell the wicked, sin is madness;
 Bid the troubled conquer sadness;
 Sing of nature, me, and gladness,—
 Themes to wake an angel's lyre.

This is not bad, although not *very* good. Here and there an ending is evidently put to do duty as a forlorn hope—no very appropriate, harmonious word having come to the poet's succour. Where a line drags in a verse, better exclude that verse than mar the piece with broken harmony.

The objectionable lines are those ending with "flinging" and "inkling."

A "Handful of Letters," by William Ormond, Letter-carrier, Bristol, is evidently of too premature birth to be either strong or long-lived. It is a pity that *crude efforts* should ever have a publisher. If a man like our author, with unmistakeable talents, could only work in the dark for a few years, and *then* publish, applause, and indeed kindest welcome, would be given by the world to his carefully-digested brain products; but we should do ourselves and Mr. Ormond gross injustice did we see unpremeditated self-slaughter, and not speak candidly.

One very pretty song we extract:—

NATURE TO HER BEST-BELOVED.

COME, toiling child
 Of city gare,
 Awhile breathe free
 The fresher air:
 Scent the new hay—
 List the birds' songs;
 This summer time
 To thee belongs:
 The broad and blessed landscape greets
 thy sight,
 Gaze grateful on, and drink in all
 delight!

Come, weary one—
 Sore sorrow-pressed,
 Lean welcome on
 Earth's grassy breast:
 Full lovingly
 These arms entwine
 The stricken form
 Like unto thine:
 Take thy repose—fear not; no foe is
 nigh;
 Kind spirits guard the spot where
 thou dost lie!

We have several MSS. which, did space permit, would bear acceptable insertion. "Lines to a Bridegroom," by J. K., are passably good. "The Poet," by the same author, is superior in matter, but not sufficiently polished in tone. Re-written and remodelled, it might be made a good thing.

"When is the time you think of me most?" is a pretty song, by Beta. The metre is faulty in the third line of the third verse;—

WHEN IS THE TIME YOU THINK OF ME MOST?

WHEN far away from haunts of busy men,
 Some favourite spot far off I chance to ken,—
 A mossy bank, a shaded nook or dell,—
 A lane, whose every turn I knew so well
 When thou wast walking there with me,—
 'Tis then I think the most of thee.

When 'mid life's fancied gaieties I pause,
 While o'er my mind, from almost hidden cause,
 The sweets of hallow'd melancholy steal
 Silently, softly—then, indeed, I feel
 How much I've lost in losing thee;
 And then I think the most of thee.

When 'midst a courteous, smiling, friendly throng,
 That gaily chats, and sings the latest song;
 When I have sought (and vainly sought)
 A kindred spirit to partake my thought,
 And lend me kindly sympathy,—
 'Tis then I think the most of thee.

When former "friends" seem wishful to retreat;
 When not one kindly-beaming eye I meet;
 When words are poison'd, marr'd, and steep'd in scorn;
 When by cold acts my weary heart is torn;
 When all seem cold and strange to me,—
 Then, then I think the most of thee.

"Up with the Morn," by Georgius; "Drink," &c., by Chip; "The Pole-Star," &c., by J. W.; "To —," by O. G., are second-rate

productions, and certainly not finished enough for insertion or criticism. "The Convict," by H. J., is respectable prose, but not good poetry, inasmuch as no attention is paid to the measure. A man who writes, might as well study the art of poetry, and do what he attempts *well*, as negligently, and obtain credit rather than censure.

"The Storm," by J. J. R., is a good descriptive piece, but too prosy—and there is too much of it. In a poem, there should be no waste of words; it should be the finished work of labour, not the hasty product of pastime.

"A Visit to my Birthplace," by J. L., is an improvement upon former contributions; is full of affectionate feeling, but not sufficiently comprehensive in thought to merit unconditional approval. Gray's "Elegy" is a model which J. L. might study with advantage.

F. G.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

81. Which is the best edition of Shakespeare's complete works, by whom published, and price?—MARCUS.

82. Which is the better work—the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana," or the "Encyclopædia Britannica?" of how many volumes do they each consist? what are the prices of complete sets? by whom are they published?—MARCUS.

83. What are the principal works published in this country on Japan, its people, manners, history? Can I procure a grammar and a dictionary of the Japanese language—if so, where and at what price?—MARCUS.

84. In the latter part of vol. ii., *British Controversialist*, present series, there occurs a query concerning French serials which has not been answered. May I again ask for a solution of it?—MARCUS.

85. Who among modern travellers first discovered the ruins of a fortress, the fall of which extinguished the last hope of the Jews, and completely subjugated Judea to the Roman empire?—P.

86. What is the popular fallacy amongst gardeners with regard to the

influence of the "red moon," and show that although the opinion is right as to the effect, it is wrong as to the cause?—P.

87. What are the books on the English language, in its various phases, best calculated to make the study of it pleasant, interesting, and, at the same time, complete? Any person, who is kind enough to give a list, is requested to furnish the price of each work.—LLANRWST.

88. As I find questions answered in your capital periodical, it will oblige me to have answers to the following:—The Bampton Lecture for the last ten years, including the subject, preacher, his residence, the sum he receives for preaching; and the principle of selection? My object in asking this is twofold:—1. To ascertain the subjects treated of, thinking they might be useful to many; 2. As being worthy of imitation, as a powerful means of doing good among theologians.—AD-MIRER.

89. Being an apprentice of the Chester Goldsmiths' Company, I should be greatly obliged to any one who will answer the following query through the very valuable columns of the "Inquirer."

What was the origin of goldsmiths' halls, and for what purpose they were originally intended? The London, Chester, Dublin, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Exeter, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Sheffield, and York goldsmiths' halls are the only ones now in existence. Are they the remnants of the ancient mints?—G. B. L.

90. I have been told that the present British military law requires, without exception, obedience to all orders of superior officers, even in cases when obedience will involve the breach of moral and religious duty, and that the military oath is interpreted with this latitude of meaning. Will any correspondent inform me if this is true, and, if true, favour me with the proof?—ZETA.

91. Can any of your correspondents inform me how to make an alarm to strike at any hour it is set for?—MIST.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

67. A Mathematical Curiosity.—“An Asymptote” laboured hard to throw ridicule on the query I proposed for solution in the January number of the *Controversialist*, but I may perhaps be allowed to say that I cannot see much reason in this.

I don't profess to be an accomplished mathematician; but, in reading astronomical and other scientific works, I have several times met with the statement under discussion, and I resolved at length to solicit information on the subject through these columns.

I am almost certain it occurs in one or more of the late estimable Dr. Dick's popular treatises, but I am not able to lay my hand on it at present. However, one thing is certain, viz., that “An Asymptote” will find it verbatim as I have expressed it in “Matter and Motion; a Philosophic Dissertation, by James Balfour, Esq., of Pilrig,” p. 18, edn., 1782.

I cannot but say that I think “An Asymptote's” advice respecting the use of “quotation marks” quite uncalled for.—EOLUSIC.

68. *Meteorology*.—If your correspondent wishes to become acquainted with the elements of meteorology, I would recommend him to read Mr. Belville's small books upon the barometer and thermometer, price 1s. each. Mr. Glaisher's “*Meteorology*,” in Hughes's lesson-book; Dr. Drew's “*Practical Meteorology*,” price 7s., and Kämtz's “*Meteorology*,” translated by C. V. Walker, price 12s. 6d. From these works he will obtain a large amount of knowledge of the present condition of this science, preparatory to taking a further step. If a more extended knowledge is required, the following works should be read:—Daniel's “*Elements of Meteorology*,” “*Admiralty Manual of Scientific Enquiry*,” Professor Forbes's Reports, in the Report of the British Association; W. R. Burt's Papers on Atmospheric Waves, in ditto; Sir W. Reid on the Law of Storms; Piddington and Redfield's Papers on ditto, papers read before the British Meteorological Society, also the Meteorological Society of Scotland; the article “*Meteorology*,” in the “*Encyclopædia Britannica*,” by Sir J. F. W. Herschel, Bart.

If he has any intention of taking the subject up as a study, he will readily obtain information and advice from any member of the British Meteorological Society, and especially from our indefatigable secretary, James Glaisher, Esq., F.R.S., &c.—G. V. V.

79. A Grammatical Difficulty.— $2+5=8$ is plainly a mathematical impossibility. According to the principles of English grammar, it is equally an impossibility for “they” to represent “he” and “she,” separated by the disjunctive conjunction “or.” “They,” being a plural personal pronoun, represents only a plural noun. Hence the difficulty of which “A Person” seeks solution at once disappears. “They,” as used in the latter clauses of the sentence, requires a plural noun in the common gender—“he or she.” Such a noun as scholar. Thus: “When sabbath school scholars attain the age of 15 or

16 years, and leave the Sunday school thinking themselves to be too old to continue scholars, they become liable to many temptations," &c. In this sentence there is no offensive repetition, and the

meaning is as clearly given, with the advantage of grammatical consistency. In composition and public speaking, nothing is much more odious than the constant use of "*he or she*."—E. W. S.

LITERARY NOTES.

THIERS's "History of the Consulate and the Empire," Vol. XVII., is now in the press, as is also GUIZOT's "Mémoires," Vol. III.

A handy book on Marriage Law, by Lord St. Leonards, is announced.

Humboldt's correspondence with Varnhagen von Ense, is in process of publication. Vol. I. is now issued by Decker, Berlin; and an English edition is announced.

A large quantity of historical letters, Mr. Eden's "Notes on the French Revolution," &c., have recently been brought to light at Eden Lodge, the property of the Auckland family.

Shakesperian criticism is ceaseless. Collier's folio is again undergoing the ordeal. He defends himself well.

Bulwer's rhymed rhetoric, "St. Stephen's" has been republished from *Blackwood*.

£1,640 have been expended in aids to authors by the Literary Fund, during the past year, to forty-nine applicants. The offered library, understood to be Mr. Forster's, was *unconditionally* rejected.

THOMAS AIRD is preparing a new edition of *Della's* "Poems."

It is proposed to erect a memorial window to Mrs. HEMANS in St. Anne's, Dublin, where she lies buried.

A memorial for HALLAM is projected.

Longmans propose to issue the early poems, essays, &c., of Macaulay; but hold out no hope of an early publication of the fragment of the "History."

A memoir of *Ary Scheffer*, by Mrs. GEOTE, wife of the historian of Greece, will shortly be published.

BAMFORD, author of "Passages in the Life of a Radical," is said to be in great distress.

"Vanity Fair" is announced as the name of an American imitation of the Fleet Street jester, *Punch*.

The works of Robert Greene and George Peele are being edited by DYCE.

THACKERAY is said to meditate wooing Clio, as the historian of "The Reign of Queen Anne."

A novel by Anthony Trollope, and a biography by T. A. Trollope, are promised *early*, by Messrs. Chapman and Hall.

"Danebury House," by Mrs. Henry Wood, which gained the £100 prize offered by the Scottish Temperance League, is published.

MACAULAY's "Essays," translated by E. Liess and P. Petrez, with a biographical sketch, have been published at Paris, by Didot.

The Rev. JOHN DUNS, Free Church clergyman at Torphichen, Linlithgowshire, North Britain, is now editor of the *North British Review*.

Reputed "JUNIUS" discoveries, and implied "SHAKESPEARE" forgeries, formed the staple of literary discourse during the past month.

HUGH MACDONALD, a Scottish descriptive writer, and a poet of considerable merit, attached to the newspaper press, died of fever in Glasgow, on the 15th ult.

Mrs. JAMESON, authoress of many valuable works, e.g., "Female Characters of Shakespeare," "Sisters of Charity," "Legends of Sacred Art," &c., died on the 17th ult.

Alexander Russell, editor of the *Scotsman*, received a presentation of £1,600, several silver articles, and a timepiece, last month.

Messrs. Harper Brothers announce SMILES's "Life of James Watt."

European Philosophy.

THE SOPHISTS.

PROTAGORAS—GORGIAS—PRODICUS.

SOPHOCLES, Euripides, Thucydides, Phidias, and Socrates, adorned and have immortalized the age of Pericles.

A drama—unequalled for grandeur of conception, simplicity and pathos, power and interest—not only amused and excited but taught the people; a history—vivid, intense, picturesque, and noble—told the story of the withered virtue of Greece; sculpture, painting, and architecture—rich, passionate, glowing, artistic, and grand—gave embodiment to luxury, pomp, and conceptive genius; and a philosophy—singularly moral, pure, and embracing a wide range of duty—offered itself for acceptance and discipleship: but the energetic enthusiasm which ennobled the fresh and blooming youthhood of the Hellenic nations—the genius, the prowess, the mighty graspings and aspirings of the earlier times—had waned, become paralyzed and powerless, were wasted. The freedom and glory which might have been immortal, were hastening to decay—corruption festered in and round the gigantic bole of Greek nobleness and heroism. Riches and success had led to luxury, and stirred up unhallowed ambitions. These had shaken institutions, as well as depraved men. Athens, ceasing to be a republic, became a tyranny; and domestic wars and intrigues wasted, while they engaged, the best energies of statesmen. The conquerors of Persia, no longer exposed to a common danger, began a contest for ascendancy and supremacy, and the general welfare and interest of Greece was narrowed to a pitiful anxiety for the advancement of the schemes, policy, and power, of each statesman's own territorial division of the peninsula. Jealousies, suspicions, ferocities, selfishness, began to abound, and a disreputable diplomacy took the place of that magnanimous earnestness which formerly ennobled the birthplace of philosophy, the cradle of the arts, and the fastness of freedom. The policy of Pericles changed the allies of Athens into her subjects, and made them tributary to her greatness and dominance; but the reaction which resulted in the Peloponnesian wars, and led to the decline of Greece, proves that there were other politics and schemes than his, and that the ambition to rule was much more active than the desire to "live and let live."

In these circumstances, the practical means of attaining power and station were more in request than the true mode of effecting

the ends and purposes of government. Oratory became an instrument, study a means, and cleverness or tact a qualification for the acquisition of success; and philosophy itself came to be regarded only as the surest and readiest agency for captivating, seducing, and influencing the minds of men. At this time, those teachers in whose hands philosophy lost its essential characteristic, and was degraded, from being the *love* of wisdom, to becoming the stepping-stone to power, spread themselves over the country, and industriously ministered to the gratification of the popular desires.

The authors from whose works we can get the nearest and best view of the Sophists are, undoubtedly, Aristophanes, Isocrates, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle—men of very differing tempers and talents, whom, if we find agreeing with each other on any essential points, we may readily believe. Their credibility, respectability, and power, are equally unable to be impugned, and we shall not very far or much insist on those matters regarding which their impartiality may be open to question.

The author of "The Clouds" holds a peculiar relation to our subject. Aristophanes was the earliest writer who branded the word Sophist with its evil connotation—a *sham* wise man. In that comedy it is first used with a reproachful implication; and the adoption of the subject, as well as the popularity of the play, may be regarded as evidence of the accord of that signification with the one attached to it by the people in general. But in it—it is sometimes argued—Socrates is held up to calumnious ridicule as the representative and exemplar of the Sophists. This seems to us a shallow interpretation of the implication of the satire. Only go a little more probing into the inner life of the play, and a new reading will readily emerge. The Aristophanic humour consists almost entirely of shrewd caricature, expressed sparkingly, broadly, mordantly, and spiritedly. The whole gist and zest of the comedy is essenced in this contra-characterisation—in this representation of the life-long antagonist of the Sophists as one of themselves; for, could an Athenian fail to remark that the language employed is studiously sophistic, and such, therefore, as Socrates *never* used; or could he fail to perceive that in this trick there was a constant suggestion of what the real Socrates would have said in opposition to the quirks and quillots put in his mouth, and hence an intensification of the fun? And can *any one* who remembers how Socrates himself pointed the moral by attending the representation, and showing himself to the house to heighten the contrast by his own presence, doubt that the true reading of the play is quite irreconcilable with the supposition that any attack on Socrates was intended by his friend and fellow-reformer? This interpretation disposes of the charge of obliquity of moral insight sometimes brought against the Fielding of Greece, throws the onus and the odium of the Sophistic character off the shoulders of Socrates, and replaces them, with all their weight, upon the backs of the ostentatious wisdom-mongers whose pedantry and chicanery it was meant

to ridicule. Aristophanes in this way became a witness against the Sophists, and in favour of Socrates.

That advantage was *subsequently* and maliciously taken of the Aristophanic characterization of Socrates by his accusers does not invalidate our argument, but rather strengthens it; for enemies like to rake up old scandals—the older the better. It imparts an animus, creates a foregone conclusion, and helps a deficiency of proof by a sufficiency of the old leaven of misrepresentation.

Isocrates was a pupil of the Sophists Gorgias and Prodicus, and a frequenter of the favourite haunts of Socrates, and was himself a successful teacher of rhetoric in Chios and Athens. In a treatise "On the Sophists," he alludes to the ill name which the professional teachers of Athens had got, and accounts for it by covertly accusing them of making promises they could not fulfil, and implies that the charge of audacity and quackery is not altogether undeserved, and hints a doubt regarding the possibility of teaching an art of action, virtue, and happiness—indeed, leaves little room for thinking otherwise of the Sophists than as pretentiously philosophical, though aiming at personal enrichment rather than the spread of true wisdom.

Xenophon distinctly asserts that the Sophists speak for the purpose of deceiving, and write for their own profit; contrasts sophistry with philosophy; and dwells on the sincerity of Socrates, in continual allusion to the dishonestly disputatious style of the speculators on the credulity of those who were in search of wisdom.

Plato regularly imputes to the Sophists of whom he speaks, a deficiency in philosophic zeal, research, and seriousness; accuses them of emptiness, pretence, and plausibility—of attempting to use words for ideas, commonplaces for profundities, and superficial skill for true intellectual culture, of taking pay for promises and not for performances—in short, of "obtaining money upon false pretences."

Aristotle, in his grand and rigid analysis of all possible forms of reasoning, reckoned it right, after having diligently, cautiously, and laboriously elaborated the theory and art of syllogistic reasoning, to subjoin an exposition and refutation of the sham art of the Sophists, in a classification of the several species of fallacious and intentionally deceptive reasoning, in a distinct treatise "on the sophistical art of refutation" (the *Sophistical Elenchi*), an extra-logical work of singular acuteness, research, and value. This fact, independently of any other, is sufficient to prove that Aristotle regarded them as worthy of keen watching and careful suspiciousness, because they were men who had no serious settled scientific purpose in view, who talked for show, fame, victory, or reward—who were much more anxious to *seem* than to *be* wise.

These brief summaries of the opinions of the best available authorities upon the subject, if they agree in nothing else, agree in showing this—that the Sophists professed to be possessed of a wisdom which they were capable of imparting, if paid for so doing,

to any one who sought to learn how to act, speak, and manœuvre so as to acquire power, position, reputation, diplomatic employment, or statesmanly honours.

If we give this statement voice, we say very little worse than their advocates assert of them, and their defenders admit, and we mollify and modify the statements of their enemies considerably—a moderate method, which, we think, brings us much nearer the truth than either the old intense depreciation, or the new light rehabilitation of their character and aims. They were, as we showed in our preceding paper, a necessary outgrowth of the moral, social, and philosophical subsoil of the period, and were not altogether destitute of either historical or scientific significance; for they tested to the utmost the controversial dialectics of Zeno, and the Socratic dialogism, while they prepared and accumulated materials for the magnificent *Organon* which Aristotle built up and polished. They fall, therefore, according to our theory, into a proper place—a place which they have no *personal* justification for occupying, but for which events sufficiently account.

The following pages may be, not without advantage and utility, we hope, devoted to sketches and estimates of the chief of those public instructors whom their own and succeeding ages have agreed to recognize as Sophists, *par excellence*.

I. Protagoras—the first, it is said, who accepted the word Sophist as an adequate and unobjectionable distinctive appellation for his professoriate of wisdom—was born at Abdera, in Thrace, about B.C. 480. In early life he is said to have been a porter, and to have attracted the notice of Democritus, the laughing philosopher of his native town, by his ingenuity in inventing a new knot. Democritus, gratified at the dexterity thus shown by one of the proverbially stupid people who dwelt at the mouth of the Nestus, adopted him as a disciple, and taught him philosophy. The investigations which Democritus had made into the origin of knowledge, had resulted in convincing him that sensation was the *source* of all knowledge, but that what meets the sense was not the same in form and matter as it seemed to the mind. The opinion is vital. Images of things strike the senses, but only *ideas* (reflections) of these images appear to and in the mind. The objectively and outwardly true is not, therefore, that which impresses and affects the mind, but, rather, a subjective and reflective truth—a truth not primal but secondary. Protagoras improved upon this pregnant thought. He maintained that thought is not only limited by, but the same as, sensation; hence, that every sensation is a true one, and, therefore, everything is true, in some sense or other, and so, “man is the measure of all things”—what he perceives, *is*; and what he cannot perceive, to him exists not.

Matter, and consequently sensation, continually changes. There is therefore no certainty in *truth*. All that man can do is to persuade, not convince. In the world of action, though conviction is impossible, persuasion may be useful; the culture of the power of

persuasion is, therefore, the duty of those who would regulate the activities of men. If sensation, and sensation alone, produces thought, then all sensations are *true*; and yet men's sensations differ. What is true to one, is (or, at least, must appear) to another untrue. In this, each man must be a criterion for himself, since there is no practical test or agency by which we may distinguish the *really* true from the *relatively* true. To the sceptic this seemed an admission of the universal necessity of doubt. But the Sophist was ready to reply—We live in a world where daily duty does not suffer us to dally on such points as these; we must live, and labour, and act; we must therefore act, and so act as to do right as far as we can. If it be asked, What is *the right*? we cannot tell; it is probable, however, that it signifies the advisable. It is advisable to obey the law, for law is the expression of that which any age regards as advisable. But law is might, and, therefore, "might is right," and truth and justice are, in reality, only the conventions of men—the decisions of the strong against the weak; and so, even in law, it appears that "man is the measure of *all*."

Protagoras was serious in appearance, taking in his language, subtle and supple in discussion, acute in argumentation, and possessed of very superior talents. He was, indeed, a representative man, and was chosen by Plato as the lay-figure of a dialogue of great power and interest, in which Protagoras and Socrates are represented as debating on the teachability of virtue, and in which, though of course shown to be in the wrong at last, he speaks with such skill, readiness, elegance, and fluent dexterity, that we cannot but suppose him to have been a very accomplished individual, perhaps sincerely convinced that the best way, after all, of guiding men, was to seize upon their propensities, and endeavour to show that the gratification of these predominating desires was indeed to be found in some other form or mode of activity than that to which the person spoken to was ostensibly inclined, and really desirous of leading men to adopt those peculiar forms of action which, considering their primary and innate tendencies, were least immoral, and least dangerous to the common weal. In this way Protagoras, though really and theoretically wrong, might have been, in the circumstances, practically right, and might have been effecting the highest possible good in his own age—making men as they were, as moral as they could be readily and easily brought to become, and so far, therefore, a true benefactor of his race, and a genuine promoter of the progress of his own age, and of men in general.

II. Gorgias, of Leontium, in Sicily, born about 480 B.C., was a disciple of Empedocles, and a rhetorician of considerable celebrity. Plato regards him as the model of the Sophists, in an oratorical point of view. The art which he aimed at imparting was persuasion—the mode of inducing men to follow any course the speaker may regard as advisable—of enabling men to participate in public business, to serve his friends and injure his enemies—to get his own way, in short, free of risk, liability, or responsibility. To make men

clever—able to say the best on any side—capable of attaining their own ends, and dissuading others from the attempt to attain theirs—was his chief object and main end. He was an able dialectician, whose power to attract and lead away an audience was at once strange and charming. The opinion entertained by his countrymen of his business talents, and statesmanly sagacity, was so high, that they commissioned him to seek assistance from Athens against Syracuse; and by a brilliant and ready discourse, he succeeded in obtaining from the cultured and critical inhabitants of the metropolis of Attica the object of his mission, besides so delighting them, that they invited and encouraged him to take up his residence among them. The subtle ingenuity of his intellect was sedulously trained by every artifice of dialectics, and every trick of rhetoric; so much so, that he professed to be able to give an impromptu harangue upon any conceivable (given) subject. By this singular exhibition of his power, he largely increased the number of his disciples, and amassed great wealth. It is true that his oratorical displays were frigid, antithetical, and elegant, rather than vital with thought and glowing with emotional ardour; skilful, but neither satisfactory nor sublime; full of dialectic quibble, plausible and showy talk. Shallow, flimsy, and ready; apparently recondite, in reality trite, his teaching fitted his public, and attained his aim,—and what more could be desired?

The three leading metaphysical doctrines attributed to him are, 1st, That nothing exists, *i.e.*, that all *seems*; 2nd, That if anything really exists, man cannot know it; for sensation supplies only appearances, and reflection conceivabilities, but neither can bring mind face to face with entity. Reason overreaches sensation, and often contradicts it; but, again, sensation is the source of cognition, and if the source be unjustifiably vitiated, how much more must the decisions of the reason be wrong, seeing that it derives its materials from sensation alone; 3rd, That, even if anything exists and can be known, it can neither be expressed in words nor communicated to others; for words are the *signs* of thought, and thought is conception, and so words are at least two removes from the entities about which they are employed, and we can never be sure that the subjective in cognition is like the objective in reality. Indeed, pushed to its extremity, the doctrine of Gorgias is capable of epigrammatical expression thus—the sensible is the *non-sensical*, because, though an object impresses the senses, only the impression of sense affects the intellect, and it derives all its ideas from the latter not the former operation. Reason deals only with ideas, and so far as it colligates them together, it conjoins only the *non-sensical*, and not the *sensible*. This is, of course, only a play upon words, and is patent *now* as arrant folly; but in the days of the Sophists words were things to conjure with, and what Coleridge calls sleight-of-words was the stock in trade of many an able leader of men. Even in our own day, a juggle of terms sometimes passes for wisdom.

"How many among us at this very hour
Do forge a life-long trouble to ourselves,
By taking true for false, or false for true!"

It is easy, of course, for us to deduce all sorts of horrible inferences from these denials of what we regard as plain and palpable facts; but little good results from looking at the worst side of any set of doctrines. Let us rather venture to probe beneath the surface of these mere showy verbalisms, in which Gorgias strove to prove his skill in managing any, even the most difficult, thesis, and try if we do not see, even in these tests of subtlety, some salutary influences for philosophy. One healthy impulse he certainly did communicate to it, for he brought into prominence the distinction between concept and object, and words and thought, and thus tended to bring into bulking-out observability, the need for a clear differentiation between thoughts and things; while his whole scheme made it still more imperative than ever on the true philosopher to bring to its greatest perfection not the art only, but also the language of dialectics.

III. Prodicus—born in Iulis, the chief town of the island of Ceos—is twice mentioned by Aristophanes,—in "The Clouds," and in "The Birds." He was, according to Plato, a man of lazy, luxurious, coxcombical habits, greedy of gain, immoral and inconsistent; he is generally understood to have expended at the shrines of Venus and Bacchus the sums acquired by initiating neophytes in the mysteries of Minerva. He was sent to Athens by his fellow-citizens, charmed by his eloquence, to defend their interests—and he attended to his own. He saw at once that Fortune had given him a favourable moment, and he seized it. He reduced the teaching of wisdom from a profession to a trade, and took whatever fee was eligible from each pupil for his lessons. That he might teach easily he arranged a table of commonplaces and of synonyms, classified the relations of thought, and keenly distinguished the shades of meaning which separated one word from another. By this he did good service to metaphysics, and gave it one useful impulse in a right direction.

One little apologue, "The Choice of Hercules," attributed to Prodicus, has become famous by the common consent of ages. It has been incorporated into the accurate prose of the *Tattler*, and been rendered into verse by Bishop Lowth and Shenstone. It is preserved by Xenophon ("Memorabilia," b. ii. 1, 21—84), has been reproduced by Lucian, was quoted by Cicero, is the subject of several paintings, and has been made, by Mr. Grote, the basis of a defence of the character of its author. We are afraid that the mere theoretic teachings of a rhetorician will go but a short way to prove the practical morality of his life, especially when that is witnessed against by the concurrent testimony of antiquity. It is so much easier to talk than to do, particularly when talking artfully and taking is one's profession. Let us be just, however, as far as we can, and admit that this homage to virtue, if it was a

hypocrisy required by the time, is creditable to his hearers, and a proof of his consummate artistic capacity and taste.

His definitions of terms, critical investigations into the inner and essential signification of words, researches into human knowledge and consciousness, entitle him to some deference as an experimentalist in metaphysics, and an observer of the obscurer movements of the mental faculties. In these items he worked for the advancement of philosophy, and we shall not seek to derogate from the praise due to him on account of these meritorious exertations in the region of thought and reflective being.

Protagoras was banished from Athens for atheism, and Prodicus was condemned to expiate the crime of demoralizing the youth of Athens.

Of the other persons, united in brotherhood of aim, usually classed together as Sophists, a few words may suffice to present an intelligible notion of their relationship to the philosophy of their own age, and to the theoretic speculations and practical arts of preceding and succeeding times.

Hippias, a native of Elis, was not only a statesman, but also a rhetorician, dialectician, grammarian, and artist. He professed himself capable of knowing everything, and doing it. He could speak for or against any opinion, and is reputed to have been the inventor of a system of *mnemonics*. He was vain and arrogant, a considerable braggart, and ostentatiously knowing. His speeches were, in general, carefully prepared, and often re-delivered. Of one of these, entitled "Troy," Plato preserves an outline, and he uses his name in the headings of two of his dialogues. Some of his moral maxims are singularly happy and sensible, *e. g.*, "The envious are doubly wretched,—they repine at their own misfortunes, and their neighbours' advantages." "Calumny ought to be a crime more penal than theft; for its perpetrators rob us of public estimation, which is man's great delight." He grew rich, and became famous; bore all before him at the Olympic games; but he is more memorable for his success than his philosophical tenets or position.

Diagoras, a native of the island of Melos, was, like Protagoras, a disciple of Democritus, and merits little mention from us. He was a bold and bravadoing sceptic, and openly taught a disrespect for sacred things, as mere conventionalities, and impostures of the wise upon the foolish. He scoffed at virtue and morality, disbelieved in Providence, and ridiculed the idea of a supervising power in nature, or in religion. He led a number of the profane young "*fast*" men of Athens into a practical joke against religion,—counterfeiting the Elusinian mysteries—which nearly effected their destruction. He was formally accused of impiety, and escaped death by flight. He died in Corinth; and on his tombstone the decree of condemnation was engraven.

Critias—though a pupil of Socrates, from whose teaching he hoped to learn the art of governing men, but who strove, though

unavailingly, to teach him, rather, the duty of governing himself—has small claim to notice in a prelection on philosophy, but that one of the dialogues of Plato bears his name. He was banished from his country, as a contemner of its laws and gods; but on his return, with Lysander, was nominated one of the ten tyrants. He exceeded his colleagues in revengefulness, cruelty, and greed. He was a poet and an orator, and the father of the comic dramatist Plato. His skill was ill used; and he practically illustrated the sophistical doctrine that laws are made by the strong for the weak.

Callicles is only known to us by the "*Gorgias*" of Plato, in which he figures as a man thoroughly interpenetrated with the doctrines of the Sophists, but not as using his so-thought wisdom for personal enrichment. Schleiermacher supposes this to be a pseudonym for Aristippus, of Cyrene, who, like the Callicles of the "*Gorgias*," believed justice and injustice to be the inventions of statesmen.

Euthydemus, surnamed the handsome, appears in one of the most lively and comic of Plato's dialogues, and is mentioned by both Xenophon and Aristotle. Xenophon informs us that "he had collected many extracts from the writings of the most celebrated poets and Sophists, and imagined that by these means he would outstrip his contemporaries in accomplishments, and had great hopes that he would excel them all in talent for speech and action."* His opinions had a close affinity to the Megaric school, and he rested many of his sophistical problems on the distinction between relative and contingent truth, and existent reality. Schleiermacher supposes that this name is used for Antisthenes, whom Plato was afraid to attack openly; but we are scarcely inclined to believe that the *vis comica* and *verve* of Plato were restrained by such a paltry fear as that. Besides, Xenophon speaks of them as different persons, and as both being friends of, and friendly to, Socrates.

Polus, Theramenes, Antipho, Thrasymachus, Dionysodorus, brother of Euthydemus, &c., are other names belonging to that indefatigable class who darkened knowledge by the excessive brilliancy of their wits and talents; who taught and practised *management* as the noblest of arts, regarded tongue-fence as the chief of merits, and elevated *tact* into a science.

Experimental science was not then existent, either in physics or metaphysics. No laws of investigation had yet been formally and acceptedly incorporated into a systematic, and so a useful unity. One mode only seemed valid—the combat of reason against itself—a controversial strife of mind against mind. Not in mere captiousness, or in frivolous play—not as mere exercise of mind, indifferent to results,—but as an earnest and vigorous discipline, ought this to have been set about; and so, by many of the earlier Sophists, it really was. But all human efforts have a tendency to misconstruction and misdirection; and instead of striving after the

* Xenophon's "*Memorabilia*," b. iv. chap. ii.

establishment of a principle, and of endeavouring to gain a knowledge of the conditions of proof—a science and art of reasoning—many of the thinkers of this age sought merely to confound the sense of right and wrong, and to deceive the judgment.

This, as we have said, and, we hope, shown, was the natural and necessary result of the concurrence of affairs in morals, religion, politics, and philosophy, during the latter part of the fifth century. In philosophy, scepticism was imminent, unless a further passage was opened up to thought. It was impossible to accept and homologate systems so plainly opposed in their doctrines and methods as those which then chiefly prevailed,—one of which denied the trustworthiness of sense, the other that of reason. If sense is the measure of truth, as the Ionic school affirms, all is uncertain; for not only are outward objects in a continual flux, but the state of the senses is daily changing: where all is changing, all must be uncertain. If, again, the *one* is the *all*, as the Eleatics aver,—then the all is in all—the all resembles itself; and so the true and false, good and evil, are, in essence, the same, though in appearance they differ.

It is unjust to deny the services the Sophists did render, or to misconstrue the ultimate results of their efforts. Through their culture of speech, as the instrument of power over minds, language was enriched and improved; by their dexterous and ingenious inversions—let us say nothing of perversions—of forms of phraseology, and their copiousness and fluency of utterance, literature was advanced. Rhetoric, as it was the engine of political success, was sedulously adapted to every exigency, and fitted for all possible purposes. Logic, even though looked upon only as an alluring, juggling trickery, gained a great development of power and perspicuity, as well as a large collection of forms and modes, out of which to choose the best, because the truest. Philosophy, which had previously been shut up in schools, and held within the narrow enclosures of sects, to whom, as disciples, confidential communications had been made, was brought by a number of adepts out of the bondage in which it had been held, and was familiarized to the people. An interest was excited in the discussion and determination of the true and the false, and the foundations of thought in general; and if knowledge was not popularized, at least the love of knowledge was professionally praised, and professedly acted upon. Their most important office, however, was to stimulate, improve, and employ Socrates, to engage the attention of Plato, and afford material for the acute intellect of Aristotle to operate upon, and to give scientific form to. Though their sad and unblushing pandering to expediency, and the means of gain, seemed to threaten the destruction of philosophy, it rather led to its reconstruction; and, from a new point of departure, metaphysics set out on a voyage of greater interest and wider import than before. The good as well as the true were now to be sought for;—Socrates becomes the pioneer, of whom and of his system, life, and labours, more anon.

Religion.

IS THE BIBLE ALONE A SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

POPERY or infidelity?—which will you have? Such is the alternative offered by the authors of each of the four negative articles on the sufficiency of the Bible as our Rule of Faith. If any of our readers ever thought harshly of the remark of Bishop Sherlock, "that from Popery to no religion, and from no religion to Popery, there is but a step," let him carefully examine the aim of those articles. From a desire to avoid unnecessary offence, we abstained, in a former article, from pointing out the animus of these productions. All our scruples have, however, disappeared, since we read in the last number of the *Controversialist* that, "to be consistent, a man must either be a Catholic or an infidel" (page 239). Hence "Gregory" has laboured to represent Scripture as obscure, in order to reduce it to the level of absurd and conflicting traditions. He has recklessly attempted to sap the very foundations of Christianity, in order to build up Roman Catholicism. "Ignatius" has endeavoured to nullify the authority of the Bible, in order to strengthen the authority of "the church." The external evidence on which the canon is determined, and the internal evidence on which the inspiration of the separate books of which it is composed is ascertained, are slighted, with a view to substitute ecclesiastical traditions and decrees, which are artful and flexible contrivances for the introduction of anything which may accord with priestly designs. "A Layman" follows with insinuations that Protestant writers are not to be credited for controversial honesty. We have already shown the nature and value of "Gregory's" paper. "Theophylact," in his masterly article, has prostrated "Ignatius," but not to the satisfaction of J. H. We propose, therefore, to reply to his question—"How do Protestants know what books make up the Bible?" (page 241).

The fundamental article in the creed of "Ignatius" is, that "the canon and inspiration of Scripture cannot be proved without reference to the traditions and decrees of the Catholic church; at least, there must be some infallible authority to reveal to us which are the books that have been written under divine inspiration" (page 109). This foundation is a veritable quicksand. You can lay your feet nowhere without instantly sinking. The "canon" is determined by one species of evidence, and "inspiration" by totally another. "Tradition," when worth anything, is testimony; and ecclesiastical

"decrees," pretensions, which prove nothing but arrogance. It is *evidence*, historical and internal, which reveals the inspiration of particular books. To talk of "authority," in such matters, is to be ridiculous. To make "infallible authority" requisite, is to make the proof of inspiration impossible; for no "infallible authority" exists. If there did, on the principle of "Ignatius," it would be useless, without another infallible authority to prove that the first authority was really infallible, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The same absurdity is repeated on page 101—"Nothing less than a divine witness is required for the fact of inspiration." On such a principle the Bible could never be proved to have proceeded from God. "No proof," we are told, "can be drawn from the New Testament, since it cannot give witness to itself" (page 101). Each witness must, therefore, be backed by another witness, to show that it is divine, and this *ad infinitum*, which is absurd in the extreme. It is by internal evidence and by our reason that we are to determine the fact of inspiration. If "Ignatius" could advance such an argument without instantly detecting its absurdity, it is no wonder that he seems incapable of appreciating the value of different kinds of evidence. Observe the following sentence:—Protestants "know what books are inspired, by what they are pleased to call 'internal evidence,' which is equal to saying that they have, in their own minds, a rule whereby to test all books for which inspiration is claimed," &c. (page 101). Here internal evidence, which is *external* to the mind of an inquirer, is confounded with *intuition*. The subjective and the objective are one and the same thing with "Ignatius."

It is absurd, again, to say that "the decrees of the Catholic Church" determined the canon. A council, whether provincial or general, could do no more than take the evidence of competent witnesses, and ascertain what was *already* and generally acknowledged by the churches which were represented. The authority of the canon could not rest on their declaration, for the validity of that declaration itself depends upon the *antecedent evidence* upon which it was grounded. The declaration was not a "decree." It was simply the embodiment of the prevailing belief. Upon the strength of that belief, adoption or rejection was determined; and the result of testimony, not authority, was promulgated, not decreed. A host of decrees will go for nothing in a question of *facts*. If the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament were unknown before they were "decreed" by Rome, it follows that the whole Christian world was, for at least three centuries, in that very predicament which is attributed to us Protestants. Christianity managed to exist and prosper during that period without such decrees, and would have continued to exist had no such decrees ever appeared.

The idea of decreeing the inspiration and canonicity of Scripture, is not only an inversion of common sense, but it is notoriously belied by history. This would have appeared in a glaring light, if "Ignatius," in talking of "decrees," had told his readers *when* the

first decree was made. During the first two or three centuries no general assembly was, or could have been, convened to pronounce an opinion on the matter. Long before the principles of common sense were set aside, different churches received certain books as Apostolic, by inquiring into the internal and external evidence of their being inspired productions. The list was extended as evidence accumulated. The primitive churches were alone competent to ascertain the genuineness and inspiration of particular books claiming to be divine; and it is by discovering what their opinion was, that we know of what books the New Testament is composed. The canon was, therefore, determined, as Dr. Lardner observes, "not by the authority of councils; but the books of which it consists *were known* to be the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, in the same way and manner that we know the works of Cæsar, Cicero, and others, to be theirs; and the canon was formed upon the ground of a *unanimous or generally concurring testimony and tradition*." Now this is not a matter of mere opinion, but irresistible facts. "Ignatius" labours, by his sophisms and subtleties, to prove that that could not take place which history shows did take place. It is not controversy about words that can settle the question put by J. H., but an appeal to history. To inquire what did occur, is at once to tear his article into shreds.

Having divested this question of the mystery in which "Ignatius" tries to involve it, we reply to the question of J. H., in the words of St. Augustine against Faustus the Manichee:—"If you ask us how we know that these are the writings of the Apostles, we briefly answer you that we know this just in the same way that you know that these are the writings of Manichæus" (lib. xxxii. c. 21). Let our readers compare the great Augustine with our "Ignatius," who observes:—"The historical evidence whereby we know, for instance, that Horace wrote the 'Ars Poetica,' would be insufficient as a foundation for the Divine faith" (page 102). It is clear that Augustine and "Ignatius" belong to two widely different schools. That Augustine and Protestants pursue the same method in this question is shown in the following extract from the "Christian Doctrines," in which that Father advises thus:—"Let him, in the canonical Scriptures, follow the authority of as many Catholic Churches as possible; among which, let those, without fail, be included, which have deserved to have apostolical chairs, and to receive apostolical epistles. He will, therefore, observe this method in the canonical Scriptures, that he must prefer those which are received by all Catholic Churches to those which some do not receive; but in the case of those which are not received by all, let him prefer those which the greatest number, or the more worthy receive, to those which the fewer churches, or those of less authority hold" (lib. iii. c. 8). It is only necessary to add that, by "Catholic," St. Augustine did not mean *Roman Catholic*; and by "authority," he meant the testimony of the Catholic Churches. In his age, the

absurd idea of decreasing the canon of Scripture had not sprung up, for he refers to no decrees, but advises each man to ascertain, by examining evidence, what books belonged to the canon. "Ignatius" (page 102), and "A Layman" (page 173), quote, with an air of triumph, the celebrated passage of this Father:—"I would not believe that the Scripture was inspired, unless the Catholic Church informed me of the fact." From the previous extracts, our readers will see how St. Augustine was indebted to the Catholic Church for his belief in inspiration, and that both "Ignatius" and "Layman" would do better by appealing to some Popish council than this Father, in justification of their dogmas. St. Augustine is a witness to the correctness of the remark of Dr. Lardner, which we have quoted; and the method he pursued, in determining the canon, refutes the statement of "Ignatius," that "it was set at rest by the unerring voice of the Catholic Church" (page 103). He "defies" us to produce any other basis on which to rest our belief in the canon, "except the authority of the Catholic church" (page 103). If by "authority" he means *ecclesiastical decrees*, and by "Catholic," *Roman Catholic*, let him turn to Eusebius, Mosheim, and Dr. Lardner, to see how ridiculous such "defiance" appears to his Protestant readers.

Throughout this controversy the writers of the negative articles perpetually shift their premises. Let our readers collect all the sentences in which the word "tradition" is used in illustration of our remark. Here it is employed to denote human, there divine tradition; here ecclesiastical, and there Patristic; now apostolical, and then Catholic. Having used the word tradition and Catholic in well-studied ambiguity, "Ignatius" prefaces his quotations from Luther, Bell, Chillingworth, and Hooker, with the following *ad captandum* remark:—"Curiously enough, some of the most eminent Protestant writers have been forward in avowing this" (page 104). "This!" *This* what? Authority, or evidence? Catholic, or Roman Catholic? Tradition—Apostolic, Patristic, or ecclesiastical? Human or Divine? Tradition, written or oral? Tradition, or the reports of tradition? Curious indeed it would have been if any Protestant had been forward to avow "this" glorious ambiguity! "This"—artful trifling with words! Having succeeded in throwing handfuls of dust in the eyes of his readers, and in enveloping himself in a cloud of words, he retires behind the monosyllabic demonstrative pronoun—"this."

Protestants, against Romanists, assert that the primitive churches and the early Fathers could alone determine *what books* form our Rule of Faith. "Ignatius" argues, therefore the Protestant rule is insufficient. It is difficult to explain how any man could impose upon himself by such a *non sequitur*. We believe that Christ revealed and left, in the writings of His apostles and evangelists, our sole and all-sufficient Rule of Faith. To know what Christ did reveal, and what the apostles and evangelists did really

commit to writing, we consult the primitive churches and the early Fathers as witnesses to these important facts; therefore, argues "Ignatius," your Rule of Faith breaks down!

Our readers have probably had enough of "Ignatius" for the present. Let us turn to "A Layman," whose notions are equally confused:—"I, too, would say to a Protestant the same words—'Search the Scriptures'—for they testify of the Church and her Divine Head; and which, if you reject your prejudices, the 'traditions of men,' will lead you into its fold" (p. 169). Where this testimony to the Church, that is, *Rome*, is to be found, we are not told; and no concordance to the Bible will help us. If, again, the Scriptures testify of the Church, why make "traditions" the guide into the fold? The first clause in the sentence asserts what the second refutes. Let the reader observe, again, that "the traditions of men" are here placed under inverted commas, as well as on page 172, where the writer adds—"we reject the 'traditions of men' as resolutely as any Protestant can wish." What "A Layman" "resolutely rejects" will lead Protestants into the fold of Rome!

The extracts made by "Clement" are, we are told, "absolutely in favour of Divine tradition; for when Catholics talk of tradition, they mean exactly what the early Fathers meant" (p. 172). For the sake of the millions at this very hour endeavouring to throw off the yoke of Papal tyranny, we say, Would to God there were a particle of truth in this daring assertion! That there is not, appears from "Gregory," who holds that "divergence from the meaning of that Book," which alone contains "Divine traditions," is not "heresy;" and from "Ignatius," "A Layman," and J. H., who perpetually confound divine and human, apostolic, patristic, and ecclesiastical tradition, as one and the same thing.

Now, in this controversy, it is a vital question to determine what is tradition, what it is worth, how it is used by the apostles, the Fathers, Protestants, and Roman Catholics; and we can render the readers of the *British Controversialist* no greater service than by showing that Romanists generally employ the word in a sense totally different from that in which the apostles and the early Fathers employed it. The whole of the New Testament was originally delivered orally by our Lord and his apostles. Before their teachings were written, they were necessarily spoken. Whatever they taught, the apostles termed traditions, *e.g.*, "hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by word, or by our ~~epistles~~" (2 Thess. ii. 15). That the early Fathers held the *writings* of the apostles as synonymous with their traditions, is demonstrated from the following extracts:—St. Irenæus declares—"By no other means have we come to the knowledge of the plan of salvation, than those through whom the Gospel came to us, which they first preached; but," instead of being "negligent" in this matter, as "Gregory" asserts (p. 17), they "afterwards, by the will of God, delivered (*tradiderunt*) to us in the *Scriptures* to be the foundation and rule of our faith." "Having, therefore, *the truth itself as our*

rule, and the testimony respecting God clearly before us, we ought not," as Romanists do, "to cast away the firm and true knowledge of God," &c. "But we, following the only true God," not the Church, "as our teacher, and taking His word," that is, the written word, "as our rule, always teach the same, all of us on the same points." "Therefore, the disciples of our Lord, wishing to proscribe all such things, and to constitute a RULE of TRUTH in the Church . . . thus commenced the doctrine taught in His Gospel, 'In the beginning was the Word,'" &c. (Adv. Hær., l. iii. c. 1; l. ii. c. 2; l. iv. c. 35; l. iii. c. 11). So indisputable is it, that Irenæus regarded the Scriptures as the "foundation and pillar of our faith;" that, when Roman Catholics have no controversial end to serve, they admit that this Father was no worshipper of human traditions. Erasmus, *e.g.*, in his preface to the works of Irenæus, observes—"he fights against a host of heretics with the sole aid of the Scriptures;" a remark borne out by the words of Irenæus himself—"using these proofs, which are from the Scriptures, you may easily overturn, as we have demonstrated, all these heretical notions," &c. In the opinion of St. Cyprian, "God hath testified that we are to do those things which are *written*. If it be commanded in the Gospel, or contained in the Epistles or the Acts of the Apostles, then let us observe it as a divine and holy tradition" (Ep. 74). St. Cyprian's idea of tradition was that it was a *written* tradition. Contrary to the writers of the negative articles, St. Cyprian argues, in his 49th Homily, that "the Divine Scriptures alone can afford a proof of genuine Christianity;" that, in his time, *a fortiori*, in our times, there was "no other method left to those who are willing to discover the true Church of Christ than the Scriptures alone;" in which he differs totally from "A Layman," who naïvely enough remarks, "If you Protestants 'will reject your prejudices, the 'traditions of men' will lead you into its fold" (p. 169). In the same Homily, St. Cyprian observes, "Our Lord, foreseeing that such great confusion of things would take place in the latter days, orders Christians to have recourse to *nothing but the Scriptures*"—an order which Romanists boast of disobeying. In his 13th Homily, his advice is, "not to attend to the opinions of the many, but to inquire into the things themselves. For," let our readers note this truly Protestant method of arguing, "for it is absurd, while we will not trust other people in pecuniary affairs, but choose to reckon and calculate for ourselves, that, in matters of far greater importance, we should implicitly follow the opinions of others; especially as we possess the MOST EXACT and PERFECT RULE and STANDARD by which to regulate our several inquiries—I mean, the regulations of the Divine laws." With St. Hilary as our guide, we need not consult Dr. Cumming as to the marks of antichrist. This Father praised Constantius "for regulating his faith only according to those things which were *written*;" because "he who refuseth this is antichrist; and he who dissembleth on this point, is anathema." St. Austin told the Donatists, what our opponents deny, that "the Holy

Scripture fixeth the rule of our doctrine, and is a Divine balance for weighing it." He required those heretics to "demonstrate, if they can, their church, not," after the Roman Catholic fashion, "by their talk, and rumours of *oral tradition* of the Africans, not by the council of their own bishops," as Roman Catholics are prone to do; not by the books of their disputers; not by deceitful miracles," a remark which embraces pretenders of modern times, "but by the prescript of the Lord and the prophets . . . that is, by all the canonical authorities of the holy Books." The principle of St. Cyprian is that disparaged by our opponents as lamentably defective; for he "would not deliver the least thing of the sacred mysteries of faith without the Holy Scriptures;" nor anything "but what is demonstrated" from them, which is the essence of the 6th Article of the Church of England, as quoted by "Gregory" (p. 15). St. Jerome, on Haggai, observes, that "those things which, without the authorities and testimonies of the Scriptures, men invent of their own heads," such as transubstantiation, &c., "they are smitten by the word of God;" which is the reason why Rome dreads the free circulation of the Bible. Jerome, again, quotes Theophilus Alexander, who held that "it comes from a demoniacal spirit that men . . . think anything Divine that *wants the authority of Scripture*." St. Basil, St. Chrysostom, and others, may be quoted, as shown by Mr. Goode, our authority, to prove that when Roman "Catholics talk of tradition, they" do not "mean exactly what the early Fathers meant," as incorrectly asserted by "A Layman" (p. 172).

It is necessary for the readers of the *British Controversialist* not only to be on their guard against such reckless assertions as the above, but also to notice the artful manner in which Roman Catholics endeavour to throw discredit upon the candour and honesty of Protestant writers. After referring to Mr. Noel, and the Oxford school, "A Layman" adds—"Any extracts, therefore, in favour of Protestantism from such a source, will be regarded with a *primæ facie* suspicion; they *must* be garbled, or wrested from their context" (p. 170). The extracts we have adduced are, then, garbled and wrested! Let the reader, therefore, consult "The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice," published in 1853, by the Rev. W. Goode; and in the third volume of that able work, he will find long and numerous extracts, furnishing damnable evidence that Roman Catholics cannot support a single article of their faith *without* garbling and wresting the writings of the early Fathers.

How then, it may be asked by the uninitiated, do Romanists and Tractarians get their dogmas from those writings? We reply, if, after abusing the New Testament, they can claim it in their favour, there is nothing which their ingenuity cannot warp and twist to their purpose. We have but to observe how from the Liturgy, and even the Articles of the Church of England, Tractarians draw proofs of their heretical notions. The Fathers, and the Liturgy, are substantially Protestant and evangelical, but are, unfortunately, interspersed with loose and ambiguous expressions, and some

glaringly inconsistent opinions. The Romanists play with the ambiguities in the Fathers, and Tractarians with the ambiguities in the Liturgy. The opinions which countenance Popery are alone quoted by these two parties; and it is by them they wish to give the complexion desired to the Fathers and the Liturgy. No man, in his senses, can believe that our leading Reformers were Papists at heart; yet they so wrote, occasionally, as to give ground for the opinion of Dissenters, that the Book of Common Prayer contains some elements of Popery. In the same manner, no candid and honest inquirer can either believe, with "A Layman," that the teaching of the early Fathers was identical with the teaching of the Catholic Church of the present day, or deny that, side by side of the soundest Protestant doctrines, will be found sometimes such opinions, and frequently such expressions, as lend countenance to Rome.

We adduce a case, in which "A Layman" commits the very thing he charges upon others. He observes that, in the extract made by "Clement," "St. Irenæus is not condemning Divine tradition" (p. 172); an insinuation that "Clement" supposed that St. Irenæus condemned Divine tradition. The facts of the case are exactly as represented by "Clement," on page 94. When the heretics found, as Roman Catholics now find, that their errors could not be supported by the written word of God, they, like Roman Catholics, accused the Scriptures of ambiguity and imperfections. Irenæus turned round upon them, and argued thus:—"Well, you denounce the Bible because the Bible condemns you: you then fly to oral traditions, and by them I will try you." Having, on their own ground, met and defeated the heretics, the Father triumphantly concludes—"It turns out, therefore, that they agree NEITHER with the Scriptures, NOR with tradition." Now, let our readers compare the extract as given by Mr. Goode, in his third volume, p. 23—34, with the garbled account of "A Layman," and he will know how to estimate the character of Roman Catholic controversialists.

The traditions which the primitive Churches had were first oral, and then written; and in either form they were equally Divine. What Rome professes to have is, however, simply the reports, not of apostolic traditions, which we have in the New Testament, but of that part of them which, orally delivered, was never afterwards written by inspired men. A judge will receive in evidence what a witness saw or heard, but will reject hearsay as unworthy of credit. Now, Rome not only admits this hearsay into court, but makes the hearsay the test of the correctness of what a witness swears he saw or heard! We have two things placed before us—the traditions of the apostles, which, by documentary evidence, history, numerous and varied evidence of an internal nature, we have ascertained, beyond all reasonable doubt, to be the revelation of God; and, also, reports of other traditions, which Roman Catholics say, without venturing to prove, the apostles delivered orally, but never committed to writing. We hold, that what inspired men delivered orally

was, in both letter and spirit, the same as that which we have in their writings; but when we compare the reports of the oral teaching with the Scriptures, we find the widest possible discrepancy between them. As men of common sense, and having things of both temporal and eternal importance at stake, we prefer reason and faith to superstition and credulity; and, on this ground, we bind God's written word to our hearts, and throw Roman Catholic reports and hearsay to the winds. The early Fathers and Protestants recognize the avowed object of the apostles in writing, to be the preservation of their traditions. What inspired men did not write, that Christ did not intend to hand down to us. If we could be assured that Rome has preserved anything that was not left in writing, we should still be assured that it is of no importance to us. If, moreover, anything, by a fatality inconceivable to those who believe in inspiration, was omitted in the Scriptures, we shall, as long as reason lasts, maintain that it has, by transmission through an unsafe and even corrupt channel, lost all its original value. That may slip from memory which cannot, without detection, be erased from parchment. That, in passing from mind to mind, through a course of many centuries, may be so perverted by the prejudices and passions of men, that we must be bereft of reason in order to admit it to be of equal value with what, written and copied on parchment in different languages, countries, and ages, can be satisfactorily ascertained to be the veritable Word of God.

From such unanswerable arguments it is in vain to appeal to the promises of Divine presence in the Church; for the validity of such appeal turns upon the meaning of the much abused word, *church*. In the New Testament it invariably indicates particular congregations of believers, or the body of believers, past, present, and future. Excepting the epistles of St. Ignatius, the integrity of which is suspected, no ecclesiastical works of the first two centuries use it in any other than the scriptural sense. Roman Catholics invariably denote by it a body unknown to the apostles, and, therefore, a body to which no promise of Divine presence and guidance was made. Even in its perverted sense, as indicating synods, convocations, or rulers of a church, Rome gains nothing, unless she can show that the promise was made to her in particular, or to her exclusively. Not a word in Scripture can be cited to prove that Rome was to be the seat, centre, and source of infallibility. The Council of Trent was the first to declare that Rome was "the mother and mistress of all the Churches," in direct opposition to the prophet, who declared that "out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem" (Isa. ii. 3); and to the apostle, who described "Jerusalem" as "the mother of us all" (Gal. iv. 26). Foreseeing the pretensions which would be set up in her favour, the apostle informed the Romans, that their church, *before it was corrupted*, was but a "wild olive grafted" upon the stock at Jerusalem; and warned them that any claims to supremacy would be made at the risk of being "cut off"—a risk that has for ages become

a dreadful penalty, and which France and Sardinia are at this hour carrying to its extreme limits. If, against the most solemn warnings, Rome set up such pretensions, we can imagine the triumph with which her supporters would have quoted an instance of an appeal to her, as that recorded of Antioch to Jerusalem (Acts xv.), had there been such.

Priority of existence is not here. The churches in Asia were founded before those in Greece, and those in Greece before those in Italy. Catholicity was never hers. Greek and Abyssinian churches existed contemporaneously, and as rivals to the Latin. But, if history could be made to lie in her favour, infallibility could not be proved from catholicity. Mohammedanism is even now as catholic, and Paganism more catholic, than Popery. Prevalence, the weapon with which J. H.—leaving the sword, the Inquisition, and massacres out of the question—attacks Protestantism, can prove nothing more than prevalence. The logic of numbers can never prove the minority to be heretical. Even to this moment, Romanists cannot tell us where Rome's infallibility resides. Ask a Romanist why he believes in this or that? and he cannot refer to the Scriptures. Bellarmine has taught "Gregory," "Ignatius," "A Layman," and J. H., that Scripture, and the sense of Scripture, are two different things, that have no necessary connection. Christ addressed his doctrines to the laity, as seen in every gospel and epistle; but their sense, the Romanist believes, was deposited with the ecclesiastical rulers. He, therefore, "hears," not the Scriptures, but "the Church." Show him the profound absurdity involved, and he quotes a text, for the sense of which he refers you to the "unanimous consent," which was never ascertained, of the universal Church, which never met, and never could have met. Driven from pillar to post, he flies to the rock Peter, for did not Christ say, "Upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"? From this he is dislodged, the moment you ask if that Church of which Christ spoke, and "the Church" of which Rome talks, are not two widely different things? Christ spoke of the body of believers, and not their rulers, as a close corporation of ecclesiastics, and the rock of Rome becomes unsafe and untenable. If, however, the Roman Catholic exposition be right, and the Protestant wrong, it is objected that the promise was not made to the Roman but to the *Catholic Church*. The Romanist then flies to the supremacy of St. Peter. To give him breath, we, for a moment, grant it. When he has recovered himself, and is once more in a position to receive a home-thrust, we suggest, if St. Peter's supremacy be established, Rome's claim to St. Peter is not. If he was ever a pillar—we will say nothing about St. Paul's expression, he "seemed" to be a pillar (Gal. ii. 9)—it was of the church at Antioch, not at Rome. But we recall the admission of St. Peter's supremacy, for even at Antioch there "seemed" to be *three* "pillars"—Peter, James, and John. And, of the three, it was only Peter that broke down, carrying St. Barnabas with him (Gal.

ii. 13), before the rebukes of St. Paul, who, according to "Ignatius," was "in the same position as St. Paul" (p. 101, 102). The Church has, not one, but "twelve foundations, which have the names of the *twelve* apostles" (Rev. xxi. 14), and is built, not on the rock Peter, but upon that confession which Peter made of our Lord's divinity, which is the sum and substance, or "the foundation of the apostles and prophets" (Ephes. ii. 20). If, again, common sense must give way to nonsense to please the Romanist, and an apostle commissioned to the Jews can be conjured into a bishop of a Gentile church in a Gentile city, it yet remains to be proved that a promise of guidance in the prayerful study of the Scriptures, which does not amount to infallibility, can be twisted into the supremacy of St. Peter. If, again, that supremacy be established, the infallibility of his *successors* does not flow therefrom. We close, then, by saying, we will reverently "hear the Church," when we are told, on the strength of Scripture, what that Church is, where it is to be found, and how we are to "hear" it. LEX SCRIPTA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

I DESIRE, in the following article, to direct the attention of our readers to the so-called "replies" which the arguments of the negative writers have called forth from their opponents. Before doing so, however, I will first glance at the introductory article of H. B., which has been already examined by "A Layman;" and the readers of the *British Controversialist* will be the best judges of how far H. B. has been refuted.

H. B. (who has very *naïvely* begged the question of the canon and inspiration of the Bible) acts upon the truly Protestant principle of producing the Bible, taking everything to be said in its favour for granted, and saying to the Catholic, "Here is the entire Word of God; I do not find such and such of your doctrines in it, therefore they are not true." This peculiar system of logic reminds one of the story of a certain country justice, before whom a culprit was once accused of stealing a blanket. The judge, after carefully consulting his favourite authors, could not discover that stealing "blankets" was specifically forbidden, and dismissed the thief.

H. B. has quoted two of the three texts* usually cited by Protestants in support of the "Bible only" theory. His first is, "From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto every good work." And "Clement" admits (p. 87) that "the Scriptures to which Paul here refers were the books of the Old Testament." What bearing, then, has the text upon the subject of discussion? These Scriptures were able "to instruct and make men wise unto

salvation, through faith in Christ Jesus;" that is, through the evidences they gave, Timothy had been brought to the faith of Christ. This text does not assert anything about their sufficiency to make men perfect in faith; nor, even supposing it, for argument's sake, to refer to the New Testament, that they are even sufficient for teaching, but merely that for instruction and reproof they are "*profitable*" and useful.

No Catholic will deny this; but, as has been already observed, there is a wide difference between saying that a book is "*profitable*," and that it is "*exclusively sufficient*."

The second text is, the Bereans "were nobler than those of Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so." In the original this text is simply, "They were nobler (or better disposed) who (*οἱ βερεαι*) received the word," &c. The apostles who preached to the Bereans were inspired; and it was a reference to the *Old Testament*, to those prophecies which the apostles declared had been fulfilled in the person of our Lord, that the Bereans made, in order to ascertain their applicability to Him. To refer to their own writings, which now form the Bible, would not have been a remarkably sensible proceeding, unless they were unable to preach. Even then it would have been almost impossible, as very little of the Bible had then been written.

H. B. might have spared the tirade he has inserted in this portion of his article, and not have called the Catholics "idolatrous multitudes" (p. 13). He has built a theory upon the fact of our Lord answering Satan when he tempted Him, by a reference to Scripture; but he appears to have lost sight of the fact, that our Lord was, in the flesh, a *Jew*, and consequently answering the tempter (who quotes Scripture also) from the Jewish law. And on all occasions, when our Lord appealed to the written word, it was solely for the purpose of turning the Jews' own weapons against themselves.

H. B.'s arguments from the Fathers are certainly unique. They have been commented upon before; but I would observe, that it would be easy to prove almost any absurdity from the writings of the Fathers, or even from the Bible itself, if we selected a few expressions here and there, as H. B. has done. Unless the context is given, it is impossible to ascertain the true meaning of the quotation. This has been shown to be the case with "Clement's" quotations at page 167.

"Clement" supplies the remaining text. He says (p. 89), "Christ commanded His hearers (and consequently us also) to 'search the Scriptures,' John v. 39." But our Lord, in this instance, was arguing with *Jews*, who disputed His mission and authority. There was an inspired series of books which they believed, and in which they "thought they had eternal life;" and it was to those our Lord referred, "for they," said He, "are they which testify of me." The Jews did refer to their Scriptures, and

in the very same chapter, as a natural consequence of interpreting Scripture for themselves by the light of their own reason, they came to the very opposite conclusion. "Search and see," they triumphantly cry, "that out of Galilee ariseth no prophet."* Is not this the case now? that while one class of Christians, putting their own construction upon various texts, finds, for instance, the doctrine of the Trinity, another finds the totally reverse doctrine.

As "Gregory" will have quite enough upon his hands, I will notice the answers which "Clement" has made to his opening article.

1. To the proposition, The Bible was never intended to be the only Rule of Faith, "Clement" appears to object very strongly. His reply is prefaced by some ill-advised remarks about the Catholic Church, which he affirms teaches "the doctrine of devils," and "speaks lies in hypocrisy," which unfortunate ebullition of bitterness I pass over, without questioning the charity or justice of the remarks. I find that his arguments are confined to a simple denial of Gregory's proposition. He says (p. 95), "It is quite true that Christ commanded His disciples to preach; but what? Hidden traditions? No, the Gospel; and the substance of this they, as wise men, afterwards decided upon committing to writing."†

I am quite sure that "Gregory" has not asserted that our Lord did "commission His disciples to preach hidden traditions," as a reference to his article will show. What he there endeavoured to prove, and what "Clement" has not attempted to disprove, is that had our Lord intended a book to be of itself the only Rule of Faith, we should have found some record of His intentions, either in the writings of the apostles or of their followers. "Clement" says the apostles decided upon committing to writing the substance of their teaching. That this is not correct, may be seen by a reference to those writings, which were none of them written under the apprehension that, if Christ's doctrines were not so recorded, they would be lost. Not one of the epistles contains anything like this. "Clement" does not, however, attempt to show, what would give the lie to "Gregory's" statement, that our Lord ever commissioned His disciples to write down the doctrines He taught.

"Clement" says, "It is surely not requisite that we should produce the evidences in existence to prove the inspiration or authority of any book of the New Testament." It is a pity "Clement" did not devote a little of his space to the production of this evidence, instead of belabouring Catholics with so much abuse.

"Clement" appears to think the opinion of the Fathers conclusive in the matter; but does their testimony become worthless when they affirm that many things not explicitly mentioned in Scripture

* Some of the ancient manuscripts say, "Search the Scriptures, and see," &c.

† How does this agree with the text, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," which "Clement," a little further on, applies to the writers of the New Testament? How could they decide upon doing what the Holy Ghost caused them to do?

were taught and practised by the Apostles and their successors? He admits that "many of the Epistles would not have been written, but for the existence of abuses in the churches to which they were addressed." Suppose, then, that these irregularities had never occurred,—what would have become of the Protestant Rule of Faith? It would never have had an existence.

"Gregory" states that "every single epistle which we possess was addressed to Christians already fully instructed in the faith;" to which "Clement" replies, that this assertion "does not seem warranted by many expressions in the Epistles; or if they were, the rod of an apostle was often requisite to stir the primitive Christians up to their duty." The figure of speech he has made use of has, indeed, little elegance to recommend it. The passages, however, to which he refers his readers, but omits to give the words, do not affect the subject at all. One of them, indeed, actually contradicts him; for at the commencement of the epistle in which one of his texts (Heb. v. 11—14) is contained, we find St. Paul writing thus: "Paul, an apostle to them that *are sanctified* in Christ Jesus, called *to be saints*:" which clearly shows that St. Paul, at least, thought them fully instructed. I would recommend my readers to inspect for themselves the texts which "Clement" has referred to. He appears to have been content to quote at second hand, or he argues very absurdly.

2. The Bible was not at first regarded as the only Rule of Faith. This, "Clement," with scant courtesy, says is "untrue;" but what he goes on to say is a mere confirmation of the proposition.

"Eusebius testifies," he says, "that all things that Polycarp professes to have derived from the apostles were in every respect conformed to the Scriptures." Of course they were: and does "Clement" suppose that a Catholic ever believed anything that he felt was not in conformity with the Scriptures? Does this quotation either prove that Polycarp was taught Christianity by the Scriptures? or that he recognized no other teacher?

His next is:—"Irenæus further remarks—'If the apostles knew recondite mysteries, which they taught the perfect, in secret, apart from others, they would have delivered them to those most especially to whom they committed the Churches.'" And so they did commit them. The bishops and priests of any church that was founded were taught those "recondite mysteries" which the "Apostles knew;" and as "Clement" appears to have read a little respecting the practice of the early Church, it is strange he has forgotten that the mass was then termed the "*Christian Mysteries*," and that none but fully instructed, baptized Christians, to whom Irenæus refers, when he speaks of the "perfect," were permitted to remain at its celebration, after the gospel had been read. All who had not been baptized, left the Church at that time.

He also says:—"The early Christians were, doubtless, left to find out and put in practice those means that in their view appeared best calculated to secure the spread . . . of Christianity."

I would merely reply to this, that "Clement's" assertion is a mere hypothesis, for which he does not pretend to offer proofs; and that whenever God commands us to do a thing, He furnishes us with the means of doing it; and that when He commissioned His apostles to "preach the gospel to every creature," He bestowed upon them all the means which, in *His* view, "appeared best calculated to secure the spread of Christianity." Whether those means were the distribution of Bibles, or the constant teaching of God's Holy Spirit, through His Church, doubtless "Clement's" and my opinions differ.

The contempt with which Clement treats the argument about the multiplication of copies of the Bible is no answer.

4. Protestants do not adhere to their own Rule of Faith. "Clement" starts at this, with "Indeed!" He thought true "Protestants ever did!" Well, "Clement," I suppose it is just *possible* for you and your co-religionists to be mistaken. He seems to think that what "Gregory" said about teaching children and young people by word of mouth, was very ridiculous; but if he will take the trouble to read a little more carefully, he will see that "Gregory" does not find fault with Protestants for ignoring their "sole Rule," but only desires to point out the impossibility of observing it.

The doctrine of the Trinity, "Clement" affirms, is plainly taught in the Bible. Can he then explain the fact of the denial of that doctrine being the very first great heresy which sprang up in the Church? What a pity "Clement" does not point out where this is so "plainly" taught! but he says that "every intelligent Protestant can deduce it in a legitimate manner from the language of Scripture." What will the Unitarian readers of the *Controversialist* say to this? It is because they are not gifted with ordinary "intelligence," that *they* are unable to discover that the doctrine of the Trinity is explicitly laid down in the Scriptures.

"With regard to infant baptism," says "Clement" (page 98), "and the observance of the first day of the week, every intelligent Protestant is satisfied as to his duty in these matters, by legitimate inference from the recorded facts of the New Testament, and the practice of the Apostolic Church."

Now it is quite clear that infant baptism must be either right or wrong. If it be right,—where does the Protestant find a command to practice it? If wrong,—why is it practised at all? and where is it forbidden?

"The observance of the first day of the week" is such a stumbling-block to Protestants, that I have never yet seen an argument which they have advanced in its favour worth noticing. There is a clear command—not to the Jews, but to all mankind—in the first chapter of Genesis, to set apart *the seventh* day, or sabbath, as sacred to the Lord. This command is repeated to the Jews; and again and again, throughout the Old Testament, they are reminded of the great importance of honouring the Sabbath, and threatened with dire judgments, if they neglect it. The student of Scripture will

not need to be reminded that the years of the Jewish captivity corresponded with the sabbatical years they had omitted to keep. Our Lord and his apostles strictly observed the Sabbath, although some of their actions on that day were censured by the Jews, who observed the letter, but lost sight of the spirit of the commandment. Notwithstanding all this, Protestants, because our Lord rose on that day, keep the first day of the week, with almost Jewish severity, and neglect the last. There is not the shadow of a command to keep the Sunday, nor the slightest scriptural proof that the apostles did not keep Saturday. That they honored the Sunday in some way, is all that we can glean from the sacred writings; but that is no reason that we should do more. Catholics honour Friday by abstinence, because our Lord died on that day; and if this were mentioned in the New Testament, we ought, on Protestant principles, to keep that day holy too.

It is not my wish to enter into a discussion here about the authority for keeping Sunday holy. The matter between us is this:—Protestants declare the Bible to be their only Rule of Faith. They keep the Sunday holy. There is no command in the Bible to keep Sunday holy. Therefore, Protestants do not adhere to their only Rule of Faith.

I have heard an argument so absurd, that it only requires to be mentioned to be refuted:—"We cannot be certain that the day we call Sunday is the first day of the week." Has the world gone to sleep for a day then? or have we, by any possibility, missed count? But does anybody really believe that they are keeping the *seventh* day holy when they observe Sunday?

"Clement's" argument amounts to this,—that Seventh Day Baptists, who keep the Sabbath, instead of Sunday, and Baptists, who refuse to baptize infants, and Unitarians, who deny the Trinity, are either wanting in "intelligence," or their inferences, which have just as much claim upon our respect as any other Protestant opinions, are not legitimate. Does "Clement" consider himself the proper standard of "intelligent" Protestantism?

"Clement" says the prohibition of eating "things strangled, and blood," in Acts xv., had reference to the "peculiar views of the Jewish converts." It had nothing to do with Jews at all. At v. 20, St. James says, "For the which cause I judge that *they who from among the Gentiles* are converted to God, are not to be disquieted. But that we write unto them that they refrain themselves from the pollution of idols, and from things strangled, and from blood:" and at v. 29 occurs the part of the Epistle which was then written, which refers to this part of the subject. "Clement" says, these things are "not essential," which is a direct contradiction of holy Scripture; for at v. 28 in the same chapter, the apostles say that they "lay no further burden" upon the Gentile converts "except these *necessary* things."

How do Protestants account for their disobedience to this command?

"Clement" replies to the notice of extreme unction (St. James v. 14, 15) in his own way. "It was given with the view of healing the sick, and not as the Roman Catholics administer extreme unction, as the final preparation for death." No matter for what the Roman Catholics administer extreme unction; there is a command, and if this epistle be inspired, a *Divine* command, to call in the priests (elders or presbyters) of the church in case of sickness, and anoint the sick with oil. This command is uniformly neglected by Protestants, who, again, do *not* adhere to their "only Rule of Faith."

Thus, all "Clement's" answers do not meet the arguments which "Gregory" has advanced. How far he has complied with the request for "a single clear text which in the remotest manner supports his theory," I leave to others to determine. His sole aim seems to have been to force into his article a certain quantity of texts; and whether they have or have not any bearing upon the subject of debate, appears to him to be of no importance.

The article of "Theophylact" is nothing more than a violent attack upon Catholic faith and practice. This is obviously no answer to the question proposed for discussion. It is to no purpose that he treats us to a knowledge of his views respecting the Catholic religion: it was for him to show that "the Bible alone was a sufficient Rule of Faith," and his reasons for thinking so. He quotes Bellarmine, to show that Catholics are not agreed about the infallibility of their Church, in that they cannot tell *wherein* the infallibility resides. One thing he may be assured of, that when Catholics argue upon this subject, they merely state their opinions. Infallibility resides in the Church; the teaching portion of the Church is its bishops, as were the apostles (the first bishops), the teaching portion of the Church at its commencement; and that not a single doctrine has been declared as "*of faith*" by the Church without a General Council, or, what is equivalent to it, the unanimous consent of the bishops of the universal Church. But enough of this.

He says there is no necessity for any record of its inspiration in the Bible itself; "yet there are statements which tend to show that the inspired *written* word should be the only standard of appeal to decide matters relating to man's salvation." If, then, there is not a syllable in the Bible to prove its own inspiration, who is to tell us so? And why has not "Theophylact" produced those statements which tend to show that the *written* word should be our only standard of appeal? I deny that either H. B. or "Clement," as "Theophylact" asserts, have supplied those texts: and as the former will have an opportunity of replying to this article, I now call upon him to produce one single text, from the New Testament, which declares that "the Bible alone is a sufficient Rule of Faith."

The rest of this article is so foreign to the subject, that I fear I should tire the patience of our readers, if I attempted to answer all the confused arguments it contains. One point, however, I may notice. The writer says the Bible does not produce uniformity of opinion, nor does true religion require it; and that Catholics, with

their infallible Rule, do not think alike on all subjects. "This I have proved," says the writer, "to be the case with the present subject of debate." I did not know that infallibility was the subject of debate. My copy of the *British Controversialist* has nothing like that in it, but the pages are headed with—"Is the Bible alone a sufficient Rule of Faith?"

But with respect to unanimity of opinion, our Lord appears to have had most at heart the absolute unity of His Church. He prays that they (His followers) all may be one, "as Thou, Father, in me, and I in Thee; that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that Thou hast sent me," St. John xviii. 21. Our Lord in this declares that unity of sentiment will be the proof of His having sent His apostles. In St. John x. 16, our Lord says, "There shall be *one* fold, and *one* shepherd." St. Paul says, Rom. xii. 5, "We being many, are *one body* in Christ:" and that, as there is but "one body, one spirit, and one Lord," so is there but "*one faith*." The Romans are warned against "those who cause divisions . . . contrary to the faith they had learned" of the apostles, and are commanded to "avoid them."

Yet, in the face of all this, Protestants declare that unity is of no moment, and that the hundreds of jarring Protestant sects, which the world contains, are, although each believing almost totally different doctrines, in the actual possession of "the faith once delivered to the saints," the "*one faith*" which our Lord himself taught. I am quite sure, that if I saw two persons, professing to be followers of the same teacher, quarrelling about what he taught, and each declaring the other to be wrong, I should undoubtedly conclude that either the teacher had taught contradictory doctrines, or that one of the disputants was wrong. And few, I think, would dispute my conclusion. But these inconsistencies do not seem to trouble Protestants.

Further on, in the course of his article, he tries to get out of a difficulty by retorting upon his opponents. He says that "Gregory" and "Ignatius" contradict each other. I transcribe what he has quoted, and leave it to the reader to decide whether there is any contradiction. "Gregory" says, "Had the Bible been intended as the only Rule of Faith, we should have found some record of the fact in the Book itself." "Ignatius" says, "No proof" of its inspiration "can be drawn from the New Testament, since it cannot bear witness to itself." "Ignatius" seems to me to be merely developing the argument of "Gregory."

"Theophylact" wisely does not attempt to cope with the demand of "Ignatius," which would settle the whole question:—From what source do Protestants obtain their Bible? Who guarantees its inspiration? Who informs them of the number and names of the books which compose it? *Not the Bible itself*. And if they are dependent for this primary information upon something besides the Bible, do they not therein stultify themselves, and practically admit the truth of the proposition, that the Bible alone is not a sufficient Rule of Faith?

Philosophy.

IS THE POETRY OF TENNYSON AS HEALTHY IN ITS TENDENCIES AS THAT OF LONGFELLOW?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN entering upon this discussion, we would say, that though an advocate of Tennyson, we admire and love the poetry of Longfellow; therefore we hope our opponents will believe that we are actuated by no blind and unmeaning devotion to any poet, and that we can appreciate beauty and goodness in those who may not be our favourite authors.

The question now before us is of such a nature, that it may be variously understood by different individuals; and it will, in many cases, not be looked at *per se*, but will be amalgamated with other questions which ought to be kept distinct from it. The question itself is rather one-sided, for it assumes a test in which one poet has already the advantage, and acknowledges as an axiom the healthy quality of the poetry of Longfellow.

The question is of vital import; for on it depends, in a measure, the utility of one of the greatest powers with which any man can be entrusted. Whether that gift shall be employed by him on behalf of mankind, in opposition to vice and tyranny, in aid of the heavenward aspirations of struggling humanity, in cherishing a love for the beautiful and true, in affectionate sympathy with the sorrowful, in infusing hope into the hearts of the wronged and oppressed, inspiring a vigorous, manly, and genuine patriotism, and in achieving something which will help to bring nearer the advent of that better time for which we all long,—is truly of incalculable moment; for he who wastes it on frivolities, dissipates it in sensuality, or misuses it in the cause of vice, is worthy of universal reprobation. Truly, poetry is a mighty agent for good or evil; and Lamartine speaks rightly when he says, that it “is the guardian angel of humanity in every age.”

True poetry can be distinguished from spurious and valueless imitations by its purity, morality, and manliness; and all poetry that is lasting and durable must have these qualities welded, as it were, into its very substance, impossible to be detached or divided, except by its own destruction. Poetry that is of a wholesome, vigorous, and manly cast, is sure to live; while that which is only the medium for expressing a vapid, sickly, and morbid sentimentality, like a plant springing into existence in the dank and dark regions, will surely fade and die.

The poetry of Tennyson is adorned with all the beauties and embellished with all the graces of the poet's art, thus appearing

more complex than that of Longfellow; yet its being so surely does not cause it to be of a less healthy tendency than his. The products of these poets may be likened to two marble pillars, the one simple and unadorned in character, and the other of a more elaborate design and intricate workmanship.

One of the things that strikes a student of Tennyson is his truth to nature, which is painted with a clear eye and unerring pencil; for he seems intuitively to grasp and picture forth all its beauties, causing you to love them almost as fervidly and as truly as Tennyson himself. The elevation of humanity by inculcating the noblest maxims, by teaching the soundest philosophy, by instilling the purest morality, is the principle which runs like a framework through all his poetry, as he attempts

"To keep down the base in man,
To teach high thought and amiable words,
And comeliness, and the desire of fame,
And love of truth, and all that makes a man."

He also raises the standard to an eminence not attained before, and fights the battles of womankind, and truly shows the right relation in which the sex should stand. In *Locksley Hall* is some of the truest teaching the world has ever listened to; and in it is explained, with an accuracy which is the result of close study and intense thought, the moods and changes of woman. Some of his lines, in their terseness and conciseness, equal any that have ever been penned, many being texts from which a volume might be written. His poetry is full of subtle thought, the depth of which cannot be sounded by careless observers, who, because they cannot see through the grossness of their intellect, the hidden meaning of his poetry, have at once concluded that it was mystical and morbid.

There is an intense earnestness pervading all Tennyson's poetry; his own soul, the very essence of his being, finds vent in his verses, which, at times, rise to such a glorious eminence as can only be attained by poets of the highest order. His soul is so attuned to nature, that he instantaneously pictures forth the image that arrests his attention, not in a dim and indefinite manner, but with each portion instinct with its own beauty and loveliness, clear and sharp like the statue that grows under the hand and chisel of the sculptor: gorgeous and grand, as one of those scenes which seem to rise like a vision before the ardent gaze of the traveller under a cloudless sky and burning sun, and where the foot of man has rarely trod: picturesque and sublime, even as the arctic solitudes, with their awfulness and desolation—their surface diversified by massive icebergs, rugged cliffs, and snow-encircled mountains, whose hoary summits seem ever to be desirous of attaining the seat of the Infinite; and withal, with every detail so accurately and delicately displayed, with every portion wrought and fashioned with such minuteness, that a moral microscope only can show their exceeding truth and beauty.

With such an affection for all that is beautiful in nature, a poet cannot be placed in a rank below that which is occupied by the masters of song, and surely cannot be branded with the charge of a diseased fancy; we understanding the word *morbid* to signify a state of mind which is pervaded with thoughts and fancies that are not in accordance with, but are contrary to, nature—where one particular feeling or fancy is magnified or diminished into a semblance which causes it to be as much a monstrosity as if it never had been connected with that from which it presents such a strange diversity. If it be contended that the muse of Tennyson creates wild, voluptuous feelings, and stirs up the wayward and animal passions of our nature, we would point to one instance which conclusively shows that Tennyson is one of the purest poets that have ever breathed, and in whom the imagination is disciplined to such a degree, that though his descriptions and imagery are at times of the most gorgeous kind, he can at will paint a picture like one of Claude's landscapes, than which nothing can be richer, and yet at the same time more refined and chaste. The instance pointed to is the legend, *Godiva*, which, while waiting for the train, he dreamed into poetry of such an elevated cast, moral tone, simple beauty, and chastity, as could never have been attempted but by a poet of lofty powers. An artist of a coarser mould could not have dealt so circumstantially with the incidents, and have succeeded in producing a poem which all may read without even raising anything like an impure thought or feeling. Tennyson's muse does not simply warble exquisite melody, it also urges on the laggard soul in the march of progress, and teaches the performance of life's duties. The true use of power, and the end and design of life, he thus dilates upon :—

" Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lend life to sovereign power,
Yet not for power (power of herself
Would come uncalled for), but to live by law,
Acting the law we live by without fear;
And because right is right, to follow right,
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence."

Encouraging those who have met with undeserved disaster, he shows that energy and perseverance can work wonders, and commends the

" One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."

He wishes in his heart to help his fellow-man in his search after the Beautiful and Good; to urge him forward

" Through a life of shocks,
Dangers, and deeds, until endurance grows
Sinew'd with action and the full-grown will,
Circled through all experiences, pure law,
Commensurate perfect freedom."

No poet inculcates more clearly and nobly the duty of the aged,— of the man whose head is whitened with the snows of time, and whose heart should be yearning for a place of rest and peace: but in no maudlin tone does Tennyson sing! No, he says firmly and without hesitation,—

“Old age hath yet his honour and his toil;
Death closes all; but something ere the end,
Some work of noble note, may yet be done.”

Some who can appreciate Beauty will, in their eagerness “to hook it to some useful end,” undervalue it, and will look at all poetry that is ornate and profound as but of little worth, in comparison with simple verse, teaching duties and rights in the plainest manner. Let those of this idiosyncrasy turn to *Clara Vere de Vere*, and see that

“Howe’er it be, it seems to me,
’Tis only noble to be good;
Kind hearts are more than coronets,
And simple faith than Norman blood.”

The duties of the wealthy and highborn are also plainly inculcated in the same poem, in which he also asks—

“Are there no beggars at your gate,
Nor any poor upon your lands?
Oh! teach the orphan boy to read,
Or teach the orphan girl to sew,
Pray heaven for a human heart,
And let the foolish yeoman go!”

Again, there are some who appear firmly to hold the idea that our present existence is to be passed in suffering and misery; that all the loveliness in which this earth abounds is to be shunned; that it is a constant temptation, and is provided not for man’s enjoyment and delectation, but as an ordeal through which he must pass, and in which he must not be allured into admiration and love. Now Tennyson, on the contrary, holds the balance fairly, and shows that there is no evil without its corresponding good; that for the apparently useless there is a use, were it only for the purpose of a contrast:—

“Let there be thistles, there be grapes;
If old things, there are new;
Ten thousand broken lights and shapes,
Yet glimpses of the true.”

He is the poet of our age; for while singing of Progress, of Beauty, of Freedom, and of Goodness, he never degenerates into a party poet, with a narrow creed. He deplores the evils of the present age, and chastises those who would interpose a hindrance to the fulfilment of any scheme by which their dire effects might be ameliorated. Listen to him as he chants of those days of happiness which, though seemingly far distant, will assuredly come, and notice

that he does not indulge in vague generalities, but specifies each power distinctly and clearly, giving each its due.

"Fly, happy, happy sails, and bear the press;
Fly, happy with the mission of the Cross;
Knit land to land, and blowing havenward,
With silks, and fruits, and spices clear of toll,
Enrich the markets of the Golden Year.
But we grow old. Ah! when shall all men's good
Be each man's rule, and universal peace
Lie like a shaft of light across the land?"

But space compels us to conclude. We had marked a profusion of passages for illustration, equally sound and beautiful, but are regretfully compelled to omit them.

As a concluding instance we quote a verse from that rare, ripe gem of poesy,—one of the brightest love songs in the language,—the *Miller's Daughter*. In this there is seen no useless repining for the loss of a dear relative; no maudlin sentiment; no weak and womanly weeping; no morbidity of mind, which would cause him to be always lachrymose: no, the image is impressed on the poet's mind in such bright and clear tints, that absolutely there is no room left for any unhealthy shade or colour—

"I see his gray eyes twinkle yet
At his own jest—gray eyes lit up
With summer lightnings of a soul
So full of summer warmth, so glad,
So healthy, sound, and clear, and whole,
His memory scarce can make me sad."

Can the writings of the poet who pens this, and who can paint such characters as here referred to, be of a less healthy tendency than Longfellow, the assumed standard?

C. B. N.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE—II.

THE question here specified for discussion is one of considerable delicacy, involving, as it does, the respective merits of our own poet laureate and those of the poet of America. It is very natural, and not at all censurable, that we should regard our own countryman with especial favour; that we should uphold his merits, and do all we reasonably can to maintain his superiority. But we must not let prejudice blind our eyes to the merits or demerits of either party. We must calmly and dispassionately reason out the subject, and let the readers of the *British Controversialist* pronounce the verdict.

The question is not that of the merit of either party as poets, intellectually considered; but of the *healthy tendency* of their poetry, or its influence for good upon the popular mind. We have little sympathy with the many and varied theories which have been propounded respecting the nature, office, and intention of poetry;

nor with the canons of criticism which have been offered respecting poetical composition. Writers differ so widely upon this subject, that we feel inclined to think that very many of them build their theories upon baseless assumptions, adjusted according to their own preconceived notions, and squared and trimmed in accordance with their own individual fancies. We never remember to have met with a definition which seemed to us clearly to specify what *true* poetry really is. It has always appeared to us as something indefinable, appreciable only by its influence on the mind, and the excitement it gives to the good and the beautiful in our nature. The poetry which is to affect the masses, which is to invigorate, cheer, and console them in all the sorrows and vicissitudes of life, and to direct the soul homeward and heavenward, must be such as will touch the heart, and warm it with sympathy and love.

To set this forth more clearly, we have only to refer to the origin of poetry, and its primitive uses. Poetry, in very early ages, was the only effective means available for treasuring up the records of the past, and was also regarded as the most alluring and advantageous method of imparting instruction. Thus Solon is said to have given his political maxims in verse, and Thales and Pythagoras scientific instruction through the same medium. Poetry had its origin in a want which must have been severely felt, especially where no national literature existed as a lively and exciting remembrancer of their early history and traditional legends, the recitation of which filled their souls with ardour and patriotic feeling. The early forms and development of all languages, as far as we can now ascertain, appear to be constructed or developed with reference to this. Fanciful and striking images, antithetical and hyperbolical ideas, were frequently portrayed in single words; and groups of such words, skilfully arranged, were very effective in answering the end intended.

The primitive uses of poetry were various. Its most popular and general uses were, to recite the deeds and prowess of their ancestors, to record the national traditions, and to incite the people to deeds of valour in war. Hence, the bard was considered as an essential requisite, on the event of the nation going to war, to recite in lively, poetical, and heart-stirring strains, the indomitable bravery of their forefathers, and to exhort the people, in like manner, to overcome their enemies. From this style of poetry originated all the styles now in vogue, from the simple ballad to the great epic. In discussing the influence of poetry upon the popular mind, its origin and primitive uses must ever be borne in mind. And although society has now attained a high state of civilization, the same heart has to be dealt with, and the same passions, in a subdued form, still exist. Poetry, therefore, in order to affect the masses, must be imbued with the same spirit; must be simple, natural, and soul-stirring; and must, at the same time, be truthful, loving, and alluring in its nature. Of the vast mass of poetry which has been written within the last few years, and which is now issuing

from the press, how little of it can be said to possess these requisites! The poetic fire seems to be nearly extinct, and only a few flickering embers, which now and then glimmer, remain to remind us of its existence.

In advocating the healthier tendency of the poetry of Longfellow to that of Tennyson, we must not be understood as desirous of depreciating the latter, for, as an artistic poet, we believe him to be superior to Longfellow. We should style Tennyson the poet-artist; for we think that, in the midst of much that is beautiful and conformable to nature, and truly poetical, there is much that is mere word-painting and a striving after effect. The skill of the artist is here very perceptible; in fact, to use a common and current phrase, "it smells of the lamp." We acknowledge that his poetry is remarkable for polish, and for severe, classic purity; but, nevertheless, we think it too over-wrought, elaborate, and refined, and, therefore, not likely to produce so healthy an impression upon the mind as that of Longfellow, which is simple, terse, and impressive. Another, and, we think, an objectionable feature in Tennyson's poetry, tending to mar its healthy tone, and which has been already referred to in a former article, is its very æsthetical tendency, and the consequent cloudiness of many of the expressions used. We quite concur in the remarks of "Edmund" upon this point. We do not like to see airy and impalpable expressions used in poetry, except by a master-hand, such as Shakespeare's. It requires a magic wand such as his to give them form, substance, and being. It is from this cause, mainly, that Bailey's "Festus," although possessing great poetic merit, is now sinking into oblivion.

Much of Tennyson's poetry is tinged with melancholy. We think this also very objectionable, and anything but of a healthy tendency. We know this kind of poetry is esteemed by many. They have a morbid love for it, which ought not to be nurtured nor encouraged. No one would like to be allured from a state of cheerfulness to melancholy; nor do we think it wise, in the case of persons so disposed, to augment that disposition, as any reference to, or sympathy with, it—especially in beautiful poetry,—most assuredly does. How opposite is the openness and vivacity of Longfellow! He says,—and these sentiments are the continued and ever-varied theme of his poems,—

"Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not our goal;
Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
Was not spoken of the soul."

The whole of this "psalm of life" is full of vigorous and soul-stirring thoughts, calculated to rouse the reader to a deep sense of the life-duty he has to perform. We never read it without being stimulated afresh in the journey of life; and the final exhortation,—

"Let us then be up and doing,
With a heart for any fate;
Still achieving, still pursuing,
Learn to labour and to wait,"—

seems to find an echo in the hearts of all. Longfellow's celebrated poem, "Excelsior," is too well known to need any lengthy comment. It is universally esteemed, as breathing the truest poetry in the most energetic style, and as teaching the soul to raise high its aspirations, and to let nothing daunt it in its onward and upward course.

One of the peculiar characteristics of Longfellow's poetry, and one which we believe to be essentially requisite to the production of a healthy impression upon the mind, is what we term vigour. There is scarcely any of his poems which are not, more or less, pervaded by this element. Earnestness is a quality in poetry closely allied to vigour, and in this Longfellow stands pre-eminent.

Time and space forbid us to adduce at length the proofs we could give in verification of the preceding remarks. We refer our readers to any or all his poems, and, after having read them, we think they will, upon this question, pronounce a similar verdict to ourselves. We believe Tennyson to be very deficient in these important elements of popular poetry, and for this cause we think his poems are not likely to have so permanent a lodgment in the popular mind as those of Longfellow. The broad, skeleton-like expressions, simple, terse, vigorous, and unsophisticated, of the latter must exert more influence and have a more healthy tendency than the smooth, even-tenored, metaphysical, and refined poetry of the former.

H. G.

History.

WAS JOAN OF ARC AN IMPOSTOR?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

" 'I have heard
Of this your niece's malady,' replied
The lord of Vaneouleur; 'that she frequents
The loneliest haunts and deepest solitudes,
Estranged from human kind and human cares,
With loathing most like madness. It were best
To place her with some pious sisterhood,
Who duly, morn and eve, for her soul's health,
Soliciting heaven, may likeliest remedy
The stricken mind, or frenzied or possessed.'"—Robert Southey.

"On pourrait admettre, sans heurter les idées adoptées par la science, que Jeanne n'était pas possédée du démon, qu'elle n'avait pas, comme certaines gens l'ont prétendu, l'imagination trop enflammée, mais qu'elle se trouvait simplement dans l'état d'hallucination.—*Histoire de France, par Châllamel.*

A PECULIARITY of the present subject is its freedom from exciting prejudice or partiality, either in the minds of the combatants

engaged in this literary tournament, or in the spectators of their conflict—the readers of the *British Controversialist*. Religion cannot be made an efficient cause of partiality in this case, because professors of the same form of religion acknowledge the mission of Joan, while other professors denied her vocation and condemned her to the *supplice du feu*—the stake. It is, then, a fortunate circumstance for us, and favourable to the elicitation of truth; we trust, therefore, that we may not be tempted to wander from the path of philosophic calmness, historic care, or truthfulness.

A careful consideration of this subject requires a preliminary insight into the political, religious, and social condition of the times immediately preceding and contemporary with the heroine of our subject.

During the latter half of the fourteenth century, France, under the prudent statesmanship of Charles V., had recovered in some degree from the disastrous results of the battle of Crecy, and the civil wars of John II. When this wise king died, he left the kingdom in a prosperous condition, and a good treasury well filled, to his successor, Charles VI.; but the lunacy of this monarch, and the struggle for the regency which resulted therefrom between his brother, the Duke of Orleans, and his cousin, John, Duke of Burgundy, produced a most barbarous strife, and the country was divided into factions, continually at war with each other. These circumstances presented a most favourable opportunity for Henry V. of England to carry violent war into that distracted kingdom. Solicited by the Duke of Burgundy, he passed over into France with a considerable force of arms, and soon had achieved the victory of Agincourt, an event which will ever stand foremost in the annals of English bravery. Falaise, Evreux, Caen, Rouen, and the whole of Lower Normandy, submitted to his victorious arms. From these successes a treaty resulted, by which Henry was acknowledged *de facto* king, while Charles retained the title and dignity during his life only. The entire north of France was subdued, and active hostilities were commenced against the Dauphin and his adherents, who retired into the south of France, whither they were most successfully pursued by the united forces of Henry and the Duke of Burgundy. In the height of his glory and power, nature arrested the course of this victorious king, and he went the way of all living. The Duke of Bedford, his elder brother, was left regent of France during the minority of Henry VI. Two months after the death of Henry, Charles also died, and the crown of France was contested by the Dauphin—who became Charles VII.—for himself, with more earnestness, if possible, than he had manifested on behalf of his predecessor. There remained for him, on his accession, only Dauphiné, Languedoc, Auvergne, Bourbonnais, Berry, Poitou, Saintonge, Touraine, Orléanais, part of Maine, and Anjou. The entire remainder of France was in the undisputed possession of the English. As we have said, the Duke of Bedford was regent in France, who, with consummate skill and bravery, not only main-

tained his ground in the country, but he prepared to undertake offensive operations against Charles in the south. With this intent he laid siege to the city of Orleans, an important place, commanding the passage of the Loire, and was, in fact, the key to the south. This brings our historic summary down to the year 1428. At this period, the social and religious condition of the two nations was necessarily at the lowest point. Although here and there a shining light had been seen, any tendency towards freedom of thought, and independent personal responsibility, was entirely absent, excepting only the few persons who, in England, had in secrecy imbibed the opinions of the Lollards, or obtained access to a copy of Wickliffe's Testament. Therefore the whole mass of the people, in both countries, may be looked upon as not yet emerged from the thick darkness of superstition and ignorance which has given a true characteristic to this and several preceding centuries, as the *dark ages* of Christendom. Serfdom and vassalage still prevailed throughout Europe, so that few men could own themselves or their homes, and all were removable at the will of the lord of the soil, and he, again, was equally subject to his superior lord. From these considerations it will appear that the mental, moral, social, and political condition of all classes rendered them peculiarly passive under influences of a marvellous or superstitious nature, more especially if such influences tended to alleviate their social miseries, or give peace to their troubled and wasted countries. It was at this time that a young female, of twenty-seven years of age, named Joan, lived as servant in a small village inn, at Domremi, near Vancouleurs. In this capacity she was accustomed to tend the horses of the guests, and ride them, without saddle, to the watering-place. Thus, in many respects, she was required to perform the duties generally devolving upon men-servants and grooms.

The news of Bedford having laid siege to the city of Orleans, the distress of the inhabitants, and the utterly hopeless and dispirited condition of the French king's cause, had necessarily reached the remotest parts of the country, and was the chief topic of interest in the little village of Domremi. Joan, being of an enthusiastic and energetic temperament, was naturally no unmoved participant in the daily rumours concerning the war which agitated the village; the feeling of true patriotism fired her indignation against the enemies of her country, and her strong, impulsive nature soon defied all the bonds which the proprieties of her sex imposed upon her. She conceived the idea of aiding her sovereign, and serving her country in its exigencies. Brooding over her country's wrongs, excited by the perils of her countrymen, her ardent imagination converted the thoughts and desires of her heart into suggestions from a higher spiritual sphere. She had, or thought she had, dreams or visions of the Archangel Michael, who, during these mental hallucinations, prompted her to the work of saving her country. These day-dreams of a masculine, impulsive nature, soon

assumed, to her distorted judgment, so much of reality, that she succeeded in imposing upon others a belief in her peculiar mission. Her parents disbelieved her. She fled to her uncle, who, uniting a patriotic love of country to an intense love of his niece, Joan, favoured her assumed mission, and procured her admission to the presence of Baudricourt, the governor of Vaucouleurs. This warrior received her and her mission with coolness, even recommending her uncle to convey her back to her parents, who, he said, would do well "to chastise her with blows," for her presumption and unfeminine tendencies. But the earnestness of Joan had a far different effect upon the inhabitants of the town; for they equipped her in armour at their own expense, while her uncle purchased for her a horse. Seeing the effect of the popular will, Baudricourt affected to favour her; assisted her to mount her charger, and gave her a safe conduct to the king, who was then staying at Chinon. She was presented to the king, who had her examined by doctors in theology and law; they, finding her story sufficiently marvellous, and her energy of character sufficiently powerful to carry her through the part she had assumed in such manner as to secure the confidence of the lower classes of citizens and soldiers, adopted her prestige, and approved her mission to the king: her former pursuits gave her an adeptness and boldness, with power of endurance in bodily labour and fatigue, which, in the vulgar estimation, were most marvellous. All these features in her history tended to procure for her the patriotic devotion of her friends, and secured the superstitious fears and dread of her enemies. Thus the bugbear she created became the bulwark of strength to her countrymen, and the source of weakness and indecision to her country's foes. She promised the relief of Orleans, and the crowning of Charles at Rheims, both of which promises she, by these means, fully realized. She then felt her mission to be ended, and desired to return to her home: the king and his court objected to her retiring from the scene of action. She consented to remain at court, but her faith in herself being gone, she no longer prevailed in the conflict; she failed to animate the confidence of her friends, or appal her foes, and eventually fell into their hands. They brought her to trial before a court of assize for the most French in its constitution, and by this court she was condemned, for heresy and imposture, to prison first, on her confessing the falsity of her pretended revelations, and afterwards, on her relapse, she was condemned to be burnt at the stake. She suffered on *la Place du Vieux-Marché* at Rouen, the 30th day of May, 1431.

We have narrated the chief topics of this history for the purpose of showing, by the facts themselves, that Joan was an impostor; and we think this course is more effectual than any line of argument that could be adopted, because the history shows no fact of a supernatural character. Saint (?) Michael, the archangel, is represented as the only spiritual agency communicating with her, according to her own account, and this account is not otherwise authenticated.

Besides, if we deny the existence of St. Michael, or the fact of his appearance to Joan, if he does or did exist at that time, the *onus probandi* lies with our opponents, who, until they have proved these two allegations of Joan, cannot be relieved of the odium attaching to her name and memory as an impostor, especially as no other fact or circumstance connected with her entire history presents any single feature beyond the power of ordinary humanity to achieve, under like conditions. The question, therefore, stands thus:—Joan of Arc claimed to have received authority and power from intercourse with a supernatural being she calls St. Michael, by which she achieved deeds of daring which any ordinary mortal, possessing equal energy of character, might have successfully accomplished without such supernatural assistance; while the existence and appearance of that personage is grave matter for doubt,—in fact, is nowhere proven. Therefore Joan of Arc was an impostor, or one who pretended to that which was not, *quod erat demonstrandum*.

L'OUVRIER.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE task of deducing the causes of events is, perhaps, more interesting than that of recording the events themselves. The reviewing of circumstances after they have taken place, when hundreds of years have passed away, when the records of them have been penned and repenned, as the lessons of youth, or the studies of mature age, when the relation of facts is accepted as the nearest approach to truth that can be attained,—we pause in our course, we turn from reading to reflection, and endeavour, from the information obtained, to discover how such things came to pass, what was the mainspring of their direction, or the cause of their accomplishment.

Such is the nature of the question before us—"Was Joan of Arc an impostor?"

Now, in dictionary phrase, an impostor is "a deceiver;" and it is because we do not think such a definition to apply to our heroine, that we are found answering in the negative.

The historical part of the subject may be thus narrated. Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orleans, was the daughter of poor parents, Jacques d'Arc and Isabeau Rornée, and was born, in 1410 or 1411, at Domremy, a village on the borders of Lorraine. She had one sister and three brothers; the former died young, but the latter, or at least one of them, lived to share the fortunes of their sister. Her education, if education it may be called, was of the rudest and most meagre kind; she could spin and sew, repeat her Pater Noster and her Ave Maria, but with reading and writing she was totally unacquainted, though her deficiency in these arts was made up by a superabundance of superstition; and to her early tuition in romance and mystery may be ascribed that peculiarity of mind and temperament which distinguished her. By the neighbours of her parents she was known only as a simple, kind-hearted girl; but an

ardent piety and reserved demeanour soon made her a subject of remark, and occasionally also of ridicule. She was seen sometimes kneeling alone in prayer in open fields; at others, prostrate with clasped hands before the altar of the village church, especially addressing her devotions to the Virgin, or to Saints Catherine and Margaret, to whom the church was dedicated. It was also her custom, at least once a week, to go in pilgrimage to a small chapel, a short distance from the village, dedicated to the Virgin, and a venerable tree,

"The goodliest of the forest"

of Bois Chenu, constituted another shrine. To a streamlet which ran at the foot of this tree, miraculous powers of a healing nature were ascribed, and numbers were in the habit of repairing thither, in order to partake of its benefits. Beneath its mysterious shade it was said that fairies held nightly converse; but however this may be, it is certain that in that direction Joan not infrequently bent her steps.

"A blessed spot. Oh, how my soul enjoyed
Its holy quietness! With what delight,
Escaping human kind, I hastened there,
To solitude and freedom!"

Ere long she began to fancy that she saw visions, and heard the voices of her guardian saints calling on her to expel the English, who were then at war with France, and do other unaccountable and marvellous things. According to the report she gave upon her trial, these visions commenced when she was only thirteen years of age, while yet engaged in tending sheep, or assisting, in some way or other, her parents in the management of their worldly affairs, and were repeated at intervals until about her eighteenth year.

"At length I heard of Orleans, by the foe
Wall'd in from human succour; to the event
All look'd with fear, for there the fate of France
Hung in the balance:"—

and it is probable that the restraints imposed by the sex and station of the maid, and the impulse of her visions, might long have struggled for the mastery, had not this crisis of the war, in which her country was engaged, happened. The news of the siege wrought the imagination of Joan to the highest pitch, and from this time her visions, hitherto unsettled in their design, "steadily fixed on two objects which she believed herself commissioned from heaven to achieve,—to raise the siege of Orleans, and to crown the Dauphin at Rheims. And if we compare the greatness and difficulty of such objects with the sex, the station, and the years of the person aiming at them, we cannot but behold with admiration the undaunted intrepidity that did not quail before such a task." We can easily imagine the surprise with which her parents, not having previous information of her "visions," would receive the announcement of

an enterprise such as that which their daughter was about to undertake. From them she was fully aware she should receive no encouragement whatever, but she had an uncle, in whom she had found

“A parent's love, when parents were unkind,
And when the ominous broodings of her soul
Were scoff'd and made a mock of by all else;”—

and upon the plea of a visit to her uncle, Joan of Arc left her father's house. It was now that the earnestness of his niece overcame the old man's doubts, and he consented to go to the governor of the neighbouring town of Vancouleurs, with a message from her; but the Sire de Baudricourt received him with the utmost contempt, and dismissed him with the injunction, “Box your niece's ears well, and send her home to her father.” But, undismayed at her uncle's ill success, the maid set out herself in company with him, with the intention of pleading her own cause. After many interviews, and no small degree of annoyance, with the assistance of two gentlemen who, from listening to her story, seem to have become as enthusiastic as herself, a reluctant assent was given by the Sire de Baudricourt for her to pursue her journey to the court of France, then at Chinon. The same sort of opposition remained to be encountered and overcome a second time. The Dauphin for a long time refused to see her, but, yielding to the desire of some among his friends, he at last appointed a time for an interview.

Now, for the first time, the supernatural powers, which report had ascribed to her, were put to the test. Charles stood amongst the crowd of attendants, dressed in plain clothes, while some of the courtiers, in magnificent robes, held the seats of honour. But, singling him out, she at once addressed him, and although he denied himself, she persisted in making her appeal. “Most noble Lord Dauphin,” said she, “I am Joan, the maid sent in behalf of God to aid you in your kingdom; and, by His command, I announce to you that you shall be crowned in the city of Rheims, and shall become His lieutenant in the kingdom of France.” What the impressions and convictions of the court were now, it would be difficult to conjecture, but they were led to give a certain amount of credence to her mission; and as a venture (it can hardly be designated anything else), she was invested with the command of an army, and, possessed of a sword recovered from a church vault at Fierbois, was sent forward to relieve the besieged city of Orleans.

The readers of history must be so familiar with this story, in all its details, that it is hardly necessary for us to trace the circumstances of it further. Suffice it to say, the city of Orleans *was* delivered, and the Dauphin *was* crowned at Rheims, by the title of Charles VII. And here, undoubtedly, the political history of Joan of Arc should have happily closed. We say happily,—for however much others may be in favour of seeing females in the situation of this woman, or even in the generally more peaceful but not less

irksome and inconsistent position of a ruler over men, we have no taste for it; and without wishing to appear disloyal, we confess we should prefer seeing the principle of the "right man in the right place," carried out in its integrity. It would, however, appear that, elated with the success which had attended the army of France since the advent of Joan, its generals grew bolder, and wishing to carry their victories further, they attempted too much, and, like many others, before and since their time, they failed. The maid was ultimately taken prisoner by the English, tried as a witch, condemned to death, and, according to history, burnt, May 24th, 1431, at Rouen. We notice, however, that the latter assertion is now much questioned.

There are many incidents in the life of Joan of Arc which, to some minds, might lead to the supposition that she was inspired, but we think it unnecessary to show that she was a prophet, in order to prove she was not an impostor.

The ideas with which she was regarded by the inhabitants of Orleans, when she arrived among them; by the army generally, with which she was connected, but more especially by the common soldiers; and by the English, when she appeared upon the scene, may be accounted for upon the most commonplace grounds, and in the easiest manner possible. If the word superstition be entirely expunged in the consideration of the matter, and the words gratitude, affection, and confusion, be severally substituted, we think the real facts at once become apparent. We can readily imagine how delighted would be the terror-stricken and starving people, and how their dejection would give place to joy at the sight of a deliverer; how the soldiery would summon up their courage, and resolve to make at least another effort for the sake of liberty and home; and how astonished and bewildered would be the besiegers, when they found an entire new expedition brought against them, and that expedition led on by a woman! Further, it must be borne in mind that Joan objected, upon all occasions, to the notion of inspiration, except so far as the visions and directions of the Saints Catherine and Margaret went; and with these, if we believe her, she certainly was upon most intimate terms. But, we repeat, there is no evidence whatever that she attempted at any time to impose, either by word or deed, upon those by whom she was surrounded, or endeavoured to persuade them that she was in possession of extraordinary powers, or able to do anything further for them, or more than she expressly stated at the outset of her adventures. Thus, upon the occasion of her examination by a council of theological doctors at Poitiers, nothing could make her alter her purpose, or vary in her statements. "I know neither A nor B," she said, "but I am commanded by my voices, in behalf of the King of Heaven, to raise the siege of Orleans, and to crown the Dauphin at Rheims." "And pray what language do your voices speak?" asked Father Seguin, of Limoges, with a strong Limousin accent. "Better than yours," she answered, quickly. When the doctors asked her for a sign, she replied, that it was not at Poitiers, but at Orleans, that she was appointed to

give a sign, and that her only sign should be to lead brave men to battle.

But the best proof, in my opinion, of the strictly natural and defined character of her scheme is, that when the accomplishment of her promises had taken place, by the coronation of Charles, she requested to be permitted to depart. "I wish," she said, "that the gentle king would allow me to return towards my father and mother, keep my flocks and herds as before, and do all things as I was wont to do." Moreover, "she refused all rewards for herself or for her family, and only asked the favour that her birthplace might hereafter be free from any kind of impost,"—which privilege was granted, and continued in force for more than three centuries.

In this last circumstance, we think we detect patriotism of the purest kind. The mission undertaken by Joan of Arc was no idle dream, but a momentous purpose; and, in like manner, it was not undertaken with a mercenary view, for present or remote advantage, but simply from a sense of duty. After all—what is there strange or extraordinary, above other events which might be mentioned, in this affair? Have there not been, in all ages of the world, heroes and heroines raised up to take their places when exigencies have demanded them and their services, and none else were equal to the occasion? To give one illustration only,—Who ever heard the name of Havelock, until the whole of India was one immense scene of bloodshed and disorder? And did he not perform prodigies of valour, and achieve victories, beside which that under notice sinks into utter insignificance? What is there doubtful in the story of Joan of Arc? We consider that an ardent enthusiasm, together with no small degree of religious zeal, was the moving cause, and the results mere accidents of fortune.

We have passed over her imprisonment and death without remark, neither have we said anything as to the character of the monarch whose subject she was; but, in conclusion, we may add that the name of Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orleans, is but one among the many benefactors of their species, who have sealed the cause they fought for with their lives; and in regard to Charles VII., it should never be forgotten "that, in the hour of misfortune, he abandoned to her fate the woman who had saved his kingdom."

G. A. H. E.

The Essayist.

LAMARTINE.

THE main purpose of our present essay—which will appear in the sequel—is not only consistent with, but provocative of brevity. The time has not yet come when the life and works of Lamartine—

poet, historian, biographer, politician, novelist, essayist, &c.—can be fully discussed; yet at the present time there seems to be—as we shall show—good ground for bringing his name before readers of an essentially thinking class; and this, we imagine, can be best done by throwing together, in agreeable mixture, a notice of the events, the doings, and the productions *quorum magna pars fuit*.

In October of the year of Mirabeau's death (1791), in the ancient town of Mâcon, of an old and illustrious family who had suffered by and in the excesses of the Revolution, Alphonse De Lamartine, founder of the modern French *romantic* school, was born. His father was a Bourbonist cavalry officer, and his mother had been a governess in the Orleans family. His childhood was spent in Milly, and he was educated at the College of the Fathers of the Faith, in Lyons. In his twenty-second year he made a hurried tour through Italy, with Madame de Staël's "Corinne" as his guide-book. The picturesque descriptions, and the beautiful composition of this story, combined with the grand scenery and glowing memories that rose continually before him, awoke the poet in him, and made him yearn to take his rank among the bands whose magic genius rules men's spirits from the silent yet speaking pages of a book. The exigencies of life compelled the adoption of a profession, and he chose the army. But he did not long continue to wield the sword, and he revisited Italy in 1818. Under the poetic nurture of its grandeurs and beauties he produced his first work, "Poetic Meditations" (1820)—a series of detached pieces, glowing with religious extasy, lofty and hallowed thought, pure and exquisite composition. He rose famous; but mindful of the uses of fame, he made his reputation a stepping-stone to a diplomatic appointment to the birth-city of Dante, Florence. In 1823, his "New Poetic Meditations," though scarcely so pure and characteristic as the former, attained an almost equal success; but the "Death of Socrates," published in the same year, was flatter, and obtained less favour. In 1825, he published "Helléniennes," a series of elegies on Greece, and "The Last Canto of Childe Harold," an unsuccessful and unlucky attempt to continue Byron's *chef d'œuvre*, which suggested "odious comparisons" between the French and the English poet. In the same year he was made secretary to the Embassy at London, and his "Byronic" muse procured for him the hand of one of our fair countrywomen, with a large fortune. An opulent uncle, too, bequeathed his wealth to the gay gentleman, but serious poet, who had thrown the beauty of poetry over the beauty of holiness, and had made both lovelier by the union; and so he became possessed of ample resources. Passing from London to Florence, he composed his "Poetic Harmonies," a work of loftier reach, but more mystical and exaggerated than his former attempts, and less compact, though more symphonious.

His Alpine experiences are finely employed in his next effort, "Jocelyn," an epic, in Alexandrine verse, intended to show "the phases the human mind must pass through, to reach the accom-

plishment of its destiny in God." It has neither the *verse* of Byron, the flow of Scott, the solemn musicality of Wordsworth, nor the practicality and pathos of Crabbe; yet the plot is well laid, and carefully managed. His name now became highest among the famous ones of France, and hence, though he was on a tour through the Holy Land, he was chosen a member of the Chamber of Deputies. He returned to France; his friends augured great things from him as a politician, but they have been somewhat disappointed. For a time he adhered to the party of the Legitimists, and attached himself to the constitutional conservatism of Guizot; but he became gradually estranged from them, and for a time held himself aloof from the parties who divided the state. At a later period, however, he flung himself, with all his might, into the advocacy of liberalism, and used the tribune and the press with equal vehemence in opposition to the staid and yet unsteady policy of the government of Louis Philippe. His success as an orator disappointed himself and his friends, and his devotion to politics injured his poetic powers. His singular egotism has had a damaging influence upon him as a leader, in whom especially overt self-assertion is regarded as unpardonable. The suave method of leading men is to make them believe that they are the motive powers, and that their leaders are their instruments.

Lamartine published his "Pilgrimage to the Holy Land" shortly after his return. It is an elaborate and highly-finished piece of workmanship, and is singularly captivating in style, manner, and matter, as well as exceedingly grateful to refined and thoughtful minds. The affecting passage relating to the death of his daughter is exquisite and touching; but there are some political disquisitions intermixed with the graver and happier matter, which seem misplaced and injudicious.

The "History of the Girondists" is a work of considerable research and great power of reproductive exposition. It is the very kernel of the story of the Revolution. It commences with the event of the author's own birth-year—the flight to Varennes; includes the history of the Legislative Assembly; the emigration; the war of La Vendée; the insurrections and massacres of the South; the insurrection of St. Domingo; the loss of the French Indies; the abolition of slavery; the Reign of Terror; the appalling struggle of one nation—torn, too, by civil contention, anarchical disputes, and disputing factions—against the whole leagued powers of Europe; the rise and fall of Robespierre; and the immense defeat to which France was ultimately subjected. It is a thrilling story, dramatically told, dazzling, striking, glowing, sympathetic. It belongs, the author says, "to an intermediate class between history and memoirs. Events occupy in it less space than men and ideas." It breathes with reality, is earnest, rapid, impassioned, and yet well subordinated to historic truth. It makes the heart throb, the nerves tingle, and the eye dilate. It is rich in original matter, and brings to light documents and sources of information

not hitherto accessible. It is just such a book as France will value, when she begins "to gather from her past wisdom and counsel for the present and the future." The 22nd of February, 1848, brought the Revolution, and amid the mob-law of that time the voice of Lamartine rose as one of power and pith. He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government. In the face of the drunken, infuriated rabble in the Place du Grève, he stood unawed and resistant, while the populace shouted for blood and a renewal of the scenes of the Reign of Terror. He persisted, though at the bayonet's point, and succeeded in calming the angry and turbulent passions of the terrible mass. But moderate counsels could not be maintained, and the whirlwind of outrageous excitement was too mighty to be guided by the forceless power of eloquence alone. Repressive measures were necessary, and were taken, and the popularity of Lamartine was gone.

In France, it has been with some truth affirmed, "there exists no attachment to any individual, and no respect for any institution." This has been over and over again illustrated in fact, but scarcely has it ever been more strikingly shown than in the fate of Lamartine, who now exists in a state of total political eclipse. The justice and the generosity of France have of late been appealed to, in vain, to make up, in some measure, the losses and the debts incurred by her noble, though perhaps not politic and astute, son for his country's good in the hour of her dire necessity; and they have responded with a subscription of £10,000, or about 10 per cent. of the whole liabilities incurred. With resolute heart, Lamartine has been working off this immense debt, and in two years managed by labour, and the kindly encouragement of willing hearts throughout the world, to liquidate about £150,000. His "Cours de Littérature" has been extensively patronized to this end, but his friends fancy that a bolder and more successful effort might be made, to secure a few years' rest for the sorrow-grey head of the septuagenarian man of thought, action, and suffering. The proprietors of the various copyrights of his numerous works have recently agreed to let him have the right to republish them in a complete and uniform set, and to allow that right to exist for ten years, should he die. The series of works, originally extending to about 100 volumes, comprising lyric, epic, and didactic poetry, novels, history, biographies, orations, voyages, political treatises, critical papers, &c., is to be published with the title of "Œuvres Complètes de Lamartine," in forty volumes, in large octavo, of about 600 finely printed pages each, price eight francs per volume. Ten volumes are to be issued annually to subscribers at this price, so that the whole will be completed in four years.

With this very month of May, 1860, this interesting experiment of the gratitude and right feeling of France, and on the appreciation and kindly spirit of readers of French throughout the world, is to be inaugurated; and our chief purpose in preceding this announcement by these few simply-stated biographical and critical

details was indeed—let us be candid; few can better afford to be so than those who try to do a good action—to induce those of our readers who understand the French language, and can afford the requisite outlay, to determine on becoming subscribers. Those, however, who may not relish our proposal, can at least either acquire information, or be reminded of facts that may have escaped the memory, by the perusal of this paper; and, as a farther excuse for our somewhat lengthy trespass on our readers' patience, we shall now reward them with a word or two of interesting news on this topic.

Besides the already published works of Lamartine, which will be included in this series, there will appear in it for the first time a "Life of Lord Byron," a poet for whom Lamartine has always had a warm and enthusiastic love; a "Life of Tasso," a story more touching itself than any romance, and, told as Lamartine can tell, is likely to be full of intense literary and psychological interest; "Antoniella," a romance; the political articles and speeches which wrought so marvellously upon the mind of France prior to and during the Revolution of 1848; several critical and biographical estimates of literary and political characters and contemporaries; as well as selections from memoirs of the author and his correspondence. The whole work is intended and expected to undergo the editorial supervision of Lamartine himself.

To be at once a hero, a genius, and a martyr, are conditions too many even for the most renowned; let us but succeed in having convinced the reader, by our mere statement of facts, that Lamartine has just claims to the central and the first, and let that have but the effect of showing that to make him a martyr too would be going too far; therefore let us manage, if we can, to free the old life-long toiler for humanity from any debt except the inevitable one—the debt of nature.

R. M. A.

The Reviewer.

How we are Governed; or, the Crown, the State, and the Bench.

By A. FONBLANQUE, JURR. London: Routledge and Co.

SINCE the days of the famous King Alfred, in no period of our country's history has political philosophy and social economy assumed such importance as at the present time. Instruction upon these subjects has never been so plentiful and good, nor has the popular appreciation of it been, under any circumstances, so general. This may in part result from the aggregation of large masses in the busy conflicts of town and city life. True it is, that men whose intellects are sharpened, whose judgments are rectified by the practical details of extensive commercial transactions, must necessarily become more interested in the important principles which form the

groundwork of these sciences. The erudite work of Lord Brougham upon political philosophy has eclipsed all its predecessors, and is the acknowledged manual for the statesman and the publicist; while Professor's Creasy's "Rise and Progress of the British Constitution" is forming the mental stamina of young England, of the middle and upper classes. These works occupy their position, and will do their work well, yet a more unpretending, but not less useful work, is the one named at the head of this notice.

In a small book, with clear, readable type, written in a simple, easy style, the author gives facts and principles, of the greatest importance, so plainly, so clearly, that a mere child may understand the most difficult principles connected with our complicated constitution, and our institutions of a national character. Some short time since, we placed a copy of one of the earlier editions (the present is the tenth thousand) in the hands of a little boy some eight years of age. He was quite delighted with the present, and, as we thought, with the outward appearance of the book only; but soon afterwards we were agreeably surprised to receive from the child a letter containing a clear and distinct outline of the various forms of government, and illustrations given from history, with reflections upon the peculiar merits of each. On inquiry, it was shown that he had read "How we are Governed," several times; was much interested in its contents, and understood the principles of politics more thoroughly than nine-tenths of the "stump orators" who have affrighted the world out of its proprieties during the past half-century. This was to us a conclusive argument in favour of the work. We have since read the work for ourselves, and our advice to every reader is, "Go and do likewise." If our recommendation is adopted, the next few years will prove our young men to be real politicians themselves, and not the blind tools of any frothy demagogue, who can talk by the hour, for the mere personal advantage of "sending round his hat," as a finale to his political oration,—his devoted self-sacrifice for the benefit of enslaved humanity.—DELTA.

The Comprehensive Dictionary of Biography; a Series of Original Memoirs of the most Distinguished Persons, living and dead, with an Analytic and Chronological List of Eminent Men and Women. London and Glasgow: R. Griffin and Co.

THIS book might be called the Peerage of Humanity, were that not a designation too flattering to the bulky tomes in which the dull catalogues of successions are enshrined and told. The men of mark whom nature ennobles are often successorless in mere lineage and filiation; but there is a true progenitorship of progressive spirits, who bear each age onwards and nearer to the goal of human effort and Divine intent. In upwards of a thousand pages, the incidents of the lives of these, who have become illustrious, are narrated in numbers nearly numberless. It is, of course, a book of reference, and its utility depends upon its brevity, accuracy, and

accessibility. In one volume, royal 8vo., with wondrous condensation, sketches of most of the notables among men have been collected and laid up in excellent little memorial paragraphs; and yet, when one of the world's enchanting names—Plato, Dante, Columbus, Raphael, Spenser, Shakespeare, Bacon, Locke, Byron, Scott, Goethe, &c.—occurs, there is an ampler scope taken, and pages pass beneath the authors' pens. The greater portion of the names have been allocated to men of some renown in the several departments of literature, art, and science, and through their collaboration a capital work has been brought within reach of ordinary readers. Alison, Brewster, Burton, Creasy, Knight, Nichol, Spalding, Wornum, &c., are a few of the writers whose efforts are here worked into a unity. This should be a volume in everybody's library, not only for the interest of its contents, but for the intrinsic merit of its execution. For £1 1s. the treasure may be won, and we believe that, for the convenience of attainment, it is also about to be issued in monthly shilling parts. We ought to mention, that there are three divisions of the work—The mighty dead; distinguished contemporaries; and a classified and chronological list of the persons mentioned in the work. It is sad to think that, as it was passing through the press, Nichol and Spalding closed the record of their own lives; and that, since its composition, already, among others, Broderip, Brunel, De Quincey, Humboldt, Hunt, Irving, Jamieson (Mrs.), Macaulay, Mure (of Caldwell), Sir Wm. Napier, Schaffer, Simpson, have passed from the columns of contemporaries into those of the sovereigns "who rule our spirits from their urns." Other changes we might remark on, but that enlargement is not possible here and now. To those who require a record of biography, or who interest themselves in the labours and sufferings of men, it will be not useful only, but pleasurable exceedingly. The *Lessons of Biography* were recently dwelt upon in this Magazine, and here is a repertory for the verification of the remarks then made.

Poetic Section.

ORIGINAL POETRY.

MACAULAY.

His words were oracles. A nation's pride
 Rung out applausive joy if he but spoke.
 The mystic magic of the Past he broke;
 And with a mid-day clearness we espied
 The living England of those olden days,
 When mighty aims inspired to mighty deeds.
 How noble the heroic pulse which plays
 Within the heart!—how swiftly the blood speeds

When the "Armada" tells the foeman's fate;
 Or "Ivry" thrills us with the sound of strife.
 "The Lays of Ancient Rome" throb with the life
 And vigour of that world-enthralled State.
 A wealth of thought lies in his "Essays" shrined,—
 But who can guess the worth of his immortal mind!—N.

A. SUMMER MIDNIGHT.

FROM yon high, drifting clouds, whose fleecy fringes
 Glint with a crystal brilliance pure and white,
 The summer moon gleams out, and faintly tinges
 With elfin hues the shadowy gloom of night.

On glides the regal orb, still vigils keeping,
 Her bright brow circled with a snowy wreath:
 Beneath her dappled robe the stars are peeping
 In twinkling clusters from their sapphire sheath.

Gray, ghostly shadows o'er the ground are flying;
 A holy calmness folds tired life around,
 Save when the wakeful wind, with mournful sighing,
 Breathes on the calm a whispered, solemn sound.

And strange, wild voices into birth are springing—
 The unseen Ariels of the midnight breeze—
 In fitful cadences they blend their singing,
 Low echoes answering from the dreaming leas.

'Tis now a chorus swelling loud as ocean,
 When o'er some sounding deep his billows fly;—
 Anon, a sweet plaint, trembling with emotion,
 Soft as a mother's tenderest lullaby!

The wide-spread arms of yon black, waving beeches,
 Stand out athwart the sky in sharp relief;
 And, from their feet, a woven fretwork reaches—
 The pictured semblance of each branch and leaf.

Beyond the trees' broad shade, a winding river
 Bears its full tribute to the exacting sea;
 Its lucent breast, where dancing moonbeams quiver,
 In rippling radiance sparkles silverly!

In the deep river—'mid the moonlight tender—
 Away beside each distant, sparkling world—
 I see dim indications of God's splendour:—
 He walks to-night in majesty unfurled.

Oh! midnight wind! bear upward through that portal,
 Which guards the entrance to that unknown land,
 The reverence of a weak and erring mortal,
 Whose soul bows down before God's mighty hand!—CECIL DEVON.

PEACE.

FREEDOM, awake! attune thy lyre
To themes of ripest melody;
For now, inspired with heavenly fire,
The nations yearn for liberty.

Man governs man; and man alone
Must sigh in vain to rule aright;
Reason is not the judgment throne,
Whence issues truth and living light.

Man envies man. No heart so good
But hides a demon in its core;

There passion rides in seas of blood,
Whilst Mercy trembles at the door.

Man loves not man. A brother's love
May never urge a brother's woe;
Love yearns to lift our world above—
Pride strains to hasten them below.

Awake, O Freedom! touch thy lyre!
Bid pride, and hate, and passion cease;
So earth, refined in battle's fire,
Shall smile to learn that Love is Peace.

PANIOTA.

SPRING.

SEASON of gladness,
Banishing sadness,
Robing the earth in a mantle of green;
Nature rejoices,—
Jubilant voices
Warble melodious where silence hath been.
Woodlands are ringing;
Daisies upspringing,
Star-like and beautiful, spangle our way;
Sunlight is streaming,
Rivulets gleaming,
Bright in the golden effulgence of day.
Flowrets, the fairest,
Richest and rarest,
Shake off their fetters, and burst into birth;
Valley and mountain,
Brooklet and fountain,
Glow with the radiance that blesses the earth.

While from Creation,
With exultation,
Gushes forth gratitude, fragrant and sweet;
Let not Humanity,
Swollen with vanity,
Fail, with thanksgiving, its Maker to greet.

Author of beauty!
Teach us our duty;
Bind our affections for aye to Thy throne.
Be it for ever,
All our endeavour,
Thee to acknowledge and worship alone.

When, through death's portal,
All that is mortal
Sinks in dishonour, and falls to decay;
Safe in His keeping,
Peacefully sleeping,
God shall quicken our slumbering clay.

Pilgrim of sorrow!
 Wait till *to-morrow*;
 Winter's wild storm-clouds will soon be o'erpast;
 Then—blest transition—
 Faith into vision,
 Thine will be sunshine that ever shall last!—J. S.

WORDS TO REMEMBER.

WORDS to remember are those that are spoken
 From lips that are breathing the tones of the heart,
 Cherished like vows that are not to be broken,
 These from our memories shall never depart.
 The voice of the stranger may charm for a season,
 The song of the Syren the moment may please,
 But the words of a Friend, breathing Love wed to Reason,—
 Words to remember and cherish are these.

Words to remember are those that are plighted,
 When young hearts are blending their earliest vows,
 For hearts, like the fair flowers of spring, may be blighted,
 And drop like the blossoms that fall from the boughs.
 But time cannot alter the voice of affection,
 Though seasons may change both the flowers and the trees;
 For youthful Love's tones, amid joy or dejection,
 Words to remember and cherish are these.—A. R.

NIL DESPERANDUM.

SONNET.

IMPOSSIBILITY is but a name
 That laggards in earth's upward, onward strife
 Have coin'd, with pompous sound to hide the shame
 Of an unfruitful, misdirected life.
 Opposing difficulties never tame
 The purpose of true men; they *do* or die.
 Determinate resolve secures them fame;
 They say, "We *will* achieve whate'er we try."
 To them all present failure's but a goad,
 Stirring to further effort, aims more high:
 Though daunted, still they work—stop not to sigh.
 Success (though coy as any maid), long wooed,
 Her ardent votary shall call his own:
 Amply the winning for the wooing will atone.—E. M., Jun.

WRITTEN IN SPRING.

'Tis spring, and the green buds are only now
 First starring o'er the earliest-leaved trees,
 And yet the air is calm, no joyous breeze
 Sweeps in rough mirth down from the mountain's brow.
 The snow-drop scarce has passed, the crocus gleams
 In its first delicate beauty, clear and bright,
 And yet a full autumnal flash of light
 Fills all the sky, as if, in her glad dreams,

THE INQUIRER.

The young Year prophesied of warmth to come;
 And truly all the air is soft and still,
 Wearing a dreamy loveliness at will,
 Sleeping in light beneath the heaven's blue dome.—J. M. S. T.

MUSIC.

Music, like a summer's dawning,
 Circles earth with voiceful light;
 And my soul leans out to listen
 From her sorrow-cloistered night.

Music, like love's speechless yearning,
 Wakes strange echoes through all life;
 The while my heart grows more contented
 With our heaven-arch'd world of strife.

Music ministers to gladness,
 Or on grief a radiance throws,
 Gently steals the frown from sadness,
 Gives new perfume to the rose.

Music, like a shell of ocean,
 Sings a plaint of days bygone;
 And a dream of beauty trembles
 In the murmur of its song.—F. G.

GONE.

"THE blinds are down, my heart is tenantless;
 Grief-laden clouds make dark the vault of heaven;
 Whilst fear goes shrieking through the starless gloom,
 The while my faint heart falters, and is sad.
 I *must* go from this house, 'tis hope-haunted.
 If I stay, these turbulent tears will wreck my soul.
 I had a hope; it died. I see sometimes
 Its rainbow in the heavens; like an echo-song
 Its memory steals upon me, and surrounds
 My thoughts with peace; peals gladness through my heart;
 With angel foot disturbs the long stilled lake
 Of love that, troubled once, heals all world wounds.
 And then the scales fall, and, turning to my heart,
 I see the cold, white corpse—I'll bury it.—F. G.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

79. I am unable to explain the difficulty of "A Person" if the sentence remains in the singular number, as in his (or her) query. I should place it in

the plural, and it would read as follows:
 —"When boys or girls attain the age of 15 or 16 years, and leave the Sunday school, thinking that they are too old to continue scholars, they become liable to

many temptations, and unless they continue* to attend a place of worship, and to read the word of God, they will most assuredly fall away from that religion which was before a great blessing to them."—F. S. M.

80. *The Lives of the Popes.*—The following will perhaps satisfy "Roger," who asks, "What books give the best account of the lives of the popes, from their rise to the present day?"

All the early ones being canonized saints, he will find ample details concerning them in Butler's "Lives of the Saints" (London: Richardson, 12 vols. 32mo., 12s.; Dolman, 8vo., £2 2s.) He will find the best account of the mediæval popes in Gosselin's "Power of the Popes in the Middle Ages;" of Gregory VII., in Vorig's life of that pontiff; of Innocent III., in Hurter's "Life of Innocent III." Translations of each of these works are published by Dolman, 21, Paternoster Row, London. The two latter works are by Protestants, and are masterly vindications of two very much maligned pontiffs. For the popes of the period of the Reformation, "Roger" may consult Ranke's "History

* I think the word "continue" should, to form a correct sentence, have been omitted by "A Person;" it is not stated that they attended before.

of the Popes," and Roscoe's "Life of Leo X.," making, of course, due allowance for the religious prejudices of the writers as Protestants. He may continue to study their history down to the present time in Dollinger's "Church History," translated by Dr. Cox (London: Dolman); in Cardinal Wiseman's "Recollections of the Last Four Popes" (Hurst and Blackett, 5s.); in Cardinal Pacca's "Memoirs of Pius VII.," and for the life of the present pope, by far the best work is "Rome, its Ruler and its Institutions," by J. F. Maguire, M.P. (London: Longman and Co., 10s.)

If "Roger" has not time for so long a course of study, he may take the Count de Maistre's celebrated work, "The Pope," a translation of which is published by Dolman for 3s. 6d., pp. 560, 8vo. This work contains by far the best bird's-eye view of the whole subject. There is no connected work worth perusal in the English language which gives a detailed account of each of the popes. Considering that from St. Peter to Pius IX. there have been 257 popes, such a work would be rather voluminous. "Roger" will find a tolerably correct list of the popes in the "Penny Cyclopædia," art. POPE.—J. H.

The Topic.

IS THE RECENT TREATY WITH FRANCE BASED UPON SOUND PRINCIPLES, AND WILL IT PROVE BENEFICIAL TO OUR TRADE AND COMMERCE?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Whatever tends to establish pacific relations between nations at real or supposed enmity, is based upon sound principles, whether considered in a moral, religious, or intellectual point of view. That which lightens, or appears to lighten, the tax-burdens that individuals of nations have to bear, is admirably calculated to establish such

relations. The recent treaty with France will diminish the taxes to the majority of the people of both countries, and on the "small profits and quick returns" principle, will prove beneficial to trade and commerce.—C.-R.-G.-S.

A political or commercial policy is best judged by its fruit. The results of the great free-trade policy inaugurated by Sir Robert Peel are patent to all,

and the most antiquated protectionist cannot deny that they have been without exception beneficial. It has given food to famishing thousands, employment to thousands beside; it has given an impetus to our trade altogether unexampled; it has doubled the national wealth. The French treaty is but a further development and application of the same principle, which experience proves to be sound and beneficial to our trade and commerce.—F.

The French treaty will prove beneficial to our trade by opening up new markets for our staple manufactures; the increased demand for these will raise the value of labour, and thus carry comfort into many thousand humble dwellings, while at the same time the poorer classes in France will have placed within their reach articles of daily use, which the prohibitive duties have hitherto deprived them of.—R.

One-half the objections which have been urged against the treaty result from the mistaken notion of regarding it as one of reciprocity. The cry has been all along, The French have got the best of the bargain! whereas, in fact, it is not a bargain at all. The Chancellor of the Exchequer wisely said that we give nothing to France which we do not give in a double degree to ourselves. We are not making a gift to the French Government. The treaty has not resulted from a disinterested desire to benefit France, but to increase our own trade, and this we have the fullest confidence that it will accomplish.—A.

Politicians who have been driven from every other vantage ground of opposition to the treaty have made a final stand on coal. What will be the consequence (they ask) of supplying a great power, with which we are as likely as not soon to be engaged in war, with the very fuel for his vessels, which are his direct instruments of war? Not only so, but the best authorities inform us that our English coal-seam will not in all probability last more than three hundred years. Three hundred years is but a small period in the life of a

nation, and coal is the principal source of our national wealth, and it is suicidal to hasten its consumption by supplying it to another, and that an unfriendly nation. To all this we reply, the amount of fuel required for the French fleet is comparatively so small, that by paying a slightly increased price, the French Government could obtain a bountiful supply from Belgium or America; and as regards the prospect of an exhaustion of our coal-seams, that is distant or near according to the political bias of him who makes the estimate. Three thousand years being considered nearer the mark by many than three hundred. There are coalfields of great extent in England, and especially in Wales, still untouched. To refuse to supply France with coal on such grounds would be unworthy of the enlightened age in which we live.—N.

Had it not been for the existence in our House of Commons of those political parties which Mr. Disraeli considers essential to the safe working of the constitution, but little or no opposition would have been offered to the treaty at all. Apart from the objection made to it from a party motive, there have been none but those which have been offered to it by the particular interests immediately affected. All politicians who hold national interests superior to party ones, all beyond the reach of merely selfish considerations, all sound financiers, and the most eminent political economists, have agreed to support it; and such testimony is sufficient to prove to us that the French treaty is based upon sound principles, and likely to prove beneficial to our trade and commerce.—K.

I apprehend that scarcely any person, either of cool or sanguine temperament, can rise from the perusal of the debate in the Commons' House of Parliament upon the commercial treaty with France, without being satisfied that it is a good and proper accompaniment to this century of events; and that, irrespective of what the designs of Napoleon may be, it is a measure

well qualified to extend the interests and sympathies of mankind to a larger sphere; and, further, the loosening of the fetters that have bound the commerce of two such great and powerful nations as England and France, cannot but prove beneficial in the highest degree to both countries.—J. C.

The recent treaty with France we consider the emancipation of the trade of both nations. What is England's principal manufacture? Hardware. France stands in great need of this commodity, especially in the shape of grates, fenders, fire-irons, and most certainly cutlery. The lower, and a majority of the middle, classes use their fingers instead of knives and forks; they have nothing else, unless it be wooden forks and spoons, which do not afford the same comfort and cleanliness as good Sheffield steel, and which, too, are of little use. The fires are on the hearth, or in grates built of bricks, and the poker, shovel, and tongs, are only to be found in respectable houses, and then of an inferior quality. Now, if these things can be exported from this country, a beneficial improvement in our trade will at once follow. Respecting the desirability of French goods being imported into England, there can be but one opinion, though perhaps our demand for them will not be so great as that of France for our goods, France requiring articles essential to the most ordinary comfort. Yet it is evident that we could take any quantity of French articles, such as music, silks, satins, toys innumerable, and many other articles of a similar kind. Thus trade will be increased, good understanding between the two countries established, and national comfort and prosperity greatly advanced.—J. A. M.

We are emphatically a commercial people; let us inquire in what way the French treaty will benefit us in that capacity? It will provide a market for the surplus manufactured articles and natural products of both countries. The unrivalled cutlery of Sheffield will in France find a ready and profitable

sale. The cheap and useful fabrics of Manchester will be eagerly bought by the working people of that country. The earthenware of Staffordshire is so superior to that of France, that it is no exaggeration to say that all kinds of crockery utensils used there will be imported from this country. The naturally fertile soil of France, which has been so badly cultivated for the want of proper agricultural implements, will by the aid of machinery introduced from England, be brought to a state of cultivation which before was unknown; while we, on the other hand, shall receive from France articles not so much of use as luxury; and the result of our trade will be, that our exports will greatly exceed our imports, which will not only raise the price of labour engaged in the above branches of industry, but greatly augment the wealth of the nation.

It will tend to increase our confidence in the good intentions of the Emperor, and remove those groundless fears of invasion which have so long haunted the minds of all classes of the community, so that we shall be enabled to reduce the enormous and ruinous estimates for the army and navy. It will establish a better understanding between the peoples of both countries; and if any misunderstanding arise between the governments, instead of, as in the past, unsheathing the sword, unfurling the blood-red banner, letting loose the dogs of war,—the pen shall, in the hands of enlightened statesmen, remove all difficulties, and the spotless banner of peace shall float triumphant on the breeze—ensuring, to both nations, the blessings of plenty, prosperity, and peace.—J. F. L.

Free Trade has received a great triumph in the ratification of the commercial treaty,—a treaty of such an unusual and extraordinary nature that a few years since its realization would have been deemed impossible. And although there is still a slight adherence, on the part of France, to protection principles, it need not create sur-

prise, when we reflect how difficult it is to abandon old ideas and opinions, and more especially when we remember the great opposition which the introduction of free trade principles received in this country itself. Still it is a great movement in advance of the prohibitory laws which have so long been prejudicial to the best interests of both countries, and will, doubtless, prepare the way for a still more liberal policy, when the advantages which the change must produce have become more apparent. For it cannot but produce the most beneficial results, by bringing the two countries into closer relation with each other, by means of commercial intercourse, and will do more to cement the alliance and tighten the bonds of friendship, than almost any other means. The reduction of the tariff, and the removal of the high prohibitory duties, throws open a new and extensive market for British products and manufactures, which cannot but prove beneficial to our trade and commerce; and by bringing the manufactures of the two countries into competition, the rivalry thereby created must greatly improve and develop the internal resources of both countries.—L. W.

Measures that are of a nature like the one under consideration, chiefly occasion agitation before they are successfully brought into the harbour of royal approbation; and they must be farther considered as to their probable workings before any definite judgment can be pronounced. But in the instance before us we may, without any danger of committing ourselves, affirm with confidence, that this new treaty of commerce is based on thoroughly sound principles. All prohibitory and restrictive regulations are impolitic, and operate perniciously to the public weal; and such may be proved to be the case by the recent proceedings of our legislative assembly: and arguing from such premises as the above, we may safely infer that the position we have assumed is tenable. The unrestricted exercise of commercial relations be-

tween the two nations possessing the capacity of mutually advancing each other's interests, is a philosophical principle upon which they may exercise the privileges of reciprocity. Thus the interests of the two countries are much promoted in both wealth and energy, the sinews of greatness in every phase.

We may assert further, that the trade in those articles affected by the treaty will be more largely increased, and thus a stimulant will be given to business in all its departments and in both countries. Take, for instance, what the Emperor of the French said on the subject of the treaty, when opening the Chambers of Deputies:—"A very simple reflection shows the advantages of this treaty to both countries." Such, then, are the sentiments of the ruler of commercial destinies. And further he adds:—"The treaty has then only advanced the period of salutary modifications, and given to indispensable reforms the character of reciprocal concessions, destined to strengthen the alliance between the two great nations."—S. F. T.

The adventurer whom commercial enterprise may have landed upon a strange coast, where the knowledge possessed by the natives of money is limited to cowny shells, and of a bank, to the beach where they are gathered, would not think of deferring operations till their information on these matters equalled his own, but adapting himself to the circumstances in which he was placed, would endeavour to effect his object by a direct exchange of goods. And this common-sense procedure would meet with general approval: none would be foolish enough to assert that the advantage gained had been dearly purchased; that they were a cause of regret rather than congratulation; that our expeditious system of exchange had been discarded in order to return to the cumbersome and antiquated practice of barter. Such an objection would be preposterous. Yet not one whit less ridiculous is the cry

lately raised, that treaties are things of the past; that this French one is a retrogression, and an abandonment of our free-trade principles. A single glance at it will show how unjust are these allegations. For Britain it grants an extension to the principles which have raised her commerce to its present colossal proportions: for France it makes the first step towards them—reducing their tariff, and thus introducing the narrow end of the wedge, that the French people may afterwards drive it in, and themselves cleave asunder the weight of protections and prohibitions, which have been hanging about their neck like a mill-stone.

Some may urge that we have granted too much and got too little; but I would remind such that one of the high contracting parties has many old prejudices to overcome; that while our neighbours have taken a step in a new direction, we have but followed out a policy tried and approved; that, as Mr. Gladstone remarked, the objections raised against the treaty, on both sides of the Channel, are proofs of its fairness; and that all the illiberality of the French is certain to recoil upon themselves. As to how much it would benefit our commerce, I would not hazard an opinion, but refer the reader to the treaty made with France in 1787 for an indication of the probable results. That treaty, continuing in force till the revolution—a period of six years—exhibited wonderful results, short though its existence was. Comparing the first year after it came into operation with the previous one, I find the intercourse between the two nations nearly doubled; and while, in 1786, our French imports were £266,121 and exports £612,519, in 1792 (the last year of the treaty) they stood thus:—Imports, £717,634, exports, £1,228,165. Let us hope that not less satisfactory results may flow from the treaty of 1860, and that its career of usefulness may not be cut short by any untoward event.—NOLA.

The leading principle of the recent treaty is *mutual* benefit, accompanied

by the usual laws of commerce between two civilized nations. Its aim is the removal of prohibition, and the reduction of *high* protective duties.

It will effect the *liberation* of our foreign trade, and thus increase our commercial transactions, cheapening all imported articles, and creating a legitimate demand for such commodities.

Statistics and experience prove, that as our export trade increases with any country, so increases our import trade from that place. If the above be so, we cannot make changes to increase the French exports to this country, without also increasing English exports there; and hence the *mutual benefit* that must result from this philanthropic measure.

It must also benefit commerce, by uniting each nation in a closer bond of union, preventing those frequent political panics which *check* wholesome speculation, diminish trade, and disgrace so enlightened nations. It must prove beneficial to trade, by cementing the *existing* alliance between the two countries, by producing a *mutual* disarmament, and throwing the expense of their maintenance into the commercial world. It will greatly benefit trade and commerce; as other nations, when witnessing the increasing advantages derived from it, will be eager to make similar compacts.

So beneficial do I sincerely believe will be the results of this treaty, that future statesmen and generations will proudly point to its creator (Richard Cobden) as the greatest benefactor of his day.—R. B. L.

The rise of nations is marked by the freedom of their laws; their fall, by monopoly and exclusiveness. The progress of free trade is the progress of civilization: every protective duty struck from the statute book is a blow aimed at the remains of barbarism.

The recent commercial treaty with France will produce beneficial results, not only in tending greatly to develop the resources of the two countries, but in cementing the affections of the two

peoples. Their aims will be directed to the fostering of those principles upon which the prosperity and advancement of nations depend; to the entire suppression of that unproductive and wealth-destroying spirit of animosity that has heretofore retarded the growth of mutual reciprocity. This country is only following out the extension of those principles to which she is pledged as the pioneer in the onward march of nations: her mission is, by example, to teach others to cultivate those things whose end is prosperity and peace.

It is no easy matter to convince nations long nursed in the hard lap of despotism, without freedom of speech or action, to understand the "might that alumbers" under the iron heel of prohibitive laws. As they feel their power awakening under the influence of free trade, they will come to understand the policy that has wrought such blessings for this country; to see, that in the free interchange of commodities lies the best guarantee of a nation's prosperity; and will become our rivals in the race for the abolition of all restrictive laws. But "as long as our civilization is essentially one of property, of fences, of exclusiveness, it will be marked by delusions. Only that good profits which we can taste with all doors open, and which serves all men." When the great Sir Robert Peel gave the death-blow to the obnoxious corn laws and other protective duties, a large portion of our landed proprietors groaned in spirit; they saw, in imagination, their own and Britain's greatness departing, and the waving corn-fields already a howling and desert waste. Instead of these gloomy forebodings being realized, the land has increased in value to an almost fabulous extent. Before the repeal of these laws, the cry of agricultural distress was borne on every wind; the torch of the incendiary was kindling stack-yards in almost every county in England. Now peace and plenty abound in almost every department of industry, and agrarian outrages are numbered with the things that were.

That the recent treaty with France is based upon sound principles the foregoing conclusions verify. That it will prove beneficial to our trade and commerce is as sure as man is destined to progress till the realization of that happy time when the "swords will be beat into ploughshares, and the spears into pruning-hooks, and men will learn to follow war no more."—D. R. R.

NEGATIVE.

An undiplomatic envoy holding first rank in the negotiation of a treaty, is a constitutional innovation, and is, therefore, unsound in principle.—CONSERVATIVE.

The treaty fixes the finance, and exports, and imports of England, a *settled* (constitutional) country, for ten years, with France, an *unsettled* country, full of the elements of revolution, and is not, therefore, likely to be beneficial.—TYRO.

In seeking to accommodate Napoleon III. with an increased outlet for the goods of France, and therefore an increase in his power of raising his finances, we have introduced an irresistible competition into the British markets, which give employment to female labour, e.g., in gloves, em broidery, straw-plait, lace, &c., which must either destroy these branches of industry, or ruinously lower, already too low, wages, and so lessen our independent and tax-paying working classes, increase pauperism, and give a sad impetus to crime and immorality. To do so is neither sound in principle nor beneficial in practice.—QUIP.

It surely cannot be beneficial to commerce and trade that we admit French manufactures duty free, while France levies 25 per cent. on ours!—RATIO.

Wine, or war?—That is the question; and the treaty is to be passed as in reality an entreaty for peace. Fye!—TOGA.

To buy peace from Napoleon by means which necessitate the re-levying of the income tax on ourselves, while it increases his means, is wrong.—FACT.

French "adhesive court plaster"

seems but a poor cure for the consumptive woe of Italy.—TOBY.

A treaty hampering the finance, and necessitating a reconstruction of the fiscal arrangements of our country, cannot be based upon sound principles, because no foreign potentate ought to be permitted, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the supreme function of our House of Commons—the power of the purse.—CASH.

We exchange necessities for luxuries, and so heighten the cost of the one, and lower that of the other; thus closing up the sources of taxation—the superfluous cash in the country,—after the supply of the necessities of life. Is that a sound principle or a beneficial policy?—Two.

Coal is the ground of our commercial prosperity, and wine is the river of a nation's debasement. We purchase the latter with the former, and are therefore wise!—EH!

We make a treaty of peace while we keep a war establishment. Is this hypocrisy? If so, is the principle sound?—T. T.

Our Volunteers tax themselves to ward off a French invasion, and are called to the Queen's levee in token of the royal approbation of their patriotic fervour, while we kiss the hand that brandishes terror throughout Europe, and give him of our substance for his wants. In arming him we disarm ourselves.—FURZE.

We make treaties to advantage France, either through fear or love. If the former, why the braggadocio of rifles? If the latter, where their need?—Sc.

To the first count my answer is "No." After all the talk about invasion from the other side of the Channel, and after the formation of rifle corps, this new treaty seems to be almost a compromise on our side, and a catch to throw off the scent upon the other. What does John Bull care for the reduction of duty on French wines? If he wants them he can pay the duty; as can Mrs. John Bull for her articles of feminine ap-

parel. More especially when it causes every poor "quilldriver, &c., at a hundred a year, to be forced to hand over to the Government £4 3s. 4d. of that sum for income tax. If the Government wanted to reduce taxation, why not that before anything else? As to the second count, the treaty may prove beneficial *if it lasts*; but I have strong doubts of such being the case. Its gigantic form reminds me of one of *Æsop's* fables, where a loud rumbling noise was heard in a mountain, and large multitudes of people flocked together to see what it would produce, when, after long expectation and many wise conjectures, out came a mouse.—F. S. M.

"Every tub should stand on its own bottom."—We cannot hold with treaties of any kind, more especially with the one now made with a naturally jealous and fickle people like the French. In the first place, the slightest real or imaginary non-observance, on either side, of the obligations, &c., contained therein, might be the cause of hostile feelings. Again, a treaty conceding so much to a powerful and ambitious nation, whose attitude of late has been so suspicious as to cause us many doubts and fears, appears to be something approaching a *farce*, and an unpardonable act of inconsistency. Have we not been building screw frigates, and turning out Armstrong guns, with extraordinary activity,—and what for? No other purpose than to protect against the danger we apprehended from France. The very moment we are trying to buy friendship, by this obnoxious treaty, we are paying the cost, and enduring all the evils, of enmity!—therein lies the inconsistency. Viewed in this light, the commercial treaty seems to be designed for the purpose of securing the friendship and alliance of our warlike neighbours; and, if so, it is based on any but sound principles. Should the anticipations of the most sanguine be fully realized, the treaty might prove beneficial to our trade and commerce; but the advantages, as far as this country is

concerned, must be considered as reduced to its *minimum*, when the effect of that arrangement is to give so little real importance to England, whilst to France is given a free, unlimited command of coal, iron, and machinery, thus powerfully assisting her in the development of her warlike preparations, and also in the facility of contending with us in industrial competition. The force of this is greatly increased if we remember France retains 30 per cent. protection against our free trade; and further, the pecuniary price which we pay for an arrangement not very just to us, is a large increase of direct taxation in the form of the income tax, which appears very like *taxing the Briton to serve the Gaul*. With truth might we say, "Save us from our friends,"—the framers of the ignominious delusive French treaty.—GEORGE.

"The treaty is open to endless objections—both in its principles and in its details.

"Relaxation of import duties ought to be the pure result of a regard to our own interests, and not a matter of bargain with other powers. Such treaties necessarily restrict our free discretion in regulating our own revenue system, and involve us in obligations which may prove embarrassing, and the source of future ill-feeling and disputes. The advantage of liberal principles of trade has already been given to a great extent by this country to France, and we have been for some time past looking for the equivalent due to us. Reciprocity, therefore, under present circumstances, is not an equal game to the two parties.

"The provisions of the treaty are apparently one-sided and unfair. France gives very little—we give a great deal. What we give is of inestimable advantage to France—coal, iron, raw materials of manufacture of all kind—the means, in fact, of developing all her latent resources and power for manufacturing industry and for warlike equipment. What we receive from France is comparatively of small importance—luxuries which afford no additional

means of directly augmenting our power or resources—brandy, wine, silks, gloves, &c. And, add to these, the admission of our manufactures into France at a duty of 30 per cent.! Surely this requires no comment.

"The treaty precludes us from any discretion as to the expediency, with a view to our own true fiscal policy, of imposing a *duty upon the export of coal and of iron*. When a country has a peculiar advantage in the production of a commodity, either as regards cost or quality, a duty upon the export of it, if cautiously imposed, is amongst the best sources of revenue. Coal certainly, and probably iron, fall under this rule—and the more especially as they are now to be reckoned as most important munitions of war.

"What practical benefit will the mass of the people of this country derive from the admission, at low prices, of the inferior French wines? Their present beer is vastly superior for them in every respect, and the command of that at a moderate price renders the admission of inferior French wines a privilege of no real value, if not absolutely undesirable."

We cannot think a treaty based upon sound principles which gives a pound in return for a shilling. The advantages England may derive from it are not to be named by the side of those it will confer upon France. In return for articles of the greatest domestic comfort and usefulness, we have offered to us such things as children's toys, and execrable wines, which nobody can drink.—X.

To sacrifice a revenue derived upon articles in a proportion which inflicted hardship upon no one, and to substitute an extra penny of income tax, is a proceeding both unjust and impolitic. The duties which have been repealed were mainly levied upon luxuries, which the mass of the people could very well dispense with, whereas the income tax presses most heavily upon the middle classes, who are already taxed far above their degree. The treaty bears, throughout, marks of a spirit of

truckling and subserviency to France. It is thrown to the French emperor as one throws a bone to an angry dog, whose fierce growl seems to denote a longing to make a meal of one's calves.—Z.

The clause relating to the remission of the coal duties is of itself sufficient to condemn the treaty. Whatever Mr. Bright and his followers may say about the absurdity of preparing against a French invasion, the people of England do well to guard against such a contingency. The emperor's conduct has never been such as to inspire confidence, and his last act—the annexation of Savoy and Nice, against the protestations of every nation of Europe, and in violation of every principle of honour

and rectitude—sufficiently proves that his will to make aggression is only limited by his power: and in the face of a probable war with France, it is suicidal to supply her with the very material of which she has greatest need. Moreover, the coal question has another phase. Dr. Buckland and others concur in saying that the coal seams of England cannot possibly last more than three centuries. Coal is the great source of our wealth; and when that fails us, our commercial prosperity will fail too. How contrary, then, to every principle of justice and common sense, to endeavour to hasten that time by recklessly squandering it upon a hereditary foe.—Y.

The Societies' Section.

THE LITERARY SOCIETIES OF EDINBURGH.

THE city of Edinburgh, though no longer the metropolis of an independent kingdom, has still many glories. The stranger is captivated by her palaces and towers, the grim majesty of the Old Town, rich in historical associations, and the luxury of architecture and of view which distinguish the New Town, with the rural and marine prospects stretching away nearly at his feet. While many of her recent architectural and other features have been blurred by bad taste and active Vandalism, the citizen of the older time, were he again to walk the streets, would recognize a vast improvement. He would certainly know with difficulty the antiquated town of which he was once so proud, as a baillie, or a member of the civic guard. He would feel somewhat the same as the original denizens of the Isle of Paris, could they now look round on the stirring quays, and the Boulevards crowned with the Galleries and the Madeleine, or the fairy splendour of the Place de la Concorde, or the

Champs Elysées. But he would be still more surprised at the educational and literary institutions which now spread their influences among the population. Heriot's Hospital, where he spent his thrashing days, and looked out with many a sigh upon the great world, would still seem to frown upon his dim and aged eyes; but, on inquiry, he would be told that, fostered by the bounty of George Heriot, various schools have been founded, imparting the blessing of free education to the children of the poorest classes.

Edinburgh has been famed for its distinguished men; and to such, literary association is a kind of necessity. The men, some of them distinguished, as Blacklock and Blair, who extended their patronage to a poor ploughman, called Robert Burns, had their coteries, where they could dwell on his eloquent words, or pander to his social excesses. The convivial meetings of literary men had, however, little influence on public opinion; but towards the close of the

ast century, arose in the University the academical and speculative debating societies. The first was resorted to by the younger students, who in time became members of the latter, which existed so long as the year 1816. The age was inclined to discussion. The lectures of Professor Finlayson and Dugald Stewart had touched the souls of the students. These prelections threw a charm around the study of philosophy, and it became immediately identified with liberal political opinions; and the fact that these were new and dangerous, made them attractive to the young. Lord Cockburn declares that these societies were of more service to him than any other part of his education. The rising liberalism of the younger members, roused into indignation by the expulsion of Emmet from a society in Dublin, was attempted to be borne down by Hope, D. Hume, and other seniors; but, led by Brougham, Jeffrey, Horner, Lord Petty, and other younger members, the Tories were compelled, gradually, to retire. Henry Brougham would thrill with his eloquence his half-a-dozen condjudtors, who also acquired in these societies the art of public speaking. The result was, that public opinion became leavened in course of time. The "Edinburgh Review" was established, afterwards the *Scoteman* newspaper. Many other important changes, including the Reform Bill, were influenced by the establishment of the societies now referred to. The University still has debating societies, which, however, are not any way remarkable. After being defeated by the rejection of Macaulay, the old Whigs have again gained complete possession of the city representation, leaving the Town Council as the only arena of the sectarian party, whose University patronage has been modified amidst general approbation, and whose transactions regarding the Trinity College church have not merely been found illegal, but have called forth animadversions in different quarters of the kingdom. The ancient glory of the

University has returned in the recent election of Brougham as Chancellor, and Gladstone as Rector.

In 1821 was founded the School of Arts, in Adam Square. It was, if not the first, at least the second institution of the kind in Great Britain. The idea of it was owing to Leonard Horner, an Edinburgh merchant, the father of the present Mr. Horner, and he took the management of it for several years. It consists of classes for young men; and while those attending them have steadily increased to several hundreds annually, it has never changed its humble meeting place. The teachers have been of a very excellent cast. It contributed to introduce Professor George Wilson, Dr. George Lees, and others, into public notice. Its purpose is entirely educational, and chiefly scientific. It has eschewed lecturing on popular topics, and the students are not admitted to any share in the management. It has a select library of educational works; has been recently enriched with one or two benefactions, and has been generally self-supporting. The other day a number of the members celebrated the birthday of Watt, a statue of whom they have erected in front of the school; and it now takes the name also of the Watt Institution. An attempt was made, about ten years ago, by a few artisans, to found a Mechanics' Institute, but it failed.

From the want of manufactures, the working class in Edinburgh are not so intelligent or enterprising as those of Birmingham, or other great centres of trade. The School of Arts does not supply the place of such an institute; but while the most of similar organizations have had no long duration, it has stood its ground. The Philosophical Institution was established in 1839. It is said to owe its origin to a course of lectures by Mr. Combe, and another by Dr. Murray, delivered in Clyde Street Hall, at the request of a number of intelligent citizens. It has large premises in Queen Street, and in them it some years ago acquired the right of

property. These are occupied with a news-room, library, and room for perusing magazines, &c. The library has now about 15,000 volumes. The number of members is between 1,000 and 2,000. The institution has steadily increased, and is in a flourishing condition. There is no similar one in Great Britain better organized or managed. It has an annual series of lectures, delivered twice a week, during the winter months. It has brought to this city the most eminent literary and scientific men, from time to time, and has spared no expense in doing so. Many of the lectures have been published, as those of "Delta," on poetical literature, Hugh Miller on geology, Mr Kingsley on the Alexandrian school of philosophy, Mr. Maurice on learning and working. Professor Wilson was its president till his death, in 1848; and he delivered, in connection with it, various brilliant orations, and otherwise worked well in its behalf. He was succeeded by Lord Macaulay. He delivered, when it was founded, an inaugural address, published in the volume of his speeches, and also spoke, with "Delta" and others, at the banquet on that occasion. He valued the honour highly; presented it with works of historical value, and also proposed to lecture before it on a topic which he mentioned, but his life was not spared. It is a purely secular institution; perhaps it carries this the length of bigotry, in the selection of books, and otherwise. In the management, the Whig element largely predominates. The terms are a guinea yearly, and ten-and-sixpence for ladies, who are admitted to the lectures. They used to attend in numbers, but have gradually vanished. Half-guinea tickets are issued, admitting to the lectures alone. While the charge is such as to exclude the labouring class, the advantages offered are such as make the sum moderate in comparison.

There may be also noticed the Apprentices' School Association, consisting of classes for instruction in the elements

of education; and similar classes established by Mr. John Hope. Edinburgh has had many young men's societies, but it may be remarked, that in consequence perhaps of the various educational advantages that exist, and of the fact that a society or two, feebly supported, is little heard or thought of, differently from the case in smaller towns, where their lecturing machinery affords instruction to the general inhabitants, this city is behind the most of other towns in regard to the power and influence of such associations. The most prominent was the Edinburgh Young Men's Society, founded about twenty years ago. It consisted of a number of young men's mutual improvement meetings, held chiefly in church vestries, and managed by a central committee, to which each branch sent delegates. In consequence of some dispute, there was (after it had been for years in existence) a secession from it, which led to the formation of the Scottish Young Men's Association, as it was called. Both societies had similar principles. The members were required to adhere to a declaration, embracing the evangelical doctrines of Christianity. Religious controversy was forbidden; and the meetings were opened and closed with prayer. The one organization competed for awhile with the other, and the result was, they were both kept in a flourishing condition. At last the other merged in the Scottish Young Men's Society, which went on for several years, but it sank about six years ago. They used to have lectures and sermons; these succeeded very well. There was novelty in lecturing, and the Philosophical Institution did not exist. But they continued their lectures when the public no longer cared for them. Financial difficulties ensued, and one branch after another withdrew. One of the last public proceedings of the Scottish Young Men's Society consisted of a large *soirée*, attended by Hugh Miller, Sheriff Gordon, and other distinguished citizens. But notwithstanding the

brilliant orations and great assembly, not a single member was added to the roll. It may be said, in general, that so long as these societies relied on their own energies, without calling in the aid of ministers and public men, they succeeded; afterwards they failed. Deputations were in the habit of visiting the branches, to encourage and maintain a friendly spirit. They pushed the cause, with missionary zeal, into the remotest parts of the town; and if one branch fell, another arose. The branches meeting in the session houses of Bristo Street, Albany Street, Broughton Place, and James's Place churches, which formed the united association when it dissolved, exist still as separate societies. The last of these is at least twenty years old; it has often been at a low ebb. On one occasion it had only two members, but they held on; it is at present in a fair condition, and we can, from our connection with it, speak favourably regarding the general intelligence and kindly spirit of the members. About ten years ago was founded the Edinburgh Young Men's Association. It was formed by Mr. James Gall (now bookseller, Jamaica). The writer of this article was its first president, and for several years held chief office in it. Its basis was secular, and it never had an average of more than between 30 and 40 members. Both the essays and discussions, in the days of its prosperity, were regarded as displaying considerable ability. Various public men delivered addresses before the society. Almost single-handed, with the mere shadow of an organization, and the members affording little assistance, the writer carried on for years courses of lectures to young men. He had the honour of introducing a higher style of lecturing than had previously prevailed here in connection with such societies. Many eminent men lectured, as Mr. Gilfillan, Hugh Miller, Mr. Dove, Professors Gregory, Miller, Blackie, Mr. Maurice, &c. These lectures were, as a whole, very

successful. He and his friends were compelled to retire from the management. It first met in the Calton Convening Rooms, where there is at present a debating society; and came back to die in Infirmary Street Hall, where it once had been famous. There was a Youths' Total Abstinence Society, about twenty years ago, which did a good deal for the cause, but it merged into the alder society; also a Nelsonian Society, founded by the pupils of the Rev. Mr. Nelson, of St. Stephen's School, which existed till within a year or two ago; a St. Stephen's Parish Society, and a Sabbath Observance Young Men's Society, which got up two lectures, and then disappeared from public notice.

Referring to societies which abound at present, independent of those already mentioned, they are chiefly Congregational: one connected with Dr. Guthrie's church; another, a very flourishing one, with Mr. Pulaford's church; a third, with South College Street church, at present giving a course of lectures; a fourth, with Rose Street church, newly started; and another with Newington Free Church. The members of the last-named society are making themselves active in trying, by moral means, to put down Sunday trading. There may also be a few more similar societies. There is a Sabbath Morning Fellowship Union, consisting of a few meetings of young men in vestries, on the sabbath morning, for religious improvement. There is also a Sabbath School Teachers' Union. The Tusculan Society meets once a week, at No. 2, York Place, for the consideration of law and literature: and there is a Total Abstinence Mutual Improvement Society, in Buchanan's Temperance Hotel. We have the Young Men's Christian Institute, which has lived for some years; its quarters are in Adam Square, beside the School of Arts. By public subscriptions and other means it has acquired its present premises, but it is yet much in debt. It has been more than once organized, in conse-

quence of the dissatisfaction of the members with the management. Its members are not numerous; they join chiefly for the reading room, and it is not able to keep up even a senior debating society. An attempt is made to hold monthly meetings, where tea is provided, and to which a fifth-rate speaker is invited to lecture to a very slender audience, instead of trying to develop the talent and energy of their own members. You may perhaps meet there one whom you may not have known as a member, and may not see him for a year again, if even then! The institute is founded on the false notion of doing some good to others, while those who try to do so decline to participate in it themselves. They regard it as suited for others, and would therefore merely patronise it. But a society that lives only upon patronage, without a hearty interest on the part of its members, is sure to fail. In healthy young men's associations, those who manage them are the frequenters of the weekly meetings, taking part in correcting essays, and the other necessary procedure. But in the institute it is not so. The managers of religious organizations should be anxious, by honourable and generous conduct, to avoid unfavourable comparison with societies purely secular. In fine, we would remark, there is ample room in this city for a Young Men's Christian Society. There is also felt the want of organizations where young men could cultivate their minds, and get suitable recreation for their wearied powers, free from vicious associations. They are driven to such amusements as the theatre, by the cravings of their nature not otherwise supplied. Such meetings as have been opened in London for entertaining youth would be the carrying out of a truly Christian object. Their good effects would not be confined to the innocent enjoyment of the passing hour.

T. U.

Edinburgh.

LIVERPOOL.—*Tenth Literary Association.*—The first annual soirée of

the society was recently held in Hope Hall, which was crowded in every part, and tastefully decorated with evergreens, banners, and mottoes. The president, Mr. F. A. Latham, in the course of his opening remarks, defended the objects and pursuits of such associations from the attacks which were made upon them, and replied to some of the objections brought forward by their opponents. He traced the progress of the association from its commencement to the close of its second session, and warmly congratulated the members on the great success which had attended their efforts. He stated the objects of this and kindred societies were to draw young men from low and hurtful indulgences to the cultivation of their nobler faculties, and called upon all to assist them in their efforts to roll back the tide of ignorance and vice, and to aid in developing, to their utmost limits, the beautiful and matchless proportions of that grand and sublime structure, the temple of knowledge. Mr. George Lightbound read an excellent paper on "William Cowper," in which he reviewed his poems, and gave numerous quotations from them. Mr. Henry Ellis read a humorous paper on "Love," giving examples of all kinds of love possible. Mr. H. M. Latham, jun., read a paper on "Eloquence;" and Mr. C. W. Luce read one on "Single Blessedness," which he stated was almost an inevitable necessity in the present state of the middle class of society: he treated the subject humorously; and his hard hits against the affectations of dress, &c., were highly relished. Mr. Edward George ably personated the "Quack Doctor," dispensing life pills to the delighted audience. Mr. D. H. Grindley delivered an address on the "Christmas Season" of the past, with all its traditional glories, and of the present, with its happy realities; the Old Year and the New—the great things of note in the Past, and the great hopes for the Future. An amusing dialogue, in which Messrs. Thwaites, Winsor, Robin-

son, and others took part—exemplifying the proverb, "It never rains but it pours"—excited roars of laughter. Votes of thanks having been passed to the ladies and to the chairman, the happy reunion terminated by singing the National Anthem.

Unlike many societies, the Toxteth has no set tea at the commencement of the *soirée*, but in the middle of the evening an adjournment to another room, in which refreshments of the most *recherché* description are bountifully supplied; tea and coffee are also provided: thus a promenade is granted, and a delightful change, in the shape of a *conversationsone*, of about three-quarters of an hour's duration, provided.

The annual meeting of the association was held in their rooms, Hill Street, corner of Park Road, on Friday evening, January 6th, Mr. F. A. Latham in the chair. After the treasurer (Mr. H. M. Latham, jun.) had read his account, showing a good balance in hand, the secretary, Mr. B. H. Grindley, read an encouraging report of their transactions during the past year. Their numerical strength was satisfactory; their finances good; and of the literary talent displayed they had no reason to be ashamed. The average attendance at the meetings (held every alternate Friday) had been 22; nominations of new members had yet to be determined; and everything promised a prosperous future. Votes of thanks were passed to the president and to the hon. secretary, when the following gentlemen were elected the officers for this year:—President, Mr. George Lightbound; vice-president, Mr. F. A. Latham; treasurer, Mr. Edward George; hon. secretary, Mr. B. H. Grindley; council, Messrs. H. M. Latham, jun., F. Eggington, R. I. Thwaites, and E. W. Ashort.

Birmingham Young Men's Mental Improvement and Mutual Aid Society.—The fifth annual social meeting of this society was recently held in their rooms, Clarendon Chambers, Upper Temple Street, when upwards of 130 members and friends sat down to tea,

after which the chair was taken by Mr. E. Watson, president of the society, and addresses were delivered by the Revs. R. W. Dale, H. Boyden, Mr. J. A. Cooper, and Mr. Loveridge. After a few words from the chairman, Mr. John Edmonds, the secretary, read the report for the past year, which showed that, since the foundation of the society, 178 lectures have been delivered upon various interesting and useful subjects; that there were now ten classes in operation in connection with the society, numbering among them Sunday morning reading, writing, and Scripture study class, drawing and perspective, grammar, logic, elocution, and phonetic shorthand classes; and that during the year an exhibition of paintings and drawings had been held, and prizes awarded to the successful members of the respective drawing classes. The report, which was a highly encouraging one, was, on the motion of Mr. J. R. Bennett, seconded by Mr. S. Greaves, received and adopted. Mr. Cooper, and the Revs. R. W. Dale, and H. Boyden, delivered interesting and able addresses. The proceedings of the evening were enlivened with several glees, sung by a choir under the superintendence of Mr. W. Langston.

Faversham Mutual Improvement Society.—The annual *soirée* of this society was held on the evening of February 28th, at the Assembly Rooms. There was a large gathering; upwards of 300 ladies and gentlemen assembled. Among the articles exhibited in the room were a collection of photographs and chromo-lithographs lent by the Society of Arts; prints and stereoscopes, by Mr. J. Higham; Indian curiosities, by Mr. Packer; Chinese and other curiosities, by Thomas Spang, Esq.; stuffed birds, by Mrs. Murton, Mr. Wise, Mr. Guttridge, and Mr. Dobbie; carved wood-work, by Mr. Rayner; photographs, by Mr. Cooke; a number of antiquities, by Mr. Bartram; maps, prints, and stereoscopes, by Mr. F. W. Monk; a marine aquarium, by

Mr. Kirby, &c. A supply of refreshments was provided, and was dispensed by the ladies. A number of operatic and other selections were admirably performed by Messrs. G. Harris, John Tong, W. Tong, W. Dobbie, and R. Mills, members of the choral society; while vocal solos by Miss Hobday, of Canterbury, and Miss Tindall's brilliant performance on the pianoforte, materially contributed to the general harmony of the evening.

The president, F. W. Monk, Esq., occupied the chair. On rising to open the evening's proceedings, he expressed a hope that the programme which had been arranged would meet with their general approval. The committee had provided for the eye and ear, as well as the understanding, and had kept in view the furtherance of those great objects which it was the society's mission to accomplish.

The mayor (S. G. Johnson, Esq.) addressed the meeting at considerable length, on "The Life of George Stephenson."

An interval of an hour was given for promenade and refreshments, during which a duet was given by Miss and Master Hobday, on the pianoforte and harp, and a duet by Mr. and Miss Tindall, on the violin and pianoforte.

Mr. Monk rose to present a statement of the society's affairs, and in doing so, expressed himself as in every way satisfied with its position at that time. It had but a humble origin, and probably few among its originators ever expected that it would attain such a position as it had done; opposition had not been wanting, but still the society had rapidly advanced, and had now become a large and strong institution. Its income had risen, from £14 in the first year, to upwards of £100, and he trusted to see it still further increased; its members numbered 450, and though this was very satisfactory, yet he wished to see that number raised to 600, when it was the committee's intention to commence a reading-room in connection with the society, and thereby supply a

want much felt in the town. The library was increasing, and now contained nearly 700 volumes, the issue of which was at the rate of 100 per week; and besides all this, they had classes and lectures, which had been well attended. Thus the society was working out its objects, and, he hoped, writing its history on a tablet more enduring than sculptured marble—in the people's hearts.

Professor T. Rymer Jones, F.R.S., of King's College, London, next delivered a brief address on "The Wonders of the Microscope."

The Rev. W. B. Davies addressed the meeting, and congratulated the members on the success which had attended their efforts, and especially on their present meeting.

Mr. Tong proposed a vote of thanks to the president.

Mr. Monk, in responding, moved a vote of thanks to the ladies, which was carried with acclamation, and a similar compliment to the singers and musical performers was proposed by the mayor, and passed with loud applause.

Crieff Debating Club Soirée.—The annual soirée in connection with this society was recently held in the Masons' Lodge, Mr. Anderson occupied the chair. The large hall was perfectly crowded by an intelligent audience. In the course of the evening a debate on "Is Emigration beneficial to the Emigrant and the Mother Country?" was entered into at considerable length, for the purpose, we imagine, of showing the public the manner in which debating societies are carried on. Messrs. Scrimgeour and Gun spoke on the affirmative side of the question; and Messrs. Fisher and Anderson on the negative. The musical part of the entertainment was good, the chief attraction of the evening being Miss Flora M'Donald. The chairman, in opening the meeting, briefly explained the object of the society; after which Mr. J. C. Fisher ably addressed the meeting on "Ought Britain to Arm?" And Mr. S. Thompson addressed the meeting on "Rome was not built in a day."

Biggleswade Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—This institution, which commenced in November, 1859, brought its first working session to a close on March 29th, 1860. A tea was provided in the Boys' British schoolroom, of which about 50 members and friends partook. After the tea, Mr. W. H. Priest (who occupied the chair) called upon the secretary to read an account of the rise and progress of the society. From this we gathered that the numbers had increased, in five months, from 23 to 64; and that 21 papers had been read and discussed during the same period. Appropriate speeches were then made by various members; votes of thanks were passed to the ladies, the officers, and the chairman; and the company then adjourned to the Town Hall to finish the evening.

The committee had engaged Mr. and Mrs. G. A. Cooper, to give their entertainment, "The Excursion Train," as a pleasing termination to the session.

The hall was well filled, about 200 persons being present; and the success of this entertainment (the first ventured on by the society) far exceeded the most sanguine expectations of the committee and their friends.

The young men of Biggleswade have good reason to be encouraged by the success of their institution, especially when they remember that they have overcome popular prejudice, and formed a literary society in a town which has for so long a time been opposed to such associations; that they have done it, too, themselves, without any patrician patronage and assistance; and that, after defraying all expenses, a goodly balance remains with which to commence their next session.

I should mention, that at the commencement of the session the *British Controversialist* was recommended to the members, when about twenty of them immediately became regular subscribers.—W. B.

LITERARY NOTES.

The late Robert Stephenson is to find a biographer in Mr. Healey, formerly editor of the *Morning Star*.

EMERIC TZABAD is author of "The State Policy of Modern Europe."

Mr. FAIRHOLT is preparing to publish, with notes, the curious collection of ballads left by Pepys, the diarist, and still preserved at Cambridge.

MACAULAY'S "Miscellanies" were first issued in Boston, U. S., in 1840.

Mr. HOTTEN, of Piccadilly, is preparing to publish a volume of "Remains of the late Douglas Jerrold," consisting of tales written in early life.

Professor ARNOLD RUGG has translated Buckle's "Civilization in England," into German.

BACON'S works are to be reissued at Cambridge, United States.

Mr. Howard STANTON'S "Shakespeare" is to include a reconsidered Life of England's Dramatist.

Wingfield's narration of the early settlement of Virginia, United States, is to be issued by the Massachusetts Historical Society.

An edition of "The Pilgrim's Progress," illustrated by Mr. Richard Doyle, the famous ex-caricaturist of Punch, will shortly be published. The great Puritan book, illustrated by the celebrated Roman Catholic artist, will be a curiosity.

M. Julius Froese has translated "Adam Bede" into German.

The celebrated German critic and historian, WOLFGANG MENZEL, is about to issue "The World-History—1740 to 1860."

M. Louis Blanc has been lecturing in English upon the Secrets of French History.

The Messrs. Longman announce for publication this month the "Miscellaneous Writings of Lord Macaulay."

A memoir — somewhat autobiographical — of Sir Charles Bell, the eminent physiologist, may be looked for, we hear, in the autumn publishing season.

SIR EDWARD S. CREASY, author of "The Decisive Battles of the World," and formerly Professor of History in the University of London, has been appointed Chief Justice of Ceylon, and been knighted.

Abbé HUC, whose "Travels in Thibet and through China" have had such popularity, is dead.

MR. FOLLY has been commissioned to execute a statue of *Goldsmit*, for Trinity College, Dublin.

It is proposed to erect, at Limerick, a memorial statue of Gerald Griffin, author of *The Collegians*, &c.

A magnificent block of houses in New York, named the *IRVING* Buildings, are to be appropriately occupied by publishers, booksellers, librarians, &c.

MR. THORNTON HUNT, eldest son of Leigh Hunt, is understood to be the conductor of the *Morning Chronicle*, and it is believed to be the semi-official English organ of the court of France.

A biography of Sir Martin Archer Shee, author and artist, written by his son, will be published this month.

Colonel WILLIAM MURRE, of Caldwell, in Ayrshire, author of "The Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece," and one of the most accomplished scholars of our time, died on 1st April, aged 61. His great and valuable work, of which five volumes have been published, is left incomplete by his decease. He was buried in the family vault, in Neilston, Renfrewshire.

ALEXANDER SMITH (author of *The Life Drama*, &c.) is to edit *The Poems of HUGH MACDONALD* — whose sudden death we announced in our last — on behalf of his widow and orphans, for whom upwards of £800 has been already subscribed.

Hon. W. E. Gladstone has succeeded Lord Macaulay as trustee of the

National Portrait Gallery; and Lord Brougham has been chosen President of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, vice the deceased historian.

A medallion of H. Kirke White, by Chantrey, has been presented by Dr. Booth to the National Portrait Gallery.

Owen's paper on *Palæontology* has been reprinted, with additions, from the "Encyclopædia Britannica;" and Mansell's "Metaphysics; or, the Philosophy of Consciousness," from the same valuable repository of knowledge, is announced for separate publication.

The "quarry" at Eden Lodge has, through Peter Cunningham, been made available, in sense interesting selections, to the columns of the *Athenæum*.

MR. MOY THOMAS is editing the works of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu; and, it is said, will materially relieve her character from some of the dark shadows which surrounded it.

The Eden Lodge papers are to be published by Bentley.

The Woman in White, by WILKIE COLLINS, is to be republished from *All the Year Round*.

LORD BROUGHAM'S *Physical and Mathematical Tracts* have, in a few weeks, reached a second edition.

The fourth volume of Bunsen's "Egypt's Place in Universal History" is ready, and the fifth and concluding one is in progress.

It is proposed to erect a monument in Kirkcudbright for the Rev. William Mackenzie, of Stirling, author of "The History of Galloway."

CARLYLE'S two concluding volumes of "Frederick" are *in the press*.

Didier and Co., of Paris, are to publish a new French translation of Shakespeare, with notes and introductions by M. GUMZOT.

BUNTAN is to have a monument in London.

GROTE, the historian, Francis W. Newman, the Latin professor, and Dr. Foster, the barrister, have been named as likely candidates for the honour of representing the London University in the re-reformed parliament.

Mr. HERBERT SPENCER is about to publish in quarterly parts a series of works which are together to constitute "a system of philosophy."

Literary speculation seemed to be touched into new life by the repeal of the paper duty—with what results we shall see.

Memorials are to be erected for Admiral Robert Blake in Somersetshire, and Isambard Brunel in London.

The library of the East India Office—rich in Oriental literature and the materials of history—is to be transferred from Leadenhall Street to the offices of the Board of Control.

JELINGER C. SYMONS—a writer of some note on Education and Statistics—died at Malvern on the 7th ult.

A new translation of the Bible into the Russian vernacular is now publishing at Moscow.

The foundation stone of a monument to MELANOTON was laid in Wittemberg on the 300th anniversary of his death—19th April, 1560.

Dr. Wm. Binder has been appointed editor of a new Napoleonic paper published in Strasburg in German.

THOMAS ADOLPHUS TROLLOPE—the "TH. T." of the Florentine correspondence in the *Athenæum*—has issued a biography of Philippo Strozzi, a patriot of Florence.

An "édition personnelle, définitive, unique," of the complete works of LAMARTINE, is to be issued in Paris in forty volumes—price, to subscribers in advance, 300 francs. Each of the original subscribers will receive a portrait of the author and an autograph signature.

The chronicle of the kings of the Isle of Man has been edited by PROF. MUNCH, with many explanatory documents, and written in English, which has now become a compulsory branch of education in public schools. The same learned professor is engaged on a new "History of Norway."

J. O. HALLIWELL, the eminent and trustworthy Shakesperian critic and editor, has recently discovered several

Dutch black-letter dramas, nearly akin in matter to the plays of the renowned bard, and bearing dates shortly subsequent to his death. He suggests this as an unworked field of much promise for men of leisure, competence, and talent.

A "Clopton House Shakespeare," of date 1632, is now on the tapis for consideration and inquiry.

A monument to the patriot-poet Arndt is to be erected at Bonn.

The monument executed by the Count of Syracuse in memory of VICO, the inaugurator of Philosophic History, is to be "set up" in Naples in June. Its base is to be graven about with the names of Neapolitan *illustrissimi* in science and literature.

Though retiring from the publishing business, Mr. John Chapman, formerly of King William Street, Strand, will, we understand, continue to edit the *Westminster Review*.

Mr. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, the well-known novelist, is one of the members of the commission recently appointed to inquire into the grievances of the circulation department at St. Martin's-le-Grand. Mr. Trollope is a surveyor of the General Post Office.

We have expressed elsewhere a wish for a collective edition of the prose works of Leigh Hunt. The Messrs. Routledge are publishing a one-volume edition of his poetical works as finally collected and revised by himself. The editor of the volume is his son, the well-known journalist, Mr. Thornton Hunt, editor of the *Spectator*, and now, also, it would seem, of the *Morning Chronicle* likewise.

The Messrs. Blackwood (say a newspaper paragraph, which must be received with caution) give "George Eliot" (Miss Evans) for her new work, "The Mill on the Floss," £2,000 down; £1,000 for the second edition; and £1,000 when the work reaches the fourth, with an extra bonus on its reproduction in a popular form. The "trade" have already ordered 5,000 copies.

THE LOGIC OF NOVEL-WRITING.

"ARISTOTLE has divided the whole field of knowledge into three grand provinces; and the line of distinction which he has drawn as the general confine between that of the rational *theoretic* mind and those both of the *practic* and poetic, is this—that the first is productive of *necessary* and the other two of *contingent* Truth. Thus Truth is the staple produce, and Reason the common instrument of all. But he descends to a more particular and philosophical distinction of the three provinces, according to the different nature and direction which Truth assumes in each. In the *theoretic* province he represents it as originating with its subject, as standing independent, and terminating in itself. In the *practic* it originates in the mind of the agent, joins itself to correct desire, with which it mixes and co-operates, and keeps in prospect a moral end beyond itself. In the poetic, it originates more in the inventive mind of the artist, and through the instrumentality of different means, intends and accomplishes a still further end, which is properly termed *effect*."*

In the Methodology of Bacon a similar division of knowledge is made. The three chief faculties of the human mind are Memory, Imagination, and Reason. The results of the operations of these powers are respectively named History, Poesy, and Philosophy. Poesy in this classification includes all the efforts of the creative Imagination. History informs, Science empowers, and Poetry delights. History deals with the *actual*, Philosophy with the *possible*, and Poesy with the *probable*. Experience lies at the root of each, and nourishes all three.

"Poetry is the *making* of thought," and "a Poem unfettered by metre and rhythm takes the name of Romance." A novel is—or, at least, ought to be—a just and lively narrative of some imaginary event, or series of events, representing the changes of state, fortune, feeling, circumstances, passions, and humours of man, so related as to induce in the reader a sympathetic interest in the evolution of the plot, the forthgrowth of the incidents, the dispositions of the characters, the progressive convergence of act and circumstance towards some result, and the ultimate upshot of the whole of the co-operant elements, forces, energies, passions, occurrences, and accidents in some completed and terminal *dénouement* satisfactory to the judicial faculties excited. Yet this narrative should be so written as to show, lying along or intertwined with the very course and progress of events, some constantly self-suggesting thought, or chain of thoughts, referring or referrible to the ordinary ongoings

* Tatham's "Scale and Chart of Truth," vol. ii. pp. 220—222.

of life, and thus through the ideal influencing the real. This undercurrent of thought, however, must neither be exhibited consciously, intrusively, or tutorially; it must be the transparent suggestion of the very incidents incorporated and detailed in the course of the story, and become "palpable to feeling," through the strictly representative harmony of the events related with the laws which regulate real history, and the accurate resemblancy given to their several details. So far as the aim and execution of the writer of fiction coincides with the Logic of Existence, his work will bear in its very inner vitality the lesson he desires to teach, and the capacity of exciting the special interest he desires to arouse or intensify. Not as an affixlike frontlet to the eyes, as phylacteries upon a garment's hem, or an amulet worn on the bosom, but as really and truly rising out of it, like the fine essence of a choice flower, will the lesson of a novel constructed with true art show itself. In History and in Nature wisdom is implicitly contained; it is not by express teaching, but by an intuitive or self-suggested interpretation, that their secret and innermost lesson is acquired; and didactic novels, whose purpose is ostentatiously paraded, must be defective because they do not in their form of teaching conform to and imitate, in this point, these divine models.

Imagination is the essential faculty in every artistic pursuit or labour.

Art is the manifested energy of the human imagination.

In its widest signification imagination is a word used to denote that mental faculty which receives, retains, recalls, combines, modifies, and produces or reproduces ideas, and which, according to fixed laws, recomposes the objects of thought by a species of creative energy into new forms, capable of originating other conceptions, feelings, thoughts, and interests. To imagine, in this lofty, sublime, yet true sense, is to interpenetrate the forms of sensible nature with the life of thought, to realize the ideal, to bring the infinite and the invisible within the scope of temporal vision, and to animate intelligible truths with a transcendent vigour and vitality. "The human imagination," says Dr. Reid, "is an *ample theatre* upon which everything, good or bad, great or mean, laudable or base, is acted." Washington Irving declares that "it is the divine attribute of the imagination that it is irrepressible, unconfined; that when the real world is shut out, it can create a world for itself, and, with a necromantic power, can conjure up glorious shapes and forms, and brilliant visions, to make solitude populous, and irradiate the gloom of dungeons." Dugald Stewart says, "All the objects of knowledge supply materials for her forming hand; diversifying infinitely the works she produces, while the mode of her operation remains essentially uniform."

The illimitable activity, the spiritual potentiality of imagination, is its most wondrous characteristic. Through the manifold variations of the similar and the dissimilar she moves with perfect ease and confidence, and chooses and combines, according to a voluntary and self-originated design, all that is fitting and appropriate for the

effectuation of the task which reason, inclination, or taste imposes on her, or for the outworking of her own gratification—the very luxury of her activity.

The imaginative organization of new actualities, the vital reproduction and realization of ideas which have been only, as yet, pre-figured in the soul, is called Invention.

Invention is a productive energy of thought. In its widest sense it denotes the construction, eduction, or production of something which had, in the same form, for the same end, and of the same materials, no previous existence. In the signification now desired to be attached to it, it is intended to mean “that prolific faculty of the mind which gives a kind of second creation to all the works of nature, which generalizes and enlarges their comprehension, heightens their beauty, and improves their charms.” In a word, the excoGITative energy of the mind, directed by the imagination towards the *forth*-figuring of some already *pre*-figured conception—the bodifying forth and actualizing of some original idea; “for everything that is great and worthy [low or contemptible] in human conduct must have been conceived in the imagination before it was brought into act,” or representative being.

Invention requires, for its proper activization, purpose, power, and opportunity.

Purpose is the result of an operative—i. e., a sufficient—inducement.

Power is the result of the combined, constrained, and submissive co-exercised energy of all the faculties requisite for the performance or effectuation of any given work.

Opportunity is the result of the possession of ample time, ready material, speedy execution, open field, scope for effort, due encouragement, fair competition, and honest appreciation.

Purpose implies an object or aim. Intention precedes invention.

Aims may vary in different individuals and at different times; and as they superintend Invention, the nature and qualities of the produce of that energy will also differ in individuals and with times.

We have here, however, only to deal with literary aims, efforts, and intents; and even of these we can now concern ourselves with those only which originate in or call for the exercise of the creative imagination. Nor have we to expatiate upon the whole wide field of those literary efforts in which the creative imagination is employed, or bears sway; our attention must be confined to a minuter department of inventive exertion. Epic, descriptive, didactic, and dramatic poetry, must be placed aside. Fables, parables, and allegories, must be passed unnoticed. Arcadias, Utopias, Clovernooks, and Dialogues innumerable, must be withdrawn from our present investigation, and we must, perforce, confine our present prelection to that special class of fictitious narratives which has received the accidental, yet now sufficiently differentiating, title of—Novels.

The Novel is the modern form of the olden Epic. It is in itself an

epitomized literature; a history pulsing with the life-blood of humanity; a drama of vivid movement, change, variety, and character; an epic of refined and intense grandeur; a fable with a pure and purifying moral; a philosophy which lightens and adorns life with the grandeur of wisdom and the splendour of beauty; and a theology which demonstrates emphatically that, wheresoever and howsoever we walk,

"There's a Divinity doth shape our ends."

A novel should be *eventful*; it ought to represent a single circle of action and existence,—possessed of a unity of interest and a unity of plot,—which, though it must have a centre and a circumference of its own, need not be so entirely and distinctly disconnected from other circles as to prevent intersection, or even circumscription. It ought indeed to be a rounded off and completed view of some course of life, in which, while there is a strict and perfect probability maintained, and a visible inter-dependence of character, circumstance, and end, observable, there need not be wanting the more complete intersections of those causative influences which are intertextured with nature, history, and time, whatever be the surroundings or environments of man's life or fate. An organic oneness and growth ought to be perceptible in the characters and the incidents; and, therefore, such events should be chosen as usually may or do happen among men living and acting in the chosen sphere, conformable to the age, the scope of the activities, and the qualities, in kind and degree, of the persons who are to be represented.

If it fulfil the primary condition of eventfulness it will be a *story*; a coil of the phenomena of life; a concrete whole, pervaded with vitality, and full of the fresh and glowing energy of progressive and consistent development; a unitive complexity of being and action, mutually modifying and modified in a natural and probable manner. It ought to give us a sense of livingness, and show the impulses and successions, the whirling and roaring, the changing and shifting, the actuation and restraint of feeling, emotion, passion, and thought; of wants, desires, hopes, beliefs, and duties. This is the groundwork the Imagination has to do that it may engage our sympathies and excite our interest.

"True genius is the ray that flings
A novel light o'er common things."

A *story* is a representative or a descriptive sketch of some specific imaginative manifestation of human life and its realities, in which the diverse phenomena of being and action, circumstance, causation, and character, are harmonized into a unique and concrete whole by the pervasive and constructive power of living thought and definite intention. It may employ itself in recording a simple set of co-existent and co-operant phenomena, tending towards and at last resulting in some ultimate issue; or it may deploy before the reader's

eye a crowded and intermixed group of co-existent and successive phenomena, weaving and interweaving their complex energies from the centre to the outermost edge of the web of fiction; but it must be a shadowing forth or presentation of life in operation under laws.

A story requires a plot, a time, scenery, characters; and a consistent associativeness in and all of these.

The *plot* must be interesting, perspicuous, probable, consistent, and skilfully harmonized with the general laws of causation which operate in the ordinary course and process of events; yet it must be possessed of unity, continuity, simplicity, and progressiveness, and have the writer's predetermined aim as the axle and central point of the whole, and that whence and in accordance with which all tends to its proper and peculiar issue.

The supreme canon relating to the construction of a plot is that it be *probable*, i.e., it must be in conformity with observation, knowledge, experience, or trustworthy testimony. Mere likelihood will, however, not satisfy or gratify the mind, and it is advisable to adopt such series and concatenations of events as may be fairly regarded as morally certain. True, "the improbabilities of experience are many, and the impossibilities few," but the liveliest power of the magic spell which enchants man in the novel is rarely felt when the thoughts are far strained beyond their ordinary bent, or much twisted out of their common course. Mysteries, hair-breadth chances, lucky occurrences, marvels, myths, magics, and monstrous mechanisms, are drawbacks to enjoyment, because hindrances to our faith. Within the circle of real life there is scope and sweep sufficient for the imagination. The reach of the probable is wide, but it does not enable the thinker to fathom the possible. Did it do so, it would no longer be true that

"Truth is strange, stranger than fiction."

In all points,—and we utter our thoughts not in the spirit of paradox,—a work of fiction ought to aim at realizing in the fullest manner the idea of truthfulness; and hence it must be probable,—be within the limits of a becoming likelihood. Fiction is not falsehood—it is Life imagined and written, conceived in, and tested by, thought.

That the plot may be *interesting* there is, in general, required both a complication and an unravelment; something that both excites and justifies curiosity; that evokes sympathy and elicits thought. The events related must have a continuity and movement, a coherent and plausible *vraisemblance* and wholeness; the several states and stages of circumstance, however they knot and twist themselves, must be carefully and causatively connected; all the tendencies and workings of the various actors must naturally and simply conduce to the production of the catastrophe or terminal *éclaircissement*; and great tact, dexterity, and sagacity is requisite to cause the full excitement to converge towards, and culminate at and in, the *allision*—the goal, or point of discovery. For this purpose,

that succession of incidents, if it is to be seized and immortalized by art, is to be preferred which excites surprise in and at the moment of allision—the crisis,—the climax of the plot. This object is best gained by the choice of a commencing point from which, by logical resultance, and strict adherence to the laws of the organic growth of events (epigenesis), *two* exodes or modes of solving the difficulty become possible.

“Animum nunc huc celerem nunc dividit illuc.”*

A vivid and pleasing surprise occasions intense delight, and this delight is enhanced when it is quite evident that it has not been snatched by trickery, but gained by the genuine evolution of life and character, or by honest inventiveness.

The conditions of interest are verisimilitude, causative coherency, dexterous evolution, unity of design held to through a multiplicity of effects, and the unexpectedness of the adopted exode, always provided that in accepting any *dénouement* it be evident that it is a natural result from the growth of events, and that it is not a mere laying hold of a fortunate accident for the extrication, at once of the author and his plastic creations, from personal difficulty. The moral feelings, the sympathies, and the reason must each be satisfied by the upshot and at the close. To particularize and enumerate,—there must be in a good plot, a *root* of thought, a centre-aim, a comprehensible extent and form, an outline, a commencement, middle, end, a successive picturing, an interest, a living reality and realization, an issue, and a growing organic progress; and all must be *so* combined as to work upon and into the sympathies of the soul. Hence the Horatian maxim, “*In medias res rapit.*”

The *time* of a story ought to be such as would give scope for the existence of the actors, sweep to their various peculiarities and characteristics, and possibility to the incidents composing the plot. This places a limit and restraint upon invention, and necessitates the study of the epoch—its chief characters and characteristics; its circumstances, conditions, states, and history; its manners, customs, and costumes; its style of speech, thought, action, and activity. Within the circuit of the possibilities of the time or age, the incidents of the story must be confined, if it be desired to preserve that unity of feeling on which the impression of life and reality so peculiarly depends. Not only must the conception and individualization of the characters be circumscribed by this sensibility to the age, or the spirit of the age, under which the reader's thought is brought, but all the details,—minute, yet not over minute,—require to be harmonized and brought into agreement with the known facts of history regarding the period.

Scenery is also a limit to invention. Space is a fact as stubborn as time, and as unyielding; the imagination cannot altogether vanquish it. The dauntless variety of thought must submit to the

* “This way and that, dividing the swift mind.”

imprisonment of geography; and even geology and climatology will occasionally interfere with the freedom of the human mind. Scenic truthfulness must be maintained, not only in descriptive sketches, whether of the scenes and operations of Nature, or of the works of art that adorn them, but also in the finer shades of association and of figurative speech over which outward nature wields such powers. Acts themselves, still oftener intentions, may often be overruled by geographic or topographic possibilities.

It is of paramount importance, therefore, that the scene of a novel should be well *laid*, both in the plot and in the author's mind; not only that a true and accurate presentment may be made, but also that a proper consistency be preserved and observed between the events, conversations, &c., related and the scenes in which they are reported to have taken place, as well as between the characters fixed on, and the possibilities of their development as stated in the given region or place.

Character is the source of power and action, of resignation and patience, and of operating or being operated upon. It is that unity and community of energies which, though each capable of individual excitation and activity, usually exist in such balance and equipoise, or at all events in such collective and correlative conditions and coincidence, as give a certain determinate individuality to a person, and make him capable both of impressing, and being impressed by, others.

Individuality is therefore the result of character.

Individuality is that compound of extrinsic and intrinsic qualities by which one person is marked off and known as different from all other persons; which so reveals, connotes, and denotes, any person that no one can be confounded with or mistaken for him, or he with or for them. That which gives a real, visible, yet indivisible, being and entity or conscious personality and differentiated oneness and separateness to any character.

Individuality of characterization is essential in a novel to prevent confusion, to make recognition possible, and to make the presentation complete and perfect. Hence, coincidence and comminglement of characteristics in persons holding part in a story must be avoided; and distinct and readily marked traits, touches, minute differences in look, voice, gesture, tastes, habits, sentiments, thought, expression, action, and associative sympathies, ought to be furnished to the reader, that no risk of misconception may be run.

Character is that series of elements which determine the functional activities of each individual in any given set of circumstances; that under the excitement of any motive or motives, and in any conjuncture of affairs, enables one to form a sort of inferential calculation regarding the results to which each individual will give adherence or movement.

Passions are the great disintegrants of character, and careful nicety is specially required in any narrative wherein the interactions of causes and results depend upon the operations of the

passions, or call them into exercise. The philosophy of passion requires close, minute, and patient study, in order that, in the exhibition of their activities in a story, the formative impulses may be adequate to the production of the precise amount of excitement shown; that the display of the operations of passion may accord with the character in whom they are induced; and that the effects stated to be produced on the after stages of the story may be such as experience warrants us to believe *might* be the results of the described and exhibited emotion.

Besides these extraordinary manifestations of character, there is the constant effervescence of mind, heart, and action, which each person undergoes, and shows in the common occurrences of the society in which he moves, in the ordinary circumstances which surround and affect him, and in the usual events which occur in his neighbourhood, or among those in whom he interests himself.

Of characters or persons the novelist may select as many and of such kinds as he chooses, and he may work them up into any combination which the law of permutations makes possible; but he must hold the reins of his imagination so far under check as to make each character, in each circumstance, act in conformity with the predetermined nature with which, at the outstart, he has been endowed; or he must exhibit and explain the manner in which a change has been caused in his disposition, manners, habits, tendencies, or sympathies. The influences of character ought to be seen spreading through the whole scheme of action; the causes which check aspiration and lead to unaccomplished hopes, which excite slumbering passions or still and calm surges of aroused emotion, which work from the outward surroundings of a man inward upon his nature, or which throw out their living influences from the very inmost juices and sap of the mind, must be exhibited in truthful accordance with the organic modes and functions of each given mind. The self-sufficing life which interpenetrates everything with its own pervasive effectuality must be distinguished from that languid spirituality and quietism which admits of the continual interfusion of external influences; and these again, from those whose chymic nature gives and takes, affects and is affected, and are not only capable of being changed, but of becoming also the causes of changes.

Character is the flower of which thought is the root, and wit and wisdom the perfume, and action the fruit. It is the efflux of the over-exciting and germinal power of the soul, and is, in fact, its outer garment. It is in general not only existent, but consistent, persistent, and resistant—it *is*, and *acts* and *reacts*.

But though plot and time, scenery and character, be each in its own isolation capable of being dealt with by the novelist with power and skill, this will not suffice to satisfy the conditions of a true Logic. These elements must all be wrought up into a consistent whole—each element harmonious with each other, and so associated as to strike the mind with a oneness of effect such as shall

educe and sustain interest, and produce a gratified complacency in the reader.

Nor is even this all:—a skilful reproduction or lifelike envisagement of images or forms of scene or thought; an elaborate copy or simulacrum of history, or an embodiment and external projection of a set of arche-typal ideas, will not content the demands of Art. Art is not imitation, it is creation. A picture without the life of thought in it—a poem without some divine essence from the soul of man—a statue without the idealist's conceptive skill and constructive touch—a building destitute of harmoniousness of plan and purpose,—who can imagine such things? The transfused energy, the masterly force of conscious and deliberative thought, gives each of these that vitality and character which makes them partake of the immortality of their executants. The chymic power of mind and heart inworks itself through the materials of outward nature chosen by the artist,—in whatever sphere he labours,—and out of the *actual* begets the *ideal*. Such have, in all ages, been the characteristics of the master-wielders of Genius. They have flashed the spirit of life into the elements of existence, and they have sprung into unity and action. An indestructible speciality has been imparted to them, and they have been redeemed for ever from dulness and death by an indelible charm, fascination, and interest. The supreme and ultimate reach of human thought, however, is displayed in that exquisite creative genius which has been termed *Poetry*.

Fiction, as we have said, is the Epic of modern life. It is also a sort of experimental living—a kind of extension of experience, and a species of hypothetic metempsychosis. It presents and represents men, modes of life, social phenomena, interests, sympathies, circumstances, wrongs, virtues, passions, and activities with which, in their various forms, manifestations, and connections, as related, we may have or have had no acquaintanceship, and so we become wider-thoughted and farther-taught. We may not be sinewed for action, nor

“ Strong in will

To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield;”

and many forms of life may be to us mere speculative enigmas, but if a novel be written with tact and art, discrimination and sympathy, we may make them a discipline for thought—they may teach us to look into the determining causes of character and action; to cast our eye backward, around, and forward upon circumstances; to notice how men and societies are modified and developed, how their interests and sympathies deepen and extend in range, and to see for ourselves the long and far results of action; and thus we may acquire a deeper insight into the moral laws under which we live, and, from those “folded annals” of life and incident, a clear broad light may be cast upon our thoughts regarding being, character, activity, and destiny.

We may resume this theme again, and endeavour to expound *The Rhetoric of Novel-Writing*.

Religion.

IS THE BIBLE ALONE A SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

IN winding up the controversy upon the Rule of Faith, on the affirmative side, our course will be this :—We shall examine *seriatim* the articles of our opponents, and then endeavour to answer the objections raised by them to arguments adduced by us. We must then leave it with the candid reader to determine, by the truthfulness and consistency of statements made, and by the force and soundness of arguments used, where the truth is to be found,—or whether “the Bible alone is a sufficient Rule of Faith,” or whether it is not.

The first champion that enters the lists against us is “Pope Gregory :” let us attend to what he teaches. We quite agree with him that “the root of the differences” which exist between Protestants and Roman Catholics is to be found in the question before us. But “Pope Gregory” must be very ignorant of the written controversies which have been held between the two contending parties, from the time of the Reformation to the present, if he adds that this question receives little attention at the hands of Protestants, as though they were afraid of treading upon such slippery ground.

Three propositions are advanced by “Pope Gregory,” by which he would show the insufficiency of the Protestant Rule of Faith. Let us look at them.

First. The Bible was never intended to be the only Rule of Faith. And why? Because it does not declare itself to be such. Does it then declare its insufficiency, or intimate that something else is to be added to render it more perfect? Show us this, and the proposition is established. This you fail to show. But cannot the opposite of your statement be gathered from the Bible; nay, has it not been gathered, and that largely, both by “Clement” and myself? What would you add to make the Bible more sufficient? Tradition? Why, did not Christ condemn the oral traditions of the elders, declaring that by them they frustrated the commandments of God, and made the word of God of none effect (Mark vii. 9, 13). And where is the deficiency in Holy Scripture which you could supply? It is not in precept, for “the law of the Lord is perfect.” It is not in doctrine, for the Scriptures “are profitable for doctrine,” able to teach all things which make wise unto salvation. The fact is, the Bible needs no supplement, and does declare its own-sufficiency.

Again, "The Bible was never intended to be the only Rule of Faith." And why? Because our Lord did not send His apostles armed with Bibles, but commissioned them to preach the Gospel. But did not the apostles preach that which they had received from Christ; and would not that which was preached be identical with that which was written? Had they two Gospels, differing from each other,—one to be spoken and the other to be written,—or not? If there was but one Gospel, as St. Paul declares, and that is handed down to us by the safest of all methods, viz., by writing,—are we doing wrong in going to this, and this only, for our instruction?

And though the first preachers of righteousness did not carry the Bible in their hands, yet did they not follow the example of their Master, and, when they entered the synagogue, read and expounded the Old Testament; and not only read and expounded the Old, but also supplied the New? Of course the apostles were commissioned to preach, but unless it can be shown that they preached different doctrines to what they wrote, the fact does not afford the least shadow of an argument against the sufficiency of the Bible as a Rule.

It is further urged, that if "nothing but an inspired volume was to enlighten the world on the subject of Christianity, the apostles would have taken the utmost care to commit to writing all the words and all the commands of our Lord;" and having said so much, the writer shows the exceeding folly of such a remark by quoting the hyperbolic language of St. John, who declares the utter impossibility of writing down all that Jesus said and did. So that the argument of "Pope Gregory" amounts to this:—If such and such were the case, then the apostles would have been very careful to do what they could not do,—and what, we may add, there was no need to do.

If the books of the Bible were as obscure and as numerous as the tomes of tradition, then the world would have been rather darkened than enlightened; for how many would have waded through them? But Romanists are no lovers of simplicity, as is further seen in the slight thrown upon the New Testament, which is described as "composed *simply* of four gospels, several letters to churches and individuals, a record of some travels of St. Peter and St. Paul, and a Book of Revelation." This reminds me of a story (as "Augustine" says) of an apprentice boy who summoned his master before the magistrate on account of the food given him to eat. When interrogated concerning the nature of the food, he replied that "he *only* had roast beef and vegetables, and puddings, and such stuff as that."

"*Simply*" four gospels, epistles, travels, and the Book of Revelation! As though these were of no importance; as though they were dumb dogs that could not bark; wells without water; teachers that could not instruct. Have you, "Pope Gregory," exhausted the New Testament Scriptures? If not, then beware how you disparage them. Has not God made of a dew-drop a world of living creatures, and can He not compress into a small compass all that

is needful for us to believe and do? Is not prolixity a sign of weakness and poverty? Does not, then, the diffusiveness of your traditions prove them human, and the comprehensiveness of the Bible stamp it as Divine? Disparagement is also thrown upon the writers of the New Testament, as though God was not at liberty to choose His own instruments, and also decide what number of them would be sufficient for the work. The question is, Were these writers inspired? If they were, then it matters not whether they bore the name of Peter or Paul, of Matthew or Mark, of Luke or John; their authority is the same, and no true Christian would speak slightly of them.

Again, it is argued that "the Bible was never intended to be the sole Rule of Faith," because the apostle Paul did not state, in his epistles, all that he wished to declare to those to whom he wrote, but reserved certain topics to be discussed upon when he should be present with them. And to what did these matters refer? To articles of faith, of course, because our opponents always quote texts that are applicable to the case in hand. Articles of faith! By no means; but to matters of discipline only does the apostle refer. And what have they to do with the Rule of Faith?

But now comes the grand poser of all; something conclusive in the matter, and to which "Pope Gregory" would particularly direct the attention of Protestants, and it is this—"that every single epistle which we possess was addressed to *Christians already fully instructed in the faith*; persons to whom a volume of doctrinal instruction was perfectly unnecessary." Now, in the first place, Where is the proof of this so-called "important fact"? Look at the texts given by "Clement," p. 96, and you will find the fact changed into a fiction. We select one of these, Heb. v. 11—14: "Of whom we have many things to say, and hard to be uttered, seeing ye are dull of hearing. For when for the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one teach you again which be the first principles of the oracles of God; and are become such as have need of milk, and not of strong meat. For every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness; for he is a babe." And were these babes "fully instructed in the faith" before the apostle wrote to them? But supposing the fact were proved, what does our opponent gain by it? Then he simply proves that which he before denied. Thus, he states a few sentences back, that "the apostles never intended their writings to be the guide of any but those to whom they addressed them." Here he declares that those to whom they were addressed were "already fully instructed;" if so, it is evident the instruction could not be for them, but for those that should come after. Mark the contradiction!

The *second* position which "Pope Gregory" holds is, that "the Bible was not at first regarded as the only Rule of Faith." The argument is built upon several assertions. First, that it was the practice of our Lord and His disciples to preach, and not to distribute Bibles; and that this practice confirmed the position assumed.

Christ did truly preach, and He frequently preached from the Old Testament, which He explained and enforced. Christ was unlike all other men: He was the fountain of light, and it would be sufficient for the disciples to preach what they heard from His lips; and nothing did they preach that was essential but what was afterwards written.

Secondly, it is asserted that the early Christians were utterly opposed to writing down anything at all, through fear of their enemies. Whatever may have been the case with the early Christians, it is evident that God was not opposed to writing down, but inspired His servants to write, and what they wrote was committed to the hands of the early Christians, who guarded their treasure with great care. "All their instructions" *were not* "by word of mouth;" for I have shown before that the apostles frequently read to the Jews their own Scriptures, and preached Christ from them; and they also wrote epistles and gospels, which were circulated among different churches for their instruction. "Pope Gregory" concludes with "a fact worth a hundred arguments;" and his fact is, "that the whole of the then known world was converted, during the first four hundred years, entirely without the Bible;" and that no writers, previous to the Reformation, held that the Bible was the sole Rule of Faith.

With regard to the first part of the statement, we reply that "the fact" is opposed to truth. The apostles carried the contents of the Old Testament in their heads and hearts, as is seen in the sermon of Peter on the day of Pentecost, when thousands were converted to the Lord; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where Jewish prophecies and rites are made to enforce Christian truth, and where it is declared that "the word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword." How was the Eunuch converted? Was it not through Philip's exposition of an Old Testament prophecy? And can my opponent say that the writings of the apostles would do nothing in the conversion of souls. Yes; the apostles *wrote* as well as preached; and the people *read* as well as heard. And the written word of God was not sterile, as "Pope Gregory" would make it. And thus his fact is at fault, for the world was *not* converted entirely without the Bible. If it were the contrary, it would leave the question untouched, for it is not whether the Bible *was* the only Rule of Faith in the time of the apostles, but whether the Bible alone is a sufficient Rule of Faith *now*—now that we have not the apostles to instruct—now that the Bible is collected into one. "Pope Gregory" could not have been aware of the opinion of the fathers, or he would never have been bold enough to declare that no writers previous to the Reformation held that the Bible was a sufficient Rule of Faith.

The *third* proposition is, "That the adoption of this rule in the early ages was, humanly speaking, impossible."

If this be granted, it does not prove the insufficiency of the Rule: its adoption, and its sufficiency when adopted, are two distinct

questions. But this position is not granted. The adoption was possible, for the early fathers received and acknowledged it as a sufficient rule. They quoted it largely in their writings. They appealed to it as their rule in their controversies with heretics. That the Bible was translated, has been clearly shown, and the egregious blunder of "Pope Gregory" has been apologized for by one of his *confrères*. The Bible was indeed scarce at the time of the Reformation, but this was through the culpable neglect of the Romish Church, and its scarcity is no argument against its sufficiency. It is further urged, that if Christ had intended religion to be diffused by the Protestant rule, it might have been supposed that He would have suggested the idea of printing, that the Bible might be largely circulated. Precisely so; and this has been done. I regard it as providential that at a time when the Bible was most needed, since the world was at its darkest, at this time the art of printing was discovered: the Bible was printed, and though copies of the printed Bible were burnt by Roman Catholic bishops, as by their priests in modern times, yet thousands and tens of thousands of copies have continued to go forth.

The *fourth* argument is that "Protestants do not adhere to the Bible as their only rule." "What Protestant was ever taught his religion by the Bible?" Every Protestant; for the Bible is found in every home, in all our Sunday and day schools, and children are taught, so soon as they are able to learn, to read the Bible, parts of which they commit to memory and never forget.

That we derive our doctrines from the Romish Church is untrue. We never appeal to her authority for their sanction; the doctrines we hold are to be found on the page of God's word, and have not been derived through a hot-bed process of development, like many of the dogmas of the Romish Church.

The observance of Sunday, the baptism of infants, meats and drinks, anointing with oil,—these things must be classed among rites and ceremonies, and have nothing to do with the *Rule of Faith*.

Thus I have gone through this article link by link, and have omitted nothing intentionally which it contains. Whether the arguments adduced have stood the test of criticism I must leave others to decide. My only fear is that I have given to them more attention by far than they deserved.

We advance to the consideration of the second article, which comes from the pen of "Ignatius."

The arguments adduced in this article have been so ably refuted by "Theophylact" and "Lex Scripta" as to need no notice by myself. But since the question of the inspiration and canon of Scripture is made the stronghold of our opponents in this controversy, I must notice this article in passing.

The first great point that "Ignatius" seeks to prove is, the difficulty which Protestants experience in ascertaining the authenticity and genuineness of their Rule of Faith.

And to increase the perplexity of these poor unfortunates, he gives them a six-fold division of the difficulties they have to encounter. But let us look these six points steadily in the face, and we shall find them dwindle down into one, and into the one which "Ignatius" examines. All that is essential for Protestants to know is, "that each and every one of the books of the Bible is divinely inspired, and that the book, which is called the Bible, is really the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible."

Let it clearly be understood that we hold no controversy with "Ignatius" upon the canon and inspiration of the Old Testament: this we receive from the Jews; not blindly, but because we have ample evidence to prove that the decision of the Jews respecting the Old Testament is correct.

And now, with respect to the New Testament, the question comes, How are we assured of the inspiration and canon of this? "Ignatius" would say, by a Divine revelation of the fact, given to the Catholic Church. We ask, When was this revelation made? And to whom was it made? Was it to the early ages of the Church, or was it to some council or to some individual pope in after ages? If the revelation was made to the early Christians, where shall we find it recorded? In what Father is it written? Surely a fact so important as a Divine communication of the inspiration of the Scriptures must have a specific time and place and person attached to it. We have no such record. Did those Christians, then, who lived before the Church of Rome usurped authority over other churches, did they have no knowledge of the inspiration of the Scriptures? Certainly they had; and their knowledge was not derived from immediate revelation, but from evidence which they had of the inspiration of the Scriptures they received.

But is it said that the inspiration was decreed to the Church of Rome at a later date? then we ask, How was it that Christians were left in ignorance so long? And to whom was the revelation made, and what guarantee have we for the honesty of those that made it?

It is just the same respecting the canon of Scripture. When was this decreed, and to whom? Your Church mentions eighteen general councils; which of these decreed the canon of the New Testament? If you say, the Council of Trent, then I ask, How was it that a question so important was not determined till the year 1546? If the canon had been determined before, what need was there for another decree? Would God grant a double inspiration upon the same point?

No! we, as Protestants, do not and cannot receive the inspiration and canon of Scripture upon the exclusive trust of the Roman Catholic Church. For, first, we do not know where its infallibility resides, whether in council or in pope. And, secondly, we have no proof, and no proof can be given, of the infallibility of either. Judging, then, by this fact, we have evidence of their fallibility. The Holy Ghost was promised to the apostles, to lead them into all truth, and the Holy Spirit is promised to every believer. But where

will you find the least hint given that either future pope or council should be inspired to declare the inspiration and settle the canon of Holy Writ.

We settle this question upon evidence internal and external; and our labour is not so large, nor are our difficulties so great, as those who have to prove the inspiration, not only of the Bible, but also of a mass of tradition of divers kinds, and who can afford us no proof that the Spirit of God does really help them in their work.

We examine the writings of the New Testament ourselves: we mark their purity; we trace in them the finger of God. We behold their harmony, though written by different men. We find that these men were mostly apostles; or, if not, the companions of the apostles. We find what they wrote profitable for precept and for doctrine: our hearts assure us that these writings are of God. We do not hesitate under a single doubt in receiving them, with the Old Testament, as our Rule of Faith; and were we upon the bed of death, we should feel perfectly safe under their teaching, and their teaching alone.

The third article on the negative side, signed "A Layman," now comes under review. I admit that a Divine Rule of Faith must be both *clear* and *infallible*. Clear, as regards essentials; and so infallible that every word of it remains true. If by clear, however, you mean clear in every particular, so that everything in it may be understood, then I demur. For as there are mysteries in the works of Nature, which God hath made, so I must expect to find mysteries in His word. Hence the exclamations of the apostle—"The unsearchable riches of Christ;" "O! the depths of the wisdom of the goodness of God."

There is no fundamental article of our faith but what is plainly revealed. We have Christ revealed in every phase of His wondrous character; and whoever believes on Him, as He is revealed, shall be saved. The Bible then is sufficiently clear. Take the great body of Protestants, and you will find them agreed upon these great essentials. Those who differ are a small minority, indeed, although magnified by our opponent to suit his own purposes.

The great argument of this article is, that because the Bible requires an interpreter, it cannot be a sufficient rule. We would recommend him to study a little logic, that he may be able to distinguish between things that differ. The rule and the interpretation of a rule are two separate things, and should not be confounded together. The Bible remains the same; the interpretation may differ. But if we admit the objection—if it be true that the Bible is fallible as a Rule of Faith, because it needs to be interpreted, does not the objection recoil upon yourself? I will suppose for a moment that tradition forms the complement to the Rule of Faith, and then find that the objection is as strong as before.

What is tradition but words handed down orally, as the Bible is handed down in written characters? But words spoken are merely sounds, as words written are the signs; and thus your Rule of

Faith, with the addition of traditions, requires an interpreter just as much as mine does without such addition. You profess to follow the interpretations of the Fathers; but these Fathers differed upon some points, and if they differed they could not all have been inspired with the Holy Ghost when they gave the interpretation. The Council of Trent requires you to accept the sense given by the Fathers, which is erroneously called "unanimous." But some of the Roman Catholic writers, as Baronius, have not hesitated to depart from the sense of the Fathers when it suited their purpose to do so. And there were some present in the Council of Trent who thought that the faithful ought to exercise their own judgment in the interpretation of Scripture, and not be bound to follow the interpretation of the Fathers. So that amid the inspired body of councillors there was a diversity of opinion after all. And thus, if your Rule of Faith requires an interpreter, which it does far more than ours, as being so ponderous, so heterogeneous, then, according to your own argument, your Rule is not clear, and cannot be Divine.

"A Layman" asserts that the Word of God is capable of being preserved by tradition, and would prove it from the fact that there was no written revelation in the patriarchal days. I answer, that there was no need of it then, for God held frequent communication with the patriarchs. And I add, that the will of God is not capable of being preserved by tradition, as may be learned from the fact that all the nations lapsed into idolatry; and from the fact that a written revelation was afterwards given to the Jews, to keep them from heathen practices.

Further on, "A Layman" would persuade us that the doctrine of the resurrection was derived by the ancient Jews from tradition, and not from the written word. Is he ignorant of the fact, that our Saviour, arguing with the Sadducees, did prove this doctrine from Old Testament Scripture; and if he did, why may not the Pharisees have derived it from the same source?

"A Layman" is certainly no Biblical scholar, or he would not display the ignorance he does respecting the condition of the Jews after their return from Babylon. When they returned from their captivity they would not speak Syriac, but Chaldee, if they had forgotten their Hebrew, which I believe they had not, as may be gathered from Neh. xiii. 23, 34; neither were they without the Scriptures in a tongue they could understand; for one of the first acts of Ezra, after the restoration of Jerusalem, was to read publicly the written word of God, which produced a great impression on the minds of those that heard it. The Scripture they would still retain, and it would be read to them in the Hebrew language, as it is at this day.

So much for the arguments and general information of "A Layman."

We now advance to the argument of J. H., in Article IV.

We are deeply grieved, but not surprised, to find J. H. at the

outset charging the Bible with being "the prolific parent of daring blasphemies and fanatical excesses." No! the Bible is the pure Word of God, which J. H. must allow, unless he is an Atheist; and if the Word of God, it must be, like its Author, holy and truthful; and if holy and truthful, it cannot be the parent of the evils mentioned. Those blasphemies and excesses had their source in the *evil hearts* of those that practised them; and he who charges the Bible with them is guilty of false accusation, and that of the foulest kind. Most of those "daring blasphemies" arose not from taking the Bible only as a Rule of Faith, but from following the example of Romanists, and admitting something else as a part of their Rule, such as pretended visions and revelations. Witness Johanna Southcott, Mormons, &c. We disown them; they are not Protestants; for they do not take the Bible as their Rule of Faith.

The first argument used is that our Lord desired unity and peace to prevail among Christians, and that the Protestant Rule has not secured this.

True, our Saviour desired unity and peace, and it is the desire of every true Christian. But unity and peace was never intended to be secured by a blind submission to an authority, the counterpart of which we nowhere find in the Bible; nor by faith in a multitude of errors utterly antagonistic to the plain teaching of God's book and to common sense.

Unity and peace must be striven after; but perfect unity and peace will never be obtained in this fallen world. Christ did not secure it, even among his twelve followers, for dissensions arose among them, and one of their number was a betrayer. I suppose there was some Rule of Faith in the Apostles' days, whether the Bible only, or the Bible and tradition combined; and yet this rule did not secure unity and peace among the churches. Opinions differed, dissensions arose, and errors were propagated. In the early ages of the Church, this desired unanimity did not exist, for the Fathers differed from each other. Origen and Tertullian, on some points were suspected of heresy, and different parties sprung into existence. Surely they had a Rule of Faith in those days, and yet it did not secure unity and peace in the church.

And what of the great Arian heresy which prevailed when Christianity became established, and received the sanction of kings? What, I say, of that heresy, which spread itself so far and wide that St. Athanasius stood almost alone in the defence of the truth? Where was the Church of Rome then? It had an existence. And where was its wonder-working Rule of Faith, that it did not prevent such heresies? And if we come down to later ages, to the time when Popery had full play,—shall we find perfect peace and unity in the Roman Catholic Church? Did not parties arise in their midst? Was there not a division between the Franciscan and Dominican friars? Was there not a dispute between Fénelon and Bossuet? Did not Popes vacillate, when called upon to decide, lest they should give offence to either party? Are there not Jansen-

ists and Jesuits still in the Church of Rome? Is not that church divided respecting the temporal claims of the Pontiff? Are not his own peculiar flock, those that live beneath the shadow of his wings, lifting up their heel against him? And are not all these "good Catholics" faithful sons of the church? Oh, J. H.! "Those that live in glass houses should not throw stones." Your peace and unity is *external*; among Protestants, *internal*. Unity does not necessitate uniformity. We, the great body of Protestants, are united in the same faith, under the same exalted head, *i. e.*, Christ, and united in our resistance of Popish errors, and Papal domination. Christ nowhere asserts that the church was to be united under *one human head*. It was not thus united in the Apostles' days; and Paul declared that the head of the body corporate was Christ, whose Vicar on earth is the Holy Spirit, and not that thing of an after-growth—the Pope.

The second argument is drawn from the alleged sterility of the Protestant Rule. This sterility I deny. It was not sterile at the time of the Reformation, as we are informed by the quotation from Macaulay:—"Fifty years after the Lutheran separation, Catholicism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Mediterranean At first, the chances seemed entirely in favour of Protestantism." Nor has the Bible been sterile since, for it was never more fruitful than at the present day. Numerous societies have sprung up among Protestants, and from them are going forth missionaries into all parts of the world; and wherever they go, people are converted unto the Lord. The Bible is at work at home; thousands upon thousands are feasting upon the truth, and live and die in the faith. Sterile! why you, J. H., know nothing of its influence upon Protestant hearts, or you would never bring such a charge against it.

It is asserted, as an "undeniable fact," that every Christian nation has been converted by Catholic missionaries. Whom do you mean by "Catholic missionaries"? If it is missionaries of the Church of Rome, then we say that history contradicts your fact, for the Apostles were the first to convert the nations; and there was a regularly organized Christian Church, with its bishops, in England, before Augustine came over to re-convert it. If J. H. were better acquainted with the early propagation of Christianity, or if he were more truthful in his representations, he would not venture the wild assertions which he does.

Prevalence is no argument, either for or against the truth of a thing. Mahomedanism prevailed, but its prevalence did not prove its truth. Heathenism is still more prevalent in many parts of the world than Christianity, but this does not prove that heathenism is right. The soil of this earth is more congenial to error than truth; hence it is in the moral as in the natural world, "ill weeds grow apace." Our Saviour never intimated that conversion should be of the wholesale character boasted of by J. H.; but he plainly taught us that the way to heaven is narrow, and the gate is strait, and

that few there be who go in thereat. Hence the argument of J. H. loses its power.

The third argument of J. H. is, that when the Protestant Rule of Faith is *freely carried out*, it leads to *infidelity*. By this Rule of Faith we understand *the Bible*; but J. H. understands the *unrestrained exercise of human reason*. Hence all his statements are now grounded upon a misrepresentation. Taking our view of our own Rule of Faith, his proposition may be thus expressed:—The Bible is a revelation of God, teaching us what we are to do, and what we are to believe, and urging upon us the necessity of faith. If we carry its doctrines and precepts freely out; then we are sure to lapse into infidelity; i. e., if we walk in the path it directs, we are sure to walk in the path it forbids. Mark the absurdity!

But now with respect to the Rationalism of Germany, and some divines of our own church. We deplore it. But what is the cause of it? Is it because these Rationalists receive the Bible as their only Rule of Faith? Nay, surely, but because they renounce the *authority* of the Bible—because they reject the *inspiration* of it—because they make their reason a part of their Rule of Faith. This is the cause of their infidelity. Their error is that of the Romanist—they will not receive the Bible as their sole standard of faith, and believe only and simply the doctrine it contains.

Thus have I answered at length all the arguments of my opponents, for "Augustine" does not advance anything new, but examines the arguments of others. It was my intention to notice all the exceptions taken to arguments adduced on the affirmative side; but I have already passed the prescribed limit, and must content myself with re-establishing the position which I assumed at the opening of this discussion.

There are two on the opposite side, viz., "A Layman" and "Augustine," who favour my arguments with a notice, and their objections shall be considered.

First, with reference to the text quoted from the second Epistle to Timothy. The objection is, that the Scriptures referred to were those of the Old Testament, and if we admit their sufficiency, then the Old Testament must contain "a complete code of Christian doctrine and morals."

Now, in the first place, I answer, that the Scriptures were able to make Timothy wise unto salvation, because profitable for doctrine and for instruction in righteousness. This my opponent cannot deny, since it is clearly stated.

Salvation is the end of faith, that at which faith aims. These Scriptures were able to make wise unto salvation, therefore they must have been sufficient as a means to this end. And, I ask, why is it absurd to suppose that the Old Bible contains a complete code of Christian doctrine and morals? Where is there a doctrine in the New that cannot be inferred from the Old? Christ is preached in the Old from beginning to the end, as He is in the New. The latter Testament is but a confirmation of the former. Every fast

in the history of Christ was predicted. Are not some chapters in Isaiah as clear as the Gospels? "Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfil the law and prophets."

Granting, then, that the Old Testament was intended by St. Paul, does it not make our case stronger? If they were able to make wise unto salvation, how much more able must be the whole Bible, where we have the Old Testament confirmed by the New—where we have doctrines that were at first only indicated, or glanced at, drawn out, explained, and enforced?

That which is profitable for a certain purpose, and shows its profitableness by its ability to accomplish the end proposed, must be sufficient; and nothing but the merest sophistry could show it otherwise.

The second objection has reference to our Lord making the Bible the ground of His appeal in all questions of dispute. The answer is, "That these appeals were made, not because any word proceeding out of His mouth was less infallible, but because, by so doing, His enemies were condemned by their own professions." I do not say that the word which proceeded out of the mouth of Jesus was less infallible than the Scriptures; but I do say, that when Jesus wished to establish a doctrine, or refute an error, He applied to God's Word, independently of Jewish tradition, thus making the Scriptures the sole Rule of Faith. This my opponent cannot deny. We, as Protestants, follow the example of our Saviour, and cannot be wrong in so doing.

The third objection has reference to the case of the Bereans. The answer of "A Layman" is simply a contradiction of the scriptural statement. We are told that the Bereans received the word which Paul preached with all readiness of mind, and that they searched the Scriptures daily, to see whether these things were so; i. e., whether what St. Paul preached concerning Christ could be gathered from the Old Testament Scriptures. "A Layman" says, that if they had brought what Paul taught them to the test of the written Word, they never would have become Christians, for they had only the Old Testament to refer to. Such proofless contradictions as these will be taken for what they are worth.

Fourthly, exception is taken to the text which says, "Search the Scriptures," &c., and we are informed that the words may be rendered, "Ye search the Scriptures." I am aware that *ipeuvāre* has been taken in the indicative by some, but I know, on the other hand, that St. Augustine makes it imperative, and the imperative has the almost unanimous consent of the Greek Fathers. I suppose tradition has not determined the sense of this passage yet, but hopes to do by-and-bye, when there are quieter times to attend to such matters.

And now come the quotations from the Fathers in favour of the Bible as the sole Rule of Faith. It is somewhat amusing to see how our opponents avoid an examination of these extracts. One has not access to the work of Tillotson, where every reference is marked;

and another considers them garbled extracts, while he fails to prove them so. "Clement" tells them where the extracts are to be found; but I suppose they have not access to the original works of the Fathers, and therefore cannot examine them. And thus they pass our extracts by, branding them as suspicious characters, but not daring to bring them, each and all, before the tribunal of investigation, that they might prove their guiltiness.

And thus have we examined, and, I trust, refuted all the arguments which have been brought forward to prove the Bible's insufficiency as a Rule of Faith. And thus have we maintained the position occupied at first, and from which we have not been shaken. Notwithstanding all that has been said, the Scriptures still bear witness to their sole sufficiency, if not in so many words, yet in effect; and thousands who have received the Bible as their only Rule of Faith, have found its sufficiency. There is precept to guide, there is promise to comfort, there is counsel to warn, there is doctrine to instruct. The way of salvation is clearly marked out; faith is enforced, and the object of faith is expressed. There is sufficient, then, to engage my attention and study so long as I live; and I can never reach its depths, or exhaust its fulness. I have no need of your traditions. I find no statement that these traditions were to form part of the Rule of Faith, and therefore my motto is still, "The Bible, and the Bible alone, this is sufficient as a Rule of Faith."

H. B.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE have at length arrived at the conclusion of our controversy upon this important question; and saving a few—I trust, unguarded—expressions on the part of affirmative writers, it is a matter of congratulation that it has been conducted with unusual good feeling and courtesy. And this is the more to be noticed, as unfortunately, in discussions of this kind, so many writers on both sides indulge in a strain of invective and insult, which renders an anxious inquirer perfectly disgusted, not only with the manner in which the debate is carried on, but also with the subject itself.

I can of course presume to offer no opinion upon a subject in which I am so deeply interested, but must leave it to the readers of the *Controversialist* to decide on which side reason and truth are to be found.

It is admitted by all that the differences between Catholics and Protestants arise from the fact of one denying and the other affirming a volume of inspired treatises to be the sole Rule of Faith, and the decider of all disputes which may arise respecting the doctrines of Christianity. It is a matter of the highest importance, for it involves the very means of salvation which the Almighty has appointed for man. If the Catholics have received something more than the whole Word of God, they will assuredly answer for it at the judgment seat of Christ; and if Protestants have wilfully rejected that church by which we believe God has ever taught, and

still teaches, His saving truths, God himself will judge between it and them.

In the present discussion, it is observable that the affirmative writers have chiefly drawn their arguments from the Old Testament; but it is quite clear that that portion of Holy Scripture can have nothing to do with the question now under debate, since it belonged only to the Jewish people; and whenever it happens to be referred to in the New Testament, it is only used as an argument *ad hominem*, against those who admit its truth and inspiration.

But it is to no purpose at all to refer to the Bible for any proofs, without you first prove the genuineness, authenticity, and inspiration of it. Until this is done, argument is useless.

Some of the fathers have been appealed to, but the quotations have been shown to be erroneous or misapplied. Nay, quotations from the very fathers our opponents have brought forward, have been met by extracts of a totally opposite description, already proving that what has been taken as an approval of the Protestant doctrine is misquoted, garbled, and, as a necessary consequence, referred to subjects with which it has no connection.* But it is quite fair to submit to the decisions of the fathers upon the canon and inspiration of Scripture (respecting which there is a vast diversity of opinion amongst them), and reject them altogether, when they testify that all that the apostles taught was *not* recorded in Scripture, seeing that each is equally a matter of *fact*.

The writers on the affirmative side seem to be under the impression that by "tradition" Catholics mean a mass of vague opinions floating about the church, and nowhere recorded. This is an error. By "tradition" a Catholic understands those things, which by express declaration in the written word, he believes not to have been committed to writing in the first instance, but delivered by Christ to His apostles, and by the apostles to their successors; and being of course of equal authority with those which have been written, are equally to be believed. The proofs of these doctrines we find in the early fathers, those who succeeded the apostles, and who in their day were precisely what the apostles were in theirs,—the teachers of Christianity. So that whenever—as for instance in the case of the Trinity in A.D. 325, the Immaculate Conception in 1854—a doctrine which has not been defined by the Church is attacked, and discussions arise respecting it, the Church takes the writings of the Apostles and the Fathers, and from them declares what has always been the doctrine of the Church; and the doctrine thus defined we believe, in consequence of Christ's promises to His Church, to be the infallible truth.

* The quotations have also been taken at second hand. H. B. has borrowed his from Tillotson; "Clement" from Dr. Bennett's "Theology of the Early Church," and "Theophylact" from the Rev. W. Goode. Could these gentlemen have read the entire passages from which they quote, they would have seen the truth of my assertion.

"Clement" is not very happy in his definition of tradition. "In Paul's Epistles, he says (p. 93) "it signifies whatever is handed down to us, whether by word or epistle. It therefore includes Scripture." Does it therefore exclude that which is *not* Scripture, viz., that which is handed down "*by word*"? He says also at p. 87, that "the teachings of the Word of God" (by which he means the Bible) "were not to be modified by any oral traditions, which . . . are far more likely to be corrupted than any written document." God forbid that we should attempt to modify a syllable of His law! But the traditions did not long remain oral; for, as Eusebius (quoted by "Clement," p. 93) says, "Ignatius recommended the churches to commit the tradition of the apostles to writing, *for the sake of greater security*." It is quite clear from this, that the churches were in possession of much that the apostles taught, but which they never wrote.

The traditions thus committed to writing are what the Catholic terms the "unwritten word of God."

I will give a short *résumé* of the articles on either side, apart from any attempt to answer objections, or defend the negative writers.

The opening article by H. B. avoids the real foundation of the question. He gives four reasons for answering the question in the affirmative:—that the Bible itself gives testimony to its own all-sufficiency as a Rule of Faith, and quotes two texts to prove it; that our Lord answered those who would not believe Him out of the Old Testament; and that St. Paul recommended his followers to consult the Scriptures* for themselves, and that the early Fathers declare that the Bible alone is a sufficient Rule of Faith.

"Clement," in the next article, considers any question respecting the inspiration of the Bible to be absurd, and quotes several texts to show that the Bible is excellent, good for instruction, profitable, and so on; that every one for himself should determine the true meaning of any passage of Scripture, and that before we pronounce the Bible to be an insufficient Rule of Faith, we should look to another Rule (that of the Catholic Church), and inquire whether that can supply any presumed want of the Bible. Several quotations from the Fathers are given, and considered to be conclusive.

The first article of "Theophylact" gives no further arguments in favour of the question, but is confined to replies to writers on the negative side. His second article, which is very similar, I notice below.

The following arguments are given on the negative side, against the all-sufficiency of the Bible as the sole Rule of Faith.

In the opening article it is asserted that the Bible was never intended to be the only Rule of Faith, because we do not find in it any record of such intention on the part of our Lord or His apostles; that it was not regarded at first as the only Rule, none of it having been written until some years after the ascension of our

* These were Old Testament Scriptures, although H. B. does not say so.

Lord, and then, not for the purpose of increasing the spread of Christianity; that the adoption of this Rule was, in the first ages, humanly speaking, impossible, since sufficient quantities of copies of the sacred volume could not have been given to the world prior to the invention of printing;* and that Protestants do not themselves adhere to the Bible as their only Rule, since they take the proofs of its authenticity and inspiration from some other source than the Bible itself; and instances are adduced in which Protestants neglect some things which are commanded in the Bible, and practise others for which no command is there to be found.

"Ignatius" shows the "impracticability of the Protestant Rule," in that it cannot of itself prove that any revelation exists at all; that the Bible contains such presumed revelation; that it contains all the inspired books which God intended it should, and none else; that the generally received belief respecting the authenticity of its books is correct; that the translation is true; and that when one reads Holy Scripture he is sure he is reading the right sense of Holy Scripture.

"A Layman's" article (which, strangely enough, has hardly been noticed by subsequent affirmative writers) argues that whatever rule we have must necessarily be INFALLIBLE. That if the Bible be so clear (contrary to the declaration of St. Peter 2 Ep. iii. 16), it must teach every one with unerring certainty the same belief; and that, if each man is to be his own interpreter of Holy Scripture, the Holy Spirit teaches a multitude of conflicting doctrines.

"J. H." proves that the Bible cannot be a sufficient Rule of Faith, by the actual results of such a belief. He shows that where the Reformation commenced the character of Protestant Christianity has gradually deteriorated, until it has resolved itself into infidelity; that in Germany, the most profound works against revelation, Scripture, and Christianity, have been written by professed Lutherans; and that in Geneva, Calvin's own city, Unitarianism is triumphant, while in England the results have been nearly as bad; and that wherever this opinion is held, it is the fruitful source of all the religious differences which exist. The writer also points out the fact that Protestantism has not increased beyond its first limits (except when its professors have emigrated, and of course carried their faith with them), and with all its wealth and superior advantages, it has never been able to convert one single Pagan nation.

The article of "Augustine" is in reply to some of the affirmative writers.

It will be observed in the above, that the question of inspiration has uniformly been shirked by the Protestant writers. They have not been able to prove that one single line of the New Testament was penned at the instance of the Almighty, nor that any of the writers "spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

* Even in the present day the Bible Societies are unable to supply sufficient; or, at all events, they are constantly asking for subscriptions to enable them to do so.

Nor has a single text been produced which declares the Bible alone to be a sufficient Rule of Faith.

Old Testament texts are obviously out of place when proving the inspiration or sufficiency of the New. The Old Testament was the exclusive property of a chosen people, who bore but a very small proportion to the rest of the inhabitants of the earth. They alone had a written law, which, after all, was not all-sufficient, while all others had to depend upon tradition only. All the world, until the time of Moses, the patriarchs included, were utterly destitute of any written rule; and if it had been necessary, the Almighty would most assuredly have vouchsafed to supply them with one.

The Old Law was given by God himself, under most miraculous circumstances, and in sight of the whole people of Israel. Moses was distinctly authorized by God to be the writer of His commands, and such proofs of his Divine legation were given as no Jew could possibly question. We do not find, that amid all their wanderings, and their desertions of the faith they should have practised, they ever disputed a word of the Scriptures, although, with the exception of those times when prophets were sent to them, the proofs of the Divinity of those writings rested solely upon tradition.

The New Law, on the contrary, was committed to the care of twelve obscure, poor men, whom the world looked upon with contempt. Out of the twelve, only five have left us anything in writing; and not one of these even affirms that he is inspired in writing his gospels or epistles. Still less does any one of them assert that he was ever authorized by our Lord to commit to writing anything that He taught. St. John writes that his readers "might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God."* St. Luke (not an apostle), because "it seemed good" to him to do so, that a certain Theophilus, to whom his gospel is addressed, "might know the verity of those words in which he had been instructed."† God has never worked a miracle in favour of the Bible, nor ever assured any one of its truth.

Search through the pages of the New Testament, you will nowhere find any code of Christianity,—no summary of doctrine,—nothing that says such and such is all that is necessary to be believed: but, on the contrary, many texts (which have been quoted in the Negative Articles) implying that all that Christ and His Apostles taught, and desired Christians to practise, has not been explicitly set down in that book. And from the beginning of the period (the sixteenth century) in which, by some, the Bible has been regarded as the sole Rule of Faith, what has been the system upon which all have acted? Why, that you must go from book to book, and chapter to chapter, and select certain texts by which you will be enabled to prove the Trinity, the Atonement, the doctrine of Justification, &c. And a religion constructed upon this plan must, as Dr. Lingard well observes, "depend mainly upon the skill of the constructor;" seeing

* St. John xx. 31.

† St. Luke i. 3, 4.

that it is a mere patchwork affair; and the more efficient the workman, the better the work will appear. But when they are asked to prove the inspiration of the New Testament, they are at fault. No inspired writer, except St. Peter, in any way refers to another, or informs his readers whether, in his opinion, any gospel or epistle is inspired or not; so that, supposing you prove the inspiration, for instance, of St. Matthew, it by no means follows that you have proved the inspiration of St. Mark. No external proofs, on Protestant principles, can exist; for the Bible is their only authority. It is to no purpose to quote the Fathers, nor the belief of the early Church. A modern divine (the Rev. Baptist Noel) argues that as the Pythagorean system was believed by wise and enlightened nations, and is now proved to be false,—so Christianity was imperfectly understood by its first professors; and we, having arrived at a superior pitch of knowledge in every other respect, must know more about it than they did. And our knowledge being greater, our conclusions must be sounder.

The Bible, then, on Protestant principles, rests solely upon *human* authority.

And can rational human beings for one moment imagine that any one not believing in Christianity, or such of its leading doctrines as the Trinity, would be converted by appeals to the testimony which fallible men render regarding what they know only on the word of others? If the Word of God be infallible, an infallible witness must tell us so.

If I am told that "internal evidence" proves the truth of the New Testament, I inquire first, of what that evidence consists? If it is that the teaching of the Bible is so pure and so holy, that persons following it as their guide forsake their evil ways, and become useful and exemplary members of society, I reply, that these results are not due to the *Book*, but to the doctrines it contains; and that a person could as easily be persuaded to amend his way of living by hearing impressive sermons as by reading the Scriptures. On the same principle, the sermons he hears might be proved to be inspired, as they would induce him to forsake sin, and practice holiness. But if by internal evidence I am to understand that the Bible contains such elevated principles and such pure and excellent morals as are nowhere else to be found, that is no better a reason than that which the Mahomedan adduces in favour of the Koran, or the Chinese in favour of Confucius. Internal evidence, no matter of what description, is worthless if supported by nothing else.

"Lex Scripta" makes some not very intelligible remarks (p. 226) about the observance of Sunday. He says, "The Apostles kept every recurring seventh day, though *called* the *first* day of the week. This is a very lame argument. The Jews, and our Lord also, kept the Sabbath, that is, Saturday; and the day on which our Lord rose was not only "*called* the *first* day of the week," but was actually so. The Jews, after the ascension of our Lord, still continued to observe, and do so in our own time, the Saturday. If the

Sabbath was to be altered, why is no intimation given of the change in the New Testament? The obvious reply is, Because the Bible was not intended to be the only Rule of Faith. There is no Scriptural command to keep the Sunday holy: the obligation rests on other grounds; and it is, consequently, beside the question to turn round upon Catholics and tell them that *they* should not keep Sunday holy because there is no command to do so in Scripture. Catholics do not believe that the Bible *alone* is or was ever intended to be the only Rule of Faith.

I do not understand what is the meaning of "He (Gregory) assumes the very thing to be proved, and asks for an authority in the very paragraph in which he supplies it." I have not, nor has any writer on the negative side, ever stated that the "authority" for the observance of Sunday is to be found in the New Testament. We know very well that no such command is there recorded, and we have vainly desired the affirmative writers to point it out if they think it exists.

"Lex Scripta" "professes to know something of the Scriptures, but has yet to learn where" a command to keep Saturday holy "is to be found." If his Scripture learning is so limited, he had better apply to the first Protestant child he meets, who will, doubtless, enlighten him upon the subject.

He says, "that *four* Gospels by *four inspired* historians constitute a proof that a written rule was essential in the opinion of our Lord and His Apostles." I should have liked this writer to adduce the proofs of the "inspiration" of these evangelists, especially of St. Mark and St. Luke. They do not claim it in their Gospels, nor do they say that our Lord commissioned them to write. Still less is there any reference in their writings to what "Lex Scripta" says our Lord considered essential,—the existence of an exclusive written Rule of Faith. One would have thought that from the fact of only two Apostles having written Gospels, it would be proved that "a written rule" was "*not*" essential in their "opinion."

This writer has furnished me with a useful figure of speech. He says (p. 229) that the Epistles, in my opinion, would never have been written but for the existence of abuses. Medicinal applications "would never have been devised had illness not existed: and therefore Gregory argues that medicines are not worth much." I am sure I should not "argue" any such nonsense. To Protestants the Bible is supposed to be the sole source of all their spiritual knowledge: they depend upon nothing else for what they consider correct religious opinions. But do we rely upon medicine alone to restore us to health, and keep us in a healthy state? I think, if "Lex Scripta" lived upon medicine alone for a few days, he would not find himself in a remarkably robust condition. Something is necessary to enable us to understand Scripture *correctly*, and food is likewise necessary to assist medicine in its effect upon our bodies.

"The common property of the whole Christian church," the New Testament undoubtedly was, and I should be very sorry to con-

tradict "all ecclesiastical history and the writings of the Fathers" by asserting the reverse; but the same writings undoubtedly prove that the early Christians were not taught Christianity by that Book alone.

"Lex Scripta" seems to think that all our Lord's acts and deeds have been preserved in the Gospels, and quotes Acts i. 1, 2, in which St. Luke says that his "former treatise" contains "all that Jesus began both to do and to teach" until His ascension. This can only mean, all that St. Luke knew of our Lord's life; for St. John's Gospel contains a great deal which St. Luke does not record, and St. Matthew's and St. Mark's Gospels likewise supply much more, which is equally wanting in St. Luke's. "Lex Scripta" should read a little more carefully.

He says, page 232, that all Pagans have their written Rule of Faith; Protestants have theirs; consequently Catholics ought to have theirs. Until he can show that Paganism is worthy of imitation, or that it is desirable to introduce into the midst of a united religion the element of discord, Catholics are pretty well content to remain as they are.

He notices in one place an expression of mine, to which he devotes nearly a page. I asked for "a single clear text which informs us that adhesion to a written rule . . . is our only hope of salvation, and divergence from the meaning of that book a heresy." This should be, "privately interpreted meaning." I certainly did not mean to imply what the faulty construction of the sentence conveys.

He also charges me with having "laboured to represent Scripture as obscure, in order to reduce it to the level of absurd and conflicting traditions." As for the obscurity, I think, letting alone the admissions of Protestants themselves, I have Scripture on my side; for St. Peter says that in St. Paul's epistles are "many things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own damnation." Not a very pleasant thing for those to contemplate who consider their own interpretation of Scripture to be as good as any other.

He professes to answer the question of "Ignatius"—"How do Protestants know what books make up the Bible?" and his answer amounts to this:—that all the Fathers, and ecclesiastical tradition, agree that the books which now make up the Protestant Bible were inspired; and that, besides them, there were no other inspired books. How any writer can really state his belief in such a doctrine, I cannot tell. It is notorious that the early Christians were divided in opinion upon the inspiration of almost every book which was in circulation among them, and that until the Council of Carthage, in 395, decided which were, and which were not inspired, Christians accepted and rejected whichever they pleased. There are, I think, about twenty ancient canons drawn up by various Fathers, no two of which agree in all the books enumerated;

and what is still more singular, not one canon agrees with the Protestant one.

"Lex Scripta" says he knows St. Paul wrote certain epistles, on the same principles whereby he knows that Horace wrote the "*Ars Poetica*;" but as the Bible is looked upon as an exclusive collection of *inspired* books, this sort of evidence is insufficient. Human tradition can never tell us with certainty what *inspired* books form the Bible. It is curious that "Lex Scripta" overlooks this fact; for notwithstanding that he declares that to "speak with authority in such matters is to be ridiculous" (page 300), he nevertheless quotes St. Augustine, who declares that to know the inspired books the Catholic must follow the "*authority* of as many Catholic Churches as possible" (page 301). "Lex Scripta" sets language at defiance by asserting that "authority" here means "testimony." I should like a reference to a dictionary which gives such a definition. If devoid of truth, it certainly has the charm of novelty. And this is absolutely all that "Lex Scripta" has to urge in reply to "Ignatius'" requisition. I have experienced no little difficulty in extracting this much from the mass of verbiage, and angry sneering, of which his article is composed.

He has laid hold of an expression of "A Layman," and wears it almost threadbare. It is this:—"I, too, would say to a Protestant the same words—'Search the Scriptures'—for they testify of the Church, and her Divine Head; and which, if you reject your prejudices, the traditions of men, will lead you into its fold." The word "which," sufficiently points out, to any one conversant with English grammar, what the "Layman" refers to. For the benefit of such individuals as "Lex Scripta," it would have been as well, perhaps, to have put "traditions of men" within brackets.

It is impossible to test the correctness of this writer's quotations from the Fathers, as he does not give a single reference throughout, except to some work of a "Rev. W. Goode." It is really too much to expect us to refer to works of this nature, even when written by eminent Protestants; and "Lex Scripta" appears to refer to this work only for the purpose of proving that Rome is wrong, which has nothing to do with the subject of debate. He should have shown that Protestantism is right. He has actually given up the Protestant Rule, for he shows that to ascertain the truly inspired books, the Fathers must be consulted;—the Bible is not sufficient to determine this fundamental point for Protestants.

The remainder of his article is simply an attack upon Catholic faith and practice, and as such, I forbear to notice it, as it is manifestly no answer to the question at the head of the page. As he has, however, complained that I have used only the artifices of rhetoric, and neglected to observe the simple rules of logic, I will give one specimen of his "logic."

I stated that neither of St. John's epistles contains much information about Christianity. "Lex Scripta" says this is beside the

mark, unless it can be proved that "information was *the* object of epistles." Does he not see that by this argument he really conceded the point at issue? The writers on the negative side have maintained that the epistles were *not* written for the purpose of informing or instructing persons in Christianity, but that all were called forth by some accidental circumstance, or some abuse. One can hardly repress a smile at what follows this portion of "Lex Scripta's" article.*

I have been charged, and especially by "Clement," with "puerility," "sophistry," "feebleness," and so on. I am deeply conscious of my own defects, but in fair debate these are usually overlooked, if the arguments are worth noticing. The style of a writer should be separated from his opinions. I am glad to see that no such contemptible personalities have disfigured the affirmative articles. It has been argued before that had the Bible been intended by God to be the only Rule of Faith, it would teach them all the same. It has the contrary effect. The Trinitarian declares it teaches him the Trinity; the Unitarian learns, from the same source, that the Trinity does not exist. Which doctrine is true? The Bible cannot decide.

In the world are some hundreds of Protestant sects, all believing different doctrines, yet professing to derive their creeds from the Bible alone. Can the Bible inform a Protestant which of these is right? The question really lies in a nutshell, although so much can be said on either side.

POPE GREGORY.

Philosophy.

IS THE POETRY OF TENNYSON AS HEALTHY IN ITS TENDENCIES AS THAT OF LONGFELLOW?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In a former article on this topic we endeavoured to deal with certain preliminary inquiries; to clear the ground (as it were) for a broad and thorough discussion of the subject; to ascertain its intellectual bearings and conditions, and thus to arrive at an intelligent apprehension of the real nature of the question before us, and of the principles of reasoning and of judgment upon which the debate should be conducted. We hold that such a course was desirable,

* He says something about "indulgences to sin," which he supposes Rome gives to her followers. He really should inform himself a little better of what Catholicism consists, before he ventures to attack it; but he doubtless thinks that where "ignorance is bliss," *'tis folly to be wise.*"

even if it were not necessary. Considered *per se*, the attempt to determine whether Tennyson or Longfellow exerts the healthier influence on the mind, is all but valueless. A more practical question would be, to ascertain what is the combined effect of their writings; for there are, perhaps, none who read modern poetry at all—certainly none who ever give a thought to the question of its moral and intellectual influences, on themselves or on society—who do not read both poets. Moreover, we are all alike agreed, that in purity and high moral tone, both Tennyson and Longfellow are irreproachable. What, then, can be the utility of the discussion before us? Might we not as well occupy our time by gravely debating the relative alimentary value of beef and mutton; or whether peaches or nectarines form the more wholesome dessert for a healthy man? For it is to be remembered that it is not the mere intellectuality of the subject matter of a given question which determines its value. The monk who wrote three folio treatises on the beard (in which he proved successively that we are bound to shave, that we ought not to shave, and that we have a perfect right to please ourselves whether we shave or not), spent his time as usefully, and arrived at conclusions as valuable and comprehensible, as those “seraphic” and “angelical” doctors who endeavoured to reason out the exact number of angels who could dance on the point of a needle. It is plainly not the particular conclusion at which we may arrive, which constitutes the utility of the present debate, so as to redeem both readers and writers from the charge of wasting their time in idle and profitless speculation. The discussion has an educational value, in exercising the moral judgment, training the reason, and in forming and educating the taste. It is evident, therefore, that the more we narrow the question, and the less we argue in accordance with general principles, and with reference to the essential nature, objects, and tendencies of poetry as poetry, so much the more shall we cast aside that which gives to the discussion its practical worth. By adopting such a course, we shall inevitably cramp and confine the mind, when ostensibly professing to call it into full and free action, and shall do our best to cultivate and confirm that worst of all habits,—the habit of judging by impressions alone, and then employing our powers of thought and reflection in the task of inventing reasons and excuses in defence of those impressions.

But we go further, and maintain that such inquiries as those to which we devoted our former article are absolutely necessary, in order that we may rightly decide upon the question now under debate. We might as well pretend to have a geometry without definitions, and a system of algebra without the foundation idea of quantity, as to judge between the influence of two poets without ever settling in our own mind what poetry is, how it is to be judged, and how its effects are to be gauged and estimated. We are actually told by H. G. that he has “little sympathy” with any theories as to “the nature, office, and intention of poetry, nor with any canons of poetical criticism.” All judgment on these matters

he regards as made up of "preconceived notions" and "individual fancies." Poetry to him is "something undefinable, appreciable only by its influence on the mind." Very appropriately, therefore, he sets out with the declaration that "the question is not that of the merits of either party as poets intellectually considered." Of course, knowing nothing of what poetry is, it must be impossible to judge between poets. Now, had H. G. pursued these views consistently, he would have proceeded just simply to detail the influence of Longfellow and of Tennyson on his own mind,—to tell us how one inspires, rouses, and stimulates his mind; while the writings of the other are "so elaborate and refined," that he finds them hard to be understood; and "so tinged with melancholy," that he cannot help thinking them "objectionable," being himself one of those who do not "like to be allured from cheerfulness." On these grounds he might triumphantly have given his single suffrage against Tennyson. It is true that our friend would not have done much in the way of *argument*, but he would have brought the question to a very practical issue—namely, that poetry being something undefinable and amenable to no rules of judgment, we can only decide upon its merits by our feelings awarding the palm of superiority to that which best pleases us. If there happen to be a few dull people, who prefer melancholy poetry, what more easy than for H. G. to declare such preference a "morbid love which ought not to be nurtured or encouraged?" H. G., however, had some qualms and misgivings in respect to this main argument; and in the endeavour to escape from the absurdity of setting up his own likes and feelings as the test of the healthy tendency of poetry, he has most wofully sacrificed coherency and consistency of thought. After telling us that we are not called upon to decide the comparative merits of the two poets, he defines the meaning of our thesis by means of an equivalent phrase. "Our topic," he says, is "the healthy tendency of their poetry, or *its influence for good on the popular mind*;" and H. G. therefore sets himself to work, to show what are the characteristics of poetry which is "to affect the masses." Will it be credited that, in the pursuit of this aim, the very writer who expresses his contempt for all reasoning on the "nature and office" of poetry, as mere baseless assumption, and who further declares that poetry itself is "undefinable," actually proceeds to put forward his own views upon the "primitive origin and uses" of poetry! But we will pass over this marvellous and suicidal self-contradiction, and will ask why the topic before us is to be debated with regard "to the masses"? Neither Longfellow nor Tennyson can be said to be popular with what we term the masses. They are the poets of middle and higher life,—the poets of the intelligence and education of the age. Neither of them writes, or professes to write, those songs, ballads, &c., which form the poetry of the people. Why, then, are they to be tried by a test which is inapplicable to either of them? The object of H. G. is obvious enough. Tennyson's poetry does not possess the same clearness, simplicity, and

directness of purpose and of teaching, as are to be found in Longfellow's writings. It requires more thought and study to grasp his full compass of profound and subtle thought; more observation to see his marvellous delicacy and refinement of imagination and of execution. The lessons he teaches are less directly concerned with our common outward life; he appeals more to the inmost man, to our spiritual nature. Of course, therefore, Tennyson will have less attractions the lower we sink in the educational and literary scale of society. Tennyson's poetry is of too high and refined a stamp to be appreciated below a certain rank in the community; while Longfellow's poetry is of too simple, earnest, and sterling a character not to find favour with the highest class of intellects. H. G.'s plan of arguing, therefore, is simply a scheme for outvoting Tennyson. It needs scarcely a word to show the utter folly of this kind of reasoning. If we admit it, we must at once concede that in nine cases out of ten the tendency for good of any work is in inverse ratio to its intellectual merit. If the numbers of persons which they directly affect is the sole criterion, the "Encyclopædia Britannica" is of far less import than Chambers' "Information for the People;" Macaulay and Hallam must give place to Goldsmith, as historians; and Sir John Herschel must be looked upon as of less beneficial influence to science than the author of a sixpenny catechism on astronomy.

We have dwelt upon this *reductio ad absurdum* of H. G.'s argument from the extent of popular influence, because it materially helps our own cause. We have only to turn to the article of "Edmund" to see that the same argument is adopted by that writer also; though more skilfully veiled. "Longfellow," says "Edmund," "appeals to an extended circle, and thereby gains a wider audience,"—"his homeliness reaches the masses,"—he preaches "sermons, in which the application is the most prominent part,"—he utters truth "for the sake of its stimulating power,"—his interest is "in the common course of events,"—he is "at home in the activities of life." All this is nothing more than the assertion that Longfellow has a wider circle who can appreciate and understand him, and who *may* be more or less influenced by him. The truth is, our opponents have no other ground left for them. They must either take this plan of criticism by universal suffrage, or else must argue the question upon general grounds. The discussion before us is *not* upon the point whether Tennyson or Longfellow has the widest range of intelligent readers. We can no more rationally twist our theme to such an issue, than we could pretend to infer that barn-door fowls are more wholesome than pheasants, because more people eat them. Nor are we asked to determine whether Tennyson or Longfellow exerts the greatest amount of influence in the world. To have misunderstood the plain question at the head of these pages, as equivalent to either of the above inquiries, is in itself a proof of the false position in which our opponents have found themselves placed. If the influence of Tennyson is less healthy than

that of Longfellow, because he is less simple, clear, and preceptively practical, then "Paradise Lost" is less healthy in its influence than Young's "Night Thoughts" and Cowper's Essays, and is infinitely below Dr. Watts's nursery rhymes. By parity of reasoning, "Edmund" and H. G. either do or ought to believe that the world could better spare Addison and Steele, Macaulay and Sydney Smith, than the "Contributions of Q. Q."

We may therefore conclude that the inquiries in our opening article were not only desirable but absolutely essential. It is our duty now, therefore, to judge between Longfellow and Tennyson as poets or metrical artists, whose first object is to gain our ear with the melody of their words, to fill the imagination with the beauty and grandeur of the creations of their genius, to wield our passions and emotions, and to engage the mind with their subtle thoughts. Having thus gauged their power of influence, we shall have next to ascertain the way in which they have used that power; for all resulting moral influence is a combination of the active power and moral quality of the influence actually exerted. With reference to the first point, the comparative merits of Tennyson and Longfellow as poets, our present share in such a comparison may be dismissed *currente calamo*. A more interesting subject for individual thought or for an essay it would be difficult to choose. The topic would at once be deeply interesting and fraught with intellectual improvement. Both poets would amply repay the thought and study required, for both stand out as true poets of a high order indeed. But, in the present case, we have merely to do with the conclusion to be drawn from such a comparison; and can any one doubt what must and will be the unanimous verdict of every person competent to form an opinion? There is much sweet music and many varying moods of rhythmic melody in Longfellow, but they sink into utter monotony when compared with the marvellous mastery over the poetic lyre which characterizes Alfred Tennyson. Listen to the *Dying Swan*, and the metre and rhythm are pure, descriptive music; the ear is ravished with delight, in spite of the want of anything in the poem on which the mind can seize. Note how musically descriptive the measure of *Mariana in the Moated Grange* is made to be; each line chilling the heart, yet marching on with a firm beat that adds a kind of nightmare force and horror to the picture which rises before the mind, and gives us a sense that her desolation is hopeless, changeless, and inevitable. How inimitable the dream-like

"Music that gentler on the spirit lies,
Than tired eyelids on tired eyes,"

of the *Lotos-Eaters*. Who can listen to the infinite calm that breathes through every line of the poem, and fail to realize the picture, and

"With half shut eyes, ever to seem
Falling asleep in a half dream?"

What poet has ever penned music more exquisitely ærial than the playful, lightsome strains of the *Talking Oak*? How wonderful the variety of music which is brought out from one single metre in the three strains of the *May Queen*; the first free, gay, and gladsome, the second full of the sad, sweet music of unavailing regret and of earthly sorrow; the third solemn, yet happy, breathing forth the calm of resignation, mingled with the brightness of hope. How quietly, softly, and gently flows the measure of the *Miller's Daughter*, that exquisite review of the happiness of a life-long love. How fierce and stinging, what sharp and pointed home-thrusts of scorn, are the verses of *Lady Clara Vere de Vere*; every line almost tells its meaning in its very rhythm. What merriment sings in every line of *Amphion*. What serenity, calm, and purity is breathed out in *St. Agnes Eve*, as we picture to ourselves the prayerful saint gazing out upon the still and stainless moonlit "snowy sward;" how the verse bursts forth into a flood of harmony, seeming to bear us up as her soul rises heavenward, under the influence of the vision and the ecstasy divine which passes before her, and then subsides into a calmness unspeakable. Again, what a boundless range of power Tennyson finds in blank verse. Take the *Morte d'Arthur*, or *The Epic*, as it is nominally entitled, and for sonorous majesty, exquisite rhythm, sustained power, and delicacy of finish, we believe that it is outdone by no blank verse in the English language; then turn to *Godiva*, the excellence is the same, but under the plastic hand of the poet the blank verse seems quite different in its music. In *Audley Court* and some other poems, the metre takes a form that seems just to pourtray the natural intonations of animated conversation between highly cultivated minds, which have thrown off all working cares and trammels, and are recreating in the genial intercourse of social life; and again, in the *Gardener's Daughter*, the verse has a wondrously rich, full flow, its music even deepening in its tones of happiness, till the mind rests in the certainty of the life-long and ever-increasing nature of that happiness; and then how the last lines seem to modulate into a minor key, and with a few rich chords, to complete the whole, and to leave us standing in contemplation at the verge of a happy life, whose past gleams out a golden memory of blessedness, and whose future is a sure and sunbright hope. Once more, how *marvellous*,—we use the term advisedly—is the power of lyric music manifested in *Locksley Hall*, with its impetuous passion, its withering, scathing scorn, and its passing modulations of heartfelt tenderness and pathos,—now moving in sullen strains of discontent, but at length sweeping forth into full majestic music, telling of the triumphs of the past over suffering and passion, and of high purposes and resolves for the future. We feel that we have digressed far, and yet we have not even alluded to the later productions of Tennyson's muse. It may safely be said, that no poet of this century has equalled him in the range and perfect command of musical skill and power which he possesses. Longfellow, on the other hand, with great sweetness,

has great sameness and even tameness in his lyric metres. Each stanza is an exact musical counterpart of the one which it follows and the one which it precedes. His music scarcely ever swells, falls, or changes with his subject. Tennyson *makes* music out of the words in which he expresses his thoughts, while Longfellow *adapts* his words and thoughts to music. And when we turn from the lyric poems, what have we in Longfellow's writings? His blank verse cannot claim anything distinctive; it is merely negatively excellent—free from faults, and smooth to read, but nothing more. In *Evangeline* Longfellow certainly succeeded in making the hexameter more tunable and more endurable to English ears than any of his predecessors had done; yet every one almost will admit that his success was but partial. Few but the most enthusiastic of his admirers will hesitate to admit that his late poem of *Sir Miles Standish* is in all respects a failure: most will be convinced by it that the popularity of *Evangeline* is due to the tale, and in spite of the metre. Then, again, what shall we say of *Hiawatha*? Can we look upon it in any other light than as an experiment as to the easiest way of lending the charm of metre of some kind to old traditions? It just proves that it is easy for any man to turn any topic he pleases into a very strongly accented metrical shape. Any one with an ear for intonation may read *Hiawatha* until he can talk *Hiawatha*, or at least talk in trochaic verse of the *Hiawatha* model. Who does not here feel the inferiority of Longfellow to Tennyson as a metrical artist? Can any one imagine it possible for Alfred Tennyson to write and give to the world such a gigantic piece of sing-song?

We claim then for Tennyson a great superiority over Longfellow in that attribute which draws the boundary line between prose and poetry. But, as we pointed out in our former article, while the poet is separated from all other thinkers and writers by the adoption of metre, he has another distinction which he shares with the humourist, the novelist, and dramatist,—he seeks to create intellectual or spiritual pleasure by addressing primarily the imagination and the heart, instead of the understanding and reason. Now we claim the supremacy in these respects also for Tennyson. It would be pleasant to give a few instances, and to dwell upon his powers of conception, the completeness and vividness of his power of reproducing in language, and presenting to the reader, the beautiful visions which rise within his own mind. The space we have already occupied, however, compels brevity, and our opponents have conceded the point. "If," says "Edmund," "our present object were to prove which was the greater poet, undoubtedly Tennyson must take the precedence of Longfellow, as possessing more depth of imagination and breadth of view, more subtlety of thought," &c. (p. 251); and again (p. 254), we are told that in "pictorial effect" (i. e., the power of presenting to our imagination the creations of his own imagination) "Longfellow cannot approach" Tennyson. So, too, H. G. declares (p. 323), that "as an

artistic poet," he believes Tennyson "to be superior to Longfellow." With these testimonies we are content.

Again,—distinct from the poetic faculty and the imaginative powers, we must have regard to the respective powers of thought possessed by the two poets now under discussion. As we have before remarked, we believe that artistic genius is always accompanied by proportionate intellectual power. It would be easy for us to prove, by analysis and example, that Tennyson is a deeper thinker, a man of profounder grasp of mind, than Longfellow; but here also we are anticipated by our opponents. Arguing as they do on the ground of popularity, they make Tennyson's mental superiority the ground of their decision. He may "captivate cultivated minds," but he is too subtle and profound "for the masses."

We have therefore arrived at the conclusion that, metrically, artistically, and intellectually, Tennyson is the greater. In a word, his poetic faculties and mental endowments place him above Longfellow. This decision we hold to be an affirmative reply to the question in debate, unless Tennyson be accused of debasing his muse to the service of vice or profanity,—an accusation which is, of course, out of question. We have already exposed the folly of judging the influences of poetry by the *number* of people whom it pleases or moves; and it must be obvious that it is equally absurd to judge it by the extent and simplicity of its didactic qualities. The aim of a poet is not direct teaching; and the more closely he attempts this, the more flat and prosaic will his poetry be. He may give very good advice, but if he confines himself to this, he will never do more than clothe his advice in smooth and pretty verse. Men have versified on almost every subject, but we know of no great poem modelled on the principle of direct teaching. Virgil professed to teach agriculture in his "Georgics," but the real, practical precepts in husbandry which he gives, are a dead weight to the poem, and might have been more plainly and forcibly put in a prose tractate. No one can imagine that any Roman ever learned practical farming from the "Georgics" alone. No great poet has ever professed to be catechist and lecturer to humanity. When Milton wrote "Paradise Lost," he accomplished a greater work than if he had attempted to put his "Christian doctrine" into blank verse. The question, therefore, comes to this,—Is the "healthy influence" of poetry to be gauged by its approach to the qualities of simple, unadorned moral prose? If so, the worse the poet the better and healthier his influence. According to this theory, when Shakspeare described the "poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling," while his imagination bodies forth the shapes of things unknown, he described an individual the world would do well to shun, for its moral health's sake. We cannot imagine the poet he paints contenting himself with inditing a Sonnet to Perseverance, or an Ode on the wickedness of telling stories. Judge on these principles, and Mr. Martin Tupper deserves the crown, if (for we confess we never succeeded in reading through a score

pages of it) his "Proverbial Philosophy" answers to its title. Poetry has no such office as our opponents seem to suppose. It teaches only indirectly, by working upon our emotional being, by refining us, by raising us above the pettiness and turmoil of the crowd. With Milton, it takes us by the hand, bids us stand, as it were, by the foot of the Eternal Throne, and there behold the ways of God justified in our sight,—not by arguments of logic, but by the glorious vision of the drama of the history of man. With Shakspeare, it bids us analyze and watch the human heart, and all its passions; to study the inner nature and hidden springs of man's being and character. With Spenser, it bids us fill our minds with pictures of purity and innocence, for which we look in vain in the world around us. It unveils the face of nature; raises us above the miserable round of self, the artificialities of society, the materiality and routine of existence; lets us breathe a freer atmosphere; convinces us that we have souls within, possessed of mighty powers; that there is a beauty and a glory about our path, above us, around us, and before us, real, though but half perceived, or totally hidden to the eye of sense. It comes to us as visions came to the prophets of old. The greater the poet, therefore, the healthier his influence. He may abuse his gifts, but he will proportionately sink his own poetic eminence. It is not in the range of possibility for any one to write a poem equal in poetical merit to the *Gardener's Daughter*, and to take for his subject a guilty and vicious love, instead of one that is holy, happy, and pure, unless he also changes his treatment. He may write a *Guinevere*, but mentally and morally the effect is the same. Our faith is strong in this. No bad poem ever was or ever can be a great poem. Poetry is one of the highest faculties given to man; and the higher the poetry, the healthier, more subtle, and more enduring, will be its influence. In granting Tennyson to be the greater poet, our opponents have answered the question before us in the affirmative.

We might conclude here, but at the risk of being thought wearisome, we must advert to the kind of comparison which it has been sought to institute between Tennyson and Longfellow. We are asked by "Edmund" to compare the *Two Voices* with the *Psalm of Life*. We accept the comparison. Take any man worsted in the battle of life, feeling, with one of old, that all things are against him; ready to utter bitter things against the day of his birth; surrounded with unsympathizing counsellors, like those of Job; or alone, sternly, but with failing strength, grappling with trial, temptation, and doubt; with the painful riddle of the earth, and the mystery of evil perplexing his mind. Read to such the *Psalm of Life*. A trumpet call to the battle it is, but he is lying wounded, benumbed with pain, veiled in thick darkness. Will the summons staunch his wounds, bring back his strength, nerve his limbs, light and guide him? Why, it is like telling the naked and hungry, "Be thou covered, and be thou filled!" It only reminds him of disappointment, of the days

"When, wide in soul and bold of tongue,
Among the tents he paused and sung."

No; the *Psalm of Life* may meet the case of him who flags through waywardness, indolence, or because he finds that he has to fight, and not merely to march in triumph; but it cannot meet the case we have supposed. Those who have known or can imagine that stern struggle within, which we have described, will value and feel the worth of the *Two Voices*. The desperateness of the struggle is not disguised; we watch it, forgetting ourselves, yet feeling the applicability of the description. We see the foe held at bay, the struggle growing more determined, vibrating between hope and fear; but the foe has spent his last shaft, and retires as from a drawn combat. But then the change! The evil one has been resisted. He has not been conquered, but he *has* fled. We look out of ourselves now, and find the remedy there. In a moment,—

"A second voice is at our ear,
A little whisper silver clear,
A murmur, 'Be of better cheer.'"

Light has broken, strength returns, we are again ready for life and its duties. Of course there are those who know of nothing beyond a little weariness, a slight dejection. The *Psalm of Life* meets their case, so perhaps would a night's rest; but Tennyson sought to meet, and we think has met, a far more fearful case. Similar comparisons without number might be instituted. Longfellow tells us in a stirring way what to do; but we knew it before. Tennyson exhibits the whole struggle before us. We feel that we have a friend, not a mere adviser,—a sympathizer in whose knowledge we can trust, not a mere director. St. Augustin told us that sins may be made stepping-stones to virtue, and Longfellow only puts the idea into very musical English for us. We may think of his verses, and the little fault of to-day may be turned into a round of the ladder of improvement to-morrow; but will the verses stand us in stead when a passionate heart is transfixed with the agony, the disappointment, and the scorn figured in *Locksley Hall*? Surely not. But in that poem we have the whole drama worked out before our eyes. We learn from it as we learn from Shakspeare. We "learn to suffer and be strong," as we can never learn by being merely told to "be strong." The same remarks would apply to *Maud*. "Edmund" is puzzled to know what to accept as Tennyson's convictions! Why, it is the very nature of dramatic writing that we should find the truth and the conclusions in the result of the whole. Did Shakspeare believe with Hamlet, or not? Did he mean to say he would have killed Desdemona? Did he really sympathize with Shylock or his debtor? Did Milton approve of Satan's sentiments? The questions are all as sensible as "Edmund's" perplexity.

Again, we are told Tennyson is morbid. Verily, it would appear as if some people thought life ought to vibrate between a laugh and a comfortable quiescence of mental and physical repose. "Mor-

hidity" is used in such a manner as to be equivalent to any mood of mind not actually comfortable—as something nearly akin to reflection and thought. Melancholy is the *bête noir* of the soul, to be shunned with horror. We can put no other interpretation upon the oft-repeated charge of being "morbid," which is brought against Tennyson. The man who wrote the *Miller's Daughter*, the *Gardener's Daughter*, the *Talking Oak*, and the *Day Dream*, surely has no diseased ideas of human love and affection. *The Golden Year*, *Ring Out Wild Bells*, *You ask me why, though ill at ease*, and *Love thou thy Land*, are not altogether like the productions of a confirmed croaker, nor of one wholly destitute of philanthropy and patriotism. But, unfortunately, Mr. Tennyson deals with human life as it is *now*,—deals with *all* its phases, its sorrow as well as its joys, its weaknesses, its struggles, wrongs and doubts; and there seem to be people amongst us who are afraid to be reminded of these things, and quite horrified at seeing them pourtrayed and grappled with. Now, for ourselves, we confess that it is herein that we find the full proof of Tennyson's real height, and of the great work which he is doing amongst us. His mind is many sided, full of deep thought and deep feeling; his soul bears close sympathies and relations to all other souls. He has grasped the full meaning of the age in which he lives, and has become its bard, interpreter, and prophet. He is nobly answering the querulous wail of those who deem that the age of poetry is gone. Not by precept, but by depicting human passions, joys, hopes, fears, and struggles, he is teaching us. He fights our spiritual battles for us before our eyes. In deep allegories, he deals with the knottiest questions of the age; and, as his latest work, he has wrought out an illustration of the great doctrines of Christianity from the old romances of the past. We cannot stay to speak of the *Idylls*; we can only point to the concluding poem of the series. We have there poetry unsurpassed in the language,—full of touching tenderness, breathing the very spirit of our holy religion. We feel love and forgiveness triumphing over injury and wrong; raising the fallen as itself rises.

The charge of morbidity is generally coupled with *In Memoriam*. One word on that series of poems, and we have done. We have pointed to the moral of *Guinevere*,—its working out the grand principle of love in its redeeming power. *In Memoriam* is the gospel of sorrow, an expansion and commentary upon the Divine declaration, "Blessed are they that mourn." We confess that to ourselves it is well nigh the book of our age, as a literary production. A book that we value the more as we read it more. Never elsewhere has the struggle of the soul with sorrow in the valley of the shadow of death been pourtrayed with such truth. Every phase of that struggle is there; but there is more. There is the victory,—the discipline and fruits of sorrow. There is the wisdom, the calm, the resignation, and the blessed hope, remaining behind. For us, there is "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath

taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord." For the dead there is the benediction, "Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord." There are dark doubts and questionings, but they ever give place to the sublimest thoughts and the brightest hopes. Grief darkens almost to despair, but softens to holy and happy remembrances, while faith passes on exultingly to future scenes of bliss. We see a purpose in our sufferings; the mysteries of Providence seem half explained. We acknowledge and feel that there is a discipline in affliction which reconciles it with Eternal love and goodness. We are ready to say, "It is good to have been afflicted." Our faith is strengthened, our souls purified. Our final mood is thankfulness. We learn to cast off *real* morbidity; all miserable shrinking from aught that is not comfortable. We rejoice that we can suffer, for we feel that so only can we deeply enjoy. There is no healthier, happier mood than that in which we learn at last to say with Tennyson,—

"I envy not, in any moods,
The captive void of noble rage,
The linnet born within the cage,
That never knew the summer woods.

"I envy not the beast that takes
His licence in the field of time,
Unfettered by the sense of crime,
To whom a conscience never wakes.

"Nor, what may count itself as blest,
The heart that never plighted troth,
But stagnates in the weeds of sloth,
Nor any want-begotten rest.

"I hold it true, whate'er befall;
I feel it when I sorrow most,—
'Tis better to have loved and lost,
Than never to have loved at all."

B. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"Procul, O procul este, profani,
Conclamat vates, totoque abssistite luco."—*Virgil*.

THE most pleasing duty of the controversialist is ours on the present occasion; for we have not to find fault with our opponents, we have only to praise, and award the meed of praise to our adopted poet, Longfellow. It is surely a pleasing task to feel that we can say as much or more in praise of Tennyson than any of his advocates, and yet be able to say still more of Longfellow. It is not patriotism, nationality, nor any considerations of time or place which should influence our judgment on such a question as this; it is as teachers of the great family of the Saxon race, as exhibitors of the true and the beautiful, as moral and intellectual artists and prophets, that we compare the two most delicate and refined tastes in this glorious universe of ours. We have presented to our notice two exquisite gems, diamonds of the "first water," and it is our onerous duty to make choice, before the many and astute readers of these pages, of the preferable one, and to show reasons for our choice of a solid and substantial character, calculated to satisfy the cultivated perceptions and vigorous judgments of men accustomed to hold fast that which they believe to be true, and who require from others a reason for the truth that is in them. We have given our opinion

of the nature of true poetry on a former occasion,* and, by implication, of the true mission of a poet, in these words:—"Poetry is the blushing forth of transcendent truth and beauty,—it delights in the beauty and sublimity of the soul; therefore the true genius of poetry, and the true philosophy, must be the creation and imitation of truthful, beautiful, amiable, and holy objects, such as elevate, ennoble, purify the soul, and fit it for a higher and a holier state of being. The distinctive characteristic of the greatest poetic genius must then be the preservation in his writings of the greatest measure of pure and holy truth and dignity, of high moral purpose." Passing years have tended to confirm the force and truth of this opinion, we consequently feel greater pleasure in relying upon this canon of taste than we could possibly have done had it not have stood the test of years and experience.

By this rule, we are content to abide by the verdict of the *British Controversialists* in the question, Tennyson *versus* Longfellow; yet not *versus*, but *concurrent*, in fraternal emulation.

Longfellow's peculiarities are delicacy and beauty rather than sublimity; yet his chief feature is real earnestness of purpose in striking home a moral lesson to the heart; his high intellectual accomplishments and many attainments qualify him to deck his thoughts in the most fascinating dress, while energy and earnestness of character make him to feel his mission as a great teacher to the world of mind and feeling by which he is surrounded; his learning does not mystify nor crush the beauteous thoughts embodied in his melodious numbers; it is not the terrors of the Alps but the beauties of the Rhine he loves to depict—not the hurricane of the prairie but the quiet and comfortable activity of the homestead in which he delights; he is rather a poet of the beauties of every-day life, than the poet of nature's grand sublimities and infinite terrors. Longfellow is strictly a sentimental poet: he speaks to the heart; he expresses the feelings of the heart; he exhibits the heart's fullest, most truthful workings; he aspires after and makes his reader wish for higher, holier, nobler thoughts, feelings, objects, and aims. Besides, while thus leading onward and upward the aspiring soul of humanity, he does not disregard the weak, the erring, the poor and the afflicted; he has pity for them, and compassion. His sympathy is "blood warm," and comes from the heart of a brother, consequently it never fails to reach the heart. It gives solace, it imparts strength, it conveys hope, it creates happiness, by means of that wondrous link of genuine sympathy which shares in each other's joys and sorrows, makes the rejoicing more a hundred-fold, while the sorrow shared is made lighter, and in the company of such sweet sympathy the burden is easily carried through life.

His "Psalm of Life" manifests his tendency to earnestness of purpose so clearly, that we particularize that as illustrating this feature in his poetry. It is not mere philosophy, commerce, nor

* See vol. iv. p. 453, First Series.

sensual pleasures which make up human life as it should be; but an earnest, painstaking effort to fulfil the mission with which God has charged every man in the present:—

“Trust no *Future*, howe’er pleasant;
Let the dead *Past* bury its dead;
Act—act in the living *PRESENT*!
Heart within, and God o’erhead.”

His “*Excelsior*” is the outspoken feeling of the nineteenth century,—the personification of the good and the true in this struggling, erring world of ours. Where is the scholar who cannot say, “That is my thought”? Where is the philosopher who has not said, “That thought has guided and beckoned me on through many years of toil and labour, such as the world would not give me credit for”? Where is the man of commerce who does not act out, in his every-day life, the sentiment of this poem? In fine, what hosts of struggling artisans have found this their chart and their encouragement to hope,—have said, “Though we perish in the effort to gain knowledge, influence, and moral power, to benefit and bless our fellows, we will with clarion voice shout ‘*Excelsior*!’”

His highly educated mind, controlled by good taste, ennobles any subject upon which he writes. The “*Spanish Student*” is a subject which, in the hands of many poets, might become a lesson of vice and immorality: in the hands of Longfellow it is made the vehicle to teach moral purity and its beauties; virtue and constancy are made fascinating, and vice to hide its recreant head from view—thus obeying Horace’s rule, “Nothing offensive or revolting to a cultivated taste must be brought before the public in the action of the drama.” Delicate art, and moral power, with consummate skill, are here combined in the most felicitous manner. Simplicity, natural elegance, native grace and loveliness, are nowhere so pleasingly exhibited as in *Hiawatha*’s wooing; the sincere welcome of the lover to the home of the bride; the genial hospitality of nature’s children; the patient, painstaking watchfulness of *Minnehaha* while he introduced the subject of his visit, and said,—

“That this peace may last for ever,
And our hands be clasped more closely,
And our hearts be more united,
Give me as my wife this maiden,
Minnehaha, Laughing Water,
Loveliest of *Dacotah* women!”

To which the Ancient Arrow-maker replied,—

“Yes, if *Minnehaha* wishes:
Let your heart speak, *Minnehaha*.”

She, with maiden simplicity and truthfulness,

“said, and blushed to say it,
‘I will follow you, my husband.’”

She leaves the wigwam of her father with the beautiful and strong Hiawatha, the father turning to his work again after his

"Fare thee well, O Minnehaha!"
Murmuring to himself, and saying:
'Thus it is our daughters leave us,
Those we love, and those who love us.
Just when they have learned to help us,
When we are old, and lean upon them,
Comes a youth with flaunting feathers,
With his flute of reeds, a stranger
Wanders piping through the village,
Beckons to the fairest maiden,
And she follows where he leads her,
Leaving all things for the stranger.'

Oh, how correctly does he pourtray the affectionate workings of the father's heart! how truly delineates the course of nature and of this world! These few lines are in their simplicity and comprehensiveness an epitome of the world's great heart; they find an echo in every family circle; the king upon his throne, and the peasant in his cot, feels the full power of this pathetic soliloquy of the lone father on his loved one's bridal day.

The joyous buoyancy of their young hopes are admirably pourtrayed in the few lines following, which show that all nature to their young eyes looks bright, happy, joyous, and rejoicing in their happiness; but how full of thought and wisdom.

"From the sky the sun benignant
Looked upon them through the branches,
Saying to them, 'O my children,
Love is sunshine, hate is shadow;
Life is chequered shade and sunshine:
Rule by love, O Hiawatha.'"

More we dare not cull from this melodious garland of many healthy sweets, but hasten to conclude with a brief reference to the quaint yet life-like picture of puritan simplicity and earnestness, "Miles Standish." The retiring modesty of the heroine, the intense affection of the student, and the manly probity and determined self-sacrifice of both Miles Standish and his unsuspecting rival, are models of healthy character, worthy of the intellect and the heart of the greatest poet of our times.

It is, then, for the simplicity, nature-like, ennobling, elevating, purifying tendencies of Longfellow's poems that we would accord to him the palm of merit in these pages. We trust we do not detract from the merits of Tennyson by the course we have taken. We think highly, very highly of him; but we hope he may yet prove less mystical, less metaphysical, more life-like, hearty, and fraternal; then may his artistic elegance, his high attainments, and his great mental power, wield with more than a master's hand his native talent to express in easy numbers great ideas, with a holy purpose evident in every line.

L'OUVRIER.

History.

WAS JOAN OF ARC AN IMPOSTOR?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It is not with any very sanguine expectations of securing publication that we now take up the pen to express a few sentiments connected with the subject mooted in this department of our Magazine. But believing, as we do, in the great value of this serial for imparting salutary and much-needed instruction, we wish to do all in our power to promote its interests, and secure its enlarged success.

Before detailing the events connected with the career of the "Maid of Orleans," we wish to make a remark on the nature of those special missions which are sometimes confided to God's creatures.

When any of inferior birth are suddenly raised to honour, on the enunciation of their personal convictions, or in consequence of their claims to Divine inspiration, or the power to perform miracles, such persons' pretensions are always narrowly scrutinized, especially if they happen to belong to the softer sex. Such was the case with Joan of Arc, when she made her *début* into public life. Her revelations to Baudricourt were at first slighted, but after repeated importunities, they were listened to, and she was introduced to the French court as a prophetess that would deliver France from all her foes, and restore her former greatness and prosperity. Before Joan was placed in command, through being of humble birth and menial occupation, she was requested to make some revelations, to give the appearance of sincerity to her intentions. Accordingly, she pointed out the king amongst his courtiers, though divested of the ensigns of dignity. She also told the king his secrets, and described a sword that was in the church of St. Catherine de Fierbois. These revelations, in those credulous ages, were sufficient to gain belief and support for her; and the French court, though sensible of the weakness of her pretensions, were willing to embrace any means to retrieve their past misfortunes, and recover confidence. Historians, in those dark ages, did not possess that acuteness in discernment, and truthfulness in narrative, which we require from their successors of to-day. The most inconsistent tales—in many instances, the merest conjectures—crowded the pages of history, in the olden times. Our task, we think, will consist in sifting, if we can, the seeds or germs of truth from the ancient traditional rubbish,

Soon after Joan's introduction and revelations to the French court, she was publicly exhibited to the French people, caparisoned as a warrior destined to conquer the conquerors of France. To give further *éclat* to her mission, she was everywhere proclaimed as from heaven; was herself girded with the *sword of Gideon*, and was presented to the doctors of the University, who, being willing to second the imposture, gave out that her mission was from above.

The French court, being fully sensible of the deplorable situation in which the country was then placed, were ready and willing to avail themselves of any pretext to rekindle the flame of patriotic ardour that had been allowed to slumber since their defeat at Agincourt. The wars of retaliation that had raged for some time between the two nations had paralyzed the invaded, whilst it had completely exhausted the resources of the invaders. The conflicts produced nothing but empty *glory*, which neither supplied population nor wealth to the conqueror, whose real strength had been greatly reduced, by means of dissensions at home, and troubles abroad. At this juncture Joan appeared on the stage, and by the animation imparted to the troops under her command, seemed to be the cause of victories being won; but if we come to collate the strength and resources of the two armies, we shall find that it was the weakness of one that was the cause of the victory of the other, not the influence of Joan's sacred banner or mission.

To run through all the eventful changes in Joan's career, would be to recount the pages of history, which may be reviewed at leisure; suffice it to say that, from her relief of Orleans, to her capture and ransom, it was the artifice of the French court that invested her with power, constituted her mission, by the rumours and reports circulated at her *début*; and the terror thus excited *was the actual conqueror*; for the English soldiers appeared panic-stricken when brought to face their foes.

If we really believe in the Divine origin of the "Maid's" mission, as related, we are equally bound to believe the statement concerning her ultimate fate. Soon after her capture, she was ransomed by the Duke of Bedford, and tried and condemned as a public sorceress, her punishment being perpetual imprisonment, to feed upon bread and water during the remainder of her life. But, to all appearance, her punishment was not condign, considering her crimes; and her prosecutors resolved to practice an artifice to bring her to the ultimate punishment. Accordingly, they concluded that after so many professions of penitence, if she should resume her former equipment, in which she had led on the armies of France, that would be a sufficient pretext to warrant her proscription. In the execution of this plan, they placed her armour in her apartment; and no sooner did she view the robes in which she had won so much glory, than she at once girded on the same. This furnished her foes with a further accusation against her, which no recantation could destroy. She was now, says the historian, condemned to be burnt alive, and was actually committed to the flames in the market

place of Rouen, though this statement many of our opponents will deny.

In support of their position, our opponents may argue, that unless Joan had been inspired, she could not have made such disclosures as she did. To this supposition we would reply that, if she had actually possessed any prescience of future events, relative to the deliverance of France, it is very evident that she did not possess the same species of knowledge regarding her own fate; and this is, in our opinion, a self-evident contradiction.

We need not go beyond the bounds of our own country to recite the adventures of similar impostors, practised upon the credulous; *e. g.*, we may advert to King Simnel's exploits, with which most of our readers are, doubtless, acquainted. This Lambert Simnel, a baker's son, was set up to counterfeit the Earl of Warwick. But the vigilance of Henry defeated the machinations of the party, and fully disclosed the plot. This impostor was regularly instructed by Richard Simon, a priest, to talk of the incidents that occurred at the court of Edward, in order, by such recitals, to induce belief of the reality of his person. And such vile mockery did gain proselytes; but the end of the enterprise was a reversal of Simnel's expectations—a scullery instead of a throne. Parkin, another impostor of the same caste, was the offspring of a converted Jew, and bore so striking a resemblance to Edward, who, some assert, had an amorous intercourse with the impostor's mother, that he was selected to personate the Duke of York. The Duchess of Burgundy, finding the youth in every respect suitable to her purpose, gave him lessons to counterfeit the Duke, and in this manner she was resolved to perturbate the dominions she could not conquer. This enterprise, like its predecessor, proved a failure.

Shortly before these arts were practised, many other portions of Europe were usurped by deceivers, equally surreptitious, namely, Lorraine, Naples, and Portugal; and such impostors continued to deceive, without detection. The inhabitants of these countries seemed to be so closely confined, that for want of intercourse, they were incompetent to exercise the powers of discernment and ratiocination. We have been somewhat profuse in our remarks on this head, but we presume our readers will courteously pardon us, as this has been done with a view to show the possibility of similar corruption being resorted to with regard to the subject of our discussion.

Simply reviewing our position, we venture, without hesitation, to affirm that Joan was an *impostor*; and we think the majority of our readers will enlist under our banner, as the result of honest conviction, and not through the influence of prejudice, or any other predisposing cause.

S. F. T.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WITHOUT by the expression endeavouring to weigh our own abilities, we would, in the outset, remark on the difficulty attending

the investigation of character, and the motives prompting to the committal of deeds, be they worthy or reprehensible. Circumstances so intertwine themselves in the formation, as well as in the perpetuation of a name, that it is with caution that we should try to criticize the belongings, or analyze the motives, of our ancestors. Another thing which addeth to this is, that all history is but *human* testimony, and, consequently, we but opinionize on opinions; for we must remember, that though a fact be ever so clearly and tersely stated, it cannot but be coloured by the mind of the man who transmits it to the future. Also, in judging, we have to credit the judged with the item that they lived and wrought in times of comparative darkness, and that they were impelled differently by sinister or higher motives to those that move us, and that stamp them as great or base. If, therefore, a man becomes an enthusiast, and his enthusiasm has not been *positively* his own work, but the effect of a simultaneous movement of his passions, he is not to be thought of as a madman, and his madlike deeds are not to be attributed to an innate, determinate propensity to do evil. Of course, we speak of only a certain class of enthusiasts. We may safely say that, in general, an outrageous disturbance of the level of society tends to no permanent good, but, on the contrary, its effects soon pass away. This we find to have been especially the case with regard to the upraising of the kingdom of France, and the addition to her power, by the noble, devoted doings of the sweet maid of Orleans—Joan of Arc.

It will be necessary—and it may promote discussion—to give a definition of an imposition; for in this lies the gist of the subject. What, then, we ask, is an imposition? And we reply, An acted or unacted lie. Nor does it matter, as regards the turpitude of the crime, that the attempt to deceive be unsuccessful. Deception, so as to render the deceiver amenable, cannot be perpetrated unconsciously; and in the fact that he *knows* he *deceives* lies the *guilt* of the *action*. An imposition is not an accident, but an idea; something thought of and brought to bear upon action. To form a true case of imposition, fully carried out, the impostor must be cognizant that he is falsifying the facts, while the party imposed upon believes that the truth is being communicated, and that this state of consciousness is the effect of representations made by the deceiving party. We have here the differentia of an imposition; and we shall find, bearing these always in our mind, that though deceiving, in consequence of a peculiar state of mind, that the peasant maid of Domremi was not a deceiver in its strictest, truest sense. Man is, in some measure, but the handle of his times; and it is mostly in stirring epochs that we have the advent of our strangest and greatest men. France, during the earlier life of Joan, was troubled from end to end. Disaffection at home brought enemies from abroad. All was anarchy and suffering; and not only the cities and towns felt acutely the calamities, but obscure villages, and out-of-the-way hamlets, shared the effects of the strife. The dread of foreign foes

was not a sufficient inducement for oneness in project, and the Dauphin came into collision with his kinsman the Duke of Burgundy. Thus two antagonistic parties were created; the Armagnacs—as the followers of the king were called—and the Burgundians. At the time these difficulties began to exert their baneful power, Joan was about twelve years of age. Born of parents villagers of Domremi, which adjoins Lorraine, she there tended their little flock. She was taught scarcely anything beside Ave-Marias, and was by the companions of her youth thought of a peculiar disposition. The game or romp had no charm for her; and oftener would she be found praying, or inciting the lazy priests to duty, than associating with her sex. Making short pilgrimages to holy places, and chanting psalms beneath fairy-haunted trees, were most in accordance with her taste. Such a spirit, and such an education, needed little to excite them to something different from the common order of things. And here allow me to remark, that if we wish an individual to become an enthusiast, we have only to surround him with the fritterings of a popish ritual, and the bewitching notions of holy saints, and he is as rampant and ready for the development of any idiosyncrasy as the baldest friar could wish. We have no need to furnish him with theme or topic: his mind is generative, and some absurdity will out; and well is it if it be so inherently gross as to die of its own humours. Possessed naturally of an ardent temperament, Joan only needed an incentive to develop her powers. Ignorant of her own capabilities, she was somewhat startled at the sight of her inner self, or in other words, at the impulsive feelings which were at play in her breast. She saw what was “passing strange;” and the coy maiden conceived the project of exterminating the foe, and delivering her country from thralldom. She became inspired by her own feelings, till her entity was lost in the overpowering thought that she was

“ Chosen from above,
By inspiration of celestial grace,
To work exceeding miracles on earth.”

Joan was thus self-deceived, and we opine that this was the combined result of a saint-believing training, and the existence of a relic of antiquity, a legendary prophecy, that “France, lost by a woman, should be saved by a virgin from the borders of Lorraine.” She became so enwrapped in her desires, that her imagination furnished her with supernatural appearances; and oral messengers seemed to surround her. These co-mingled allusions prompted her to what she conceived to be a duty; and she heard “voices,” which caused her to exclaim, “No one but myself is appointed to recover this realm of France. The Lord my master willeth it.”

Having thus shown some of the causes that induced this state of mind, and *produced* this coruscation of ability, we shall try to prove that in her professions she was sincere. Ordinary obstacles deter ordinary men: short leaps for small abilities, but the testing

of determinate power is a gaping chasm. Difficulties, not insignificant from their nature, were in the way of the maiden. The means of access to the King were precarious; but having the inward promptings of a sincere heart, with earnestness she opened up her projects to an astounded uncle—a homely swain. The aid of a neighbouring governor was entreated, but he, believing more in the potency of steel, wielded by trusty arms, than in predictions and “voices,” would give no ear to the patriotic girl. Ultimately, however, she commenced her journey, unsexed in dress, enduring fatigue, and encountering danger from the adherents of the House of Burgundy. She had to pass through provinces hostile to her cause, and submit to taunts from those who travelled with her. And here we must mark the fact, as it bespeaks her consciousness of right, that no misgivings came over her, though her fellow-wayfarers and escort deemed her to be a sorceress, and felt inclined to toss Joan into a stone-quarry. Ushered, at length, into the presence of the Dauphin, she spoke for her mission and her aims; and, as Shakspeare hath it, she declared her call in the words,—

“Heaven, and our Lady gracious, hath it pleased
To shine on my contemptible estate:
Lo, whilst I waited on my tender lambs,
And to the sun's parching heat displayed my cheeks,
God's mother deigned to appear to me;
And in a vision full of majesty,
Willed me to leave my base vocation.
And free my country from calamity.” *

Though she revealed her visions, and gave proofs of ability, Charles and his court were unpersuaded by her tales. She was summoned to attend before the doctors of theology, and these questioned her on the several points relating to her object; and they at last came to the conclusion that the King might accept her services without sin. Nor is it foreign to remark that, during this close examination, she never professed “any gift or prophecy” beyond her mission. Joan was thus authorized, and, equipping herself knight-like in armour, and carrying a banner, she commenced her career. Concomitant circumstances favoured her *début*, and the soldiery, haggard and worn out, dispirited by ill-success, and cast down by the black future, received an infusion of new spirit. She began to reform the morals of the army; prohibited laxity of discipline; called to prayer and confession; and by her striking individuality strangely influenced the soldiery.

Her power, however, was not confined to her followers; her bewitching influence was felt upon our own army. She thus doubly did her work, by inciting her friends, frightening her foes, and a career of glorious chivalry followed.

Her after life may be summed up in a few words. The city of

* “Henry VI.” act i. scene ii. Shakspeare.

Orleans was relieved, and that in the short period of seven days from the time she took the lead in the assaults on the English entrenchments. City after city yielded, until the French army approached Rheims, into which Charles, without the show of opposition, entered, and was crowned king. The shepherd maid's legitimate mission was now ended; her professed work was done, and she believed her inspiration was gone. Her *prestige* now gradually declined. The higher grades, the officers, looked jealously on her power; the common soldiers applauded only when victories were secured. These facts, with natural love of retirement, caused her to wish for the quiet days of the past. She sighed to

"Return to green Lorraine,
And be a shepherd maid again."

Nowhere does her simplicity of character and honesty of purpose shine forth more than in her subsequent history. The cause of her king was endangered, and she entered a beleaguered city by stealth. That very evening saw her heading an unsuccessful sally, and a prisoner of the Duke of Burgundy. Bought by her bitterest foes, the English, they made short work, and less ceremony, in despatching her. Joan was arraigned before an ecclesiastical tribunal; and, to their shame be it spoken, her countrymen sat in judgment. Her answers displayed a great amount of tact and cautiousness. She declared her victories were owing to God, and none else. But pre-judged, and pre-condemned, no earnest straightforwardness could avail her, and she was taken into the marketplace of Rouen; and there, amid the life-taking flames, she died, with the word "Jesus" on her lips, a victim of an ignorant witch-burning age—an age in which chivalry and honour were no match for chicanery and deceit.

BENNETT.

The Reviewer.

The Mill on the Floss. By GEORGE ELIOT, Author of "Scenes of Clerical Life," and "Adam Bede." 3 vols. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1860.

THE merits of a new work, from an author whose reputation is already, to a great extent, established, are usually determined, not by the ordinary critical canon merely, to which all works are subjected, but by another altogether distinct therefrom, viz., that which its author's previous works supply; and how much less easy it is to satisfy the requirements of the latter than of the former, the present age supplies many significant illustrations. Believing this course to be perfectly fair and legitimate, we shall not scruple to follow it with regard to the "Mill on the Floss." A book such as this is a

wondrous thing, but the brain which produced it is a greater wonder still; and hence, while it is interesting to notice the play of passion, the flashes of wit, or the depths of pathos it contains, it is still more interesting to trace therein the growth and development, or otherwise, of the powers of its author. The first thought which flashed across our mind as we opened the "Mill on the Floss," and the first question we were asked when we had finished it, was, "Is it equal to 'Adam Bede'?" The same thought occurred, and the same question has been put, we doubt not, to almost all who have as yet read the work, and this alone is sufficient to prove the reasonableness of the ground we have taken.

What, then, is the relative position which the "Mill on the Floss" bears to "Adam Bede"? Our reply is,—As regards its merits as a work of art, it is equal if not superior to it; but its *morale* is far inferior. What we mean will appear as we proceed.

In attempting to point out the book's excellencies, we scarcely know where to begin, they are so many and so various. The country scenes, wherein the plot is laid, are portrayed with a breadth of conception, and a delicacy of finish, and in language so nervous, yet so rich, as to call forth our heartiest admiration. It is here that "George Eliot" is most at home. A river sweeping along with musical murmur; the green willows bending lovingly from its banks, and cooling their parched heads in its waters; rich pasture lands stretching far and wide; in the distance a village, with its old-fashioned gables, and the church spire shining in the summer sun—such a scene warms her into sympathy, and she paints them with extraordinary effect. But these pictures, exquisite as they are, are subordinate, and rightly so, to the crowd of characters who constitute the *dramatis personæ* of the story. George Eliot's delineations of these are truly Shakspearian. The class of life from which most of them are taken peculiarly evidences her power. To an author of ordinary perceptions farmers and farmers' wives would have little else whereby to distinguish them but a general and deeply infused slowness and stupidity; but George Eliot gives us a dozen persons, all living in circumstances exactly identical, and while drawing them all in the same general outline, she yet contrives to separate them from each other by her keen perception of the nicest shades of character, and her graphic delineative power—so rendering them "distinct in individuality," yet "like to like." And this is accomplished by no artifice. It is not effected by investing each character with some external peculiarity, which is so constantly pressed upon the reader's attention as at last to become inextricably associated in his mind with its owner, after the manner of one of our greatest novelists. None of George Eliot's characters are made wholly known to us at once; they gradually unfold as the story proceeds. This is not the case only with those who are at first introduced to us as children, it is so with all those with whom the action of the book is largely concerned. Mr. Tulliver, the owner of the "mill," is vigorously drawn. The "Dodsons," with their family

pride, their belief in one another, their traditional prejudices, are types of a class not yet extinct, and once very prevalent. Who that has any familiarity with life in our more remote agricultural districts, but can call to mind some specimens of the class thus vividly drawn:—

"The religion of the Dodsons consisted in revering whatever was customary and respectable. It was necessary to be baptized, else one could not be buried in the churchyard; and to take the sacrament before death, as a security against more dimly understood perils: but it was of equal necessity to have the proper number of pall-bearers and well-cured hams at one's funeral, and to leave an unimpeachable will. A Dodson would not be taxed with the omission of anything that was not becoming, or that belonged to the eternal fitness of things, which was plainly indicated in the practice of the most substantial parishioners, in the family traditions—such as obedience to parents, industry, rigid honesty, thrift, the thorough scouring of wooden and copper utensils, the hoarding of coins likely to disappear from the currency, the production of first-rate commodities for the market, and the general preference for what was home-made. The Dodsons were a very proud race; their pride lay in an utter frustration of all desire to tax them with a breach of traditional duty or propriety. A wholesome pride in many respects, since it identified honour with perfect integrity, thoroughness of work, and faithfulness to admitted rules; and society owes some worthy qualities in many of her members to mothers of the Dodson class, who made their butter and their frumenty well, and would have felt disgraced to make it otherwise."

Another point in which George Eliot excels is in her knowledge of children. The first volume, which is occupied mainly with the childhood of Maggie and Tom Tulliver, is by far the best of the three; it excels both in interest and in healthiness of tone. Was ever child life portrayed better than in this dialogue?—

"Tom," says Maggie, as they sat on the boughs of the elder tree, eating their jam puffs, "shall you run away to-morrow?"

"No," said Tom slowly, when he had finished his puff, and was eyeing the third, which was to be divided between them. "No, I shan't."

"Why, Tom?—because Lucy's coming?"

"No," says Tom, opening his pocket-knife, and holding it over the puff in a dubitative manner. (It was a difficult problem to divide that very irregular polygon into two equal parts.) "What do I care about Lucy? She's only a girl,—she can't play at bandy."

"Is it the tipsy cake, then?" said Maggie, exerting her hypothetic powers, while she leaned forward towards Tom, with her eyes fixed on the hovering knife.

"No, you silly, that'll be good the day after. It's the pudden. I know what the pudden's to be—apricot roll-up. O! my buttons!"

With this interjection the knife descended on the puff, and it was in two, but the result was not satisfactory to Tom, for he still eyed the halves doubtfully. At last he said—

"Shut your eyes, Maggie."

"What for?"

"You never mind what for. Shut your eyes when I tell you."

Maggie obeyed.

"Now, which'll you have, Maggie—right hand or left?"

"I'll have that with the jam run out," said Maggie, keeping her eyes shut to please Tom.

"Why, you don't like that, you silly. You may have it, if it comes to you fair; but I shan't give it you without. Right or left?—you choose, now!"

"Ha-a-a!" said Tom in a tone of exasperation, as Maggie peeped; "you keep your eyes shut now, else you shan't have any."

Maggie's power of sacrifice did not extend so far; indeed, I fear she cared less that Tom should enjoy the utmost possible amount of puff, than that he should be pleased with her for giving him the best possible bit. So she shut her eyes quite close, till Tom told her to "Say which!" and then she said, "Left hand."

"You've got it," said Tom, in rather a bitter tone.

"What, the bit with the jam run out?"

"No; here, take it!" said Tom, firmly; handing decidedly the best bit to Maggie.

"O, please, Tom, have it; I don't mind; I like the other, please take this."

"No, I shan't," said Tom, almost crossly, beginning on his own inferior piece.

Maggie, thinking it was no use to contend further, began too, and ate up her half puff with considerable relish as well as rapidity. But Tom had finished first, and had to look on while Maggie ate her last morsel or two, feeling in himself a capacity for more. Maggie did not know Tom was looking at her; she was seeing on the elder bough, lost to almost everything but a vague sense of jam and idleness.

"O you greedy thing!" said Tom, when she had swallowed the last morsel. He was conscious of having acted very fairly, and thought she ought to have considered this, and made up to him for it. He would have refused a bit of hers beforehand, but one is naturally at a different point of view before and after one's own share of puff is swallowed.

Maggie turned quite pale. "O Tom, why didn't you ask me?"

"I wasn't going to ask you for a bit, you greedy. You might have thought of it without, when you knew I gave you the best bit."

"But I wanted you to have it; you know I did," said Maggie, in an assured tone.

"Yes, but I wasn't going to do what wasn't fair, like Spouncer. He always takes the best bit if you don't punch him for it; and if you choose the best with your eyes shut, he changes hands. But if I go halves, I'll go 'em fair; only I wouldn't be greedy."—Vol. i. pp. 77—79.

We can add little more to our commendations than that the interest is sustained throughout—dialogue, narrative, description; the authoress excels in all. Still there are spots even in this sun. As we intimated, we are not satisfied with the moral impression the book is likely to produce. The great majority of the characters are of a sordid, vulgar type, with scarcely a trait that is honourable or beautiful. Granting that they are faithfully drawn, as we have done already, still it would have been wise to put in some one impersonation of the beauty of goodness, if only as a relief. The absence of all such, so calculated to excite within us a disgust for humanity itself, is to us most painful. The action of the various characters has in scarcely a single instance any spring or motive out of or higher than themselves. Parental love and friendship are the noblest motive powers to which allusion is made, but these are instincts which man shares to a great extent with the brute creation. No good is done, no evil left undone, in obedience to the commands of a higher and unseen Power. As we read the book, we feel ourselves in the company of heathens, rather than of the dwellers in a

Christian land. The character of Dr. Ken, it may be urged, is of a noble kind. It certainly is; but the part he plays is so insignificant, and his appearances so few, that he is quite overshadowed and lost amid the crowd. And it may be also said, that the account given of the brief period of Maggie's life, wherein she strove after happiness by self-abnegation and perfect submission, with Thomas a Kempis, the Bible, and the "Christian Year," for her teachers, is imbued with a higher spirit; but this we cannot but feel is introduced simply to show how futile all such attempts must be, while there is nothing which suggests the existence of a more perfect way. The hero and heroine, Tom and Maggie, we confess to disliking heartily. Maggie is a problem. As when a child she licks the paint off Tom's lozenge-box, and pushes her head through his kite, and "never can help it," so she goes through life, bringing constant trouble on others, but always with the best intentions. The proceedings which are related in the third volume, in which she is the principal actor, are something more than questionable. Stated briefly, the case is this;—here are four persons thrown together—Maggie and Philip Wakem, Stephen Guest and Lucy Dean, both couples being virtually though not actually betrothed. Maggie and Stephen Guest, her cousin's lover, betray a passion for each other, and Maggie so far yields to it as to allow Stephen to convey her away from her friends down the river, and passes the night with him by her side on the deck of a vessel. When morning comes she returns to her right mind, and, leaving her lover, goes home again. Much virtuous indignation is wasted by the authoress upon the good people of the town of St. Ogg's, and upon society generally, for their uncharitableness in severely judging such conduct. For ourselves, we are inclined entirely to sympathize with them. Maggie's passion was of no sudden growth; it was consciously cherished, in opposition to every dictate of duty, honour, friendship, and maidenly modesty; and it seems to us, it will be a sad thing when such departures from the paths of decorum are looked upon otherwise than with the severest reprehension. We greatly regret that George Eliot should thus display a moral insensibility better worthy of George Sand than of the author of "Adam Bede."

There is yet one other complaint we have to make. In our review of "Adam Bede" we had occasion to complain of the melodramatic blunder committed in the reprieve of Hetley, almost at the moment of execution. We have a similar complaint to make of the abrupt conclusion of the "Mill on the Floss." While the whole story is in a state of suspension and of confusion, out of which the reader can see no escape, the Floss swells, in a great flood, and all difficulties are got rid of by the drowning of the two principal characters. There is no reason why they should not die this way as well as any other, but it is a matter of great regret to us that "George Eliot" has not finished her story in a manner more worthy of her powers as an artist.

CONSTABLE'S EDUCATIONAL SERIES.

1. *School Geography*. By JAMES CLYDE, LL.D. 4s.
2. *Concise History of England*. By J. F. CORKRAN. 3s.
3. *Italian Grammar*. By E. LEMMI, LL.D. 5s.
4. *German Grammar*. By T. H. WEISSE. 3s.
5. *French Grammar*. By AUGUSTE BELJAMBE, LL.B. 2s.
6. *Elementary Latin Grammar*. By D'ARCY W. THOMPSON, M.A. 2s.

WE have had occasion, in this serial, to speak with truthful admiration of MacLean's "Book-keeping," and with appreciative pleasure of Morell's (now, worthily, LL.D.) grammatical works, constituent members of this excellent set of school books. Clyde's "Geography" is a most complete, thorough, and excellent work, remarkable, in these days of everlasting plagiarism and pilferment, for its genuine, useful, yet unpretentious originality. It is such a book as *we* should have liked to have composed. It is reliable, full, well-planned, sensible, with here and there a stroke of genius in it. That it has these especial features deserves impressive statement, for *best* and *first-rate* are so hackneyed now-a-days, that we cannot use them of such a labour of intelligent love, care, and usefulness. Of nearly a hundred school geographies recently published, it, for its bulk, price, and purpose, "bears the bell."

Corkran's History is fluently written from the ordinary standpoint, only that it dilates upon social progress, and incorporates a kindly Christian philosophy of history, with its carefully composed sketches and concise expositions. It must have cost a great deal of self-restraint to write so cautiously and so briefly, yet so well, on the many-topiced History of England. This "narration of the deeds" of England deserves to be thought much of by teachers, and should quickly receive adoption in schools. The grammars are useful, and in many instances are superior to the commoner books. Lemmi's seems to us the plainest useful and brief Italian Grammar we have met. Weisse's German does not strike us as much in advance of other works on the same topic, though Sir Wm. Hamilton thought it "admirably calculated to impart a practical knowledge of the German language."

Both of the above works are suitable for self-instruction.

Beljambe's French Grammar is well-arranged and carefully compiled; it must be useful in the hands of a good teacher, but it will require that.

Thompson's Latin Grammar is elementary, and aims strictly at utility. It is clear and simple, yet not dry, and the explanations of the *general* principles of the language are brought within the range of the mind of the merest tyro, without losing philosophical exactness and philological accuracy.

The series is handsomely got up, in uniform volumes, and cannot fail to please those who adopt it. Several volumes of it yet lie for notice on our library table.

Arithmetic of Fractions and Proportions. By JOHN COPELAND.
London and Glasgow: Richard Griffin and Co. 1s.

Exercises in Arithmetic for Beginners. By JOHN COPELAND.
Edinburgh: Wm. P. Nimmo. 4d.

Arithmetic for Beginners. By CORNWELL and FITCH. London:
SimpkIn, Marshall, and Co. 1s. 6d., or, in Two Parts, 9d. each.

ARITHMETIC is a science not over easy to be taught to young people, and hence it has often been reduced to a mere empirical art, gaining an absurd puffing apotheosis in some such mass of mere nick-nacks as "O'Gorman's Intuitive Calculator." It is neither right to dwell on the abstruse theses of the reason for ever, nor to pother on in mere empiric manipulations. A good text-book for arithmetical tuition ought, we imagine, to teach the science, as well as supply copious exercises. It would be possible to do this either by publishing the theoretic portion separately, as a lesson-book—a sort of readily understood philosophy of arithmetic—or by interweaving the theoretic with the practical part, so that both might be learned together. We do not know any work combining, in due proportions, the qualities of philosophical accuracy in definition and demonstration, with teachability. But we are dashing into general observations, when we ought only to *review*.

Mr. Copeland, author of the two first-mentioned books, is a painstaking, intelligent, practical teacher, who has won his way well up in his profession, and we think that he has done a good service to pupil teachers, senior classes, and self-educators, by producing this investigation and explanation of "Fractions and Proportions." We can recommend it as ingenious, able, and honest; and if we were to hint a fault, or hesitate dislike, it would be, that the book contains no answers, and is therefore unhandy for those who have no master, or who have little time to prepare their class sums. The other little book is simple, neat, and plentifully filled with capitally constructed exercises.

Cornwell and Fitch's book is initiatory, and intended to lead up to their larger volume, "The Science of Arithmetic," which we have not seen. It is eminently plain, practical, and full. It supplies easily comprehended explanations, simple mental exercises, and copious slate work. The questions come not only within the range of ordinary life, but of every-day needs, and are yet important enough to require consideration and care. We have tested it for six months, and can assert safely that it is capable of being so used as to make interesting progress. We look upon the references to the higher work as a blemish, and we have found some few typographical errors in it.

In the three works now noticed, "the decimal system" receives notice and elucidation.

The Topic.

OUGHT PUGILISM TO BE SUPPRESSED BY LAW?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Prizefighting degrades humanity, encourages brutality, and fosters a spirit of inhuman emulation and daring. It ought not to be allowed in any civilized country. Let the strong arm of the law crush it at once and for ever.—W. F.

Order is professedly the object of legislation. Pugilistic exhibitions are breaches of the peace, *ergo*, pugilism ought to be suppressed by law. All the concomitants of a prize-fight are most demoralizing in their influence. It is the nucleus of the vilest specimens of humanity; and the many crimes committed in connection with every fistic display render it very desirable that measures should be taken towards the speedy abolition of such a diabolical practice.—C.R.G.S.

Without entering into the question of whether there is anything in pugilism, as a system, radically wrong or not, we think the associations inseparably connected with its operations are sufficiently brutal and barbarous to demand the interference of the legislature. We do not see the justice of the analogy attempted to be drawn between pugilism and warfare; and we defy any right-minded individual to read the columns of vile slang disgracing the pages of the sporting journals, and say that anything which calls such language forth can be deserving either of support or commendation.—G. H. S.

Years ago the practice of duelling was rendered illegal, and that act has met with the unqualified approval of all classes of the community. Now, it appears to me that pugilism is but another form of duelling; undertaken, certainly, for other objects, but still having very much in common with the obsolete and illegal practice. Consequently, it should be placed under

similar restrictions. It is also a breach of the peace itself; an illegal act, and also a public nuisance to the neighbourhood in which the contests take place. On these grounds, and without any appeal to its moral bearing, pugilism ought to be brought under the same punishments that are awarded to other misdemeanours.—LYNDOCH.

As it is evidently an important part of the duty of a good government to protect the morals of the people, and as exhibitions of this nature cannot possibly be otherwise than immoral in their tendency, I think it follows, as a natural consequence, that it is the incumbent duty of the State to step in, and suppress such brutal and demoralizing contests.—ECLECTIC.

If "Law" be "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a State, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong," it is evidently necessary that its force should be extended to pugilism, which constitutes a breach of virtue and a stronghold of vice.—IOTA.

The laws of a country that recognises and countenances pugilism are in direct opposition to civilization. They partake more of the dark and barbarous ages, when brute courage was esteemed as a virtue of high price—when the arena of the amphitheatre was the scene of bloody encounters, and applauding crowds exulted in the groans of expiring gladiators. As practised, what is noble in pugilism? What sentiments proper to man—the image of his Creator—has it called forth? Does it not sink the man, and exalt the brute? In all the black catalogue of the prize ring is there one redeeming virtue, one ennobling act, to save it from unqualified condemnation? For no love of the general good does the prizefighter undergo his severe course of physical

training; his highest thought, his only aim, is to beat his opponent, and pocket the stakes, and to be held in the estimation of those who can appreciate such jungle work, as the best bruiser of his country; to wear the belt of human degradation, and glory in the shame. The Englishman of to-day needs not to cultivate pugilism for the purpose of developing his muscular strength; there are many ways far more elevating and innocent whereby he can attain the full measure of active bodily energy. Pugilism is at variance with the spirit of the age, and our high claim to intelligence; it is opposed to the growth of sound morality, by inculcating a love of the brutal, therefore debasing; it is inconsistent with the precepts of Christianity, for no good Christian can be a pugilist by profession. Therefore, it ought to be suppressed by law.—D.R.R.

No doubt the coroner that has so recently been engaged in the investigation of the circumstances attending the deaths, by violence, of Thomas Weller, at Knightsbridge, and Charles Dickens, in the Edgeware Road, will severely comment upon the pugilistic encounters that have been attended with results so fatal. From the above we may categorically infer that pugilistic encounters, such as are of the Heenan-Sayers character, are highly demoralizing, and even cruel, to an extent indescribable; and therefore we advocate their suppression by special legislation.—S. F. T.

Of the many manias which have recently prevailed in this country, the pugilistic is the most inconsistent, absurd, and humiliating, being opposed to reason and morality, and calculated only to awaken the baser feelings of our nature. We naturally wonder how people, presuming to be civilised, can derive pleasure or delight from beholding such brutal exhibitions as Spanish bullfights; yet, in this country, a few weeks since, the all-engrossing topic of conversation was regarding the particulars of a prize-fight; and hundreds, nay, thousands, representing almost every class of society, eagerly rushed to

witness the shocking spectacle of two men fighting in a ring, until their disfigured faces ceased to have a human likeness. And this is the noble art! Is it pluck to throw your man, and fall heavily on the top of him? Is there anything manly or noble in getting your antagonist in a corner, and trying to choke him? Is any one of these things science? So far from that, they are gross brutalities that ought to be suppressed by law; but are, unfortunately, fostered by some of our law-makers. What a caricature on our age of progress, enlightenment, and intellectual refinement! There never was a greater delusion than the pretence that society can be in any way strengthened or improved by such spectacles, which, on the contrary, cannot but produce the most demoralizing effects. True courage does not require the aid of such horrid scenes for its display, but is ever ready to exert itself on behalf of humanity and justice, to assist the oppressed, or defend the right. British courage never wavers in the hour of danger or disaster. When duty calls, there is not a danger but Britons will face unflinchingly, like "the thin red line" at Balaklava—or a disaster, even though it be a disaster such as that of the immortal *Birkenhead*—British courage can meet it with calmness and resignation.—J. M.

It is universally acknowledged that war is only justified when it becomes a necessity; and, considering pugilism in the light of war, where are the proofs of its necessity? There is not a single circumstance attending pugilism which induces soldiers to risk their lives in warfare, unless contrarily considered, thus:—On the one hand the soldier feels, in the heat of battle, a glorious ardour and enthusiasm in the fulfilment of a duty which he is called upon by his country to perform; while, on the other hand, the pugilist has no such feelings, but others, the most degrading to his manhood, as by the debasement of his nature to the common feeling which inspires animals in their fights,

he places himself on the same level with them. Bull and other fights are generally deemed detrimental to humanity, and are suppressed by law; how much more, then, ought those fights to be suppressed between men, endowed with souls originally destined to soar into sublimity!—J. C.

That two men should deliberately stand up to fight for the sake of money and notoriety is, to my mind, brutish; and when we think of those in authority, and of (so called) ministers of the Gospel, taking a delight in such things, how can we hope for a remedy, except the law shall carry out the desirable object? Bets have been made; money has been wasted (no one knows how much); minds have been corrupted; no good has been accomplished; and why all this? Simply because the law is deficient. It becomes us, therefore, with all earnestness, and with much determination, to demand that the necessary act of parliament be passed without delay.—TNEJBOR.

If pugilism be beneficial to the country and its inhabitants, it ought, by all means, to be supported by the laws of our land. *Is it beneficial?* Does it elevate the tastes, either of those who partake in it, or of those who witness it? Does it incite us to do good to others? Does it rouse our best and most Christian emotions? Does it teach us to "do unto others as we would have them to do unto us"? Nay, verily! Can the sight of a battered human countenance elevate our tastes? Are not anger, revenge, and other evil passions, roused by receiving a blow? Will it stand the test of Christianity? England professes to be a Christian land, and therefore her laws ought rigorously to suppress all that tends to shake her fair pretensions. Pugilism is low and vulgar in the extreme; it has not the slightest support in the Christian's guide-book; and conscientious men will at once denounce this sport (?)—BETA.

Pugilism is a disgrace to any civilized country, and is followed only by the scum of society, whether that society be-

long either to the upper or lower classes. Men going through a systematic training, for the purpose of doing bodily injury to each other, sacrifice all manliness in the fistic arena, engage in the lowest and most degrading pursuit, one that taints everything that comes within its influence, raises all the evil passions of a man's nature, immoral in its tendencies, destroys every right feeling, and brutal in the extreme. Such a system as this cannot be consonant with the feelings of true-hearted Englishmen, and the law ought to put forth its powerful arm for the suppression of such barbarism, and a severe (but deserved) punishment be inflicted upon all offenders.—S. T. W.

In pugilism the worst passions of men are aroused, and find full scope for action. It hardens and brutalizes all who take part in, or witness, its displays; and fits them, in no small degree, to commit acts of violence, cruelty, or atrocity. These are its natural fruits.—J. W. D.

Everything exists either for good or for evil, and upon interrogation as to this matter, we naturally reflect for a moment, and ask, What is the object aimed at, or to be attained by pugilism? Not being connected, directly or indirectly, with *gentlemen* engaged in this rather *ungentlemanly* profession, we are at a loss to determine what is the object aimed at. It may be replied, that it is sport, pastime, and manly exercise, in which is exhibited bravery, courage, determination, or what is usually called "pluck." We deny that it affords such, and doubt very much if the late worthies of fistic renown possess half as much real courage, self-sacrificing, fearless intrepidity, as was exhibited lately by one or two individuals on the occasion of the destruction by fire of our Sailors' Home. What is attained, or what follows consequent on the practice of pugilism, we do know, and emphatically say, it is a disgrace, a reproach to all right-minded men in this enlightened age of moral, social, and intellectual progress; in fact, pugilism is an un-

christian, a low, debasing, barbarous, brutalizing practice, which, while injuring, morally and physically, the pugilists, opens up a wide field, and calls in a multitude of attendant evils.—GEORGE, *Liverpool*.

Pugilism is but another name for scientific and systematic brutality. The prize-ring an area for the ferocious exhibition of muscular power and physical endurance. Pugilism develops the worst of our animal faculties. It is a barbarous relic of the feudal times. It professedly teaches the art of self-defence, but in reality the mode of attack. It debases and brutalizes the noble nature of man, and fosters a spirit of revenge. It enables men to settle their disputes by the unjust method of brute force, by which the might often conquers the right. It disturbs the peace and endangers the lives of her Majesty's subjects. It leads to rioting, drunkenness, and immorality. For these reasons we say, pugilism ought to be suppressed by law.—J. F. R. L.

Whatever the *Saturday Review* might be able to say *for* pugilism, I rather think much more can be said *against* it. The ring imposes a consummate physical training, but the unnatural climax is brutal mutilation, and, perhaps, death. It calls forth a sturdy courage, but the objects to be attained are mean and mercenary. It exhibits hardy endurance in the fighters, but it awakens their bad passions. The beholders, too, and others not present, it may be, are injured. Those around cheer as they see responsible, immortal men endanger each other's limbs and life, and are thus brutalized. Those away hear or read the disgusting accounts, the effect being somewhat the same. Those present and absent, too cowardly to enter the ring themselves, too lazy to earn an honest penny by persevering industry, bet upon the results. Here, then, are counts surely sufficient to form an indictment against pugilism. It endangers life and limb; evokes the worst passions; fosters gambling; and these things it does without

furnishing any exclusive counterbalancing advantages, which are not to be found in *manly* pursuits. But to what is pugilism amenable? I think to the law of the land. Now, what is the end of government? Simply, the common weal. But pugilism tends to destroy this. Therefore, a just regard to the well-being of the people demands an interference on the part of those who are entrusted with power on their behalf.—D.

Only a cursory glance is required at pugilism to show its baneful consequences. The places at which its business is conducted; the *inhuman* passions it fosters in the breast; and its antagonism to the principles, examples, and commands of the New Testament, are abundant reasons why it should be suppressed by law. Some will say, Support it, because it encourages bravery: but its bravery is of a mere animal and useless kind. Others will defend it on the grounds of its necessity for personal safety. Now, if this be true, it ought to become general; and, if so, of what advantage would it be, as your opponent would be equally strengthened by the *science*? We are told in the *Athenæum* that pugilists live but short lives, and terminate even that with dropsey, or some other malady; if so, upon physical grounds such a cruelty ought to be suppressed. When future historians shall record the follies, crimes, brutalities, and wickedness that had disgraced the past ages, conspicuous on all that lengthy list shall the noble art of pugilism stand forth; and loud indeed shall be the thanks of all humane and christian men; but gloriously weak shall be the cry for its re-establishment, as reasonable and reflecting men shall see that although patronized by the opulent, and frowned upon by the educated indigent, it proved upon examination not one reason for its continuance.—R. B. L.

England has become the centre of Christianity and civilization; commerce rules with golden sway o'er all her fair domain; arts and science flourish; vir-

tue and industry are encouraged; and yet with all her civilization and progress she has many vices which cry aloud for prompt and immediate reform. Of these, pugilism is one. It is a remnant of the times when men met each other in mortal combat; when reason and justice were hid under a bushel, that their lights might not be seen; and jousts and tournaments were the amusements of the rich, and cock-fighting and bull-baiting those of the poor. Its tendency is degrading, as it is the incentive to, and the occasion of, other vices. It is duelling in another and more vulgar form. It is incompatible with Christianity, and as our laws are founded upon its principles, those laws should, as far as possible with regard to personal freedom, suppress everything derogatory to it.—E. G.

It is a disgrace to us as a professing christian nation that such a revolting spectacle, as the one beheld in the late fight, should have taken place upon our shores. In this brutalizing and degraded action we have beheld man brought to the very level of the brute, and, painful to relate, a Christian people sanctioning and approving it. If one man more than another is gifted by his Maker with great physical powers, surely it was intended that they should be applied to nobler and better purposes than this. Pugilism as a practised art is in this, our enlightened age, deserving of the strictest censure, and ought, therefore, by Government to be at once suppressed.—T. J. M.

NEGATIVE.

The prize-ring is the standard of honour in pugilistic encounters, and keeps before the thoughts of men the laws of fair-play in fighting, and thus forms a safeguard from the fierce brutality of mere animalism, ungoverned and unregulated in a mob-fight or other casual need for maintaining, *vi et manu*, the safety of one's person. It ought not, therefore, to be abrogated.—BOX.

Pugilism exhibits the *hygiene* of exercise, self-control, and regulated diet, illustrates the power of endurance and

the capacity for health which man possesses, and is a perfect evidence of the might of care to produce in man the full animal beauty and power of which he is capable; and as a standing remonstrance against self-indulgent softness, ought to be preserved by law, yet under law.—TOUCH.

Pulpy puffiness and paltry puppyism are making such rapid advances among us, that it is judicious to keep up some other form of humanism than these as a continual protest against the petty peevishness of those who abjure the curative influences of cold water, exercise, dietetics, and pain.—SAYERS.

If war is not evil, neither is pugilism.—TOM.

To pluck out the heart of the "mystery" of pugilism by a legal enactment for its suppression would be a failure, because men, and especially Englishmen, cannot be persuaded that there is *not* something noble in the exercise and "the art of self-defence;" and law can only be effective when it is the expression of the opinion of the majority of the most sensible.—P. R.

Pluck is a quality in man Britain can scarcely now-a-days endeavour by law to proscribe. It has been too long a boast of ours against the world.—S. S. C.

The prize-ring is essentially a British institution. The stiletto of Italy, the poison of France, the secret assassination of Spain, the duels of Germany, and the shillelah of Ireland, are by no means improvements on the natural weapon of the fist; and we believe that there is something proud in the fact that England has codified a set of principles regulative of personal encounters, which forbids and prohibits anything save the fair, free use of the force and skill of the bones and muscles of the human arm in giving or receiving satisfaction. Law is thus helped in its aim, and it would be foolish to destroy its own assistant.—QUOTHA.

Does not the increased use of the knife in street brawls indicate the evil of throwing into disfavour the manlier way

of settling disputes that are only to be arranged by animal force?—L. M.

The laws of the pugilists supply reasonable safeguards and controlling rules, even to the unreasoning brutes who glory in street fights, and keep them from inflicting fatal wounds on fatal places, because it is unfair. It is no small influence to exert over such men to withhold them from giving full swing to their bulldogism. Were law to suppress pugilism, what oode of honour would it be able to place in these men?—SLAP.

Public morality cannot be advantaged by the suppression of any evil which would only be *ostward*; and would most certainly be aided and abetted in private, and hence it would be inexpedient to use the force of law further than now against pugilism."—MOA.

The wager of battle, trial by ordeal, the duel, &c., have given place to the chicaneries and cheats and quirks and chances of law, with what real advantages in suppressing in man the combative propensity? The amusements of bear-baiting, bull-baiting, the tournament, the village-green game at single stick, or quarterstaff, &c., have been sacrificed to the fastidious tastes of modern times, with what gain to the public, and what to the public-house—with what decrease of strength and open honesty, and what increase of pauperism, illegitimacy, and hidden prodigality? To shrink and shrivel up the human faculties by legal enactments, when they are not really and flagrantly injurious in their operation to the body politic, is eminently unwise. Pugilism is a propensity in man arising out of the very core of the moral nature—the desire for self-preservation—and it cannot rightly be denounced and abolished unless law can change and alter the source whence it proceeds. Can it?—No!

When, "foot to foot and man to man opposed," the pugilist ventures to enter the arena or stakes or ring to show and to maintain fight, what is he really doing more than others, though more openly, observedly, and rewardedly?

Competing for his livelihood, his interests, his fame, his instigator's money—so are most men;—enduring pain, present or permanent injury, and smarting under the changes of the world's opinion—so are most men. But, besides this, he shows *pluck* in his eating, which it would be well if most men would show in theirs. Why law for one, not for the others?—E. H.

We ribbon and beband the weaponed fighter, and honour him at festivals, in courts, and with monuments; but the unweaponed one we stigmatize as rogue and vagabond, and "put him in hold" if found showing fight. Is not this difference enough, without that rigorous suppression which is not enforced on brawls creating drunkenness and other clamant social evils?—S. T.

Brutal! is an exclamation easily used; but what does it mean? Shocking! is a word of awful menace, and ready to men's tongues; but is there anything really in it. Disreputable! is a term, and but little more. How often during the last few years have we not found the reputable man doing disreputable actions on the sly; and shocking his friend's conduct? How often has it been proved that rank, station, wealth, intelligence, &c., cannot cure all that is brutal in us? Let police courts and other legal assemblages tell, and it will be found that there are doings little less needful of legislative abolition than pugilism—which has in it quite enough of disrepute to keep it from becoming a flourishing business. Let it alone, it will die quickest of neglect.—QUIS?

Admitting in full all the evil of pugilism, deploring the scenes to which it gives occasion and leads, we are not prepared to advocate the abolition by law of "the noble art of self-defence." It has uses in an economy such as ours. It is honest, plucky, and fair; it requires skill, caution, preparation, good humour, and emulation, and, in short, it is the best thing a bad one can be made, and there are many bad things that might be bettered by a leaf from the moral code of the prize ring.—THOUGHT.

There is a certain class of persons who can settle their differences (mostly public-house brawl) in no other way than "fighting it out." Therefore, if the present ready mode, "Turn up your sleeves and go at it" is suppressed, we shall, most probably, have the American stiletto or knife introduced, thereby causing bloodshed, and perhaps death, where now a bruise or so is the only result. The lower class of English are not the people to send polite invitations to "come and have your brains shot out;" and I am glad of it. I think pugilism is by far the better method of the two of cooling the anger caused by a dispute. The English have, from the earliest times, been noted for their feats of arms and manly exercises. The nation cannot do without them. "To excel" is our motto; and as one mode of testing skill and strength has gone out of date, another has sprung up, as it were, from the remnants. The "tournaments" celebrated in Sir Walter Scott's "Ivanhoe," were a much more dangerous

amusement than prize-fighting. But this sport has long since passed away, as have the cruel practices of olden times, cock-fighting and bull-baiting; we have now in their place, horse-racing, hunting, archery, cricket, and other noble and athletic sports, including pugilism. Again, a knowledge of the fistic art is a good aid to defence against the attack of highwaymen when left without weapons, and therefore it should not be suppressed if for this reason only. However bad a prize-fight may be, it should not be made the cause of putting an end to pugilism as an aid to self-defence. It may, perhaps, in time wear itself out (for it is less and less prevalent every day); and in the mean time custom should not be meddled with, unless it can be shown that no worse practice will introduce itself in place of the forbidden one. But what harm is there in pugilism? Does it in reality debase the mind and morals of its practiser, levelling him with the brute creation? No: it is the man, and not the practice, that is bad.—F. S. M.

LITERARY NOTES.

At the annual meeting of the Royal Society of Literature, held April 25th, Sir John P. Boileau, Bart., presiding, Mr. J. A. Cooper, a gentleman well known to many of our contributors, was unanimously elected a Fellow.

Learn to Live; Firstlings from the pen of a Working Man, is a book in the press for which we wish to bespeak subscriptions. Its author was an early and distinguished member of our young students' classes; one of the earliest members of the Neophytes' Society, which rose out of them; and a contributor to these columns. The portions of the MSS. we have perused—in prose and verse—are worthy of a place in many a library. The writer, in his noble endeavours at self-elevation, has deserved, though he has not yet gained, success. Those who desire to aid him, by adding their names to his list for copies (3s. and 4s. each), should ad-

dress *The Editor of the British Controversialist*.

We regret to have to announce the sudden death, on the 23rd ult., of Mr. Albert Smith, the well-known lecturer and author.

The Rev. Dr. Redford, a celebrated Congregational divine, died on the 20th ult., at Edgbaston, near Birmingham.

DAVID IRVING, LL.D., author of a "Life of George Buchanan," "Eminent Scottish Writers," and contributor to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, editor of several works for the Roxburghe and Spalding Clubs, and keeper of the Advocates' Library from 1821—1848, died on Friday, 11th ult., aged 84. He has left behind him, in MS., a *History of Scottish Poetry from the Middle Ages to the close of the Seventeenth Century*.

It is said that Rev. CHARLES KINGSLEY is to occupy the Professoriate of Modern History in Cambridge, vacant

by the death of Sir James Stephen. It has also been said, that Messrs. Helps, Merivale, Spedding, and Woodham were among the candidates.

The Rev. THEODORE PARKER, of Boston, U.S., author of a *Discourse on Matters pertaining to Religion, &c.*, died at Florence on 10th ult.

Lady BYRON's demise has been announced.

Lisbon has now been enriched by a monument to CAMOENS. It is the work of Victor Bastos.

Prof. TISCHENDORF is to superintend, at St. Petersburg, the reproduction of the Bible Codex found by him on Mount Sinai. It is to be an exact reprint of the original, with new types, in three large folios, with one vol. of Commentary, History, and Criticism.

A monument to James Hogg, the Ettrick Shepherd, is to be inaugurated on 28th inst., at Chapelhope—beside St. Mary's lake, in the parish of Ettrick and county of Selkirk—a spot which stands in the midst of the scenery he has made famous by song and story, and where his early life was spent.

"A History of Flemish Literature," by Octave Delepierre, intended to supplement Hallam, is just out.

Messrs. Ticknor and Fields (Boston, U.S.) "have assumed the control of *The Atlantic Monthly*," an international magazine.

ANDREAS RETZIUS, an anatomical and physiological writer, as well as a distinguished ethnologist, expired at Stockholm, 18th April, aged 64.

The Welsh *Dante*—ELIS WYNNE (1670—1734), is about to be introduced to the Saxon-speaking public, by Mr George Borrow, author of "Lavengro," &c., who has translated the "*Gweldigaethau y Bardd Cwsg*," or Visions of the Sleeping Bard of the World, Death, and Hell, one of the most beautifully-composed works in the Cambrian tongue. The poet, however, has been accused of deriving some hints from Quizedo's (1580—1645) *Visions*.

H. H. WILSON, Boden Professor of Sanscrit, the historian of India, trans-

lator of "Sakountala," &c., died in Wimpole Street, London, 8th ult., age 75.

"Memorials of Thomas Hood," collected by his daughter, and prefaced by his son, are in the press of the Messrs. Kent (Moxon).

One thousand pounds have been raised for a memorial to HALLAM.

The complete works of Frederick the Great, edited by himself, and then capriciously (because of Voltaire's snappish criticism?) withdrawn from circulation, have been discovered in some nailed-up boxes in the Royal Palace of Berlin. Will this discovery delay Carlyle?

The *National Review* is said to be conducted by RICHARD HOLT HUTTON.

TAUCHNITZ's English editions of Macaulay's "History," and Carlyle's "Frederick," cost respectively 16s. and 10s. each.

1860 has an issue of 1,042 newspapers in Great Britain.

The Rainbow is the title of a newspaper publishing at Theodosia, in the Crimea, and printed in parallel columns in French, Russ, and Armenian—edited by Bishop AIVASOFFSKI.

Puritanism and its Leaders—Cromwell, Milton, Baxter, Bunyan—by Principal Tulloch, is in the press.

The Pepysian Ballads, with introductions on Ballad lore writers and printers, are promised shortly by Dr. RIMBAULT.

Day and Son have issued a *fac-simile* of Magna Charta.

HERR KÜNZEL has published a Biography of the late Sir R. Peel, in German.

The *Deutsch Zeitung* is now edited by Professors Gervinus, Haussier, and Beseler.

William Tegg is about to issue, commencing on 25th inst., Dr. Adam Clarke's Commentary, in ninety fortnight shilling parts.

THIENS is preparing the 18th vol. of *The Consulate and Empire*. It will contain a record of The hundred days, and an account of Waterloo.

The death of E. M. WHITTY, author of "Sketches in Parliament," "Friends in Bohemia," &c., in Melbourne, is announced.

L. N. R [anyard] is the authoress of "The Book and its Story," "The Book and its Missions," &c.

Routledge and Co. have begun an issue of "The Old Dramatists," and of "The Old Poets," in shilling monthly parts. They are to be annotated, and to be preceded by Biographical Notices, &c.

EDWIN ATHERSTONE, the author of the highly poetical works entitled "Nineveh" and "The Ruins of Herculaneum," &c., has been placed upon the pension list for £100 per annum.

The Boston Transcript is edited by E. P. WHIPPLE (born 1819), author of *Lectures on Life and Literature* (1850), and one of the chief contributors to *The North American Review*.

REV. J. J. BLUNT's contributions, Literary and Theological, to the *Quarterly Review*, are to be issued separately by Murray.

Dr. Isaac da Costa, a distinguished Dutch poet, is dead.

"The Life and Letters of Washington," by his nephew and literary executor, now in preparation, is highly spoken of. It is to be hoped that there will be in it something more pleasant than G. W. Plaster was able to tell of the Hero of American Independence.

Mr. Fry, of Bristol, intends to issue an exact transcript of Tyndale's New Testament, edition 1525.

DR. LATHAM is employed in editing Johnson's Dictionary for the Messrs. Longman; and Messrs. Williams and Norgate are to issue his Philological and Ethnographical Essays.

A Life of BLAKE, an artist of singular intensity and vigour of fancy, is about to be published by Gilchrist, the biographer of Etty.

A memorial church is to be erected at Bemerton, near Salisbury, where GEORGE HERBERT was rector. The fund has been raised chiefly among literary celebrities.

ERRATA.

Page 8, line 29, for "he," read "she."

Page 8, line 34, after "Gulenne: and," insert "sister."

Page 53, line 21, for "of a." read "of an."

Page 53, line 22, for "poetical." read "political."

Page 93, line 10, for "its," read "the."

Page 94, line 7, omit the word "but."

Page 94, line 14, for "that," read "what."

INDEX.

PAGE	PAGE
EPOCH MEN: —Geoffrey Chaucer . . . 1, 145	McClintock's Discoveries of Sir John Franklin 196
Lord Macaulay 73	Margaret Penrose 278
EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY: —	Mengé, the Mineralogist 49
The Sophists 217, 269	Smiles's Self-Help 44
THE LOGIC OF NOVEL-WRITING 361	Seth Bede, the "Methody;" his Life and Labours 195
DEBATES: —	The Long Bow of the Past; the Rifle for the Future 52
RELIGION:—Is the Bible alone a Sufficient Rule of Faith?	The Mill on the Floss 412
Affirmative Articles 10, 86, 158, 225, 290, 370	Talk and Talkers 132
Negative Articles 15, 99, 164, 231, 309, 382	Tweddle's Temperance Almanack for 1860 195
PHILOSOPHY: —Is the Poetry of Tennyson as Healthy in its Tendencies as that of Longfellow?	The Public Speaker 196
Affirmative Articles 241, 317, 391	The Good Steward 278
Negative Articles 250, 321, 402	The Art of Writing 278
HISTORY: —Was Joan of Arc an Impostor?	POETIC SECTION: —British Poetry 53
Affirmative Articles 324, 406	Original Poetry 198, 338
Negative Articles 328, 408	Poetic Critique 279
POLITICS: —Ought the Indian Opium Trade to be Suppressed?	THE INQUIRER: —Questions 59, 134, 200, 286
Affirmative Articles 21, 104, 173, 254	A Mathematical Curiosity 201, 287
Negative Articles 28, 107, 177, 262	Almanacks 204
SOCIAL ECONOMY: —Are the Operations of Trades' Unions Beneficial to Working Men?	A Grammatical Difficulty 207, 287, 342
Affirmative Articles 32, 113, 180, 269	Archimedes 206
Negative Articles 35, 117, 184, 273	Books on Geology 203
THE ESSAYIST: —	Civil Service Appointments 201
The Objects Aimed at in a Discussion Society 40	Diogenes 206
In Memoriam MDCCCLIX 122	Kaleidoscope 62
Winter or no Winter—which is Best? 190	Latin not Necessary to Learning Greek 203
Lamartine 332	Meteorology 203, 287
THE REVIEWER: —	Mohammed's Coffin 206
Anderson's Discourses 131	Origin of the Title "Pope" 61
Balfour's Lectures from Jesus 278	Origin of Banks 205
Constable's Educational Series 417	Profane History and the Miracles of the New Testament 59
Cornhill Magazine 52	Riding the Black Lad 134
Cornwell and Fitch's Arithmetic 418	Supernatural Appearances 61
Copeland's Arithmetic 418	Theological Degree of T.A. 200
Dictionary of Biography 337	Translation of the Bible 204
Good Words 277	The Lives of the Popes 343
Howard Hinton's Lectures on Redemption 133	THE TOPIC: —
How we are Governed, by A. Fonblanque, jun 336	Revivals in the North of Ireland 62
Lectures on English History 51	Rifle Corps 207
Lord's Modern Europe 277	Treaty with France 343
Macmillan's Magazine 53	Pugilism 419
CONTRIBUTORS' SIGNATURES.	THE SOCIETIES' SECTION: —
A. Layman 27, 262	The Literary Institutions of London 140
A. F. 189	The Literary Institutions of Edinburgh 351
Augustine 316	Reports of Societies 70, 140, 213, 351, 355
Bennett 412	Literary Notes 71, 144, 216, 288, 358, 425
B. S. 250, 402	
C. 139	
Clement 99	
C. H. N. 321	
D. W. 44	
D. R. R. 184	
Edmund 264	
F. G. 58, 266	
George Potter 117	
G. A. H. E. 332	
H. B. 15, 342	
Henry Keeble 143	
H. G. 374	
Ignatius 104	
J. H. 241	
L' Ouvrier 40, 121, 277, 328, 405	
Lex Scripta 233, 309	
M. A. X. 35, 273	
M. 195	
Pope Gregory 21, 391	
Poppy 32, 113, 269	
R. B. 180	
R. M. A. 336	
S. F. T. 408	
S. N. 9, 85, 131, 157, 224, 298	
Sinim 107	
S. E. L. 117	
Theophylact 164	
T. U. 355	

THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

LITERARY MAGAZINE:

DEVOTED TO THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,

AND TO THE PROMOTION OF SELF-CULTURE AND GENERAL
EDUCATION.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

* *

LONDON:
HOULSTON AND WRIGHT,
66, PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCCLX.

Digitized by Google

J. AND W. RIDER, PRINTERS,
14, BARTHOLOMEW CLOSE, LONDON, E.C.

PREFACE.

ANOTHER sheaf of thoughts we now bind for the reader's garner—for the great Harvest. As the years roll on, and the seasons revolve, the fruits ripen and are gathered. So is it with a Serial such as ours. Growth is its grand law, and by its fertility must it be judged. Intentions do not suffice; nor will "flexure and low bending" secure acceptance, if worth be wanting. The years have already borne witness to "the place, degree, and form" of our literary efforts, and by this time the objects of our Magazine are, or should be, sufficiently well known.

"As many arrows, loosed several ways,
Fly to one mark;
As many several ways meet in one town;
As many fresh streams run to one self-same sea;
As many lines close in the dial's centre:
So"

do all our aims and exertions tend to the excitement of the reflective spirit in man, the awakening of the intellect to effort, the stirring up of the powers of thought, that they may all co-operate in the investigation of all subjects for the attainment of truth, and for the advancement of the mind's own capacities. The following review of the contents of the pages now submitted to the reader's notice seems all that is needful to commend them to the judicious.

An undiminished interest has been felt and shown in the *Debate* department in all its divisions. Keen, logical, vigorous thinking, well-linked and terse expressions, closely serried facts, and acute yet kindly opposition, have been displayed in the consideration of the various important questions which have been submitted to the ordeal of controversy. The sensible advice of Plato—"Do not quarrel about subjects, but discuss them"—has, we think, been followed in our pages with some effect. The *Topic* has been successful in bringing out the ardour of disputation, and producing some well-sustained specimens of concisely expressed thought upon several of the more immediate subjects of debate which the passing months have furnished. Several contributions of high value have

had a place assigned to them in the *Essayist*. The *Poetic Section* has brought into the permanence of type not a few specimens of ideas touched with Castaly's dews, or breathing with the perfumes of Parnassus. The *Reviewer* has been conducted, as far as possible, upon the same impartial plan as heretofore of speaking the truth in love of all books brought under inspection—judging and determining the merits of their execution, and their special adaptability to attain their object, rather than adjudicating upon the peculiar tenets held by the authors compared with the critics. The *Inquirer* has been freely opened, and we are happy to note not only the general ingenuousness of the queries proposed, but also the ingenuity and intelligence of many of the answers—in great part contributed by the general body of our readers. Our *Literary Notes* have been at once concise and copious; they form a brief summary of the chief matters that have had the power to stir the book-loving world. The *Societies' Section*, though second to none in importance, has, we are afraid, had less justice done to it. If brevity were more studied by our contributing friends, this section would be richer and more valuable. We give this "word to the wise."

Some of our contributors have been casual; some have but recently been placed upon our roll; others have been co-labourers with us for years. The acceptance which their labours have met with from our readers and the critical press is matter of high gratification [to us]. The unpayable gratitude of heartfelt thanks is due to all who have aided our exertions by act, or voice, or pen—to our known and unknown helpers alike—in the attempt to train our fellow-men to a sincere and earnest search for truth.

It is no part of our aim or business to persuade our readers either to quit or follow any special creeds, canons, or opinions; we wish to cultivate, in all, a loving reverence for truth—the mistress of a right life—without reference to the number of those who throng her temples and follow her behests. Opinion we regard as valuable only when it has been formed after deliberate and honest examination—after an inquisitive, rigid, and impartial criticism of all that can be best said on all sides of a subject. Our mission is strictly *educative*, not *propagandic*. We have no special tenets to impress on any mind, and we desire that each human soul should regard truth as "the pearl of great price," and search for it "as for hid treasure." Truth is the highest, best, and holiest gift of heaven;—may it be ours to become successful inquirers as to how, where, or wherein it may be found.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Epoch Men.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES, the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor of repute, and of "the noble-minded midwife Phænarete,"* was born in the *deme* (township) of Alopece, a suburb of the city of Athens, on the 5th day of the month Thargelion, in the year 468 B.C. (Olympiad LXXVII. 4). He had an elder brother by the mother's side, named Patrocles. He was himself of strictly Attic descent, being of the tribe of Antiochis, and of the *gens* (clan) Dædalidæ. His family, though poor and humbly circumstanced, was good and old. Of his early life little or nothing is known. The highest charm of modern biography,—its detail of private particulars and of personal characteristics,—was seldom consciously imparted by ancient authors to their works. Individual and domestic existence formed a theme too lowly, and the daily routine of life was too petty to merit record in the enduring pages which they wrote. Inference can lend but little help in filling up the foreground of a sketch of the life of Socrates. Doubtlessly the sculptor's doors would wear the usual ornaments of olive, indicative of the birth of a son, on that springtide morning when he first puled in the nurse's arms. On the tenth, or name-day, gossips would assemble round the hearth, and the celebration feast would be at once fitting and choice. The *lala* (*lullaby*) would be sung over him, the *μορμολύκειον* (*bugaboo*) would be used to frighten him to quietness, and a honied sponge would sometimes tickle his palate when it was inconvenient to attend otherwise to the wants of his babyhood. The public registrar would get notice of the father's intention of bringing him up, and he would grow in stature as the months flew past.

The years of childhood being spent, the mother's and the nurse's special care would be exchanged for the labours of the pedagogue, the schoolmaster, and the gymnast. That he received the ordinary education within reach of the Athenians we know,† but there is no reason for supposing that in his youth he had any superior advantages. The law enjoined that the children of citizens should be

* Plato's "Theætetus," par. 17.

† Plato's "Crito," par. 12.

instructed in grammar, music, and gymnastics; grammar included the arts of reading and writing, a little history, and some elocution; music was used as a generic name for intellectual culture, *e.g.*, philosophy, poetry, rhythm, melody of speech, voice, and song-tone, as well as the empiric use of the lyre, the flute, the pipe, and choral singing; gymnastics was a systematic course of physical training in all those arts which

"Brace the nerves, or make the limbs alert,
And mix elastic force with firmness hard."

From six to sixteen this process of education would most probably, as was then usual, go on; for the jealous watchfulness of the law was superadded to natural affection to secure the proper upbringing of the young. Bodily strength, intellect, and taste, having thus been, in some measure, subjected to culture, as his father was not wealthy, it became necessary to decide upon a profession for him. It was at length—some authors say, against his own will—determined that he should follow his father's business; and hence Timon, the Sylligraph, speaks of him as

"The stone chipper,
The reasoning legislator, the enchanter
Of all the Greeks."

The labours of apprenticeship would occupy some years closely. On attaining his eighteenth year he would be enrolled among the citizen *Ephebi* (persons of age); would receive a spear and buckler from the State, and would, according to law, take oath, that he would never disgrace his armour, desert, revolt, or damage his country, but would conform to the religion, and endeavour to extend the dominion of Athens, defend its laws, maintain its rights, fight, and if need be, die, for his country. The *Ephebi* were the guardians of the bounds of Athens, and performed the duties of an internal police during the two years which elapsed between that enrolment and their introduction to their fellow-burgers and their registration *ἐν ἀνδράσι* (among the men). At twenty the Athenians were emancipated from the government of parents and guardians, and became subject to the laws alone. They then became men in the civic sense, and were free to make their way in the world as best they might or could. He appears to have devoted himself with some earnestness and industry, for a time, to his business as a sculptor, an art which in the luxurious age of Pericles was both remunerative and popular. Pausanias (*circ.* 170 A.D.), the geographer (in the "*Periegesis*, or Itinerary of Greece," book i.), reports, that when he visited Athens a statue of Mercury, and a group of the Graces, clothed in flowing drapery, were preserved and shown on the walls of the Acropolis as his work. It is believed that his father died shortly after the majority of Socrates. He left him an inheritance of eighty *minæ* (about £320); but this he lost by the treachery of the trustee, and he was compelled to earn his bread by the exercise of his professional skill; contenting himself,

however, with doing enough to procure a simple subsistence, suited to his unambitious life; and devoting his whole leisure to the perusal of all the accessible works of the ancient philosophers, or in listening to those teachers of wisdom who from time to time visited Athens. This greedy thirst for knowledge attracted, it is said, the notice of Crito, a wealthy Athenian, subsequently both a disciple and a friend of the reflective statuary, who supplied Socrates with the means of cultivating his talents, and of paying for the instructions of those who taught the various accomplishments of life in Athens. He is reported, though this is thought improbable, to have been one of the students and auditors of Anaxagoras. Under Archelaus he studied physics; Evenus of Paros, a famous elegist, taught him poesy; Theodore, of Cyrene, gave him lessons in geometry; he may have seen Zeno, and must have been acquainted with his system of dialectics; the art of eloquence was expounded to him by Prodicus; the ethical and political uses of music were confided to him by Damon; and even in his old age he "put himself to school" under Konnas, an eminent and highly cultured musician, to acquire the power of playing on the lyre. Though all his life professing to know nothing, he was in reality possessed of the most encyclopædic store of information of any Greek. This is abundantly proven, not more from the felicity than by the range of his illustrations, and the fearless readiness with which he met all men on their own ground.

Against these traditions regarding the teachers, and this remark about the acquired knowledge of Socrates, the ironic humility with which, in Xenophon's "Symposium," he confesses himself to be only "self-taught in philosophy," does not really militate, even if interpreted in the most literally serious sense. He drew the vital elements of his philosophic system from no predecessor. He struck out a pathway in the maze of speculation for himself. He had every right to advance a claim to originality. "He taught that man has to discover and recognize in *himself* what is the right and the good, and that this right and good are in their nature universal. Socrates is celebrated as a teacher of morality, but we should rather call him the *inventor* of morality,"*—if we dare say that any *man* invented that which God at first impressed on the heart, and afterwards expressed in His law, which, however, was *then* only revealed to the Hebrews. But hold! this is criticism, not biography. Let us return.

Marriage was directly enjoined as a duty due to the Gods and the State by every Greek who had attained the full development and vigour of his physical being. Abstinence from it was discountenanced, and no man was permitted to exercise important political functions, to manage public trusts, or to regulate national affairs, unless he had given proof of his attachment to the State by placing himself in such relations as to be likely to contribute to the increase of its citizens, and had tied himself, by the bands of conjugal or parental affection, to his country. We have no certain information as to

* Hegel's "Philosophy of History," part ii. sect. ii. chap. 3.

the date of the marriage of Socrates. Solon thought thirty-five the best age for the marriage of males, Aristotle thirty-seven, Plato and Hesiod thirty; and it is the impression of scholars that "the usual age for men was thirty, and for women twenty years." We may safely infer that Socrates was married between 438 and 433 B.C. His first wife is said to have been Myrto, daughter of Aristides (the Just), who was at that time a widow. This is probable, though some classicists dispute the story as well as explicitly contradict the grosser tale, which affirms that Socrates had two wives at once. We know that he was married to the ill-reputed Xantippe, *now* the synonym for a shrew. We are inclined to believe that calumny has had a large share in the making of this displeasing characterization; for Xenophon* gives a dialogue in which Socrates pleads affectionately in her favour with Lamprocles, his eldest son, who had indulged in some peevish anger towards her; and Lamprocles denies no one of her claims to his regard which his father presses upon him. He does, indeed, speak of her ill-temper; and Socrates does not directly deny it. In the "Symposium," too, when he is bantered by Antisthenes about her passionate violence, Socrates good-humouredly breaks a jest about it, and changes the subject.

Active life opens upon Socrates in the shape of military service—which every Athenian was bound to give on demand—between the ages of twenty and forty, when he was about thirty-seven.

The Peloponnesian War began in 431 B.C., and lasted for twenty-seven years; that is, till within five years of the close of the life of Socrates. The story of that eventful contest has been narrated with such artistic grace by Thucydides, and that narration has been transferred with such singular fidelity from the Greek original into English, by Hobbes—besides being retold with all aid and illustration from comparison of ancient writers and extensive scholarship by Mitford, Thirlwall, and Grote—that there is no need for interpolating the merest sketch of the cause, events, and termination of it in the present paper. We shall therefore only notice the circumstances in which Socrates took a part—of which we have accounts in the "Apology" and in the "Symposium" of Plato, &c.

Potidæa, a town in Macedonia, colonized by Corinthians, but tributary to Athens, revolted against the dominion of that city—at the instigation of their mother-city, and with the connivance of the other states in the Peloponnesus—the south and peninsular, mulberry-leaf shaped part of Greece, now called the *Morea*. In the campaign against it Socrates performed military service as an *hoplite*—a heavily-armed soldier. There he endured the severe intensity of a Thracian winter, bare-foot, and clad only in his ordinary dress, sustaining hunger uncomplainingly, and out-doing most in the endurance of fatigue. In the engagement there, he distinguished himself by his valour, by defending Alcibiades—who himself tells the story—when fallen and wounded, and thus saving

* "Memorabilia," II. ii.

his life and arms. The prize for courage, though acknowledgedly due to Socrates, was conferred, at his request, on Alcibiades, that he might be encouraged to merit well of his country in her hours of danger again.

At Delium, a town on the coast of Bœotia, a territory north of Attica, when the Athenians, under Laches, were defeated, 424 B.C., Socrates fought bravely, and retreated reluctantly. Xenophon, the historian, was thrown from his horse and disabled. Socrates, as *Æneas*

"Did from the flames of Troy upon his shoulders
The old Anchises bear,"

caught him up, and carried him beyond the reach of danger. Alcibiades was there, mounted, and kept between Socrates and the enemy to cover his retreat. This valour in saving life is far more glorious than if he had stood

"Companionless, spreading destruction abroad."

The courage of kindness is preferable to the bravery of carnage. The above two incidents are related with due enthusiasm by Alcibiades in Plato's "Symposium," which has been beautifully translated by Shelley.

Amphipolis, one of the most important commercial towns in the Athenian possessions in the north of the Egean Sea (*Archipelago*), colonized in 437 B.C., was seized by Brasidas, a Lacedæmonian general, in 424 B.C.; and an expedition was sent out from Athens, under Cleon, for its recovery. Socrates, though beyond the years when he was legally bound to do service, was present and active. The affair was unsuccessful; and Socrates returned to the more congenial pursuits of peace.

We have, in the preceding paragraphs, anticipated chronology, and must now revert to prior events. At what time Socrates became the public controversialist of Athens it is impossible to determine accurately—nor is it requisite; the manner, and in great measure the matter, of his teaching we know; and these things are to us much more precious than a mere knowledge of the time at which he began his mission.

Athens was at this time indeed—as Pericles affirmed—"the school of Greece." Though burnt by Xerxes only twelve years before the birth of Socrates, it had—under the administrations of Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles—been so rebuilt, as to have compelled the admiration of succeeding ages. Its streets, it is true, were ill laid out, and its private houses mediocre; but its public edifices and temples were witnesses at once of Attic taste, genius, skill, munificence, and magnificence. The Acropolis, temple-crowned and sculpture-crowded, rose in the centre. The Parthenon and the Erechtheum were there, and between them the colossal statue of *Athena Promachos* (first in fight) threw the gleam of its helmet and the flash of its spear from sea-board to wall. The Areopagus, with law-engraven walls, is there too; and on it the wise men of the state

hold counsel and give judgment in presence of the citizens—then numbering about 140,000. The Gardens of Illysus margined the river on the city side, and the long walls stretched down to the three harbour towns, where, by the commercial enterprise of her citizens, Athens had gathered the precious things of all known lands; *Gymnasia*, *Agorai* (market places), and public halls were numerous, and, in or near these, assemblies were frequent; for the people were notorious gossips and newsmongers, inveterate talkers, adepts at scandal, and anxious about nothing so much as “either to tell or to hear some new thing.” Athens had an annual revenue of about £200,000; and its public offices were filled with functionaries who looked keenly, if not well, after their affairs. Pericles, Alcibiades, Nicias, Cleon, &c., were, in the time of Socrates, among its lawgivers and rulers; Herodotus, Xenophon, and Thucydides composed history; Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides produced the masterpieces of Greek tragedy; and the satiric humour of Aristophanes vented itself in comedy; the sculptures of Phidias, Calliocrates, and Mnesicles, the paintings of Parrhasius, and the orations of Lysias and Isocrates, excited and delighted the people; while the Sophists walked in pompous grandiosity, making a parade of their knowledge amongst the wondering crowds of the Athenian populace. Wealth, luxury, energy, intellectual inquisitiveness, wit, conversational urbanity, and immense power of quibble and quarrel, abounded in Athens. It was an age of general intermeddlement and mutual interference. Wordcraft and statecraft were confounded and intertwined; and logic-chopping was more industriously and artistically studied than stone-chipping—as the Sophists sneeringly called sculpture. Socrates chose his life’s aim well, and fitted it excellently to the spirit of his age. Among talkers, he too would talk—but with a purpose; among a dramatically-inclined people he would win attention by the quick-cued dialogue of everyday life; among the critical, he too would criticise—but among pretenders he would not be one. Talk, with him, was thought made vital—it was the gymnastic training of Reason. Truth has seldom or ever had sterner or stranger devotee among men.

There he goes—squab, rotund, ungainly, and protuberant of paunch; snub-nosed, ox-eyed, thick-lipped, burly-headed, broad-browed, with a nape of the neck like a butcher’s; bare-foot, shabbily dressed, almost satyr-like; mean-looking, rude, virtuous; in each affair measuring all wisdom by its last results. A hero unrefined in speech, yet with a witchery of tongue, a keenness of logic, a readiness of wit, a pungency of style, and skill in exciting intellectual activity, unequalled in Athens. In contented poverty, yet haughty independence; in public converse distinguished—even amid crowds of Sophists and professional haranguers—for striking originality and appropriateness to time, place, and subject, he passes his life in the self-imposed task of teaching and suggesting topics of thought to any and every one who chooses to listen. “He was constantly in public; for he went in the morning to the promenades and the *gymnasia*;

at the time when the market-places were full, he was to be seen in them; and the rest of the day he was where he was likely to meet the greatest number of people. He was generally engaged in discourse,"* and every now and again there quivered out from his lips, in his usual shrewd, broad, buffeting style of speech some dauntlessly bold inquiry into the innermost nature of things; or glances into the more momentous speculations which referred to the moral aspects of his age. There was a manly courageousness about the way in which he stalked about in Athens; as Aristophanes said,

"With stately strut along the streets, with eyes askance and mocking,
Proud to be poor, though destitute of either shoe or stocking."

Ameipsias, too,† even while ridiculing him, is obliged to confess—

"This worthy man,
Though ne'er so hungry, never flatters any one."

What singular seductiveness of manner, of *bonhomie*, mingled with irony! What strange sympathies must his have been, who knit to himself the affections of the wealthy, the beautiful, the noble, the intellectual, and the young! Seizing and transporting with the fervour of passion alike the wise Euripides, luxurious Alcibiades, spiritual Plato, enthusiast Xenophon, fair, frail, but intellectual Aspasia, and the coy decoy Theodota! Yes! this is the man of whom the Pythia of the Delphic oracle has made this declaration—"Sophocles is wise, Euripides is wiser, but the wisest of all men is Socrates!" Had this Pythic and pithy compliment any influence upon his mind in inclining him to make the inscription on the temple at Delphi—"Know thyself"—the text of his philosophy?

One means only have we now of ascertaining the date of his public apostolate in favour of morality, i. e., the production of "The Clouds." In the spring of 423 B.C., at the Dionysian festival, when Athens was filled with tribute-bringers from all parts of Greece and the islands of the Ægean, this play was first performed. Prior to this, therefore, Socrates must have acquired sufficient notoriety to be singled out as a fit object for theatrical caricature, and been of mark enough to make a taking subject. Of the moral signification of this play we have already spoken,‡ and have attempted to supply a reading consistent with the known friendship of Socrates and Aristophanes, and the hatred of both for the Sophists and their demoralized disciples; and to that interpretation we still adhere. That the play unintentionally operated against Socrates, when the jealous Meletus—well bitten by the satire of both Aristophanes and Socrates, and therefore well acquainted with both—took from it, by suggestion, the grounds of an accusation against the burgher of Alopec, it would be unwise to deny; though it was, we are sure, intended to hit harder against Euripides, Theramenes, Critias,

* Xenophon's "Memorabilia," I. i. 10.

† Diogenes Laertius, "Socrates," ix.

‡ *British Controversialist*, May, 1860, p. 290.

Prodicus, and Alcibiades—who is specially and poignantly touched in the body of the drama—than against him whom, in that very comedy, Aristophanes makes the chorus address thus:—

“Prudent man, who long’st through us to be true wisdom’s phoenix,
Happiness will be your lot in Athens and among all the Hellenics;
For you’ve a noble memory, careful thought, and good invention,
Patience dwells within your soul, and cold you never mention;
You walk or stand, and never tire, and are unawed by hunger,
Wine, play, and gluttony you shun, and leave to those far younger.
With word and deed and sage advice you artfully bamboozle;
And prove it best for every man that nothing he should use ill.”*

Before 423 B.C., then, Socrates must have been teaching; and so teaching, though unprofessionally and unprofessedly, as to have acquired a wide reputation for eccentricity of manner, curious multifariousness of lore, and strange notions of man and his highest happiness; and we know that this comedy made no alteration in his conduct, but that he went about fearlessly and actively as ever, braving the scorn of men with itching ears; and, with impassive firmness, working the work before him, despite of the misconstructions of men.

Pericles died in 429 B.C. Cleon, Nicias, and Alcibiades then became competitors for supremacy in Athens. Cleon was rash, blustering, talkative, and atheistic; Nicias, cold, timid, superstitious, and reserved; Alcibiades, egotistic, versatile, wealthy, eloquent, ambitious. In their contests Socrates took no part. Cleon fell at Amphipolis, 422 B.C.; Nicias perished in Syracuse, 413 B.C.; Alcibiades, after Cleon’s death, became a leading politician, but was scarcely deemed trustworthy, and popular fear and jealousy kept Athens on the rack about his likings and doings. He was suspected, charged with wishing to establish a democracy, recalled from a command he had received in Sicily, 415 B.C., fled in fear of injustice, was restored to citizenship in 407 B.C., was superseded next year, went into exile, and was assassinated at Bisanthe, in the Thracian Chersonesus, 404 B.C. Socrates opposed the expedition against Sicily, as unjust; and the sorrow in which it closed seemed to make good his auguries.

In this interval the victory of Arginusæ, 406 B.C., occurred.

* That we are so far right in our conjecture regarding this drama may be further inferred from the fact that, though the comedy was popular with the people, the judges awarded the prize to Cratinus, “the wine-bibber,” who contested with Aristophanes and Amipsias, both of whom had placed Socrates amongst their *dramatis personæ*. As these judges were specially appointed to decide upon the merits of each drama critically, there can be little doubt that defects in characterization—so palpable in their nature as those regarding Socrates—must, notwithstanding the wit of the dialogue and comicality of the incidents, have been the cause of the failure. Aristophanes himself thought it the best of his pieces; and as he lived till after the trial and death of Socrates, it is not likely that he would have remained in that opinion, had it been through other cause than a misunderstanding of its meaning that his friend had been treated to hemlock by the State.

Near these three islands the Athenians conquered the Spartans. After the battle a storm arose; and neither were the warriors slain in battle picked up and buried, nor the living saved from the vessels wrecked by warfare or by the storm. Joy for the victory was mingled with grief and horror at the fate of these victims of battle and the elements. The generals, though thanked, were superseded, and recalled. Six came, one was faultless, one slain, and two held aloof in fear. They were tried before the public assembly. An astute, far-sighted, ambitious statesman, Theramenes, was their accuser. Thrasylbulus, who was implicated in the generals' report, helped him. The evidence was contradictory, and the trial was adjourned. The solemn days of the Apaturia (registration) intervened. The relatives of the dead clad themselves in mourning during those days of joy; for it was the belief of the Greeks that the unburied dead wandered in woe a hundred years along the banks of the Styx. This affected the citizens much, and the minds of the people were inflamed against the generals by this sad demonstration. It was proposed to take the votes upon the criminality of the accused at one finding—guilty or not guilty on all in one. This was contrary to all law and precedent; for each man was entitled to separate trial and judgment. The people determined it should be done. The tribe Antiochis occupied that day the Prytaneum (judgment hall). Socrates was president—an office legally held one day only. He refused to entertain the proposal, because it was illegal. Menace and clamour were employed: the mob became furious. Socrates would not commit an act of injustice on the seat of justice, and he held out. The other judges wavered, then yielded; but he would not put it to the vote. His duty he would do, whatever betide. The assembly was adjourned—a new president was chosen—the vote was taken—the urns were set—the generals were doomed, and they perished by hemlock. It is pleasing to know that one man in Athens could outbrave the mob in the interest of law, justice, and a reverence for right; still more so, that that one man was Socrates. It is a noble power that—to be able to stand *alone*.

Athens after this fell into sore straits. Calamity and failure followed each other with close-coming footsteps; and, in the leaderless state of Athens, intrigue—which had become more fashionable than intelligence and effort—became active, powerful, supreme. Ambition impeded its wings. Antiphon gained a change in the constitution. The uncontrolled power of the State was vested in four hundred men of wealth and dignity. Their tyranny became intolerable, and they were overthrown. War continued. Famine and disease united their energies with war to feed death. Athens fell before Lysander; and the seventy-sixth anniversary of Salamis saw the queen of the sea subject to Sparta. Thirty tyrants—persons possessed of supreme power—were appointed. To be popular was dangerous; to be wealthy was a crime. Socrates continued his dialectic conversations throughout all changes of men and things. The tyrants desired to silence him; and forbade the pursuit of his

usual course. Socrates persevered; and even went the length of remarking, that if a cowherd under whose care cows grew fewer and thinner was a bad one, much more was a governor who lessened the happiness and the number of the citizens. Anxious to make a tool of the sage, they commanded him and four others—among whom was Meletus, afterwards the accuser of Socrates—to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens. The others went on their message; Socrates went home. Of this act he says—in Plato's "Apology"—that he did it, "caring not a jot for death;" and indeed, on account of it, he "might have been put to death, if that government had not speedily broken up." The only recorded instance of opposition to their tyranny is this of Socrates, to whom, once more, it is permitted, in the interests of justice and in protest for the right, to be *alone*. "The inflexible resistance of Socrates," says Grote, "stands as a worthy parallel to his conduct as Prytanes, in the public assembly held on the conduct of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ."^{*}

Democracy was restored in Athens early in 403 B.C., and Socrates escaped *for that time*.

Office-less, unpaid for teaching, courting no applause, fearing no frown, undepressed by failure, unelated by change, holding duty as the supreme law of life, and morals as the holiest wealth of nations, this man—in some measure the De Foe of antiquity—offended many, conciliated none, pleased few; but these few were grappled to his soul with hooks of steel, and in their hearts the deepest reverence of discipleship and the keenest fervour of love were felt for him. He was the morning-star of their intellectual heaven; the pilot of their souls towards truth; the seedsmen to whom the after-harvest of their thoughts was due. Of his thoughts, contrasted with his Silenic outward form, Alcibiades affirms—"They are so supremely beautiful, so golden, so divine and wonderful, that everything which Socrates commands ought assuredly to be obeyed,—even like the voice of a god."[†] Yet all the while envy was working itself into traditions round "the old man eloquent;" and as he had acquired the dangerous eminence of noticeability—which forms a tacit yet continuous irk and reproof to the soul of the mediocre, and excites the jealousy of that dangerous passion, egotism, so as to convince it that it cannot permit, with impunity, the growth of a fame so destructive of democratic equality as that of a self-constituted critic of men, manners, and events, because it might imperil the reign of noodledom—envy was heated to a tenfold warmth of patriotic conservatism, and found it necessary to denounce the guileless, guiltless benefactor of Athens; so that, in 399 B.C., he was summoned before the court of the Heliastæ (judges chosen by lot from the people) as a disbeliever in the gods, and a corrupter of youth, and had, as he says himself, to "come, for the first time, before a court of justice, though more than seventy years of age."

* Vol. viii. part ii. chap. lxx. p. 332.

† Plato's "Symposium."

The accusations read thus :—"Meletus, son of Meletus, of Pittes, impeaches Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of Alopece. Socrates is guilty, for he does not believe in the gods whom the city worships, but introduces other new deities. Again, he is guilty, for he corrupts young men. The punishment incurred is *death*."

Meletus was a dramatist, whose tragedies are now only known of by the ridicule with which Aristophanes pilloried them; yet he opposed Euripides, the friend of Socrates—who had the repute of helping the most speculative and philosophic of Attic tragedians: he was also one of the captors of Leon, of Salamis; and may have had other causes of enmity. Concurrents with him in the accusation—but by his request—were Lycon, a public orator, and Anytus, a tanner, a demagogue, a magistrate, one of those who aided in the expulsion of the Thirty—and on many accounts a personal enemy to Socrates, who had now outlived many of his powerful friends, and most of those who knew the nature of his life-long labours. Many enmities had been evoked by his style of bantering men of reputation, so as to show up their real ignorance; many calumnies had arisen round him, because people construed his disproof of others' wisdom into an underhand assertion of his own; and besides, he was poor, and of no estimation by the possession of political office and—an example was needed to terrify Sophists, and to keep down censors. Self-conceit plays sad havoc with justice; self-examination is far less agreeable than self-satisfaction; and irony is so different from the complimentary flatteries which men love. To be told and shown that "well-doing" is the duty of man, and is the only true secret for attaining to "well-being," is so disagreeably suggestive of ill-doing as the source of Athenic woe, that the man who pushes it continually into the foreground of conversation and consciousness is sure to incur popular odium and antipathy; so that Meletus had well calculated the likelihoods before he issued his indictment.

Socrates appeared before the bar. Lysias, a graceful and elegant orator, prepared a defence for him; but this he haughtily rejected, saying, "My whole life forms my defence against this present accusation." He defended himself as one confident in his integrity, and careless of the humours of the judges—holding his superiority to fear of death before them, and expressing fear only of their disgrace and degradation. It was a deliberate foregoing of all chance of acquittal. He was found guilty; but that only by a majority of six in a total of 557. Meletus prosecuted for the penalty; and Socrates refused to plead for its remission. He again stood solitary in the superiority of his nature, and in his reverence for law and duty. Jocularly he submitted that, as a public benefactor, he should be decreed subsistence for life in the Prytæum; then suggested a fine of a mina (£3 5s.), but raised it, at the desire of his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, Apollodorus, &c., to thirty minæ. The proud independence and contumacy of his manner inflamed his judges to rage; and he was "condemned to be surren-

dered to the eleven"—a euphemism for death. He addressed his judges with calm irony, intrepid resignation, pious exhortation, and sage advice. He asserted the injustice of his sentence; and closed with a discourse on death. After that, he concluded by saying, "Now, however, it is time to go—me to die, you to live; to which of us the better fate is assigned is known to God alone." He was fettered and imprisoned, and next day would have been executed, but that the festival *Theoria*—during which it was unlawful to put criminals to death—had begun the day before. Thirty days elapsed before its return. All this time he was kept in chains, though his friends had free access to him, and visited him regularly. Crito had bribed the gaoler to allow him to escape; but of this he declined to take advantage, because it was a breach of the law. A great part of his doctrinal teaching was uttered during these days. He seemed—like the setting sun—to flash a brighter radiance forth nearest the hour of his departure. The day on which he drank the fatal draught was suitably spent in discoursing on "the immortality of the soul." Having taken a tender farewell of his wife Xantippe, and of his children—three sons, one advanced in years, and two of whom had only reached their unripe boyhood—and having had them kindly conveyed from the prison-house, his chains being stricken off, he conversed seriously and affectingly with his friends—among whom were Crito and his son Critobulus, Æschines, Euclides, Antisthenes, &c. Plato was absent, because unwell. In the "*Phædo*" of that philosopher an account of this last day is given; but the arguments are supposed to be the pupil's, rather than the master's. The dying speech of Cyrus, in Xenophon's splendid historico-fiction, *Cyropædia*, is thought by critics to be a nearer and closer version of the opinions of the great humanist. The minister of death approached apologetically, and announced that the hour of doom was near. The cup was brought—accepted—its contents were quaffed. The sun stood on the mountain-top as he lay down. The ice-chill supineness of Death crept up his frame apace. His friends wept. He mildly rebuked them. His heart beat slow and hesitantly. He stirred, and said, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius." His eye glazed; the executioner covered him, for he was dead. The sun set.

"Like an ear of corn

Full ripe he fell, on nature's noblest plan
He lived to reason; and he died a man."

"This was the end of our friend; a man, we may say, the best of all his time that we have known; and, moreover, the wisest and most dutiful."*

[We have not thought it necessary in this paper to speak of the *Dæmon* of Socrates; nor have we ventured on any prologue or epilogue of reflections. In a subsequent paper on the *Philosophy of Socrates*, we shall return to the consideration of the influences of the life and thoughts of this renowned dialogist.]

* Plato's "*Phædo*," par. 155.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It may not be altogether unnecessary to inform new subscribers that this debate is an indispensable counterpart of one which was completed in last month's *British Controversialist*. I would strongly urge all who have not read that debate, to purchase the last volume and read it, otherwise much that will be said in this and subsequent papers may possibly be unintelligible. To those who have already read the articles as they appeared, I would say, re-peruse them, and give them a diligent reconsideration *as a whole*.

It will be seen that one writer, in order to be a consistent Protestant, felt himself constrained to maintain the absurdity that the Old Testament *alone* is a sufficient Rule of Faith (p. 380); while another was driven to deny the all-sufficiency of the Bible, and to allow that, on the question of the canon of Holy Scripture, "we must have recourse to the testimony of the ancient churches (p. 301). This is a virtual admission that the Bible cannot instruct us on *all* points of Christian doctrine and practice. It will be the aim of the writers on the affirmative side of this question to explain and defend a Rule of Faith in which this "testimony of the ancient churches" is recognized as a legitimate principle, a rule by which alone you can steer clear of the difficulties which have been urged against the "Bible only" theory.

But first of all it will be necessary to state our Rule of Faith. I do not think there is any subject upon which so much misconception prevails, in this country, as upon the Catholic religion. Most persons who are, as the French say, *au fait* on a subject—that is, who have a professional and matter-of-fact knowledge of things appertaining to their own state or mode of life—have been led to wonder at the coolness with which people who have not that sort of knowledge undertake to hazard bold assertions on such subjects, or, at any rate, have seen through the shallowness of argument and the incorrectness of statements which are commonly ventured upon by writers who aim at effect rather than at truth. On any other subject than the Catholic Church, men's sense of shame is enough generally to keep them from talking at random. But the critics of our religion have an advantage peculiarly their own, in the deep ignorance of the public whom they address. Their statements pass

current in England, because the generality of people are about as wise as themselves. If a man talk nonsense about public affairs, he is soon put down, because there are, on every side, others with information and good sense enough to expose him. But to misrepresent Catholics in this country is no difficult matter; for all ears are ready to drink in the abuse, and equally deaf to the defence.

I make these remarks in order to try to induce those readers who have imbibed their ideas concerning the nature of the Catholic Rule of Faith from *hostile* sources, to lay them aside, or, at all events, to test their accuracy by *Catholic* sources. It may surprise some to be told that some of the Protestant writers, in the last debate, ventured upon some most glaring misrepresentations, knowing full well that there were opponents to contradict them. Thus H. B. charges J. H. with saying that "the Bible is the prolific source of every heresy and blasphemy;" while the writer referred to merely said that private interpretation of the Bible was the source, &c. Other charges are worse still. It would really seem incredible, if the facts were not before our eyes, that men of education and competent acquirements should bring themselves to believe that others, of equal education and acquirements, should deliberately offer to the Blessed Virgin the worship due to God alone; that they believe they will be saved by works only; and that they have adopted a religion in which licences to commit sin are regularly granted to its adherents. Yet all these charges have been brought against the Catholic Church by the Protestant writers in the religious debate in the last volume of the *British Controversialist*.

These considerations have prompted me to devote the opening paper to an explanation of the Catholic Rule of Faith, leaving the defence to future writers. This course is the more necessary, as the rule is not defined in the question at the head of the debate; and I fear that very few of my Protestant readers would take the trouble to ascertain its nature from a reliable source.

Subjoined is the decree of the Council of Trent on the Rule of Faith (Sess. iv.):—

"Sacrosancta oecumenica et generalis Tridentina Synodus, in Spiritu sancto legitime congregata, presidentibus in ea eisdem tribus apostolicæ sedis legatis, hoc sibi perpetuo ante oculos proponens, ut, sublati erroribus, paritas ipsa Evangelii in Ecclesia conservetur; quod promissum ante per prophetas in Scripturis sacris (Jerem. 51) Dominus noster Jesus Christus, Dei filius, proprio ore primum promulgavit, deinde per suos apostolos, tanquam fontem omnis et salutaris veritatis et morum disciplinæ, omni creaturæ prædicari jussit (Matt. et Marc. ult.); perspiciensque hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, quæ ab ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptæ aut (2 Thess. ii.) ab ipsis apostolis, Spiritu sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt, orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta, omnes libros tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti (quam utriusque unus Deus sit auctor) necnon Traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem, tum ad mores pertinentes, tanquam vel ore tenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu sancto dictatas et continuæ successionis in Ecclesia Catholica conservatas, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur."

Literal translation :—

The sacred oecumenical and general Council of Trent, lawfully assembled in the Holy Ghost, and presided over by the same three legates of the apostolic see, having it constantly in view that by the removal of errors, the Gospel (which, premised aforetime in the Holy Scriptures by the prophets, Christ himself first published with His own mouth, and then commanded His apostles to preach to every creature, as the source of all saving truth and discipline) should be preserved pure in the Church; and clearly perceiving that this truth and instruction is contained in written books and unwritten traditions,—which traditions have been received by the apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or dictated by the Holy Spirit, and by the apostles handed down even to us,—receives and reverences, conformably to the example of the orthodox Fathers, with the same pious regard and veneration, all the books of the Old as well as the New Testament (one God being the author of both), and the traditions relating both to faith and practice, inasmuch as these traditions were either delivered by word of mouth from Christ himself or dictated by the Holy Ghost, and preserved by uninterrupted succession in the Catholic Church. (Then follows the Catholic Canon of Scripture.)

It will be seen from this that the Catholic Rule of Faith is *the whole Word of God*, viz., Holy Scripture and Divine traditions, which, as the Council of Trent says, were delivered to the apostles by Christ himself, or dictated to them by the Holy Spirit, and such traditions only. Hence the futility of the objection which Protestants often make that our Lord condemned the “traditions of men.” We distinguish true from false tradition by the same method that we distinguish an authentic copy of Scripture from a false one. In both cases we must depend on the uniform and universal testimony of Christian antiquity. Both Protestants and Catholics believe the four gospels to be a reliable account of the life of our Lord, because all Christian nations and ages have done so before them. Catholics have the very same testimony for the traditional doctrines held as Divine by the Catholic Church. We have as much evidence for the truth of universally admitted traditional doctrine, as we have for the truth of the four gospels.

The subject-matter then of the Catholic faith is the original revelation of God. To that revelation nothing may be added, from it nothing may be taken away. We may neither fix our own private meaning upon it, nor may we misinterpret it, pervert it, or make it speak our own sense. We must receive it as God gave it, in its perfect fullness, with its true sense and purport, as it was revealed.

But how are we to obtain a certain and definite knowledge of this revelation? The Catholic's answer may be inferred from the decree of the Council of Trent, which I have just quoted. Christ himself first promulgated the Gospel with His own mouth, and before His ascension commissioned a body of men “to preach it to every creature,” promising to be with them to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). Our Lord also said to them, “I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth” (John xiv. 16). From these promises the Catholic infers that there is, and will be until the end

of the world, a body of men in existence who have authority to teach him all that Christ has revealed, and, moreover, that this teaching body, which the Catholic calls the Church, in consequence of its being assisted and guided by Christ and his Spirit, can teach him no error.*

Thus, to a *visible society of men*, is the great and important work of preaching the kingdom of heaven entrusted. The ultimate reason of the visibility of the Church is to be found in the *incarnation* of the Divine Word. Had that Word descended into the hearts of men, without "taking the form of a servant," and, accordingly, without appearing in a corporeal shape, then only an internal, invisible Church would have been established. But since the Word became *flesh*, it expressed itself in an outward, perceptible, and human manner; it spoke as man to man, and suffered and worked after the fashion of men, to win them to the kingdom of God; so that the means selected for the attainment of this object fully corresponded to the general method of instruction and education determined by the nature and wants of man. This decided the nature of those means whereby the Son of God, even after He had withdrawn himself from the eyes of the world, wished still to work in the world, and for the world. The Deity having manifested its action in Christ, according to an *ordinary human* method, the form also in which His work was to be continued was thereby traced out. The preaching of His doctrine needed now a visible human medium, and must be entrusted to visible envoys, teaching and instructing after the wonted method. And as in the world nothing can attain to greatness, but in society, so Christ established a community,—a Church wherein He continues to live—His Spirit continues to work, and the word uttered by Him eternally resounds. In fact, the Church is the Son of God Himself,

* It must be borne in mind that I am merely *stating* the Catholic doctrine, and not *proving* it; this will be done by others. I make this remark because, strictly speaking, our theory requires that we should prove the authority of the Church without having recourse to the Bible as an *inspired volume*, though of course we may use it as an *authentic history*. The demonstration of the Catholic Rule of Faith will be best understood by supposing one's self in the position of an apostle or missionary arguing with a heathen, or a Christian arguing with a deist. We first prove the Divine mission of Christ from His miracles, &c., and thence deduce the necessity of yielding implicit credence to whatever we find Him to have taught. We then show (merely as a matter of history) that He appointed a succession of men, whose province it is, by the aid of supernatural assistance, to deliver inviolate to man all that God has revealed. Here we find ourselves in the presence of the Church. The Church informs us that *some* of those works, which we had been looking upon merely as historical documents, are divinely inspired. We thus arrive at the canon of Scripture, and may henceforward use it to confirm the authority of the Church. In short, we admit the Divinity of Christ, on the strength of the miracles which He worked to prove the fact; we believe the Church on the authority of Christ, and believe in the inspiration and canonicity of the various books of the Bible on the authority of the Church.

perpetually manifesting Himself among men in a human form, or, as St. Paul says, "It is the body of Christ."* Hence it is evident that the Church, though composed of man, is yet not purely human; for as in Christ the Divinity and the humanity are to be clearly distinguished, and are yet bound in unity, so it is with the Church, His permanent manifestation—she is at once human and Divine. It is Christ Himself who, concealed under earthly and human forms, works in the Church; and this is the reason why she has a Divine and a human part in an undivided mode, so that the Divine cannot be separated from the human, nor the human from the Divine. Hence these two parts change their predicates. If the Divine—Christ and His Spirit—constitute, undoubtedly, that which is infallible, and eternally unerrable in the Church—so also the human is infallible and unerrable, in the same way, because the Divine, without the human, has no existence for us; yet the human is not unerrable in itself, but only as the organ and as the manifestation of the Divine.†

Those who deny the infallibility of the Church, practically assert that Christ has not fulfilled those glorious promises which He made before His ascension. They must maintain that Christ has not sent the Spirit of truth to remain with His Church for ever; they must maintain that Christ has failed in His promise of being with His Church, to guide it, "all days, even till the consummation of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20).

A well-known Catholic divine‡ has truly said, "It will be found that the reluctance of too many, even among good men, to receive the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church of God, springs from this—that they base their religious opinions upon human reason, . . . and not upon the illumination and supernatural guidance of Christ, and His Spirit, ever present and ever dwelling as a teacher in the Church. It will be found to involve a doubt as to the office of the third person of the ever-blessed Trinity. . . . The discernment they ascribe to the Church is human, proceeds from documents, and is gathered by reasoning. We rise above this, and believe that the Holy Spirit of God presides over the Church, illuminates, inhabits, guides, and keeps it; that its voice is the voice of the Holy Spirit himself; that when the Church speaks God speaks, . . . so that the ultimate authority upon which we

* "He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet in the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God . . . that henceforward we be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every word of doctrine," Ephes. iv. 11—13. See also 1 Cor. xii. 27. The reader is particularly requested to peruse the whole of the twelfth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians. It will be found to be a remarkable confirmation of the views here developed.

† This will be a sufficient answer to those who, in the last debate, were constantly making inquiries as to the seat of infallibility in the Catholic Church.

‡ Dr. Manning, late Protestant Archdeacon of Chichester.

believe is the voice of God, speaking to us through the Church. We believe not in the Church, but through it, and through the Church, in God."* ("Grounds of Faith," page 47.)

As the Catholic doctrine respecting Divine tradition has already been touched upon in the last debate, and will, no doubt, receive ample attention from other writers, I will not prolong this already too lengthy paper by discussing it in detail. Having laid before my readers an exposition of the Catholic Rule of Faith, and having explained its theory and leading principles as lucidly as I possibly could, I will close my remarks with a few admissions which some celebrated Protestant writers have made on the subject.

Bishop Bull, "Defence of the Nicene Creed," page 2:—

"The matter in question in the first Nicene Council, was a main article of the Christian religion (the Trinity). If, in a matter of such importance, all the pastors of the Church could fall into error, how shall we be able to defend the word of Christ, who hath promised to His apostles, and in their persons their successors, to be always with them? Which promise would not be true, the apostles not being to live so long, were it not that their successors are here comprehended in the persons of the apostles themselves."

Dr. Whittaker, "Controversy," ii. 13:—

"The Church cannot hold any erroneous doctrine, and remain a Church. *Truth* constitutes the Church, and the Church shows where truth is to be found. The first of Timothy proves that truth ever remains in the Church, nor can be separated from her. *Other* societies may err; this society never can err.

Bishop Montague, "The Gagger Gagged," page 20:—

"Traditions instituted by Christ in points of faith, have Divine authority, as the written Word hath. Traditions from the apostles have equal authority with their writings; and no Protestant in his senses will deny that the apostles spoke much more than is written."

Dr. Brett, on Tradition, page 73:—

"It is evident, from the Scriptures themselves, that the whole of Christianity was at first delivered to the bishops succeeding the apostles, by *oral* tradition, and they were also commanded to keep it, and deliver it to their successors, in like manner (2 Tim. ii. 2). Nor is it anywhere found in Scripture, by St. Paul, or any other apostle, that they would either jointly or separately *write down all* they had taught as necessary to salvation."

IGNATIUS.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE—I.

1. It is of great importance at the commencement of a debate that the terms of the question should be explained and freed from all ambiguity. The sense in which any word of dubious meaning is used should be determined; the propositions by which the question is affirmed or negated should be clearly laid down; and then the

* "All thy children shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of thy children," Isa. liv. 13.

strongest arguments should be lucidly brought forward to demonstrate the truth of the propositions. This we shall endeavour to do in the present article.

2. By the "Catholic Rule of Faith," we understand the "*Roman Catholic Rule of Faith*;" and, in speaking of its being "true," we refer to its *Divine authority*. This Rule of Faith includes the "Bible," the "Apocrypha," "unwritten traditions," and the "interpretations" of these by the Romish Church.* As we both admit the Divine authority of the "Bible," so our dispute will not relate to it, and we shall assume, of course, that that part of this Rule of Faith is "true." We deny the Divine authority of the others, and hope to make good our denial before we conclude this paper.

3. The Divine authority of the "Apocrypha," "unwritten traditions," and the "interpretations" of these by the Romish Church, entirely depends upon the *infallibility* of that church. If it were admitted that this church were infallible, it would follow that these are "true," simply because she has declared them to be so; and were we to discuss these one by one, our opponents would ultimately refer us to the infallible authority of their church for proof. They even assert that the Bible has no Divine authority but for her infallibility; and when we ask for proof of this infallibility, she refers us back to the Bible. This reminds us of the man who, when asked what he believed, said, "I believe what the Church believes." "And what does the Church believe?" "The Church believes what I believe," was the reply. It requires no argument to prove that these have no Divine authority except for the infallibility of the Romish Church, as the fact is maintained by our opponents. Bellarmine says:—"That is a true tradition which all former doctors have successively, in their several ages, acknowledged to come from the apostles, and by their doctrine or practices have approved, and which the universal Church owneth as such; and the reason is, because the universal Church CANNOT ERR."† By "the universal Church" he means, of course, the *Romish Church*. Instead, then, of taking up these three topics *seriatim*, and discussing their "truth" separately, we purpose showing that the very *foundation* on which their Divine authority rests, is false; in fact, that they have no foundation whatever for such a distinction. For as their "truth" depends upon the infallibility of the Church of Rome, so, if it be proved that this Church is *not* infallible, it will follow that they are not of Divine authority, and, consequently, that "The Catholic Rule of Faith is *not* true." Let our opponents prove their Church to be infallible, and we must of necessity admit that their Rule of Faith is *true*.

4. We shall endeavour to make good our denial of the question by proving the truth of the following propositions:—

* Douay note, 2 Tim. v. 16. 1853.

† "De Tradit." cap. 9: "Poole's Dialogues," p. 50, 1839.

- (1.) The "Catholic Rule of Faith" is not true because the Roman Catholic Church is not infallible.
- (2.) The "Catholic Rule of Faith" is not true because the Roman Catholic Church by her "traditions" and "interpretations" teaches doctrines and commands practices which are erroneous, being contrary to the plain teaching of the Holy Scriptures.

5. Prop. 1. "The Catholic Rule of Faith is not true because the Roman Catholic Church is not infallible." To be infallible is to be exempt from any liability to error, mistake, or deception. Now the Romish Church grounds her doctrine of infallibility upon the Sacred Scriptures. She must either do so, or prove it independently of the Bible. This she does not attempt; and as she appeals to the Scriptures for proof, so by their evidence must she be tried. Upon the Bible *alone* must we rest for the proof of this important question, because that *alone* is the authority which we both admit to be Divine, and to which we both can appeal in this matter. *We therefore assert that the Romish Church is not infallible because she has no Scripture authority for this doctrine.*

6. The first and principal passage to which she appeals is Matt. xvi. 18: "And I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my Church; *and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.*" The italicized words are those on which she builds this doctrine of infallibility. But that they prove what the Romish Church says they do, will depend—1. Whether it is Peter or the Divine dignity of Christ, as confessed by Him, that is the *rock of the Church*. 2. If it be Peter, does it include all his successors? 3. Whether is the promise general or particular? 4. Does it relate to matters of *faith and practice*, or to matters of *faith only*? 5. Does it prove the infallibility of Peter or the Church?

7. Is it Peter or the Divine dignity of Christ that is the *rock of the Church*? That it is not Peter will appear from the words translated *Peter* and *rock*. The Greek word *petros*, anglicized *Peter*, does *not* mean a *rock*; but a *stone*, or *piece of a rock*. "Thou art Simon, son of Jona; thou shalt be called Cephas, which is by interpretation, a *stone*," or *Peter* (John i. 42). The word *petra*, translated *rock*, means a *real rock*, not a *stone* or *fragment* of one, as does *petros*. And as *petra*, a *rock*, is of superior dignity to *petros*, a *stone*, so we understand the *rock*, the *true foundation* of the Church, is superior in dignity to *Peter*. That this is the true meaning will be evident when we consider that the term *rock* is a scriptural, figurative expression, to signify a *Divine Protector*; and is only applied to God or Christ. "Jehovah is my rock," 2 Sam. xii. 2. For they drank of that spiritual Rock (*Petra*), and that Rock (*Petra*) was Christ," 1 Cor. x. 4. But the term *petros*, a *stone*, if applied figuratively to Peter, can only mean that he is but one of the true believers who, "as living stones, are built up a spiritual house, . . . acceptable to God by Jesus Christ," 1 Peter ii. 5.

8. Again, the *grammatical* construction of the sentence will prove that Peter is not the rock of the Church. The word *petros* is a noun *masculine*, and *petra* a noun *feminine*. If our Lord had intended by the rock Peter himself, He would have repeated the *masculine* noun in the *dative* case with a *masculine pronoun* and *article*, thus,—“*epi touto to petro.*” But the text is “*epi taute ta petra,*”—words which are all *feminine*, and cannot therefore refer to Peter. What our Lord did refer to will be seen from the context: Peter had said, “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.” Our Lord answered, “AND I ALSO say unto thee,” &c. This, by the copulative conjunction *and*; and the connective adverb *also*, points out the inseparable connection of this verse and Peter’s declaration of Christ’s Divine dignity, and proves that the declaration of Peter was the main object of the sentence, and the true and only foundation of the Christian Church. Seeing then that Peter is not the rock of THE Church, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, it is evident that the Church of Rome, being built upon Peter, cannot be the Church referred to in this text; and, therefore, this passage does not prove the infallibility of the Church of Rome.

9. Suppose Peter to be the rock of the Church, does it include all his successors? First. Who was Peter’s successor in this supposed supremacy? Was it *Linus* or *Clemons*? How careless of Peter not to name him, when by so doing he would have put away no end of dispute! He might have said, “And to this end I leave my successor, Pope.—, whom you must hear in all things, and who will be as infallible in doctrine and practice as I have been” (Gal. ii. 2.) If this privilege belongs to *all* his successors, it will follow that—to quote D’Aubigné—“Benedict IX., a boy of twelve years of age, who, after being tutored in debauchery, continued his horrible turpitudes as Pope,” was the rock of the Church for the time being. That Alexander VI., a fornicator and incestuous person, a compound of vice in all its evil shapes, was the rock of the “infallible” Church. We cannot believe that these, and other Popes of this class, could be the foundation of the Church, or a *security* from the “gates of hell.” It will not find credit with seriously thinking men till east and west meet together.

10. Is the promise general or particular? If it be particular, and refers to the Church built upon Peter, and proves the infallibility of *any* who are built upon him, it also proves the infallibility of *all* who are built upon him. There is nothing in the text or context to prove the contrary. And since the Church of England and those of Germany were ones built upon him, and having apostatized, according to the views of our opponents, it follows that their being built upon Peter, while subject to the Pope, did not make them infallible, nor secure them from falling. So those who are now built upon him may, in like manner, fall away, until the Pope be left the head without a body, a shepherd without sheep. This shows that the promise is not a particular one, does not refer to any one par-

ticular church, but that it is a general promise to Christ's own Church, which includes *all true believers in all ages*; and that it signifies that the Church built upon the only true foundation, Jesus Christ, shall be maintained in the world to the end of time.

11. The Church of Rome claims to be *infallible* in matters of *faith* ONLY. But this text speaks no more about matters of *faith* than of *practice*. It secures the Church of Rome no more against the one than the other; and the "gates of hell" prevail as much against the Church by *practice* as they do by *doctrine*; and "since it is acknowledged that some of Peter's successors have died in damnable sins, they may also die in damnable heresies," for they are no more secured from the one by this text than from the other. This passage, therefore, does not favour the pretensions of Rome to be infallible in matters of faith or doctrine *only*; but the fact of her claiming infallibility in this *alone* is a tacit acknowledgment of her *fallibility* in matters of *fact* and *practice*.

12. Does it prove the infallibility of Peter or the Church? The passage evidently speaks of the infallibility of the Church, if it speaks of infallibility at all. But the infallibility of the Church will depend upon that of the rock on which it is built. Now, the Church of Rome is built upon Peter, and the Popes as his successors. But the infallibility of the Pope *alone* is denied by the majority of Roman Catholics; and we have proved that Peter cannot be the rock of the Church spoken of in the text, which also proves that he is not infallible; and this shows at once that the claim of the Romish Church to infallibility is not found in this passage of Scripture, since the *stone*, Peter, on which she is built, is not infallible, and the Popes are no more so than he.

13. We have thus gone through this passage more minutely than we intended; but as it is the great stronghold, the chief passage on which the Romish Church founds this absurd notion, perhaps it is better to investigate it more fully than any other. We shall now glance at some others, to which we are referred for proof of this doctrine, and then pass on to our second proposition.

14. The next passage is found in 1 Tim. iii. 15, where the Church is called "the pillar and ground of the truth." And "therefore the Church of the living God can never uphold error, nor bring in corruption, superstition, or idolatry."*

But the church here spoken of was not that of Rome, but of Ephesus; and if any particular church was meant, it must have been the latter. If it were the universal Church of Christ, *that* might be infallible, though the Church of Rome were obliterated. It is generally acknowledged by our opponents that infallibility resides only in "the Pope and a general council agreeing together;" and that these alone constitute "*the Church*." Accordingly, the following paraphrase will convey the true meaning of this text,—
"That thou mightest know how to behave thyself in a *Pope* and

* Douay note, 1 Tim. iii. 15. 1853.

general council, which is the Church of the living God." This is nonsense; and none but those who blindly follow the blind can believe that St. Paul would give directions to Timothy how to behave in a "Pope and general council," which was not then in being, nor, indeed, till more than two centuries after. The passage evidently refers to his behaviour in the Church of Ephesus, over which he was bishop; and it has no more to do with the Church of Rome than with the Church of the "Latter-day Saints."

But the words, "pillar and ground of the truth," are figurative; and whether they refer, as some think, to Timothy himself, or to the Church of Ephesus, they evidently mean being well *rooted* and *grounded* in the faith—a *strong supporter* of it—as he is a *reed* who is tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine. Jeremiah was called an "iron pillar;"—was he, therefore, infallible? The saints of Vienna and Lyons called Attalus, the martyr, a "pillar and ground of the truth;"*—was he, therefore, infallible? James, Cephas, and John, seemed to be *pillars* (Gal. ii. 9). If this made Peter infallible, so were likewise James and John; and, consequently, so were the churches over which they were bishops. But enough has been said to show that this passage does not favour this celebrated dogma of the Church of Rome.

15. John xvi. 13: "When He the Spirit of truth is come, He will guide *you* into all truth." This promise was made to the apostles only. If it relates to them *alone*, it does not prove the infallibility of the Romish Church; but if it refers to their successors, it includes *all* the successors of *all* the apostles; and it proves no more the infallibility of Peter's successors than it does of all the others. John xiv. 16: "And I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter, that He may abide with you for ever." This passage does not say that *every one* with whom the Comforter abides *should be led into all truth for ever*. "*For ever*. Hence it is evident that this Spirit of truth was not only promised to the persons of the apostles, but also to their successors, through all generations."† If this implies the infallibility of all who are led by the Spirit of God, then all believers are infallible, for they are led by the Spirit (Rom. viii. 14). The Spirit of truth is promised to all who ask it (Luke xi. 13); and a knowledge of the *doctrine*, whether it be of God or not, is promised to *all* who *obey the will of God* (John vii. 17). This passage, therefore, has no more to do with the infallibility of the Church of Rome, than with that of every Christian believer.

The last passage we shall examine is one in the Old Testament, on which they found this dogma of infallibility. Deut. xvii. 8, 12, is one of the principal arguments they bring forward to prove it. Our opponents argue that, inasmuch as God gave to the Church-guides of the Old Testament infallible authority in deciding,

* Eusebius, lib. 5, cap. 1: Poole's "Dialogues," 1839.

† Douay note, John xiv. 16. 1853.

without appeal, all controversies relating to the law, that He has not done less for the Church-guides of the New Testament. The infallibility of the Jewish Church, in the person of the High Priest, is made the foundation of the infallibility of the Romish Church, in the person of the Pope. Well, then, since the Jewish Church was *infallible*, it will follow that those books only are canonical which the Jewish Church received. The Jews rejected the books of the Apocrypha; they never received into their canon of Scripture those books which we Protestants reject; and as they were *INFALLIBLE*, they must be right. And unless the Church of Rome can show that they were *not infallible*, or that she has received *Divine authority* to declare the *infallible* decisions of the Jewish Church to be *fallible*, it must follow that the Apocrypha is *not any part of the revealed will of God*, and, consequently, that this part of the "Catholic Rule of Faith" is *not "true."* Josephus bears testimony to the Jewish canon of Scripture, and declares that the apocryphal books "are not of the same credit with the former, because there was no certain succession of prophets."* Bellarmine says:—"All those books which the Protestants do not receive, the Jews also did not receive."†

16. We have thus gone through the principal passages of Scripture alleged to support this favourite dogma of the Romish Church, and have found that they do not, in the slightest degree, give countenance to any such notion. We believe, therefore, that our first proposition has been demonstrated, and that, *because* the Church of Rome is *not infallible*—not having scriptural authority for the doctrine, that her "Rule of Faith" is *not "true."* We have seen that the argument she brings forward to prove her own infallibility, namely, that respecting the Jewish Church, proves that the Apocrypha, which she receives as *part* of her "Rule of Faith," cannot be of Divine authority. We shall now pass on to consider the second proposition.

17. Prop. 2. "The Catholic Rule of Faith is not true because the Roman Catholic Church, by her 'traditions' and 'interpretations,' teaches doctrines and commands practices which are erroneous, being contrary to the plain teaching of the Scriptures."

Our space bids us to be brief on this part of our subject. We shall, therefore, not enter into any lengthy arguments to prove our position, but shall put in parallel columns the teaching of the Scriptures, and that of the Church of Rome, and leave the readers of the *British Controversialist* to compare the two, and to draw their own conclusions, which, we doubt not, will be generally in accordance with our proposition.

THE BIBLE.

18. "Whatever things were written aforetime were written for our learning,

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

18. "Translated Bibles must not be in the hands of every husbandman,

* Josephus, "Contra Appionem," lib. 1: Poole's "Dialogues." 1839.

† "De Verbo Dei," lib. 1. c. 10: *Ibid.*

THE BIBLE.

that through patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope."—*Rom.* xv. 4.

"Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly."—*Col.* iii. 16.

"Search the Scriptures."—*John* v. 39.

"These are written that ye might believe."—*John* xx. 31.

"From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith in Christ Jesus."—*2 Tim.* iii. 15.

"Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures."—*Matt.* xxii. 29.

"Jesus said unto him; *It is written again*, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."—*Matt.* iv. 7.

"Is it not written?"—*Mark* xi. 17.

19. "Full well ye reject the commandments of God, that ye may keep your own tradition."—*Mark* vii. 9.

"Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and not after Christ."—*Col.* ii. 8.

"Refuse profane and old wives' fables."—*1 Tim.* i. 4.

20. There is none righteous, no not one."—*Rom.* iii. 10.

"All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."—*Rom.* v. 12.

"The Scripture hath concluded all under sin."—*Gal.* iii. 22.

"That which is born of the flesh is flesh, that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."—*John* iii. 6.

21. By grace you are saved *through faith*; and this not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: *not of works*, that no man may glory."—*Eph.* ii. 8-9. *Donay version.*

22. "Behold the Lamb of God; he who taketh away the sin of the world."—*John* i. 29. *Donay.*

"Who gave himself a ransom for all."—*1 Tim.* ii. 6.

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

artificer, prentice boie, girl, mistresse, man—*this holy booke is the booke of the priests*, at whose hands and dispositions we must take and use it."—*Preface to Douay Testament*, 1633.

"It is not a command for *all* to read the Scriptures."—*Donay note*, *John* v. 39. 1853.

"Of these translations (of the Bible), are come much vanitie, curiositie, contempt of superiors, horrible errors and divulgation of the dreadful sacraments which of purpose were hidden from the vulgar."—*Donay note*, *1 Cor.* xiv. 2.

"The apostle affirmeth only that Timothee knew the Scriptures, and therefore had studied them by *hearing* good readers and teachers."—*Donay note*, 1633. 1816.

"If they (the heretics) say, 'It is written,' that is the voice of the *devil* speaking in his members."—*Cardinal Bossius: De Expressio Dei Verbo. Poole's Dialogues.* 1839.

19. "For example of necessary traditions—the sign of the crosse, praying towards the east, the words spoken at the elevation of the Eucharist, the hallowing of the font, blessing of the oil, exorcismes of the party to be baptized. What Scriptures taught these and such like? None, truly; al coming of secret and silent tradition."—*Donay note*; *2 Thess.* ii. 15.

20. "Heart of Mary, *unstained with original sin*, pray for us."—*Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori.*

"Whilst we have been born in original sin, Mary, by a privilege granted to her alone, *was conceived free from every stain of original sin.*"—*Pastoral of the Romish Primate of Ireland*, August, 1850.

21. "Good works do truly deserve eternal life; and whosoever holds the contrary is accursed."—*Trid.* sess. vi. cap. xvi. et can. 32.

22. "Whoever shall affirm that we can by no means make satisfaction to God for our sins, let him be accursed."—*Trent.* sess. xiv. can. 13.

"But after He had offered one sacrifice, for ever sat down on the right hand of God."—*Heb. x. 12.*

23. "I have trodden the wine-press alone, and of the Gentiles there is not a man with me."—*Isa. lxiii. 3. Douay version.*

"There is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus."—*1 Tim. ii. 5.*

"We have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous."—*1 John ii. 1.*

"I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father but by me."—*John xiv. 6.*

"There is none other name given among men, whereby we must be saved."—*Acts iv. 12.*

24. "All power is given unto me (Jesus) in heaven and in earth."—*Matt. xviii. 18.*

"The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand."—*John iii. 35.*

25. "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin."—*1 John i. 7. Douay.*

"Wherefore He is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by Him."—*Heb. vii. 25.*

26. "For this is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins. But I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of this FRUIT OF THE VINE," &c.—*Matt. xxvi. 28, 29.*

"For as often as ye eat this BREAD and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death till He come."—*1 Cor. xi. 26.*

The wine after consecration is still called the *fruit of the vine*, and the cup; and the bread is also called *bread*.

"Because thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine HOLY ONE to see CORRUPTION."—*Acts ii. 27.*

"He seeing this before spake of the resurrection of Christ, that His soul was not left in hell, neither did His flesh see CORRUPTION."—*Acts ii. 31.*

27. "Let no man deceive you by any means; for that day shall not come

"O miracle! He that sitteth with the Father in heaven above is handled of men beneath."—*Douay note, Acts i. 2.*

23. "True, Lord, there was no MAN with thee, but there was a WOMAN with thee."—*In Martialis, Ann. 1493. Quoted in Poole's Dialogues, p. 108. 1839.*

To the Virgin Mary: "Receive our praises, obtaine our requestes, for thou art the special hope of sinners; by thee we hope for pardon of our sinnes, because of her intercession for us, whereby she is our refuge, our advocate," &c.—*Douay note on Acts i. 14.*

"General salvation is procured to all mankind by mediation of the B. V. Marie."—*Douay note on Esther ix. 1. 1633.*

24. "Hail, Mary, lady and mistress of the world, to whom all power has been given both in heaven and in earth."—*The Sacred Heart, p. 206.*

25. "The fire of purgatory, in which the souls of just men are cleansed by a temporary punishment."—*Cat. Council of Trent, p. 59.*

26. "The words of consecration accomplish three things; first, that the true and real body of Christ, the same that was born of the Virgin, is rendered present in the Holy Eucharist; second, that no substance of the elements remain in the sacrament. The substance of the bread and wine is so changed into the body and blood of our Lord, that they ALTOGETHER CEASE TO BE the substance of bread and wine."—*Cat. Council of Trent, p. 212.*

"If something poisonous have touched the consecrated Host, let it be preserved in the tabernacle in a separate place until the species be CORRUPTED; and when CORRUPTED, then let it be thrown into the sacarium."—*Roman Missal, published by Coyne, Dublin. 1822.*

27. "The Divinity of Christ and of God (in respect of us) depends upon

THE BIBLE.

except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God or that is worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God."—*2 Thess. ii. 3, 4.*

THE CHURCH OF ROME.

the authority of the Pope."—*Triflicatio Contra Whitak. c. 17. Quoted in Poole's Dialogues, p. 66. 1839.*

"If the Pope should err in forbidding virtues and commanding vices, the church were bound to believe vices to be good, and virtues bad, unless she would sin against conscience."—*Bell, De Pont. lib. iv. c. 5. Ibid.*

28. In conclusion, we think that the comparison between the teaching of the Bible and that of the Romish Church fully establishes our position, that by her "traditions" and "interpretations," she teaches doctrines and commands practices which are contrary to the plain teaching of the Holy Scriptures; and that, therefore, the "Catholic Rule of Faith is" NOT "*true*." We, of course, except the Bible; but respecting the Apocrypha, "unwritten traditions," and the "interpretations" of these by the Romish Church, we believe that the evidence brought forward in proof of their *fallibility* of that church, and of her *erroneous* teachings, proves, beyond a doubt, that the latter portion of her "Rule of Faith" is not of Divine authority, being nothing more than the opinions and commandments of men.

THEOPHYLACT.

Philosophy.

IS THE POETRY OF TENNYSON AS HEALTHY IN ITS TENDENCIES AS THAT OF LONGFELLOW?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

Lord Bacon has said, "The world being in proportion inferior to the soul, there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because true history hath not in its acts or events that magnitude, that justness, poesy feigneth acts and events greater, and more heroical, and endureth them; so that poetry serveth to magnanimity, and conferreth therewith morality and delectation. And, therefore, was it ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things." This definition of the nature and work of poetry by one of the most subtle and far-seeing philosophers, may be applied as a test in a discussion upon the moral tendencies

of the teachings of Tennyson and Longfellow. The question fully recognizes the value of poetry, and hence relieves the disputants from the labour of defending it from the utilitarian, who deems it veriest idleness to contend for a superiority in that which he regards as fit only for the weakest pastime. The affirmative writers in the present debate admit the claims of Longfellow, as a poet alike pure, lofty, and moral, but contend that Tennyson stands equally high, if not above him. Although the previous affirmative writers have cheerfully conceded this, their opponents have not at present clearly defined what their own estimate includes. In allowing that the American is one of the most popular poets of the present, we believe that is rather against than for him in the question at issue, since we contend that his popularity is the effect of characteristics in which he unfavourably compares with our Laureate. One of Longfellow's most intimate friends (Mr. R. W. Griswold), in introducing an edition of his works, says, "These poems have that naturalness which commends them alike to the rude and the cultivated. Yet he seems to lack a certain freshness and creative energy necessary to poets of the highest order." This we take to be a fair estimate, and have looked in vain through the negative articles for proof of higher power and moral strength to justify his being placed above Tennyson, from whom he as essentially differs in teaching as in style.

Longfellow's poetry is entirely that of the commonplace, even in his most meritorious performances; there is the easy flow of thought and graceful symbolism which readily commends itself to every one's mind, for the sentiments are such as float in the popular brain, rather than the profound intuitional utterance of the highest poetry. This lack may be expressed in the words of a recent reviewer, who says, "There is none of the intensely delicate and surprising touches which the greatest poets use, and which, like the scent of May blossom, seems to place us at once amid long-forgotten sights and sounds."* Holding that his advocates have advanced no higher claims than those admitted by their opponents, we may justifiably conclude our premises admitted, and thence turn to the objections they so strenuously urge against Tennyson, qualified as they are by frank concessions, which, if logically and fairly carried to their issue, would decide the question against themselves. They allow Tennyson to have the greatest depth, breadth, and subtlety, and yet deny his *equality*; hence considering superficialism to be mentally and morally healthy: they grant his poetry is of a loftier cast, more thought-laden, yet deny to it "practical" power; hence arguing that truth, however majestically displayed, is powerless unless "directly" applied, and that he who "aspires to direct the current of men's thoughts" is not equal to him who didactically aims to "stimulate their actions," thus setting mere action above thought, which must be the life of all right, earnest, manly work.

* *National Review*, No. 13, Art. "Longfellow."

The reasons of the opposition to Tennyson, shown by the negative writers, are most vague and unsatisfactory; by one writer they are chiefly confined to the use of such epithets as "morbid and mystical," while another speaks of his poetry as "overwrought, cloudy, melancholy, and deficient in earnestness and vigour;" and a third insinuates that were he less abstruse and metaphysical, more "lifelike, hearty, and fraternal," he would wield a magic power, crowned as he is with such genius. To reply strictly and explicitly to such charges would narrow the debate, and altogether rob it of its true value, as was so ably proved in the last affirmative article. Indeed, we opine that the course already taken on both sides is wise, for though the articles may appear to be made up of special pleading, an exposition of the grounds on which preference is decided, appears the most suitable means of giving the best evidence for guidance of judgment. Not that it would be difficult to take the charges brought against Tennyson and disprove them by copious quotations from his poems, or to place the works of the two poets side by side, and demonstrate that for whatever excellence there is in Longfellow, there are precious things far more glorious in Tennyson. To place several of their pieces in juxtaposition would be valuable mental exercise, as well as conducing to a just appreciation of both; especially if such comparison has due regard to their chronological position, so that early should be pitted against early, and mature against its compeer. Taking the "April Day," "Autumn," "Winter Woods," "Sunrise," "Spirit of Poetry," "Anti-Slavery Poems," "The Bridge," "Old Clock," "Arrow and Song," "The Builders," &c., of Longfellow, together with the "Arabian Nights," "Ode to Memory," "The Poet," "Circumstance," "Miller's Daughter," "May Queen," "Death of Old Year," "Gardener's Daughter," "Golden Year," "Godiva," "Two Voices," &c., of Tennyson, or "Evangeline" and "Locksley Hall," "The Spanish Student" and "The Princess," "The Voices of the Night," and "In Memoriam," or the "Song of Hiawatha" and "Miles Standish," together with "Idylls of the King;" the result of such a critical study would be conducive to the strengthening of Tennyson's claim to the first place.

It is a much-disputed point whether progress in civilization is destructive of poetry and its influence; and whether that external assimilation and seeming distinction of individualism, which some of the deepest thinkers deplore as an inevitable result, is to leave no room for poesy to rule as of yore. But we have yet to learn that the antagonism exists elsewhere than in the minds of those who imagine it, between that ideal excellence which seems in the progress of science and knowledge ever nearer to attainment, and the spiritual tendencies of man's unchanging nature. If the external world in relation to each unit of the vast humanity, is losing its speciality, we may be sure the outgrowth can only be a deeper, fuller, richer development of the internal being of each and all; and hence it may be that the mission of the poet in the future shall far

transcend the glory he has had in the past. Inasmuch as some faint indications seem to suggest that we may be living in an era which is to see the beginning of new casts of thought and new growth in spiritual life, we deem the position and relation of Tennyson to our times one of great importance, since he must be admitted to wear the laureate's crown in spiritual poetry, he alone having succeeded in transfiguring the outward and material by an infusion of the hidden life.

To appreciate truly Tennyson's poetry, and ascertain how far he fulfils what Bacon lays down as the work of the true poet, it is imperative that we consider the purposes developed in his works, as only by so doing is it possible rightly to estimate what the question at issue terms their "healthy tendency." He, unlike most poets, from the commencement of his work set before him a regular progress and development which could only ripen slowly; for he resolved not to rely upon the passionate utterances of genius alone for his power to sway men, but sought to infuse that genius into artistic and refined language, and so to secure an effect reaching alike the taste, imagination, intellect, and affections. So great and wondrous an ideal could only be slowly and painfully wrought out, and hence the great value of his poems regarded as the biography of a mind which-sets high excellence from the first before it, but comes gradually to see that point after point has to be altered and given up, and that a loftier and more blessed standard can alone satisfy the unquenched craving of the poet's soul.

His earlier poems are mere pictorial efforts; here the poet's ideal is firm, exquisite, gorgeous, colouring with little sympathy with the life pulsing in the wide world; still they are worth consideration as indications of that marvellous word-painting afterwards associated with such noble sentiments, and the polish and beauty of which are still dwelt upon in the structure of his later works. In "The Poet" he gave proofs that already the fire was kindled which anon was to leap so high heavenward; in the quiet flow of "Circumstance," we have the promise of that analytical power he has since wielded with a master's hand. His collected edition of 1842 at once placed him on the proud eminence of the poet of his country and age; and though he is still struggling to a loftier height, his songs are now full of a rich life, flowing on amid more than the old vigour and beauty of versification. He is not yet perfect; there are still the taints of what our negative friends term "morbidly and mysticism." And why? Because he is not content to balance every light and shade, and, like Longfellow, utter didactic songs, each of which shall have its practical and utilitarian value consequent on its very triteness. He has not yet found his resting-place; he utter's life's riddles, but has no solutions to offer; hence, if judged by an arbitrary standard, he is non-understandable and mystical in this series of his works. "Locksley Hall" is loaded with thoughts of most invigorating and soul-stirring power. Such, for instance, as,—

"Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns."
* * * *

Again :—

"Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers, and he bears a laden breast,
Full of sad experience, moving towards the stillness of his rest."
* * * *

"Men, my brothers, men the workers, ever reaping something new,
That which they have done but earnest of the things that they shall do."
* * * *

"Not in vain the distance beacons. Forward, forward let us range,
Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change;
Through the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day:
Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay."

Despite the wild passion of this poem, we feel there is deepest, richest, healthiest life throbbing through it; the poet has insight almost inspired to look through and beyond all the fierce doubt and struggle of his era; and to see a future radiant with glory, for he sees a present in which a will works that is subduing all things to itself, and evolving a blessed godlike *oneness* out of all the divers aims and ends of man. In the classical poems of this series, where he seems most removed from the sympathies of his contemporaries, a careful review will bring out the proof that he has placed them there, not so much as studies in the antique as analyses of character, applicable alike to all time. His "Ulysses" and "Cenone" are laden with wisdom and sentiment, as he declares that

"Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power."

Scattered among this series there were, however, a number of pieces which at first sight seemed so destitute of any moral power for good, if accepted without antidote, that they have served all those who could not understand Tennyson's teaching as a whole, as a constant drawback with which they justify their verdict that his tendency is unhealthy. The "Lotos-eaters" may be taken as a specimen of this class; they have been ably characterized as "studies by the artist in one colour." The poet has not yet reached his highest region; he is still struggling; and with the restlessness there ever and anon comes deep yearning for rest and fixity of being.

This seeming melancholy is a proof of the depth and intensity of his mind, which no easy commonplaces respecting the mystery of life can satisfy; and must not he who has felt deepest be always the truest and best teacher? Why have the Psalms of David such marvellous aptitude to teach all generations, but that they are the fullest expressions of the experience of one of the deepest and most poetic minds the world has known? So, if, in some of his works, Tennyson has only stated the need, this of itself is not a small thing; nor is it morbid or unhealthy to proclaim that the soul

will not, cannot be satisfied with the material, that, because, as Bacon says, "It has a more ample greatness;" it is ever crying, "Give, give."

Taking the collected pieces as a whole, we challenge comparison with Longfellow to show wherein he has more health in the tone and tendency of his poetry than Tennyson; for in the minor pieces or ballads of the latter there lives a power most marked; we need hardly refer to the "Gardener's Daughter," the "Miller's Daughter," "Clara Vere de Vere," the "Lord of Burleigh," as proofs of this; for even in the quaint conceits of the "Day-Dream" we read such lines as these:—

"To sleep through terms of mighty wars,
And wake on science grown to men,
On secrets of the brain, the stars,
As wild as aught of fairy love;
And all that else the years will show,
The Pest-forms of stronger hours,
The vast Republics that may grow,
The Federations and the Powers;
Titanic forces, taking birth
In divers seasons, divers climes."

But it is objected by our opponents that Tennyson is not fraternal and warm-hearted; that his sympathies are with some far-off romance which attracts his notice, rather than the every-day life around him; we reply that to admit him to be a great and true poet, and then expect his genius to be "cribbed, cabined, and confined" by our notions, is to contradict all nature, which will bestow its gifts in its own way. We believe that the poet whose teachings have to be brought out as hidden gems will be more useful to his fellows than he who aims directly to stimulate them. We have little faith in what is termed practical poetry, which is ever striving to reach men through giving expression to their ordinary thoughts, rather than influencing them by glorious examples. Nor is Tennyson's devotion to the romance of Arthur the idle and fruitless thing some would fain persuade us; to him his hero is no myth of the past, but a living exemplar who has ever his message to all men; for, in his earlier devotion to him, as in "*Morte d'Arthur*," he tells us,—

"Arthur is come again: he cannot die;
Come again, and thrice as fair;
Come with all good things, and war shall be no more."

Arthur, too, was an image for all time; through the poem just noticed he answers some of the querulous lamentations of the present about the past, when he makes the grand old king in his last words say,—

"The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
And God fulfils himself in many ways,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

And he adds,—

“ More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of.”

Our opponents have disputed the Laureate's claim to healthy teaching on the ground of a lack of earnestness and vigour; they have asked for a counterpart of the “ Psalm of Life ” and “ Excelsior,” and have affirmed they exist not in Tennyson's poems; they must surely have forgotten those wondrous political lyrics which have been before men for years, in which there breathes a wisdom unmatched by anything Longfellow has yet given to the world. In them political philosophy has been wedded most happily to the poetic form; for the poet has no shallow love of country and friends; he dwells there, rather than in more gorgeous regions, because

“ It is the land that freemen till,
That sober-suited Freedom chose,
The land where, girt with friends or foes,
A man may speak the thing he will.

“ A land of settled government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where Freedom broadens slowly down
From precedent to precedent.”

Hence he glories in his great position as a modern citizen in such a land, and sings:—

“ Of old sat Freedom on the heights,
The thunders breaking at her feet;
Above her shook the starry lights,
She heard the torrents meet.

“ There in her place she did rejoice,
Self-gathered in her prophet mind;
But fragments of her mighty voice
Came rolling on the wind.

“ Then step't she down thro' town and field,
To mingle with the human race,
And part by part to men reveal'd
The fulness of her face.

“ Grave mother of majestic works,
From her isle-altar gazing down,
Who, God-like, grasps the triple forks,
And, King-like, wears the crown.

“ Her open eyes desire the truth;
The wisdom of a thousand years
Is in them. May perpetual youth
Keep dry their light from tears;

“ That her fair form may stand and shine,
Make bright our days, and light our dreams,
Turning to scorn, with lips divine,
The falsehood of extremes!”

But in the longer poem, “ Love thou thy land,” there is a majestic display of power which has seldom been equalled. In it he probes the want and need of his age, the lack of reverent heed for and consistency to truth, which too greatly marks the knowledge of the time.

“ Make knowledge circle with the winds,
But let her herald, Reverence, fly
Before her, to whatever sky
Bear seed of men, and growth of minds.”

Every verse might be quoted to show how full of ripest wisdom and experience it is; the warning against working for place; depending on mere watchwords; the blessed trust that the right shall not always be won through blood,—

“Certain, if knowledge bring the sword,
That knowledge takes the sword away;”

and finally, the marvellous close in which the result of all the ages' strife and work is declared,—

“To-morrow yet would reap to-day,
As we bear blossom of the dead;
Earn well the thrifty months, nor wed
Raw Haste, half-sister to Delay.”

The next era in the development of Tennyson's mind is that marked by “The Princess.” He has reached a certain position where the fierceness of the old struggle is past, and as yet the new problems before him are not started. He has now taken that place which, amid all subsequent variations, he holds firmly, as the poet of woman; he has seen that the relation of the sexes, their mutual power and influence, is one perplexing enigma, which presses especially on the present era, and hence he essays some solution of it, knowing that in so doing he is also doing most for man. The result of his study is summed in that magnificent passage, commencing,—

“For woman is not undevelop't man, but diverse.”

Having completed this task, he next appears before us in a totally new phase of being; the mystery of death has opened up before him the whole problem of human existence; there is now an end to the even flow and philosophic spirit of “The Princess;” questions deep, vast, awful in their significance, press his spirit; he has lost communion with one of earth's fairest growths, a young man of *such* powers, that those who knew him best, tell us Tennyson in nowise has overdrawn or idolized his character, when in those matchless lines he describes him as

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>“Heart affluence in discursive talk
From household fountains never dry,
The critic clearness of an eye
That saw through all the Muses' walk;</p> <p>“Seraphic intellect, and force
To throw the doubts of man;
Impassioned logic, which outrun
The hearer in its fiery course.</p> <p>“High nature, amorous of the good,
But touched with no ascetic gloom,</p> | <p>And passion pure in snowy bloom
Through all the years of April blood.</p> <p>“A love of freedom rarely felt,
Of freedom in her regal seat
Of England; not the schoolboy heat.
The blind hysterics of the Celt.</p> <p>“And manhood fused with female grace
In such a sort, the child would twine
A trustful hand, unasked, in thine,
And find his comfort in thy face.” *</p> |
|--|--|

* For a review of the privately published works of A. H. Hallam, see the *North British Review*, in Vol. for 1852.

This poem, libelled as morbid and melancholy, has about it a glory which of itself would establish the claim of Tennyson to healthiest power; there is first the crushing sense of sorrow, blinding the spirit by its agony to all else; next the stage of terrible doubt, as to what the issue of such sorrow shall be, both to him who feels it, and to him who is removed. In this stage he forces his way through darkest doubt, into fullest and richest sunlight, where he sees the spiritual glory of the universe, and gives forth sentiments at once sublime in their mental, as they are most truthful in their religious aspect. He has found the truth, not in any abstract form, but in its glorified impersonation, as the "Strong Son of God, Immortal Love;" hence he can say,—

"If e'er when faith had fall'n asleep,
I heard a voice, 'Believe no more,'
And heard an ever-breaking shore
That tumbled in the Godless deep;
A warmth within the breast would melt
The freezing reason's colder part,
And like a man in wrath, the heart
Stood up and answered, 'I have felt.'"

Compared with Longfellow's "Footsteps of Angels," this work will fully establish the claim of our Laureate to as high, if not a higher place in the literature of the heart.

The publication of "In Memoriam" indicated that its author was once more roused to action, and was pluming his wings for further flight; which he soon proved by the issue of that much-maligned and misunderstood tragedy "Maud," of which we have a most excellent estimate in a recent periodical, the writer observing: *—"The blending of styles in it shows at least one thing, that the poet has reached a stand-point from which he can disregard that mere outward beauty, that smooth and rich melody, which seemed the chief object of his earliest works. He has found there is something higher than beauty, and that is truth."

Unsatisfactory as seemed the progress of the poet indicated by "Maud," there was demonstrated by it, as by "The Princess," an aim and ideal which he had set before himself to reach and fulfil, and what Bacon intimates by "Poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical than in history."

High ideals wrought out into beautiful and glorious forms, and so clothed as to appeal to all the parts of man's nature, being the great need of our race; and the mission of the poet being, in his matured strength, to supply such need; we wonder not finally to behold Tennyson, in all the greatness and goodness of his experience, going again to those old romantic springs where his earlier steps had been directed, and from the rich, national legends of Arthur and his knights and ladies, creating those poems which are only

now beginning to be understood. In our previous remarks, we have had to regard Tennyson and his teaching as comparatively incomplete, not because there was any inherent want, but that such high promise and aim was in them displayed, that we could not but be left after their study in the attitude of anticipation of other and fuller utterances. So much has been and is being said on the wondrous power manifested in the "Idylls of the King," that we feel that there is little need here to expatiate either on their beauty or tendency; suffice to say, we have in them more than a fulfilment of the great promise their author had previously given; his artistic power is richer and fuller, his social wisdom more matured, his old devotion to the aspects of womanhood further developed, and withal a deep spiritual and religious insight into the power and requirements of our nature, which leave the careful student with but one conclusion, that a true national poet is giving expression to heart-views on the greatest of themes, under the sweetest guise of ancient myth and romance.

Superficial as our estimate and criticism is, we yet hope thoughts have been hinted at, which, if fairly carried to a conclusion, will induce all candid students of the question under debate, unhesitatingly to give an affirmative reply to it, and so admit to his true place the Greatheart who teaches his age that it should have unswerving trust in

"That God which ever lives and loves,
One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off Divine event,
To which the whole creation moves."

ANGLO-SAXON.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

POETA nascitur, non fit. Such is the ancient dictum, and recent times and experiences tend to establish more firmly its truthfulness.

A modern poet has beautifully expressed this idea in a Christian form, telling us that

"Poetry is itself a thing of God;
He made His prophets poets, and the more
We feel of poetry do we become
Like God in love and power—under makers."

We have read the previous portions of this debate with much pleasure, and although the inherent interest of the question itself were sufficient to command the careful attention of all interested in the healthy character of English literature, the admirable essays given by previous writers have gathered around the question additional pleasures, and not the least is our present pleasure of participating in the friendly conflict upon the points at issue. We were much pleased with the pro-Tennyson paper of B. S., p. 241, *et seq.*; and

we regret that we could not find in it any application to the healthiness or contrary tendencies of either poet; indeed, B. S. himself has some conviction of its want of connection with the subject, for he says, p. 249, "We fear that some of our readers may think that we have wandered from our professed theme, and treated them to a very dry discussion." 'Tis true he had wandered from his theme. Yet had the question been the poet and his work, or the nature of poetry and the character of the poet in its widest sense, so as to include all poets and all poetry, the paper of B. S. would have been far from dry and uninteresting; but so far as its applicability to the tendencies of Tennyson's or Longfellow's poetry is concerned, it is dry, uninteresting, and completely *hors de combat*. Our aim is, by the terms of the debate, limited to one point,—the comparative healthiness of the poetry of our two authors. The form in which it is proposed necessarily implies that both are great poets,—accomplished masters of the musical concatenation of our English vocabulary. It is not for us to discuss which is the most happy in his choice of measures with which to beautify his work. The mechanical part of poetry, so to speak, is admitted to be in the hands of two highly accomplished masterly artists. Indeed, it were an absurdity to apply the comparative terms healthy or unhealthy to the mere orderly collocation of melodious sounds.

It is alleged that a certain order or arrangement of sounds may produce joy or sadness, love or hatred, and many shades of these principal passions or emotions of the mind; but if we narrowly search into the springs or motive powers in which these emotions have their source, we shall find them rather in some subjectivity of the individual, some ideas existing in the mind of the individual which are in accord or discord with the objective sounds impinging upon his sensorium, through the medium of the sense of hearing, and that the efficient cause does not reside in the objective sounds themselves. Were the cause of these emotions purely objective, no variation could possibly be experienced in their effects, and a purely uniform taste and rule of criticism must prevail throughout the whole family of man. Thus the uncivilized and barbarous savage and the most cultivated poet and musician would be equally moved by the same order of sounds, and equally good judges of purity and beauty in poetry and music, the absurdity of which is at once apparent. We might here dismiss the entire paper of B. S. in the April number of the *Controversialist*, as fully and fairly refuted, and proved to be unconnected with the question at issue; but *ex sui oro* we hope to show the fallacy of his advocacy of Tennyson. *En passant* we may notice one of many contradictions to be found in the papers of B. S. On p. 243 he says,—“The poet, though he may convey information, and may argue or persuade, always aims at *intellectual pleasure*.” Then, in the succeeding sentence, he continues, speaking of poetry, the work of the poet, “It is a species of composition which has for its object the creation of intellectual pleasure, by addressing primarily the imagination and feelings

rather than the intellect." Here are two assertions of a contrary character, one asserting that poetry is addressed to the intellect, and the other that it is not addressed to the intellect. What confidence can be placed in conclusions drawn from such a course of reasoning?

Throughout the first paper of B. S. he has laboured to show that "*as a poet, the poet's object is to give us intellectual pleasure, and to do so in metrical or musical language. As a man highly endowed, his object ought to be to make this poetic power tend to the doing good and increasing of wisdom.*" In these words we have the sum of B. S.'s philosophy; as a poet, excellence consists in power to communicate intellectual pleasure. Now, our present concern is with these two authors as poets. B. S. gives us the *dictum*, that as such they must be judged by their power to communicate intellectual pleasure. Man being a moral agent, the influence of one man or one mind upon another must be judged as to its healthiness or unhealthiness by moral considerations alone, not by intellectual pleasures; in fact, the terms healthy and unhealthy are perfectly inapplicable to man in any question of this kind, excepting only as to his moral nature; to suppose the contrary is absurd. Let us try to conceive of joy or sorrow, love or hatred, or any secondary emotion, being capable of production as intellectual pleasures, and we find that it is only so far as such passions or emotions are morally right that they are pleasures of an healthy character. It is then a fallacy for B. S. to assume that he is right in judging Tennyson to be more healthy in the tendencies of his poetry, because, as he alleges, it gives more intellectual pleasure. Moreover, B. S. affirms that the poet,—that is, Tennyson,—"*as a man highly endowed, his object ought to be to make his poetic power tend to the doing of good and increasing of wisdom.*" Here B. S. makes the healthy tendencies of his poetry to consist not in his work as a poet, but in his nature as a man highly endowed,—another fallacy, evidencing that B. S. has thought and argued quite foreign from the question in debate.

B. S. having been at considerable pains, as shown in the passages to which we have referred, to prove that as a poet intellectual pleasure is the true test of healthy tendency and excellency in his poetry, he proceeds, in his second paper, p. 395, to remark,—"*It is our duty now, therefore, to judge between Longfellow and Tennyson as poets or metrical artists, whose first object is to gain our ear with the melody of their words, to fill the imagination with the beauty and grandeur of the creations of their genius, to wield our passions and emotions, and to engage the mind with their subtle thoughts.* Having thus gauged their power of influence, we shall have next to ascertain the way in which they have used that power; for all resulting moral influence is a combination of the active power and moral quality of the influence actually exerted. With reference to the first point, the comparative merits of Tennyson and Longfellow as poets, our present share in such a comparison may be

dismissed *currente calamo*. . . . But, in the present case, we have merely to do with the conclusion to be drawn from such a comparison."

Surely the *sang froid* with which B. S. treats his readers is most remarkable. After having laboured through about thirteen pages to make an intellectual comparison of our two authors, he says plainly it has nothing to do with the present question at all, although very interesting *per se*, and consequently it may be dismissed *currente calamo*.

B. S. says, p. 398,—“ We have therefore arrived at the conclusion that, metrically, artistically, and intellectually, Tennyson is the greater. In fact, his poetic faculties and mental endowments place him above Longfellow.” This decision we hold to be an affirmative reply to the question in debate, but B. S. has also said, p. 395,—“ We shall have to ascertain the way in which they have used that (poetic) power; for all resulting moral influence is a combination of the active power and moral quality of the influence actually exerted;” and at the same time he dismisses with a “flying pen” the metrical, artistical, and intellectual comparison of the two poets; thus in one sentence making an intellectual comparison the subject of debate; in another, dismissing this mode of handling the question; in a third, claiming the moral mode of treating it; and in a fourth, arriving at the conclusion that the debate has been proved affirmatively for Tennyson, on intellectual and artistic grounds. Really such logical versatility entitles B. S. to more than chameleon honours, and we doubt not the readers of this serial will accord them with acclamation.

Space forbids our entering at further length into an analysis of the fallacies of B. S. Having indicated a few of them, we place them before the reader as a chart to guide him through the shoals and quicksands of false logic and rhetoric exhibited by that writer. In conclusion, we cannot refrain from referring to the definition of poetry, given by “L'Ouvrier,” p. 403, as the correct canon by which to judge of the comparative merits of the two poets, in the form that question is given for our consideration in this debate.

Having shown that B. S. has not proved Tennyson to be the most healthy in the tendency of his poetry, we by implication prove that Longfellow's poetry is the most healthy. *Verbum sat sapienti*.

DELTA.

History.

WAS JOAN OF ARC AN IMPOSTOR?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE consideration of a question like this is full of interest to all students of history, as well as to all lovers of the wild and marvellous. In inquiring into the pretensions and in endeavouring to

estimate the character of Joan of Arc, we have not only to do with her individually, but with the circumstances by which she was surrounded, and with the age in which she lived. It is difficult, under ordinary circumstances, to discover the mainspring motives even of those who are associated with us in common enterprises and in everyday life: how far more difficult, then, must it be rightly to estimate the character and conduct of those who lived in distant ages and in foreign lands! And of all persons who have figured in history, few have been the subject of so much controversy as "the Maid of Orleans." It has been, therefore, with great interest that we have perused the articles in this serial on the question, "Was Joan of Arc an impostor?"

In taking part in this discussion, it is important distinctly to understand the meaning of the principal terms employed, and we therefore naturally inquire, "What is understood by the word impostor?" "L'Ouvrier," in his opening affirmative article, declares his belief that Joan was an impostor, "or one who pretended to that which was not, *quod erat demonstrandum*." G. A. H. E., the opening negative writer, declares, in dictionary phrase, that "an impostor is a deceiver." Thus far all is clear; but "Bennett," the second negative writer, now steps forth to darken "counsel by words without knowledge." To the inquiry, "What is an imposition?" he replies, "an acted or unacted lie;" and therefore an impostor is one who speaks or acts out a falsehood. But "Bennett," seeing that this definition will not support the position he is anxious to take, attempts to improve upon it, and goes on to say, "Deception, so as to render the deceiver amenable, cannot be perpetrated unconsciously, and in the fact that he *knows* he *deceives* lies the *guilt* of the *action*." What this reference to amenability or guilt has to do with the real question at issue we are at a loss to imagine, although we quite understand the purpose our friend wishes it to serve. But he proceeds to observe,—“To form a true case of imposition, fully carried out, the impostor must be cognizant that he is falsifying the facts, while the party imposed upon believes that the truth is being communicated; and that this state of consciousness is the effect of representations made by the deceiving party.” According to this theory, truth is subjective, rather than objective; and has little reference to any existences or varied relationships, or eternal realities! The moment, therefore, that a man believes an error, it loses all its evil, and thus the blind emissaries of falsehood become the glorious apostles of truth! Thus our friend "Bennett" wishes to take under his kindly care those weak ones who first having imposed upon them, succeed in deluding others; and begs that they may not be considered as *impostors*, lest it should wound their feelings, or those of their dupes!

The question now naturally arises, What were the pretensions of Joan of Arc, and in what way did she seek to impose upon her followers? And we answer—By declaring that she held intercourse with angelic beings, and that she had received Divine authority and

power to accomplish certain objects. "From the age of thirteen or fourteen, Jeanne d'Arc was subject to frequent hallucinations of the organs of sight, hearing, and smell. Luminous trains of surpassing brilliancy, and visions of angels, were seen by her at noon-day. Strange voices were heard by her when she imagined she was quite alone; and fragrant odours were perceived by her when some of her spiritual visitors made their appearance. She had communication and councils with angels; visits from the archangel Michael, the angel Gabriel, St. Catherine, and St. Marguerite."*

"Jeanne d'Arc, by her own account (to her judges), had reached her thirteenth year, when she heard, for the first time, the voice (*la voix*) which announced to her that France would be saved by her!"†

She solemnly asserted and steadfastly maintained that those angelic beings frequently appeared to her, and spoke to her; that she saw them, not with the eyes of the imagination, but with her corporal eyes; that she only acted in conformity with their counsels; that she had never said nor undertaken anything of importance without their directions.

Now, are these statements true or are they false? or, in other words, was Joan an impostor? In the words of the "Imperial Dictionary," "a religious *impostor* may be one who assumes the character of a preacher without authority; or one who falsely pretends to an extraordinary commission from heaven." The latter was Joan's case, and hence our verdict is against her. The coolness with which our opponents dispose of Joan's claims to the supernatural is certainly amusing. G. A. H. E. says, "she began to fancy that she saw visions, and "Bennett" boldly declares that she was "self-deceived." Alas! poor Joan, as appropriate now thy prayer might be, "Save me from my friends," as it once was, "Deliver me from my enemies."

Here we feel we might without impropriety close our remarks, were there not some who still believe that "the *pucelle*" derived her inspirations from God; and as it is possible that some such may be among our readers, we will briefly state the reasons which lead us to the opposite conclusion.

I. We reject much that is recorded of Joan of Arc. Our opponents do the same. The two negative writers in this debate have each given a brief outline of her career, but they take care to omit some of the records respecting her, the statements in which are as well attested as many they have endorsed. In this they remind us of the old woman who is reported to have said, "Well, son John, and what wonderful things did you meet with all the time you were at sea?" "Oh! mother," replied John, "I saw many strange things." "Tell us all about them," replied his mother, "for I long to hear your adventures." "Well, then," said John, "as we were sailing over the Line, what do you think we saw?" "I can't imagine," replied his mother. "Well, we saw a fish rise out of the sea, and

* Madden, "Phantasmatia," vol. ii. p. 26.

† Quicherat, "Aperçus Nouveaux," p. 1.

fly over our ship!" "Oh! John! John! what a liar you are!" said his mother, shaking her head, and smiling incredulously. "True as death!" said John; "and we saw still more wonderful things than that." "Let us hear them," said his mother, shaking her head again; "and tell the truth, John, if you can." "Believe it, or believe it not, as you please," replied her son; "but as we were sailing up the Red Sea, our captain thought he should like some fish for dinner; so he told us to throw our nets, and catch some." "Well," inquired his mother, seeing that he paused in his story. "Well," rejoined her son, "we *did* throw them, and, at the very first haul, we brought up a chariot wheel, made all of gold, and inlaid with diamonds!" "Lord bless us!" said his mother; "and what did the captain say?" "Why, he said it was one of the wheels of Pharaoh's chariot, that had lain in the Red Sea ever since that wicked king was drowned, with all his host, while pursuing the Israelites." "Well, well," said his mother, lifting up her hands in admiration; "now that's very possible, and I think the captain was a very sensible man. Tell me such stories as *that*, and I'll believe you!; but never talk to me of such things as flying fish! No, no, John; such stories won't go down with me, I can assure you." In many respects our opponents appear to resemble the old lady, for they are ready to credit only that which their previous reading has prepared them for, and they ignore such "well attested" statements as the following:—One of her contemporaries, Percival Sieur de Boulourmak, in a letter to the Duke of Milan, written June 13th, 1429, says, that at her birth "an extraordinary and unaccountable exultation was manifested throughout the village. The people ran from house to house rejoicing, they knew not why, and "*se demandoient ce qu'il y avait de nouveaux.*" Another contemporary, "*Le Bourgeois de Paris,*" says, "The cocks crew with unusual vehemence on this occasion, and there was something too in the time that was remarkable—it was the night of the Epiphany of our Lord. And when she was a little girl, the birds of the woods and the fields came when she called them to eat the bread out of her lap!" During the time Joan of Arc was at the town of Lagne-sur-Marne we are gravely told that "the corpse of a still-born infant was brought into the church. Some young women of the town came there when the *pucelle* was at her devotions, and begged the latter to join them in their prayers that God might restore the infant to life, in order that it might be baptized. Jeanne joined them in their prayers. Happily, after praying some time, the infant yawned several times, made some movement, returned, it is stated, to its natural colour, and was baptized, but died shortly after." If, as we presume, the majority of the supporters of Joan of Arc will reject these statements as fabulous, they must not be surprised if we do the same with all that are not consistent in themselves, or in harmony with the general experience of mankind.

II. Joan of Arc frequently acted inconsistently with her assumed Divine mission. She was unsuccessful in many of her later enter-

prises; she failed in them where success was not only confidently expected but boldly predicted by her. During her captivity in the fortress of Beurevoir she leaped from the summit of that tower, a height not much under sixty feet, and death therefore being more probable than deliverance. And finally, in the hope of escaping death, she signed a retraction, in which she accuses herself of having acted in violation of the sacred Scriptures and the laws of the church, of having simulated apparitions, to have done wrong in assuming man's attire, and adopting the profession of arms.*

III. There was nothing in the military exploits of Joan of Arc that cannot be accounted for on rational principles. When we remember the age in which she lived, the ignorance of the people, the superstitious feelings which her assumed character therefore excited, we see nothing in her successes to surprise us. That it was this that excited the enthusiasm of her followers, and struck terror into her foes, the negative writers in this debate frankly acknowledge; and on the latter point the evidence of our historian Hume is conclusive. Speaking of the English army, he says,—“Men enlisted slowly or soon deserted, by reason of the wonderful accounts which had reached England of *the magic and sorcery and diabolical power of the Maid of Orleans.*”†

IV. The claims of Joan of Arc to supernatural guidance are seldom admitted by those best qualified to form a judgment. To the honour of the French nation let it be said that she was never regarded as a saint by them. Voltaire in his writings reduced her memory to the lowest level. The Abbé Langlet Fresnoy, in his “*Histoire de Jeanne D'Arc,*” says—“To think that this girl had visions, apparitions, and revelations, I do not at all believe. I abandon this pious belief to persons of a less stubborn turn of mind than mine. But for these apparitions I substitute an interior persuasion, a reflective meditation, which strikes, which animates, and strongly agitates the imagination; and it is the effort of this last faculty which often represents to us as real, objects which are simple images which we picture to ourselves.” Shakespeare, that great discerner of human character, paints her in the blackest colours, and designates her

“A goodly prize, fit for the devil's grace.”

We might, did time and space permit, go on to speak of other impostors, who put forth similar claims to those of Joan of Arc; and of some who, after her execution, personified her, and were declared by her own brothers to be their sister Joan. Such facts as these show the credulity of the age, and account for the ready acceptance given to marvellous stories and monstrous pretensions; but we close in the full belief that sufficient has been advanced by us to support the views of “*L'Ouvrier*” and S. F. T., and to prove that Joan was an impostor.

A. J.

* Quicherat, “*Procs.*” t. i. p. 447.

† “*History of England,*” by Hume, ch. xx. regn. Henry VI. A.D. 1429.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

IN writing of the motives which influenced the great of bygone days, it is very necessary to bring, if possible, before the "mind's eye," a picture of things as they then existed.

"L'Ouvrier" has so ably painted the picture, that we are prepared, for the most part, to endorse his sketch, although we do not, from the same premises, draw like conclusions.

France *was* divided by contending factions; the people *were* enveloped in "the thick darkness of superstition and ignorance;" and they would, no doubt, hail with delight anything calculated to give peace to "their troubled and wasted countries;" and when the desolation had reached its height,—when it seemed necessary to strike but one blow to paralyze and destroy the power of France,—a deliverer arose in the simple peasant maid, Joan of Arc. Was she an impostor? Most unhesitatingly we answer—No.

Before proceeding to demonstrate this, let us glean a few particulars of her life.

Born in Domremi, of peasant parents, she shared in their rustic labours, receiving no other education than the lessons of simple piety. "The district was remarkable for the simplicity of manners and devotion of the people, but not less so for superstition, and the prevalent belief in visions and supernatural appearances." The curse of faction had reached even to that remote district, and the children of Domremi, which was Armagnac, used to pelt with stones those of the next village, which was Bourguignon.

The news of the cruel war that was desolating France was brought by the passing traveller to the quiet marches of Lorraine. Joan, who was famed for her piety, heard these tales of horror, and the miseries of the land became mixed with her dreams of heaven. She spent much of her time among the hills, tending flocks, and musing in solitude over the wondrous legends of saints and virgin martyrs. There was an old prophecy that France, after being ruined by a wicked woman, should be restored by a spotless virgin. It required no great stretch of imagination to fix the character of the destroyer on Queen Isabella. Joan believed herself called to be the virgin deliverer. "Her ardent imagination (says 'L'Ouvrier') converted the thoughts and desires of her heart into suggestions from a higher spiritual sphere;" and yet he concludes by branding her an impostor!

"An imposition ('Bennett' has well said) is not an accident, but an idea; something thought of and brought to bear upon the accident." The impostor must be aware she is deceiving, or she is not an impostor: now "L'Ouvrier" tacitly consents to her *believing in her mission*, but objects to the idea that she was inspired. Granting she was not inspired, we would ask, if she believed herself to be commanded by heaven, was she an impostor? We think not. She might be self-deceived, but not knowingly a deceiver, and, therefore, not an impostor.

"Joan was possessed naturally of an ardent temperament, and needed only an incentive to develop her powers. Patriotism was the incentive which did this. She saw some and heard more of her country's ills. Being of a pious character, no doubt she prayed to the saints that these wrongs might be avenged. Being of a highly imaginative disposition, and surrounded as she was by all that would conduce to its development, she fancied she had Divine communications; she thought much about them, dreamed of them, and at last they became to her as realized facts. She told them to others, and they disbelieved her, but the very sincerity of her own belief made her persevere, and finally succeed in performing that which she believed herself commanded to do."

Is there anything of the impostor to be found in such conduct as this, or rather is there not here patriotism exhibited to our gaze? Because she was *not* "born to blush unseen," conclude ye that she was an impostor? Then say all are impostors who believe they are able to help a suffering country, and who, although they be weak, yet by perseverance do it. One is as logical as the other?

We are not among those who believe her to have been inspired, but we think we may fairly assume that she implicitly believed herself so to be; that she had no intention to deceive, but that she wished to perform the mission to free her country, which she believed God had confided to her charge. A monomaniac she may have been, and it would be both logical and charitable to suppose her one, but not an impostor.

The following positions have been held by most modern historians:—1. "That there was no supernatural agency in the case, though Joan thoroughly believed that there was. 2. That her heated imagination, acted upon by the miseries of France, by current superstitions, and aided by a peculiar temperament of body, raised the visions she saw, and the voices she heard. 3. That her object was pure and glorious, entitling her in all ages to the name of a patriot and liberator. 4. That there was no previous coalition between Joan and King Charles, or between her and any of the King's friends, though some of the latter wisely determined to make the most of a delusion in which they themselves never believed."

We know that Monstrelet, Du Raillan, and other French historians, brand her as an impostor, and that Voltaire's clever but indecent burlesque of the "*Pucelle*," is against her, but the French, who seem incapable of separating her fanaticism and insanity from her patriotism, or conceiving that she could not be the dupe of her own heated imagination, have generally been rather ungrateful to Joan.

"L'Ouvrier" closes by saying, "Joan of Arc was an impostor, or one who pretended to that which was not."

The writers of the two affirmative articles seem to rest upon this argument,—*because she was not inspired, therefore she was an impostor.* We take it, the question is not, Was Joan of Arc inspired? but,

"Was Joan of Arc an impostor?" i.e., Was she *knowingly* a deceiver? And we say every circumstance of her life goes to prove that she was not an impostor, but that she was imposed on—self-deceived.

S. F. T. says, "We need not go beyond the bounds of our own country to recite the adventures of similar impostors," and then gives, as examples, Lambert Simnel and Parkin. With all deference to S. F. T., we contend the cases are not analogous.

Lambert Simnel well knew he was lying; he did not believe himself what he was represented to be; he did not think a higher Power was using him as an instrument. Ambition was his motive power, and the hope of a crown that which sustained his imposture. The same argument will apply to Parkin. How different the case of Joan of Arc! When the siege of Orleans had been raised, and the King had been crowned at Rheims, she believed her mission fulfilled, and desired to retire to her birthplace, with no reward save that which a good conscience afforded, for having done what she considered her duty.

Happy had it been for her, if she could have followed the bent of her inclination! Far brighter would have shone the page of France's history! But, no; the patriot and liberator must still lead on to victory, and at last be rewarded by a horrible and ignominious death. Men of the country which she had delivered would one day be ready to find her guilty of being a "heretic, apostate, and idolater," and condemn her to be burnt.

Among the black spots in the history of France, this remains indelible,—a foul libel on Christianity, civilization, and humanity.

She was burnt; and the gentle maid's soul took its departure to the realms of the blest, murmuring, as it left its tenement of clay, the name of Jesus, her Redeemer.

W. H. P.

The Essayist.

GIOVANNI BATTISTA NICCOLINI,

THE PATRIOT-POET OF FLORENCE.

ON the 20th of April, Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia, received from the hands of its author a presentation copy of a tragedy, prescribed some seventeen years ago by every sovereign State of Italy. The compliments of a monarch rang and sounded sweetly strange in the ears of the poet, whose heartiest welcome from the powers that be had hitherto been—a curse. The author bore the weight of eighty winters on his head. He was Italy's greatest living tragic writer—Niccolini—and the book was—"Arnoldo da Brescia." Are we wrong in supposing that our readers would like to know something of this

man and of this book—the patriot-dramatist of Florence, and his most marked and most remarkable production? We fancy not; and in this, *to us*, pleasing fancy we shall proceed to tell what we know. Should there be any imperfection of details, some other writer may perchance supply our errors of omission—of our sins of commission we shall, of course, bear the sole blame.

In the city of Dante, within hearing of the hum of Arno's waters, in Florence, where

"Repose

Angelo's, Alfieri's bones; and his,
The starry Galileo's, with his woes;
Where Macchiavelli's earth returned to whence it rose,"—

Niccolini—a worthy inheritor of the glory of its ancient time—was born in 1780. His boyhood was passed among whisperings of Reform in his own country, and the sounds of Revolution from France. He was but a youth when the troops of Napoleon marched into Italy, when the Republic was acknowledged by his sovereign, and excommunicated by the Pope. Scarcely a year of manhood had been passed before the Italian Republic was proclaimed; and the year thereafter, 1803, Alfieri—the founder of the noble and masculine-spirited drama of modern Italy, severe, simple, rigid, and classical—died, and had his dust laid to rest within the church of Santa Croce. At this time Niccolini was a student in the celebrated university of Florence, founded in 1438, where he became an illustrious humanist, and gained some repute as a Greek scholar. In 1805, Italy became a kingdom, of which Napoleon I. wore the crown; and Niccolini, as well as others, became dazzled—if not deceived—by the splendour of the cometic career of that great military despot. In 1811 the King of Rome was born; and in the same year Niccolini—fresh from his collegiate draughts from the vintages of Greek and Roman learning—made his earliest effort on the stage in the tragedy of "Polyxena"—a work which, in grand simplicity and purity of conception, in classic unity of action, in intense power, pathos, and sentiment, in exquisite antiqueness, has had few rivals among the first attempts of modern dramatists.

The plot is trite, yet highly wrought by simple agencies. Polyxena, daughter of Priam, in the division of the captives taken at Troy, falls to the lot of Pyrrhus, her father's murderer, as Cassandra does to Agamemnon. Pyrrhus loves her, and is loved by her; but the gods have decreed that the Greeks shall not return to their native land, till one of the daughters of Priam has been sacrificed by him who is nearest and dearest. Piety and love strive for mastery; and at last the *dénouement* is accomplished by Polyxena, ashamed of her love, precipitating herself upon the sword which Pyrrhus has uplifted to strike the prophet Calchas. Destiny is appeased; and the curtain falls. Twice thereafter did he adopt those subjects which Italy has resolved to consider fitted to the tragic muse—classical events—in his "Medea," and "Ino e Temisto;" but a higher purpose took

possession of his soul, and he determined "*celebrare domestica facta*"—to find in the national history, and even in his own time, a topic for the stage. Allegory is a figure of rhetoric with which, perforce, the Italians are familiarized; and there are few hearts and minds that do not beat and think behind a veil. This masquerade of thought is in Italy considered legitimate and laudable; for the *spy* is abroad instead of the schoolmaster, and the superintendence of the State is widely and actively exercised. After the capture of Paris, and the fall of Napoleon, Niccolini produced the tragedy of "Nabucco" (Nebuchadnezzar), and under the forms of Persian life and Scriptural history dramaticized in reality the times of the Revolution and the Empire. Nabucco represents Napoleon; Aspene, Caulaincourt; Arsace, Carnôt; Mitrane, chief of the Magi, Pope Pius VII.; Vasti, the Empress-Mother; and Amiti, Maria Louisa. Of the scenes, Babelle means Paris; and the "King's Palace" is St. Cloud. The period of this dramatic Napoleoniad is the interval between the battle of Leipsic, 1813, and the capture of Paris, 1814. There are many passages of moment in this play, *e. g.*:—Amiti says of the war between Darius (who is the representative of the Austrian Emperor) and Nabucco:—

" In me each prayer
Is sin: I must be now a faithless wife,
Or else a loveless child."

Nabucco asserts of Mitrane:—

" I can nor slay this pontiff nor revere him.
He has been too submissive for respect;
And yet much too resistant for contempt."

Arsace tells Nabucco in the Senate-hall,—

" I, who in the ranks
Have fought, have seen thee general and soldier,
And on the field of battle have admired
As at a God in arms;—enthroned I hate thee."

Like most historic plays, this is rather a succession of scenes than a regularly consecuted and united whole; but the cunning deceptiveness of reproducing the present in the past is well kept up.

Other national subjects Niccolini chooses. This time from mediæval history. The plot of one is taken from the conspiracy against the French, known as the Sicilian Vespers, under the leadership of *Giovanni di Procida* (1225—1302) from whom the play takes its title. Collusive allusion is here also artfully employed to advocate Italianism and nationalization. The student of Italian history will easily guess the subject and style of "Antonio Foscari" and "Ludovico Sforza," in both of which there are splendid passages and noble thoughts. These dramas made his fame even amid the memories of Alfieri, and beside the competitive efforts of Monti, Pellico, Foscolo, and Manzoni, disciples of the same school, using history for much the

same end as he—the regeneration of Italy,—and were found by their countrymen to be worthy of becoming sharers in the applause accorded to the efforts of genuine genius.

Shortly after the production of those fruits of study and patriotism. Niccolini was chosen a member of the Academy of La Crusca, and in 1821 delivered an eloquent and elegant address on the occasion of his *reception*. From this *discorso* we shall give one (translated) sentence, which may be useful, viz.:—"Let our writers employ, above all, clear, determinate words, understood by all, spoken and written by many; let them avoid pedantry and eschew licentiousness; let the rules of our language be unto them as a bridle to guide, not as fetters to enslave; let us avoid the errors of our fathers of the previous century—who bestowed all their attention on the subjects about which they wrote, and not on the words in which they clothed their ideas; as well as the copious verbosity of others, by which it has been observed that the patrimony of human knowledge has not been enriched by one single thought."

A man of weighty speech, of known ability, great learning, and spreading reputation, when a professorship (of history, we think) became vacant in the Academy of Arts, it was little wonder that Niccolini should be appointed to the post. For some time he devoted himself studiously to historical pursuits, and at last determined on claiming a new position in the literature of his country as a historian. He chose as his theme the House of Hohenstauffen, the imperial family of Austria. He laboured long, carefully, and vigorously at this work, but had the ill fortune to be forestalled, in 1841, by Raumer, a German writer of European repute, who took a view widely differing from that of Niccolini—whose work was not published till five years thereafter. In the meanwhile he did not lag in his literary labours. Induced by the criticisms of the *Edinburgh Review*, and the opinion of Lord Byron, to read the splendidly gloomy tragedy of Shelley—"The Cenci,"—he conceived the idea of translating it into Italian. It is, he says, not translated with the timid fidelity of an interpreter, but rather imitated with the daring freedom of a poet. By so doing, he certainly brought that grand, strong drama into greater conformity with classic models; but we cannot believe he has improved it. It is tamed and toned down to a most un-Shelley-like decorum and dulness. The Spinozism of Shelley did not please Niccolini, whose philosophy was more Christian as well as more Dantean.

A Greek play, entitled *Agamemnone*, was also prepared, and a discourse on Greek and Italian tragedy was proceeded with, though these were not published till 1844. In the play he is all himself, and in the *discorso* he does not confine himself merely to his text, but branches off into critical disquisitions upon the modern school of the Romanticists, and protests against the tendencies of literature indicated by Victor Hugo's "Marion Delorme" and "Lucrece Borgia," Eugene Sue's "Mysteries of Paris," &c., as proving not only the need for a high classical standard and ideal, but also that the imitation of

evil always outstrips the example, as on the contrary the endeavour to equal the good falls short of its aim.

When the ripe age of sixty-three had been attained, the veteran in a happy moment found a subject suitable to his genius, to his time, and to the taste of his countrymen. Mediæval history again afforded him the curtain behind yet through which he might once more

"Show the very age and body of the time,
Its form and pressure."

In 1843 the work was finished, printed at Marseilles, put into circulation, and in a few weeks upwards of three thousand copies were disposed of in Florence alone. Rome and Austria were both aghast, and a thrill shook the Vatican and quivered up through the throne of the Hapsburgs. That work was *Arnoldo da Brescia*, the work which, but a few weeks ago, its author, frail with age, but stout of heart, presented during a high-festival week in his old-storied native city, to the soldier King of Sardinia, while being welcomed by the joy of thousands to his new dominions. It was *then* (1843) at once and rigorously prohibited throughout Italy and Roman Catholic Christendom. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II., nominally joined in the proscription, but really connived at its circulation, and Niccolini became the admiration of his townsmen, the delight of his friends, and the abhorrence of the Jesuits. A lick-spittle toady offered his services to Leopold to write down the drama, but he was answered only—yet fittingly—by the silence of contempt. Notices of the work and the sensation it created were sent abroad through many lands, and Niccolini's fame, widening its circle, became European.

The plot of this play is laid in the pontificate (1154-9) of Adrian IV.—Nicholas Breakspere—the only Englishman who ever sat upon the papal chair. While undeniably a historic drama, the time is so fitly chosen that the mere interpretation of the events then passing raises in the heart of the modern Italian an echo of the thoughts and aspirations therein expressed, and stirs and animates to wish, if not to effort, for nationalization. The style is energetic and noble, the plot is simple, and the characters are distinctly drawn, yet with a dash of double meaning which is well kept up, and gives it, to an Italian, an additional charm and an unspeakable beauty.

Arnoldo—a reformer—endeavours to animate the Romans to the resistance of both Pope and Emperor, and to choose rather to become a republican nation. Adrian would gladly but unavailingly gain over Arnoldo to his party. This failing, he forms a hollow truce with the Emperor, and as one of the pledges of the new-born affection between the Holy Father and his most beloved son in God, Adrian asks the capture of Arnoldo. The Emperor delivers him to the prefect of Rome, and he is undungeoned and slain. This bald outline gives but a faint idea of the power and art of the play. Nor could we well by extract prove the intense interest of

the writing without overstretching the limits of our space, but one or two sentences may be quoted (translated) as specimens rather than as samples. The Pope is called by Arnaldo—

“Tyrant of Time and of Eternity,
Who on the earth usurps Christ's place, and dares—
His foot in the abyss, his head in heaven—
To thunder—impious—forth, 'The world is *mine*.'”

In his prison he claims prophetic light, and grandly says:—

“I see the Lombard nations pledge their faith,
And twenty cities, with one heart, unroll
One common standard amid war and flame.
The band of Death prostrate implore God's aid,
And Heaven has heard the oath brave hearts have sworn,
While tyrants pale at the dread sound. I see
His troops around a proud one fall, and then
His standard by strong hands is ta'en. To earth—
Once but a footway for his haughty march—
He sinks, and mid the general carnage seeks
Safety in flight. Beyond the Alps they fly,
Those Germans; and the insatiate eagle trails
Its beak in dust, while o'er their spoil elate,
Enfranchised Italy looks up and smiles.”

Addressing the Pope, in reference to his assertion that he reigns independent of peoples, and is the unseen ruler of the universe, Arnaldo says:—

“Thou dost deceive thyself, oh, Adrian!
The terror of Rome's thunder fades and dies.
Reason unknits the bonds thou'dst aye maintain;
She'll break them, were she but completely roused.
Already human thought has so rebelled,
Thou canst not quell it. Christ calls to thought,
As to the sick man once, 'Arise and walk!'
'Twill trample thee if thou wilt not go on.
The world has other truths than those proclaimed
From altars; nor will brook a fane which hides
Heaven from its gaze, though fondly seeking it.
Thou wast a shepherd once, become a father now.”

Such are a few of the brave and telling words contained in this magnificent tragedy, even in a weak transfusion into our common English speech. How much more powerful and effective must they be in the copious, spiritual, flexible language of the author! The finest translation is but as a plaster cast from a marble statue. It will at once be seen that Niccolini's tragedies must have had a causative efficacy in bringing about the changes now taking place in Italy. If it be possible to

“Cast, to-day,
A seed into the earth, and it shall bear thee
Flowers such as waved in the Egyptian hair
Of Pharaoh's daughter,”

how can it be otherwise than that the seed-thoughts of a patriot-poet must produce thoughts like in kind to his? It has surely been so in Niccolini's case, else he would scarcely have been chosen as the poet to whom the first word of appreciation of his country's literature was spoken when Florence took holiday to welcome as their king the most popular continental sovereign of our day.

Our readers will perceive that we know more of Niccolini's books than of the man; nay, that we know the man only, or at least mostly, through his books: but we believe our estimate of the literary influence of this author is not overcharged when we say that he is a worthy continuator of the nationalizing influences, *per la gloria e regenerazione d'Italia*, begun by Dante, and passed on from poet to poet, like the light of the torch of truth, which shines the more it is shaken.

There must be hope for Italy while its peoples reverence and cherish Niccolini for his genius, his gifts, his efforts, and his aims.

R. M. A.

The Reviewer.

Easter Hall Lectures to Young Men. Thirteenth Series. 1860.
London: Nisbet and Co., Berners Street.

THIS volume of lectures is in every respect equal, and in many respects superior, to its excellent predecessors. Apparently without any intention on the part of the lecturers, the subjects selected are of so varied a character, that it would be difficult to find a man who would not be pleased with several of them.

History and biography—those never-failing reservoirs for lecturers—are largely drawn upon, while subjects of a more decidedly religious bearing, and others relating to social ethics, form the staple of this interesting volume. Without being invidious, we think the lecture on "Blaise Pascal," by Dr. Goulburn, particularly deserving of commendation.

We confidently recommend this volume as likely to be useful to our readers, especially to those who have not much time to spare, and, consequently, none to lose.

The Teacher; his Books, and How to Read Them. A Lecture.
By W. H. GROSSER, F.G.S. Sunday School Union, 56, Old Bailey, E.C.

THE advantage of practice over theory is here exemplified in a clear and well-written tractate on an important subject. Although the author is a practical man, he is by no means insensible to the charms of a highly-finished style; and his remarks will, consequently, be read with pleasure as well as profit. He says:—"There are four great libraries in which we may read,—Revelation,

with its golden lines; Nature, with her pictured pages; Literature, with its gaudy bindings; and the chequered folios of Human Life. These are the libraries which the teacher may consult, and grow in knowledge and in wisdom thereby." The subjects, however, upon which he more particularly treats are Reading and Observation. His hints on each of these divisions are sage and pointed, and comprise many valuable suggestions for the intelligent study of the sacred volume. We can express no better wish for the Sunday school cause than that this lecture may be read by ever teacher throughout the country.

England and Missions. By the Rev. F. BOSWORTH, M.A. London: H. J. Tresidder, Ave Maria Lane, E.C.

THIS little work will be found to be a valuable manual of missionary enterprise during the last 100 years. It is written in an easy and intelligent style, and is evidently the result of much research. The object of the author appears to be to invite Christians everywhere to realize their responsibilities in this matter, and to keep pace with the growing demands made upon them for their sympathy and support, in this important sphere of the church's work. The catholic sentiments of the writer, and the neat appearance of the book, are calculated to secure it wide circulation and extensive usefulness.

Inquiry into the Original Language of St. Matthew's Gospel; with Relative Discussions on the Language of Palestine in the time of Christ, and on the Origin of the Gospels. By the Rev. ALEXANDER ROBERTS, M.A. London: S. Bagster and Sons.

THIS is an inquiry which at first sight would seem to be interesting and even possible only to the well-equipped critical student of the Bible; and as it has been carried on, men not qualified by sound knowledge of the sacred languages have been prevented from taking part in it; but the author of the present work has treated the question in so cogent and pleasing a manner, and withal so simply, that none need fear to enter upon it, and all may promise themselves instruction, satisfaction, and delight, in accepting Mr. Roberts as their guide into this important and long-contested region of Scripture criticism. Our author, in his preface, would seem almost to restrict this inquiry, on account of its difficulty, to the learned; but we must repeat that he has handled this hard matter so ably, and has brought it home to every Christian as a vital interest, that all who love the pure Word of God may be refreshed and strengthened by following his argument: and this he has maintained with so little use of Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, that all may see its force. But we will give his own words as to the question itself and its difficulties:—

"Every one at all conversant with Biblical studies knows how keenly the question respecting the original language of St. Matthew's Gospel has been discussed, and how diverse are the conclusions which have been formed regarding it. The question is, indeed, one which is beset with peculiar difficulties, and which demands

no ordinary patience and reflection from those who enter on its consideration. But with all its perplexities, it is a question which must be faced by every critical student of Scripture. It meets him at the very threshold of the New Testament; and he soon perceives that it is not only first in the order in which it occurs, but first, also, in many respects, in the importance which belongs to it. As will fully appear in the following pages, it is an inquiry of the very gravest practical importance. It involves in its settlement some very momentous consequences; and it requires, therefore, not only to be investigated with earnestness, but with a solemn feeling of responsibility and reverence."

That it is "an inquiry of the very gravest practical importance" is thus shown:—If the Gospel of St. Matthew were originally written in Hebrew, then we possess but a *translation*, which we have no means of comparing with the pretended Hebrew original, it being irretrievably lost; and no person being known *ever* to have seen it,—the supposed translator, also, being utterly unknown, and his *version*, in its rendering of quotations from the Old Testament, and its explication of Hebrew customs, &c., being manifestly modified according to his own judgment, the Gospel as we now have it in the Greek cannot be looked upon as inspired, in the highest sense of that word,—and the fact that this *translation*, on insufficient grounds, has been received into the canon, induces some distrust of that authority and universal testimony which have always been considered as decisive of the question of canonicity.

Mr. Roberts commences by giving the opinions that have been held as to the original language of this Gospel. These are three: first, that it was Hebrew only; second, that it was Greek only; third, that it was both Hebrew and Greek. Each of these has a large body of distinguished scholars as its advocates. Our author contends for the "Greek only," and convincingly has he shown that not only is it the safest, but also the only tenable position. He bases his conclusion on *evidence* alone, which, as he says, is alone admissible in questions of this nature. He demands, too, that the *whole evidence* be taken, and that the *internal* should have precedence of the *external*. These principles and methods cannot but commend themselves to every thoughtful reader. Our author then shows, from historical testimony, and from the fact that seven or eight mostly unlettered Jews wrote the other gospels and the epistles to Jews and others in the *Greek* tongue, that Greek must have been the language most generally understood and used throughout Palestine in the time of our Lord and His disciples, and hence infers the extreme likelihood that Matthew also wrote in Greek. This is confirmed by comparison of this Gospel with those of Mark and Luke; our author showing, that on his supposition, the remarkable *coincidences* and *differences* in these three Gospels are accounted for naturally and completely, and that on no other hypothesis have they been satisfactorily disposed of, though several efforts at reconciliation have been made. We have, then, displayed the many difficulties and vast confusion in which they involve themselves who endeavour to account for the origin of the first three Gospels on the supposition of a Urevangelium or original Aramaic

Gospel, or that the Evangelists copied from one another. We have exhibited the famous hypothesis first proposed by Eichhorn, improved by Bishop Marsh, and finally elaborated by Eichhorn again. We must confess that the prolixity and profundity of this scheme are of themselves sufficient to condemn it, and that it is quite a relief to turn from it and other like speculations to our author's very simple but comprehensive and sufficient hypothesis. It is this: "The Lord Jesus Christ SPOKE IN GREEK, and the Evangelists independently narrated His actions and reported His discourses IN THE SAME LANGUAGE which He had Himself employed." This position is made good; and when our author proceeds to notice the occasional use by our Lord of Syro-Chaldaic expressions, which have been hastily seized upon by some as proofs that He usually spoke in this tongue, he shows how naturally this would occur in perfect consistency with the fact that the Saviour's usual language was Greek. He modestly suggests, too, the probable inducements which may have led our Lord in the several instances to recur to the *old* tongue. These suggestions are worthy and pleasing.

That Matthew's Gospel bears no marks in itself of being a translation, but, on the contrary, has every appearance of being an original, and that *all* internal evidence that can be brought to bear on this question is in favour of this, is clearly shown; ample *external* evidence is also adduced that the Greek Gospel was received as genuine close upon the times of the Apostles. After all this, the question may be put in wonder, "What ground can there be for maintaining a contrary hypothesis?" All that can be urged is from *external* evidence alone, and this, when examined, proves to be of a very meagre character. Eusebius, in his History, quotes a saying of Papius, Bishop of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, in the early part of the second century, to the effect that Matthew wrote his Gospel in Hebrew. This saying Mr. Roberts ably criticizes, and shows it to have scarcely any value, especially when it is remembered that it is the saying of one whom Eusebius himself characterizes as *σφόδρα σμικρὸς τὸν νοῦν*: but Papius, being one of the most ancient Fathers, was revered by all who followed him, and his opinion too easily received without question; so that, in truth, the array of testimonies to the fact that this Gospel was originally Hebrew can honestly be reduced to that of a single writer, and he a man "of very poor ability." Mr. Roberts notices, too, Dr. Cureton's much-paraded Syriac Gospels, and shows that they are in all probability a mere copy of the Greek. In his remarks on Dr. Cureton's unguarded professions and assertions we entirely concur.

We sincerely thank Mr. Roberts for throwing so much light on this vexed question. We have derived much pleasure and confidence from reading his book. With him we rejoice and are comforted in the belief that we have the "*ipsissima verba*" of our gracious Lord. We heartily commend his book to all who have heard of this question, and who wish to know assuredly what is the true Word of God.

H. G.

Poetic Section.

BRITISH POETRY.

IN very childhood our estimate of right and wrong, of moral beauty and deformity, is based mainly on our knowledge gleaned from the fields of child-lore. This lore, so attractive and so powerful, embraces exciting rhymes of valiant little giant-killers, of loving little babes, and most loving little redbreasts; of enthralling Cinderellas, of detestable Bluebeards, of simple, trustful, but most basely-deceived little Riddinghoods.

Shipwreck and Robinson Crusoe; Utopia and the men of Lilliput; voyages round the world; encounters with cannibals; and improbable combats with impossible dragons, griffins, and goblins, gather round the standard of our fluttering imagination.

As we grow older, David and Goliath are our wonder, and Joseph and his brethren become our chiefest study, and the injunction, "See that ye fall not out by the way," is, like the Caliph Vathek's terrible eye, full of strange, mysterious, and prophetic meaning; our unfledged passions move uneasily, longing to leave the nest and pierce the cloud.

The way is the grand mystery. Always uncertain, always unseen, always attractive. Oh, child-heart! hope's pure palace! cease not to look thus hopefully into futurity. The way may be, at times, through terrible darkness; thou mayest have to endure the baptism of sorrow, and drink the cup of disappointment; but the way has an end—and its end is PEACE.

By-and-bye THE WORLD is our study—the great, wide world unveils. With an eye already growing accustomed to the glare of the footlights, tinsel, and rouge, we gradually lose sight of the fancies that held us in fairy thrall, and at last our reflections are gathered from the world *as it is*, ripe, unmasked, matured. Then, as actors in the great drama, we feel that to play our part well we must study well the plot.

Just so is it with literature. First, the wonderful, the altogether unreal, the wildly imaginative, is unfolded. Then the observant, coupled with exaggeration, and varnished with the ideal. Lastly, the true, the unmasked, the reflective, the dramatic.

In the period of ballad poetry, England had arrived at the second stage of literary development. Greece and Rome rose by the same gradations. We are only a higher development of them. Our history is but another slide which Time is swiftly passing through his magic lamp. The light is stronger *because the sky is clearer*; the colours are more pure, because living water, not stagnant, is mixed with them; the subject is more real, because wisdom is more universal;

but the slide moves on, and what *we are* will be the "have been" of some far-off essayist, who shall reflectively examine the painting, as it hangs dust-endowed in the hall of history.

Emerging from the second period of our national poetic life, the period of minstrels and ballads, we come upon the drama, with its crowd of immortal names. Once men's passions were put in chains by skilful master-hands, men acknowledged the service done by immortalizing the doers.

Whilst Poetry led a vagrant life, and went about, poor girl! with a ballad as her only garment, men admired and adored, but never protected her. When she seized the crown and grasped the sceptre, winning and ruling the smiles and tears of throbbing hearts, then Poesy was acknowledged, and her servants held in high repute.

Ballads are the wild songs of our forest nooks and our primrose banks. The drama and its fellows are the organ melodies of our costly cathedral. *There* we sit by the soft-flowing stream, under the shade of leafy wilderness, and dream of beauty and love, of nature and her minstrelsy. Here we stand beside the altar, and above the dead,

"Whose swords are rust,
Whose bodies dust,
And whose souls are with the Lord, we trust;"

and we think of man's devices and heaven's gifts.

The fourteenth century will ever be considered the English Homeric age, because of the man who made it brilliant,—Chaucer, the father of English poetry. "He acquires his right to that title, not only on the ground of being our earliest poet, but because the foundations he laid still support the fabric of our poetical literature, and will outlast the vicissitudes of taste and language."

He wrote five hundred years ago, without a national literature to learn from, before books were printed, and before men cared or hoped to read; and still he stands immoveable; whilst others, with greater advantages, have since written, and they with their writings are in dead darkness.

From his poetry we learn of a state of society without modern parallel. Moreover, his strong intellect was well employed to our advantage. His was the era in which the Norman and Saxon races became fixed; the language was then discriminately arranged and sifted by him, and, in his "Tales," stereotyped imperishably.

Gower, the friend of Chaucer, although a poet of the same era, is far from being of the same power. His "*Confessio Amantis*," or "Confession of Love," is dull and dreamy. If penances were fashionable, it would be worse than solitary confinement to be condemned to read within a given period this most unreadable antiquity.

Chaucer, well for his fame, wrote as purely, and with as much polish, as he could; and although his "Tales" were admired by contemporary and succeeding scholars, yet not till centuries after were they diffused as they ought to have been. Reading was

a luxury only attainable to the rich, therefore long written poems were sealed to the many. Some means must soon arise to spread knowledge, for the minstrels and troubadours, having suffered ignominy and reverses, were becoming scarce, and so a new race of *litterati* appeared with the dawn of the sixteenth century, — the dramatists.

The art of Poetry was no longer to be confined to the feudal hall, with its retained minstrel, but according to the inevitable law of progression, was about to take a stride which should eventually lead to the highest developments of her splendour.

Men should *hear*, if they could not read. Oral teaching should instruct those who cared not to, or could not, receive book instruction.

Oratory was then about to establish a purpose, and to earn a fame, which for a time should obtain followers innumerable. Dramatic teaching, from the stage, pulpit, and platform, holds even now a high place among THE POWERS of literature. Is it not possible that, in a not far off futurity, men shall cease to worship oratory, and be their own philosophers—getting knowledge from others, seeking wisdom in themselves; painting their own ideals, and aiming at individual, manly perfection. "Speech is silvern; silence is golden."

The first dramatist was Nicholas Udall. His first work a pageant exhibited by the Mayor and citizens of London to celebrate the entrance of Anne Boleyn into the city, after her marriage; a pageant perhaps equal in glitter, pantomimic mummery, and meaningless adoration, to our nineteenth century Lord Mayor's Show.

The first regular English comedy was his play called "Ralp Roister Doister," a rollicking composition for a churchman and courtier. He was rewarded for his services to religion by presentation to a stall at Windsor in 1551. Died 1556.

Ralp Roister Doister, the hero of the comedy, sings a song, the refrain of which, although afterwards used by Shakespeare, is not a fashionable one in our time. The song is worth reading.

"I MUN BE MARRIED A SUNDAY.

"I mun be married a Sunday;
I mun be married a Sunday;
Who soever shall come that way,
I mun be married a Sunday.

"Roister Doister is my name;
Roister Doister is my name;
A lusty brute I am the same.
I mun be married a Sunday.

"Christian Cunstace have I found;
Christian Cunstace have I found;
A widow worth a thousand pounds.
I mun be married a Sunday.

"Cunstace is as sweet as honey;
Cunstace is as sweet as honey;
I her lamb, and she my coney.
I mun be married a Sunday.

"When we shall make our wedding
feast,
When we shall make our wedding
feast,
Thereshall becheer for man and beast.
I mun be married a Sunday.
I mun be married a Sunday."

The hero quarrels with his Custance, and cries,

"Master Roister Doister will go straight home and die;"

and in a crude sonnet, called the "Psalmodie of the Rejected Lover," he, with some poetic and some strong matter-of-fact feeling, gives direction for his own funeral "*Dirige*." He will go darkling to his grave.

"Neque lux, neque crux, nisi solum clink,
Never genman so went towards heaven, I think.
Yet, sirs, as ye will the bliss of heaven win,
When he cometh to the grave, lay him softly in;
And all men take heed, by this one gentleman,
How you set your love upon an unkind woman;
For these women be all such mad peevish elves,
They will not be won, except it please themselves.
But, in faith, Custance, if ever ye come in hell,
Maister Roister Doister shall serve you as well."

As a favourite, John Heywood followed Udall. According to the "Book of Payments," Henry the Eighth took him into his service as a player on the virginal. The song of "The Green Willow," which gave refrains to so many songs in subsequent times, is the best in his works.

"All a green willow, willow,
All a green willow is my garland.

"Alas! by what means may I make ye to know
The unkindness for kindness that to me doth grow?
That one who most kind love on me should bestow,
Most unkind unkindness to me she doth show.
For all a green willow is my garland!

"To have love, and hold love, where love is so sped,
Oh, delicate food to the lover so fed!
From love won, to love lost, where lovers be led,
Oh! desperate dolor, the lover is dead!
For all a green willow is his garland!

"She said she did love me, and would love me still;
She swore above all men I had her good will:
She said, and she swore, she would my will fulfill:
The promise all good, the performance all ill;
For all a green willow is my garland.

"Now, woe with the willow, and woe with the wight
That windeth willow, willow garland to dight!
That dole dealt in allmys is all amiss quite,
Where lovers are beggars for allmys in sight.
No lover doth beg for this willow garland.

"Of this willow garland the burden seems small;
But my break-neck burden I may it well call;
Like the sow of lead on my head it doth fall;
Break head, and break neck, back, bones, brain, heart, and all,
All parts pressed in pieces.

"Too ill for her, I think, I best things may be had.
Too good for me, thinketh she, things being most bad.
All I do present her that may make her glad;
All she doth present me that may make me sad:
This equity have I with this willow garland.

"Could I forget thee, as thou can'st forget me,
That were my sound fault, which cannot, nor shall be;
Though thou, like the soaring hawk, every way flee,
I will be the turtle still steadfast to thee.
And patiently wear this willow garland.

"All ye that have had love, and have my like wrong,
My like truth and patience plant still ye among.
When feminine fancies for new love do long,
Old love cannot hold them, new love is so strong.
For all, &c."

F. G.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

92. Will some of your numerous readers kindly inform me where I may obtain any information respecting a secret society which once existed in Germany, called the *Vehme Gerichte*?—PONTIFEX.

93. Where can I obtain an accurate account of the Gypsies, their origin, history, language, &c.?—JESSE.

94. Would one of the readers of the *British Controversialist* be kind enough to inform me what are the best and cheapest works I can get (adapted for self-instruction), to obtain a knowledge of the English language and arithmetic?—J.

95. What is the best plan to be adopted in studying English history and the Evidences of Christianity?—J.

96. Can any reader of the *British Controversialist* refer me to any peri-

odical containing an account of the Rev. J. C. Smith, who died about three years ago in Glasgow? He was editor of the *Family Herald*, and wrote an able work on "The Divine Drama of History and Civilization."—JESSE.

97. Could any of your readers inform me of any books on Bookbinding, the tools required for it, and their prices, or any other information that might be useful on the subject?—P. M.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

76. *Banking*.—Every information attainable on banks, &c., can be had in the admirable work of Henry Dunning Macleod (Longmans), entitled, "A Dictionary of Political Economy." "Banks and Banking" is the title of a fair work by Gilbert. A French "Dictionnaire de Politiques Economiques" is issued by Delau.—N.

77. *The meaning of some expressions*

occurring in the "*Laird of Logan*."—*Seests* is a denomination acquired from a provincial colloquialism for "*Seest thou*," used by the Paisley "*bedies*." *Saeddon* was once the Pall Mall of Paisley. *Sauney* is a diminution of Alexander, at one time a common Christian name. *Bien* is merely the French word "*well*." A cock *Laird* is a cockcomb; one who struts like that majestic bird whose harem occupies the manure field. For *Lismahago* read Smollett's "*Humphrey Clinker*." *As a tub does a whale* evidently means *not at all*.—RODERICK RANDOM.

79. A person's "*grammatical difficulty*" may be accounted for, though perhaps not explained. The English—unlike the people of the Continent—not only never obtrude, but even refrain, wherever possible, from bringing into notice—the *sexual* idea. The small remnant of vocables denoting difference of gender by difference of *termination* or of *word* is being more and more departed from; many of those words given in common grammars are obsolete, more obsolescent. The word *person* (like the Latin word *homo*, which includes both *vir* and *mulier*) is not a neuter noun, but is used in meaning indifferently of either or both sexes, and in accordance with this use the pronoun must (where possible) be made to agree with it in gender and number; and where this is impossible, that gender—the masculine, which includes the other within it as a *sub-species*—is employed. The difficulty, though externally *grammatical*, is intrinsically *moral*, and depends on the reluctance of the English to *sexualize* ideas. This desire to keep the notion of sex out of sight is the cause of the indefiniteness of expression employed. The rule followed by scholars is that employed in writing Latin; viz., "If the substantive used denote living beings of different genders, the pronoun takes the gender of the masculine." The same rule holds in Greek also; and seems to have been generally adopted as the best practical solution which could be obtained.—R. M. A.

80. *History of the Popes*.—Ranke's "*History of the Popes of XVth and XVIth Centuries*;" Eiseler's "*Manual of Church History*;" "*Gibbon*," Milman's "*History of Christianity*."—S. W.

81. *The best edition of Shakespeare's complete works* I consider to be that of Dyce, which is published by Russell Smith, price £6.—T. W.

To determine the reply, the use intended ought to be known. Knight's "*Pictorial*," £3, is a good popular book; so is "*Staunton's*" (Routledge), £2 12s. The text only can be had in Griffin's popular Shakespeare for 7s. 6d. Critical editions are numerous, and confusing—Halliwell, Dyce, Wheeler, Singer, Collier, &c.—and are costly.—TEN.

82. *Encyclopædias*.—The *Britannica* is most complete; the *Metropolitana* is fullest; the former, 22 vols., one guinea each; the latter, 30 vols. (originally 59 parts, at a guinea), in cloth at £21: Black, Edinburgh; Griffin, London.—R. M. A.

83. *The Japanese Language*.—In reply to "*Marcus*," who asks, "Can I procure a grammar and dictionary of the Japanese language?" I beg to say, that as only a few characters have yet been collected, a friend will doubtless have to wait many years before he will be able to obtain that which he is seeking.—J. E. F.

84 and 38, vol. ii. *French Serials*.—The *Indépendance Belge* is edited by Prof. MASSON, of Harrow; the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and Lamartine's *Entretiens*, are to be readily had by subscription, though not published in England.—R. M. A.

87. *Interesting Works on the English Language*.—Trench's "*Study of Words*," and "*English Past and Present*," 4s. 6d. each. Craik's "*English Language*," 3s. 6d.; Latham's "*English Language*," 18s.; Hoare's "*English Roots*," 4s. 6d.; Neil's "*Rhetoric*," 4s. 6d.—P. Q.

88. *The Bampton Lecture* owes its origin to the Rev. John Bampton, who, in his "*last will and testament*," says:—"I give and bequeath my lands and estates to the chancellor, masters, and

scholars of the University of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and singular the said lands or estates upon trust, and to the intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to say, I will and appoint that the vice-chancellor of the University of Oxford for the time being shall take and receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for ever in the said University, and to be performed in the manner following:

"I direct and appoint that, upon the first Tuesday in Easter Term, a lecturer be yearly chosen by the heads of colleges only, and by no others, in the room adjoining the printing house, between the hours of ten in the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity Lecture Sermons the year following, at St. Mary's in Oxford, between the commencement of the last month in Lent Term and the end of the third week in Act Term.

"Also, I direct and appoint that the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the following subjects, to confirm and establish the Christian faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics:—Upon the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures; upon the authority of the writings of the Primitive Fathers, as to the faith and practice of the Primitive Church; upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost; upon the Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds.

"Also I direct that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be always printed within two months after they are each preached, and one copy shall be given to the chancellor of the University, and one copy to the head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing

them shall be paid out of the revenue of the land or estates given for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, before they are printed.

"Also, I direct and appoint that no person shall be qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons twice."

The following are the titles of the Lectures, and the names of the lecturers, for several recent years:—

1851.—"The Communion of Saints: an Attempt to Illustrate the True Principles of Christian Union." By H. B. Wilson, B.D., late Fellow and Tutor of St. John's College.

1852.—"The Natural History of Infidelity and Superstition, in Contrast with Christian Faith." By J. E. Riddle, M.A., of St. Edmund's Hall.

1854.—"New Testament Millenarianism; or, the Kingdom and Coming of Christ, as taught by Himself and His Apostles." By the Hon. and Rev. S. Waldegrave, M.A., late Fellow of All Souls' College.

1855.—"The Absence of Precision in the Formularies of the Church of England Scriptural, and Suitable to a State of Probation." By J. Ernest Bode, M.A., late Student of Christ Church, Oxford.

1857.—"Christian Faith Comprehensive, not Partial; Definite, not Uncertain." By W. E. Jelf, B.D., late Censor of Christ Church.

1858.—"The Limits of Religious Thought Examined." By H. L. Mansel, B.D., late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford.

1859.—"The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Record stated anew, with Special Reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times." By George Rawlinson, M.A., late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College.—C. A.

The Topic.

OUGHT GOVERNMENT TO APPOINT OFFICIAL AUDITORS TO EXAMINE THE ACCOUNTS OF ALL PUBLIC BODIES?

AFFIRMATIVE.

The recent failures of large banking and other companies, entailing misery and ruin upon thousands of families, prove the necessity of some means being employed to prevent the recurrence of such calamities. Those who have read the very able pamphlet on the perils of policy-holders, by William Carpenter, Esq., will acquiesce in the statement that, as things at present exist, no dependence can be placed on the safety of any company, however imposing its appearance, and specious its statement of accounts. I certainly think, that if Government auditors were appointed, it would remedy this uncertainty, and would greatly benefit those companies who are on a really sound basis, and whose accounts would bear examination, and the public at large, who would, according to the information yielded by such a scrutiny, be in a position to support the good, and reject the doubtful; and, as a natural consequence, no company could then exist on which dependence could not be placed.—J. C.

Looking, during the past few years, to the large number of cases of fraud, and embezzlement of the funds of building societies and other public companies, in whose welfare the working community of England have now obtained a deep interest, and whose hard earnings, by the dishonesty of an individual, may at once be swept away, and themselves and families reduced to penury and wretchedness—for the Government to appoint official auditors, whose duty should be the examination of the accounts of all public bodies, thus checking rash speculation, and misappropriation of funds by treasurers and other officers, and thus certifying

that they were conducted upon safe and permanent principles, would not only be conferring a benefit upon the working man, in securing his earnings from the crafty and designing speculatist, but upon the community at large, in protecting public property.—J. R. B.

It will be a happy day for England when Government appoints auditors to examine the books and accounts of public companies and other bodies. Such an appointment would save many from loss, perhaps ruin.

The advantages of such an appointment, if managed in a proper manner, would show themselves, firstly, by putting a stop to the large system of embezzlement that has lately been carried on by clerks, secretaries and others; and, secondly, by informing the public of the real state of the funds of the various companies, whether their capital is what they state it to be, and would thus forewarn of ruinous insolvency, bringing to light the whole of the so-called "bubble" schemes. For these reasons, Government should give the matter their serious consideration.—F. S. M.

In a large majority of instances the supervision of boards of directors has proved no barrier to fraudulent proceedings on the part of the officials of public companies; on the contrary, the existence of such boards has tended rather to promote peculations, on account of the mere routine manner in which their duties are discharged. The system of auditing the accounts of public companies at present carried on is extremely defective; in fact, it is more an approval *in globo* than an examination in detail. It is time, therefore, that some effectual means were devised to prevent the repetition of our Redpath,

Knighting, and Pullinger frauds. The appointment, by Government, of official auditors of competent skill and large experience, at good salaries, whose sole duty would be the proper examination of public companies' accounts, appears to us to be the best remedy. Such a plan would place those accounts under the eyes of gentlemen unconnected officially with the company or its *employés*, and therefore unfettered in the discharge of their simple duty. The result would be effective auditing, and the restoration of public confidence, now much shaken, in the management of public bodies. Means should be taken to make public the names of such companies, at present existing, as were willing to come under the inspection of the Government auditor; and no act for the formation of a new company should be passed without a clause to the like effect. The salaries and expenses of the auditors should be paid out of a fund to be made up out of a certain amount, to be levied from each company deriving the benefit of their services. Britain is essentially a commercial country; and one of the strongest bulwarks of a commercial people is integrity in all their dealings. It is the duty of the Government to maintain inviolate the *bonâ fide* character of our public companies, either by restrictive or assisting measures; and, since its interference seems best calculated to do what the ordinary plan is evidently unable to effect properly, we think the appointment of such gentlemen as have been proposed, by Government, is a duty it owes no less to the shareholders than to the country at large.—G. H. S.

The gigantic frauds and embezzlements that have been perpetrated during the last few years have not only shaken the confidence of the commercial world to its very centre in all kinds of joint stock companies, but has proved to a demonstration that the machinery by which the mercantile transactions of these public bodies are conducted is very deceptive and incomplete, or that the discrepancies arise from the culpable

negligence of those whose duty it is to examine, direct, and control; and the result is that the public have been victimized, owing to their entire ignorance of the internal condition and financial position of these companies. For these grievances as yet there has been no redress; for these crying evils no antidote has been found. We have only to refer to the embezzlements of Robson, Redpath, and Pullinger, and to the wholesale frauds and systematic plundering by the directors of the Tipperary and British Banks, to furnish abundant evidence in support of the foregoing statement.

The advantages of insuring both life and property is acknowledged and appreciated by many; but, on the other hand, there are thousands who, while acknowledging the necessity and benefit to be derived from insuring their property against accidents by fire, and their own lives against sudden death, yet refuse to insure because they have no means of accurately knowing the financial state of insurance companies, and therefore prefer running the risk of losing their property, or of leaving their offspring dependent upon the bounty of others, rather than trust to the fair promise of a company which, perhaps, time may prove to be nothing but a floating bubble. These are evils of no small magnitude, affecting the present welfare and future prosperity of all classes of the community, and to remedy which, if it be possible, is the high prerogative and imperative duty of Government.

It may be urged by the opponents of this scheme that inquisitorial examination of accounts by the Government would be vexatious and unnecessary. Such objections might with reason be raised by private firms; but in the case of public bodies no such argument could legitimately be advanced, as this minute scrutiny would take place in the name of and for the benefit of the public. It may be said that a great evil would result from the examinations of the accounts of these public bodies to them-

selves by their exact position being known at a time of great financial embarrassment, by which they would lose prestige and credit, which might ultimately involve them in ruin. Granted it be so, this inconvenience is so small when compared with the numerous and deplorable evils which result from the present insecure system, that it may very appropriately be designated infinitesimal. As things stand now, we have falsified returns, fictitious balance sheets, dividends out of paid-up capital, ruinous speculations, embezzlements of almost fabulous sums, by which a few enrich themselves, to entail on thousands indigence, starvation, and death. For these reasons, we say, that in appointing official auditors to examine the accounts of all public bodies the Government would not exceed, but only exercise, its legitimate legislative and constitutional functions.—PEN AND INK.

Viewing this subject in its moral tendency, and in all its bearings, we opine that no subject of greater importance can be advanced for discussion. Whenever the sinews of industry become injured from any external violence committed with a view to fraudulent design, prosperity puts on the garb of sorrow, and continues to droop and wail till the stimulus of revivification be again applied. Whatever shocks credit is productive of serious inconvenience, frequently becoming a serious calamity, and not *unfrequently* deteriorating the national reputation, which should be sedulously protected on every side.

No subsequent acts of candour can redeem the forfeited pledge. If ever the *fides* of a person be chargeable with betrayal, its redemption is a matter of contingency, approaching to impossibility. Dishonesty appears in so many garbs of diverse aspect, that no cautionary provisions have yet been found,—however stringent and scrutinizing,—to provide an effectual remedy: and the subject deserves the special notice of Parliament. When we instance the perpetration of wrongs against *justice* and *public faith* by Fauntleroy,

Stephenson, Remington and Co., Davidson and Gordon, Rufford, George Hudson (of railway notoriety), Strahan and Paul, Robson (the scrip speculator), Redpath, and the last great *felon*, Pullinger, and a host of others charged with delinquencies of lesser magnitude, we think our readers will agree with us that the time has arrived to warrant legislation on the subject.

The violation of the terms of a deed of indemnity hardly ever gives such a power as will facilitate the execution of the laws of retaliation in all their bearings; in fact, the prosecution of a fraudulent offender against common honesty in our courts of criminal justice is seldom if ever recuperatively applicable to the true merits of the case. Every functionary, having opportunities to commit deeds of peculation, ought to be debarred from entering into any schemes of speculation whatever; and whenever one so situated should be discovered to be so engaged, his retention of office should at once be a *legal impossibility*. Too frequently do the race-course and the gambling table become the concomitants of the basest crimes, varied in hue, covering enormous sums, and extending over a series of years. Yet such offences against good morals and common honesty would have been detected, and their lamentable results avoided, had there been a *public auditor*.

We would earnestly urge upon Parliament the expediency of either establishing a board of commissioners for auditing the accounts of public bodies, or extending the jurisdiction of some standing commission, so as to have supervision over such accounts; and we think the majority of our readers will join us in this.—S. F. T.

NEGATIVE.

There is a great tendency in the present day to look to Government for the performance of work which clearly lies beyond its province. Government is now expected to educate our children; to inspect our dwellings; to prevent the

adulteration of our food; and it is even gravely suggested that it should examine our banking accounts, and audit the books of all our public companies! Why this new work should be allotted to our rulers, we are at a loss to imagine. It surely cannot be because they so diligently perform their ordinary duties, and so promptly and efficiently attend to everything which they take in hand!—X.

Although greater care is certainly wanting in keeping and auditing the accounts of both public and private companies, it is only needed by those who have funds invested therein; but if these companies were inspected by Government, it would increase our national expenses, and thus the poor would have to assist in guarding the purses of the opulent. If the members of gas, railway, banking, and such companies, can or will not mind their affairs in this respect, the needy ought not to assist them.—SUNLKY WOOD.

Self-preservation is said to be the first law of nature, and self-love is certainly the strongest principle in the human breast. We may, therefore, safely leave to them the protection of the pecuniary interests of our fortunate neighbours, and not trouble our legislators with it.—C.

If Government were to appoint official auditors, an expense would be entailed upon the country, which ought to be borne only by the parties directly benefited, and to make the public bodies themselves pay for the services performed, would be to turn the Government into a jobbing office. Either all must pay, or one department of our constitution keep a staff of officers for hire. But the question arises—Have we any precedents whereby it might be proven that the servants of Government are noted for their ability? Unless they are superior in the requisite qualities to private individuals, the difficulty would not be obviated. The superior qualifications are rarely found in Government offices, principally on account of the system pursued in the

selection of servants. Influence is the great element of success on such occasions, and merit is left in the background: a booby may easily obtain a good situation by the assistance of a member of Parliament, while a man of worth, with only his own aptitude for business to befriend him, is scarcely, if ever, recognized. If Government officials are, as a body, incompetent, it would be absurd to place the auditing of a joint-stock bank, or any other institution, in their hands. The Circumlocution Office may at present be borne with, but to connect it with the establishments of enterprising mercantile firms, would clog their machinery, and saturate the atmosphere of the counting-house with the air of official routine. Instead of expensive, incompetent official auditors, let the public accountant, on whose energetic performance of duty depends his respectability, meet the difficulty.—RONALDO.

After some consideration, I am of opinion that the appointment of such officers as are suggested by this question can be dispensed with. Embezzlements happen from want of *proper* care and oversight. It has been, wrongly, the custom for many auditors, hitherto, to treat their duties as *formal*, without calling for and examining vouchers, and obtaining sufficient evidence. It is true that this has often arisen from feelings of delicacy towards those whose accounts are to be checked, and from a dislike to appear suspicious; but henceforward, auditors *must* act more business-like; and if *proper* care and oversight be strictly pursued by them, embezzlements and fraud would then be quite as effectually prevented, as if the Government were to appoint officially. I form this opinion on the ground, chiefly, that public officers are not, *as a matter of course*, more cautious than private individuals. It is true that the situations would benefit some lucky persons who may chance to fill them; but that embezzlements would then be *stopped*, is quite another thing, and, in my judgment, extremely doubt-

ful. At all events, if it can be proved that official auditors ought to be appointed, they should be liable to *punishment*, if their duties are so neglected as to leave a door open for embezzlements or fraud being committed; otherwise, what would be the *real use* of Government interference?—TNEJBOR.

Every one will admit that there is at present a great necessity for a stricter supervision of the actions of men in positions of public trust; but it is very doubtful if auditors appointed by Government would accomplish so much as a good system of supervision, exercised by able officers appointed by a company itself. This is easily seen in the last great case which came before the public, in which the simplest check would have proved effectual in stopping those defalcations which, on being discovered, so astonished the public. Moreover, the interference of Government, in a mere matter of business of this kind, would not be well received by those whom it would be intended to benefit, as may be easily perceived by looking at other matters of a similar kind.

If the checks which are provided for the safety of public companies against fraud were duly enforced, and the prevailing carelessness was effectually shaken off, we should hear less of Robsons, Redpaths, and Pullingers.—OFFICIAL.

"Not yet," we would say. The recent and oft recurring embezzlements are certainly alarming; but still we think the Government ought not to interfere until the public petition for protection against frauds. We shall be glad when such a step is taken, but let the public risk their money as long as they choose; perhaps when all their cash is in the possession of fraudulent accountants, &c., they will be fully alive to the danger they are in without the shelter of Government. It is a sad thing if honest men are so scarce that the legislature must appoint official auditors to examine the accounts of all public bodies; such a proposition casts

a slur over the whole profession,—a slur for which there is too good a ground. We think, however, that until the English people ask Government for official auditors, such officials should not be appointed.—BETA.

Is our commercial morality then sunk so low? Is integrity so rare a virtue in our public mercantile men? Have the people, whose word was formerly as good as their bond, degenerated so far that censors must watch over their actions, and the lash of the law be required to confine them to the path of rectitude? Such are the ideas suggested by this month's Topic. But instead of following this train of thought, let us consider the utility of the plan proposed. Will it afford greater security to public bodies against embezzlement by their *employés*, or will it protect the public more efficiently against the dishonest schemes of any such bodies themselves? If so, the commercial community would, we have little doubt, be glad to avail themselves of its assistance; none are more desirous than they to protect their interests, and they are equally concerned with the general public to expose the black sheep that may exist among them. But if, as we believe, novelty is its only recommendation,—if it offers no better means of attaining the end in view than is already possessed, it is likely to lull into a false security, and ought certainly to be rejected. We do not see what powers of penetration Government officials can possess beyond private individuals, or how they are better proof against false books and forged documents. As a preventive of fraud, the plan can effect little. The dread which some may suppose an annual inspection of accounts by a Government auditor should inspire, could have little influence upon any defaulter who runs the risk of detection through other means during the rest of the year. Even as a plan for discovering embezzlement it seems no better. The examination of any recent systematic fraud upon a public company by

its official will show that the plan adopted by the culprit was the result of a perfect knowledge of the system pursued in the establishment, which he must have studied for his purpose, and detected a —, perhaps its *only* weak point. When such fraudulent practices are continued for years without exciting the suspicion of other officials, and when balances are made and published too, and then the discovery happens quite accidentally, what likelihood is there of good resulting from the visits — few and far between — of an auditor who comes to certify all to be right,—not surely with the expectation

of finding anything wrong? With respect to the imposition practised on the public by rotten companies, it could do no service. These keep their accounts right enough, but their debtors are men of straw, and their assets consequently visions. Let directors be responsible for reports published by them, and severely punishable if they misrepresent anything, and let the public insist on regular reports; let defaulting officials be more smartly dealt with, and no tickets of leave in future thrust into their hands, then we shall more rarely hear of flagrant breaches of trust. —

The Societies' Section.

THE LITERARY SOCIETIES OF DUBLIN.

It is unfortunate that no authentic history of Ireland previous to the eighteenth century exists, through the pages of which might be traced the early dawn and spread of education, as a system, among the inhabitants of the large towns in the provinces, and more especially of the metropolis itself. That educational pursuits engaged the attention of our ancestors at a very early period, and that literary institutions of some kind existed, not only in Dublin, but throughout the country, more than two centuries ago, seems perfectly plain from the records which have reached us, mutilated and one-sided though they be. The founding of Trinity College in Dublin, under a charter from Queen Elizabeth, in 1591, and its opening for the instruction of students in 1593, seems, however, to afford us the only reliable starting-point from which to date the formation of anything approaching the character of a literary institution in our city. Within the precincts of "Trinity" learning was cultivated, and a taste fostered among the upper classes of the community, which, in the year 1622, induced the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the city to

establish a university of their own, in the classic neighbourhood of Back Lane. This rival institution, however, was but short-lived; for, in 1632, we find it was closed by order of the Government, and its premises granted to Trinity College. From that time till the year 1731 we cannot find traces of any literary institution in Dublin distinct from "Trinity;" but on the 23rd of June in that year, "The Royal Dublin Society" was founded. This is the oldest institution of the kind in the three kingdoms. It was incorporated by royal charter on the 2nd of April, 1750, upwards of a century ago. Although in strictness not perhaps entitled to rank among the "literary" societies of our city,—for it was established at first "to promote husbandry and other useful arts and sciences in Ireland,"—its field of operations has been so much extended of late years, that we feel justified in placing "The Royal Dublin Society" in the place of honour in this paper. For a long time after its incorporation a grant of £500 a year was made to its funds from the privy purse; and up to the present time, a special amount is annually allocated

to its use out of the national fund. It occupies a very prominent position among the literary and scientific institutions of the country, and enjoys no mean repute in the world at large. The crowned head of England for the time being is its patron, and the Viceroy of Ireland its president. Under its auspices meetings are held monthly, and, at periods of the year, weekly, for the discussion of subjects connected with practical science and art; and lectures (free) by paid professors are delivered, from time to time, on natural philosophy, natural science, chemistry, &c. Attached to the society is a magnificent library of upwards of 27,000 volumes; and also an agricultural and a natural history museum, all open to the public. The botanical gardens at Glasnevin also belong to the same body. During the two visits of the members of "The British Association" to Dublin, this society acted the part of their host, and its rooms formed the arena for their many interesting meetings. The members are elected by ballot, and pay an entrance fee of £3 3s., and an annual subscription of £2 2s. Life members pay one sum of £21. On the roll of this society are men whose names are household words in the paths of literature, science, and art.

The next society which we notice is "The Royal Irish Academy," founded and incorporated on the 28th of January, 1786, "for promoting the study of science, polite literature, and antiquities." The operations of this institution have been most valuable in collecting and epitomizing much interesting and important information with regard to ancient Irish learning and art; and not the least important result of its labours is the formation of a museum of Irish antiquities, which, under the able direction of Surgeon Wilde, has lately been catalogued and intelligently classified. Meetings are held in connection with the institute from time to time, at which papers bearing upon matters in the peculiar province of the academy are read and discussed, and such of them

as are deemed worthy are published in the proceedings. Many of these papers have formed most valuable additions to our national literature, and have awakened in the minds of the general public a great desire to still further investigate the long-buried treasures, literary and artistic, of our native land. The "academy" ranks among its members many well-known talented men, of whom we shall but mention Dr. P. trie, the exponent of the Round Tower mystery, and Eugene Curry, the celebrated Irish scholar.

Passing over "The Geological Society" and "The Dublin Natural History Society," which are both founded for specific branches of knowledge suggested by their name, we meet "The Dublin Statistical Society," which is of comparatively recent birth, but has succeeded, thus early in gaining a good position in our city. Just at present its attention seems to be energetically devoted to the amelioration of the condition of the bakers of the metropolis. Many of its members are sincere and well-known philanthropists, who have succeeded in investing a page or two of *figures* with an interest for the public mind altogether unknown some years back. Its meetings are open to the public, and many of the papers read at them treat of highly important topics intimately connected with the social prosperity of our country.

In the precincts of "old Trinity" two institutions flourish, which we may briefly glance at. One is "The College Historical Society," and the other, "The University Philosophical Society." The former is rather a noted institution in the annals of our city; for in troublesome times, before the Union, it was the nursery in which rebellious sentiments were first enunciated by many an after well-known individual. Occasionally its proceedings appear to have gone beyond the limits of either law or order; for, in 1794, we find its doors were closed for a considerable time by the authorities of the college. At the meetings of this society, many of Ireland's most cele-

brated speakers have first given evidence of their oratorical powers, and developed their debating capabilities. Its meetings are held every Wednesday evening, and frequently the discussions are very ably maintained. None but students of the university of a certain literary rank are admitted as members.

Dublin can boast of an "Oratorical and Literary Society," and a "Legal and Historical Debating Society" also. At a meeting held in connection with the former, some few weeks since, we heard a very excellent paper read, on "Living Essayists," which, if taken as a sample of the capabilities of the members generally, would reflect much credit upon their literary attainments. The Right Hon. Joseph Napier, ex-Lord Chancellor of Ireland, is president of this and of "The College Historical Society." The subjects dealt with at "The Legal and Historical Debating Society" are chiefly on legal topics, and none but members of the bar are admitted to the privileges of membership in it. It is an exceedingly useful preparatory school for the professional man, and, as such, is largely made use of by would-be chancellors, &c.

The "Oratorical Society" meets every Friday, and the "Legal" one every Thursday evening, at eight o'clock, in their rooms, Upper Sackville Street.

We can but name "The Social Enquiry Society," and "The Celtic or Irish Historical and Literary Association," inasmuch as we, until recently, never heard of their existence in our city. Their objects, judging from their titles, are excellent, but their operations are, we anticipate, limited.

Our city boasts a "Mechanics' Institution" also, but the fact of its existence has long since faded away from the minds of the more intelligent citizens. Like almost all other institutions of its kind, it has failed in the objects for which it was founded, and is the lounge of every class but that of the mechanic. If a well-stocked news-room, largely pervaded, as some think, by a *religio-politico* atmosphere, and a very miscel-

laneous library, entitle a building to the epithet "Institute," certainly that in Lower Abbey Street has earned it well. Its management lately has undergone some improvement, but still needs a touch of Lord John Russell's *reforming* wand!

"The Young Men's Christian Association" appears among us as a flourishing tree, although but of about a dozen years' growth. It is established on the same basis as that in London, and its operations are carried on by similar agencies. Annually a course of lectures is delivered in connection with the association, which is attended by large numbers of young men especially. Heretofore, the lecturers on these occasions have been all public, well-known, well-tried men, and most of their papers have been published. It might form a matter of consideration with the committee, however, whether, in future, it would not add much to the interest felt in these proceedings, if some one or two of the *members* were selected as lecturers. We know that many of them are quite equal to the duty, and we are certain that some of them would give a much more pleasing and instructive address than many of the public lecturers have done. The experiment might be worth the trial, at any rate. A well-selected library and a comfortable reading-room in Middle Abbey Street form useful adjuncts to the machinery of the association.

Besides the societies which we have named, there are some fourteen or fifteen Young Men's Societies in Dublin, all, with one exception, we believe, connected with some of the congregations in the city. A few days since, that in connection with the Union Chapel, Abbey Street, which *claims* to be the oldest of these societies, held its annual meeting in the Metropolitan Hall;—we say "claims," because there seems reason to believe that the statement is not strictly correct, though we cannot ourselves see anything very important in the point. Recently, a course of lectures in connection with this society was delivered—

by members only—and we believe all of them were very well attended.

The operations of all these Young Men's Societies are alike, to a great extent. Their meetings are held weekly, and their programmes prepared quarterly. Subjects in literature, science, and religion are brought before the members in the form of essays or debates, and the proceedings are opened and closed with prayer. The pastor of the congregation is president, and the members, from among their own number, elect a secretary and treasurer. The majority of the meetings are well attended, and the papers read at them often very creditable productions. The members, being in general young men engaged in mercantile or commercial houses in the city, do not claim any high position in the literary world, but they feel that connection with such associations aids them in their literary progress and home studies. All these associations are based upon the foundation of Gospel truth, and seek, while improving the mental powers, to develop the moral faculties of their members. Their influence in a city such as Dublin is very great, but would be much more tangible if means were adopted to unite them all in one bond of fellowship and brotherhood, though still pursuing each its independent course. Why should not they be as offshoots from the Christian Association? At present they have no unity of action, and, indeed, almost no community of feeling; and the result naturally is, that their influence is limited towards what it might be. One of these societies, some few years since, endeavoured to amalgamate them all under one common banner, and make them branches of the central Christian Association. but, with one or two exceptions, its suggestions were but coldly received. We hope, however, such an amalgamation may yet be carried out.

We mentioned that all these societies but one existed in connection with some congregation, — than one is, "The Literary and Commercial Association,"

Eustace Street. This society was originally in connection with the Mary's Abbey congregation, but for several years has existed as an independent body. It has not found the election of a president essential to its prosperity, and its management is therefore entirely in the hands of its own members. About fifteen months since prizes were offered for the best essays upon the subject of "Competitive Examinations," written by members; and since then two other competitions have taken place, one upon the subject of "The adaptation of the Gospel to the wants and conditions of all men" (a notice of which appeared in this magazine), and the other, only now decided, upon the subject of "The best safeguards for a young man." The adjudicators have spoken very favourably of the papers sent in, and the competition has awakened a great interest in the minds of the members themselves. We are not aware of any other society of the kind which has yet adopted the prize essay scheme.

The Roman Catholics have of late established a young men's society in connection with their own body, which, however, lays no claim to the character of a "literary" association. The fact of their establishment of it, however, shows the benefits resulting from the operations of the various Christian societies in the city. Their influence must have been great, when it was deemed advisable to start a monster rival institution to counteract their hal- lowing tendencies.

In conclusion, we would say that we regard the existence of so many of those simple young men's societies in our city as one of the most healthy and encouraging signs of our times. We have belonged to one of them for many years, and have experienced great benefits arising, mentally and morally, from our connection with it. Their exercises tend to cultivate a habit of thought, a charity of feeling, and a facility of utterance, which are one and all, now-a-days, almost essential to our temporal progress; and they at the same time

recognize to the fullest extent the evanescent character of all mental knowledge, when not based upon that knowledge which appeals to our higher and nobler being. They are shields of protection to their members, if used aright, against many of the snares which beset their daily path in a city such as ours, and ought to receive the support and aid of all who desire to see

our young men living evidences of the Christian faith, and living examples of Christian character. Their standing in a literary point of view may be far inferior to many of the societies we have named, but in their place and generation they may accomplish quite as much for the advancement of their members.—G. H. S.

LITERARY NOTES.

James Aikman, bookseller, author of "A History of Scotland," &c., died in Edinburgh on May 21st, aged 61.

Professor John Lizars, editor of "Anatomical Plates," and author of several physiological works, expired at Edinburgh, 21st May.

The French Emperor is emulous of many fames. He is said now to be engaged in composing "A Life of Julius Cæsar." Is this because he was engaged in the invasion of Britain?

S. G. Goodrich, author of 170 works, under the *nom de plume* of Peter Parley, is dead. He was born in Aug. 1793, and was, therefore, nearly sixty-seven years of age.

"Laconics, by Chatham," is to be the title of a work formed out of materials discovered in MSS., in his handwriting, recently.

The first volume of Lamartine's complete works is to be delivered to British subscribers on 1st July.

Webster's "Speller" is reported to have a circulation of a million copies per annum.

Two humourists are to have additional memorials of them published—Hood and Jerrold. The letters of the former, and the Browning Papers of the other, are the works which filial affection is to place before the public.

A new Latin-English Dictionary, by Rev. J. T. White and Rev. J. E. Riddle, in one octavo volume, is expected to be ready for issue in the autumn.

Johnson's "Rasselas," adapted for students preparing for the several middle class examinations, is in the press; edited by Rev. John Hunter, M.A.

John Veitch, Esq., translator of Descartes' "Method" and "Meditations," and sub-editor of the lectures of Sir William Hamilton on Metaphysics and Logic, has been appointed Professor of Logic in the University of St. Andrews, N.B., as successor to the late William Spalding.

Mr. Herzen is compiling a translation of the Bible into popular, instead of ecclesiastical Russ.

"The New Revolution; or, the Napoleonic Policy in Europe," by R. H. Paterson, Esq., editor of the *Press*, is likely to be a work of much value and insight. His papers on foreign policy in *Blackwood*, have long borne the marks of intimate knowledge and keen reasoning.

The concluding volume of the late Mrs. Jameson's "Legendary Art," "The Life of Christ and John the Baptist," is to be edited by Lady Eastlake.

Messrs. Routledge have become proprietors of the copyright of "Men of the Time."

Lamartine is ailing.

Messrs. Griffin announce for August a work containing 1,000 sketches of eminent living personages, to be entitled "Contemporary Biography."

George Payne Rainsford James, perhaps the most voluminous novelist of our age, the possessor of an almost Calderonic power of plot, and of a most prolific genius, whose first novel, "Richelieu," is now thirty-two years before the public, expired at Venice on the 9th ult., aged 60.

An eligible site in St. Paul's has been got for a full length statue of Henry Hallam.

Epoch Men.

ADAM SMITH.—SCIENTIFIC POLITICS.

"The work of Adam Smith so far transcended all the writings of his predecessors, as to give him the fame and merits of a founder."—*Sir G. C. Lewis.*

"Smith is the most original writer that Scotland has produced for a century and a half. Of political economy he was truly the father."—*Jouffroy.*

"Adam Smith, the father of political science."—*Morell.*

"The 'Wealth of Nations' may truly be said to have founded the science of political economy."—*Lord Brougham.*

WEALTH is the fine old word which our Saxon ancestors used as the name of the sum of those things which conduce to or produce the *weal*—the well-being of man. The science of wealth ought to be, in its widest and its true signification, a systematic exposition of the means of obtaining human happiness; and political economy, in its most advanced form, ought to be a collected digest of all those laws by which the genuine prosperity of nations is or may become possible. True prosperity consists in the actual possession, by all and each, of the largest and purest amount of the most certain and enduring happiness; and the problem which the scientific politician requires to solve is—how to supply mankind at large with the greatest possible quantity of the means and agencies of happiness, so distributed as to be most conducive to the present and future, the personal and the relative, well-being of man. As the mechanism of social life becomes more complex, this problem becomes more intricate and bewildering; the manifold combinations and inter-relations of men and methods of production, distribution, and consumption, so exhibit themselves on the surface of society, that we are apt to lose sight of the inner springs of all these outward movements, and so fail to perceive the incidence of simple reasonings upon those apparently complex facts. The depth of insight which penetrates beneath the mere shadowed and tinted surface of phenomena, and perceives in the multiplicity of their complexities the self-same subjects for analysis, as in the most simple and ordinary forms of the contribution to and the distribution of happiness, constitutes the merit of the politician, and is the power by which he is able to show the means of, or to suggest the laws for, the maximization of human happiness.

So vast a theme as this, however, unrolls a mass of speculation too extensive by far to be treated of with particularity and advantage, and in practice it has been found advisable to relegate many of the multifarious discussions involved in an investigation into the causes of prosperity to separate departments of study, such as jurisprudence, administrative legislation, ethics, police, &c. This desire for simplification has led, if not misled, men from the consideration of the laws which regulate the supply of happiness or true prosperity to the investigation of the causes which operate and co-operate in the production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption of *wealth*—not in its original and ideal signification, but in its derived and material one—as a synonym, not for happiness, but for riches,—the agent of attainment, not the object of search. Wealth, in *this* sense, is the name employed to denote all those articles or products which are necessary, useful, or agreeable, and are possessed of an exchangeable value, *i. e.*,—are the results, in some degree, of the industry of man. In fact, wealth might be strictly and truly defined as labour and its products, or the means of acquiring them. Labour, mental, moral, or physical, imparts exchangeability to the materials among which man is placed, and is, therefore, in reality the very tap-root of wealth, of which *money* is merely the symbol.

Of political economy, in this sense, the nations of antiquity had no idea. Politics—the science of government—they had made in some measure the subject of study. Hippodamus of Meletus was a speculative politician; Socrates a practical one. Xenophon had a political object in writing the “*Cyropædia*,” Plato, in his “*Republic*” and “*Laws*,” gives us an exposition of his views on statescraft. In Aristotle’s “*Politics*” we have an elaborate investigation into the principles and practices of government; and Zeno, the Stoic, advocated a world-wide communism. Cicero strove to apply the Platonic politics to Roman affairs. Of any treatise having for its special object the consideration of the material causes which affect the prosperity of nations, we have no trace. The opulence of one nation was sought by the impoverishment of another, not by an increase in the sum total of production; and slavery, in ancient times, supplied the place of machinery in ours.

History, so far as it touches on domestic life at all, is a record of the continual struggles of those who desire to labour, and reap its fruits for themselves, and those who wish others to labour for them. Monarchy, military force, feudality, monachism, ecclesiasticism, &c., are names denotive, in part, of the irreproductive consumption of labour. Borough-right, civic charters, monopolies, patents, &c., are names given to means employed, in part, for the security of industry in a proportion of the results of labour. The maritime laws of Barcelona, about the middle of the eleventh century, were other securities gained by industry from the hands of power. “The running to and fro on the face of the earth,” occasioned by the Crusades, increased the means of diffusing wealth, and led greatly

to the development of commerce. Consuls, factories, parliaments, states-general, &c., came prominently into use, and wealth arrogated to itself a place and a power in the state. The Italian republics had early learned the worth of commerce, and had acquired, through its means, a magnificent prosperity. Compters and exchanges were fashioned into utility by them, and they first saw the need of labour for the enrichment of man. Commerce, without production, was impossible, and without commerce they could neither maintain their credit nor their grandeur. Growing demands stimulated production, and industry was encouraged, besides being, as it was called, *protected*. It is ever so,—

“ Vaulting ambition doth o’erleap herself,
And fall on the other side.”

The system which gave them greatness, fettered industry elsewhere, and consequently lessened the possibility of exchanges. In the hands of an oligarchy its commerce declined. America was discovered; the precious metals became abundant, and money (coin) was plentiful, but impoverishing. Here was a paradox the vulgar could not comprehend, for (what they called) riches produced poverty. In Italy, Davansati, Serra, Bandini, Montanas, Broggia, Carli, Verri, Beccaria, Vasco, Galiani, Genovesi, &c., have written on the subject of money with, for their time, much judiciousness, lucidity, and originality. Holland, through Grotius and Vattel, contributed to the adjustment of international law, and through Jacob Vanderlint, to the knowledge of the true worth of money. France supplies, in speculations upon money, trade, and labour, the names of Sully, Fénelon, Forbonnais, Melon, Gournay, Quesnay, Colbert, &c.; while in our own country, Thomas Mun, Mr. Asgill, Sir Josiah Child, Sir William Petty, Sir Dudley North, Sir Matthew Decker, Mr. Massie, Mr. Nicholas Barbon, are some of those who directed their studies to monetary science.

Mr. Fortrey, John Locke, &c., directed attention to the fallacy of regarding money (coin) as anything else than a commodity, to the necessity for industry, to the laws of commerce, to the need for facilities of exchange, and for the desirableness of recognizing money as the representative of labour, as worthy of a place in the management of affairs. All these tentatives towards the establishment of a *science of value* originated in the felt wants of men. A policy grounded on a false theory of value was destructive to effort and enterprise, and productive of indescribable misery. Yet all the activities of men were stirring for an outlet. Risk even ran into rashness. The splendid but visionary projects of the once famous John Law had found a public ready and anxious to seize upon any source of profit which would bring their money into use. The wide-spread bankruptcy, in which they ended, set speculation on the rack to learn the true secrets of money and taxation. The eagerness with which the East India Company was formed, Paterson's

Darien scheme was patronized, the South African Company was set up, and the instantaneous readiness with which the starting stocks of the Bank of England and the Bank of Scotland were subscribed, are further evidences of the extraordinary eagerness for the employment of capital and the attainment of profit, for the acquisition of wealth and the conveniences and luxuries it can provide. All these experiments in exchangeability, in the distribution of the supplies of one nation, so as to gain the products of the industry of another, must have given occasion for a large expenditure of thought on the means of enrichment and the mode of effecting—best, easiest, and quickest—the increase of wealth. The problem was one of paramount importance, and a solution was eagerly sought. Singularly enough, it was in one of the poorest, and, at that time, one of the least mercantile nations of Europe that the nearest approximation to the truth was found; and that a safe basis was laid for securing the true prosperity of nations and of individuals—so far as they are parts of one community. Turgot, Condorcet, and Mirabeau, *Ami des hommes* (father of Mirabeau, "Swallower of formulas," as Carlyle calls him), were engaged on this subject. Montesquieu, by the confession of Maupertius, did not include in his plan "*cette partie essentielle qui regarde les commerce, les finances, la population; science si nouvelle parmi nous, qu'elle n'y a encore point de nom. C'est chez nos Voisins qu'elle est née.*" Adam Smith first gave this science a systematic form, and so became its founder.

Adam Smith was born, on 5th June, 1723, in the town of Kirkcaldy, on the shore of the Frith of Forth, in the county of Fife, Scotland. His father was a native of Aberdeenshire, a writer to the Signet in Edinburgh, private secretary to the Earl of London (while Chief Secretary of State for Scotland and Keeper of the Great Seal), Clerk to the Councils of War in Scotland, and Comptroller of the Customs at Kirkcaldy. His mother was Margaret Douglas, daughter of Mr. Douglas, of Strathernrie, a small estate in the neighbourhood of Leslie, in Fifeshire. The wedded life of his parents was short. He was the only fruit of their union, and his father, whose name he bore—died some months before the birth of his son. The education of the posthumous, fatherless child fell entirely upon his mother, a woman of exemplary life, singular intelligence, and affectionate fidelity. He was, during infancy, delicate and weakly, and was, therefore, considerably indulged. One day, while visiting his uncle at Strathernrie, he was stolen by gipsies. By a lucky accident he was missed, sought for, and at last found in the vagrants' temporary settlement in Leslie Wood. He was educated at the grammar school of Kirkcaldy, then taught by a person of great ability—Mr. David Millar. Smith was noticeable, even during his school-days, for a passionate love of books. At the age of fourteen, he matriculated in the University of Glasgow. Here he studied the literature of Greece and Rome, mathematics, natural philosophy, and logic. In 1740, he went to Balliol College,

Oxford, as Bursar, on Snell's foundation (instituted 1688), on the nomination of the University, with an allowance of £90 per annum, tenable for ten years. Three of his professors during his Glasgow student years were George Ross, an elegant Latin scholar; Robert Simson, the eminent mathematician; and Francis Hutcheson, the moralist. It gives us a high opinion of the precocious development of Smith's powers to know that the sage who systematized the theories of Butler and Shaftesbury regarding the moral sense, recommended him to David Hume as a person of sufficient discrimination to comprehend, and of sufficient merit to be worthy of receiving, a presentation copy of Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature," and that, too, before he had completed his seventeenth year. This copy was afterwards seized, in a sudden midnight visitation, by the authorities of Oxford, and he was reprimanded by the "heads" for possessing and studying it. The impression made on him by Oxford life does not on the whole appear to have been very favourable, as we may see in reading "The Wealth of Nations," book v. chap. i. article 2. He remained at Balliol College seven years, but he does not appear to have performed more than the mere routine of duty demanded from students, and to have devoted himself more to the study of polite literature, the modern languages, and philosophic speculation, than to the attainment of collegiate excellence in the branches of education prescribed in the *curriculum*. He was intended for the Episcopal Church; but his own tastes did not incline in that direction, and, contrary to the prudent wishes of his friends, he left Oxford, and returned to Kirkcaldy, determined upon cultivating literature, in the hope that some of the moderate competences which Scotland then afforded might fall to his lot.

For two years Smith quietly settled down—to think. In 1748, he presented his literary claims to the Society of Edinburgh, and under the patronage of Henry Home, Lord Kames, read a course of lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. During session 1750-51 he was Professor of Logic in the University of Glasgow; but was transferred by next session to the chair of Moral Philosophy, vacant by the death of Dr. Craigie, the immediate successor of his own instructor, Francis Hutcheson. The latter situation he held for twelve years; as candidates for the former, among others, there appeared David Hume and Edmund Burke, but the successorship was conferred on a Mr. Clow. One of Smith's pupils—John Millar, afterwards Professor of Law in the University of Glasgow—supplied Professor Dugald Stuart, the earliest biographer of Smith, with an interesting account of his method of teaching, from which we make the following excerpt regarding the logical training he pursued:—"After exhibiting a general view of the powers of the mind, and explaining so much of the ancient logic as was requisite to gratify curiosity with respect to an artificial method of reasoning which had once occupied the universal attention of the learned, he dedicated all the rest of his time to the delivery of a system of rhetoric and *belles lettres*." It is quite evident that this plan, though some-

what too servilely adhered to by his successors, in deference to his great reputation, was merely a temporary means of accommodating his duties to the exigencies arising from an appointment made too late in the year to allow of adequate preparation, and that he used his Edinburgh lectures as an *excuse* to lessen the laboriousness of the task of preparing for a class so onerous. It is not likely that, had he continued Professor of Logic, he would have adhered to this plan. It is, in fact, a palpable practical *ignoratio elenchii*—an attaining of an irrelevant conclusion by shifting ground. His course on Moral Philosophy was better planned and more thoroughly worked out. It treated—I. Of Natural Theology, under the two divisions—(a) the nature and attributes of God; (b) the religious faculties in man. II. Ethics, or Personal Morality. III. Justice, or Public Morality. IV. Expediency; or the best means capable of being employed to increase public and personal happiness, prosperity, and power. The chief thoughts included under Part II. were reproduced in his celebrated work on the "Moral Sentiments;" and those of Part IV. were developed into the "Wealth of Nations." Parts I. and III. were never published in any other form than orally, though the tenor of his speculations on the latter of these points may be regarded as pretty fairly before us in the "Historical View of the English Government," and other works of Professor Millar, who, in fact, attained his chair mainly through the influence of Kames, Smith, and Hume.

Smith's mode of descanting on morals was not only original, but attractive; his "reputation as a professor was accordingly raised very high;" "those branches of science which he taught became fashionable," "and his opinions were the chief topics of discussion in clubs and literary societies." They had occupied his mind during a series of years, and their germs had been noted by himself in the quiet of Kirkcaldy, and were extended by an amanuensis during his stay (1748—1750) in Edinburgh. They were, however, only publicly and professorially taught subsequently to 1752. Hutcheson, Hume, and Kames, had stricken the fire from the flint; but the fire had been latent, and they had hit on the right material. They gave the impulse; but the results are all and truly his own. He gained from them the initiative touch, but he made and kept a path for himself.

During a great portion of his life he was a martyr to hypochondria; an inveterate scurvy, and a singular nervile disease, which caused his head to shake spasmodically, slightly impeding his speech, and occasioned several peculiarities of manner. While a student in Balliol, the repute of Berkeley's "Siria,"—a treatise on the virtues of tar-water,—reached him, and he placed himself under the prescribed regimen—with little permanent benefit, however. We can scarcely doubt that the other works of that learned, reflective, and pious bishop had also then attracted his notice. We are inclined to believe that Smith must have been the person who interested the philosopher of Cloyne in the projected folio publication of Plato by

the printers Foulis, undertaken about 1751, shortly after his advent in Glasgow. About the same time, the literary and philosophical society of the western metropolis of Scotland was instituted, and in it Smith read those essays on "Taste, Composition, and the History of Philosophy," which he had prepared while holding the lectureship on Rhetoric in the legal capital. Dr. Robert Watson, author of a "History of Philip II. of Spain," continued on the same plan the course of prelections on literature which Smith had begun in Edinburgh; and when Watson was appointed Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in St. Salvador's College, St. Andrew's, Dr. Hugh Blair took up the same theme in those "Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres" on which his fame chiefly rests, and which led to the establishment of the Regius professorship on that subject in Edinburgh University. It is pleasing to think that Smith proved his friendliness to his successors by unmistakeable services, *e. g.*, permitting the use of his MS. prelections to Dr. Blair, as he acknowledges in a note to his XVIIIth Lecture. The noblest minds are least chary of their claims to fame, and most communicative of those thoughts which, in the aftertime, change manners, laws, and institutions. But that frank freedom from an all-absorbing selfishness ought not to reach the length of supine indifference to truth; and hence, in 1755, Adam Smith drew up an abstract of his teachings, begun in 1748, and written out for him by an amanuensis during 1749, to show that, though he might have been forestalled in absolute publication, his opinions had been the genuine results of his own independent speculations.

In the same year (1755) an effort was made to establish, in Edinburgh, a periodical of a higher literary tone and of a more original character, than those then published. It assumed the name—since much more popularized—*The Edinburgh Review*, and was issued twice. Among its contributors were Robertson, the historian; Blair, the rhetorician; Russell, the naturalist; Home, the dramatist; Wedderburn, afterwards Lord Loughborough; Jardine (editor, I think), a clergyman; Smith, and other members of the *Poker Club* in Edinburgh—so called from its usefulness in stirring into manifest activity the intellect of its members. Singular enough, Hume was neither a contributor to its pages, nor in the secret of its origin. Its projectors were afraid of his good nature. Unless it were a review of Hume's "Essays," written during his college years (of which sight has been lost), the contributions made to this periodical were the earliest which Smith gave to the press. They consisted of—1st, a "criticism of Dr. Samuel Johnson's 'Dictionary'" (then just published), a paper of great merit, in which, while admitting the laborious talent exhibited in that important work, he objects to the want of classification in the explanations, and its deficiency in acute analysis and discrimination; 2nd, a letter to the editors, advocating an extension of the original scheme—which confined the criticisms to works issued in Scotland—and giving, in the course of his argument, under the guise of illustration, an

account of the literature of the continent at that time. The composition of these pieces is ingenious and elegant, and the work altogether fair for its time; but the Church rose in arms, militant against this organ of Philosophy, and the light was put out for a season.

The opportunity of expounding his opinions in the scattered form which gives immediate applicability to thought having thus been taken away, Smith seems to have determined upon making an effort to fix his ideas in the minds of men by an authoritative exposition, in preference to trusting his views and reputation to the notes of his students or the memory of hearers. With the intention of trying his foot on ground as yet but seldom trodden by Scottish thinkers, he reproduced, in the form of a book, the greater part of the doctrines contained in the second or ethical portion of his professional course of lectures, with the title of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments." This work was issued early in 1759. While it was in the press, a scheme was set on foot for buying out the interest of Mr. (afterwards Dr.) John Stevenson, Professor of Rational or Instrumental Philosophy,—i. e., Logic,—in favour of Smith, and of arranging for the successorship to his chair, in Glasgow, of Mr. (afterwards Dr.) Adam Ferguson. He did not, however, feel inclined to pay £1,200 for Stevenson's reversion, and the plan was not proceeded with. At this time we infer from a postscript in one of Hume's letters to him on this subject,—viz., "Lord Milton can, with his finger, stop the foul mouths of the roarers against heresy,"—that he was lying somewhat under the suspicions of the Church; naturally enough excited by his intimacy with Kames, Hume, Home, Carlyle, Ferguson, Jardine, &c., against whom an indefatigable crusade had been waged by a party at whose head figured the burly veteran of the Presbytery, the Rev. George Anderson.

"In the early part of Mr. Smith's life," says Professor Dugald Stewart, "it is well known to his friends that he was, for several years, attached to a young lady of great beauty and accomplishments. How far his addresses were favourably received, or what the circumstances were which prevented their union, I have not been able to learn; but I believe it is pretty certain, that after this disappointment he laid aside all thoughts of marriage. The lady to whom I allude died also unmarried. She survived Mr. Smith a considerable number of years, and was alive long after the publication of the first edition of this memoir (1793). I had the pleasure of seeing her when she was turned of eighty, and she still retained evident traces of her former beauty. The powers of her understanding and the gaiety of her person seemed to have suffered nothing from the hand of Time." It is not easy to guess at the facts of a subject so studiously concealed, yet as among the arguments employed by Hume to induce Smith to take up his quarters in Edinburgh, we find the following *arch*-allurement—"I had a letter from Miss Hepburn, where she regrets very much that you are settled at Glasgow, and that we had the chance of seeing you so

seldom;" and as this is the only lady mentioned in their correspondence, we can scarcely be far from the mark, under the circumstances, if we conclude that Miss Hepburn was the *affiancée* from whom, by some freak of time, circumstance, temper, or temperament, he either was, or became, estranged. Did he at this time really believe that "the loss of a leg may generally be regarded as a more real calamity than the loss of a mistress"?* or was this only a spirit of ill humour jerked forth as a retaliative in a quarrel? Or, was his expressed preference for "the gaiety of Ovid and the gallantry of Horace" over "the grave, pedantic, and long-sentenced love of Cowley and Petrarch,† the cause or the effect of the unsympathizing celibacy of this pair of excellent people—in whom, it would seem, the light of love never died, though its heat decayed—else why their unwedded lives? We know not. It seems a mystery of the passions. Is his portrait of a prudent man, in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments, part vi. sec. i., intended for a study in autobiography,—is it Smith's ideal of himself at this time? It bears in many points the appearance of being, as the painters say, "a study from life." But we have digressed; let us return.

Hume, then resident in London, greeted "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" heartily; and so early as 12th April, 1759, posted a pleasantly tantalizing, good-humoured, and kindly letter announcing its success. We can only afford space for one or two brief excerpts—in which the spice is omitted—about the book, viz.,—"I give you thanks for the agreeable present of your "Theory." Wedderburn and I made presents of our copies to such of our acquaintances as we thought good judges and proper to spread the reputation of the book. I sent one to the Duke of Argyle [Archibald, 3rd duke]; Lord Lyttleton [the poet and historian]; Horace Walpole [of Strawberry Hill]; Soame Jennyns [author of "The Art of Dancing," and "Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil," &c.], and Burke, an Irish gentleman who wrote lately a very pretty treatise "On the Sublime [and the Beautiful]." Millar [bookseller in the Strand] desired my permission to send one in your name to Dr. Warburton [author of "The Divine Legation of Moses," and just then raised to the see of Gloucester]. . . . I proceed to inform you that your book has been very unfortunate, for the public seem disposed to applaud it extremely. It was looked for by the foolish people with some impatience; and the mob of *litterati* are beginning already to be very loud in its praises. Three bishops called yesterday at Millar's shop in order to buy copies and to ask questions about the author. . . . Millar exults, and brags that two-thirds of the edition are already sold, and that he is now sure of success. . . . Charles Townshend, who passes for the cleverest fellow in England, is so taken with the performance, that he said to Oswald [M.P. for the Kirkcaldy burghs] he would put the Duke of Buc-

* "Theory of Moral Sentiments," part i. sec. 2, chap. i.

† *Ibid.* i. 2, ii.

cleugh under the author's care, and would make it worth his while to accept of that charge."* On 29th May Hume writes to Dr. Robertson, "Our friend Smith is very successful here;"† and on 28th July he forwards additional gratifying notices of the sensation his book had created, referring at the same time to the preparation of a *second* edition.‡ This success was not only pleasing but profitable, both immediately and in its results; nor was it undeserved.

"The Theory of Moral Sentiments" is a work at once ingenious, comprehensive, and original, rich in accurate observation, and remarkable for its acute analysis of facts and feelings. It is a repertory of statements and ideas of the greatest value to students of human nature. No intelligent reader can close its pages without being struck with the grace of his style, the delicate keenness of his thought, the singular felicity of his expositions of the workings of human thought and passion, the elegance of his method of reasoning, and the stimulant healthiness of his tone. It is hardly likely that any one will now coincide with him in his "Theory," but few can fail to be delighted with the skill, clearness, feeling, and eloquence of this first great systematic investigator of man's sympathetic nature. A very brief abstract will be sufficient to put the reader in possession of the leading thoughts in the treatise; but no *résumé* can touch the harp of the heart so thrillingly as in some of its finer toned passages the "Theory" succeeds in doing.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, first introduced into the language of philosophy the term *moral sense*; Bishop Butler's "Sermons" are implicitly, though not professedly, based upon that same idea, namely, the existence in the very core and centre of man's nature of an innate regulative moral sense,—conscience; and Francis Hutcheson (whose pupil Smith was) gave the theory of the moral sense its ultimate scientific development. These were all revolts against the selfish system of Hobbes, which decreed that enjoyment was the directive law of life. But "an ingenious and agreeable philosopher" had since arisen, whom Smith justly characterizes as one "who joins the greatest depth of thought to the greatest elegance of expression, and possesses the singular and happy talent of treating the abstrusest subjects not only with the most perfect perspicuity, but with the most lively eloquence." This was Hume. His *punctum essentiale* was utility. Against this conclusion Smith's "Theory" was the earliest reaction. He says,—"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it." "To denote this fellow-feeling with any passion whatever,"—he uses the term sympathy—which "enlivens joy and alleviates grief." We

* Burton's "Life of Hume," vol. ii. p. 57.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 55.

‡ *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 59. Digitized by Google

sympathize, admire, and approve of what we feel to be right, and we feel that to be right with which others sympathize. Propriety excites our sympathy instinctively and at once, and hence is the standard of moral goodness. The best actions excite universal and unmingled sympathy, and in the proportionate degree in which our actions fail to attain the instinctive, pure, and exceptionless sympathy of our fellows, our acts are wanting in true goodness. The fundamental maxim of morals is, then,—Act so that all men—or at least the greatest possible number of men—may sympathize with you. Experience indicates the kind and degree of conduct and sentiment with which men sympathize; this experience, when generalized into rules, forms the moral code from which we derive our sense of duty, and by reference to which we judge of merit and demerit. Prudence is virtue, and beneficence is the most genuine prudence, not because it is *useful* only, but because it commands and obtains the widest and the most unequivocal sympathy. Of course the above sentences are little more than the scaffolding of that great temple of moral science which Smith reared. Its pictured walls, its traceried pillars, its illumined windows, its arched dome, are gone. Not even a model—which the above outline is far from being—could give any adequate idea of its grace, grandeur, elevating tendency, and exquisite ratiocination,—“Naught but itself can be its parallel.”

It will at once be seen that this theory is vitiated by the omission of several links in the chain of thought; and, by not carrying analysis to its ultimate bound, the true conclusion is not reached; for, 1st, if sympathy is the *motive* of action, and if from our experience of the emotions excited in us, and inferred to be similarly educed in others, we deduce rules for our moral life, it is evident that in the last resource we come to Reason as the lawgiver of morality, and erect it into the unchangeable sovereign of our affections or feelings; and, 2nd, if we depend for our inducements to and our rules for moral conduct on the sympathy of others, our capacity for leading or even comprehending a moral life would be proportioned to the amount of our intercourse with men,—annihilated in solitude, minimized in the country, and maximized in the city. This all experience contradicts. But the feeling of *right* in the human soul has a source far higher than the current level of society, and a rule that transcends the mere inductions of man's conduct to man; and men would not have given a name to *conscience*, or realized—and almost *personalized*—it, unless they had felt that a sanctioning power did indeed exist within them, whose decisions were of a higher authority than the observation, systematization, and generalization of the phenomena of action. The motive and the emotive powers of the soul derive direction and energy from a main-stream, of which sympathy is only an affluent. It often happens that the affluent troubles the main-stream, and seeks to turn it into new channels; but it is always resistant, even when at length for the time being overpowered. Who are

martyrs, patriots, missionaries, epoch-creators in general, but men who have bent the whole energy of their natures to the working out of some grand moral aim, in which they condemn the current sympathy of their age and country, stem its onflow, and bring it back at length into the channel of *right*? Are not reform and virtue words which signify an energetic striving to withstand the lower and commoner sympathies of our nature, and of the sphere in which we move; a protest against the levelling of our actions to the merely possible and plausible, and an uprising into the higher elements of being? Sympathy is a blessed thing, but it is not that which leads to our being ever-blessed, not that to which our *last* appeal must be made. The foundation of the stately temple is unsound, and few worshippers have mingled with the admiring crowds its novelty and elegance drew to it.

The scales of some minds are too fine, too nicely adjusted for common purposes;—diamond scales will not do for weighing wool. Very refined, very ingenious, very philosophical minds, are all too scrupulous weighers: their scales turn with the millionth of a grain, and are all, from some cause, subject to the defect of indecision. They see too well how much can be said on both sides of a question. There is a sort of philosophical doubt, arising from enlargement of the understanding, quite different from the irresolution of character which is caused by infirmity of will; and when once some of these over scrupulous weighers come to a balance, that instant they become most wilful. After excessive indecision they perhaps start suddenly to a rash action.—*Edgeworth*.

Perhaps the leading distinction of superior intellect is a power of compression; a faculty which pre-supposes that of generalization. A subordinate understanding never perceives more than certain fragments or mutilated portions of a subject,—surveying the field of thought as a landscape through a tube.—*W. B. Clulow*.

Self-delusion is ever averse from inquiry, though by inquiry alone can the charm be dissolved.—*Dr. Parr*.

Compilation is a task of far greater difficulty than the production of what is original: though there is no comparison between their intellectual merit or their praise, whatever may be the case as to their respective utility. It is in literature as in life; the most laborious departments are the most necessary, yet often the least appreciated or lucrative.—*W. B. Clulow*.

Conclusions from partial reasoning often, perhaps always, make more difficulties than they remove.—*W. Danby*.

It is only by comparison that we can judge of anything: absolute knowledge is not given us to possess; the knowledge of truth, especially of the highest truth, must be progressive: let us then not quarrel with the slowness of our progress, or with the imperfection of our convictions; but doing what we can to improve them, let us wait with patience for their final accomplishment.—*W. Danby*.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

I SHALL assume that I am arguing, not with infidels, but with persons who profess some form of Christianity. And that I may not be accused of begging the question, I would remind my readers that as much was granted to Protestants in the preceding debate. We pointed out the difficulties which a Protestant must encounter in proving his Rule of Faith; but allowed it to be taken for granted that the New Testament was a true record, so far as it went, of the sayings and doings of our Lord and His apostles. The inspiration of that book was not disputed; but we endeavoured to show that the grounds upon which a Protestant believes it were fallacious.

It is worthy of remark, that the teaching of the Catholic Church is *positive*. She attacks nothing that has gone before, for the simple reason, that she dates the commencement of her creed centuries before that of any other church or sect. The heresies that have arisen have been condemned by her as soon as they appeared. Protestantism, on the contrary, is—as its very name imports—a protest against certain opinions which existed before it. The celebrated Edmund Burke has said that Protestantism is “a mere negation;” than which a truer description could not be given.

As some of the affirmative writers in the last debate do not appear to have read the negative articles with much attention; and as the writer of the first negative article in the present has quoted several texts which have been already refuted, I trust I shall be excused if, in my present article, I repeat some of the texts and arguments previously made use of.

The Catholic Rule has been described by “Ignatius” as consisting of the *whole* word of God; viz., Holy Scripture, and Divine tradition.

The term Church is usually understood to signify either a place in which Christians meet together for the worship of God,—a local association of Christians under proper government (as the Church of Ephesus, &c.),—or the whole Christian society, the Head of which is Jesus Christ.*

The existence of a body called Christians is a matter of history, notorious to the world. The Christians were well known, from the

* “Theophylact” has confused the three meanings of the word most lamentably in his opening article.

time of their Founder, as believers in peculiar doctrines never before heard of; as offerers of sacrifices to a God, of whose name Rome was then ignorant; and were, under various emperors, the constant mark for cruelty and fanaticism. That they were believers in certain tenets, now branded by Protestants as corrupt, may be easily gathered from their own writings, the writings of their heathen enemies, and the records they have left us in the catacombs. That they had bishops to rule over them, priests to offer the eucharistic sacrifice, and to perform the various functions still exercised by the priesthood,—deacons to assist at the altar and in the church, and to distribute the alms; and that there existed at Rome a bishop who governed the whole Church,—appointed bishops, and sent forth missionaries,—are all facts which history, whether Christian or pagan, will amply testify.

I shall, therefore, proceed to show that the authority upon which a Catholic believes in Christianity is founded upon truth; and that the Church, whose Rule of Faith we are now discussing, is the true Church, and, in consequence, teaches us the true faith.

In the previous debate we showed that Scripture alone is insufficient to direct us in matters of religion; and that those who profess to be guided by its dictates alone are, in reality, only following their own opinions, ostensibly based upon that book. That Scripture, by itself, is sufficient to direct us, *if interpreted rightly*, no one will pretend to dispute. The question is, What is the right interpretation? Who is to assure us that the meaning we put upon certain texts is correct? Protestants have no such guiding power among themselves, as their innumerable and irreconcilable divisions testify. The actual Protestant Rule of Faith is private interpretation, in contradistinction to the authoritative interpretation of the Catholic Church. The Church founds her interpretation upon the Holy Scriptures, and upon the true interpretation of them as delivered by the apostles to the fathers, who left the truth as a sacred deposit entrusted to the Church, which we believe to be immediately and constantly under the guidance and protection of the Holy Spirit.

I shall, therefore, point out some of the texts referring to the Rule of Faith, and the promises made for the perpetuity of it.

Before our Lord visited this earth as our Redeemer, the Almighty had made many promises of a church which was to take the place of the Jewish, and was to embrace not only the favoured nation, but all people. As the gorgeous magnificence of the temple was substituted for the beautiful but far inferior tabernacle, so the church which the Son of God was to found was, in turn, to supplant the entire Jewish dispensation. It was promised that Christ "should teach us His ways," and we should "walk in His paths."* No weapon formed against the Church should prosper; and every tongue which resisted her she should condemn;† and that the

* Isa. ii. 3.

† Isa. liv. 17.

nation and kingdom which would not serve her should perish.* "She was not to be ashamed nor confounded; for she should not be put to shame."† And God further promises that He will make her an "ETERNAL excellence:"‡ and in the same chapter He says, "Thou shalt call thy walls *salvation*; the Lord shall be unto thee an *everlasting* light, thy sun shall go down *no more*, and thy moon shall be no more diminished" (ver. 18). Again, she is called "*a crown of glory: delight of the Almighty*;" § and a promise is made that God would direct their work in truth, and would make an *everlasting* covenant with them; || and added to these are the following:—"There shall come a Redeemer unto Zion, and to them that shall return from iniquity in Jacob. As for me, this is my covenant with them: *My spirit which is in thee, and my words that I have put in thy mouth*, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, *from henceforth and for ever*." ¶ "I will set my sanctuary in the midst of them for evermore."** And that, in the time of Christ, "the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and a highway shall be there, and it shall be called the way of holiness . . . so that fools shall not err therein."††

Now, it will be observed that in the Protestant Bible the above texts are, by the headings of the chapters, referred to the Church of Christ. In the Catholic Bible it is the same. How is it, then, that any difficulty arises in ascertaining what body, styling itself a Church, tallies most closely with the Church described in the prophecies?‡‡ These texts undeniably point to some visible body, unmistakeably apparent to the eyes of all mankind. A Protestant "Church" does not exist. Protestantism is a mere conglomeration of hostile elements. But there is a church claiming to be the only true one, which declares that those texts apply to her, and to her alone. The Catholic Church has always consistently affirmed that, besides her, there is no true church; that she alone is the depository of the promises of the Founder, and that she alone can point with unfailling and undoubted certainty to the long line of teachers, from Peter downwards to Pius IX. She dates her existence, not from any "Reformation," nor does she claim for herself a heretical sect appearing now and then in the course of fifteen centuries. She has been a prominent object in the eyes of the world, whether in the days of Nero or Caligula, of Pepin or Charlemagne, of Henry VIII. or Victoria. Such as she is now, so was she in the first ages,—a visible Church,—never hidden, though often overclouded.

When our Saviour came upon earth, He came "not to destroy" the dispensation which His Father had given to the Jews, but "to fulfil it." The Christian was to take the place of the Jewish law, but was to be a continuation and development of it,—not its

* Isa. lx. 12.

† Isa. liv. 4.

‡ Isa. lx. 15.

§ Isa. lxii. 3.

|| Isa. lxi. 8.

¶ Isa. lix. 20.

** Ezek. xxxvii. 24.

†† Isa. xxxv. 5.

‡‡ I have only selected the above texts from a vast number I had marked for quotation, as I have no desire to trespass on the Editor's kindness.

destroyer. The priesthood and the sacrifice were not to be swept away, but the offering was to be that which they had before only offered in type. The altars were still to stand in the magnificent temple,* and He himself set us the example of frequenting the Church at stated hours for prayer. He speaks of His own Church several times. He declares that it is "to be founded upon a rock," which name He bestows upon the disciple who was to be the head and key-stone of it, and that "the gates of hell should not prevail against it." He compares it to a city set upon a hill, which could not be hid; it is the light of the world; a grain of mustard-seed growing up to an immense tree; and His promises to sustain it are many and frequent. He bestows upon His apostles the office of teachers; He gives to them powers second only to His own; He sends them forth into the world armed with His Spirit, and renders them invincible by His own might.

The apostles were chosen by our Lord from among the rest of mankind. Their number was peculiar—twelve—agreeing with the number of the Jewish tribes. To them were made certain promises, viz., that our Lord "would be with them *all days, for ever*;"† that when He was no more visible to them, He "would send the Paraclete, who should abide with them *for ever*;"‡ and they are sent forth by our Lord to "teach *all nations*."

When Judas, by his sin, lost his apostleship, the remaining eleven met together and elected a successor in his place. This, be it remembered, was *after* the ascension of our Lord. As these promises of the perpetual presence of Christ were made to those whom he sent to teach, the practice of the apostles in appointing successors shows clearly that they conceived the promises as extending to the chief teachers of the church, call them apostles, bishops, patriarchs, or whatever name you will. The promises were that He would be with them for ever. As they were not to live for ever, the words are unintelligible, unless they refer also to those who were to succeed them. That the apostles understood it in this sense may be inferred from the fact of their appointing bishops, to whom the care of the new churches was committed. When, then, a point of doctrine was disputed, reference was made to the bishops, who decided the matter for the Church. Thus, when a dispute once arose upon the subject of circumcision, a conference of bishops was held at Jerusalem, where the matter was settled.§ We do not read that the Bible was referred to; but as the decree of the Council declared that the Holy Ghost concurred in its decisions, we may safely conclude that the promise to be with the apostles extended also to their successors, for we are distinctly told that S. Paul, Titus, and Barnabas, were there, and the promise was not given to each of them personally.||

* It will be remembered that the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple was in consequence of the Jews' rejection of our Lord. See S. Luke xxi.; S. Matt. xxiii., &c.

† S. Matt. xxviii. 20.

‡ S. John xvi. 16.

§ Gal. ii.

|| Acts xv. 24; Gal. ii. 1.

The teachers were sent by the apostles to the early churches, precisely as our Lord sent the apostles, only the apostles were not sent to any special place. These teachers were set over the churches, as in the case of Titus, the first Bishop of Crete,* and of Timothy, Bishop of Ephesus.† The Hebrews are told to "obey their prelates, and submit themselves to them, as they watch for their souls, "as they that must give account;"‡ and S. Paul tells the bishops of the Church of Ephesus to take heed to themselves, and to the whole flock, whence the Holy Ghost had placed them bishops to rule the Church of God.§

If, then, a succession of teachers be proved, and it be admitted that the promises, which were to last for ever, were intended to extend to the bishops of the nineteenth century, as well as those of the first, it necessarily follows that to those bishops we must have recourse in matters of doubt upon any point of our faith. They alone are able to settle the canon of Scripture;—they alone can inform us of the true interpretation of it;—and they alone can tell us what is necessary for salvation. And these things they do tell us; and it rests with ourselves to accept or reject their teaching.

If the Church, which these bishops represent, be the true Church of Christ, it will possess the fourfold work of Unity, Catholicity, Holiness, and Apostolicity.

I. And is it not *one*? Has Christ's earnest desire that His Church "might be one, even as He and His Father are one," come to nought?¶ Is it no longer necessary for Christians to "continue in one mind,"¶ as in the days of the apostles? Are we no longer to "avoid them that cause divisions contrary to the faith we have learned from" apostolic teachers?*** S. Paul adjures the Corinthians to speak the same thing, and to have no divisions among them, but to be perfectly joined together in the same mind and the same judgment.†† Does the "one faith" which S. Paul puts on an equality with "one Lord, and one God and Father over all,"‡‡ no longer exist? Is there no longer "one fold and one Shepherd?"§§ or are there Wesleyan, Independent, and Baptist folds possessing separate shepherds?

Protestants are certainly forced to strange extremes, when they fly in the face of Scripture itself, and declare unity of no importance. The Catholic Church, the unfailing object of the attacks of her enemies, constantly holds before the face of her children the necessity of remaining in one mind, and of holding fast "the faith once delivered to the saints," and to avoid all novelties in religion, whether propounded by Luther, Voltaire, or Joe Smith.

* Titus i. 6.

† Tim. i. 3.

‡ Heb. xiii. 17. Although "prelates," in the Protestant version, is translated, "Them that rule over you," it does not destroy the meaning, which is sufficiently demonstrated by the context.

¶ S. John xvii. 21.

¶ Acts iv. 32.

§ Acts xx. 28.

†† 1 Cor. i. 10.

‡‡ Ephes. iv. 5, 6.

** Rom. xvi. 17.

§§ S. John x. 16.

VOL. IV.

H

In the Catholic Church, unity is its very heart and soul. No adverse teaching anywhere exists in her. She alone, of all professed Christian bodies, is not "a house divided against herself." Truth is one; and it is, therefore, impossible to wander from the unity of truth, without falling into error. It is the oneness of Catholic truth which has held the Church together for nineteen centuries; and as unity is impossible amongst Protestants, they are carrying their divisions to the fullest extent, and rushing into the arms of rationalism and infidelity.

II. The Catholic Church is holy,—in her doctrine, in her pastors, and in her children. It may seem invidious to speak in this manner, but I will avoid any comparisons. The Church teaches her children the truth of the doctrines of Almighty God, and by every means strives to induce them to follow the humility, the faith, and loving charity which must fit them for their eternal home. The clergy are, as a body, remarkable for their devotion and patient ministering to the spiritual wants of the laity; while the latter are always looked upon by Protestants as being very "strict." No doubt my Protestant readers will bear me out in this.

It will be no reply to this to say that many Catholics, both clerical and lay,—even some of the popes themselves,—have been guilty of great sins; as although the Church invites her children to practise holiness, it has not, of course, the power to compel. It is left, as God leaves our own salvation in our own hands, to accept or reject it as we think proper. The tares and the wheat must still grow together until the harvest, when they will be separated.

III. The Church is catholic, that is, universal. The apostles were sent to teach all nations, to preach the Gospel to every creature, and the Church consequently embraces all nations; her religion is professed in every country on the face of the earth; and this can be said of no other religion whatever. The Catholic Church has held firmly to her doctrines, and always professed the same faith, while those who taught otherwise have been separated from her and condemned. As Arius and his followers started an heretical novelty, and were all excommunicated by the Church, so was Luther, when his new-born religion first made its appearance.

I have no desire to quarrel with the Church of England, which assumes the title of Catholic. I doubt not that many in that body would be glad to get rid not only of the name, but also of the creeds which contain it; but the assumption of the name Catholic is in the face of facts.

IV. The Church is apostolical, deriving her doctrines from the apostles, and tracing her spiritual descent with undoubted clearness from them. Her creeds are apostolic; her services and even ceremonies are from the same fountain-head.

That the traditions forming part of the Rule of Faith of the Catholic Church are warranted by Scripture, I will proceed to show as briefly as possible.

Our Lord commissioned His apostles to "go and teach all

nations all things, whatsoever He had commanded them."* He sent them, "even as His Father had sent Him,"† and invested them with an authority which teachers sent by God must always possess. There was no mention made of any written code which was to remain in their place when they were dead: and that the apostles themselves believed that a book was not entirely requisite is sufficiently proved by their own conduct in not committing to writing much of our Lord's teaching, and by the fact that the Christians were fully instructed in the doctrines of Christianity, and their churches thoroughly organized, before a line was ever addressed to them.

We accordingly find S. Paul writing to one of the bishops to "keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in thee, that good thing which was committed to thee;"‡ and "the things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to others, who shall be able to teach others also."§ He commands the Thessalonians to "stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by word or by our epistle;"|| showing most clearly that they had learnt some things of S. Paul that he had never committed to writing. He commands them also to withdraw from every brother who walked disorderly, and not after the traditions which he had received of the apostles.¶

S. Peter writes his second epistle "by way of remembrance, that they may be mindful of the commandment of the apostles of the Lord."**

S. John, "having many things to write, would not with pen and ink, but trusted shortly to come" to the person whom he addresses, "when he would speak face to face."†† S. Paul also, after redressing some disorders in the Church at Corinth, says he will set "the rest in order when he comes."‡‡

Is there, then, nothing in any of these texts to warrant us in believing that what forms the unwritten word of God, that is, the tradition of the Church, committed to her care by the apostles themselves, is of equal authority with what its authors have recorded in the pages of the New Testament? Was what S. Paul imparted to the churches by "word" of less value than what he taught "by epistle"? Or did inspiration leave S. John when he wrote no more, preferring to "speak face to face"?

If oral teaching was the divinely appointed means of acquainting mankind with the truths of Christianity in the first century, why are the same means to be repudiated and condemned by modern Anti-Catholic theologians? Protestants do not argue in the same fashion when the laws of the country are called in question. If the meaning of an Act of Parliament is doubted of, to whom do we resort,—popular opinion, or the properly appointed expounders of

* S. Matt. xxviii. 20.

§ 2 Tim. ii. 2.

** 2 Pet. iii. 1, 2.

† S. John xx. 21.

|| 2 Thess. ii. 15.

†† 2 John i. 12.

‡ 2 Tim. i. 14.

¶ 2 Thess. iii. 6.

‡‡ 1 Cor. xi. 34.

the law,—the judges? It may be said that the law which judges explain and decide is of human origin, and cannot, therefore, be compared to that of God. But this is only making matters worse; for if you deny the existence of a tribunal appointed by the Almighty to explain this law, you allow every illiterate person to arrogate to himself the office of teacher, and are forced to admit, upon your own principles, that his explanations of contested passages may be of equal truth, and are of equal authority with your own.

S. Paul declares that God “appointed some teachers;” who appoints the Protestant teachers? He further asks,—“How can they preach unless they be sent?” and we still ask the question.

“Theophylact” has endeavoured to show that S. Peter was not the head of the apostles, nor the rock of the Church. This has nothing to do with the question. The primacy of S. Peter might form the subject of a separate debate, but it certainly is not the Catholic Rule of Faith. Nor do Catholics, as he seems to think, believe in the personal infallibility of the Pope. There have been Popes, we all know, who were a disgrace to religion. But the Pope does not constitute the Church any more than the Archbishop of Canterbury constitutes the Anglican Church. Christ prayed for Judas in common with the rest of the apostles, and no doubt bestowed miraculous powers upon him, but that did not prevent his crime. So also with S. Peter, about whose faith our Lord was so solicitous, who was one of the earliest apostles and the chief amongst them, even he denied our Lord. No personal infallibility was promised to S. Peter, nor to any other apostle, but to the Church, which our Lord declared He would be with “all days, even unto the end of the world.”

As I have written my article without using those texts which “Theophylact” conceives Catholics rely upon to prove their Rule of Faith, it is hardly necessary for me to notice them.

If his second proposition be true, viz., that Catholics believe many things directly contrary to the teaching of the Bible, it is certainly true that Rome has fallen into grievous and awful error.

“Theophylact” will find that most of the texts he brings forward to support this portion of his argument have been quoted in the preceding debate, and replied to. With respect to his manner of placing in opposite columns the teaching of Scripture and the teaching of the Church, I will only remark that it would be easy not only to place Protestant opinions in juxtaposition with texts of Scripture, but also to torture Scripture into the same apparent contradictions.

But it is a work of great labour, and has nothing to do with the present question, to discuss, as “Theophylact” has attempted to do, the supremacy, transubstantiation, and various other doctrines of the Catholic Church. He must not be surprised, therefore, if I pass over his formidable array of texts and notes from the Douay Bible and other sources.

I have endeavoured to show the grounds upon which the Catholic

Rule of Faith rests,—the Scripture authorities, both from the Old and New Testaments; and I leave the question for the present for the consideration of all who may feel that the truth is of any importance, and earnestly hope that they may be induced to give the whole subject a full and impartial inquiry. GREGORY.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE readers of the *British Controversialist* will, doubtless, sympathize with our expression of disappointment at the nature of the first affirmative article on the question, "Is the Catholic Rule of Faith true?" The duty devolving upon Romanists undertaking the discussion is, obviously, the *defence* of this proposition. Unquestionably, the position taken by Rome should be first stated, that each debater may know, from authentic sources, what that position is; and having done this, "Ignatius" ought to have placed before us, if not all the arguments in proof, yet an outline of the arguments usually adduced in support. Instead of this, he tells us in a note, what is obvious enough in the article itself, that "it must be borne in mind that" he is "merely *stating* the Catholic doctrine, and not *proving* it; this will be done by others" (page 16). It is always easier to attack than to defend,—to destroy than to build. A vulgar labourer can pull a house down, give him but pickaxe, and spade, and wheelbarrow; but it is only an experienced builder and skilled workman that can erect a goodly edifice. In the former discussion, our opponents have done their best to cavil and object; and now that we look for arguments, we have a mere "statement," and bare "explanation," while the "defence" is postponed *sine die*. Depend upon it, the arguments in this discussion, as in the former one, will consist chiefly in attacking the opposite side—not in proving what abler hands, since the times of Luther and Chillingworth, have never *attempted* to prove. Since "Ignatius" has contented himself with a bare statement, he cannot fairly complain if, for the present, we meet it with another bare statement,—that the Rule of Faith he has laid down is neither true, nor capable of the appearance of a defence. With a pertinacity worthy of a better cause, he and his party have reiterated baseless assertions, again and again. It has been most interesting to notice how oblivious they have contrived to be of the reasoning of their opponents, and how completely they have changed the *British Controversialist* into a Roman Catholic caviller, for the time being.

If they have shown little faith in the arguments on their side, there is no lack of evidence of a disposition to draw largely upon the sympathies of the reader. Their case is truly a hard one. "It is impossible," complains "Gregory," "to test the correctness of this writer's ('Lex Scripta's') quotations from the Fathers, as he does not give a single reference throughout, except to some work of the Rev. W. Goode. It is really too much to expect us to refer to works of this nature, even when written by eminent Protestants"

(page 390). From rare and old books, not to be found, except in the expensive libraries of some collegiate institution, or in the British Museum, extracts are freely made—as for example, on page 18,—but a book of the day, to be had for a few shillings, or to be borrowed from any respectable library, is beyond the reach of our opponents. The clumsiness of such an evasion will appear, if our readers will consider what it must cost a person to possess a complete set of the Christian Fathers, which “Gregory” wishes us to believe he is ready to consult, if we would but give him the necessary references. On a very moderate calculation, a sum from £150 to £200 is the price of these works. A man must have something more than a smattering of the Greek and Latin tongues to understand their involved sentences, to catch their obscure allusions, and to reconcile the contradictions not only between the statements of the different writers of contending schools, but between the statements of the same author. For the execution of this laborious task, a period of some twenty years has been assigned as not too long for a man—and there are few such—who, with his classical attainments, combines great mental endowments.

On a review of the discussion on the Protestant Rule of Faith, it is gratifying to observe that none of the writers on the affirmative side have had the humiliating task of retracting a rash statement, or of apologizing for the errors of his party. Truth is consistent, and its defence is simple; error is inconsistent, and its defenders have to advance, and retreat, and cover their defeat as well as they can. The Roman Catholic writers have had to back out of untenable positions, with the ill grace of those who are confuted, but are unwilling to confess to a defeat. “Gregory,” for example, apologizes for his extremely rash assertion that to diverge from the meaning of the Scriptures is not heresy (page 21), by stating, “I certainly did not mean to imply what the faulty construction of the sentence conveys” (page 389). This writer of confessedly bad grammar endeavours to improve the sense of a clause in “A Layman’s” article, with what success will presently appear. J. H. again comes to the rescue of his friend, by stating, “I should hardly think that ‘Gregory’ meant to say that there were no translations at all, when every one knows that the contrary is the fact” (page 240). Let the reader be at the pains to turn to page 19, and he will commend rather the generosity than the good sense of the apologist. These pretended blunders happen only when the arguments of their opponents are felt to be too damaging to be entirely ignored. We will here content ourselves with another specimen. “Gregory” tells us that “Lex Scripta” “sets language at defiance by asserting that ‘authority’ here (in Augustine, quoted page 300) means ‘testimony.’ I,” he continues, “should like a reference to a dictionary which gives such a definition. If devoid of truth, it certainly has the charm of novelty” (page 390). The confidence with which this reference is courted looks like a wish that the reader may take “Gregory’s” notion of English words without the

trouble of consulting a dictionary. Every one who has the slightest knowledge of current and commonplace words knows that "testimony" is one of the usual significations of the word "authority." One has only to reflect upon the drift of the extract in question, to perceive that Augustine uses it in this sense. Conceding to our opponent that this Father was a Roman Catholic, it follows that he acknowledged the "authority" of only the See of Rome. When, therefore, he advises one in doubt about the canon of the New Testament to receive "the authority of as many Catholic churches as possible," he could mean nothing more than their testimony to the fact of the canonicity of any controverted document. Apart, however, from this unanswerable argument, let our opponent turn to the "Imperial Dictionary," or to Webster's (London, 1831), where he will read that one of the usual senses of the word "authority," is "*testimony, witness, or the person who testifies,*" &c. To prevent a repetition of the evasion, "it is too much to expect us to refer to works of this nature" (page 390), we will cite a much cheaper work, "Walker's Dictionary" (Nelson's edition), where "Gregory" will find the meanings given of "authority" are, "legal powers; influences, credit; power, rule; support, countenance; *testimony, credibility.*" Let not any one suppose that in exposing such paltry evasions of the main point in discussion, we are descending from the dignity of fair controversy. We crave a little credit for acquaintance with the tactics of Rome, and we assure the uninformed that her common practice is by such evasions to endeavour to throw dust into the eyes of those whom she would beguile into error.

Another observation which I have to make is, that the reader should be on his guard against appeals to his good nature. "Gregory" congratulates himself that "unguarded expressions" have escaped only from his opponents (page 382), and complains that he has been charged "with puerility, sophistry, feebleness, and so on" (page 391). In the very next sentence he uses harsher terms than any of which he complains:—"I am glad to see that no such contemptible personalities have disfigured the affirmative side" (page 391). The eagerness of this abuse is seen in the haste with which he wrote the sentence. He writes "affirmative" when he meant "negative." Some of the remarks of "Lex Scripta" are not very "intelligible;" one of his arguments is "very lame" (page 387), and he is recommended to apply to "the first Protestant child he meets" for enlightenment. Poor "Gregory" "experienced no little difficulty in extracting this much from the mass of verbiage and angry sneering of which 'Lex Scripta's' article is composed" (page 390). Such "contemptible personalities" come with no good grace from one who whines and abuses in the same breath. We do not complain of abuse; we hail it as an evidence of feeling on his part that, as arguments fail him, he must resort to the sympathies of the reader. For our part, we have ever respected a man the more whose consciousness of *honesty* will not suffer him to repress an outburst of indignation when one writer, having made a rash

assertion, looks to another to deny that he meant what no one can doubt he did mean. When a man, with blandness of manner, plots against all that is sacred or dear to British Christians, we respect him less, and dread him more, than a rough and noisy foe. We claim the privilege of an occasional laugh at nonsense, though at the risk of a charge of "angry sneering." We assert the right of calling things by their proper names, undeterred by the charge of discourtesy or intolerance. But of all things, the most distasteful to us is the practice of abusing and whimpering in the same breath. On this ground, it is to be hoped that "A Layman," when he ventures to write another article, *nine* pages in length, will cease to complain (pages 166—167) that "Clement" exceeded the limit assigned by the Editor of *six* pages.

Another preliminary observation, of some importance, is that Roman Catholicism is frequently defended by a cry of injustice. "Ignatius" opens the present discussion by observing that, "on any other subject than the Catholic Church, men's sense of shame is enough, generally, to keep them from talking at random. But the critics of our religion have an advantage peculiarly their own, in the deep ignorance of the public whom they address. Their statements pass current in England, because the generality of people are about as wise as themselves" (pages 13, 14). From no other country does there issue such a host of annual visitors to the lands of Popery as from England. No other people have so many relations residing in those lands of superstition as the British. For either business or convenience, multitudes of the British live in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Austria, in Gibraltar, and Malta, and Madeira, —where Popery throws off the masks it wears in England. To talk of British ignorance of Romanism, is rash in the extreme. Without going abroad, we may, any day, see in the Irish what "Ignatius" is so anxious to deny, namely, that "Papists deliberately offer to the Blessed Virgin the honour due to God alone; — that they believe they will be saved by works only," &c. (page 14). It is true that he qualifies his disclaimer by restricting it to men of "education and acquirements;" but this, so far from being a recommendation, is that very feature of which Protestants so loudly complain. Rome dares not offer to Englishmen what she instils into the Irish. She dare not experiment upon our credulity with the miracles with which she deludes the Neapolitans. Conceding, however, for argument's sake, that the English are as ignorant as they are represented by "Ignatius," we ask whether the English, under Wycliffe, and later Reformers, had no personal experience of the nature of Roman Catholicism? Were they, who were bred and born Papists, as ignorant as their Protestant descendants? Why did they freely shed their blood to throw off the yoke of the "Blessed Virgin"? Not to go so far back in the history of men's experience of Roman Catholicism, we ask, Are the Irish in Ulster, the French in Paris, the Germans in Austria, "put down, because there are on every side others with information and good sense

enough to expose them" (page 14), when they become ignorant "critics" of the religion of their native land? Nay, if we may judge from the following instance, it will appear that "*Lex Scripta*," really knows more of the doctrines of Romanism than "Gregory," who writes in its defence, wishes it to be thought he knows. In reference to an allusion to "indulgences to sin," which we "suppose Rome gives to her followers," "Gregory" thus writes in a note on page 391:—"He really should inform himself a little better of what Catholicism consists, before he ventures to attack it; but he, doubtless, thinks that 'where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.'" Thus do Romanists meet with a denial the charge of encouraging immorality by their pernicious doctrines. But the worth of such denials may usually be tested by a reference to some other document, or, as in this case, by turning to another part of the same document. For example, on page 15 of the former debate, this very "Gregory" tells us that Protestants prefer discussing "transubstantiation or indulgences" to the "Rule of Faith," "for the simple reason, that one is much easier than the other; since they do possess some documentary evidence respecting the former, while they are totally destitute of any Divine proofs of the latter." Here he admits that we have *documentary evidence for indulgences*, and there he tells us of our ignorance on the subject.

The present discussion is opened with the characteristic ingratitude of Rome. We are informed that "to misrepresent Catholics in this country is no difficult matter, for all ears are ready to drink in the abuse, and equally deaf to the defence" (p. 14). This assertion is made in the pages of the *British Controversialist*, which have been thrown open to the defenders of the system, and is addressed to a class of readers ever anxious to hear both sides of every question. In no purely Popish country would a Roman Catholic periodical invite discussion on religion. Here for now seven months we have been patiently listening to the advocates of Rome, and they turn round upon us with the charge of being "deaf" to its defence.

We regret to see that "Ignatius" reiterates the assertion of "Gregory," that to consult the early Fathers on the authorship and canon of the New Testament is to give up the Rule of Faith (p. 390). In his opinion we are "driven to deny the all-sufficiency of the Bible, and to allow that on the question of the canon of Holy Scripture we must have recourse to the testimony of the ancient churches" (p. 13). In this sentence two things are linked together which have no connection in the nature of things,—first, the all-sufficiency of the Bible, "and" the appeal to the testimony of the early churches. No man in his senses can think that it is the opinion of Protestants that the Bible can tell us what the Fathers thought of it. It would be necessary to suppose it endowed with the faculties and organs of a human being before one can dream of its being "*all-sufficient*," or sufficient at all in such a matter. We repeat, that no candid and intelligent debater can really hold that,

unless the Scriptures can inform us of what the ecclesiastical historian can alone communicate, they do not and cannot constitute our only Rule of Faith. If "Gregory" and "Ignatius" have any respect for their character, let them cease to reiterate such an absurd statement. What we are willing to attribute to the heat of controversy, and the prejudices of Romanism, must in future be regarded as proof of a determination to misunderstand and mislead. Let the reader notice the premises and the conclusion of "Ignatius." The premises are, the necessity of appealing to the early churches to know in what book, or in what number of books, we are to find the Christian doctrines and practices. From this necessity his inference is, *therefore*, "The Bible cannot instruct us on *all* points of Christian doctrine and practice" (p. 13). The endeavour to ascertain what is our Rule of Faith and practice is thus represented as abandoning that rule. A charitable construction of the pertinacity with which this absurdity is reiterated is already difficult, and will become impossible ere long. As confusion here is the triumph of error, and clearness of ideas is the triumph of truth, we shall devote the remainder of this article to the arguing and illustrating of this simple proposition, that to appeal to historical evidence, that is, to the writings of the Fathers, to ascertain the canon and authorship of the New Testament, is not abandoning the position that the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the Christian Rule of Faith and practice.

The *authorship* of the New Testament is a historical *fact*, which, like all other facts, is to be proved by *testimony*. The *nature* of the contents, or the *meaning* of any part of the New Testament, is a matter of *opinion*, which, like all other opinions, is to be proved by our *reason* and *common sense*, to which the word of God is invariably addressed. The former, in the absence of a standing miracle, is ascertained by an appeal to history; the latter is the result of attention to the Bible itself, and, in Protestant communities, to the Bible *alone*. To this, however, the Romanist and Tractarian object, declaring that we must appeal to the Fathers, not only for their testimony to the *fact*, but to the *opinion* of the early churches as to the *meaning* which should be attached to the words of Scripture. Now the question at issue is as simple as it can be, and is the point to be proved or disproved. The great object of Roman Catholic writers has been to mystify this plain question, and our great object is to expose their attempts at mystification. On pages 299—302 we have argued it at length, and all that we need do in this article is to add an illustration.

Let the readers of the *British Controversialist*, then, resolve themselves into a jury, with its editor as the judge. We shall bring into this court of appeal the article signed by a person whose monogram is "Layman," and which occupies pages 164—173. We raise two questions on that article; first, is the signature of the author *bonâ fide*? Is that signature genuine, or is it a forgery? Now this is a simple question of *fact*,—a fact of authorship, and is to be

determined by cross-questioning witnesses. The second question about to be raised is not of facts, but of an *opinion* as to the real *meaning* of a controverted clause in that article, which is as follows:—"I, too, would say to a Protestant, 'Search the Scriptures,' for they testify of the Church and her Divine Head, and which, if you reject your prejudices, 'the traditions of men,' will lead you into its fold" (p. 169). "*Lex Scripta*" accuses the writer of this clause with, first, two grammatical blunders; and, secondly, with tergiversation. To defend "*A Layman*," "*Gregory*" is employed as one of the witnesses. The first thing to be decided is, did the person who signs himself "*A Layman*" really write the third negative article containing this clause? The judge, as Editor of the *British Controversialist*, declares that there can be no question on the genuineness of the signature, producing the manuscript in evidence, and from a reference to p. 390, lines 21—29, showing that witness "*Gregory*" also swears to the authorship. The first question,—a question of fact—of authorship, is thus settled. But mark, this witness "*Gregory*," in *attesting* the authorship of the article, volunteers his *opinion* also of the *meaning* of the controverted clause. Listen. "*Lex Scripta*" "has laid hold of an expression of '*A Layman*,' and wears it threadbare" (p. 390). Here the judge very properly stops the loquacious and impertinent witness, and informs him that, in giving evidence to the fact of authorship, he must leave out the offensive words, "thread-bare." The article of "*Lex Scripta*" is before the court, and the jury is empanelled to pronounce upon matters of *opinion*, and can decide for itself. The witness has sworn to the authorship, and must withdraw; but if he has anything to add, it must be evidence and not opinions. The judge, moreover, advises him to recall his insulting expressions, and to be more cautious for the future. Witness "*Gregory*" proceeds to address the judge, amid the cries of "Turn him out!—turn him out!" issuing from some of the ill-mannered spectators in the court. After silence has been restored, the witness is heard to say, "The word '*which*' sufficiently points out, to any one conversant with English grammar, what the '*Layman*' refers to" (p. 390). The judge again interposes, saying, "*That* is not the point for you to decide, it is the business of the jury to see to that. I have given you an opportunity to mend your manners, and you have availed yourself of it to make an insulting allusion to the grammar of "*Lex Scripta*." Unabashed witness "*Gregory*" adds,—"*For the benefit of such individuals as '*Lex Scripta*' it would be as well, perhaps,*"—(here the reporter calls attention to the hesitation and confusion of mind with which the witness uttered the word *perhaps*)—"to have put '*the traditions*' of men within brackets" (p. 390). The judge now orders "*Gregory*" to be removed from the witness-box, and to be kept in "the lock-up" through the night for contempt of court. In summing up the evidence, the judge speaks as follows:—"Of the two points raised, the first has been proved, namely, that the third negative article bears the *bond fide* signature of the person

known as 'A Layman.' The second point is one of opinion, which the jury have now to decide. The jury must be careful to dismiss from their minds the opinions volunteered by the witness 'Gregory.' His opinion is inadmissible in court. Free from the bias of extraneous influences, you, gentlemen, will now withdraw and consider your verdict on the meaning and design of the controverted clause in the document which has been submitted to you this day. The design of the clause, as it stands, is, after the best consideration in my power, I am sorry to say, an intention to mislead, by perverting the sacred words of Scripture. It is faulty as a sentence, judged by the ordinary rules of grammar. The words 'her' and 'it' leave one in considerable doubt whether the Roman Catholic Church is of the feminine or of the neuter gender in the opinion of the writer. If, again, the word 'which' refers to the Scriptures as calculated to lead men without prejudices into that fold, no honest or at least sensible man would have introduced the phrase—'the traditions of men.' It has been argued by counsel, that if that phrase be put within brackets, all ambiguity will disappear; but the suggestion simply shifts the confusion of ideas from one part of the clause to another. With the proposed amendment, the clause reads as follows:—'I, too, would say to a Protestant the same words, "Search the Scriptures," for they testify of the Church and her Divine Head, and which, if you will reject your prejudices ("the traditions of men"), will lead you into its fold.' The proposed alteration makes *the traditions of men* synonymous with *the prejudices of the Protestant*, which, to say nothing of the absurdity of the idea, there is no evidence in the whole article of 'A Layman' to show was the meaning of the author." The jury, having retired for two minutes, return with the verdict in favour of "Lex Scripta."

To apply the above illustration, all that the reader has to do is to substitute the apostles and evangelists in place of "A Layman;" the writings of the New Testament in place of the third negative article; the early Fathers and the ecclesiastical historian Eusebius in place of the witness "Gregory"; and the Protestant public in the place of the editor and the readers of the *British Controversialist*. The first question raised is the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament Scriptures, and the number of books that should constitute the sacred canon. The witnesses to these facts are the early Fathers. From documentary evidence it is proved beyond all doubt that the New Testament, as it now stands, is what it purports to be, the whole written revelation of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Having obtained this testimony from the only competent witnesses that exist, we have, in these particulars, done with the Fathers. Now, at this stage of the inquiry the Roman Catholics step in, and declare that the *opinion* of those witnesses is absolutely necessary, to know in what sense particular passages in Scripture were and should be understood. To this the Protestant decidedly objects. He says, No; we have the Bible, grammars, and dictionaries; we

have eyes, and reason, and common sense; we have the text and the commentary; and we can judge whether God, in giving us a Rule of Faith and practice, did or did not intend those rules to be intelligible to mankind. No doubt it is interesting and instructive to learn how different Fathers interpreted different passages of Scripture. But we know that they not only contradict one another, but each one contradicts himself on matters of mere *opinion*. They are men like ourselves, and erred as we are liable. Their *opinion*, therefore, is not authoritative. We can prove they were honest men, and their *testimony to facts*, which we know from other sources were matters of public notoriety, we unhesitatingly receive.

We close our article by observing, that this course is not giving up our Rule of Faith. The reiteration of this absurd representation is simply an unwilling confession that the arguments advanced in the former discussion are unanswerable. Attempts have been repeated to mystify this plain question, and we have been forced to repeat the arguments, and add an illustration. Let each of our readers see to it, that he will have an answer in arguments and not bare assertions, to the statement that in appealing to the early Fathers as witnesses, for their *testimony to historical facts*, we do not abandon our Rule of Faith, namely, that the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants. LEX SCRIPTA.

Philosophy.

IS THE POETRY OF TENNYSON AS HEALTHY IN ITS TENDENCIES AS THAT OF LONGFELLOW?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It now becomes our duty to review the course of debate upon this interesting topic, and to reply to the articles which have been put forward by our opponents. The task, so far as a *reply* is concerned, might be disposed of summarily and in few words. We believe that our readers will almost unanimously admit that, whatever the real merits and true solution of the question at issue, and whatever the literary value of the different essays upon it which have appeared in these pages—anything like an attempt at relevant argument and reasoning has been entirely confined to the *affirmative* side of the debate. The writers on the negative side seem to have written under a depressing consciousness that there was little to be said in behalf of the opinions they undertook to maintain. Their whole tone is apologetic, tame, and spiritless, where it is not purely evasive. Their few arguments are nothing more than feints,—a show of reasoning on false issues, raised apparently in order to divert the attention. Whenever they venture to approach the

real question directly, they at once sink from argument to assertion. They push forward their own individual preferences with an engaging air of simplicity and innocence, that at once reminds us of the old rhyme,—

“ I do not like thee, Dr. Fell;
The reason why I cannot tell;
But this I know full well,
I do not like thee, Dr. Fell.”

To such a mode of argumentation, or rather to such a substitute for argument, we of course are not, in strict logic, bound to make any reply. Preferences, unless based on analysis, thought, and reasoning, can only be regarded as personal idiosyncracies and instincts of mind; and with these we have no concern in debate,—*de gustibus non est disputandum*. In the same way, when our opponents praise Tennyson highly, and Longfellow more highly, or, like “L'Ouvrier,” praise Longfellow, and roundly assert in a concluding paragraph that Tennyson has not the qualities for which Longfellow is praised; and when they proceed to ask us to accept this fancy painting as logical proof, or axiomatic truth needing no proof,—when, in short, they require of us to judge the two poets, not by a comparison of their merits, but by the eulogiums passed upon them, we might fairly remain silent. At best, a series of assertions cannot, as of right, demand any more specific reply than a general denial. As between our coadjutors and ourselves on the one side, and our opponents on the other, we might treat the debate as already at an end. If, indeed, victory alone were the aim of the literary encounters in these pages, we certainly should adopt this course. We should feel that we were wasting our efforts, so fighting as one that beateth the air, contending with opponents whose only aim is to evade us. The great value and mission of this Magazine, however, we believe to be the education it affords us in thinking justly and reasoning soundly, in tracing up the sophistries and fallacies which our minds are so apt either to lose themselves in when searching for the true and the right, or to take refuge in when confronted by unwelcome convictions. While, therefore, there may be no logical necessity for a reply, we may find moral and mental instruction in replicatory criticism. Our antagonists number amongst them names whose earnest and honest belief in the opinions they from time to time defend is beyond a shadow of doubt; it must, therefore, be instructive even to ourselves to investigate and criticize that which they have written, under the delusion that it was sound and pertinent reasoning. To this, then, conjointly with the endeavour to strengthen the affirmative side of the debate, we now address our efforts.

We have already pointed out that “Edmund” and H. G. actually change the subject of debate from an inquiry into the “healthy tendencies” of Tennyson’s and Longfellow’s poetry to a mere comparison of their “effect on the masses,” and their “influence for

good on the popular mind." Even then, to take advantage of this change, they have to assume that popularity is a proof of influence exerted by that which is popular. Herein is a marvellous medley of absurdity and of confusion in thought and ideas. Preference and admiration for a thing are treated as equivalent to active influence exerted by it. Area of extent over which influence may be exerted is put for intensity of effect in each individual case; and quantity is regarded as identical with, or at least as the measure of, quality and moral power. Tendency is assumed to be the same as effect! It is astonishing that such fallacies could be put forward. On such assumptions every principle of common sense would be upset. We should have to estimate the "healthy tendency" of everything by its tendency to gravitate, lodge, and diffuse itself amongst the most numerous classes. If dangerous disease seized upon us, and baffled the family doctor, we must not go to the eminent men of the profession, but to the parish doctor, who has ten times as many patients. If our property is in jeopardy, the advice of a retired Lord Chancellor should be forsaken, for that of any pettifogger who has a string of clients around his doors. The *Family Herald* may be doing, and we believe is doing, good, in winning the lower classes from the perusal of "Mysteries" and other immoral and mischievous publications, to a class of reading which is untainted with vice or irreligion, if not very instructive and elevating. But are we, on account of its enormous circulation, to be told that it is the *best* periodical for each of us individually,—that it would produce a healthier result on our mental and spiritual nature than the perusal of half-a-dozen of our best quarterly reviews and the *British Controversialist*, with *Macmillan's Magazine* and *Fraser* to boot. Or, to take an illustration from poetical literature; shall we pronounce "Oh, Susannah!" and "Lucy Neal" to be among the *chefs-d'œuvre* of love-songs, and of a healthier tendency than Burns' "Ae Fond Kiss" and "Mary Morrison"? Must we really estimate "Cheer Boys, Cheer," or "The Roast Beef of Old England," as worth more than Campbell's magnificent and heart-stirring national lyrics? Will "Edmund" and H. G. tell us that "Rule Britannia," and "The Red, White, and Blue," teach a healthier, higher patriotism and political wisdom than are to be found in those subtle, deep-thoughted, and large-hearted lyrics of Tennyson's, to which we alluded in a former paper, and which our friend "Anglo-Saxon" has quoted and so ably criticized (*supra*, pp. 33, 34)? But we waste space in dwelling on this aspect of the attempt made to change the debate to one on popularity. We must refer to our former remarks (pp. 392—394).

While we have shown the folly committed by "Edmund" and H. G., however, the illustrations we have given naturally suggest that the probable conclusions to be drawn from the fact of Longfellow's poetry appealing to a wider circle than that addressed by Tennyson, will, if logically traced out, throw some light upon our theme. Instead, therefore, of confusing and interchanging totally

distinct ideas as our opponents have done, let us endeavour to ascertain the relationship of mere popularity to literature. Remembering what human nature is,—ever prone to the practical and the present, to the neglect of that which is of higher import, the spiritual and future,—ever recoiling from the labour of thought and the burden of responsibility, and choosing by preference the beaten paths of habit,—not so much wanting in vigour and power of action as in perseverance and willingness,—comparatively seldom sinning from sheer ignorance, but from evil inclinations, or through fickleness of purpose or faintness of heart,—seeing and approving that which is good, but following that which is evil; can we do otherwise than suspect that popularity is an indication of that which is pleasant and commonplace, of the trite and obvious in the common course of life and events? Longfellow's poetry is doubtless calculated to strike the mind readily, and to excite enthusiasm, especially amongst numbers. He is so clear, plain, and practical, that we do not need to stop and think; he is so spirited in utterance that we catch the momentary fire of enthusiasm. He tells us old truths which we have always known, and which we generally acknowledge; we therefore "lend him our ears" at once, and assent to what he says. He tells us common things, and tells them perhaps better than they have ever been told before; so we again assent to his matter, and applaud his manner. Are we wiser? Certainly not. Are we *much* better—*permanently* better? It is hard to imagine so. We have not even been shown a new view or a new relationship of an old truth; we have only got it embalmed in amber. Take a man who believes in a future state, and who has often heard that solemn, tremendous query, "What shall it profit a man, if he should gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"—If that man is still careless, if he trifles away life without regarding its value and importance, can we, can any one, believe that he will be aroused and renovated by being told that

"Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal;
Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
Was not spoken of the soul."

If a man has become worse than lethargic—despondent, perplexed, and sceptical, will such a verse restore his faith? No! we admire the verse because it puts our usual belief into a terser, plainer, more musical shape than before. It arouses approbation and enthusiasm in an audience. We need and probably can find no better or more telling quotations for the lecture-room than Longfellow can supply. But is this all mankind need? Is it enough to draw from us a round of applause for that we already know, and habitually disregard, and to arouse a mere passing impulse of admiration? The truth is, that man is already too much a creature of impulse. The most melancholy class amongst us is the impulsive class, the class whom we often term "thoroughly

goodhearted," and describe as "nobody's enemies but their own"—people who are tender-hearted and well-meaning, open to every good and generous impulse, yet, alas! quite as open to the influence of temptation—miserably weak in principle, and wholly wanting in moral firmness. If we depend upon impulse, our characters will assuredly be such that we cannot depend upon ourselves, and those around us will feel they cannot calculate upon us. Social enthusiasm has its place and its uses, but we might almost dispense with it, if we only cultivated individual resolve, purpose, and firmness. We want adequate and permanent *motives* and springs of action dwelling within us, and not a mere temporary impress and excitement occasionally moving us from without. We need that our moral nature should be placed under influences which will combine with it, become a part of it, and thus tend to make it self-acting. Now this very want we believe is to be found in Tennyson. He can tell us a common truth as plainly, forcibly, and musically, as Longfellow; but if he does so, he at the same time places it in a new light and relationship, so that we see it in connection with human nature, and feel it as a part of our own consciousness, in such a manner that it has all the force of a living motive instead of an abstract truth. He tells us,—

"Howe'er it be, it seems to me,
 'Tis only noble to be good;
 Kind hearts are more than coronets,
 And simple faith than Norman blood."

Longfellow has nothing to surpass the plainness, earnestness, terseness, and beauty of this verse. But Tennyson employs it not as a mere precept. He paints before us the haughty, high-born Lady Clara, "the daughter of a hundred earls." We see her snares; we learn "some certain truths of her," till we feel deeply how little birth can atone for heartlessness and wrong. There she stands before us, humbled, for even "her pride is yet no mate for his"—the "foolish yeoman" whom she sought to snare; humbled, and worse than humbled, scorned with such scorn as only a Tennyson can embody at once in thought, in words, and in music. She, forsooth, is told that despite her wealth,—

"You are not one to be desired;"

that despite her ancestral honours—

"A simple maiden in her flower,
 Is worth a hundred coats-of-arms."

The "foolish yeoman," as he calls himself, can tell her, face to face,—

"For were you queen of all that is,
 I could not stoop to such a mind."

Even darker charges are hurled:—"the guilt of blood is at your door." We have studied this picture of human life, the nature and

results of two sins little regarded—the pride of birth and coquetry. With what personal force does the mocking appeal thus come!—

“Trust me, Clara Vere de Vere,
From yon blue heavens above us bent,
The grand old gardener and his wife
Smile at the claims of long descent.”

What power in that phrase—“the grand old gardener”! Then, as the verse we originally quoted occurs, how it comes home to the very heart’s core! How the “Howe’er it be”—the semblance of a doubt thrown in—intensifies the effect. But this is not enough for the poet. Goodness, kindness, faith—how are these to be sought and gained? The lesson is yet too bare, the truth even still too abstract for effect. The source of the sin is pointed out, and then the path of penitence suited to the case. The tone is changed. The verse no longer commences with the mocking, scornful “*Lady Clara Vere de Vere*,” nor with the plain, stern “*Clara Vere de Vere*” of the later verses: there is now a tone of pity mingling with the softened strain:—

“Clara,—Clara Vere de Vere,
If time be heavy on your hands,
Are there no beggars at your gate,
Nor any poor about your lands?
Oh! teach the orphan-boy to read,
Or teach the orphan-girl to sew,
Pray Heaven for a human heart,
And let the foolish yeoman go.”

We have thus criticized and dwelt on this little poem, not because we regard it as one of Tennyson’s finest productions, but as affording a comparison and contrast to Longfellow in his chosen style and character. We have here all those characteristics on which the advocates of Longfellow ring such continual changes, while we have much that is not to be met with in the writings of the American poet. The lesson is presented to us in such a form that we become identified with the dramatic circumstances with which it is linked. The wrong, the folly, the scorn and shame, the grand moral lesson applicable to and deducible from the case, the secret source of the crime, and the path of restoration and of moral cure, become, as it were, a part of our own experience. The lesson thus becomes engrained. The superiority of this to mere didactic directness is too evident to need enforcing.

It is plain, then, that Tennyson is superior to Longfellow when they meet on common ground. If he is less popular than his brother poet, it is because he has other aims and purposes, and pursues a different path. What is that different path? Our opponents admit that the two poets are equally pure in morals, that Tennyson is the greater artist, the deeper, subtler, and more refined thinker. There is no escape, therefore, from the conclusion, that the superior popularity, i. e., the wider circle, reached by Longfellow is owing to

the fact, that his genius and powers are inferior. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to assert that culture and elevation of imagination and mind are unhealthy; that shallowness, triteness, and superficiality are morally and spiritually more powerful and beneficial than deep reflection and thought; and that the greater the artist the less his power to teach us wisely and well,—we must inevitably look upon this question of the relative popularity of the two poets in question as one which, when thoroughly sifted, becomes conclusive in favour of Tennyson.

We have just used the terms *shallowness* and *superficiality*. We have already expressed our hearty admiration of Longfellow, and therefore, when we use these terms, it will, of course, be understood that we are pushing our argument to its ultimate consequences, and, as applied to the case before us, are speaking *relatively*, and not *absolutely*. Our opponents truly describe Longfellow as "simple," "earnest," "at home in the activities of life," and "in the common course of events." They cannot put forward higher claims for him, and try to balance matters by declaring Tennyson "morbid," "melancholic," "mystical," "metaphysical," &c. Let us examine these points. Longfellow never attempts to solve or to throw any light upon the deeper and darker problems of individual or social existence, but confines himself to the obvious and outward phases of life. Tennyson, on the other hand, is ever at grapple with our darkest doubts and sorest trials, with the deep things of the soul and of society. The one looks wholly at the material and present, or speaks of the hereafter simply as the trusting, happy child speaks of the unknown. The other glances far back into the past, and forwards into the future. The one will talk pleasantly with us by the way, cheer us when somewhat weary with the heat and burden of the day, sing to us and teach us simple lessons as we tarry at the house Beautiful. The other (as has been so happily said by "Anglo-Saxon") is our Great-heart—our friend, interpreter, guide, and guard. He will accompany us through the valley of the Shadow of Death, if our path lies through it. If "groanings are heard," "the ground shakes," and the "pilgrims are afraid," Great-heart will encourage them. It is not He who raises these dangers. "The pit and the great darkness are there." Maul, a giant, lurks in a cave by the path, and it may be that "the giant and Mr. Great-heart must fight." The contest may terrify us as we watch it, but is it not better to endure this terror than to risk the fate of Heedless? Is it wise to be terrified by the epithets "mystical" and "metaphysical" (vol. iii. p. 405)? Shall we join "L'Ouvrier," "Edmund," and H. G., in shrinking from every attempt to meddle with doubts and questions, and in trying to forget that such things exist? Let us take a lesson from old John Bunyan, and his inimitable allegory. The pilgrims, "being come to *By-path stile*," sat down and consulted whether they should attack Giant Despair. "So one said one thing, and another said the contrary. One questioned if it was lawful to go upon unconsecrated ground;

another said, they might; but Mr. Great-heart said, I will attempt the taking away of his life, and the demolishing of Doubting Castle. So they left the women in the road, and with them Mr. Feeble-mind and Mr. Ready-to-halt, with his crutches, to be their guard. So Mr. Great-heart, Old Honest, and the four young men, went to go up to Doubting Castle, to look for Giant Despair. Then fought they for their lives, and Giant Despair was brought down to the ground, and was very loth to die, but *Great-heart was the death of him*. Then fell they to demolishing Doubting Castle. They were seven days in destroying of that." The allegory is true to the letter, in the present instance. Because Tennyson turns out of the main road, crosses By-path stile, and goes to combat the giant, and to demolish Doubting Castle, the Ready-to-halts and Feeble-minds cry out against him, and tarry behind. When they tell us that Longfellow is so "simple" in his teaching, we reply that the failings, weaknesses, trials, temptations, sorrows, wants, and destiny of mankind are *not* simple,—that human nature is too deeply complex in itself—that life and consciousness are environed with mystery. He who can grapple with these difficulties, who can show sympathy with us when passing through them, and throw a light, however faint, which may cheer and guide us, is doing a great and holy work. His poems have the highest value that uninspired literature can have, and their tendency is the most healthy and beneficial possible. There is an infinite difference between Great-heart slaying Despair, and Prudence playing to the pilgrims in the Interpreter's house "on a pair of excellent virginals," and "turning *what they had seen* into an excellent song."

Be it remembered, too, that in its place, Tennyson can paint the purest, simplest, trusting faith. Look how exquisitely "life-like," tender, and true, the opening of the "Miller's Daughter,"—"I see the wealthy miller yet." Aye! and he is painted with the vividness of breathing life, in a picture never surpassed in the whole range of literature. But a shade falls across the speaker's mind; the old man is numbered with the dead; they have sorrowed over his grave, and yet—

"His memory scarce can make me sad."

No! but it suggests a deeper loss when that happy marriage union between the speaker and his sole listener shall be dissolved by death. Shall he utter the thought? He hesitates:—

"Yet fill my glass,—give me one kiss."

And now the whole must be outspoken, for in such love there are no concealments, no joys, and no regrets unshared:—

"My own sweet Alice, we must die."

Why should it be? Why should such affection be sundered,—such a chord be rent, such a sorrow be inevitable? The mystery is dark

—too deep for answer;—but the loving heart is strong in child-like faith and trust. What it knows not now, it shall know hereafter:—

“There’s somewhat in the world amiss
Shall be unriddled by and by;
 There’s somewhat flows to us in life,
 But more is taken quite away.
 Pray, Alice, pray my darling wife,
 That we may die the selfsame day.”

Here is no melancholy, no mysticism, no metaphysics, and no *evasion*. One of life’s mysteries and deepest trials is fairly met, frankly acknowledged, and exquisitely treated. An equal parallel from Longfellow cannot be produced. We have again a proof that Tennyson is superior to his brother poet in his own special vein. We see that while the latter confines himself to a single phase of human life and experience—the outward, sentimental, gentle, and tender,—the former deals with life in *all* its phases, and the soul in *all* its moods.

There are many interesting points, all conclusive in favour of Tennyson, to which we might advert; we can only allude to two. There is that gradual development of power, and moral plan and purpose, that unity of design and progressive teaching, which marks Tennyson’s successive works. It is with great pleasure that we refer on this point to the admirable essay of our most able ally, “Anglo-Saxon” (*supra*, pp. 33—36). Nothing of this kind is to be found in Longfellow. His last long poem (“Miles Standish”) has less of moral teaching than almost any of its predecessors. “Hiawatha” is only a picture,—it has no pretence to teaching.

Again, Longfellow is the poet-moralist of everyday life and society. His allusions to Christianity are frequent, but we cannot speak of him as a Christian teacher. Plato, Aristotle, and Seneca, would teach us all he teaches us; for it is morality alone that is necessary for everyday outward life and intercourse. But we claim for Tennyson the higher honour, and the better office, of a great Christian thinker and teacher. He is, in an especial manner, the poet of the inner spiritual life of man of the age, and, as such, he has embodied in his work not the form and vocabulary, but the essence and spirit of Christianity. We have already (vol. iii. p. 461) pointed out that the very Gospel of Christ—redeeming love—is taught in beautiful allegory in “Guinevre.” The theme is too large to discuss farther now. Both “Anglo-Saxon” (pp. 34, 35, *supra*) and ourselves (vol. iii., p. 401—402) have briefly touched on the spirituality and deep Christianity of “In Memoriam,” where the wail of sorrow swells into the anthem of faith. Is there anything more sublime than the description there given of the struggle? True, it leaves—as the human intellect must to the end of time leave—many dark riddles unsolved; but it is a grand lesson when we watch a great and glorious soul, which, when foiled in the attempt to *know*, rests confident in *faith*, and even recognizes in these mysteries—

"The world's great *altar-stairs*,
That slope *through darkness* up to God."

That, surely, is christian faith in its highest form. We might give many other illustrations,—the "Vision of Sin," the "Two Voices," and others;—we will confine ourselves to one. What is the "Palace of Art" but a modern Ecclesiastes—teaching us the curse which falls upon selfish pride of intellect, the vanity of all earthly joys and possessions, and their emptiness—the impossibility that the things of sense and powers of mind can fill the whole soul? Never was "lordly pleasure house" so wondrously imagined and described; never was the misery of self-sufficient and self-deceiving soul so vividly presented—misery deepening fearfully, until—

"She howled aloud, 'I am on fire within!

There comes no murmur of reply!

What is it that will take away my sin,

And save me lest I die?"

"So when four years were wholly finished,

She threw her royal robes away;

'Make me a cottage in the vale,' she said,

'Where I may mourn and PRAY!'"

Have we such teaching in Longfellow? Emphatically we say, "No."

We have now fully answered every assertion and argument which has been, either directly or by implication, brought against Tennyson by "Edmund," H. G., and "L'Ouvrier," and have, at the same time, done something to strengthen our own case. We cannot, however, forbear calling especial attention to the article of our veteran opponent, "L'Ouvrier." Skilled as he is in controversy, he professes to settle the present debate in three pages. We have a definition of poetry which, by the way, applies equally to painting, to the highest class of prose fiction, biography, to music, sculpture, and the fine arts generally. We are told that poetry is "the blushing forth of transcendent truth and beauty," and that Longfellow is simple, earnest, nature-like, &c., whence it appears that transcendency is something like equivalent to ordinary! Poetry delights "in beauty and sublimity," and Longfellow's peculiarity is "beauty *rather than* sublimity." This is the mode of proving Longfellow to be more healthy in his influence than Tennyson! "L'Ouvrier" defines a great poet; *asserts* Longfellow to answer to *half* his definition; never utters a word about Tennyson, and then cries out, *q. e. d.* He next praises Longfellow (vol. iii. p. 403); and we assent to all he says, merely adding, but "greater than all this is Tennyson." We *have* given reasons for saying so, and "L'Ouvrier" has *not* given reasons for denying it. We have then a comment on the "Psalm of Life," but nothing to hint that Tennyson has not done as well; whereas we have shown that in the same vein he can do *better*. A criticism on "Excelsior" follows. It is "the out-

spoken feeling of the century." We admit that it is so. It is an admirable picture, but it is *not* a lesson. Taken by itself, every stanza suggests "whither?" and "why?" There is self-sacrifice without a purpose. When he has planted his banner on the snow-crowned height, he has gained a barren victory, and must perish alone, or wearily retrace the downward path. As a painting of energy overcoming difficulty, the poem is beyond all praise,—it is nothing more. "L'Ouvrier" next points us to the wooing of "Hiawatha." Does he mean to say there is anything really uncommon, unless it be in the association of such delicacy and purity with the loves of a youth with "painted face" and "flaunting feathers," and a maiden whose home is an Indian wigwam? It is really preposterous to suppose that the quotations he gives us are sufficient to prove Longfellow a greater teacher than he who has written "Dora," "Love and Duty," "The Gardener's Daughter," "The Miller's Daughter," "The Lady Clare," "The Lord of Burleigh," and "Maud." One half suspects that the real "L'Ouvrier" has been caricatured by some one who has stolen his *nom de plume*. The next theme of praise is, however, little better. "Miles Standish" is set up for admiration, as a healthy model, beyond all that Tennyson ever wrote! Why, the hero, John Alden, strong enough in generosity to go and woo his heart's beloved for another, is yet foolish enough not to attempt any explanation either with his friend or his lover! He tamely submits to reproaches of treachery on one side, and remains stolidly silent, in spite of declarations of love, on the other. He resolves to make the misery of all three perpetual by running away, and looks to the "green churchyard" as the sole solution of his troubles. If this be "natural" it is a very weak and contradictory specimen of nature. Again, "L'Ouvrier" speaks of "the retiring modesty of the heroine." Now it may not be a moral duty to act like Juliet, who—

"never told her love;
But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud,
Feed on her damask cheek;"

but we really cannot congratulate the young lady who—

"Said, in a tremulous voice, 'Why don't you speak for yourself, John?'"

on her peculiarly retiring disposition. Priscilla was anything but bashful in the way of making advances, and urging her love upon one who had not declared himself her lover. Was it leap-year? or did she wear a scarlet petticoat? Truly "L'Ouvrier" is not happy in his selections.

We now turn, in conclusion, to pluck a crow with our particularly three-cornered friend, "Delta." "Having shown," he says (page 39), "that B. S. has not proved Tennyson to be the most healthy in the tendency of his poetry, we by implication prove that Longfellow's poetry is the most healthy." B. S. respectfully declines the honour

put upon him. He is *not* the greatest logician, nor the most eminent critic now living, and, therefore, when *he* fails to establish a proposition, it does *not* follow, "by implication," that everybody else would fail, and that the converse of the proposition is true. Surely an essay, concluding with such an absurd "implication" as that just quoted, might be very fairly reviewed and dismissed in a sentence—"the end thereof is foolishness." If "Delta" has convicted B. S. of "false logic and rhetoric," he has not advanced Longfellow's claims one whit. For anything that appears from his article, Tennyson may have written a metrical treatise on the quadrature of the circle, and Longfellow be the author of the "Loves of the Triangles." We cannot gather whether "Delta" ever read either poet. B. S. supports Tennyson; B. S. argues badly; therefore Longfellow's poetry is the more healthy. Surely, of the two, "Delta" must be a worse logician than B. S.

The truth is, "Delta's" article is a personal controversy with B. S., and, with the reader's leave, shall be briefly answered as such. "Delta" accuses B. S. of "contradictions," &c. Surely he is not the man to make this charge, for he tells us (page 36), "we were pleased with the paper of B. S.;" that he thinks the said paper is "far from dry and uninteresting" (page 37); and yet that it is full of "contradictions," "contrary assertions," "false logic and rhetoric," and "fallacies," and one in which no "confidence can be placed." May not B. S. justly reply, *Tu quoque*, when thus assailed by a writer who takes pleasure and interest where he finds neither confidence nor reason? But to the contradictions he finds. He says (page 37) that the debate is limited "to the comparative healthiness of the poetry of our two authors," and that "*this form*" of the question "implies that both are great poets,—accomplished masters of the musical concatenation of words." Then, if healthiness implies a great poet of great musical skill, *a fortiori*, the greater the poet, and the greater his musical skill, the healthier will be his poetry. Yet, because B. S. argues instead of "implying," "Delta" turns round and contradicts his own implication, in order to condemn B. S.'s argument. "It is not for us to discuss" which poet has the greater metrical power, &c., &c. "Delta" proceeds (p. 37) to prove that the emotions produced by word music are subjective in their origin and not objective. Of course, all *emotions* must be subjective, for they are states of our being. B. S. never denied so obvious a truth; nay, he even incidentally mentioned it (vol. iii. pp. 243, 244, and 248). "Delta" next (p. 37) quotes two sentences to show that B. S. first asserts and then denies that poetry addresses the intellect. The assumed contradiction exists in one sentence, where B. S. says that the object of poetry "is the creation of intellectual pleasure, by addressing primarily the imagination and feelings rather than the intellect." B. S. regrets that, writing under circumstances which allowed him no time for revision, this clumsy expression escaped attention. He ought to have used another adjective. He meant, as the sentence shows, to point out the

pleasures which are not of the bodily senses merely, but emotional, spiritual, or soul pleasures. He used "intellectual" as we do in saying, "Man is a physical and intellectual being," *i. e.*, as a generic term for all our non-material faculties. He admits his error frankly. The intellect, properly so called, is capable of neither pain nor pleasure. B. S., however, did not print intellectual in *italics*, as "Delta" has been compelled to do in order to add colour to his objection; nor does he believe that one reader in fifty has misunderstood his meaning. He pleads guilty (at the bar of small criticism) of a verbal carelessness; reminding "Delta" that his Latin, *ex sui oro*, would stand small chance, either etymologically or syntactically, before the same tribunal. In his next paragraph (p. 38) "Delta" carefully argues that "man, being a moral agent," the healthiness or otherwise of human influence must be judged "by moral considerations only," and states that B. S. "is at considerable pains" to show that "as a poet, intellectual [*i. e.* spiritual] pleasure is the true test of healthy tendency." B. S. does *not* argue anything of the kind. He argues (vol. iii. p. 245), that (spiritual) "pleasure cannot be refined and permanent without being moral." He declares (vol. iii. pp. 246, 247) that while "the *secret and source* of a poet's influence" lies in his being "a minister to our pleasures, still the "amount of his influence for good," *i. e.*, its healthiness, depends "on the way he exercises his powers, and the thoughts he invests with the graces of poetry." In other words, B. S. said that the power to please decides the relative power, greatness, and influence of a poet; and that "having thus gauged the power of influence" of each of two poets, we must next ascertain *how* they used it, in order to determine the relative healthiness of their works; for, he adds, "all *resulting* moral influence is a combination of the active power and moral quality of the influence actually exerted." "Delta" finds here "contradictions" and "fallacies," "chameleon versatility," &c. It is just as if we said, "The sanitary value of a medical drug is the result of (1) its power, and (2) its quality." "Delta" would interpose,—"No: sanitary value does not depend on power, for poisons are powerful," and when the sentence was finished, he would turn round and say,—"There! you said it was power, and now you say it is quality; you contradict yourself." If "Delta" *will* blunder thus, if he really *cannot* put two ideas together to form a third, if he *will* regard combination as the same as contradiction, B. S. is not to blame. He can only say with Coleridge, *Intelligenda non intellectum adfero*. "Delta" then (p. 39) speaks of B. S.'s *sang froid* in dismissing the intellectual comparison between Tennyson and Longfellow, as poets, *currente calamo*. He forgets that the "flying pen" nevertheless devotes two pages to a brief review of Tennyson's metrical power as compared with that of Longfellow. Moreover, when B. S. wrote his first paper, arguing that it was necessary to the debate to determine which was the greater poet, he could not foresee that his opponents would admit the metrical, artistic, and intellectual superiority of

Tennyson; when he found this to be the fact, he naturally thought he need not prove at length that which opponents even granted,—that he might fairly quote their admissions, and pass on *currente calamo*. "Delta" finally, in the second paragraph of p. 39, strings his objections together in a firstly, secondly, thirdly, and fourthly. They gain no new force by this repetition, and, therefore, need no further notice. We think the corners of our triangular friend have now been so far rubbed down, that he will fit into a round hole of the smallest dimensions.

With sincere acknowledgments to C. B. N. and to "Anglo-Saxon" for the powerful support rendered in their essays, and apologizing for the many imperfections in our own treatment of the great theme, we now make our bow. The issue and the verdict are with the readers. Let them judge. B. S.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN the opening article of this debate we stated our reasons for taking the negative side. We then endeavoured to show upon what grounds our decision in favour of Longfellow was based. We did not claim for him higher rank as a Poet, or assert that, as a thinker, he was superior to Tennyson. On the contrary, it was frankly admitted that he would not well bear the comparison, either for "depth of imagination, or breadth of view; for delicacy of diction, or subtlety of thought." In only one respect did we consider him to be entitled to a higher place, that being *the healthier tendencies of his poems*.

By the question itself we are limited to this one point. It is not asked which is the greater poet? but which exercises the better influence? We think it is altogether irrelevant to the present discussion, which has to do with the effect of their writings *only*, to give an elaborate essay upon the nature of poetry itself, or a rhapsody upon the music of verse.

We are aware our opponents think otherwise, and object to be confined within the narrow boundaries assigned to them. B. S., indeed, says that, "considered *per se*, the attempt to determine whether Tennyson or Longfellow exerts the healthier influence on the mind is all but valueless" (p. 392); and is of opinion that we might as well occupy our time by discussing "the relative alimentary value of beef and mutton." Notwithstanding, B. S. has thought fit to occupy eighteen or nineteen pages in a debate which has professedly no other object than the one he ridicules. He maintains, also, that the inquiries to which his first article was devoted were absolutely necessary; and persisting in regarding the question as one involving an accurate estimate of the relative poetic power of Tennyson and Longfellow, devotes the greater part of his second to prove what he acknowledges his opponents have never disputed, viz., that Tennyson is the greater of the two. On p. 392 he tells us, "We might as well pretend to have a geometry without definitions, and a system of algebra without the foundation idea of quantity, as

to judge between the influence of two poets, without ever settling in our own mind what poetry is; how it is to be judged; and how its effects are to be estimated." To have made the analogy complete, he should have said, "We cannot judge between the *influence* of two poets without settling in our own mind what *influence* is."

Influence is felt, and does not depend for its power upon our understanding how it is exerted. There is in this a confusion of ideas which runs all through his article. To say that we cannot appreciate the influence of a poet without first clearly defining what poetry is, its nature and office, is as absurd as to say we cannot be swayed by the eloquence of a speaker without understanding oratory; or be knocked down by a pugilist without being acquainted with the laws of boxing.

Does B. S. imagine that, without a correct theory, it would be impossible for a poor seamstress to feel the pathos of the "Song of a Shirt?" Will he deny that an "unfortunate" might recognize the tender humanity of the "Bridge of Sighs" without having read his article in the April number?

Passing from this, B. S. attacks H. G. for making his own experience a test of the influence of Tennyson and Longfellow. At first sight this may seem a fallacious ground upon which to rest our verdict; but it is not so. Do we not make ourselves the standard by which we judge of the feelings of others? We know only so much of our neighbour's heart as we have learnt from our own. That which moves us we expect to exert a corresponding power over our fellows.

If, therefore, we are conscious of a strengthening, elevating influence in a man's works, we have some reason for supposing a similar effect is produced upon all who read them. Of course, not absolutely the same; it will be modified or increased, according to the nature upon which it operates; but our hearts are, in their larger characteristics, so fashioned alike, that whatsoever is true, lovely, and of good report, reaches all who are not degraded or debased.

B. S. objects to the fact of Longfellow's influence being more extensive than that of Tennyson being urged as a point in his favour; and in opposing this argument, takes occasion to insinuate that it is only from want of intellect that any prefer the former. That he feels somewhat contemptuous towards those who do, may be inferred from his query on page 395, where, speaking of a comparison between them, as to the way in which they have used their power, he asks:—"Can any one doubt what must and will be the unanimous verdict of every person *competent* to form an opinion?" We do not think that the number of persons influenced by either one or the other determines the question. We would not settle it by universal suffrage,—the same objection applying to that principle in things literary as in things political,—that for the right use of it, education and taste are required, which all do not possess. But still we consider the fact that Longfellow does gain

a wider audience, even among those who have the requisites for a right judgment, ought to be allowed some weight. Besides, there is reason to doubt the *healthiness* of that which has nothing in common with the generality, and makes for itself, by its own exclusiveness, a narrow circle. And this we think to be the case, in some degree, with Tennyson's poetry.

But we pass on to notice a remark of B. S., in which he endeavours to ward off the argument which has been derived from the mystical, uncertain, indistinct teaching of his favourite poet, by declaring that "The aim of a poet is not direct teaching; and the more closely he attempts this, the more prosaic he will be" (page 398). We partly agree with B. S. as regards the aim of most poets, but would remind him again that it is not the poet's aim, but his influence, we are discussing. He goes on, however, to say what we cannot agree with:—"No great poet has ever professed to be catechist and lecturer to humanity." Does B. S. mean to say that Isaiah, and the author of Job, were not great poets? Perhaps, in accordance with his definition on page 243, he will deny that their writings are poetry at all, as they are usually printed as prose.

In a previous article we expressed ourselves in doubt as to the influence of "Maud," inasmuch as it contains fantastic passages, which, if accepted from so high a poet as his own convictions, would be very detrimental. To this, B. S. replies, "that it is the very nature of dramatic writing that we should find the truth and the conclusions in the result of the whole. Did Shakespeare believe with Hamlet, or not? Did he mean to say he would have killed Desdemona?" &c. (page 400.) This, instead of being a conclusive answer, is an argument on our side. B. S. thinks we ought to find the truth in the result of the whole. Our objection to "Maud" was, that after a careful reading of the whole, it was difficult to know what Tennyson intended it to teach. No such difficulty exists with regard to the plays of Shakespeare or the poems of Milton, which B. S. refers to. In them it is apparent with whom the sympathy of the poet goes; but in Tennyson's "Maud" it is not. If B. S. had not felt this, he might have more effectually replied to our stricture by explaining that most perplexing poem, or he might have had recourse to his dictum,—"The aim of the poet is not direct teaching." In this case it certainly is not.

We offer the above remarks in reply to the most important objections that have been brought forward to our view of the question. There are others which would have been noticed, if space permitted; but we hope enough has been said on both sides to place the question before the impartial reader, to whose judgment we confidently leave the decision.

EDMUND.

History.

WAS JOAN OF ARC AN IMPOSTOR?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

CHALLAMEL, in his *History of France*, affirms that Joan of Arc was simply in the state of hallucination; or, in other words, a self-deluded automaniac, acting upon the superstitious tendencies of friends and foes by the power of pretended spiritual communications, the offspring of her own delirious flights of fancy.

We refer to the closing sentences of our opening paper, (p. 328, vol. iii. New Series) as indicating the true position of this question. We there say, that "Joan of Arc claimed to have received authority and power from intercourse with a supernatural being she calls St. Michael, by which she achieved deeds of daring which any ordinary mortal, possessing equal energy of character, might have successfully accomplished without such supernatural assistance; while the existence and appearance of that personage is grave matter for doubt,—in fact, is nowhere proven. Therefore, Joan of Arc was an impostor, or one who pretended to that which was not." In disproof of this position not one argument or valid reason has been assigned by our opponents, as we now proceed to show.

G. A. H. E., p. 330, gives, as the first test of her supernatural powers, the address she makes to Charles in his disguise; a feat, we imagine, readily performed by any one perfectly unskilled in court life. Where is the person of either sex in our own land, who would not readily recognize our beloved Queen and her worthy Consort in any assembly, however dressed, especially if that interview were chosen in the royal presence chamber? But G. A. H. E., on this occasion, puts into the lips of Joan this remarkable language:—"Most noble Lord Dauphin, I am Joan, the maid sent in behalf of God to aid you in your kingdom; and, by His command, I announce to you that you shall be crowned in the city of Rheims, and shall become His lieutenant in the kingdom of France." Again he says, p. 331, when she was examined by the doctors of theology, she addressed them:—"I know neither A nor B, but I am commanded by my voices, in behalf of the King of Heaven, to raise the siege of Orleans, and to crown the dauphin at Rheims;" and after the course of events had shown the accomplishment of these promises, not by any superhuman means, but by the vigorous efforts of the soldiers, excited to emulate her bravery, all of which was perfectly natural and human, she is made (p. 332) to say, "I wish that the gentle king would allow me to return towards my father and mother, keep my flocks and herds as before, and do all things as I was wont to do."

Upon these speeches of Joan our friend, G. A. H. E., assumes

that she was not an impostor. If such could be a truly valid reason, then success in the achievement of any bold promise of a rash nature, where the name of God is invoked by the villain or visionary, would be proof positive of merit, and entitle the cut-throat and the maniac to canonization. Beyond the speeches and the assumption, G. A. H. E. offers no argument. Lest the rhetoric with which these assumptions and speeches are placed before the reader should have magnified them beyond their real worth, we will offer a few remarks on the speeches, to show the fallacy of the assumption, and, by consequence, the unsound logic of our friendly opponent.

Joan, in these speeches, claimed—1st. To have been sent by God; 2ndly. To have been endowed with supernatural power; 3rdly. To prophecy that the dauphin should be crowned by herself in the city of Rheims; and, 4thly. She acknowledged *the king's authority only* to limit or continue the work to which, as she alleged, she had been commanded by God.

We may fairly assume that these speeches are really and truthfully Joan's own, as G. A. H. E., her advocate, affirms; to suppose otherwise, were to make that writer guilty of literary suicide—guilty of putting into the lips of his heroine words she had not uttered, merely to make her the object of ridicule. Respecting her claim to the Divine mission, we have only her own assertion; if further evidence were in existence, surely G. A. H. E. would have produced it, in her support. Such being the case, that this claim rests on her unsupported assertion, we would inquire, Do the circumstances of the case render the direct interference of God, and the special revelation of that interference to an ignorant and obscure female, probable, necessary, or wise, as having relation to the moral government and providential arrangements of an all-wise, beneficent Deity? We submit this question seriously to the thoughtful reader, and would suggest, that to our mind it appears little short of the most daring impiety of which a human being can be guilty, to assume a Divine commission, or to affirm that another has rightly and truthfully assumed a Divine commission, under such questionable circumstances. It must be remembered, as S. F. T. has shown, p. 408, that all Europe was the theatre of impostures of a kindred nature for ages, to most of which none but candidates for Bethlehem Hospital would give the least credence. It is true—

"God moves in a mysterious way
His wonders to perform;"

but all His works show unmistakeable signs of skill, wisdom, and adaptability of means to the required end. Let it not be objected that God has sent His servants in times past to work His wonders in the earth, and why not in the case of Joan? But in every truly Divine mission there is evidence above and beyond the mere assertion of the person sent. God is more apparent in the mission than the instrument chosen for the work; in fact, the finger of God is seen tracing upon the wall the work He is accomplishing, and the

person sent is entirely lost in the awful presence of the wonderful working of God himself. It matters not, as we shall subsequently see, to object that Joan believed herself to be the messenger of God; the facts adduced by our opponents conclusively prove the assumption of Joan to be daring blasphemy.

Let us be understood as speaking seriously. We feel strongly, and the importance of the principle involved should make every professing Christian to think, feel, and speak firmly, forcibly, and with great care. It is an awful thing to make God the foster-father to all our daring wishes and desires, or to approve of and idolize our fellow-mortal for daring to speak as God's mouthpiece, and act as His instrument irreverently and falsely.

She claimed supernatural powers. Her assertions surely can entitle her to no credence in this respect; the tendency of her daring, united to the superstitious influence her pretensions exercised in her favour, were the efficient causes of her success, and are to be accounted for by the well-recognized principles of psychological science, without supernatural assistance. She assumed to be sent by God, and endowed with supernatural powers for a specific object; the superstitious ignorance of the people induced them to receive her according to her pretensions; they believed in her mission; that belief created confidence, gave fresh vigour to their efforts; they expected success, and worked with hearty goodwill to achieve that success: the result was perfectly natural, and they succeeded. An entirely different series of circumstances resulted from her pretensions in their influence upon the minds of her foes: in the former case, confidence of success was produced; but in the latter, superstitious dread of her supernatural power, and of her assumed Divine mission, induced timidity, fear, terror, weakness, and expected defeat. Hence defeat was realized to one party and success gained by the other—the sole causes being, what is termed in military language the relative strength or weakness of the *morale* of the contending armies, superinduced by the pretensions of Joan. The whole, so far from being proof of supernatural power, is simply a psychological fact, the result of a natural law.

She is made by G. A. H. E. to say that she was "commanded on behalf of the King of Heaven to crown the king at Rheims." This implies one of two things; either she was to crown the king with her own hands, or to cause him to be crowned as a result of her supernatural power. The king was crowned by the archbishop, therefore she did not crown the king with her own hands; and we have seen that nothing of a supernatural character was manifested in the successes of the French army, nor in the defeats of the English army; therefore the coronation of the king was a result of military success and State policy, neither of which were supernatural, however much they might have been brought about by Joan's conduct and assumptions. At the outset of her public career she alleges the command of Heaven to the work, and yet she is made

by G. A. H. E. to accord the power to the king, either to continue, limit, or even entirely to terminate her Divine mission. These are positions as contradictory as language can express. God commands to a mission; and yet the person sent appeals to a fellow being for permission to forsake the mission of God: this fact stamps the whole of Joan's pretensions as the grossest imposition it is possible for the ingenuity of man to invent.

We shall now offer a few observations on the chief arguments of subsequent writers:—"Bennett" says that imposition is "an acted or unacted lie;" and a deceiver is "he that *knows* he *deceives*," and in this lies the *guilt* of the *action*." And W. H. P. observes, "The impostor must be aware she is deceiving, or she is not an impostor." In the first place, we shall show the impossibility of Joan having been self-deceived; and secondly, that self-deception does not relieve the impostor of her guilt. She represents herself, or at least is represented by her advocates in this debate, as having had authority from heaven, as being commissioned by God, as instructed and authorized by voices or spiritual agencies. Now we have seen by the facts of history that these assertions of hers have only her own authority to support them; no one else was cognizant of them. We have also seen that supernatural communications were not only very improbable, but about this time many extraordinary deceptions were popular, which none but Bedlamites would now believe; pretension to supernatural power and spiritual communications appear then to have been a superstitious idiosyncrasy of the age. Going still further, we have seen that all the phenomena attending the history of Joan, public and private, are to be accounted for by known psychological laws. Aggregating these facts as cumulative evidence, we are convinced of the impossibility of Joan being self-deceived; self-deception, even if practicable, could not be a valid relief from the guilt of imposition or the successful deception of others. Truth is objective as a thing extraneous to humanity; a fact is a fact, whether we believe it to be as another represents it or not. The fact or falsity in question now is simply this:—Was Joan inspired, commissioned, or commanded by God, by heaven, by St. Michael, or by spiritual voices, to accomplish a certain work, or not? If she was, she was not an impostor, and the *onus probandi* that she was divinely authorized lay upon our opponents, and so far from having accomplished their task, we find them confessing, in the words of W. H. P., that "she was not inspired." Hence, out of the mouths of her own advocates is Joan condemned as an impostor, verifying the old adage, "Save her from her friends, from her foes she could defend herself." Our opponents having confessed to the falsity of Joan, they prove her an impostor, her self-deception notwithstanding. Could we believe that self-deception were no imposture, according to our opponents, then Joan was a lying self-deceiver, worthy of canonization for the success of her deception, because there is no midway between the two extremes: if Joan was not an impostor, she was a

martyred saint, and worthy of the highest admiration. If self-deception makes the lie a truth when communicated to others, then every monomaniac and half-witted imbecile is worthy of our highest esteem and most reverential regard, and every crazy inmate of our lunatic asylums, who believes himself or herself to be a monarch, is worthy of all the homage due to royalty. The egregious absurdity of the thing is so glaring, that we are almost persuaded we are removed back to the fifteenth century, or else that we have, by the suggestion of this debate, exhumed the fossilized remains of the dark ages and given life to them; but as we have no relish for the fate of Frankenstein, we have brought them to the touchstone of truth, and have exhibited them to the logic and reason of the British Controversialists, who will, doubtless, consign all such antiquated superstitions and stolid logic as exhibited by the pro-Joanites to the limbo of oblivion, *in secula seculorum*. *Requiescat in pace.*

Thus, when Joan and her mission are stript of the gorgeous pageantry of State-craft, denuded of the sepulchral ceremonies of priestcraft, and forsaken by the paraphernalia of military glory, they become a miserable patch of filthy rags, the blackest blasphemy ever conceived by the polluted mind of the monkish visionary in the dark ages of ignorance and superstition.

Upon these premises we feel ourselves warranted in pronouncing Joan of Arc an impostor.

L'OUVRIER.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE story of Joan of Arc is one of those of which we are permitted to know only a portion of the facts; and it is the absence of the details requisite to form a complete memoir which constitutes the difficulty we have to encounter in the consideration of such a question as the present. In this instance, however, we know sufficient to enable us to arrive at definite and sensible conclusions; and though several incidents in the narrative at first sight bear a somewhat contradictory appearance, we submit that a careful and candid investigation will show them to be perfectly reconcilable. As an illustration, it will be observed, in contrast to our statement, that at the time Joan was first impressed with the idea of the "visions," she was engaged in attending to the domestic concerns of her parents, or in guarding the flocks which belonged to them. "L'Ouvrier" states she was employed as servant at an inn; and, from being accustomed in such capacity to ride the horses of the guests to water, she learnt the art of horsemanship. The real facts are these:—At the period of which we write, the greater part of France was distracted by the faction which arose upon the death of Charles VI., between the Armagnacs, as the adherents of the rightful heir to the throne were called, and the Burgundians, or those who espoused the cause of the rival aspirant for the regency, John, Duke of Burgundy. The inhabitants of the village where Joan resided belonged to the royalist party; and upon one occasion

"a party of Burgundian cavalry drove them with their families and flocks from their peaceful homes, and compelled them to take refuge elsewhere. The family of Arc found shelter in an hostelry at Neufchateau, a town which, belonging to the Duke of Lorraine, was safe from aggression. Here they remained fifteen days, during which it is just probable that Joan, as some return for the hospitality and protection afforded, assisted, as is supposed; and this conjecture is the only foundation for the story of Joan having been servant at an inn, a statement first made by a chronicler of the Burgundian faction," and always repeated (when used at all) in the same vindictive spirit which originally prompted the record.

The chief embarrassment with our opponents seem to have had has been in deciding the first, perhaps the main point, involved in the discussion, viz., the meaning of the term "impostor." The simple definition of the great lexicographer, with which we started, appears to have been rejected in favour of a more elaborate interpretation; and we cannot help remarking the fact in each case, that the more laboured the description is, the more abstruse and obscure is the explanation. Thus, A. J. transcribes the words of the *Imperial Dictionary*, evidently believing it a greater authority than Johnson, *especially when the sentence is italicized*; but we think he might have avoided the trouble, for the quotation does not serve him at all. Joan of Arc was certainly not a religious "impostor;" her object was rather a political than a religious one; neither did she "falsely pretend to an extraordinary commission from heaven," as we hope to prove satisfactorily, before we finish.

"L'Ouvrier" tells us (p. 326), that it was "the feeling of true patriotism which fired her indignation against the enemies of her country;" and yet he closes his article by declaring (p. 328) that "Joan of Arc was an impostor." Did any one ever hear of a PATRIOTIC IMPOSTOR before? The mere thought is absurd; the very words are ludicrous in their connection; and yet this is the substance of the opening affirmative paper. "An impostor," animated with "the feeling of true patriotism," would be a special novelty at any time; how much more so in an age when, generally speaking, men were intent only on extending their own individual power, increasing their own individual wealth, or contributing to their own personal pleasures, and when this episode stands prominently forward, as at once the brightest and blackest spot, on one of the darkest pages of French history.

In continuation of the argument, it may be interesting to look for a moment at the character and career of a *real* impostor,—one, too, whose performances are to be found related in the same annals as those which record the achievements of Joan of Arc. We refer to Law, the originator of the Mississippi scheme. Here was a man, a notoriously professed gambler, who, having wasted the best part of his life, and the whole of his means, in a reckless and uninterrupted course of dissipation, sought by means of a monstrous swindle to enrich himself at the expense of his victims. Was this

"the feeling of true patriotism"? Was he so actuated when he propounded his bubble contrivances for replenishing an empty exchequer, but by which only his own position, for the time being, was improved, while thousands were ruined, and the national debt of France augmented one-half? How different is the opposite case. The private character of Joan was unimpeachable from the moment when she entered upon the scene of action until she quitted it for ever. The propositions she submitted to the government of the day were designed for the benefit of the country, and were eminently successful. The "filthy lucre," which was the idol of Law, had no charms for the Maid; and the honours and rewards which he coveted were spurned by her. Is it difficult to decide, then, which was the patriot, and which the impostor?

But this is not the only inconsistency which the reasoning of "L'Ouvrier" exhibits. In the last paragraph of the paper contributed by him he endeavours to make out a case against the Maid, by doubting, or affecting to doubt, the existence of any such personage as St. Michael, and, perforce, the improbability of his having appeared to her. He then goes on to argue that, unless her friends prove such existence, that Joan must *of necessity* be guilty of imposition. We would, however, remind "L'Ouvrier" that Joan spoke more of Saints Catherine and Margaret than of St. Michael; and we think it would be equally logical for us to require "L'Ouvrier" to show that Joan never did have "visions," as for us to be called upon to prove that she was so favoured. Indeed, he might just as rationally demand a proof of the angel's appearance to Balaam's ass—both statements resting upon much the same kind of evidence, the only difference being that one event is recorded in ancient, and the other in modern history: and we all know there are some persons who quite as conscientiously disbelieve the one testimony as the other.

Further, if Joan of Arc is to be denounced as an impostor, because she believed in "visions" and supernatural agencies, some of the greatest names in the history of the world must bear a similar imputation. The great Napoleon believed in "a star;" and his nephew is so far susceptible in this respect, that we are told he goes to war for "an idea." Lord Castlereagh relates that a fire spirit once appeared to him in a bedroom of a noble mansion; and Socrates had a demon as his adviser. Ignatius Loyola, whom the sternest Protestant would not call a weak man, saw the Trinity in Unity on the steps of the church of St. Dominic, communed with the Virgin Mary, and beheld the Saviour with mortal eyes. Are we then to deny the right to indulge in similar fancies, if so disposed, to a simple village maiden, living at a time of which "the thick darkness of superstition and ignorance was the true characteristic," whose chief knowledge was a slight acquaintance with the elements of the Catholic faith, and the essence of whose religious belief was the worship of saints?

We will now show the distinction between our heroine and "one

who falsely pretended to an extraordinary commission from heaven"—we mean Joanna Southcott—for the particular edification of A. J.

Joanna Southcott imposed upon the people by selling them a sort of certificate, which they were led to believe would secure their eternal salvation; and she further rendered herself amenable to the italicized argument of our friend, by representing that she was the ordained mother of the Shiloh promised to Jacob, whose birth was arranged to take place at midnight of the 19th October, 1814, but which event, it is hardly necessary to say, never came to pass. Did Joan of Arc practise any such deceits? Did she make capital out of those by whom she was surrounded? Did she promise anything which was not fully accomplished? There is but one answer that can be given to these questions, and which, when given, if nothing else could be said in her behalf, ought at once to relieve her of any such epithet as that which has been associated with her name.

Lastly, we turn to the article of S. F. T., who mentions Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck as "similar impostors" to the individual for whom we are concerned; but we really do not see what is gained by the relation of their exploits, for there is not so much as a shadow of a coincidence between the two, or rather we should say, the three cases; and we might almost content ourselves with repeating the very words of S. F. T., in demonstration of the fact. Thus he says, "Lambert Simnel was set up to counterfeit the Earl of Warwick." Was Joan of Arc "set up to counterfeit" anybody? And again, "Perkin was selected to personate the Duke of York." Was Joan of Arc "selected to personate" anybody?

Simnel and Warbeck, as S. F. T. indeed tells us, were the tools of certain parties who had an interest in the success of the schemes in which these youths, *for their own advantage*, respectively took part; but is there anything "similar" in the other case? Joan of Arc knew no patrons, and expected no patrimony. On the contrary, she forsook friends to find enemies; she left a happy home to become ultimately the inmate of a loathsome dungeon; she relinquished comfort, to become wretched; she renounced life, to die a martyr. Can this be said of the others? and if not, may we inquire where the "similarity" exists, upon which S. F. T. based his argument?

We will trespass no further, and therefore merely add, that we trust we have said sufficient to insure a verdict in our favour.

G. A. H. E.

I consider there is a certain quantity of distempered brain in the world, which, though sure to manifest itself in some way, is often checked and diverted, or prevented from attaining its ultimate effects, by the variety of absurd opinions that, in one department or another, are always to be met with or invented. The mad humour which used to be absorbed by the dreams of alchemy, witchcraft, astrology, and other exploded chimeras of the dark ages, is as rife as ever, only expended on newer and less imaginative follies.—*W. B. Clulow.*

The Essayist.

SHAKESPERE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

"What is your substance, whereof are you made,
That millions of strange shadows on you tend?
Since every one hath, every one, one shade,
And you, *but one*, can every shadow lend.—*Shakespeare's Sonnets*, 53.

INTRODUCTION.

SHAKESPERE! There is conjuration and mighty magic in the *name*, and there is mystery about the *man*. The place of his birth is a shrine for pilgrim feet, and Stratford-upon-Avon holds the dust of her (and England's) noblest intellectual son. Yet of this man, who "was not for an age, but for all time," fewer memorials are preserved than of almost any of Britain's mighty minstrels. Far away, in the time-distance of five centuries ago, "Old Dan. Chaucer" shows himself as a reality, and no myth,—

"Singing he was, or floyting alle the day;
He was as fresche as is the moneth of May."

Dunbar, Gawin Douglas, and Sir David Lyndsay, appear in literary history lifelike and solid. Surrey and Wyatt are known, both in biography and romance. Sydney and Spenser are palpable and substantial figures in the *tableaux* of their age. The personality and "the very form and pressure" of many of the Elizabethan *sages*—Raleigh, Fairfax, Daniel, Drayton, Marlowe, Chapman, Middleton, Jonson, &c., are known to the most casual readers of biography; yet here is *one*—the greatest—of whom it has been remarked, "'*He lived*' is almost all that can be said."

We remember the vividness with which the thought of this self-forgetfulness, and as it were, spirit-like impalpability, shone on us as we stood in the chancel of Stratford Church—the church in which he was baptized, in which he worshipped, where he mourned, and in which he lies "so sepulchred,"

"That kings, for such a tomb, might wish to die;"—

saw before us the bust that "was for gentle Shakespeare cut;" and beheld the grave which held all that was mortal of him who was "not one, but all mankind's epitome." A dear friend accompanied us,—one whom a connection with the *British Controversialist* first, and now long and fast, made ours,—and we recall the singular feeling with which we, almost simultaneously, remarked how difficult it was to realize Shakespeare in all the breadth, power, and geniality of his nature, as "a visible presence" among men: he seems so much more like an impersonality, a shape, a shade, a force, a voice, than as a form shrouded in a "muddy vesture of decay," and as moving amid the casualties of time and space, possessed of all the attributes of man. And yet we had read, with some care,

the abounding biographies of Avon's bard, and knew almost by heart those items of his life which research had rescued from among Time's "alms for Oblivion;" we had conned his precious pages with a lover's ardour and a student's zeal, and could not bear to think of him as one whose "soul was like a star, and dwelt apart" from human friendships, interests, aims, and cares. We were anxious to bring a feeling of his *humanity* into our souls, and to realize the period when

"Mellifluous Shakespeare, whose enchanting quill
Commanded mirth or passion, was but *Will*."

We thought then, as we have often done since, of the remarks of Hallam,—“Of William Shakespeare, whom . . . we *seem* to know better than any human writer, it may be truly said that we scarcely know anything. We see him—so far as we do see him—not in himself, but in a reflex image; . . . to us he is scarcely a determined person, a substantial reality, the *man* Shakespeare. . . . All that insatiable curiosity and unwearied diligence have hitherto detected about Shakespeare serves rather to disappoint and perplex us than to furnish the slightest illustration of his character.”* We repeat, with a sigh, the curt summarization of Stoevons, “All that is known, with any degree of certainty, concerning Shakespeare is, that he was born at Stratford-upon-Avon, married, and had children there; went to London, where he commenced actor, and wrote poems and plays; returned to Stratford, made his will, died, and was buried;” and we were compelled to re-express the ejaculation of Carlyle, “How much in Shakespeare lies hid—his sorrows, his silent struggles, known to himself; much that was not known at all, not speakable at all; like roots, like sap and forces, working underground!” Then we cast our thoughts from the brief, gossiping, uncritical “Life,” prefixed to Rowe’s “Shakespeare,” 1709, to the *side-lighted*, picturesque, synchronized, though somewhat highly-coloured and imaginative, biography of Charles Knight; and recollecting the researches of Malone, Dyce, Drake, Collier, Hunter, Bell, De Quincey, Wheler, Halliwell, &c., came to the conclusion that it might be possible, by an exercise of discriminating criticism, to attain some more decided and realizable notions of the great dramatist than we at that time possessed. With the view of attempting this, we some years ago re-read a considerable amount of Shakespearean literature, taking notes as we proceeded; but other tasks, at that time, prevented the fulfilment of our design, and for awhile these notes have been laid past in a limbo of those interrupted or unfinished attempts which have now and again created excitement

“In the quick forge and working house of thought.”

Our collection of references is dispersed into the libraries from which they were selected, and we are now in a retired nook of a village where the means of extended literary research are sparse and scant; and

* “Literature of Europe,” vol. ii. p. 175. Google

"When to the sessions of sweet, silent thought,
I summon up remembrance of things past.
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought."

The recent discussions concerning Shakespere have revived the idea relinquished then, and we have resolved to sketch out our plan and lay it before our readers. The necessity for brevity laid upon us in this department of this serial will materially interfere with the literary execution of our design; but it will have this advantage, that it will make our outline occupy a compass much narrower than we originally contemplated, and will therefore, perhaps, lessen its tedium to our readers, though it will certainly increase our labour. The accommodation of our original view to the exigencies of the present state of opinion among Shakesperean critics and readers will necessitate a remodelment of our materials, a special arrangement of the topics of our research, and an extension of our subject itself. With this view we have selected the words contained in the title of our paper, as in our opinion inclusive of all that we shall require to consider. We make no pretensions to originality of research; we have no "new facts" to reveal; no fresh materials to bring into the argument. We intend only such a reconstruction of that which is already known as by its method may lead us to feel the *human* in Shakespere's character; as may bring him before us as a man; as may show him somewhat in his habit as he lived; and, by an appeal to chronology, prove that, though we know too little to satisfy our insatiable curiosity, we do really know more than is commonly believed. The vagrant manner in which dates have hitherto wandered here and there, in the pages of professed biographers, has been quite mystifying. If it is only by "applying this to that, and so to so," that a memoir can be constructed, it will surely be well that these should be placed in their natural order; for then and thus may we most likely break the spell

"That does in vile misprison shackle up"

our thoughts of Shakespere, and bring out the man as well as the dramatist. Let us try.

I.—SHAKESPERE'S ANCESTRY.

"Honours best thrive
When rather from our acts we them derive,
Than our foregoers."—*All's Well that Ends Well*.

I. *Paternal*. "Breakspear, Shakespear, and the like," says Verstegan, in his "Restitution of Decayed Intelligence" [Antwerp, 1605], "have been surnames imposed upon the first bearers of them for valour and feats of arms." Bosworth field on the 22nd August, 1485, beheld the first of the Tudor dynasty proclaimed—"King Henry the Seventh." Shortly after this, Henry began to enrich, with possessions and goods, according to their desert and merit,

those who had then aided him. "For his faithful and approved service to the late most prudent prince, King Henry VII., of famous memory," *probably* Richard Shakespere, of Snitterfield, near Stratford-on-Avon, "was advanced and rewarded with lands and tenements given to him in those parts of Warwickshire." He had two sons *at least*, Henry and John. The latter—born, *perhaps*, about 1530—became resident in Henley Street, Stratford, prior to 29th April, 1552. In that street, on 2nd October, 1556, he bought the copyhold of a house and garden, as well as that of a house in Greenhill Street, having a garden and a croft—i. e., a small piece of pasture or tillage land—attached to it. A man of business, too, was he then; for on 17th June, 1556, he was sued at court as a *glover*, and on 19th November he impleaded a neighbour for unjustly detaining 18 quarters of barley. Aubrey says he "was a butcher;" Rowe, that he was "a considerable dealer in wool." In 1557 he was a burgess, a member of the corporation (for a charter had been granted to Stratford in 1553), and, by choice of the court-leet, ale-taster for the borough, "sworn to look to the assize and goodness of bread, or ale, or beer," within its precincts. In that year (or early in the next?) he married; for "Joan Shakespere, daughter to John Shakespere," was baptized on 15th September, 1558.

II. *Maternal*. The groom of the chamber to Henry VII. was Robert Arden, a scion of a family of the highest antiquity in Warwickshire. His son, also named Robert, had by his *first* wife a family—at any rate, of seven daughters; of whom Mary was the youngest. "John Shakespere, having married the daughter and one of the heirs of Robert Arden, of Willmecote, in the parish of Aston Cauntlow," became under the will of the said Robert Arden, dated 24th November, 1556, possessed of "land in Willmecote, called Asbies," as well as of the property in Snitterfield, on which his father had been reared.

The Ardens and Shakesperes were naturally brought together, and the rising burgess of Stratford seems not to have advanced unadmitted claims to the hand of the heiress of Asbies, whose father had died in December, 1556. After this event, if we suffer rather more than a year to elapse, we may *fancy* that on or about Christmas, 1557, John Shakespere and Mary Arden, suitably attired and attended, arrived in (*say?*) Aston Cauntlow parish church, with full intent that then and there

"All sanctimonious ceremonies may
With full and holy rite be ministered."

And that, no opposition being offered to their union, having plighted the full assurance of their faith, the ceremony of their compact was duly solemnized, so that, shortly afterwards, Henley Street was musical for many a merry hour.

The young couple *may* have had a goodly round of visitings to do and to get; and though the world was disturbed by wars, they

seemed to enjoy both peace and prosperity at that time. In 1558, John Shakespere was one of the four constables of Stratford, an office then always held by chosen burgesses, and in that year also, as we have said, Joan Shakespere was born. Rising in municipal dignity, in 1559 he became an affeorer—an official whose duty it was to fix and determine the fines leviable for offences against the bye-laws of the borough. In 1560 it is *probable* his daughter Joan—named after Mrs. Shaksperes [*eldest?*] sister—died. He was one of the municipal chamberlains in 1561. On 2nd December, 1562, his daughter Margaret was baptized; and on 30th April, 1563, she was buried. In 1564 he was a member of the Common-hall of Stratford, and to an important document of that hall in that year, he did, (as Charles Knight thinks) in *writing*, affix his name. In that same year, his eldest and world-famous son was born—WILLIAM SHAKESPERE.

II. SHAKESPERE'S BOYHOOD AND YOUTH.

"This jewel in the world."—*Cymbeline*.

The circumstances of a child's parents, and the conditions of life around him, so influence his position, prospects, and progress, as to form a full justification, in all *constructive* memoirs, for taking these as basis of inference regarding the *probabilities* of a person's career. Indeed, the circumstances of the parents are the conditioning causes of many of the mental, personal, and social sufferings and exertions of their children, and no complete view of the formative principles of any man's life can be obtained unless we know the environments of his earlier years. For these reasons, as well as in defect of personal anecdote and gossip, the biographers of Shakespere have expended great industry and employed singular care in acquiring, from every accessible source, information regarding the Shakespere family, during the youth of William, their son, in the belief that thence they may infer, with tolerable certainty, the special influences which operated on the destiny of the mighty dramatist. In this, however, they have only been partially successful. The following is, as nearly as possible, a chronological summary of the chief matters that have been learned, and of the deductions sought to be drawn from them, as premises, viz. :—

1564. In the Stratford register of *baptisms*, under date 26th April, appears the entry [in *incorrect* Latin], "William, son of John Shakespere." As it was customary in these days to baptize as early as convenient,* a *tradition* that he was born on the 23rd (equal to 5th May, new style), has been generally acquiesced in, especially as it was put into substantive form by the Rev. Joseph Greene, master of the Stratford Free School, *about* a century after his death, and seems to be confirmed, or at least to be implied (as is generally understood), by the inscription on his monument.

* Edward Alleyn, the player, founder of Dulwich College, was baptized the day after his birth; Oliver Cromwell, *four*, and John Milton, *eleven*.

Little more than two months elapsed before the beat of the hearts of the twice-bereft parents was quickened with anxiety for the life of their eldest son, and *now* only child; for the plague was in Stratford, and from June 30th to December 31st, the angel of death was busy. Of its inhabitants, 238 perished in that time. No Shakespeare occupies *that* death-list. "Shakespeare's home—his boyhood's home," and his birthplace, has never, we believe, been matter of *dispute*. An undisturbed *tradition* points out *that* house in Henley Street, which is now the property of the *British nation*, as the place in which life dawned upon him. Frequent donations to the poor of the borough *seem* to prove that the Shakespeares were, at the time of his birth, thankfully enjoying prosperity, were kindly-hearted, and likely, therefore, to be popular among their townsofolk.

1565. In this year John Shakespeare was elected one of the *fourteen* aldermen of Stratford.

1566. His second son, Gilbert, was baptized on 13th October, 1566; and at Michaelmas,

1566, John Shakespeare, in two precepts of the Stratford Court of Record, of this year's date, appears as the surety of Richard Hathaway.

1568, he was promoted to the office of borough or high bailiff.

1569. In this year, the Queen's players and the Earl of Worcester's players visited Stratford, and performed in it. The former received nine shillings and the latter twelve pence out of the town's fund for their entertainment. John Shakespeare's third daughter, named after her eldest sister (dead) Joan, was baptized on 15th April, 1569; while in

1570, he held the tenancy, under Wm. Clopton, of Ingon Meadow, "a parcel of land" of 14 acres in extent, for which, with its appurtenances, he paid an annual rent of £8.

1571. In 1571 he attained the highest civic dignity by being chosen chief alderman, and thus, in the punctilious age of Queen Elizabeth, became entitled to the respectful appellation, which he afterwards gets in the parish registers, of (Mr.) *Magister*; for "all titles of honour appear to have been originally names of office," and that word primarily signifies a man who rules, governs, or directs either men or businesses.

In 1482, Thomas Jolyffe left lands to the Guild of the Holy Cross of Stratford-upon-Avon, provided that they "should find a priest fit and able in knowledge to teach grammar freely to all scholars coming to the school in the said town to him, taking nothing of the scholars for their teaching." That guild was dissolved at the Reformation, and its lands fell to the king. When, however, the town was incorporated, the Charter ordained "that the *free* grammar school for the *instruction* and *education* of boys and youth there should be thereafter kept up and maintained as theretofore it used to be." The preliminary qualifications for admission were—residence in the town, being *seven* years of age, and being able to read

It is therefore held as reasonably probable that, in 1571—the year in which Roger Ascham's "Schoolmaster" was published—Chief-Alderman Shakespeare's eldest son, *being able to read*, had his name enrolled by the then master, Thomas Hunt, also curate of Luddington, as a pupil of the town free grammar-school. School-hours were then lengthy, from daylight till dark in winter, and from six to six in summer, with suitable meal-intervals and play-hours. We are to *suppose* Master William Shakespeare, with "his satchel and shining morning face," wending his way daily to the grammar-school, which then meant a seminary in which instruction was given in Latin [and Greek, French, and Italian?]. The early instruction was oral, and dealt chiefly with the inflections of the eight parts of speech, the formation of simple sentences, and the engrossing of these neatly in note-books. *Æsop*, Terence, Virgil, Cicero, Sallust, or Cæsar, accompanied with the repetition and application of Lily's Syntax, Horace, and Ovid, with conversational exercises, according to Donatus and Valla, usually finished the school curriculum. *If* Greek,—Lucan, Aristophanes, Homer, and Xenophon, in this order, were generally the authors. French and Italian were taught by and in conversations.

The drill of a free grammar-school in the country, presided over by Curate Hunt, or Thomas Jenkins, his successor (of which of these was Holofernes a caricature?), could not equip a pupil with learning like that acquired in the ancient City of Westminster School under Camden—who, by the bye, became master therein in 1571. Ben Jonson's "small Latin and less Greek" is therefore to be taken not only *cum grano salis* as referring to points on which *he* prided himself, but as also implying the *almost* necessary inferiority of rural to civic training in institutions so different in their appointments, and therefore as somewhat resembling Chaucer's jesting saying about French, "After ye maner of Stratford-atte-Bowe." Aubrey says he "understood Latin pretty well," but his is only hearsay evidence. On 28th Sept., 1571, the year of his chief magistracy, Mr. John Shakespeare's fourth daughter, Anne, was baptized.

1573. Richard, third son of Mr. John Shakespeare, was baptized 11th March, 1573. "The Earl of Leicester's players" received in 1573 from the Chamberlain of Stratford the sum of six shillings and eightpence; and next year,

1574, the same official pays "my lord of Warwick's players" seventeen shillings, and the Earl of Worcester's players five shillings and seven pence.

1575. Two freehold houses in Henley Street were bought by John Shakespeare during the year 1575. In the summer of that same year, Queen Elizabeth made her grand historical visit to Kenilworth Castle, and enjoyed the "princely pleasures" which her unworthy favourite the Earl of Leicester had prepared for her reception, and to enliven her stay. As William Shakespeare was then about twelve years of age; his father, apparently, in good

circumstances;—Kenilworth is only thirteen miles distant from Stratford; and crowds from all mid-England were collected by the gorgeous spectacles and pageantry with which the Queen was welcomed,—it is *probable* (as Percy, in his “Reliques,” 1765, suggests) that he was a spectator of the costly magic of those festivities, and that he lighted the torch of his imagination at the blaze that shone around her Majesty while there.

1577. In this year, Mr. John Shakespere *begins* to be irregular in his attendance at the meetings of the corporation; and has one-half of his borough taxes remitted by consent of the municipality. He is reported by Dettrick, Garter King of Arms, to have had in this year a pattern of his *arms* blazoned for him by Clarence Cooke, though he did not *bear* them till after 1597.

1578. John Shakespere and Mary, his wife, mortgage the “land in Wilmecote called Asbies,” to a relative (?) named Edmund Lambert, for £40, on condition that it should revert to them if repaid before Michaelmas Day, 1580. In 1578, and on 19th Nov. of that same year, it is arranged in the corporation books that John Shakespere and Robert Bratt, in regard to a levy of fourpence a week for relief of the poor, “shall not be taxed to pay anything;” and it has farther been found that in this year the aforesaid Edmund Lambert was security for a debt of £5 due to Mr. Roger Sadler, of Stratford, by Mr. John Shakespere. It *seems*, too, that about this time the interests held in the tenements at Snitterfield were parted with. During this year, it is generally *assumed* that William Shakespere left or was withdrawn from school.

1579. The sum, three shillings and fourpence, levied upon John Shakespere by the *borough* of Stratford, in 1579, for the furnishing “of pikemen, billmen, and archers,” is entered on the corporation books as “unpaid and unaccounted for;” yet, in a deed of the same date, he is designated a *yeoman*. This, however, did not keep the woe of death from his hearth; for “Anne, daughter to John Shakespere,” was buried on 4th July, 1579. A John Shakespere resided in this year, and up till, if not beyond, 1583, in Clifford,—a pretty village about two miles from Stratford-on-Avon,—and we may *suppose* that this was the late alderman of that borough.

The above facts have given rise to two hypotheses of very opposing natures; *first*, that of Malone, and the greater part of the biographers of Shakespere—supported so far, if not indeed suggested, by tradition—that the prosperity of John Shakespere had suffered a decline; and, *second*, that advanced by Charles Knight, that he had turned his attention more towards agriculture at this time, was living less in the *borough*, though still dwelling in the *parish*, and therefore paying his rents and bearing his burdens in the latter, though holding property in the former. “The lands of Bishopton and Welcombe, of the purchase of which by William Shakespere we have no record,” and which he disposes of in his will under the designation of his *inheritance*, Knight *supposes* to be the lands purchased at this period. We have no account of the disposal of the

properties in Henley Street, and it is difficult to imagine their being held by a person justly indebted to the corporation, or insolvent, or "depending" (as Malone has it) "rather on the credit of others than his own." But the registry of the Court of Record at Stratford from 1569 to 1585 is wanting, and research has as yet been vainly expended in attempting to make up the deficiency. We certainly incline to Knight's hypothesis as highly plausible, and as fully accounting not only for the apparent financial difficulties of the family, but also for the withdrawal of William from school—on account of the distance, and difficulty of attending, as well as for the vagueness and general inaccuracy of the village traditions regarding him.

In 1579, the players of Lord Strange and those of the Countess of Essex held dramatic entertainments in Stratford, in the hall of the guild, under the patronage of the bailiff.

1580. The players of the Earl of Derby visited Stratford, and there exhibited as well as they could the transactions of human passion, "set out with sweetness of words, fitness of epithets, with metaphors, allegories, hyperboles, amphibologies, similitudes, with phrases so picked, so pure, so proper with action, so smooth, so lively, so wanton," as to gratify their audience. On "May 3rd, 1580, Edmund, son to Mr. John Shakespere," was baptized; and in "A Book of the Names and Dwelling-Places of the Gentlemen and Freeholders in the County of Warwick, 1580," John Shakespere, of Stratford-on-Avon, in the hundred of Barlichway, has a place. On or before the 29th September (Michaelmas) of this year, in the matter of the mortgage of Ashbie, the money in discharge thereof was duly tendered and refused, unless other moneys in which they were indebted to the mortgagee were also paid—at least, so John and Mary Shakespere declare in Chancery. 1597.

On and after leaving school, what did William Shakespere become? Seven attorneys practised in Stratford during his youth—did he ply the "the trade of *Noverint*" in an apprenticeship with one of them? as has been guessed to be implied in a sarcastic quip printed by Thomas Nashe in Greene's "*Menaphon*," 1589; did he exercise his "father's trade"? and was that—as Aubrey, 1680, says—a butcher? Or was this Shakespere—as a clerk above eighty years old, that showed the church of Stratford to one Dowdall, 1693, affirmed—"bound apprentice to a butcher," but "run from his master to London"? It is now regarded as *all but proven* that Mr. John Shakespere was *not* a butcher to business, but rather in some sort a glover, woolstapler, sheepmaster, and agriculturist—as Knight has it, "a small rural capitalist,"—and it is very *probable* that William, his eldest son, should take a share in the conduct of his affairs, especially as he seems to have been somewhat of an arithmetician and penman. In this capacity he might even kill a calf, yea, "doe it in a high stile and make a speech;" and that the love of the marvellous and the indistinctness of tradition—if Shakespere spent his youth out of the *borough* of Stratford, all the more

likely to be wrong—had so transformed the story. During his leisure, how did he disport himself? Did he,

“Under the shade of melancholy boughs,
Lose and neglect the creeping hours of Time.”

Did he, with wise studiousness, “chewing the food of sweet and bitter fancies,” “observe all qualities with a learned spirit,” and note for after use the phenomena of Nature and the acts of men; or did he, “like a wilful youth, pursue a life unprofitably gay,” spending his “time in the fencing schools and dancing schools, in stealing deer and conies, in hunting the hare and wooing girls”? Or can we fancy him—as Aubrey tells, on the authority of a Mr. Beeston—as one who “had been in his younger years a schoolmaster in the country,” and whose

“Study had made him very lean,
And pale, and leaden-eyed”?

We cannot well decide. The tradition regarding the deer-stealing somewhere and at some time—even though it could be proven that Charlecote was not “an enclosed ground royally licensed,” and that Sir Thomas Lucy was not likely to accost any one with a Sirrah, “you have beaten my men, killed my deer, and broke open my lodge,”—cannot be pooh-poohed out of the way. It seems to be a myth, with a basis of truth. Neither the ingenuity of De Quincey, nor the palpable wishing-cap reasoning of Knight, can quite rub off the original likelihood of the tradition, nor otherwise account for the co-linking of Lucy and Shallow in the thoughts of men to “be laughed at” for all time. The ballad, we believe, is a forgery of a later date than the age of Shakespere, and we cannot think that *this* could be the reason for his early and abrupt departure from his native town. Mutual offence may have been given and gotten without going quite so far as that, and the player-proprietor may in after years have had a cold shoulder from Sir Thomas, which would not lessen his sense of wrong, or incline him to forget and forgive. That he was a schoolmaster, we would fain believe; but that has little support except from the tradition that he taught some of the actors elocution and the arts of stage-management; that he was studiously observant, requires no proof; and that he occupied himself in wooing, and that right early too, becomes both manifest and prominent on documentary evidences. An old intimacy subsisted between the Shakesperes and the Hathaways, and these ties were drawn more closely together by William on the one part, and Anne on the other, at wakes and fairs and fireside pleasantries, until “love’s feeling” began to grow in both. With this eventful crisis, the youth of William Shakespere closes and the responsibilities of manhood are undertaken, and a new chapter may fitly be devoted to the latter time and its concerns. S. N.

The Topic.

WAS THE HOUSE OF LORDS JUSTIFIED IN PREVENTING THE REPEAL OF THE PAPER DUTY?

AFFIRMATIVE.

The chief powers vested in the House of Commons are those of imposing taxes and voting money for the public service. Bills for these purposes can only originate in that house, and the Lords may not make any alterations in them, but they have the undoubted right of *veto* by that ancient and fundamental clause in our constitution which ordains that nothing shall become law unless it first has the sanction of the three estates of the realm. And the popular twaddle recently got up about the *aggression of the Lords* (?) is so much ignorant nonsense, for why send a Bill up at all, if the Lords had not the power to reject it?—RHOS.

The unseemly wrangle now agitating the country is merely a party dodge. The Cabinet receives a very justifiable snub, and immediately the outsiders set up a clamour that we are no longer taxed by our representatives in the Commons, but by those hereditary noodles, the Lords. This is simply absurd. How stands the case? A tax exists on paper. An inglorious but too clever budgetmonger says, "I'll have it off." The Lords say, "Don't be in a hurry, we'll see if we can spare it;" and the result is, they reject the Bill for its repeal. They don't thereby impose a fresh tax upon the people, but only withhold their consent from a Bill which seeks to release the people from a light and equitable tax, which has hitherto been paid without a murmur.—A.

Mr. Editor,—I appeal to you to defend the Lords on this question, because of the analogous position which they hold to your own as editor of this Magazine. An article is sent to you; you think it will not answer, and reject

it. A bill is sent to the Lords, and for the same reason they do likewise. Would any right-minded man attempt to get up a scandalous agitation amongst the contributors against the editor? I am happy to say, they all know better. And I maintain that the only point of difference in my analogy consists in the fact, that you have the power to alter or amend an article, which the Lords have not. I trust, therefore, you will not place a "*thorn in your editorial cushion*" by subscribing to any such revolutionary nonsense under the guise of popular reform.—U. V.

Much after-dinner claptrap has lately been volunteered by used up *anti-rifle corps ranters*, who, forsooth, imagine they will intimidate the tyrannical Lords, and themselves repeal the paper duty. A very *Bright* idea, truly. Let all such remember—before they quote the men who delivered our country from the second Stuart—that a tyrannical House of Commons is not altogether unheard of in history, and that any attempt to knock up the House of Lords must fail, so long as they act in a constitutional manner. Such men dishonour the constitution they affect to defend, and would make it out that the House of Lords is a gigantic bugbear, having certainly "a local habitation and a name," but as to power, powerless.—TOWYN.

In the opinion of superficial observers, the House of Lords has lately, by its repeal of the paper duty, placed itself in rather an anomalous position; but, if we consider the case more attentively, we shall find that it has acted not only constitutionally, but (perhaps unwittingly) with great foresight. It has acted constitutionally, in so far as it is

convened for the very purpose of approving or passing its veto upon any bill which may have received the sanction of the Commons; and if it generally allows bills approved by the Commons to pass, it is not thereby debarred from exercising its prerogative.

We are told by the agitators for the repeal that this is a tax upon knowledge, and, therefore, ought at once to be abolished; and we are treated to a large amount of statistical information, which goes principally to prove that Government derives a considerable portion of the public revenue through this tax. Now, even if this tax were so grievous to be borne, is this the time to diminish the revenue, when our expenditure is very great, and is daily increasing? But do we in reality feel this tax to be a burden? The public, at least, we think, may answer that it is not, and would much rather continue to buy its books at the present low prices, than submit to the infliction of an increased income-tax.—*TOUJOURS PRET.*

Any bill to become law must receive the sanction of the three estates of the realm, "the Commons, the Lords, and the Crown," and each of these have the power to refuse their assent to any bill whatsoever; it being one of the laws of our constitution that there is no power in this country without check or control. Although the Lords have not the right to originate or amend money bills, yet they have the power to reject them. It was in accordance with this law that they refused to repeal the paper duty; and if in their opinion the present was an unsuitable time for taking off that duty, they were perfectly justified in not giving such a bill their sanction.—*ARISTOCRAT.*

The House of Lords have the power to reject money bills, though powerless to originate or even amend them. If not, why send them up to receive their lordships' assent? Do they not form part of the constitution? and is not their sanction necessary before any bill can become law? Therefore, with-

holding it is not a breach of constitutional usage; and in the face of a large deficit in the revenue this year, they very properly refused their assent to repeal the paper duty. Forming as they do the Upper House of Legislation, and acting as a check on the Commons, they only exercised a right which they possessed, by the course they took on this question.—*TRUE BLUE.*

Little, very little is required by the mere partisan debater to enable him to vindicate his own party, and vilify all who oppose it; one plausible argument, a single fact, which, when isolated presents an imposing appearance, is sufficient for the construction of a defence eked out by means of flashy rhetoric, and frothy declamation. Thus every demagogue, great or small, whether addressing the honourable members of St. Stephen's, or haranguing some illustrious coterie of St. Giles', points with an air of triumph to the fact that it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to grant all supplies and regulate the purposes to which they must be applied; and then, shutting his eyes to the fact, equally undoubted and well-known, that the Peers possess the power of assenting to or rejecting every bill submitted to them, denounces them, for simply exercising this right, as gigantic innovators, underminers of the constitution, and invaders of the people's liberty. Yet, we make bold to say, that if an aggressive spirit has been exhibited by either House, it has been by the Lower one. Fusty, musty records, extending for centuries back, have been overhauled and scrutinized, that some precedent might be discovered which should establish its supremacy in financial matters, and declare its power to dictate to the Lords; but nowhere could such precedent be found; everywhere did the same rebuke meet those who wished to overstep their bounds, "thus far and no further." On the principles we have mentioned, the defence of each house respectively rests. They appear to clash, and may cause some to suspend

judgment on the question, but a little reflection will dispel any doubts that exist regarding the propriety of the Lords possessing such a privilege.

Though the history of the House of Commons does not illustrate the truth of the adage, that knowledge is power, it certainly affords a strong proof of the potency of wealth. The necessities of the first Edward gave to it its present form, and the requirements of succeeding monarchs confirmed and extended its rights. Its influence being thus entirely attributable to the power it possessed over supplies, it was only in keeping with what may be termed constitutional practice that it should have afterwards secured to itself the right of *originating* all money bills; by this means it could not be coerced into conceding grants, if it respected and adhered to its privileges; and though the King and Lords united in passing a money bill, when it came to the Commons it was rejected, on the simple ground that it did not begin with themselves. Their power was thus effectually secured, without giving to them an undue influence in the State; and their privilege, so far from being anomalous or singular, as some people think, corresponds to the power belonging to the Upper House, that bills affecting the rights of the peerage must originate in the Lords, and cannot be altered by the Commons. Again, every one who regards the constitution of this country must be struck by the system of checks pervading it; maintaining a perfect equilibrium throughout the varied and complex machinery; rendering every single part dependent upon some other; and restraining all from the abusive exercise of the powers entrusted to them. Grant, however, to the Commons the right of levying taxes by their own vote exclusively, or compel the Lords to give an unvarying assent to all money bills submitted to them, and you destroy this harmonious order, rendering the Lower House not one of three equal estates, but the dictatorship of the country. The first object of a

ministry would be to conciliate them, knowing that, possessed of their favour, the second estate of the realm might be ignored. The executive then could levy war, and the Commons raise the needful supplies, despite the utmost effort of the Lords to the contrary. As it is, the constitutional aspect of this question we have treated as far as space permits, but it must be remembered that the desirability of the repeal of the paper duty is acknowledged on all sides, though its opportuneness is at present open to doubt.—OLIVIER.

The mere question of the repeal of the paper duty becomes one of minor importance when compared with the vital principle involved in its rejection by the House of Lords, namely, the power of that house to reject money bills. Their constitutional power to reject such bills was so conclusively established by the venerable Lord Lyndhurst, in his memorable speech during the important debate on the second reading of the bill, by the long list of precedents he brought forward, extending over a period of 200 years, and embracing all kinds of money bills, some for the repeal of excise duties, and others for imposing fresh taxes, that it would be presumptuous on my part to attempt to add anything to his conclusive arguments; suffice it to say, that shortly after the bill was rejected by the House of Lords, a committee was appointed to examine the journals of the House of Lords for precedents where money bills had been rejected by that house. That committee has completed its labours, and drawn up and presented its report, which confirms the opinion of the noble Lord just mentioned, and acknowledges the power of the House of Lords to reject money bills. That the House of Lords has not the power to originate or alter a money bill is distinctly stated in a resolution passed in the House of Commons in 1678; but at the same time it also acknowledges that they have the power to reject a money bill, as will be seen from the latter part of the last

clause.—“That as kings and queens must receive all or leave all such aids, gifts, or grants, so must the House of Lords reject all or pass all.” The mere fact of sending the bill up to the House of Lords to obtain their sanction, indirectly confirms their power to reject it. If they are compelled to pass all kinds of money bills in obedience to the command of the Commons, they no longer remain an independent and responsible branch of the constitution, but mere dependents on the Lower House to sanction and approve its policy, and carry out its whims and fancies, which would for ever destroy that independent action and wholesome check which both houses, according to the constitution, are empowered to exercise over the transactions of each other. But our opponents tell us that the exercise of this power by the House of Lords would be indirectly imposing a tax on the people, independent of the consent of the House of Commons: such an inference is unwarrantable and erroneous, as the tax in question was originally imposed by the Lower House, and the only question involved in its rejection of the bill for its repeal by the House of Lords is the time when it will be *expedient* and *politic* to abolish it. If, as our opponents affirm, the rejection of this bill by the House of Lords is virtually taxing the people, then by the same parity of reasoning the passing of it would have been to remit taxation. The fallacy of such reasoning must be apparent to all. Having proved that the House of Lords has the constitutional right to reject this bill, the question naturally arises,—did they, in the exercise of that power, act prudently and judiciously? After calm deliberation of the whole of the circumstances, we must confess we think they did. It will be remembered that the bill was not opposed because the repeal was not desirable—that was readily acknowledged,—but because it was premature. Mr. Gladstone, in repealing it, would have us believe he was acting on the great principles of the financial policy of

Sir Robert Peel (nothing could be more erroneous). When Sir R. Peel reduced taxation, it was upon articles the lowering of the price of which tended greatly to increase their consumption, so that the burden of taxation might press less heavily on the toiling masses of this country, without impoverishing the exchequer; and when he repealed taxation, it was when he had a surplus to dispose of and not a deficit to meet. The income-tax was this year to be reduced, if not abolished; and the war duties on tea and sugar were to be taken off; but the sacred promises given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer have been broken, to enable him to repeal the tax on paper, which, we are told, is burdensome and oppressive; and so, no doubt, are all taxes, according to those who have to *pay* them.
—PEN AND INK.

NEGATIVE.

I maintain that the House of Lords has overstepped proper bounds in the course it has pursued. The resolutions passed by the House of Commons on Friday evening, 6th July, can, I think, be regarded as nothing more than patching up the dispute for the sake of peace. I dissent from the views of Mr. Bright upon most parliamentary matters; still, we can occasionally catch a thought worth noticing from the sayings of those with whom we usually disagree. On the present topic I have done so, by adopting a sentiment expressed by Mr. Bright, in his speech in the House of Commons, on the evening referred to. “Above all (he observes), I implore the House never to abate one jot or tittle of their just privileges, whether assailed by the House of Lords, or any other power; ever bearing in mind that the maintenance of those privileges is the best and only safeguard for the liberties of the nation.” England’s glory, and England’s happiness, consists in the fact that we have a House of Lords and a House of Commons. It would be the downfall of our glory if the House of Lords ceased to exist. Both have rights

and privileges which must be watched and maintained; and one house must not intrude upon the other.—*TNEJBOR.*

The desirability of repealing the paper duty even the Lords themselves will admit. They allege, however, that the present state of the exchequer will not permit it: but how can that be? The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in order to meet the deficiency caused by its repeal, levied an extra income-tax. Their only ground, therefore, is their very questionable right to continue a tax in defiance of the representatives of the people, and so take upon themselves the responsibility of taxing the nation.—*J. S. F.*

It is, we think, the duty of our legislators to do all in their power to promote the welfare of the nation, socially and morally, by removing all obstacles to free trade. It is their duty, also, to encourage the progress of a healthy literature, unfettered and unbound, which will do more to promote the moral welfare of the people than years of legislation. This duty, we think, the House of Lords has disregarded, in preventing the repeal of the paper duty; and our reasons are manifold. In the first place, leaving literature for the moment out of the question, the tax hinders trade, and prevents the growth of a manufacture which would give remunerative employment to thousands. Everything of a fibrous nature, we are told, might and would be used in the manufacture of paper, if it were not for the obstructions placed upon it by law; and it appears, from a statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that there are sixty-nine trades into which paper enters largely as an article of manufacture. To encourage this manufacture, the duty should have been repealed. But again, it appears that the tax operates in an oppressive manner upon the publications read by the middle and lower classes particularly. "The paper duty," says the Chancellor, "is not only bad in its effects, but it is untenable." It is bad in its effects, by preventing trade, and encumbering the

circulation of our bibles, tracts, periodicals, newspapers, &c. Its repeal would be a great stimulus to the spread of gospel truth, and to the dissemination of cheap, wholesome literature among the working classes. For the same reason, it is untenable. It has been urged, that the repeal of the taxes on knowledge would entail a loss to the revenue of £1,000,000 per annum; but, granting this, are there are no other commodities that might be taxed, to make up the deficiency?—*J. S.*

The House of Lords can no more be justified in refusing to repeal the paper duty, than can Louis Napoleon be justified in occupying Rome with French troops, against the general wish of its inhabitants. The second estate of the country has degenerated into a mere sham; the day of its greatness is past. Of far greater moment to them is the triumph of party, or the perpetuation of the obsolete rights of their order, than cheap paper and the blessings of extended commerce. It is only by obstructive acts that the country is favoured with their legislation at all. In general, the spirit of their deliberation partakes more of the middle ages, when peers were everything, and the people their slaves and servants, than of the enlightenment of the nineteenth century. The extorting of Magna Charta from King John by the ancestors of our present House of Lords has been extolled as a measure conferring and recognizing the rights and liberties of the people; but it was "a" for their ain haun they fought," while the mass of the people were as little cared for as the cattle they herded. If any act of theirs can be justified, it must be on the ground of self-interest; their last crowning one, in relation to the paper duty, must stand in the same category.—*M. W.*

Justified in taxing the means of education, restricting the diffusion of knowledge and intelligence, and continuing a restrictive and depressing impost, which weighs heavily upon many branches of trade and manufacture?

Certainly not. And under whatever light the conduct of the Lords is viewed, it is evident that they were actuated by the most injudicious, narrow minded, and unjustifiable motives; for instead of assenting to one of the most liberal, enlightened, and progressive measures of the session, they checked and obstructed its course in such a manner as proved they were influenced more with a spirit of peevishness than a desire for the true interests of the country. But, with ostensible regard for the financial necessities of the Government (of which they have no official knowledge, as they are never consulted, and, therefore, are not responsible for providing), they resolved to continue the obnoxious tax, without the consent of the House of Commons or the Crown,—nay, in direct opposition to the intention and vote of the Commons, who alone have absolute power to determine the mode and amount of the taxation which shall be imposed upon the people. It will be generally admitted, we believe, that the House of Lords has a constitutional power of rejecting money bills; but has the Commons ever succumbed to that power, and allowed a great tax to be levied without the sanction of their authority? Never, in any instance. The House of Commons has always resumed the consideration of bills thus rejected by the Lords, pronounced anew its own independent decision, and either sent back, for the assent of the Lords, the rejected bill in its original or in some modified form; for it is plain that if the Lords cannot begin a tax, if they cannot increase or abate one, yet if they may prolong a tax, by refusing their assent to its repeal, when the Commons have voted that repeal, and provided a substitute, then the “fundamental and inherent right” of the Commons to an absolute control over taxation and supply is destroyed, and an innovation and encroachment without precedent initiated, which it is the duty of the House of Commons to repel by an immediate and energetic assertion and

vindication of its rights and privileges.—J. M.

Deriving my arguments from the report of the debate in the House of Commons upon this important subject, I have no hesitation in asserting that the House of Lords was *not* justified in preventing the repeal of the paper duty. The House of Commons alone possesses the right to impose and repeal taxes upon the people, and has on previous occasions successfully resisted the attempted innovations of the Upper House upon its rights in amending money bills passed through it. It is nearly five centuries since the Lords last attempted to usurp the constitutional privileges of the Commons in a manner somewhat resembling the present attempt; and if the talented and noble Chancellor of the Exchequer pursues the course he has declared he will take, then the present unjustifiable and obnoxious interposition of the Lords will be as triumphantly defeated. To conclude, if the Lords were justified in preventing the Commons from repealing or imposing taxes, it would be a complete overthrow of the constitution of the country.—J. C.

The repeal of the paper duty could not but be beneficial to the majority of the British public. The only means of knowledge a working man can command are those of self-education. Self-education can only be gained by books, coupled with observation. The cheaper books are, the wider will be its spread; and cheap books can only be had by taking away the duty from the manufacture of paper. The tax is a tax upon education, and as such its repeal ought not to be hindered; for this reason alone, the Lords are not justified in the course they have taken. In the report of the committee of the House of Commons appointed to investigate the legality of the Lords' proceedings, we find that, although they searched for precedents as far back as the year 1629, there has not been a single instance of the Commons introducing a bill, either for the taxation of the nation or for the repeal

of any tax, which the Lords have opposed, but it has eventually passed in spite of opposition. In 1640, the Lords requested the Commons to confer with them as to granting supplies to the king; but the Commons felt insulted at such a suggestion; they thought it a breach of their privileges, and indignantly refused to confer; and in 1639, the Lords amended a bill as to the duty on tea, coffee, &c., but the Commons refused to agree to their amendment, saying, "That they had always taken it as their undoubted right that in all aids given to the king by the Commons, the Lords ought not in any way to interfere in altering the same." The Commons carried the day.

The Lords sometimes suggested amendments in the seventeenth century, to which the Commons consented, but not to any alteration of a substantial character. The rule generally has been, that when the Lords amend, the Commons either postpone the consideration of the bill, or disagree, and by so doing invite the reconsideration of the Lords; or they lay aside the bill without further notice, and bring in a fresh bill. The same principles apply equally to the repeal as to the imposition of a tax. The Commons allow no alteration, except as to errors resulting from oversight—F. S. M.

The recent decision of the House of Lords on the paper duty was neither justified by constitutional usage, nor by a wish, on their part, to save the country from a deficiency of the revenue. It was a virtual defiance of the representatives of the nation—an undue interference with the privileges of the House of Commons. The Lords formed their decision on the possible deficiency of the revenue, and claim for themselves, by their adverse vote, the merit of having saved the country from pecuniary difficulties. It has been truly said, that they are a "House of Incurables;" every measure, having for its aim the extension of the liberty of the subject, by throwing down the barriers to progress, has received from them the most determined opposition. The jus-

tification of an act must, to a great extent, depend on the necessity for it. In the debate in the House of Lords on the paper duty, it never was clearly shown whether the necessities of the revenue warranted them in retaining the tax; while it has been demonstrated, and even admitted by its opponents, that the tax was a disgrace, and ought no longer to limit, by its action, the extension of knowledge among the people. The Commons, in their lukewarmness, have been mainly instrumental in giving the Lords encouragement to take the course they have done. If the House of Commons had done their duty,—had they shown one spark of spirit,—the Lords would never have attempted the unjustifiable deed. So long as the Lords can get a chance, they will not lose their opportunity of throwing every impediment in the way of justifiable reform, and retarding by every means in their power all measures tending to raise the condition or to improve the intellect of the great mass of the people. No measure embodying those principles but has on each occasion been forced from them by a stormy and almost general agitation. The three great measures of this century,—Catholic Emancipation, the Reform Bill, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws, were wrung from them only when the country was standing on the verge of a revolution. They have succeeded in the present case in defeating the best measure of the session; and though the effect of the defeat may be slightly apparent, still it is another proof of the obstructive character and unjustifiable hindrance of the House of Lords in all that tends to our progress, both in a commercial and a political point of view. The breaking down of these privileges, which to a great extent have been usurped by them since the days of barbarism, may not be far distant; the day may soon arrive when the anomaly of a House of Lords, retarding the growth and stifling the life-current of a nation, from a too rigid adherence to the forms and usages of the past, will be numbered with the things that were.

If they wish to preserve their present privileges intact, let them legislate in a large spirit, commensurate with the requirements of the age, and their name will shine to latest posterity, honoured and respected, and the "last of the Barons" will not be extinct till the "crack of doom."—D. R. R.

The question of privilege that has arisen between the two branches of the legislative body of Great Britain would have produced other consequences, had the reins of government been in other hands than Palmerston's. The examination of the journals of the House of Lords clearly testifies that their act was countenanced by precedent, so far back as the *retrospective examination* has reached. Although in the constitutional rights of Parliament the lords possess no power to originate measures calculated to impose taxes on the people, yet their veto is clearly recognized on constitutional grounds. The jealousy with which the Commons have invariably watched over the jurisdiction of the Upper House has been great on all occasions, as manifested by the Committee's report thereon. The Commons have their seats from the people, and they have, in our estimation, the right to impose, alter, amend, or repeal such acts and statutes as may appear offensive to the people, their constituents, who are the replenishers of the royal treasury, and the authors of England's greatness. But to set aside entirely the baronial jurisdiction would be too flagrant an invasion upon the sacred rights of freedom. The different expression given to sentiment in both houses seems to perplex us to such a degree, that we must confess ourselves in a *dilemma*; nevertheless, we will take the course pointed out by our own judgment. Although we award to the Lords the right of veto in bills of this description, yet under such circumstances as attended the one recently rejected, they were not justified in the course they adopted. It must be borne in mind that the bill in question was a portion of the scheme which provides the supply for the year; and a

substitute had been passed by the Lords, consequently the sacrifice of a *million and a half of revenue* would not have been a dead loss to the Crown. The additional penny in the income-tax had been previously discussed and passed, and the subsequent opposition and defeat of the paper duty repeal bill gave the reproach of inconsistency to the Lords' decision. The *governing power* of the Lower House is of great consequence to the public, and is founded on *constitutional and political* bases. But to enter into minute detail would extend the limits of our article beyond the allowed bounds; consequently we must direct the attention of our *inquisitive* readers to the parliamentary reports, particularly to the oration delivered by the Premier on the 5th of July.

In giving a summary of our synopsis, we will emphatically pronounce against the decision of the House of Lords in arresting the progress of the paper duty repeal bill, and say that such opposition to the measure *was not justifiable on political grounds*.—S. F. T.

Never was a more practical and important question asked of a *self-governing* nation than the present one. It is impossible to perceive that importance and significance, unless the constitution of the House of Lords is borne in mind. The chief characteristic of that body appears to me to be *irresponsibility*. Were they the *elected* of the people, what earthly objection could there be to their decision being taken upon money bills, as it would be but the voice of the people speaking through its representatives (if elected by a free people)? But the contrary being the case, their interference can only be interpreted to be the vilest of all despotism, which, if persisted in, must produce the rapid destruction of the House of Lords. Legally, they had a right to say no, but constitutionally, or customarily, they possessed not the right, paradoxical as it appears. Such unfortunate anomalies too often come under the notice of a student of the English constitution. The Queen herself can create peers from chimney-sweeps; but would not

the Lords themselves inform her erring Majesty that such conduct was *unusual* and *unconstitutional*? Again, Her Majesty has the full power of refusing her assent to all bills sent from either house of legislation; but such conduct would be regarded by her loyal subjects as an innovation and a breach of the constitution. Should the Lords not revise their decision, they will be the tax imposers to the extent of a million and a quarter this year. The House of Commons have repealed the paper duty, and, practically, the non-elective Lords have re-imposed it. What schoolboy is there in England that has not been taught, even by the most conservative of schoolmasters, that the power of imposing taxes was the *exclusive* right of the Commons? and a reference to the books of our school days will prove that till 1860 such was the universal opinion. But apart from the constitutional view, there were abundant reasons why the paper duty repeal bill should not be rejected. Its universal oppression, its difficulty of collection, its financial unsoundness, its condemnation by the House of Commons (expressed in Milner Gibson's resolution), its injurious effects upon beneficial knowledge, were sufficient reasons why such a beneficial measure should become the law of the land. When you remember, that from childhood to old age, man is constantly using the article, you see the desirability of it being free. When we think that every boy, whose neglected education has been caused by its expense, can throw a share of responsibility upon the shoulders of the Government, for taxing his instruction and copy books: when we find that a self-governing people have declared their unwillingness to have a *gog* put upon their *intelligence* and knowledge:—spontaneous and universal must be the verdict, that the House of Lords was not justified in preventing the repeal of the paper duties.—R. B. S.

The committee appointed by the House of Commons to search into precedents have proved beyond doubt that

the House of Lords had no previous precedent to justify their vote against the repeal of the paper duty; and that for the last five hundred years it has been the right of the Commons to control everything relating to the finances of this country, it being one of the fundamental principles on which the constitution of England is founded, that all Englishmen do (through their representatives) tax themselves, holding them responsible for all acts committed in the Commons House of Parliament; for representation and taxation belong to the people, and are inseparable. Lord Chatham says, "The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence of the Peers and the Crown to a tax is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law." Therefore, the House of Lords, being an irresponsible body, have no right, not so much as to meddle with matters of supply, which properly belong to the Commons, and which Mr. Pym declared in 1640 had been "not shaken by one precedent for 300 years," and this privilege has ever been firmly held by the representatives of the people against any encroachment on this power by the Lords. In times past they have been worthy of the confidence reposed in them, and have made many noble and magnanimous efforts to maintain this principle inviolate. By their vote the Lords committed a breach of the constitutional usage of England, and encroached on the proper functions of the Commons. Shall we, then, allow them in 1860 to make a precedent which, at some future time, will most assuredly be turned to the detriment of this great country, and the true interests of its inhabitants? If so, we prove ourselves unworthy children of great and noble ancestors, who would have sacrificed all things rather than give up this privilege, which is the vital element of our constitution, and, by the law of our land, the just and inherent right of the people.—S. T. W.

LITERARY NOTES.

Jules Gerard, the famous lion hunter, whose story acquired such a success lately, has been put at the head of an *authorized* National Rifle Association in France.

The "Encyclopédie du XIX. Siècle," a record of contemporaneous events, has reached its 55th vol.

M. Horn's "Annuaire International du Crédit Public," containing the statistics of the world in 1859, has just been issued.

Mr. T. D. Hardy, of the Record Office, is preparing a pamphlet on the Collier-Shakespeare question.

The Day is the title of a newly projected liberal conservative London penny paper.

The Shakespeare Committee of Stratford-on-Avon appeal to the public for aid to relieve them from the liabilities incurred in the restoration, &c., of Shakespeare's house, in the belief that Mr. John Shakespeare's bequest and annuity would be forthcoming for their liquidation.

The Northumbrian poet, Robert Story, expired on the 7th ult., at Battersea, near London, aged 63.

The late Professor Austin's "Province of Jurisprudence" is to be edited by his widow.

The Ashmolean collection of MSS. has been removed to the Bodleian Library.

Robert Brough, dramatic author, and comic *littérateur*, died 26th of June, aged 32.

A monument to the memory of James Hogg, the Ettrick Shepherd, was inaugurated by Henry Glassford Bell, Esq., a poet of some repute, and one of the sheriffs of Lanarkshire. It is situated upon a knoll of ground on the banks "of lone St. Mary's silent Lake," by a roadside which Wordsworth, and Hogg, and Scott traversed in company.

Routledge is to issue a new vol. of "Gerald Massey's Poems."

G. H. Von Schubert, the natural philosopher, and *schellingist*, died on

July 1st, at Lutzow, near Munich, aged 60. He has written an autobiography.

Some Irish scholars are engaged in compiling a Dictionary of the old native Irish language.

The Messrs. Blackwood are just publishing the late Sir William Hamilton's long-expected lectures on Metaphysics, edited by Mansel and Veitch.

Messrs. Fullerton and Co., of Edinburgh, propose to issue by subscription, in a series of eight volumes, the posthumous works of the Rev. Ralph Wardlaw, the late well-known congregational minister, of Glasgow, to be edited by his son, the Rev. J. S. Wardlaw.

"Lectures, chiefly on Subjects relating to the Use and Management of Literary, Scientific, and Mechanics' Institutes," is the interesting title of a work about to be published by Messrs. Bosworth and Harrison.

The Messrs. Longman are on the point of publishing the new and some time expected contribution to the Collier Controversy, "Collier, Coleridge, and Shakespeare: a Review," by the author of "Literary Cookery," who, we need scarcely tell the initiated, is Dr. Ingleby, of Birmingham. The mention of Coleridge in the title, marks the aim of a section of Dr. Ingleby's review.

Mr. John Camden Hotten, of Piccadilly, appears not only as a publisher, but as editor, furnishing an introduction and notes to the first English translation of "The Book of Vagabonds and Beggars, with a Vocabulary of their Language," said to have been "edited by Martin Luther, in the year 1528." Is this latter sentence quite correct? The great Reformer was a voluminous writer, but we never heard before of this somewhat anomalous exercise of his pen.

The scattered metrical effusions of the late lamented Mr. R. B. Brough, are, it is said, to be collected for publication by his friend, Mr. John Hollingshead.

Epoch Men.

ADAM SMITH.—SCIENTIFIC POLITICS.

"The 'Treatise on the Law of War and Peace,' the 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' 'The Spirit of Laws,' and the 'Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations,' are the works which have most directly influenced the general opinion of Europe during the two last centuries. They are also the most conspicuous landmarks in the progress of the sciences to which they relate."—*Sir James Macintosh.*

A SECOND edition of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" was called for within the year. Smith spent the greater part of his summer vacation in preparing it, and in revising his college lectures, which, by this publication, he was able to condense in the third and extend considerably in the fourth parts. To this revised edition of the "Theory," Smith annexed a "Dissertation on the Origin of Languages,"—most probably a portion of the lectures on Rhetoric delivered in Edinburgh—a theoretical or conjectural account of the manner and causes to which languages may have owed their beginning and development. It is more admirably ingenious than sound. It is an attempt to show by what means, in accordance with the known principles of the human mind, the first rude efforts of man might have progressed from a less to a more symmetrical system of signs for the interpretation of human thought, until that highly complicated machinery of expression which is now used—or rather, which was in use among the ancients—acquired the perfection, effectiveness, and polish which it now displays. It was a specimen of a style of investigation to which he was prone, which his logical intellect loved to pursue, and which may, if judiciously followed, often lead to valuable results; though it may not prove that it *was* so, it may suffice to explain how it *may have been*, and so may gratify the mind at the same time that it gives a standard of reference, when congenial matters arise in the course of research, which may be employed to facilitate inquiry, and so help in the attainment of a solution of the matter under consideration. The admirers of his work on Morals were many, though his proselytes are few; and his tract on Language is far more pleasing in its manner than trustworthy in its matter.

In 1762, the Senate of the University of Glasgow, in acknowledgment of his talents, the ability of his lectures on jurisprudence, and

the advantages which his name and fame had conferred on that institution, unanimously conferred on him the degree of LL.D. In October, 1763, Hume, then Under-Secretary of Legation in Paris, writes to inform Smith that the Baron d'Holbach (patron of the Encyclopædists, and author of a "System of Nature") had told him, "there was one under his eye that was translating your 'Theory of Moral Sentiments,' and desired me to inform you of it." The translation here referred to was published, with the title "Metaphysics of the Soul," at Paris in 1764; it was executed by M. A. Eidous (1710 to 1780), a friend of Diderot's. Baron Grimm, however, says, "It met with little success in Paris."

About the close of 1763, the Right Hon. Charles Townshend's resolution ripened into action. He had married Caroline, the daughter and heiress of John, 2nd duke of Argyll and Greenwich; widow of Francis Karl of Dalkeith, who, having predeceased his father, Francis, 2nd duke of Buccleugh, left her with the care of a son, Henry, and a daughter, Frances. This Henry, born 1746, became titular Duke of Buccleugh on the demise of his grandfather in 1751. On the re-marriage of his mother, Charles Townshend became his guardian; and as he was about to make "the grand tour," for the completion of his studies by seeing life in different countries, and so becoming acquainted with the customs and languages of other lands, Charles Townshend—desirous of providing him with the most improving companionship, guardianship, and tutorage combined—offered Adam Smith most handsome terms present and prospective if he would undertake the superintendence of the young duke, his step-son, on his travels. Smith accepted the charge, and early in 1764 met the young Duke of Buccleugh in London, and set off with him, in March, to Paris. Here they remained only about a fortnight, and then proceeded to take up their residence for eighteen months in Toulouse. From Paris he forwarded to the Rector of the University of Glasgow (Dr. Leechman) a formal note of demission of his professorship.* The office was declared vacant, and in the college minutes an entry, of which the following is an extract, was made:—"The University cannot help expressing their sincere regret at the removal of Dr. Smith, whose distinguished probity and amiable qualities procured him the esteem and affection of his colleagues; and whose uncommon genius, great abilities, and extensive learning, did so much honour to this society; his elegant and ingenious 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' having recommended him to the esteem of men of taste and literature throughout Europe. His happy talent in illustrating abstract subjects, and faithful assiduity in communicating useful knowledge, distinguished him as a professor, and at once afforded

* We have been told that Dr. Smith, before leaving the University, appointed an assistant, at his own expense, to read out the course of Lectures for the Session, and that he returned each student his whole fee for the year. They were unwilling to take it; but he insisted on it as a matter of conscience with him.

the greatest pleasure and the most important instruction to the youth under his care." Dr. Thomas Reid's "Inquiry into the Human Mind," published in 1764, led to his appointment to the professorship Smith left; and the retiring professor's wish, "that whoever is my successor may not only do credit to the office by his abilities, but be a comfort to the very excellent men with whom he is likely to spend his life, by the probity of his heart and the goodness of his temper," was granted.

Toulouse, at the time of Smith's residence in it, was the seat of a Parliament, with the principal members of which Smith lived on intimate terms, and so became fully acquainted with the internal policy of France, its modes and objects. On leaving the city of the *Jeux Floraux*, Smith and his pupil took an extensive tour through the south of France to Geneva, the capital of Switzerland. About Christmas, 1765, they returned to Paris, and remained in that city till the following October. Here, through Hume's influence, he was introduced into the selectest circles of society. Among those whose acquaintance he enjoyed may be mentioned Helvetius, author of "Dè l'Esprit;" Marmontel, whose so called "Moral Tales" are so much purer in style than in matter; D'Alembert, astronomer and mathematician, author of the "Discours Préliminaire" to the Encyclopædia; Necker, the financier; Quesnay, the economist; and Turgot, his disciple, a statesman of far-seeing views; Morellet, the critic and publicist; Baron D'Holbach, author of "The System of Nature;" the Duke of Rochefoucauld, grandson of the author of the "Maxims," &c. His intimacy with these men was very close, and his friendship for some of them warm. The impression made upon Smith's mind by the Duke of Rochefoucauld's friendliness may be in some measure estimated by the fact that he omitted a severe animadversion against his grandfather's principles from the later editions of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments;" while the influence exerted by Smith on him is traceable in his intention to have translated the Scotchman's work—had he not been forestalled, and by a letter of date 1778, in which, while transmitting a new edition of the "Maxims" to his friend, he apologizes for the tenets they maintain. Turgot and Smith, we gather from Hume's correspondence, were sincere and mutual friends, though there is no extant proof of their having kept up a voluminous interchange of thoughts, as was at one time supposed.

So great was Smith's respect for Quesnay that he intended to dedicate "The Wealth of Nations" to him; but the great economist died (1774) while it was passing slowly through the press. From a letter published in the Abbé Morellet's "Memoirs," we learn that Smith spoke French very ill, and that the chief topics of his conversation were banking, commerce, and finance. Smith at the same time had the *entrée* to and mixed freely in the *salon* life of Paris, in the suite of Mesdames Riccoboni (authoress of "Ernestine," &c.) and De Boufflers, and of Mademoiselle Rianecourt, so that he had every opportunity of becoming familiar with the social customs

and economics of France, and of widening his experience by the teachings of society.

Dr. Smith and the Duke of Buccleugh (who was then twenty years of age) returned to London in October, 1766, and there their connection as tutor and pupil ceased, after having been nearly three years in each other's company, "without," says the Duke, in a letter to Professor Dugald Stewart, "the slightest disagreement or coolness: on my part, with every advantage that could be expected from the society of such a man. We continued to live in friendship till the hour of his death; and I shall always remain with the impression of having lost a friend whom I loved and respected, not only for his great talents but for every private virtue." Smith shortly afterwards returned to his mother's house at Kirkcaldy, and there passed his time for nearly ten years, broken only at intervals by visits to Edinburgh and journeys to London, for the purpose of collecting authoritative information, or making references about the objects of his research. "My business here," he writes to Hume, June 7th, 1767, "is study, in which I have been very deeply engaged for about a month past. My amusements are long solitary walks by the seaside. You may judge how I spend my time. I feel myself, however, extremely happy, comfortable, and contented. I never was, perhaps, more so in all my life."

Dr. Smith had written to Hume from Toulouse on 5th July, 1764, saying:—"The life which I led at Glasgow was a pleasurable dissipated life in comparison of that which I lead here. *I have begun to write a book* in order to pass away the time; you may believe I have very little to do." The book here referred to, as just begun, was in all likelihood "The Wealth of Nations," and it was this same book that for years formed the serious occupation of his life.

The Duke of Buccleugh, shortly before completing his majority, married, in 1767, Elizabeth, daughter of George, Duke Montague; and during the earliest weeks of their married life, Smith was an honoured guest at Dalkeith House, as we know from a letter to Hume, of date September 18th, 1767.

About the year 1766, Smith became acquainted with Franklin, and he afterwards grew deeply interested in American affairs. Morellet, on 15th May, 1769, forwarded to Hume a prospectus of "A New Dictionary of Commerce," and requested him to distribute them among his friends, naming among others Smith, Franklin, and Principal Robertson, the historian. This Hume undertook to do. It was probably through Franklin that Smith acquired the accurate and extensive information relative to America which the "Wealth of Nations" displays. Hume, from James Court, Edinburgh, where he resided after his retirement from official political life, invites Smith to visit him for a little, saying, "I want to know what you have been doing, and propose to exact a rigorous account of the method in which you have employed yourself during your retreat." Smith most likely went, and enjoyed the aid and advice of his friend. Several letters of this year (1769) to Lord Hailes

(Sir David Dalrymple, the historian and legist) give us glimpses of his pursuits:—"I should *now* (March 5th, 1769) be extremely obliged to your lordship if you would send me the papers you mention upon the prices of provisions in former times. . . I have read law entirely with a view to form some general notion of the great outlines of the plan according to which justice has been administered in different ages and countries." A week later, he communicates his views on the prices of silver to the same learned personage. On February 6th, 1770, we find Hume writing, "What is the meaning of this, dear Smith, which we hear, that you are not to be above a day or two on your passage to London?" From which we may infer he intended to go, and suppose that he went, to the metropolis. He was at home in January, 1772; but from Hume's letters to him, June 27th, 1772, and Nov. 23rd, 1772, we learn that he had been in London the greater part of that year. In the former, Hume communicates to Smith the news of the extraordinary state of monetary affairs for which Scotland was in that year remarkable; and in the latter he says, "Come hither for some weeks about Christmas; dissipate yourself a little; return to Kirkcaldy; finish your work before autumn; go to London; print it; return and settle in this town, which suits your *studious independent* turn, even better than London." We presume he took the first part of this advice; for in the spring of 1773, before setting out from Scotland for London, where he intended a longer than usual stay, he wrote the following letter to Hume:—

"Edinburgh, April 16th, 1773.

"My dear Friend,—As I have left the care of all my literary papers to you, I must tell you that, except those which I carry along with me, there are none worth the publication but a few fragments of a great work, which contains a history of the astronomical systems that were successively in fashion down to the time of Des Cartes. Whether that might not be published as a fragment of an intended juvenile work, I leave to your judgment; though I begin to suspect that there is more refinement than solidity in some parts of it. This little work you will find in a thin folio paper in my back room. All the other loose papers which you will find in that desk, or within the glass folding doors of a bureau in my bedroom, together with about eighteen thin folio books, which you will likewise find within the same glass folding doors, I desire may be destroyed without any examination. Unless I die very suddenly, I shall take care that the papers I carry with me shall be sent to you.—I am ever, my dear friend, most faithfully yours,

"ADAM SMITH."

Hume corresponded with him several times during 1773 and 1774. He seems to have been living chiefly in London during those years, superintending his book's passage through the press. Early in 1776, "The Wealth of Nations" was published. Hume, on the 8th February, 1776, says: "By all accounts, *your book has been printed long ago*; yet it has never been so much as advertised. What is the reason? If you wait till the fate of America be decided, you may wait long. By all accounts, you intend to settle with us this spring. Yet we hear no more of it. What is the reason? Your chamber in

my house is always unoccupied. I am always at home. I expect you to land here." Hume had not long to wait for a copy. He was at this time in ill-health; but he brisks up on receiving his friend's book, and writes off in high glee thus:—"Euge! Bello. Dear Mr. Smith, —I am much pleased with your performance; and the perusal of it has taken me from a state of great anxiety. It was a work of so much expectation, by yourself, by your friends, and by the public, that I trembled for its appearance; but am now much relieved. . . It has depth and solidity and acuteness, and is so much illustrated by curious facts that it must, at last, take the public attention. It is probably much improved by your last abode in London." The enthusiastic congratulations of his friends poured in upon him fast and manifold; and so far, at least, the reception of his book was favourable. By 1781 it had reached a second edition; and a French translation (by Abbé Blavet) of it was published in Paris; this may be taken as an indication of the value set upon it by his continental friends. Before his death it had been translated into the languages of most of the nations of Europe. Upon this work,—“perhaps,” says Sir James Macintosh, “the only book which produced an immediate, general, and irrevocable change in some of the most important parts of the legislation of all civilized nations,”—the great name of Adam Smith rests, and rests securely. “In a few years it began to alter laws and treaties; and has made its way, throughout the convulsions of revolution and conquest, to a due ascendant over the minds of men, with far less than the average obstructions of prejudice and clamour, which choke the channels through which truth flows into practice.”*

Few works so ill bear abridgment. The beauty of its style, the wonderful variety of illustrative examples, the immense and multifarious mass of statistical matter and historical reference or allusion, the wide stretch of thought, rising into pure philosophy and stooping to discuss the price of pins,—make it impossible to produce any adequate estimate of the merit of this book—in some measure, it might almost be said, the creed and decalogue of a certain class of politicians: but, as in the case of the “Theory of Moral Sentiments,” we shall endeavour to bring into the prominence of one thread of thought the leading principle which permeates the whole, and so give an idea of its quality, and—let us hope—an aid to the study of it.

As an *Organon* of social science, the “Wealth of Nations” is not quite complete, although it has a topical and logical compactness in its main elements that is almost wonderful. The Copernicus of political economy, the Columbus of free trade, the Lavoisier of the science of wealth, the Bacon of mercantile induction, like his types, left some labour for others to perform, some errors for others to correct. His great work was liker the “Critique of Pure Reason,” than the Logic of

* Sir James Macintosh's “Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy,” prefixed to “Encyclopædia Britannica,” p. 368.

Aristotle—it was a work by which the foundation-stones of a building were laid, not one in which the work was finished and perfected. The grand fundamental principles of economics, so conscientiously and far-seeingly established by Adam Smith, are, even yet, imperfectly understood, and still less perfectly applied. It might be well if the world would listen to this great-thoughted man, and strive to comprehend the living spirit rather than the killing letter of his system. If observation and experience, analyzed by reason, expounded by a wise logic, with a rare discretion and an abounding wealth of historic illustration, can charm and inform the mind, this instauration of economic philosophy cannot fail to be a book rarely valued by a thinker. If, in the comprehensive sagacity of his own mind, he has left some dissertations seemingly unlinked to the great and firmly-knit chain of his general reasoning, it is because he has given his readers credit for being able and willing to think for themselves, not from his incapacity to adjust them into oneness.

If we endeavour to trace the line of thought along through the vast series of his speculations—each interesting and all excellent—we shall leave much in his work unnoticed; but then we shall, perhaps, pioneer some sterling mind through the apparent perplexities of the favourite digressions of Smith, and enable him to see, in the electric light of reason, that flashes along the main line of his thought, that the seeming pathlessness is, after all, a well-arranged avenue, bringing into view all the attractive sights within vision on the way to the chief structure, towards which we press. Labour is the source of wealth, the original purchase-money paid for all things. Everything coveted by man is either the produce of labour, or acquires more or less of its desirability from labour; and that quantity of labour which is expended in bringing it within the catalogue of desirable and attainable things is its real value, whatever its accidental one may be. To minimize labour and maximize production is the great task of man. Labour is best minimized by intelligence, and production best maximized by intelligent industry. Industry is best and most intelligent, in itself, when all the power of one's mind can be given to such a portion of the great cycle of labour involved in production, as may be at once and easily performed; and hence labour is minimized, and production maximized, by careful subdivision and arrangement. The *real* value of any man's labour—of whatever kind—is a due and competent portion of the necessities, comforts, conveniences, and luxuries of life, in the state and station of society in which he lives. Its *accidental* value may be more or less, according to the exigencies of the times. That the *accidental* should be brought as nearly as possible to the *real* value of labour, every external restriction should be removed, by which justice is impeded or equity destroyed. The true policy of man is freedom in every act and circumstance of life, if it be governed by justice and restrained by charity. Wages, profits, rents, &c.—every form of defining any man's share in the good things of life, for which his labour has been given as an equiva-

lent—are, in reality, subject to the same law, and are regulated by the same principle, unless interfered with by ill-judged political or social measures. Capital is stored labour; and Taxation is the charge or per-centage levied by the State for protecting society in its ordinary forms of ongoing, so that, as far as possible, the laws of natural right may become the laws of nations, and of the individuals who compose them. This seems to us the true statement of the prime thought of the book, apart from its sectional or special teachings. Formally, the work is divided into five parts, in which are discussed—*first*, the causes of the formation, increase, and decline of national wealth, and the rules by which it becomes diffused throughout society; *second*, the nature and results of capital; *third*, the forms, modes, and changes in national wealth; *fourth*, the influences, for good or evil, of political and social doctrines; and *fifth*, the nature of revenue and the laws of taxation. This bald and meagre free-hand outline of the work can convey no adequate notion of the masterly disquisitions which bestud it; the noble tone of morals which pervades it; the relishable honesty of controversy which characterizes it; the clear, methodical, judicious, and luminous reasoning in which its doctrines are explained; and the kindly keenness of thought with which it pleads for the poor to the rich, by showing that, in most instances, the accidents of life have been more powerful in their case than their own real and genuine efforts to do their part. It is true there are errors in this book;—were it otherwise, would it be a *human* work? It is true there are omissions;—what mind, not indeed divine, can compass the whole circumference of even the simplest truth? It is true there are some overstrained reasonings;—but who has dwelt long upon a theme without being somewhat biassed in his view of it? It is true that society has changed since it was written; that sentiments are now surging in the State of which he knew nothing; that forms of industry and methods of production have sprung into existence of which he had no conception. What then; is it not the inevitable fate of man to be ever outmarched by his successors? Read carefully, with a wise caution and a cautious scepticism, Smith's work is, in itself, a vast contribution to the "Wealth of Nations," which, if attended to, would raise man much in dignity, wealth, power,—in one word—*happiness*. So let it be read.

The greater part of the two years succeeding the publication of that work which Lord Brougham describes as having "the extraordinary merit of showing in what way economical reasoning should be conducted,—with a constant recourse to the general principles of human nature, and a distrust of all empirical details, though with a due attention to ascertained facts of a general and not a topical or accidental class"—Dr. Smith spent in London. Hume appointed Smith his literary executor, giving him full power over all his papers and works, except the "Dialogues on Natural Religion." Smith resolved not to edit that work, and told Hume so, and he made other arrangements, without, however, cancelling a donation of

£200, which was to be paid to Smith immediately after the publication of that work. On Hume's death his brother paid the bequest, but Smith refused to accept of it, because he had not fulfilled the conditions of the grant. Hearing that Hume's illness had assumed a serious aspect, John Home, the dramatist, and Adam Smith, set out from London to see him: they met him, by chance, on his way to Bath *viâ* London, at Morpeth, in Northumberland, on April 23rd, 1776. By agreement Smith went to Scotland, and Hume accompanied his friend and relative to London; whence, on his arrival, Hume wrote to Smith, May 3rd, 1776, regarding his hesitance about the "Dialogues," and informed him,—“I find the town very full of your book, which meets with general approbation.” Smith agreed to superintend a new edition of Hume's works, then in the press; and it was subsequently published in 1777.

Hume grew worse, and returned to Edinburgh, where he met his friends, Lord Elibank, Dr. Blair, Dr. Black, Professor Ferguson, John Home, and Adam Smith, at dinner on July 4th, 1776, to bid farewell to him who had been the chief ornament of Scottish literature in his age. Smith remained with him to see that he was cared for, till Hume, unwilling to wrench his friend's heart with grief, suggested that he should take rest and relief in Kirkcaldy, on the assurance that he would be called when the dangerous hour came near, and that Dr. Black would keep him regularly informed of the progress of the malady. On Aug. 25th, 1776, Hume died; and Smith saw him laid in his chosen grave, in a corner of the Calton Hill of Edinburgh. Scarcely had the earth been shovelled on him, before venomous calumny assailed the memory of the philosopher, historian, and moralist; and Smith, yet saddened by his loss, was required to deny the puerile tales of death-bed remorse, which some well-meaning people were foolish enough to circulate. This denial was embodied in a beautiful and touching narrative-letter, addressed to Mr. Strahan, printer, containing an account of Hume's illness and death, appended to the characteristic memoir entitled, “My own Life,” which the historian left among his MSS. This effectually silenced the traducers of his friend's fame on that point; but they turned their rancour on Smith himself, and resented his generous zeal by accusing him of a sceptical indifference to things sacred. Dr. Horne, bishop of Norwich, whose “Commentary on the Psalms” is so great a treasure in theological literature, assailed Smith in a letter much more conspicuous for subtle irony, dexterous theologic weapon-handling, than Christian charity-or candour. To these attacks on himself Smith never replied. Dr. Samuel Johnson, it is said, resented this defence of his dead friend's memory, at a Mr. Dilly's table, so keenly as to call Smith a liar, a title which Smith, according to report, capped with an epithet quite as opprobrious, and left the room in which the lexicographer sat. This story, disagreeable, if not improbable in its details, is related in the *Edinburgh Review*, No. 175, and in the “Life of Wilberforce.” That it is “founded on fact” is certain. Boswell relates a similar

incident as having occurred at Mr. Strahan's. Several years afterwards, when Dr. Johnson was maintaining the superiority of rhyme over blank verse, Boswell remarked, that he had heard Adam Smith enforce the same opinion in his lectures when he was a student at Glasgow. "Sir," said Johnson, "Smith and I *once* met, and we did not much take to each other, but if I had known that the dog loved rhyme as much as you say he does, sir, I should have hugged him." And yet, while living in London, Smith enjoyed a fair share of literary reputation, was a member of the Literary Club, and in an address presented to the members of that body—published in the *Annual Register*, 1776—is mentioned as follows:—

"If I have thoughts and can't express 'em,
Gibbon shall teach me how to dress 'em,
In words select and terse;
Jones teach me modesty and Greek,
Smith *how to think*, Burke how to speak,
And Beauclerc to converse."

In 1778, Smith, at the unsolicited request of the Duke of Buccleugh, was appointed one of the Commissioners of Customs in Scotland, and removed to Edinburgh, where he spent, for the most part, the remaining years of his life. In the same year, Lord Kames, while preparing the third edition of his "*Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*," felt it necessary to review and oppose the opinions of Smith, and forwarded to his opponent a copy of those parts of the work (part i. chap. ix.) which contained the intended strictures; and Smith, in returning the sheets, observes, "Nothing can be more perfectly friendly and polite than the terms in which you express yourself with regard to me; and I should be extremely ill-tempered if I could make the slightest opposition to their publication. I am no doubt extremely sorry to find myself of a different opinion, both from so able a judge of the subject and of so old and good a friend;—but differences of this kind are unavoidable; and besides, *Partium contentioibus respublica crescit*."

Hereafter, the trivial but incessant and irksome routine of official duty exhausted his spirits, weighed on his attention, and he ceased to cultivate letters except as an amusement for his leisure, or as the agent for giving animation and interest to conversation. He shrunk from the arduous task of completing the round of his speculations as he originally intended, by giving "*an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society— not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law.*"* Neither did he feel himself competent to conduct the researches necessary to enable him to compose a "*Treatise on the Republics of Greece and Rome*," which formed one of his early plans. A few years of leisure, retirement, competence, and health might have enabled him

* "*Theory of Moral Sentiments*," part xvii. sect. 4. Digitized by Google

to fulfil the grand designs of his life. But Smith, with the capacity of a legislator, was quartered on the customs, and the world lost a theory of jurisprudence, that George III. might have an inland revenue officer, and perhaps (P) the Duke of Buccleugh be free from a pensioner. Shortly after he had issued the third edition of "The Wealth of Nations," Dr. Smith's mother died, in 1784. This was a bereavement he felt sorely. In 1787, he was chosen Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow, a token of fame than which no other, he says, "could have given me so much real satisfaction." It is traditionally related that he failed in being able to address his students on the installation day.

In 1788, his niece and housekeeper, Miss Douglass, died, and "all that he ever knew of the endearments of a family" life were thus taken away from him. He was now alone, helpless, and sixty five years of age; his friends fading around him, and his own health failing. His only enjoyments were his library—the books in which were few, select, and handsomely bound—and in the conversations of his friends, who were in the habit of dining with him every Sunday, and oftener when convenient. His lonely and sedentary life affected his health, and he became subject to a chronic obstruction of the intestinal canal, which pained him sorely. He bore his ailment with patience, fortitude, and equanimity, sympathized with by friends, and resigned in his own mind. It cannot be doubted that he looked with regret upon the time spent in performing duties which almost any one of a thousand common men might have performed with all but equal skill and accuracy. He regretted "he had done so little. I meant to have done more," he said; "and there are materials in my papers of which I could have made a great deal. But that is now out of the question." Jealous of his literary reputation, and solicitous to free any of his friends and pupils from the charge of plagiarism, he destroyed all his lectures and papers, with the exception of six essays, a few days before his death. He had spent the previous winter in preparing for the press the sixth edition of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," and the fourth of "The Wealth of Nations," both published in 1789, and had even expressed, in an advertisement prefixed to the former, a last faint hope of being able to accomplish his work on "Jurisprudence."

On the sabbath before his death a pretty numerous gathering of his friends had met to sup with him; but finding himself too weak to enjoy their society he left them, and, when retiring, remarked, "I believe we must adjourn this meeting to some other place." In a few days afterwards he died, on 17th July, 1790, exactly three months after Benjamin Franklin, than whom, however, he was seventeen years younger, but whom in many ways he resembled. He bequeathed his library and property to his nephew, D. Douglas, Esq., Advocate, whom he had educated under his own old pupil professor, Millar; and appointed Drs. Hutton and Black his literary executors. They published his six essays,—1st, "The History of Astronomy;" 2nd, "The History of Ancient Physics;" 3rd, "The

"History of Ancient Logic and Metaphysics;" 4th, "On the Nature of Imitation;" 5th, "On English and Italian Verses;" 6th, "The External Senses." The first three were fragments of a great work he had once contemplated,—but subsequently abandoned from its unmanageable width and scope,—upon the principles which direct philosophical inquiries as illustrated in the "History of the Various Sciences,"—a work since in part accomplished in Whewell's "History of the Inductive Sciences."

Dr. Smith lies buried in the Canongate churchyard, in the Scottish metropolis—"Edinburgh town"—and Stewart, his biographer, occupies a place not far distant. The pilgrim may easily find the tomb of the father of political economy. All that was earthly of him lies *there*; but who shall tell where the influences of his intellect are unfelt? Trace but one chronological line of his disciples, and you will gain a faint idea of the power—the epoch-forming actuality—of his intellect. Millar, Stewart, Say, Horner, Brougham, Malthus, Macintosh, Ricardo, Cobbett, Torrens, Thompson, McCulloch, Mill, Whately, Doubleday, &c. Run over, in thought, only a few of the topics upon which he discoursed, *e.g.*, labour, capital, wages, profit, rent, credit, interest, money, price, property, population, production, consumption, metals, merchandises, agriculture, taxation, banking, &c., and you will be able, in some measure and degree, to estimate the variety and extent of knowledge and thought which must have been brought to bear upon these matters to make a useful, popular, and original work upon them. Items of thought—disjunct and one-sided—had, it is true, appeared upon many of these points; special tractates on some of them abounded; but Adam Smith, for the first time, attempted to invade this extensive and difficult field of inquiry with the powers of reason, and made a whole mass of prejudices, errors, mistakes, and impolitic enactments fly from it in vanquished dismay. He inaugurated reasonable legislation, based upon a full and proper investigation of the facts, regarding the objects on which the law was to exert its influence or power. Trace, if you can, the mark he has made on the statute-books of all the countries of Europe; the measures founded on his views; the changes originating in his suggestions; the taxes remitted; the obnoxious laws repealed; the very form and method of thought altered by the active permeation of the public mind with his ideas,—and you may form some notion of the might that lies within a studious mind when it girds itself up to the height of its capacity, and gives its force and power to the elucidation of those questions which affect the happiness of mankind. Triumph upon triumph has proven the validity of Smith's theoretic views. Iniquitous laws have fallen from power; prejudices have crumbled into dusty nothing; customs have been altered, policies changed, and systems inaugurated, and doctrines of potency become dictates of policy, since Smith thought, and because he wrote. He was an epoch man.

S. N.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"There was no time when a visible and speaking authority did not exist, to which submission was due. Before Jesus Christ, that authority, among the Jews, was in the synagogue; when the synagogue was on the point of failing, Jesus Christ himself appeared; when this Divine personage withdrew, He left a Church, and with it His Holy Spirit. Tell me that Jesus Christ once more appears upon earth, teaching, preaching, and working miracles, I want this Church no longer. But if you take her from me, again I must have Jesus Christ in person, speaking, instructing, deciding by miracles, and with an unerring authority. But has He not left, you say, His written Word? He has; a Word holy and adorable; but it is a Word that may be handled and expounded as fancy shall direct; a Word that remains silent under every interpretation. When difficulties and doubts arise, then I must have some external guide that shall solve those difficulties and satisfy my doubts, and that guide must be unerring."—Bossuet, "*Conférence avec M. Claude*," p. 129.

THE nature of the Catholic Rule of Faith has been fully entered into by "Ignatius;" and "Gregory" has pointed out the testimony of the written Word of God to the existence of such an authority in pp. 86 and 87. If due consideration be given, it will be found that many of the passages which he has extracted from Holy Writ cannot possibly apply to any other institution than the Holy Roman Church. But, in doing this, he has by no means exhausted this rich treasury of evidence, for it would seem but meet that the prophets of God, as well as our Lord himself, should dwell much upon the future greatness of that glorious kingdom which He has established upon earth.

Although this article is intended chiefly to draw the attention of the reader to those times which immediately succeeded the apostolic age, yet, in order to render the testimony of the early ages of the Church complete, it will be necessary for me to revert to the period when Christianity was in its infancy.

First, then, I assert that, during the lifetime of the apostle Paul, the Church located in Rome was in possession of the true faith. This is a simple truth, which will be readily admitted. But although simple, it is, at the same time, highly important; because, although simple, it is a truth from which many others necessarily flow. "First, I give thanks to my God, through Jesus Christ, for you all, because your faith is spoken of in the whole world," Rom. i. 8. The same apostle writes to the Ephesians of "one Lord, one faith, one baptism," Ephes. iv. 5; and to the Corinthians thus, "For in one

Spirit were we all baptized into one body," 1 Cor. xii. 13. These passages prove that the Christians in Rome, Ephesus, and Corinth were in possession of one common faith. If an individual in one of these cities had taught a single doctrine contrary to, or had denied a single tenet of this one faith which S. Paul preached, he would have been marked out as a heretic, and, in all probability, the advice of this same apostle would have been followed: "A man that is a heretic, after the first admonition avoid." Now, if this be true of an individual, how much more noticeable would have been the departure of an entire local Church from this one true faith. If I, in common with all other Catholics, am in error, the Roman Church must have fallen into heresy. I ask, When? My opponents cannot declare that she fell into her supposed errors all at once. Must there not, then, have been a beginning to her heresy? What heretical tenet was first broached therein? or, what is still more important, which Bishop of Rome confirmed it? and how was it that the Church, in all other parts of the world, did not protest against it? I believe Protestants do not consider any early writers entitled to be called Fathers of the Church besides those which the Roman Church has ever recognized as such. If they do, can they tell which of them wrote against the Roman Church? If these questions cannot be fairly answered, we see clearly that the Roman Church in the early ages had no accusers, neither churches nor even individuals, save those whose tenets are acknowledged by Protestants themselves to have been of the most horrible description.

But let us look at this matter in a common-sense point of view, and judge which is most probable,—that Satan should instigate certain individuals, at different times, to affirm that the Church which Jesus Christ had founded, and the apostles and their successors propagated, was in error; or, that this Church, against which He had declared the gates of hell should not prevail, should really fall into heresy, and even idolatry. The Holy Scriptures declare that in the latter days many shall depart from the faith; and we know, indeed, that this has come to pass; but it gives the lie to the oft-repeated assertion that, for many centuries prior to the Reformation, the whole or nearly the whole of the world lay buried in spiritual darkness, and even "damnable idolatry."

Again, how unreasonable is it for Protestants to refuse to acknowledge the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome in the early ages of the Church, and yet, at the same time, declare that so many errors were palmed upon, to say at least, the majority of Christians in all other places. I have thus shown some of the reasons which induce us to believe that the Roman Church, which possessed the one true faith at the beginning, has not fallen into error, and has, therefore, the true Rule of Faith; but in order to show more clearly the impossibility of its erring without incurring the denunciations of the remainder of the Christian world, we subjoin an illustration.

The reader will imagine all Christians, no matter where located, to act in the following manner:—They are in the habit of meeting

together, at least once a week, to partake of bread and wine, in memory of the sacrifice and death of Jesus Christ. Before partaking, however, he whom they recognize as their minister makes use of certain words, which are indeed the words of the Saviour, when He instituted this memorial. This is simplicity itself; all believe they receive bread and wine, and in substance nothing more. But an individual residing in England, France, or Italy, no matter which, rises up and makes the astounding declaration that when the minister makes use of the words before mentioned, the bread and wine remain no longer; but that Jesus Christ, by His own power, changes them into His own body and blood, and that He even did the same thing when He instituted the memorial which they are in the habit of commemorating. The most probable notion is, that such a person would be looked upon in the light of a madman, and treated accordingly. If he *did* obtain any followers, a formal protest, at least, would be everywhere made against such a seeming absurdity. If the Bishop of Rome is *supposed* to be looked upon as superior in any degree, there can be no question about his decision,—it would decidedly be against any doctrine which was novel. If Catholicity be not true, then this *supposition* becomes a *fact*; and the Protestant is left to wonder, not only at the absence of a protest, but also to wonder for what motive the whole Christian world, with the exception of a solitary few, should renounce a simple practice for belief in the greatest of mysteries. But while we find no stir made in the Christian world against this and other supposed Romish errors, we find enough about the errors of Valentinus, Marcion, Arius, Nestorius, and a host of others. *How is this?*

I leave the Protestant reader to answer this satisfactorily, even to his own mind, if he can. The only answer I can give is this:—*Because all the rejected tenets of those heretics were novel.* Hitherto I have merely dwelt upon the absence of any kind of reproof given to the Roman Church by the immediate and subsequent successors of the apostles. Bearing in mind that the undermentioned writers were strenuous opposers of various heresies, I proceed to set before the reader their testimony to the truth and infallibility of the Roman Church.

S. Irenæus was the disciple of S. Polycarp, the angel of the Church of Smyrna, and disciple of S. John the Evangelist. After distinctly proving the descent of doctrine from the apostles, he (S. Irenæus) writes thus:—

“However, as it would be tedious to enumerate the whole list of successions, I shall confine myself to that of Rome,—the greatest, and most ancient, and most illustrious Church, founded by the glorious apostles Peter and Paul,—receiving from them her doctrine, which was announced to all men, and which, through the succession of her bishops, has come down to us. Thus we confound all those who, through evil designs, or vain glory, or perverseness, teach what they ought not. For to this Church, on account of its superior headship (*propter potorem principalitatem*), every other must have recourse,—that is, the faithful of all countries, in which

Church has been preserved the doctrine delivered by the apostles."—*Adv. Har.* lib. iii. c. 3, p. 175.

"Things being thus made plain, it is not from others that truth is to be sought, which may be readily learned from the Church; for to this Church, as unto a rich depository, the apostles committed whatever is of Divine truth, that each one, if so inclined, might thence draw the drink of life. This is the way to life; all other teachers must be shunned as thieves and robbers."—*Ibid.* c. iv. p. 178.

"The teaching of the Church is true and stable, showing to all men the same one path of salvation; for to her has been committed the light and the wisdom of God. As the wise man says (Prov. c. i.):—'*She uttereth her voice in the streets; she crieth on the highest walls; she speaketh, without ceasing, at the city gates.*' *Everywhere the Church proclaims the truth.* She is the candlestick with the seven lamps (Exod. xxv.), bearing the light of Christ."—*Ibid.* lib. v. c. 20, p. 317.

S. Cyprian died a martyr for the cause of Christ in the year 258. In his treatise on the unity of the Church, he says, that men are exposed to error—

"because they turn not their eyes to the fountain of truth; nor is the head sought for, nor the doctrine of the heavenly Father upheld. Which things would any one seriously ponder, no long inquiry would be necessary. The proof is easy. Christ addresses Peter:—'*I say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.*' . . . He that does not hold this unity of the Church, can he think that he holds the faith? He that opposes and withstands the Church, can he trust that he is in the Church?"—*De Unit. Eccl.* pp. 194, 195.

"He cannot have God for a Father who has not the Church for his mother. If, excluded from the ark of Noah, any one might have escaped, so may he, if out of the Church."—*Ibid.* p. 195.

Origen died about the year 254. He thus writes:—

"As there are many who think they believe what Christ taught, and some of these differ from others, it becomes necessary that all should profess that doctrine which came down from the apostles, and now continues in the Church. That alone is truth which in nothing differs from ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition."—*Præf.* lib. 1; *Periarchon*, tom. i. p. 47; edit. PP. S. Mauri, Paris, 1733.

"If we follow the mere letter of the Scriptures, and take the interpretation of the Law, as the Jews commonly explain it, I shall blush to confess that the Lord should have given such laws. But if the law of God be understood, as the Church teaches, then truly does it transcend all human laws, and is worthy of Him that gave it."—*Hom. VII. in Levit.* tom. ii. pp. 224—226.

S. Jerome, in the fourth century, writes thus from the deserts of Syria to Pope Damasus:—

"I am following no other than Christ, united to the communion of your Holiness—that is, to the chair of Peter. I know that the Church is founded upon that rock. Whoever eateth the Lamb out of that house, is a profane man. Whoever is not in the ark, shall perish by the flood. But, forasmuch as being retired into the desert of Syria, I cannot receive the sacrament at your hands, I follow your colleagues, the bishops of Egypt. I do not know Vitalis. I do not communicate with Meletius. Paulinus is a stranger to me. He that gathereth not with you, scattereth."—*Ep. XIV. ad Damasum*, tom. iv. p. 19.

"I cease not to proclaim: He is mine, who remains united to the *chair of Peter*."—*Eph. XV.*; *ibid.* p. 22.

The great S. Augustine brings me to the fifth century, beyond which I will not extend these extracts, the testimony of five centuries being sufficient to illustrate the truth of my assertions.

"In the Catholic Church many are the considerations which must keep me in her bosom. The assent of nations; her authority first established by miracles; the succession of pastors from the chair of Peter, to whom the Lord committed the care of feeding His flock, down to the present bishop; lastly, the name itself of Catholic."—*Contra ep. Fundam.* c. iv. tom. viii. p. 153.

"The Church shall not be overcome; it shall not be rooted up; nor shall it give way to any temptations: it shall endure to the end of the world, when we shall be translated from this temporal to an eternal habitation."—*Enarrat. in Ps. LX.* tom. iv. p. 587.

"Some, who are not in the Church, are heard to say, her unity is gone, the Church of all nations has disappeared. What insolence! Is she no longer because thou art not a member? She shall be, though thou be not. This presumptuous saying, resting on no truth, upheld by no wisdom, full of vanity and rashness, the spirit of God foresaw. But the Way and the Truth has announced (*Matt. xxviii. 20*). Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world."—*Ibid. Ser. ii. in Ps. CI.* p. 1105.

Speaking of the validity of baptism conferred by heretics, he says:—

"Nor should we ourselves dare to assert such a thing, if we were not supported by the most united authority of the Universal Church, to which also Cyprian himself would undoubtedly have yielded, if at that time the truth of this question had been solidly established, being elucidated and declared by a plenary council."

The lucid explanation of the Catholic Rule of Faith by "Ignatius," together with the article of "Gregory," will, for the present, be found a sufficient answer to the objections of "Theophylact." I propose, therefore, to devote the remainder of this article to a review of that by "Lex Scripta." In doing this, I shall clearly show that many of his statements will not bear the test of investigation. He first complains (page 93) that "Ignatius" has not written in *defence* of the Catholic rule of faith, and in doing this makes use of the following remark: "It is always easier to attack than to defend." The reader will observe that this expression is perfectly uncalculated for, since "Ignatius" has there abstained from any attack whatever upon the Protestant rule. Before the truth of any rule can be proved, the nature of it must be explained, and it was undoubtedly on account of the misconceptions existing among Protestants with regard to the Catholic rule, that "Ignatius" was induced to devote an entire article to its definition. In a former discussion, alluded to by "Lex Scripta," it was the duty of writers on the affirmative side to defend the theory, but on reviewing those articles I find a great deal of paper wasted by attacks upon the Catholic Church.

On the other hand, "Lex Scripta" himself makes the following admission:—"In the former discussion, our opponents have done

their best to cavil and object." To *object* in this instance was decidedly our *duty*, but in doing this it would appear that we have drawn upon us the wrath of "Lex Scripta," for he remarks, "Depend upon it, the arguments in this discussion, as in the former, will consist chiefly in attacking the opposite side." I promise "Lex Scripta" that by the end of this discussion he will be unanimously declared a false prophet. He does not hesitate to accuse us of making use of "baseless assertions," but readers of the *British Controversialist* will doubtless accuse him of a baseless assertion where he says, that abler hands than ours since the times of Luther and Chillingworth have never *attempted* to prove the Catholic Rule of Faith (page 93).

With regard to honour paid to the Blessed Virgin, touched upon at page 96, I would ask "Lex Scripta" if he ever knew any man of "education and acquirements" assert that we ought, or that it is lawful, to "offer to the Blessed Virgin the honour due to God alone"—or if he ever *heard* of any Catholic, in this country or *any other*, making such an assertion? I suppose he would answer honestly, and therefore his answer would be, No. But yet he believes the ignorant offer her this honour. If this is the case, who are their teachers? Not their priests, for they are men of "education and acquirements;" or if they were not, their bishops would be. Not their books, for if "Lex Scripta" refers to any book of instruction used by Catholics, he will find, that every degree of honour is to be paid to the Blessed Virgin, *save*—Divine honour.

With respect to indulgences, referred to by "Lex Scripta" (page 97), I must observe that we have here an instance on his part, either of lamentable ignorance with respect to Catholic doctrine (although he boasts of his knowledge on the same page), or of desire to mislead the reader. He not only asserts that Rome gives "indulgences to sin," but that Gregory admits the fact of documentary evidence to prove the existence of *such* indulgences. A few words will suffice to show what this "baseless assertion" is worth. It must be borne in mind that "Lex Scripta" distinctly mentions "*indulgences to sin*," which he supposes "Rome gives her followers." *These* indulgences have not, nor ever had, any existence, save in the imagination of such Protestants as "Lex Scripta." "Gregory," therefore, tells him to "inform himself a little better of what Catholicism consists, before he ventures to attack it."

The power of the Pontiffs to grant indulgences, (*not to sin*) however, is really a point of Catholic doctrine.* It was for *these* indulgences "Gregory" stated we have documentary evidence, *not* for "*indulgences to sin*," which "Lex Scripta" affirms "Gregory" first admits and then denies. Not content with this, he ("Lex Scripta") proceeds to accuse, not only "Gregory" but Catholics in

* To learn what the doctrine of indulgences really means, I refer the reader to Challoner's "Catholic Instructed," "Papist Misrepresented and Represented," or any other book of instruction, to be had of most Catholic booksellers.

general, with unprincipled lying, by the following malicious remark, "Thus do Romanists meet with a denial the charge of encouraging immorality by their pernicious doctrines" (page 97).

The impartial reader will perceive that want of space alone prevents me from noticing further the article of my opponent, and I must therefore look to some abler hand to complete the work. At the same time, it will be readily admitted, that in this instance I have endeavoured to prove "the Catholic Rule of Faith true" by an appeal to *facts*. The testimony of the first five centuries to the ever-enduring truth of the Catholic Church is no mean authority; and although I have been compelled, for want of space, to limit that testimony to the selection of a few passages only, yet should this selection lead all or any readers of the *British Controversialist* to make further inquiries, my labours will be well rewarded.

A LAYMAN.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

As, by common consent, the present discussion seems to be merged, to a great extent, in the question of Infallibility, we propose to examine the statements put forward in the two preceding papers, by writers on the opposite side, in support of this claim of their church. We will endeavour to show that there have been adduced no reasons why we should accept the Romish Church as infallible; but, on the contrary, that there exist many reasons, with "confirmations strong," for believing that she has erred.

"Ignatius," who "merely states Catholic doctrine, and does not prove it," declares that the doctrine of the sufficiency of the Old Testament is an "absurdity." Well, *we* have not invented it; it was St. Paul who affirmed it; let "Ignatius" settle the question with St. Paul.

He congratulates himself that, on the question of the Canon, Protestants must have recourse to a "legitimate principle" and portion of his Rule of Faith, viz., the testimony of ancient churches. But in a note on page 16 we find that he stultifies himself and insults his Church, by declaring that he receives the doctrine of her infallibility "merely as a matter of history."

He next informs us that the Bible cannot instruct us on *all* points of Christian doctrine and practice. Now, on page 86, we find "Gregory" affirming "that Scripture by itself is sufficient to guide us, if interpreted rightly." Can any interpretation render Scripture by itself sufficient to guide us, if all points of Christian doctrine and practice be not contained therein? And what is the use of an infallible Church, if it cannot preserve its members from such downright contradiction?

He proceeds to "state" that the Catholic Rule of Faith is the whole word of God, or, in other words, Scripture and tradition. But in the course of a few sentences we begin to discover that these are not the rule, after all! For after asking, "How are we to obtain a certain and definite knowledge of this revelation?" he goes on to inform us of some "succession of men whose province it is to

deliver inviolate to man all that God has revealed;" and, again, "when the Church speaks, God speaks." Why, then, all this talk about the Bible and tradition being the Catholic Rule of Faith? Is it not plain that these are really disregarded, alike in theory and in practice, and that the only Rule of Faith recognized by the Romanist is "Infallible Church," which, being translated, means "priest of the parish"?

"Ignatius" seems to have been annoyed by the conduct of "those persons who in the last debate were constantly making" impertinent "inquiries as to the seat of infallibility in the Catholic Church." Well, "Ignatius," we wish now to be infallibly assured of the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Where shall we apply? To the Pope? "Gregory" informs us that Catholics do not believe in the personal infallibility of the Pope. Shall we go to a council? Why, there is no council now sitting: the last was held at Trent 300 years ago. If a council be the seat of infallibility, then the Church has been fallible for 300 years. Shall we go to a bishop? He is only a private individual. To a priest? He, also, is liable to err. Where, O "Ignatius," shall we find Infallibility? Listen to the "sufficient answer" of "Ignatius." "The human part (of the Romish Church) is not inerrable in itself, but only as the organ and as the manifestation of the Divine."

He tells us that "those who deny the infallibility of the Church (meaning *his* Church), practically assert that Christ has not fulfilled those glorious promises which He made before His ascension." Christ's promises were made for the benefit of His followers in every age, and while they ensure that some visible and true Church shall always exist, they do not guarantee infallibility to any external organisation.

He adduces some quotations from Dr. Manning. Can Dr. Manning or can "Ignatius" bring forward a single proof that Christ ever promised infallibility to any corporation of professors of Christianity? He has never promised that the Church of England, or of Scotland, or any other *visible* body, shall be guided into all truth for ever. These have either erred or may err. Visible companies or churches are made up of mixed multitudes, and are compared, in the Gospel, to a ripening harvest of "tares and wheat;" to a mixed flock of "sheep and goats;" to a company of "wise and foolish virgins." The Church to which the most glorious promises of Christ were made is not a company of this sort. It is made up, exclusively, of the true believers in Christ of every age and place. It is of her members that it is said, that they are "born of the Spirit," that they "live by the Spirit," and that the Spirit "shall guide them into all truth." Whatever may be the arrogant pretensions of Rome, it is this Church which is the "body of Christ," and which "He will present to Himself a glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing."*

He closes with some four statements, which he terms "admissions," from Protestant writers. Let him know that upon matters of religion Protestants will "call no man master." In every case our sole inquiry must be, "What saith the Scriptures?"

In the extracts from Bull and Whittaker there is not a word that need be construed into an "admission" of Romish doctrine. The others we are willing to make over to "Ignatius" as our parting gift. They are fit flowers to deck the Romish altars.

"Gregory" must now come in for a share of our attentions. After treating us to some ingenious remarks about "begging the question," and rehearsing some of his achievements in the previous debate, he points out as "worthy of remark that the teaching of the Catholic Church is positive." Such also was the teaching of the old Pagan mythology. Such also is the teaching of the Moslem creed, "There is but one Allah, and Mahomet is his prophet."

He says, "She dates the *commencement* of her creed centuries before any other church." But he should have told us, too, that she dates the *end* of it so late as the 8th of December, 1854.* He informs us that Protestantism, in his opinion, is a "mere negation." Can he not comprehend that the word "Protestantism" is only a new name for the negative side of that old thing, Christianity?

He alleges that several *texts* have been already *refuted*. We presume that this is a mere "*lapsus pennæ*." If not, we suggest that the old plan of burning the whole book is much more expeditious.

He gives us three meanings of the word "Church," and seems willing to insinuate that these are the only ones. Let us supply another, which ought always to be remembered by the readers of Romish controvertists. It is this: "The whole body of the elect of God, or the true disciples of Christ of every age and nation." "And the Lord added to the *Church* daily such as should be saved."† "And He is the head of the body, the *Church*."‡ "The general assembly and *Church* of the first-born, which are written in heaven."§ "That he might present it to Himself a glorious *Church*, without spot or wrinkle."||

We are next told, "that the early Christians were believers in certain tenets now branded by Protestants as corrupt," and that this may be "easily gathered from their own writings, the writings of their heathen enemies, and the records in the catacombs." We challenge "Gregory" to show from their writings that the Christians of the first four centuries held any one of the peculiar dogmas of his Church. But how is it that it does never occur to him to gather their faith from the *book* which they loved? And would he rather accept as evidence the calumnies of their

* Dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, then first made an article of faith.

† Acts ii. 47

‡ Col. i. 18.

§ Heb. xii. 22.

|| Ephes. v. 26.

enemies and the forged records of a charnel-house, than the Word of the living God ?

He goes on to tell us that among these early Christians there existed at Rome a bishop who governed the whole Church. Well, there existed a bishop at Rome, A.D. 606, whose name (curious coincidence) was Gregory, surnamed the Great. Let us listen to him. "I most confidently affirm that whosoever calls himself Universal Bishop, or desires to be so called by others, shows himself by such haughtiness to be a forerunner of Antichrist; inasmuch as he proudly advances himself above all others."*

He makes an admission "that Scripture by itself is sufficient to guide us, if interpreted rightly. The question is, What is the right interpretation?" Of course, he goes on to say that it is the sense of the holy mother, the Church; and the unanimous consent of the Fathers. No, "Gregory," the best interpretation of the book must be that of the Author; and Protestants may have that. "If any man will do His will, he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God."† "Ask, and ye shall receive; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."‡

He proceeds to quote, as demonstrations of his Church, a great number of passages from the Hebrew prophets. These are all declarations of the glorious condition of the Jewish and Gentile churches during the future millennial times. We have examined every text he has adduced, and find that in every instance he has quietly put his thumb over some expression (frequently in the immediate context) that would have instantly detected the mal-appropriation. He quotes a promise from Isaiah ii. 3, and passes over verses 1st and 2nd, which show that it relates to "Judah and Jerusalem," and that "it shall come to pass in the last days." He quotes from Ezekiel xxxvii. 24. Let the reader refer also to the 21st verse.

He quotes several texts from Isaiah lx., and also from preceding and following chapters, and coolly concludes that they all belong to Rome. We suppose that he was too deeply impressed with the sad necessity for Swiss Guards and Irish Contingents to inform us that these promises all relate to a time of perpetual peace (verse 18), wherein "violence shall no more be heard in the land, wasting nor destruction within her (the Church's) borders." Can he recall to mind the "monster popes" of Baronius, the bloody fires of Smithfield, the demoniac massacre of St. Bartholomew, or

"The slaughtered saints, whose bones
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold,"

and glibly tell us that it is of *his* Church that it is said, "Thy people also shall be all righteous" ? On the whole, it is painfully evident that, in all these extracts, "Gregory," designedly or otherwise, has wrongfully endeavoured to appropriate for his Church

* Lib. vi. Epist. 33: Cambridge, 1718. † John xvii. 17. ‡ Matt. vii. 7.

those blessed promises that, like robes of beauty, are laid up in store for both the Jewish and the Gentile Church in coming ages.

He states that "the Church of Rome has always affirmed that besides her there is no true Church; and that she alone is the depositary of the promises." Well, it was long ago predicted that she should have a "mouth speaking great things and blasphemies."* He tells us of her long line of popes. Why did he not strengthen his argument by informing us that her "long line" has sometimes even been a "threefold cord" of contemporaneous popes? He says, "She does not date her existence from any Reformation." Certainly she is ancient enough. She is perhaps as old as Mahometanism; but not quite so old as Christianity. He affirms that "she has always been a prominent object in the eyes of the world." Yes; the apostacy was to "sit on many waters;" and "multitudes and nations"† were to follow her. Christ's flock is to be but a "few," a "little flock," while this dispensation lasts.

We are next informed, that "when our Saviour came upon earth, the Jewish priesthood and altars were not to be swept away." "The altars were still to stand in the magnificent temple, and the offering was to be that which before was only offered in type." This must be one of his traditions. The Bible only tells us that, at the death of Christ, "the vail of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom."‡

He treats us to a long and laboured version of the old argument upon "succession." We have only time to quote his summary:—

"If, then, a succession of teachers be proved, and it be admitted that the promises, which were to last for ever, were intended for the bishops of the nineteenth century as well as those of the first, it necessarily follows that to those bishops we must have recourse in matters of doubt on any point of faith." How calmly he takes for granted that Romish bishops must be meant. Mark how a single simple statement will answer him. Christ promised to be for ever present with His disciples, while "teaching all things whatsoever He had commanded them." But, as has been shown, Christ never "commanded" invocation of saints, or worship of the Virgin. He never "commanded" transubstantiation, or purgatory, or the mass. Rome teaches "another Gospel," and therefore has a claim only on the threatenings of Christ. "Gregory" tells us that his Church has "unity." Has she unity with Christ? Is her Gospel His Gospel? May there not be unity in error, as well as unity in truth? Satan is not divided against Satan, or his kingdom could not stand. But are there no divisions about infallibility in the Church of Rome? Have there not been endless controversies between Jesuits and Gallicans; between Dominicans and Franciscans; between popes and councils? Does not Bellarmine, alone, enumerate above 300 divisions on matters of religion among the members of the Church?

He says, the Church is holy: "She is holy in her doctrines."

* Rev. xiii. 6.

† Rev. xvii.

‡ Matt. xxvii. 51.

Well, "Theophylact" has shown the reverse of that. "She is holy in her pastors and people, who are 'very strict.'" We admit their strictness; they possess that in common with the Pharisees, who "tithed mint and cummin, but neglected the weightier matters of the law." We must, however, have some little proof of her "holiness," before accepting her claims. We shall, for this end, call in two or three unexceptionable witnesses, all true sons of the Church.

Genevèbrard, the historian, tells us that "for nearly 150 years above fifty popes deserted wholly the virtue of their predecessors, being apostatical rather than apostolical."

Cardinal Baronius, in his "Annals of the Church," thus writes: "What was then the face of the holy Roman Church? How very foul! when harlots, as powerful as profligate, ruled at Rome." Again: "What unworthy, vile, yea, what execrable and hateful things the apostolic seat has been compelled to suffer! How many MONSTERS, horrible to behold, were intruded into that seat which is revered by angels!"

Nicholas Clemangis, an Archdeacon of the Church of Rome, in the fifteenth century, in his book, "Of the Corrupt State of the Church," chapter iii., informs us "that she was defiled with the sink of all vices, and might be fitly called the 'Church of the Malignants.' Who preaches or declares the Gospel? Who, either by word or deed, shows the way to life eternal?" He concludes with an apostrophe to the Roman Church: "What thinkest thou of thine own prophecy—the Revelations of St. John? Dost thou not think they do, in part at least, belong to thee? Thou hast not, surely, so wholly lost all shame as to deny this? Look, therefore, unto it, and read the damnation of the Great Whore sitting on many waters, and there contemplate thy famous facts and future ruin!"

The next statement put forth by "Gregory" is, that "the Church is catholic—that is, universal." Perhaps she is; but is she more catholic than paganism? The fact of her being universal will prove nothing but that she cannot be a true Church of Christ. It is not until the "last days" that "the mountain of the Lord's house shall be exalted above the hills, and all nations shall flow unto it."*

He then declares that she is apostolical in doctrine, and traces her descent from the apostles. We admit the "descent," which has, indeed, been a dreadful one. With regard to her doctrine, a comparative view of apostolic and of Romish teaching has already been instituted by "Theophylact." Let "Gregory" study it.

On page 91 he brings forward much previously-discussed matter to prove that oral tradition is necessary to be received, as well as the written tradition of the Bible. To all this let us give one general answer. If "Gregory" knows of any oral traditions of the apostles, distinct from those traditions which they first preached, and afterwards embodied in their writings, let him produce them,—prove them to be inspired, and not temporary in nature, when we

will accept them;—till then we must hold that the “written” traditions are sufficient.

But he reminds us that St. Paul exhorts the Thessalonians to hold fast the traditions which they had been taught, whether by word or epistle. We answer, that there is not a particle of evidence that these were different traditions. The passage is just an exhortation to hold fast the faith, in whatever way it had been received. Should “Gregory” still remain in doubt, let us refer him to the historical account of St. Paul’s transactions at Thessalonica. He will find it in Acts xvii. 2, 3. We think it decisive on the question.

He hints that Protestants “deny the existence of a tribunal appointed by the Almighty to explain His law.” We do not, but we advise him to look for it where David sought it:—“Open Thou mine eyes, and I shall behold wondrous things out of Thy law.”*

He then inquires, “Who appoints and sends the Protestant teachers?” We answer, Christ, who commissioned His disciples to go and preach the Gospel. In return, we ask, “Who has sent the priests of Rome?” When they are ordained, they receive commission from their bishop—not to preach the Gospel, but to offer in sacrifice the body and blood, bones and nerves, soul and divinity, of the Lord Jesus.

He declares that “Catholics do not believe in the personal infallibility of the Pope.” We fear that some little quibble is employed here with respect to the word “personal.” Will he assert that Catholics do not believe in the infallibility of the Pope, speaking *ex cathedra*,—that is, authoritatively, and from the “chair of Peter”? We do not affirm that all Catholics must believe it, as it is a point on which the Church is divided. In the remainder of his essay we have not been able to discover anything to which it is necessary to reply.

One word in conclusion. If, in the excitement of debate, we have used any expression personally offensive to either of our opponents, we now heartily retract and apologize for it. The contest is for great and vital principles, and ought not to be waged with unworthy weapons.

MONTGOMERY.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WE assume a sufficient elementary acquaintance with geology on the part of the reader to render unnecessary any exposition or defence of that science. The *facts* of geology, apart from any

* Psalm cxix. 18.

theory, are so palpable, unmistakeable, and incontrovertible, that those who would deny or dispute them *must be* so unimpressible by reasoning that an attempt to convince them of the truth of *theory* would be but wasted effort. For such, then, we do not write, but address ourselves to those who have honesty enough to forsake old and long-cherished opinions when no longer tenable, candour enough to admit their own as well as others' liability to error, and intelligence enough to see that many of the ridiculed speculations of the past have become the unquestioned facts of the present, and that the theories of the present may yield corresponding results in the future. To these we shall endeavour to show that the preponderance of evidence and probability tends to indicate, and, as far as proof is possible, to prove, that the principles of the Development Theory are true.

Our argument is this:—

I. That it is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, to give the preference to natural than to supernatural means in the explanation of natural phenomena.

II. That the Development Theory supplies an explanation by natural means of the natural phenomenon of the creation of species.

III. That hence the Development Theory is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, than other theories of creation, and its principles are consequently entitled to be considered as true.

We proceed to discuss separately the above premises:—

I. *It is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, to give the preference to natural than to supernatural means in the explanation of natural phenomena.*

The Creator is most honoured by that which attributes to Him the greatest power, wisdom, and benevolence. Now, the prevalent supposition that the operations of nature take place and continue by successive active interventions on the part of the Creator, implies the existence of inferior power to that which would be requisite to endow matter at its creation with an inherent capacity of assuming the various phases of its development. That the power so to endow matter is possessed by the Creator, must be admitted by those who would honour Him most; and that its exercise cannot be deemed superfluous is evident from the necessity, if not thus employed at the first, that it should be eventually retailed (if the expression be allowed) in the production of each successive item of nature. It is equally in accordance with the greatest amount of wisdom and benevolence on the part of the Creator, to assume that He has not formed a universe which requires unceasing attention and renovation by Himself,—but rather a universe which, by a grandly simple exercise of omnipotence, He has made subject to inherent and self-acting laws, which work with ceaseless, unerring; and immutable accuracy, all His purposes and designs alike guiding the onward

sweep of stellar systems, and balancing the wings of a fluttering butterfly—appointing the tracks of fiery comets, and pencilling the petals of a primrose. That the execution of nature's operations are thus left solely to natural law does not imply any isolation from nature of nature's God, any more than does the spontaneous activity of our bodily structure indicate its independence of the vital spirit. As in the body each organ performs its function without specific volition by the soul, so in the universe each atom acts its part without special direction by the presiding Spirit.

"All are but part of one stupendous whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."

We honour the Creator more by giving the preference to natural means, *i. e.*, laws given to matter at its creation, than to supernatural means, *i. e.*, modification and impulse communicated from without to matter, in the explanation of natural phenomena. The reasons which account for this preference being more honourable to the Creator, likewise explain its accordance with the intelligence of intellectual beings; for, from the consistency and relationship pervading creation, it must inevitably result that the theory which most displays the power, wisdom, and benevolence of the Creator shall most favourably affect the mind of the reasoning creature.

II. The Development Theory supplies an explanation by natural means of the natural phenomenon of the creation of species.

Geology reveals the fact that for myriad ages prior to man's birth, the earth has been tenanted by countless forms of vegetable and animal life, all of which have become first existent and then extinct at certain regular recurrent periods, well defined by a marked change in the physical character of the earth's surface. Now these inorganic changes are admitted on all hands to be the natural results of physical causes, generally assumed to be volcanic action. During the intervals of this action such parts of the world as were exposed to the sea's influence became disintegrated, and finally deposited as strata.

All this was unquestionably accomplished by physical laws (natural means), and not by direct interposition of the Creator (supernatural means); in proof of which, the same action is really taking place at this time all over the world. Now, the Development Theory seeks to explain in the same way the changes of organic forms which occurred simultaneously with those of stratification. The forms of life existent at any given time have always been those adapted to the then physical conditions of the earth; and at the occurrence of an epoch of upheaval and redistribution of the configuration of the surface, these conditions have become changed, and consequently unfitted to the continuation of life in the same forms; and hence the necessity for either a re-creation by special act of the Divine Being (which would be supernatural), or a modification of organic structure produced by the new conditions (which would be natural), rendering the continuance of life, under

the form of fresh species, possible. The point to which we wish to direct especial attention is the fact, that the application of external physical conditions is capable of effecting structural modification in animals and plants. Our experience on these points is necessarily confined to the application of those conditions by man, the great physical catastrophes of the past having been pre-Adamic. The inference from analogy, however, leads to the conclusion, that, as artificial means used by man are capable of producing varieties, often more distinct than acknowledged species, it is reasonable to ascribe to the influence of those great conditional changes of temperature, climate, soil, food, &c., such changes in organic form as have simultaneously occurred. In the different breeds of horses and dogs we have marked instances of what artificial change of condition is capable of producing. The difference between the fleet, beautiful racer, and the plodding, heavy cart-horse, is surely as distinct as that which serves to define some species of animals. Yet these and every other variety of horse have been developed by human agency from one typical kind. And man, in opposition to nature, having effected thus much, what may not nature herself do when it becomes a necessity of the continuance of life that it should assume fresh forms, and seeing that the very change of circumstances which involve the necessity, may, by a beautifully-instituted law, become subservient to the development of the new forms of organization? "As man can produce, and certainly has produced, a great result by his methodical or unconscious means of selection, what may not nature effect? Man can act only on external and visible characters; nature cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good; nature only for that of the being which she sends. Every selected character is fully exercised by her; and the being is placed under well-suited conditions of life. Man keeps the natives of many climes in the same country; he seldom exercises each selected character in some peculiar and fitting manner; he feeds a long and a short-beaked pigeon on the same food; he does not exercise a long-backed or long-legged quadruped in any peculiar manner; he exposes sheep with long and short wool to the same climate. He does not allow the most vigorous males to struggle for the females. He does not rigidly destroy all inferior animals, but protects, during each varying season, as far as lies in his power, all his productions. He often begins his selection by some half-monstrous form, or at least by some modifications prominent enough to catch his eye, or to be plainly useful to him. Under nature, the slightest difference of structure or constitution may well turn the nicely-balanced scale in the struggle for life, and so be preserved. How fleeting are the wishes and efforts of man! How short his time!—and consequently, how poor will his products be compared with those accumulated by nature during whole geological periods! Can we

wonder, then, that nature's productions should be far truer in character than man's productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted by the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far higher workmanship."*

The opponents of the Development Theory may say, "We admit that man is capable of changing the characters of certain animals, for we see the results of his agency around us, but where is there any evidence that nature has done any analogous work? We are surrounded by multitudinous species, but where are the intermediate transitional varieties?" To this we unhesitatingly reply, that each individual species may reasonably be considered as the evidence they seek, and that the development of one species from another may have been the work of one generation, and hence the absence of intermediate varieties, none having existed. And that this complete transition in the lifetime of one individual is not a stretch of lively imagination, we refer to a very similar fact, patent to all physiologists, that in the case of many animals, during growth from infancy to maturity, the organism develops, through successive stages, each the characteristic of some distinct species. And this is a result of the very principle we are endeavouring to demonstrate—the plastic power of condition. Thus, during the foetal period of an animal's life, its organism is totally different from its future structure; such, for example, as a system of circulation of the blood with the agency of the lungs, these organs being unnecessary till the commencement of extra-uterine life, when they become incorporated in the system of circulation by means of one of the conditions of such life, namely, existence in an atmosphere. So that, in this one point, for instance—and others might be adduced—the foetal state of certain of the more highly organized animals is identical in structure with the mature state of ones not only distinct as species, but widely separated in generic character, and in regard to classification of very inferior grade. Structural changes, greater than would be that of one species to another, the intermediate gradations of development of which are asked for as evidence of our theory, are thus seen to be the actual contingency of certain organic forms, as a consequence of their exposure to the modifying influence of changing conditions during the periods of gestation and subsequent growth till the attainment of maturity.

As before stated, the great inorganic catastrophes which have from time to time changed the conditions upon which organic forms depend, have all been pre-Adamic, so that a change of species is an event of pre-historic occurrence; and hence, no actual evidence of observation can be adduced in proof of the Development Theory. Nor, at present, have the facts of geology been sufficiently accumulated to warrant any positive generalizations on the subject. But, reasoning from analogy, the preponderance of evidence decidedly favours the preference the theory gives to a natural rather than

* Darwin's "Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection," p. 83.

a supernatural explanation of the origin of species. We subjoin the mature conviction of a writer who has made this question his especial study for twenty years, and whose opinions are of weight, and worthy of consideration :—" I believe that animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number. . . . Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide. Nevertheless, all living things have much in common ; in their chemical composition, their germinal vesicles, their cellular structure, and their laws of growth and reproduction. We see this even in so trifling a circumstance as that the same poison often similarly affects plants and animals ; or, that the poison secreted by the gall-fly produces monstrous growths on the wild rose or oak-tree. Therefore, I should infer from analogy that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator."*

III. *That the Development Theory is more honourable to the Creator, and more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, than other theories of the creation of species, and that its principles are consequently entitled to be considered as true,* follows as a logical corollary from the premises already laid down. We have endeavoured to show that He who created matter, and endowed it with the law of gravitation, by virtue of which it assumes the spherical form of worlds ; circles with swift flight through space in harmonious systems ; or, in other phases, for ever ebbs and flows, as the ceaselessly moving ocean ; leaps wildly down, as the impetuous cataract ; glides slowly but inevitably onward, as the treacherous glacier ; rushes down with appalling crash, as the blinding avalanche ; descends as the heaven-sent fertilizing shower ; trickles as a tear down the pale, wasted cheek of some broken-hearted one ; or, may be, falls as a tear of joy from the eye of one whose heart's hope is realized :—that He who endowed matter with mechanical law, by virtue of which thousands of miles of hard rocks have been disintegrated by the waves, and deposited in layer upon layer, with such gentle action, that the most delicate organisms are preserved unbroken and entire therein, forming new rocks miles in thickness ; whole mountain ridges are borne up from the ocean's bed, in some cases during the lapse of but a few hours, in others, slowly, but ceaselessly, for ages ; continents and seas change place ; the crust of our planet is rent and shivered in all directions :—that He who endowed matter with chemical law, by virtue of which the component gases of the atmosphere so combine as to become a suiting medium for the existence of life ; the various elements unite so as to form the multitudinous objects whose diversity of purpose, nature, form, and hue, benefit and adorn this earth ; the different

* Darwin's " Origin of Species," p. 484.

minerals crystallize with such wondrous regularity, harmony, and beauty; each organic product assimilates its respective nourishment:—that He who endowed matter with these among other laws, by virtue of which all these phenomena are inevitable natural consequences of its existence, could have, and probably has, endowed it with a law by virtue of which organic development would naturally occur, and that with more honour to Himself than by specially creating by supernatural means each successive species. We have endeavoured to show, as well, that the existence of such an inherent law of matter is supported by the knowledge of nature we at present possess. And the conclusion, we think, of the unbiassed reader will be, that the principles of the Development Theory are true. •

E. M., JUN.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

“And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so.” • • • • •

“And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so.”—*Gen. i. 11, 24.*

As a preliminary consideration, it is of great importance that the subject of the present debate should be understood as a theory, not a fact.

The propounders of the Development Theory do not presume to assert with certainty, nor even to claim any considerable degree of probability,—they only suggest the possibility of their theory, and, if true, of suggesting (to them at least) a satisfactory mode by which many of the mysteries of the natural world may be accounted for. Such being the modesty of their pretensions, associated as it is with erudition, talent, and an ardent love of God's great and wonderful world of nature, it would ill become us, on the present occasion, to treat them or their works with disrespect; our object is the attainment of truth, both for ourselves and for the readers of the *British Controversialist*. In the pursuit of this object we hope to be guided by reason, directed by wisdom, and assisted by both friends and opponents, in the exchange of friendly counsels and mutual instruction. Under such circumstances, truth is most likely to be attained, and to be most enduringly serviceable to all, on whichever side we may set out upon the inquiry before us. Knowledge and truth, not victory over an opponent, will also tend to remove the asperities of conflict, and result in lasting friendships.

Primâ facie evidence goes to show that all history, and the greater portion of all our experiences, knowledge, and observation, prove the theory of development a fallacy. Nearly all the familiar facts of every-day life, with the education received from the past history of nature, so evidently contradict the theory, that hitherto all our notions upon the subject are fixed in diametric opposition to

it. This being the case, the *onus probandi* necessarily rests with the advocates of the theory. It is for them to show, not only that the theory is possible, but that it is probable; nay, further, they must show that it is the only correct and true law of nature's operations; that she works by this one law, and no other. This is a fair and legitimate demand, and must be realized in the efforts of our opponents, or the thesis they have assumed will be unproved, and may be consigned to the region of visionary speculations, until abler hands again exhume it, and with more success.

The task assigned to us we feel is only affected by one drawback, that is—it is the advocacy of old notions in opposition to new ones. We would not, however, be understood as conservative in anything but the truth; and in this respect the most unflinching seeker after a knowledge of the mysteries of nature is, in our opinion, the truest conservative of truth; his only danger is, lest he should mistake appearances for realities, shams for facts, possibilities for incontestable verities.

It is necessary we should succinctly state the peculiar features of the Development Theory before proceeding further, which we will do with impartiality. The author of the "*Vestiges of Creation*," who, if not the originator of the theory, has at least the merit of having reduced the theory to a well-defined system, says, on bringing forward the principle of progressive development,—"*The proposition determined on, after much consideration, is that the several series of animated beings, from the simplest and oldest up to the highest and most recent, are, under the providence of God, the results, first, of an inherent impulse in the forms of life to advance, in definite times, by generation, through different grades of organization, terminating in the highest dicotyledons and vertebrates,—these grades being few in number, and generally marked by intervals of organic character, which we find to be a practical difficulty in ascertaining affinities. Secondly, of another inherent impulse connected with the vital forces, tending, in the course of generations, to modify organic structures in accordance with external circumstances, as food, the nature of the habitat, and the meteoric agencies—these being the 'adaptations' of the natural theologian. We may contemplate these phenomena as ordained to take place in every situation, and at every time, where and when the requisite materials and conditions are presented—in other orbs, as well as in this—in any geographical area of this globe which may at any time arise—observing only the variations due to difference of materials and conditions. The nucleated vesicle is contemplated as the fundamental form of all organisation—the meeting-point between the inorganic and the organic—the end of the mineral and the beginning of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, which thence start in different directions, but in a general parallelism and analogy. This nucleated vesicle is itself a type of mature and independent being, as well as the starting-point of the foetal progress of every higher individual in creation, both animal and vegetable.*"

"We have seen that it is a form of being which there is some reason to believe electric agency will produce, though not, perhaps, usher into full life, in albumen—one of those component materials of animal bodies in whose combinations it is believed there is no chemical peculiarity forbidding their being any day realized in the laboratory.

"Remembering these things, it seems, after all, an obvious idea that a *chemico-electric operation, by which germinal vesicles were produced*, was the first phenomenon in organic creation, and that the second was an *advance of these through a succession of higher grades and a variety of modifications*, in accordance with laws of the same absolute nature as those by which the Almighty rules the physical department of nature." *

A subsequent author has, by what he terms the "Principle of Natural Selection," shown the origin of species, or, in other words, that species were not originally independent acts of creation, but that, by a peculiar process of development, that variation in plant or animal which gives it any force not possessed by others of the same species, qualifies it to become the original of a new species, capable of superseding the parent species; thus new species have their origin and line, while old species may become extinct. It will be perceived that the latter theory is an offshoot from the former, yet, in some respects, essentially different. We shall treat them separately, and devote our attention for the present to the development theory, as shown in the extract we have made from the "Vestiges of Creation."

To put the question more clearly before the reader, we will categorize the leading ideas of this extract. First. Certain collo-cations of inorganic matter may, by peculiarity of external conditions and influences, become organic—endowed with life. Second. The lowest condition of vegetable life may rise to the highest and most perfect plant, under favourable circumstances. Third. The humblest polypus and mollusc may, under favourable conditions, progress onwards to the perfect mammal—may, in fact, become a human being. It is said that these changes may not, in their whole extent, take effect during the long period of the historical era, but they may have been realized in the many millions of generations preceding—in the geological eras. While we might, for all practical purposes in the cause of truth, reply that this very admission places the Development Theory beyond the pale of reason, we shall not take advantage thereof, but proceed to investigate the real value of the principles of the theory, as indicated above.

All elementary bodies have certain independent peculiarities, known by the student of natural philosophy; they have also other peculiarities which have especial relation to other bodies. These peculiarities are called their properties and qualities. *Vis inertiae* is a property possessed by all inorganic matter; nor can objection

* "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," pp. 130, 131.

be made to the universality of this property of matter by the processes of chemistry producing changes in organic bodies, because such changes are the result of extraneous influences, not of any inward impulse; on the contrary, organic matter, taken in each individual whole, is superior to this law of inertia; there is in all organic matter a peculiar preparedness to act under circumstances favourable to its nature; this action is from within, not from without. Herein we have an essential difference between the constitution of inorganic and organic matter, of general application.

The inquiry now presenting itself to our mind is, By what means is this difference to be removed, or the chasm it makes between the mineral world and vegetable and animal life to be traversed? An attempt is made to show that the germinal vesicle of organic life is capable of production from albumen by electricity; but has life ever been produced by such means? No, only a something similar to the nucleated vesicle,—similar, we say, but not the same, for the nucleated vesicle may be ushered into full life, while the chemico-electro vesicle is a “perhaps-not” capability of progress to full life. It is not too much to expect, if it were a law of nature, instituted in the beginning by the great Creator, that all the higher classes of beings are merely progressive developments from inorganic matter, we should at least be able to see some plainly marked instance crossing the abyss marking the distinctive separation of the inorganic and organic world, within the limits of the historical era.

The creative *fiat* was once issued, and each kind had assigned to it its personal limits; its peculiarities as a whole belonged to it alone, were not interchangeable, nor susceptible of extinction or change into other specific or contrary characteristics: Gen. i. 11, 24.

Admitting, for the purposes of our argument, that the first grade in the Development Theory is a fact, and that the germinal cell is capable of production from inorganic matter by artificial mechanical or chemical forces, we still shall find insuperable difficulties in the theory, even after inanimate matter has received life, according to the supposition now granted, because every germinal cell is presented by nature to us with certain definite peculiarities, or essential properties, by which its progressive development to mature age, and afterwards to decay and death, are fixed, with but slight deviation from the true course of its being. It can be no valid objection to this fact to say that the exact composition and properties of the germinal cell are unknown; neither is there any validity in the objection that the determining forces of its specific progress through life are unknown. It is enough for our purpose to know, that a germinal cell produces *its specific form* of vegetable or animal life, and *no other form*. In no case have philosophers observed any single broadly marked deviation from this specific progress of being in the vegetable and animal kingdom; and surely, in the long period of the historical era, and that still longer and larger page of history, extending throughout the myriad-aged geologic cycle, some

case might reasonably be expected to have found a record in the annals of science.

The fungi have never been observed to develop into the stately oak; the tiny mollusc has never been known to advance to the dignified condition and gigantic proportions of "the great whale;" the crawling worm, or the nimble gnat, have never attained to the beauty of form and fleetness of the sagacious horse, or the noble eagle. Still less has any one of the millions of animated beings which have ever lived upon this earth given us one trace of having progressed from the lower grades to that highest grade in this sublunary sphere—God's chief handiwork, the human soul divine,—man.

It is well for us constantly to bear in mind that if the Holy Scriptures are not formal treatises on science, they convey to us scientific truth; and if, in any case, we cannot perceive their exact harmony with our supposed knowledge acquired from other sources, we must search for a solution of the difficulty, not by a denial of the truth of Scripture, but by a careful and painstaking examination of all the sources of knowledge in question, precisely noting all the points of divergence from Scripture, and rightly estimating the value of our deductions from apparent facts; and while inquiring after truth, prayerfully seeking the guidance and love of the all-wise and mighty God, who created all things after their specific kinds and ordained to them their course through life.

For the present we conclude, wishing that this debate may be productive of much interesting inquiry into the beauties and mysteries of nature, feeling assured that the more intimate our knowledge of God's works may be, the more shall we endeavour to become humble in mind and holy in heart.

L'OUVRIER.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Though justice be thy plea, consider this—
That, in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy;
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
The deeds of mercy."—*Shakespeare*.

It is usual for an advocate, when beginning his address to the court in a case upon which public feeling has run high, to desire the jury to dismiss from their minds all recollections of the

opinions and rumours current *extra curiam*; that they confine their attention exclusively to the evidence brought before them during the trial; and that on it alone they found a verdict which shall acquit or condemn. And on the present occasion we deem it necessary to follow a similar course; for the strong prejudices which an indiscriminating satire and too austere morality have connected with our subject must be uprooted from the minds of our readers—the jury we address—ere we may hope to make a favourable impression, or they to be benefitted by our humble endeavour.

If any one considers the demand now made either too great or unreasonable, we would advise him to skip this paper; but as we believe the judiciousness of our counsel will be perceived and acted upon, we feel encouraged to proceed, and enter upon our task sanguine of success.

The order and welfare, and indeed the very existence of civil society, depend upon one condition—security; which naturally divides itself into protection against foreign invasion, and safety from domestic violence. The preservation of the former is the province of the Admiralty and War offices, forms the principal duty of the public services, naval and military, and is the all-important object for which volunteers have started up in every corner of our land, instant as the clansmen at the shrill whistle of Roderick Dhu, but not, we trust, like them, so quickly to disappear; the latter, the object of public justice, is maintained by an extensive and complex machinery of law and police. But while the manifold advantages attending a rule of conduct, founded on justice, and authoritatively enforced as law, must be apparent, there are certain risks associated with the same no less manifest; and hence, in the enacting and administering of law, two important ends require to be kept in view: that it may prove a net in the toils of which the innocent shall not suffer, nor from its meshes the guilty escape. And these two features in the laws and legal administration of a country are pretty good indices to the condition of the country itself. During turbulent times, and under despotic governments, the terrors of law play no unimportant part; short trials and long ropes are then in especial favour, and impeachment forms but the prelude to condemnation. When, however, a state is free and tranquil, the opposite practice obtains; judicial proceedings are deliberate and impartial; law appears in true majesty; perfect assurance is felt in its power to reach the offending; the only anxiety being lest this power should be misdirected. This is what might be expected in Britain; and to this feeling may be ascribed the privilege enjoyed here by criminals in having the aid of counsel; and which is sometimes even provided by the court. Honourable, however, as this custom is, it will be found on examination to be no more than simple justice to the accused. The charge against him has been prepared by skilful hands, an experienced advocate elicits from the witnesses all the necessary evidence, and no more; joins the various facts link by link till they appear a perfect chain; and so collects the suspicious cir-

cumstances, that from their very grouping they assume a darker hue. What could any simple man, so circumstanced, hope to effect unaided? Some would find themselves quite unable to give utterance to their thoughts; while to all who could command their speech it would be difficult, although conscious of innocence, to rebut the criminating evidence, and almost impossible to expose any flaw in the reasoning or law brought to bear against them. Indeed, any attempt in the latter direction would most certainly fail: the smatterer in legal lore who endeavours to avail himself of his sciolism, invariably flounders. Nor need this excite surprise; for the legal profession, beyond perhaps any other, requires of those who wish to attain proficiency in it, severe study, and unremitting, undivided application. "Lady Common Law," says the maxim, "lies alone."

"Well," the reader may exclaim, "I am quite willing to allow the assistance of an advocate in ordinary doubtful cases, and to admit that a public benefit is conferred when he secures the acquittal of an innocent person; but do you really mean to say that it can serve any good purpose, for him, when quite aware of his client's guilt, to endeavour to

' ——— make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest councils ——— ' ? "

Ah! dear rhetorical reader, let it not make you start when you learn that we do say so. If it is indeed possible "to make the worse appear the better reason" in the case you have mentioned, it is only because of some serious defect in the evidence, or imperfection in the law; mere specious sophistry need not be tried before the bench, as the judge in summing up would tear such to shreds and scatter it to the winds. And should a guilty prisoner be condemned when the evidence is either incomplete or conflicting, public safety would be imperilled, and a precedent established, which might prove the destruction of the innocent at some future time. At the mere consideration of such an occurrence popular feeling recoils; and, in proof, we need merely allude to the recent case of Dr. Smethurst. We do not know that this man had any sympathizers; but certainly some persons considered his condemnation as an outrage upon even-handed justice, on account of the unsatisfactory state of the medical evidence; and would have regarded his execution, had it taken place, as the inauguration of a new feature in our jurisprudence, fraught with danger to the community. Besides, the evidence of a prisoner's guilt being conclusive, it is no less necessary that the law which he is believed to have violated be distinct, precise, and perfectly applicable to his case. From what has been already said, it will be apparent that the accused cannot, in all probability, determine regarding this matter. Yet the importance of such an inquiry being made on his behalf cannot be too highly estimated; for not his interest only, but the interest of every one

imperatively demands that the law be observed to the very letter. To be tried *by the laws* of his country is the birthright of every Briton; is a source of our characteristic independence; and the palladium of our civil liberty. It is the right of the meanest criminal, guilty though he be, and all are concerned that this right he should enjoy. To strain a law, ever so slightly, that it by this means might reach a guilty individual, otherwise likely to escape, would be to render the whole body of law uncertain, and endanger the safety of the community. A door would then be opened for the entrance of all sorts of irregularities, of which no man could anticipate the extent nor foresee the termination. The prevention of such a contingency is a common duty, and the question arises, How can this duty be most effectually discharged? Few could spare time to acquire a knowledge of law sufficient to advocate their own cause if accused; fewer still, who have time, would enter upon a study so dry, and apparently uninteresting, merely to provide against so unlikely an event. And yet these events are often occurring. Not a week elapses but some one is accused upon suspicions almost groundless. Now it is a bank official on a charge of embezzlement, who is afterwards dismissed "without the slightest imputation on his character." Anon it is a child accused of murder most foul, on such frivolous ground, that her counsel is justified in demanding her immediate discharge. But the danger referred to is no cause of annoyance. Every one of our toiling, moiling millions regards it with perfect unconcern, or, rather, never bestows a thought upon it. And why? Because a practical solution has been given to our former question, in permitting the assistance of counsel to every person accused. For as an advocate in discharging his duty towards his client thoroughly examines in every particular the charge preferred against him, and restrains any excess of zeal on the part of those entrusted with the prosecution, a simple yet most effectual protection of the common weal is by this means provided. Here it may be objected to the theory propounded by us that many persons, though guilty of the crimes imputed to them, are, nevertheless, through the efforts of counsel, discharged from the bar; and that thus great encouragement is offered to the commission of crime. To this we reply, that it is to be regretted that the law or proof required to convict a guilty person should happen to be defective; but that, in such circumstances, so far from his dismissal being in itself an evil, it is quite otherwise; and that we ought to congratulate ourselves that so wisely tempered a judicial system prevails, and remember it to be better that ten guilty men escape than an innocent one suffer. The alleged effect we consider fallacious; for if in one case dismissal occurs through defective proof, it is too much to suppose that a like defect will appear in the next case; and if it be on account of a legal flaw, this can be remedied, and the loophole stopped up. It may also be urged by our opponents that the judge who presides at the trial will watch over the interest of the accused, and dispense the law in all its

integrity. We again reply, that to make the judge watch over the interests of either party is simply degrading him from his high office; and, while we admire the ability and impartiality of the bench, we think that, without counsel, the opportunity enjoyed by the judge of guarding the interest of the accused is rather limited: the prosecutor has previously studied and arranged the case; the judge's knowledge is only acquired as the trial proceeds: the prosecutor would of course only bring forward such witnesses as substantiated his statements, which, therefore, under the circumstances, could only be regarded as of an *ex parte* character.

We have thus, at the risk of being tedious, shown it to be for the public well-being that all prisoners should enjoy the aid of counsel; and so strong do we consider the position taken, that on it alone we will rest the justification of an advocate who knowingly defends a guilty person. Believing that what is socially right cannot be morally wrong, we might refrain from further consideration of the subject: but lest any of our *British Controversialist* moralists should think proper to oppose us, it may be well to glance at the moral aspect of the question. And first we should like to know, if an advocate's conduct in defending a guilty client be unjustifiable, when did he cross the delicate line between right and wrong? Does his transgression date from the commencement of his connection with the case. We scarcely expect to find any maintaining this. When requested to conduct a case, an advocate can hardly form such an opinion of the individual's guilt or innocence as (on this ground) would justify him in accepting or declining the duty. The case may, in his opinion, be bad, and yet not be so in reality; appearances are often deceitful, and the innocent have frequently suffered. Virgil, in his description of the nether world, does not omit the spirits of the

“———*falso damnati crimine mortis;*”

and we do not require to refer to the records of the “*Causes Célèbres*” for instances of judicial errors and sad proofs of human fallibility; some such are doubtless known to all our readers. If, then, our opponents, instead of finding fault with counsel for *undertaking* the defence of a guilty person, assert that his conduct is to be impugned only when he continues his connection with his client after becoming aware of his guilt, we would offer several objections to this opinion. In the first place, he has no plea to excuse this desertion of his post, or justify this violation of the sacred trust reposed in him. It cannot be urged that he undertook the office on the ground of his client's innocence; and that, such not being the case, his engagement is at an end. No such guarantee is given or required; nor does such tacit understanding exist.

Again, the defence of his client does not imply his belief in that client's innocence, any more than the appearance of the counsel for the prosecution indicates his belief in the prisoner's guilt, while both the precepts of morality and the law of the land require him to observe the truth; neither wittingly putting forward a false state-

ment, nor using any deceit. There is therefore nothing in his duty that ought to offend the most fastidious moralist. Supposing, however, that the advocate determines to cut the connection, what is the obvious result? Why, that his client goes to other counsel, from whom he carefully conceals as much as he can; and the chances are, that the ends of justice will be defeated by the latter advancing bold and skilful hypotheses, which he would not have done had he been better acquainted with the merits of the case. Then his course would have been simply defensive,—parrying, and not thrusting.

We have thus endeavoured to vindicate the principle which custom has sanctioned; and in conclusion submit, that as it tends to the security of society, is no breach of morality, and rather advances than retards the course of justice, an advocate is justified in defending a criminal of whose guilt he is cognizant. NONA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they that deal truly are His delight."—*Prov.* xii. 22.

"Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness."—*Ephes.* vi. 14.

God is truth, and the more truthful we become in words and actions, the more do we become like Him, and the more faithfully are we obeying the Divine precept of Jesus,—“Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect.” Truthfulness is in the Gospel of Christ made the first and paramount duty of every Christian man, and its contrary in every respect is shown to be thoroughly opposed to the Divine will. The case of Ananias and Sapphira are impressive illustrations of this, as is also that of Gehazi under the Mosaic economy. Thus, not only in works of charity is lying condemned by the Spirit of inspiration, but in the ordinary duties of life incidental to our domestic relations. Even in those cases where an apparent good might appear probable of realization, we are not left without unmistakable directions what course we ought to pursue; for the apostle Paul has spoken in his most vehement strain,—“Shall we do evil that good may come? God forbid!”

It is, then, of paramount importance we should understand what is intended by the term “truth” at the outset of this debate: a clearness and explicitness of definition will tend to facilitate our arrival at a just judgment.

Truth is the exact representation to others, by word or deed, of any fact or idea which might be the subject of communication. In the most general sense, truth, as thus defined, is not affected by the intentions of the person speaking or acting, for truth, being objective, cannot receive its character from any subjectivity of the individual through whom it is transmitted; a lie by good intention on the part of the speaker is not made truth, and *vice versa*; besides, that which is untrue may be communicated as truth through ignorance or vice of the individual, in which case the moral character of

the person acting is determined, while the objective truth or falsehood itself is unaffected thereby. The whole course of sacred history has given evidence to the great importance of truth, and imposed it as a duty upon every man. Profane history has also contributed many illustrations, both in ancient and modern times, which are doubtless familiar to every reader. The duty of truthfulness is recognized by every nation, whether civilized or barbarian, equally so within the Arctic circle and at the torrid zone; and if, under the deep darkness of a refined system of idolatry, lying is made a trade, and is constantly inflicted upon the Feringhees by the devoted Hindoo, the exception only proves the rule,—truthfulness is a universal duty of man.

The utility of this moral duty is evident if we contemplate its influence upon society. In our domestic relations it plays a conspicuous part. Suppose the father could not believe the son, the mother had no confidence in the word of her daughter, brothers in their intercourse with sisters found only deceit and lying, what would become of the family circle? how long would the endearments of the family hearth enchant us? In commerce, truth is the chief element of a nation's success; and in proportion to the degree of truthfulness possessed by any class of traders, other things being equal, success is always in favour of truth. In fact, it cannot be otherwise; a person once deceived does not buy again from the deceiver. So universal is the instinct planted in the nature of man, that, once deceived, he always fears and avoids the deceiver. The politician is relied upon and becomes popular, truly popular, only so far as he makes his sincerity or truthfulness palpable to his fellow-citizens. The physician is esteemed according to the sincerity or truthfulness of his efforts to heal his patient, which is the profession he makes. This leads us to consider whether, from the nature of his profession or any peculiarities of his position, the professional counsel is relieved of this universal obligation to speak and act truly.

We are of opinion that counsel is not justified in speaking or acting a lie to save his client from punishment when guilty, and we proceed to show our reasons for this belief. We have shown that it is the duty of all men, as men, to speak and act truly; therefore his humanity does not relieve the counsel from this obligation, and if he is relieved, he must derive the privilege of exemption from his office. The duty of counsel is evidently to prevent a wrong, having the sanction of a court of justice, being inflicted upon plaintiff or defendant, accuser or accused; but we have now to do with his relation to the accused only. The function of counsel, as now in question, is to protect the accused, when innocent, from all punishment; and when guilty, from undue punishment. In the latter case, we submit that he steps beyond his province as counsel, and becomes an accomplice after the fact, if, being cognizant of the accuser's guilt, he makes effort to prove him innocent; especially is the moral turpitude of counsel manifest when it is considered that he, being

conscious of his client's guilt, represents and tries to prove to a court of justice that he is innocent.

In accordance with these views of the question at issue are the doctrines laid down by that great man, Jeremy Bentham, for he speaks of it as "among the expedients that have been contrived for selling impunity to such criminals as have wherewithal to purchase it." And he thus illustrates this way of defending a known criminal: "A man has committed a theft; another man, who, without a licence, knowing what he has done, has assisted him in making his escape, is punished as an accomplice. But the law (that is, the judges, by whom in this behalf the law has been made) have contrived to grant to their connections, acting in the character of advocates, a licence for this purpose. *What the non-advocate is hanged for, the advocate is paid for, and admired.*"—Vol. vi. 350.

But it is not the function of counsel to defend the guilty from due punishment for his guilt. Every citizen in a rightly constituted commonwealth is in duty bound to assist in the free exercise of the laws; and, as a corollary to this duty, he is also under obligation to prevent every criminal escaping that punishment the law inflicts upon him for his crime. Not only is the law of England explicit upon this subject, but common sense and the dictates of morality confirm its propriety. The position of counsel cannot alter his responsibility as a citizen in this respect, because the general duty owing to society is paramount to that existing between himself and his client. It is a maxim of morals and law that the general law, or public duty, is more powerful and of stronger obligation than the private duty; especially is this maxim applicable when the private duty is owing to him who has broken the law, and respects that breach of the law only.

Above and beyond all arguments of a purely political or civil nature, we have to look at the moral and religious aspect of this question. What is there in the profession of an advocate to invest him with power to set aside the great command of God, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour"? What right has he to defy the prohibition of the Almighty,—the puny worm to rise up in defiance of Omnipotence? The attempt at justification is surely the most ridiculous for its absurdity, yet most blasphemous for its impiety, that the mind of man can well conceive.

For the present we conclude, with the hope soon again to resume our argument, feeling assured we shall ever have an approving auditory in the readers of our magazine while advocating truthfulness under every circumstance, at all times, and upon all subjects.

Magna est veritas, et prævalebit.

L'OUVRIER.

The Essayist.

SHAKESPERE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

III.—EARLY MANHOOD.

* Bright metals on a sullen errand
Will shew more goodly, and attract more eyes
Than that which hath no foil to set it off."—*Henry IV.*

"LET me not to the marriage of true minds *admit* impediment," are the words with which Shakespere commences his 116th Sonnet, and they appear to have embodied the thought uppermost in his mind, not long after he had companioned in intimate associateship with "sweete Anne" Hathaway, whom he early began to address as "My all-the-world." As he walked with her in the hours of "black Vesper's pageants," how keenly and kindly would he express himself on the enduringness of *his* affection:—

" Love is not love
That alters when it alteration finds.

Oh, no!—it is an ever-fixed mark,
That looks on tempests, and is never shaken:
It is the star of every *wandering* bark.

Love's not time's fool;
Love alters not with *his* brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out, even to the edge of doom."

And while he so speaks, do not

" A thousand blushing apparitions start
Into *her* face,"

and tell us a secret that she dare not utter?

Whatever engaged the youthhood of Shakespere after leaving school—law, trade, or pedagogism—it is pretty clear that he must have made a good use of his eyes in noticing the tints in the sky, the flowered earth, the love-inspiring beauty of the river-threaded meadows, and the changeful variances of the seasons. Nor is it at all improbable that he sauntered, in slouched hat, into the taverns along the road, and lounged about travelled highways, or sped over the downs with dog at heel, and at night took a shot at a deer. These were the common amusements of his day. But we can never think of him as an idler, nor can we imagine him viciously bent on a breach of the law. With Anne Hathaway to occupy his thoughts and time—with her influence to keep him right—we cannot picture him as a wildling and a worldling, nor believe him to have been a

culprit, exposed to penalty and ignominy. *Before* his marriage, that would be unlikely; *after* it, still more improbable. The germ of the deer-stealing myth is palpable, but that it *grew* is just as plain. Aubrey (1680), the earliest *writer* of his life, says nothing about it. Rowe (1707) first relates it, with some circumstantiality. The Rev. Richard Davies, Rector of Sapperton and Archdeacon of Lichfield (1701), is more particular in his narrative still, though he makes mistakes regarding known facts, which he might easily have avoided, and therefore shows his incompetency as a reporter. Capel (1768) brings an increase to the tradition; and in 1778, a confirmation of Capel's news comes from Oldys. Rowe says the ante-Lucy *ballad* was "lost." Capel and Oldys *recover* one verse of it, and Malone gets and prints the *entire* poem, but believes "*that the whole is a forgery.*" In this opinion most critics now coincide.

We believe Shakespere took his sport like a *man*, not like a vagabond; and we are the more inclined to think this, because we know that a true attachment is the best safeguard to a young man's character.

Our next earliest definite notice of Shakespere refers to

1582, and is Shakespere's marriage-bond. It was found by Sir Thomas Philips in the Worcester registry, in 1836. It bears date 28th November, 1582, and in it Fulk Sandells and John Richardson, farmers, of Stratford, become bound in £40, "that William Shagspere, one thone partie, and Anne Hathwey, of Stratford, in the dioces of Worcester, maiden, may lawfully solemnize marriage together," "with once asking of the bannes."

This document, besides the signatures of the bondsmen, bears the seal of R. H. (Richard Hathaway?) so that it seems *probable* that responsible friends on both sides had agreed to the match. We may believe, as was the custom of his age, that some time before he "was affianced to her by oath, and the nuptial appointed; between which time of the contract and limit of the solemnity,"

"Before the perfect ceremony of Love's rite,"

they had deported themselves, as the registers of Stratford in his time will prove to have been often the case, as married persons, esteeming the troth-plight and betrothal as equivalent to *moral* though destitute of *legal* sanction; for though we know not where the marriage ceremony was performed, we learn in the Stratford register that,—

"1583, May 26th, Susanna, daughter to William Shakspere," was baptized as a child begotten in wedlock. Shakespere was then little above nineteen, and his wife a little over twenty-six.

It is only reasonable to *presume* that, prior to friends consenting to this union, and the occurrence of the marriage, Shakespere had some independent means of support. What these were, we have no means of now ascertaining; but we know (or at least *infer*), that he was resident in Stratford parish in

1585, for in that year, "February 2, Hamnet and Judith, sonne and daughter to William Shakespere," were baptized. Before he has attained his majority, he has a family about him, and it needed no impulse from any Justice Shallow, no poaching notoriety or danger, to prompt a first-class mind like his to act in a kind and manly spirit, and "being inclined naturally to poetry and acting," as Aubrey says, to take his way to London, where, probably, his townsmen, if not his relatives, were at that time successfully getting on, and so become "an actor at one of the playhouses," and show that he could, as well as "did, act exceedingly well." Aubrey tells us, too, that he began *early* to make essays at dramatic poetry, which at that time was very low, and his plays took well. In the desire to drive hunger from the home of his children, we find a *motive*; and in his conscious possession of superior power, we perceive an *occasioning cause* for his removal from the "circumscription and confine" of Stratford to the city on "the banks of the Thames." When a given sufficient, efficient cause is given, there is no principle of logic which necessitates the search for a greater or more unusual one. We need not invent miracles to account for every-day occurrences.

Did Shakespere go alone to London? and did he there forget a father's love, a husband's duty? If the sonnets be in aught autobiographical, I would suggest that those numbered 50, 39, 36, 27—29, 44—49, 61, and 97, should be read as here arranged, as a reply. So read, we fancy that they will help to unthread the maze into which commentators have got themselves when they write as follows, viz. :—

"Another section of Shakespere's history is composed by that romantic chain of adventure which is supposed to be hidden beneath the obscure allusions of the Sonnets. There was, we are told, a friend and patron of the poet, a youth of high birth and personal accomplishments; there was also a dark-haired lady, whom the poet loved, but over whose relations towards him there is thrown a veil of mystery, allowing us to see little except the feeling of the parties—that their love was guilt. The female, introduced to the youthful friend, transferred her passion to him. The poet, at first shaken to his inmost soul, recognized at length, in the double treachery, a judicial visitation, punishing his own offence. He cast off the faithless woman for ever, but received the repenting friend again to his heart. That something not very unlike this did really happen, we firmly believe. The supposition that the most specific of the sonnets were written by Shakespere for a friend or friends, is too absurd to be listened to for a moment."*

Beautiful tissue-paper romance, vanish! Is there truth in man, and that man Shakespere? Then read, *seriatim*, that splendid justificatory series of sonnets, 109—121, beginning,—

"Oh, never say that *I was false of heart*," &c.,

and if there be self-reference in them at all, the calumny shall wither faster and more surely than the gourd of Jonah.

1586. On January 10th, 1586, the return to a *Distringas*—a writ to seize upon goods, &c., for debt, or to secure a person's appearance on a certain day, is—John Shakespere has nothing in which he is able to be distrained; a *capias*—a writ of personal seizure, was then issued; again in February; again in March. He was afterwards deprived of his alderman's gown, the reason being, he "doth not come to the halles, nor hath he of long time." What these writs were about we do not know; perhaps to force compearance in the halls, perhaps to call in the fines due for non-attendance.

1587. Was he arrested in 1587? In that year he produced a writ of *habeas corpus*, i.e., a writ for the release or bailing of a person who considers himself illegally imprisoned.

These several law transactions may imply that he was then a man of falling or fallen fortunes, though they can also bear the interpretation that he was then living beyond the jurisdiction and power of the courts of Stratford. Were these legal actions indeed against this John Shakespere? there was another, a shoemaker, resident in Stratford then.

1587. "The Queen's players" (Burbadge's company—incorporated as the Queen's, 1583—with whom Shakespere is supposed to have thus early formed a connection) made their first appearance in Stratford, and are more highly rewarded than any previous company,—e.g., Oxford's, Warwick's, Essex', in 1584.

1589. A document, said to have been found among the Ellesmere papers, used to be quoted, though doubtfully, regarding this date, to show that at this period Shakespere was a sharer in the Blackfriars Theatre—twelfth out of sixteen—but this has recently been branded as a fabrication; and though the matter is, in itself, probable enough, we forbear the insertion of it—as it may readily be found elsewhere—to save space.

1590. The "Anatomic of Absurditie," by Thomas Nash, "a man," as Isaac Walton says, of a sharp wit and the master of a scoffing satirical merry pen, author of "Summer's Last Will and Testament," &c., published in 1590, speaks of "new found songs and sonnets, which every red nose fiddler hath at his fingers' end;" of men who "make poetry an occupation; lying is their living; and fables are their moveables;" and who "think knowledge a burden, tapping it before they have half tunde it, venting it before they have filled it, in whom the saying of the orator is verified—*Ante ad dicendum quam ad cognoscendum veniunt*. They come to speak before they come to know. They contemn arts as unprofitable, contenting themselves with a little country grammar knowledge." As all the dramatists of this period (except Thomas Greene, Shakespere's fellow-townsmen, a playwright and actor—unless it may have been Drayton, a Warwickshire man, or Kyd?) had received a university education, it is quite evident that Nash was here gnashing his teeth in spite at the achievements of a "country grammar" school scholar then rising into fame, whose sonnets were known, and who was beginning to obtain the name and repute of an English

past; yet not then so successful as to restrain the affected contempt and real jealousy of "the alchemists of eloquence," of whom Shakespeare was then one—and one, too, who could "outbrave" even him in "the swelling bombast of bragging blank verse." Nash was an intimate of Robert Greene, Lodge, Marlow, Peale, Maunday, and Chettle, who felt their reputation waning before this brighter light. It is held, therefore, with great probability, that the above is a notice of Shakespeare.

In 1590, the first three books of the "Fairie Queen" were published, and Edmund Spenser was appointed poet-laureate by Queen Elizabeth. Its popularity induced Ponsonbie, the bookseller, to collect a number of small poems, which, under the title of "Complaints," &c., he entered at Stationers' Hall in 1590, and published in the following year, viz., 1591. Of these poems, the second is entitled, "The Tears of the Muses." In it "the golden brood of great Apollo's wit" rehearse their "piteous plaints and sorrowful sad time," and in her turn *Thalia* (the muse of comedy) takes up the tale of dole, in a poem which has almost unanimously been regarded as referring to William Shakespeare,* and to the occupation of the comic stage by the Marprelate Controversy, 1589-90, to such an extent of personality as to have driven almost all other themes off the stage. These arguments have been induced against this interpretation,† viz., "firstly, that Shakespeare had not at the time attained a rank such as would justify the encomiums [the lines contain]; secondly, because there is no probability of his having subsided into the condition of inertness described; and, thirdly, because there are grounds for supposing the verses in question were composed before he even began to write." To these objections the following replies might be made:—1st. Though the lines might not apply to they might have been suggested by Shakespeare. 2nd. The first argument assumes the very matter in dispute. Its correctness will be considered under date 1598. 3rd. There is a probability shown by the advocates of this inference which he has not disproven; and, moreover, a probability is not absolutely required; for the general idea of the poem must govern the treatment of the particulars brought under it, and this demand for probability would necessarily imply a proof of a general decay in all branches of learning during the reign of Elizabeth, because all the muses have cause to mourn as well as *Thalia*—and that we think could scarcely be maintained. 4th. No other dramatist can be mentioned, of whom the lines are characteristic. Sir Philip Sidney (whom Todd suggests and Dyer advocates) was not a comic dramatist; and Lily, the *enigmatist*, "a little fellow" Nash calls him, but adds, "he hath one of the best wits in England," was still less so. Malone's conjecture is

* See this matter argued at full length in Charles Knight's "Shakespeare: a Biography," book iii. chap. iv.; and Chambers' "Knight's Shakespeare," vol. xii., "History of Opinion," chap. i.; Halliwell's "Life of Shakespeare," pp. 139—142.
† Staunton's "Shakespeare's Life," p. 27.

quite untenable. 5th. The reasons for supposing a distant authorship are not stronger than those which tend to show that the poem was written during Spenser's visit to London in 1590. 6th. If the logic of exclusion is valid at all, every competitor must be set aside when Shakespere's name is given. The gist of the verses may be gained from the following excerpts :—

"Where be the sweet delights of Learning's treasure,
That wont with comic sock to beautify
The painted theatres?
Oh, all is gone! and all that goodly glee
Which wont to be the glory of gay wits,
Is laid abed.
All places they with folly have possest,
And with vain toys the vulgar entertain.
But we have banished with all the rest,
That whilome wont to wait upon my train,
Fine counterfeisance and unburthful sport,
Delight and laughter decked in seemly sort.
All these; and all that else the comic stage,
With seasoned wit and goodly pleasaunce graced,
By which man's life in his likest image
Was limned forth, are wholly now defaced.
And those sweet wits, which wont the like to frame,
Are now despised and made a laughing frame.
And he—the man whom Nature's self had made
To mock herself, and Truth to imitate,
With kindly counter (contour?) under mimic shade,
Our pleasant *Willy*, ah! is *dead of late*,
With whom all joy and jolly merriment
Is also deaded and in dolour drent.
Instead thereof scoffing scurrility,
And scornful folly with contempt is crept,
Rolling in rhymes of shameless ribaldry;
Without regard or due decorum kept.
• • • • •
But that same *gentle* spirit from whose pen
Large streams of honey and sweet nectar flow,
Scorning the boldness of such base-born men,
Which dare their follies forth so rashly throw,
Doth rather choose *to sit in idle cell*,
That so himself to mockery to sell."

If this was not Shakespere, who was it?

1591. Shakespere's father, notwithstanding his apparent difficulties, seems not to have been quite done up; for his possession, and *perhaps* his occupancy of a house in Henly Street is proven by a deed of date 14th August, 1591. It is the conveyance of a tenement in that street, "between the house of Robert Johnson on the one part, and the house of John Shakespere on the other, from Geo. Badger to John Couch." Unless, which is highly improbable, this was John Shakespere the shoemaker.

The "Diary of Philip Henslowe," printed for the Shakespere

society, consisting of 260 octavo pages of a copy from a bulky, parchment-bound, ill-spelled note-book about plays, dramatists, loans given to poor playwrights, the proceeds from performances, and the pay given to theatrical authors, extends from 1591 to 1609; and contains entries regarding a multitude of actors and playwrights; but it contains not one word regarding the greatest and best of them all, even in these years of his hard, lowly struggle:

"When in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes."

This is, at least, a sort of negative proof that he held aloof from borrowing and the convenience of getting money in advance; as well as of his seemly conduct, which did not, it appears, drive him into such rash necessities as would have made the help of the pledge-taker of playwrights a blessing and a boon. Ben Jonson and Rowley, Heywood and Chettle, Field, Daboe, and Massinger, Marlowe, Dekker, Maunday, Haughton, Lodge, Greene, Nash, &c., are there, but not Shakespeare.

1592. "Henry VI., Part I.," is alluded to by Thomas Nash in his poem of "Pierce Penniless, his Supplication to the Devil," published in 1592. Robert Greene, an early dramatist of wonderful fluency and industry, though of low moral character, died on September 3rd, 1592. His executor, Henry Chettle (author of "Patient Grissell," &c.), published, immediately after his death, Greene's "Groatsworth of Wit bought with a Million of Repentance." In this work, a rival playwright of his day is stigmatized as "an *upstart* crow, beautified in our feathers, that with his *tiger's heart wrapped in a player's hide*," supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as the best of you, and being an *absolute Johannes Factotum*, is, in his own conceit, the only *Shakescene* in a country." In this passage we have evidence that in 1592 Shakespeare, the "upstart," was *up*; and of so much consequence too as to excite the scurrilous ire of a disappointed rival. The abuse of opponents is the earliest sign of fame. Moreover, we see that his talents were not confined to one mode of endeavour,—he was "an absolute Johannes Factotum,"—his *sonnets* were getting abroad, as Nash, 1590, confesses; he was an actor and a dramatist, besides being a prudent man. Some have supposed he was a money-lender!

Greene had incurred the wrath of Doctor Gabriel Harvey, the college companion and friend of Edmund Spenser; and a few days after the death of the *quondam* parson and whilome dramatist, "Four Letters and certain Sonnets," from the pen of Harvey, appeared, in which the character of Greene is very severely handled. In the third of these letters the following passages of moment and of intimate bearing on our subject occur, viz., "I speak to a poet. . . . Good sweet orator, be a divine poet indeed; and use heavenly eloquence indeed; and employ thy golden talent with

* A parody of "Oh, tiger's heart wrapped in a woman's hide," in the Third Part of "Henry VI." act i. sc. iv.

amounting usance indeed; and with heroical cantoes honour right virtue indeed; as noble Sir Philip Sidney and gentle Maister Spenser have done with immortal fame: and I will bestow more compliments upon thee than ever any bestowed upon them; or this tongue ever afforded; or any Aretiniah mountain of huge exaggerations can ever bring forth. . . . The right novice of pregnant and aspiring conceit will not outskip any precious gem of invention, or any beautiful flower of elocution, that may richly adorn or gallantly bedeck the trim garland of *his budding style*. I speak generally to every springing wit, but more specially to a few; and at this instant singularly to *one* whom I salute with a hundred blessings, and entreat with as many prayers to love them that love all good wits, and hate none but the devil and his incarnate imps, notoriously professed." As Harvey commends for imitation Spenser, Sidney, Stanihurst, Fraunce, Watson, Daniel, and Nash, it could be none of these; and as the characters of Marlowe and Peele cast them out, who among the poets of that age, whose style was in its bud in 1592, could this be but that one whose "Venus and Adonis," a poem in the verse and rhythm of Spenser's manner, must at this very time have been in the press? The friend of Spenser, like Spenser himself, seems to have guaged Shakespeare thoroughly. Though they have not expressly and directly named him, the implication *appears to us* to be irresistible.

But more follows: Chettle, in 1592, published his "Kind Hart's Dream," five "invectives against reigning abuses," and from the preface to this pamphlet we find that his editorial labours had put him in a false position, out of which he endeavours to extricate himself thus:—"About three months since died Mr. Robert Greene, leaving many papers in sundry booksellers' hands, among others his 'Groatsworth of Wit,' in which a letter written to divers playwrights is offensively by one or two of them taken; and because on the dead they cannot be avenged, they wilfully forge in their conceits a living author; and after tossing it to and fro, no remedy but it must needs light on me. . . . With neither of them that take offence *was* I acquainted, and with one of them (Marlowe?) I care not if I never be. The other (Shakespeare?) whom at that time I did not so much spare as since I wish I had. . . . That I did not I am as sorry as if the original fault had been my fault; because myself *have seen* his demeanour no less civil than he excellent in *the quality* he professes. Besides, divers of worship have reported his *uprightness of dealing*, which argues his honesty; and his *facetious* grace in writing, that approves his wit. . . . I protest it was *all* Greene's, and not mine, nor Master Nash's, as some have unjustly affirmed."

The links now fit pretty closely: Greene's attack, Harvey's advice, and Chettle's apology show that he (or if not, who?) *was*, about 1590—1593, known as a comic dramatist, and might, therefore, be praised as such by Spenser then, as he was subsequently in 1596.

1593. "Venus and Adonis" was entered by the publisher,

Richard Field, "at the sign of the White Greyhound in St. Paul's Churchyard," in the books of the Stationers' Company as "licensed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Wardens," 18th April, 1593, and the first edition was printed in the same year. In the Epistle Dedicatory, to the Right Hon. Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton and Baron of Lichfield, Shakespere speaks of this poem as "unpolished lines," calls it "the first heir of my invention," and promises "to take advantage of *all idle hours* till I have honoured you with some graver labour." It has been a matter of dispute whether this was really a *first* work, or a *first published* work; and therefore whether it had been composed early in life, or but a short time before its publication. It is *probable* that it was an early work, written in the heyday of his blood, which—while the theatres were closed on account of the plague, in the autumn of 1592—he touched off (at Stratford?) It is, however, *equally probable* that he did not look upon his dramas as works of literature, but as articles of trade, and that he did not reckon them "heirs of his invention" in the peculiar sense the words here seem to bear. Or he may really at that time have produced no play so thoroughly and irrefragably *original* as to justify him speaking of any of them as an "*heir* of my invention." This would, to a certain extent, be a confession of Green's accuracy, or would at least be a confirmation of the implication it contains; at the same time, it would show that poetry was not the main and chief object of his efforts—the mainstay of his being.

"Titus Andronicus" was entered at Stationers' Hall for publication in 1593.

1594. A second edition of "Venus and Adonis" was entered at Stationers' Hall in this year by the same printer. On May 9th, 1594, Mr. Harrison, senior, placed upon the Stationers' register "A Booke intituled the Ravysheiment of Lucrece." This poem was also printed by Richard Field, and was sold by him at "the White Greyhound." Drayton's "Matilda," 1594, contains an allusion to it, and in some verses affixed to *Willobie his Avisa*, mention is made of how "Shakes-speare paints poore Lucrece rape."

"The First Part of the Contention betwixt the two Famous Houses of York and Lanaaster" (now the Second Part of "Henry VI.") was published in 1594; as was also "The Taming of a Shrew" (either a first draft by Shakespere, or an old play by Kyd, Greene, Marlowe, Haughton, or some other early dramatist, on which to fix the critics are divided), if not an early outline, then the source of the chief plot of "The Taming of *the* Shrew."

"'The Comedy of Errors,' says Hallam, in his 'Literature of Europe,' vol. ii. p. 177, *may be presumed*, by an allusion it contains, to have been written before the submission of Paris to Henry IV., in 1594, which nearly put an end to the Civil War;" and in a note he indicates Act III. Scene 2, and adds, "Some have judged the lay from this passage to be written as early as 1591, but on precarious grounds."

A "Historie" called "Titus Andronicus," presumed to be the play afterwards published as Shakespere's, was entered for publication at Stationers' Hall in 1593; and critics have assented to the probability of its having been published in 1594, although the earliest edition of which any copy is now known is dated 1600. In 1614, Ben Jonson, in the "Induction to his Bartholomew Fair," says: "He that will swear 'Jeronimo' or 'Andronicus' are the best plays yet shall pass unexcepted at here, as a man whose judgment shows it is constant, and hath stood still these twenty-five or thirty years." "Jeronimo" was first produced in 1588; i. e., twenty-six years before Jonson's notice of it; and if we allow of a like exaggeration of time for "Andronicus," it will bring us very nearly to 1594, so that we may regard this date as approximately correct. If, as many critics think, "Titus Andronicus" is not a play of Shakespere's, the above calculations, &c., are of little or no importance to us.* The Globe Theatre was built in 1594.

1595. "The True Tragedy of Richard Duke of York" (now the Third Part of "Henry VI.") was published in 1595. In a note to a work entitled "Polimanteia," 1595, it is said, "All praise the 'Lucrece' of sweet Shakespere;" and it is believed by most critics now that in Spenser's "Colin Clout's come again," 1595, Shakespere is alluded to in the following lines, viz. :—

"And there, though last not least, is Action:
A gentler shepherd may nowhere be found;
Whose muse, full of high thought's invention,
Doth like himself heroically sound."

The lines have been applied to Michael Drayton (and to Warner!), but evidently in error. The characteristics are Shakespere's alone.

"The Return from Parnassus"—a play first *publicly* acted by the students in St. John's College, Cambridge, which contains remarks on contemporary authors—is adjudged by critics to have been produced *about* 1595. Spenser, Constable, Lodge, Daniel, Watson, Drayton, Davis, Marston, Marlowe, Shakespere, and Churchyard, are the authors specially noticed. Of Shakespere, the following is said :—

"Who loves Adonis' love or Lucrece rape,
His sweeter verse contains heart-robbling life;
Could but a graver subject him content,
Without love's lazy foolish languishment."

While in a prose dialogue between the actors, Burbage and Kempe, Kempe says, "Why, here's our fellow Shakespere puts them all down—aye, and Ben Jonson, too. O! that Ben Jonson is a pestilent fellow, he brought up Horace, giving the poets a pill; but our fellow Shakespere hath given him a purge that made him betray his credit;" and Burbage replies, "He is a *shrewd* fellow,

* See the question argued in Knight's "Studies of Shakespere," book ii. chap. 1; Hallam's "Literature of Europe," vol. ii. p. 176; &c.

indeed." If, however, *as we think*, the allusion here made is to "The Poetaster," the assigned date will be too early—or this is an addition; or "The Poetaster" is older than it is usually supposed; or this being the work of a university pen, its author was not read up to the time in the theatrical literature of his age. Yet, if the poetical, like the prose opinion, is to be dated 1600, we cannot account for the writer's seeming ignorance of Shakespeare's published dramatic works!

1596. It has been customary, since 1831, in reliance on Mr. J. Payne Collier's "History of English Dramatic Poetry," then published, to quote, in reference to this date, a reply of the players of the *Globe* and the *Blackfriars*, to a representation from certain inhabitants of the precincts of the Blackfriars, against the repair and enlargement of that theatre, and the continuance of performances therein, in which Shakespeare's name holds the fourth place; but on the 30th of January of the present year, several eminent palæographers, Francis Palgrave, Frederick Madden, &c., have delivered, at the request of the Master of the Rolls, an opinion on the matter, and they have declared "*that the document in question is spurious.*"

Malone inferred, from a paper that had belonged to Alleyn the player, that Shakespeare lived in Southwark, near the Bear Garden, in 1596, but the paper has not been found. One, *said to be it*, in which Shakespeare's name appears, has been declared to be "an evident modern forgery."

One melancholy entry gives this year a sad importance in our Shakespeare chronicle. Death first, in that year, invaded the poet's own household, and bereft him of his eldest and only son. The burial entry in the Stratford register reads thus:—"1596, August 11th, Hamnet, filius William Shakespeare." We cannot be far wrong in assuming that Shakespeare was in Stratford at the funeral, and that he, with a heavy-hearted sorrow, laid the youthful head of his son in the cold grave.

"How many a holy and obsequious tear
Hath dear, religious love stolen from his eye,
As interest of the dead!"

In the same year, a third edition of "Venus and Adonis," and a second of the "Rape of Lucrece," were published; and John Shakespeare, in all probability, "at the instance of his son," says Dyce, applied to the Herald's College for a grant of arms.

1597. Dethick, the Garter King of Arms, granted the application for arms, and they were accordingly blazoned (according to a pattern by Clarence Cooke in 1576?)

"Romeo and Juliet," "as it hath been often (with great applause) played publicly," &c., was printed by J. Danter, 1597.

"King Richard the Second," "as it hath been publicly acted," &c., and "King Richard the Third," "as it hath been lately acted," &c., were printed separately by V. Sims for Andrew Wise, in

1597. "The First Part of Henry IV." was also entered at Stationers' Hall.

"In one month from the day of St. Michael, in the 44th year of the reign of Elizabeth," &c., i. e., on 29th August, 1597, by "a plea of covenant," between "William Shakespere, gentleman," and "Hercules Underhill, gentleman," the former became possessed of "one messuage, two barns, two gardens, and two orchards, with appurtenances, in Stratford-upon-Avon," and for this he gave "to the aforesaid Hercules sixty pounds sterling." The house on this property had been built by Sir Hugh Clopton, in the reign of Henry VII., and was called *the great house*, but Shakespere, a *novus homo*, called it New Place. He used it a short time afterwards as his residence.

In this same year, John Shakespere and his wife filed a bill in Chancery—the most expensive court in the country—against John Lambert, son of the Edmund Lambert to whom, nineteen years before, they had mortgaged the estate of Asbies, for the recovery of that estate, unjustly, as they averred, withheld from them, although the money in release had, according to agreement, as they say, been duly tendered. It is *believed* that this was done at the instance and by the help of their son William Shakespere.

The Reviewer.

The Denominational Reason Why. London: Houlston and Wright.

THE object of this work is to give a brief statement of the origin, history, and tenets of the various Christian sects, with the reasons for their forms of belief and modes of worship. In accomplishing his difficult and delicate task, the Editor has judiciously carried out the distinguishing principle of our own magazine—viz., that of allowing the representatives of every sect to make their own statements, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions. The work has evidently been compiled with great care, and from the number of authorities quoted it must be the result of great research. It is worthy of a place in the libraries of all truth-seekers and truth-defenders.

Historical and Descriptive Geography of Palestine. By JOSEPH A. MEEN. Sunday School Union. London.

THIS work is specially designed for use in day and Sunday schools, and is the production of one who has had much experience in the instruction of the young? It is written in an interesting style, and abounds with Scripture facts and references. The numerous pictorial illustrations are, for the most part, good, but we cannot say so much for the map of Palestine, which certainly should give place to a better when a second edition of the work is required.

Industrial Labour; where and how to get it. By ISAAC GREGORY, F.R.G.S. Manchester: David Kelly.

THIS pamphlet is published to make known to the working classes of this country the fact that in Manchester and other parts of Lancashire the demand for labour greatly exceeds the supply, while the reverse is the case in the south and west of England. The writer says:—

"In the north there is constant employment, with large wages; in the south, almost no employment for the young, from thirteen to sixteen or seventeen years of age; and wages which are a caricature upon history. There are thousands of young women under twenty years of age, in Lancashire, getting from 8s. to 12s. a week for light, easy work, while the only working head of a large family in Essex, Dorsetshire, Cambridgeshire, Kent, and other counties in England, is getting about 9s. or 10s. for many more hours of labour, and with wear and tear of body at a maximum. We are grievously short of hands, even at the above wages, and throughout this whole manufacturing district we have a daily increasing dearth of labour."

The writer makes various suggestions for facilitating communication between willing labourers and anxious employers, which are worthy of the attention of both classes.

John Bright and his Calumniators. London: Gratton. Manchester: Heywood. Price 6d.

WE notice this pamphlet, not for the purpose of endorsing or condemning its political sentiments, but because it is the production of one of our own contributors, who, in this instance, writes under the *nom de plume* of "Caleb Crofton." The object of the pamphlet is "the refutation of certain aspersions made upon the character of Mr. Bright, in regard to his connection with Manchester; and in confirmation of his views in reference to the peerage."

Gabriel de Mirabeau. By HENRY KEEBLE. London: Horsell and Candwell. Price 6d.

The Life of Thomas Chatterton, the Poet. By JAMES R. BENNETT. London: F. Pitman. Price 6d.

WE have here two biographical sketches; the first being originally prepared for—though, for space-reasons, not published in—our pages, and the second delivered as a lecture to a society in which we feel interested. They are both evidently the result of considerable reading and research, and well calculated to interest and inform.

The New Quarterly Magazine, and Literary Chronicle. Nos. I. and II. London: J. F. Hope.

THE literary progeny of the *British Controversialist* are becoming numerous; and now we have to announce the advent of a Magazine in which the family features are very strongly developed in a "poetic" and a "societies'" section, &c., &c. We of course feel a paternal interest in this new candidate for public support, and trust it will merit and obtain a more than ordinary amount of success.

Learn to Live. By ROBERT KERR, Kilmarnock.
London: Houston and Wright.

"THESE" "firstlings from the pen of a working man" come to us from one of our earliest contributors—a working man, who is an honour to his class. He has suffered sorrow, borne difficulty, and encountered disappointment bravely. His hours of leisure have been long and often given to the service of men of toil; and after the irksome labour for daily bread was over with him, he has willingly lent his aid towards the improvement of his fellow-workers. He has cultivated his own mind well, read much, studied much. In Kilmarnock he is valued and esteemed. A physical infirmity has—unjustly, we think—acted as a barrier to his gaining a position of influence he sought, but with unconquerable will and endeavour he is about to "try again." This time he wants help and sympathy, and he has appealed to the public in this book—a collection of lectures, essays, and poems.

The book, though wanting in some of the graces of good writing, is a welcome addition to the literature of labour. It is kindly toned, large viewed, honest, full of ripe, excellent thoughts, touched here and there by the light of an imagination, bold, vivid, vigorous, and poetic. "The Poetry of Life" has seldom been better expressed than here, nor has "Self-Culture" often been more genially illustrated. "The Philosophy of Life" receives consideration such as we wish many of our working men were able and willing to give it. "The Bookworm" may gain a little pleasure, profit, and delight from the paper dedicated to him. The few poems with which the volume closes are chastely, feelingly, and musically composed; though we by no means think them the best part of this commendable book. The following extract, from "Self-Culture Illustrated," we place before our readers, because it possesses a double interest. It will serve as a specimen of the style and quality of the book, and it will inform our readers regarding another early and valued contributor, whose brief but useful life entitles him to some more lasting memorial than has yet been given it. The initials R. L. G. appear in some of our early volumes; and we think it a duty to show how impressively that writer's life has affected those who enjoyed his personal friendship.

"Permit me now to introduce you to one whose name not twenty persons present ever heard pronounced. Let us then suppose it is the 11th of August, 1856. We leave the port of Ayr, as the sun is dipping behind the peaks of Arran, and gazing an adieu to us as we launch out into a boisterous sea, bound for Liverpool on the ill-fated *Earl of Carrick*. After a fearful night of storm, spent amid all the horrors of sea-sickness in the steerage, into which the waves that sweep the decks come pouring ever and anon among the prostrate passengers; and a day which promises little improvement on the night, but latterly assumes a milder temper, and then throws sunshine o'er its face, we reach our desired haven. We are glad once more to secure comfortable quarters on *terra firma*, in the great maritime town. Next morning finds us a little after six o'clock on our way to Manchester, the metropolis of cotton, discussing part of our sea stores as 'the huge steam-horse

with his iron sinews' hurries us along. An hour and a-half spent in Manchester, and then we are off for Oldham; the workshop of the cotton city, some nine miles distant. Having arrived, we make our way to a rising ground in the outskirts of this smoky, scattered, and uncomely town, yet containing some 60,000 of a population; and at length reach a neat row of houses with garden plots before the doors, and lying at right angles almost with the Blue Coat School of Oldham. We have been seen approaching, and a blithe, bonny Scotch girl, the sister of the friend we seek, bids us welcome. We can see a subdued sorrow on her countenance, notwithstanding the smile of friendliness our visit has occasioned. By and by we are conducted into a neat bedroom upstairs. Stretched on his bed, there lies a young man, pale and emaciated, with a winning face, sparkling eye, and massive brow; a face in which you cannot fail to read the presence of a high order of intelligence, and to regard as the index of a soul full of generous feelings and lofty aspirations. Around him are quite a number of books and papers. In his long bony fingers is a pencil; and, as he lies on his back, he is engaged in writing, with a book for his desk, the leading article for the next number of the *Oldham Chronicle*. He sits up in gladness as we enter; extends his friendly hand, and gives us such a hearty shake and kindly welcome as we scarce could expect from one so far gone in consumption. He begins to talk with fervour and eloquence, on themes in which our mutual interest is centred. You cannot keep him from talking, for there is a great spirit in him that disease cannot subdue. But the excitement is too much for him, and vomiting of blood ensues. We are mildly pained that our interview should have such an effect on one whom we esteem so much, and to see whom we have travelled so far. After such a scene, we have little anticipation that our beloved friend will so far rally as to be able in three weeks time to pay us a visit, and stay a night with us in Kilmarnock, and will continue to run his brave race with death till July of the following year. But so it happened. And who is he? you ask. It is Robert Lewis Gerrie, the founder of the Neophyte Writers' Society, now grown into the British Literary Society, in connection with which I first formed his acquaintance in 1852. Never do I hear the name of Robert Nicoll uttered without having my breast stirred with love to him, or without having Robert Lewis Gerrie brought vividly before my mind; for their nobility of character was one, and their life-struggle and its results were sadly similar. Gerrie was born in Aberdeen, in January, 1831. At the age of thirteen, he went to be a compositor in the *Herald* Office there, where he served seven years. During his apprenticeship he attended evening classes, studying modern languages and other branches of mental improvement. At fifteen he wrote verses, but the bent of his mind was decidedly literary; and before he was nineteen he was a prize essay writer, and contributor to several magazines. He loved nature, and adored books; and in the haunts which he loved, says a friend, where every spiky pine-tree was a familiar friend, and every summer violet a thing to be caressed, it was not unusual to find him asleep with the moonlight upon his face. Such traits distinguish the mind exalted with the germs of greatness. And so he courageously struggled on in the culture of his own mind, and in extending a brotherly helping hand to other youths whose aspirations ran up the same golden track as his own. So did he live and labour, till he rose to be editor and proprietor of the *Oldham Chronicle* before he was twenty-four years of age. And what brought him to the condition in which I have first introduced him to your notice? It was partly the villanies and immoralities of trade. He purchased the copyright and furnishings of the paper beyond their real value. The circulation was less than 300, and many of the advertisements, on the faith of whose *bona fide* character he had purchased the paper, were fictitious; sometimes the workmen, whom he had continued in their places, rendered themselves unable on the Friday night to bring out the paper on Saturday morning, and poor Gerrie had to run to Manchester for help, and had

to act as pressman himself, in addition to all his other arduous efforts to establish a popular paper, and make it self-supporting. The ability displayed in his leaders occasioned the baseless rumour that leading men in the neighbourhood were their authors; so jealous is the public of a young, self-made man. So successfully did he fight the battles of reform, of freedom, and the people, in his columns, that, in three years, the circulation of the *Chronicle* rose from 300 to 3,000. It was little wonder that his constitution, not over robust at best, should begin to yield under such cheerless and harassing circumstances. These were the circumstances that planted the fatal ivy at the root of that noble stem; and for two long years did the insidious creeper drain the sap, and shrivel up the opening leaves of the better life that so cheerfully nursed it. Yes, cheerfulness was there up to the very last. Manly, Christian fortitude was there too, and a gladsome hope lighting up the soul, and entering into that which is within the veil. I would like to read you some extracts from letters of his which I received in '52 and '53, which are distinguished by eloquence and true friendship, by varied intelligence and sage-like counsels, tendered in the very spirit of a warm-hearted brother—but time forbids. I only give you a few verses from his pen, which are beautiful and pathetic, and have the melancholy interest of being written shortly before his death. So tenderly did he love his mother and only sister, who left Aberdeen to reside with him, and tend him in his journey to the tomb, that he was afraid they would be witnesses of his last conflict with the last enemy of men; and so, in touching tones, he expresses an anxious desire 'To die alone :—

“TO DIE ALONE.

“No silence is there when the heart doth beat,
But warning sounds of many muffled feet,
Of inside watchers, servants not of ours,
Telling out the lingering mortal's hours.
Companions close are they on long black nights,
Our rest to share, or clamber fever's heights,
When rest is gone, as it has gone from me,
Nor other rest is wished but to be free,
Without a human ear to hear my moan,
To stretch my limbs, and thus to die alone.

“O many are the nights that seem like years,
Countless in watchings, hopes, and stormy fears,
Endless in phantoms, bottomless in pain,
While anarchy and chaos rule the brain.
Many those nights, but with us lives the power
In lucid rests to make a heaven's hour,
With prayer of heart and highest thought of good,
With soul of faith so deep in earnest mood,
As helps for laggard doubtings to atone,
And sweetens more my hope to die alone.

“Then night becomes so beautiful, that rest
Is well forgotten in a change so blest;
Mayhap the night fire spurts a cheery blaze,
And some old housepiece smiles of jocund days;
Mayhap my bird, that roosts within its cage,
Trills like the dreaming songster on the stage;
Or walls and roofs have changed to starry sky,
And show the quiet moon sail stately by,
While some still stars, from rosy childhood known
And loved, invite me then to die alone.

"The death-bed is too serious for show,
 For formal parting, or set speech to flow;
 The gush of love that prompts us then to meet,
 Good bye to bid, and one another greet,
 Sore to all hearts, is sorest to that one
 Whose time's run out and all its watchings done.
 Oh! ye whose nursing kindness can prolong
 A feeble life your friendly joys among,
 You cannot wish to hear its final groan,
 Then why should I not hope to die alone?"

"Oldham, February, 1857.

BETHESDA.'

But, no; he did not die alone. From the fond embrace of his mother's arms, on the 16th July, 1857, in the 27th year of his age, his freed spirit winged its flight to the Christian's home—inspired with the hope of yet meeting those dear ones whom he left behind. Nor had he long to wait till his beloved sister, whose health was impaired by attendance on him, followed him thither. To Robert Lewis Gerrie, and the institute of which he was the founder, I am indebted for some of the best lessons of my life; and so let me add to this tribute to his memory, these parting words: 'Oh, man greatly beloved, go thy way till the end be; for thou shalt rest, and stand in thy lot at the end of the days.' Farewell, brother, till we meet again!"—Pp. 95—101.

Young men, buy this book and read it carefully, you will find its contents repay you; and we hope that the knowledge of having helped a fellow-struggler towards a more useful and a diviner life may add a pleasant seeing to the eye that looks on it.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

98. Was it common in the 17th century for the Litany to be sung or chanted in the service of our national church?—INDOCTUS.

99. I remember reading some time since of a book which was said to be the oldest in the world, the letters of which were neither written nor printed, but cut out of the vellum with a sharp instrument. Can any of your readers give any information respecting it?—C. A.

100. When did the custom of marrying in churches originate? An answer will oblige—THE INQUIRER.

101. I am making a collection of eloquent passages and gems of thought from sermons, speeches, essays, &c. Can any

reader of the *British Controversialist* direct me to the mines where such wealth may be found in abundance?—AUGUSTINE.

102. A few months back, the members of the Leicester Young Men's Christian Association were favoured by an illustrated lecture on an instrument called the Gyroscope. Notwithstanding the lecturer's endeavour to be perspicuous, I could not clearly see its nature or use. I shall, therefore, be glad if you, or any of your correspondents, will explain them through the medium of the *British Controversialist*. We were informed by the lecturer that it was invented within the last two or three years, by a Frenchman. I should like to know if the fly-wheel is not an application of the same principle; also the fly-pulley

which is the shape of the wheel inside the gyroscope exhibited. This fly-pulley is used to gain speed; they are at work in this town, the shaft revolving at the rate of between 4,000 and 5,000 per minute.—J. T. B.

103. I shall be greatly obliged if any of your correspondents will explain the derivation of the word "Trollius," a name given by Linnaeus to the common globe-flower. I am sometimes puzzled, not only to know the meaning of scientific terms in botany (which may, however, generally be discovered by reference to a Latin dictionary), but also the reason of their application. It seems to me a matter of regret that in most botanical works the English word is set against the Latin one without any explanation, as if the one were a translation of the other.—AN A B C BOTANIST.

104. Please be so kind as to inform me, in your next number of the *British Controversialist*, the titles and prices of a few of the best (and cheap if possible) books, where I can find the elements of the history of civilization in different ages and countries.—E. C.

105. Oblige by saying in your next number what are the simplest, shortest, and best treatises on the existence of a God and on the divinity of Christianity.—D.

106. What is the age of the "Toll Down"?—INDOCTOR.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

85. *Massada*.—P. inquires, "Who among modern travellers first discovered the ruins of a fortress, the fall of which extinguished the last hope of the Jews, and completely unbated Judea to the Roman empire?" and the answer is:—The name of this famous fortress was Massada, which stood on the western shores of the Dead Sea, towards the south-western corner of the lake, on a lofty rock surrounded by deep ravines and precipices, and could only be reached by two dangerous narrow paths, one from the west, and

another from the east, which was four miles in length.

Upon this rock Jonathan, the Maccabean, built a citadel, which Herod the Great afterwards greatly strengthened by immense fortifications. The wall, which was of polished stone, was 14 feet thick and 32 feet high, flanked by 37 towers, each 87 feet high, and communicating with a line of buildings inside the wall. This celebrated fortress was besieged several times, and at last was taken by Flavius Silva. For ages after this stronghold was neglected and forgotten, but in 1838 Messrs. Robinson and Smith suggested that a certain rock they saw from the heights of Engedi, and crowned with ruined buildings, might be it; and in 1842, Mr. Walcott, an American missionary, with Mr. Tipping, an English artist, ascended the rock, and proved effectually that it was the real Massada. Since then (1851) M. De Sanley and a band of Frenchmen have ascended by the eastern path, and all concur in their details, corroborating to the very letter the descriptions of Josephus.—J. E. F.

93. *The History of the Gipsies*.—Has "Jesse" read Borrow's "Gipsies in Spain"? The work is entitled, "Borrow's Account of the Gipsies of Spain, with an Original Collection of their Songs and Poetry, and a Copious Dictionary of their Language," 2 vols., and may be had at the public libraries. It is a popular work, and I have heard it very well spoken of, though I cannot speak personally as to its value. Mr. Borrow has also published another work, entitled, "Lavengro; the Scholar, the Gipsy, and the Priest," in 3 vols. The well-known novelist, Mr. G. P. R. James, has also published a work, entitled "The Gipsy," in 3 vols.—J. W. J.

97. *Bookbinding*.—Lesné sung the praises of bookbinding forty years ago, and papers on the subject are to be found in almost all the encyclopedias; e.g., Britannica, Ure's "Knight on the Industrial Arts," and Houston and Wright published a small work, price 2s., on

titled, "The Bookbinder," in their "Industrial Library." Perhaps some other correspondent may be able to give more definite information.—N.

102. *Gyroscope*.—In "Recreative Science," No. 1., price 6d., an artistical, some length, explanatory of this instrument, will be found. It may yet be usefully employed to prove and illustrate several important astronomical truths regarding force, motion, &c.

104. *The Theory of Civilization* has occupied much of the attention of thinking men. A very excellent paper on the general question—civilization—attributed to Albany Fonblanque, appears in the *London and Westminster Review* for April, 1886. A definition of what is meant by the history of civilization will be found in Sir G. Cornwall Lewis's "Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics" (28s.), vol. i. p. 306. Chapters XXII. and XXVII. of the same book contain many excellent remarks on and facts regarding civilization, and the bibliography of the subject is pretty well exhausted in the notes to these chapters. Guizot's "Civilization in Europe" (2s. 6d.) is a well-known, able, and readable book. F. von Schlegel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of History" (Bohn, 8s. 6d.), Hegel's "Philosophy of History" (Bohn, 5s.), exhibit the subject from a German standpoint; as do also the more elaborate works of Washburn and of Adelson. Kames' "Sketches of Man," Millar's "Philosophy of History," Millar "On Civil Government," Dr. Adam Ferguson's work on "Refinement," James Dunbar's "Essays on the History of Mankind," several of Hume's Essays, Arnold's "Lectures on Modern History" (15s.), T. McCullagh's "Use and Study of History," and J. S. Mill's "Political Economy" (30s.), are all easily accessible to the English reader. Volney, Montesquieu, Buchez ("Introduction to the Science of History"), Roux-Ferrand ("History of the Progress of Civilization in Europe"), and Daunon ("Course of Historical Studies") are among the best French writers. Besides the German

writers above mentioned, useful information may be gained by a perusal of Heeren's and Niebuhr's works (many of which are translated into English or French). Müller's "Historical Criticism" is valuable, as are also Leo's "Universal History," Rüh's "History of the Middle Ages," Rehm's "History of the Middle Ages," Spittler's "History of the European States," Hallam's "Cities in the Middle Ages," &c. "A Historical Analysis of Christian Civilization," by L. R. de Verriour (a Frenchman who writes in English), was published by Chapman in 1850 (10s. 6d.) Hallam's "Europe in the Middle Ages" (24s.) is replete with the results of careful investigation, and rich with thought. Carlyle's and Macaulay's essays "On History," though differing widely in their matter and manner, are worthy of careful perusal. Several articles on "History," the "Philosophy of History," "Historic Criticism," &c., have appeared in the pages of the *British Controversialist* itself, which may be usefully read. The true theory of civilization has not as yet, we believe, been discovered, nor has its history been adequately written. A thoughtful perusal of any history will soon start such a host of reflections in the reader's mind as will work out for him a holier and nobler theory of civilization than books can give. One vigorous shoot of thought springing up in a man's own mind is worth a thousand hothouse growths planted by mere reading. To the thinker alone does *CH* reveal her choicest secrets, and unroll "the map of days outworn" with an explanatory index.—N. L.

105: "The Evidences of Christianity," by Beilby Porteus, D.D., late Bishop of London (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh), price 6d.; Archbishop Whately's "Introductory Lessons on Christian Evidences" (Parker and Son, London), price 6d.; Henry Rogers' "Reason and Faith" (Longmans, London), price 1s. 6d.; Gillespie's "Necessary Existence of God" (Blackwood, Edinburgh), 3s. 6d.—N. L.

The Topic.

DOES THE EXPEDITION OF GARIBALDI DESERVE THE SUPPORT OF ENGLISHMEN?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Garibaldi is fighting under the banner of liberty against a world-wide execrated despot; and although, as lovers of peace, we would rather have seen liberty extended by moral means, yet, as the battle has already unavoidably commenced, the sympathies of Englishmen—a liberty-loving people—must be with Garibaldi; and doubtless they ought and will render that assistance which the law and ability admits of, and the case requires.—LUTHER.

The inherent love of political freedom, and the determination to possess and maintain it, which characterizes Englishmen, may be said to have greatly contributed to place this nation in the position it now occupies in the world; and as it is for freedom and not fancy, for liberty and not lucre, for justice as opposed to jobbery, that Garibaldi fights, his mission cannot fail to excite the sympathy of Englishmen, and consequently entitle his expedition to their support.—G. A. H. E.

England being the land of liberty, it may naturally be inferred that her sons are lovers of freedom, and would do anything to promote its extension. The expedition of Garibaldi is, in our opinion, one which is intended to burst the bonds of tyranny, and untie its cruel shackles. The man has proved himself a brother to all who would see a tyrant overthrown; and we cannot, therefore, understand why Englishmen should not aid him in his praiseworthy undertakings.—BETA.

Wherever oppression exists, wherever tyranny plants its iron heel, there is a spot to which the sympathies of Britain will certainly be directed. It is not always possible or proper for us to interfere, either by moral or physical

intervention. The safety of nations generally makes this not only a maxim, but a law. But when a native of the oppressed country starts up, dashes aside the yoke, and strikes for freedom, he then becomes a power recognisable without any transgression of the international law. Garibaldi has been treated with by the Neapolitans, who, in that way, acknowledge him an independent power; and to which side will a free country lean, when watching a struggle between violence, oppression, and brutal tyranny (we use the words advisedly), and freedom and right government? As a matter of course, to the free side. Then let us send every assistance, both material and in the shape of sympathy. Let us exclaim,—
"Strike till the last armed foe expires;
Strike for your altars and your fires;
Strike for the green graves of your sires;

God and your native land."—

LYNDON.

Any man who honestly endeavours to rescue his fellow-countrymen from the bondage of tyranny, deserves not only the support but the sympathy of all who bear the honoured name of Englishmen. Are not the people of this country looking with thrilling interest to what Garibaldi is now doing for the sake of liberty in Italy? The base and treacherous Bourbons have used every cruelty which human ingenuity could devise; and beneath the iron heel of despotism they have trampled down that love of liberty which is the natural instinct of human nature; and though it may wane for a time under the blighting and destroying influence of tyranny, it needs but such an influence as Garibaldi can give to rekindle it into a bright and irresistible flame. This

has been proved by the wonderful exertions the people have made, the marvellous success which has crowned their efforts, and the brilliant victories which Garibaldi and his brave co-patriots have won wherever they have fought. Henceforth victorious liberty and freedom are to rule with justice and with equity, and bright days are yet in store for suffering Italy; and soon the hearts of her children shall beat with a new joy, and the horizon of their existence shall be as bright and unclouded as her matchless skies.—S. T. W.

It is against the nature of Englishmen to stand unmoved at the cry of oppression; and, therefore, we cannot stand unmoved while the sons of Italy are asking us to help them to snap the chains of their oppressors.—J. R.

The expedition of Garibaldi *does* deserve the support of Englishmen, because the mission he has undertaken is *noble, just, and good*. Many words could not, I think, convey a more favourable opinion than the three I have used.—TNEJBOR.

Is not Garibaldi a *true* patriot, who, for the love of country, and hatred of a government which is the incarnation of tyranny and imbecility, has risked life and honour in the struggle for liberty, and the total overthrow of a decayed race of despots whose time is come? And such being the case, is he not worthy of the support of all free nations, and especially of England and Englishmen? This is a question which can only receive one answer, and that answer must be, *yes*.—CASTLESIDE.

England has herself had so many fights for liberty that she can really understand the uprising in Sicily. Freedom is a glorious thing, and any cause for emancipating a kingdom is worthy of the best support and encouragement of every one. The day will perhaps come, when despotic governments will give place to higher and better ones—when all the countries of Europe and Asia will be free. Till then let us fight the battle for true liberty and freedom of thought.—F. S. M.

One reason why England should assist Garibaldi in his attempt to overthrow the strongholds of tyranny, is to be obtained from a consideration of the fearful effects produced by the tyrant's rule. Tyranny takes away the liberty of the subject; robs the prostrate people of hope and energy; saps the very foundations of all moral rectitude and honourable feeling; annihilates genuine religion; and drives the miserable subjects of oppression to seek for relief from their bitter pangs in the madness and forgetfulness of the passing hour. Again, we think that nations possess an inherent right to rise and shake off any rule that has passed certain limits of patience and endurance. Can we be astonished that the frightful scenes exposed to view in the "chamber of horrors," should arouse the spirits of the warm-blooded?—T. L. P.

When boys at school fall out and quarrel, there is generally one of them, who is taller and stronger than the rest, who jealously guards fair play, and with earnest courage rescues the weaker boys from the blows of the bully of the school. To my mind, an affirmative reply to the Topic assumes a similarity to an expression of approval of the boy's noble-heartedness in saving his weaker companions from being the victims of oppression. Italy is in the hands of tyrants, and, consequently, in a state of slavery. Garibaldi is the hero who succours the weak, and delivers them from their mental and physical bondage, and this from no selfish end, but simply from the patriotic love of freedom. He is the noble-hearted boy; but when he lacks the height and strength of the oppressor, and has the earnest will to overcome him, then sympathy is the more enlisted in his cause. Upon these grounds I think that the expedition with which Garibaldi has identified himself, deserves our support.—J. C.

We think it to be the duty of those who have successfully striven under the banner of liberty, to aid, to the utmost of their power, any nation who

seeks to free herself from tyranny. Would it not be inconsistent and cowardly of Englishmen, who boast of their freedom, and urge others to obtain it, if they refused a helping hand to a people most slavishly enthralled, who have risen for their lives and liberty? Did they do so, we are sure so noble and patriotic a spirit as Garibaldi's would tremble at our heartlessness, and scorn us as a band of sentimentalists.—IOTA.

Let indignation rest on those men, unworthy to bear the name of Britons, who can calmly and dispassionately view, while they are enjoying the blessings of freedom, the haughty tyrant pursue, with unrelenting heart, his fellow-men, and crush their very souls by the brutal aid of the fiends in human shape in his pay!—MARCUS.

They who enjoy the blessings of liberty, whose fetters have been broken, and who breathe the pure air of freedom, purchased by the blood of the brave, the patriotic, and the pious, should be first to support the man who

"Swears, beneath God's burning eye,
To break his country's chains, or die."

J. K. C.

The words, "Garibaldi," "Sicily," cannot but arouse in the breast of every Englishman the burning desire to assist in the glorious cause of Italian emancipation; and although we cannot render physical aid, we ought, as a duty we owe to Providence for the happy position which we, as Englishmen, occupy, to do all in our power to further the cause of the long-oppressed Sicilians.—S. R.

The innumerable calamities ensuing to a nation from the attack of an outward force, and an ill-concerted revolution, make it a matter of some diffidence to many in hazarding an opinion; but however that may be, there cannot, we think, in the present instance, be one who wishes for the emancipation of his fellow-beings from the galling chains of monarchial or empirical tyranny, that will refrain from giving his support to the expedition of the famous guerilla chief, Garibaldi. Dictated by the purest

patriotism, sanctioned by the future interests of liberty and humanity, it is calculated (if successful) to establish in greater security the peace of Europe, and to extinguish those agitations which have so often arisen, to the annoyance of every nation possessing diplomatic relations with the continent.

The antecedents of Garibaldi show him to be actuated, not like Louis Napoleon, by a sordid avarice, and a personal ambition. In a chequered career of romance and vicissitude, Garibaldi has as yet proved the purity of motive and unstained character of those life-actions of his which have identified him on the dark yet bright page of his country's history. His unswerving loyalty, undying patriotism, and magnanimity, mark him as one in whose breast perfidy and treachery could find no home. A man like Garibaldi, known as the present knows the past, seems alike incapable of taking a wrongful side, or acting in any part other than to elevate mankind. This, then, is our sufficient guarantee that his present expedition deserves the support of Englishmen. What is the great characteristic of our own country? Is it not its Christianity and its heroism? and does not Garibaldi eminently represent both these virtues? His life has been one long war against oppression and tyranny. Guided by the principles of Christianity, he has heroically fought to regain for his brothers the glorious heritage bequeathed to universal man. England has struggled, long and hard, to hold that glorious heritage (liberty); and, not unmindful of the intensity of the fight, and the preciousness of the prize, does she pray with fervour that nations may have strength given them from on high to carry on the holy war, and to plant, though it be with bleeding hands, the standard of victory and freedom on every citadel; for with such a history, and such a position, England, who has bought her freedom at the price of her sons' blood, not to say "God speed" to brothers who fight for birthright, such as she holds so dear,

would prove herself an ingrate above all ingrates;—that is why never should cause be dearer to English hearts than the present expedition of Garibaldi, for whose safety and preservation, at heaven's footstool, should England bedew her morning prayer.—D. S.

Englishmen have ever been foremost in extending their support to those great spirits whose aim has been to crush tyranny and emancipate the downtrodden from the thrall of bondage. Shall they now be false to the aspirations that have heretofore made every nation, upon whom the blight of tyranny has fallen, look to England as their star of hope and their haven of rest? What man in this epoch of European history deserves the support of Englishmen so well as Garibaldi? His name shines above all other names; his action in the cause of Italian nationality stamps him as a patriot in whom the love of country supercedes all other love; we behold in him the stuff of which tyrants are afraid; his name sounds the knell of their departing power, and the strongholds of their oppression totter to their fall. As we love and venerate the departed great ones of our country—whose memories are enshrined in our hearts, who sealed by their blood the freedom of England, and taught our tottering steps to climb to our present greatness,—when we recall the names of a Hampden, a Cromwell, and a Russell, we see in a more noble and exalted form the patriot Garibaldi. Sardinia's king, seated on his now thrice-powerful throne, may truckle to France's tyrant. Count Cavour, checkmated in his diplomacy by the honesty of Italy's uncorruptible patriot, may envy his greatness and fulminate reports derogatory to his honour. But Garibaldi, undismayed by frowns, and unconciliated by overtures—swerving not from his purpose—his great soul looks forward to the goal of his wishes and of his hopes. As Englishmen love patriotism and freedom they will support Garibaldi. Because they venerate the patriot names of their own land, and as they detest the

deeds of Sicily's late hated tyrant, they will give Garibaldi their support.—D. R. R.

The events now occurring in southern Italy are becoming the general subject of discussion in every assembly in Europe. And when we bring to the bar of our deliberative judgment the state of the theatre of conflict prior to the first efforts of the great conqueror of tyranny and oppression, the endurance of hardships and misery by the ill-fated Italians could not be borne with patience *within* or passive inactivity *without*. The attempts at emancipation demand from every son of happy Old England—and, indeed, from every votary of freedom—*aïd*, so far as his pecuniary or other strength will contribute. The funds now being raised in England for the purpose of sending succour to the *hero* who deserves so well of his country, cannot be expended in a holier cause—the liberation of the inmates of the *fætid dungeons* of Italian cruelty; and the *outpouring of the blood of the brave* is the price that must be paid for the completion of so worthy and much admired a cancellation of the decrees of scandalous oppression beyond all sufferance. Let the sword of freedom be *energetically supported* to the utmost, so that the fullest effect may be given to the worthy deeds of the greatest warrior of that country which is the garden of Europe, and which the soldiers of Hannibal viewed with such ecstasy from the summit of the Alps.—S. F. T.

NEGATIVE.

Here is the *law* of Britain on the subject:—"If any person whatever, within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or in any part of his Majesty's dominions elsewhere, or in any country, colony, settlement, island, or place, belonging to, or subject to, his Majesty, shall hire, retain, engage, or procure, or shall attempt or endeavour to hire, retain, engage, or procure, any person or persons whatever to enlist, or to enter or engage to enlist,

or to serve, or to be employed in any such service or employment as aforesaid, as an officer, soldier, sailor, or marine, either in land or sea service, for, or under, or in aid of any foreign prince, state, potentate, colony, province, or part of any province or people, or for, or under, or in aid of any person or persons exercising, or assuming to exercise, any powers of government as aforesaid, or to go, or to agree to go, or embark, from any part of his Majesty's dominions, for the purpose, or with intent, to be so enlisted, entered, engaged, or employed as aforesaid, whether any emulating money, pay, or reward shall have been, or shall be actually given or received or not, in any or either of such cases every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour." Are we to violate law, and so begin with licence, to gain liberty? Surely no.—LEX.

The European complications which Garibaldi's expedition involves—the want of a defined publicly announced purpose it shows—the politic aversion he displays to the announcement of his designs—and the unguaranteed action he may take—are all premises on which to withhold English help till his ultimate aims are known, not guessed.—O. P. Q.

If it be illegal in our country to urge on rebellion and upstart mutiny in any other country, then we do wrong to support—however right they may be in their aim—the objects of Garibaldi's expedition.—GRANT.

We have no more right to invade a country with our money than with our military, unless on a declaration of war. Every contributor to the Garibaldi Fund is a violator of the laws of nations, inasmuch as he is an invader of another's coasts, while the Government under which he lives is at peace with the Government of that country. Non-intervention is a misnomer if this can be allowed.—T. R. Y.

Those who subsidize the expedition hamper the Government in subsequent action, and lead to inferences not legiti-

mated by the public opinion of this country.—T. H.

Dictator Garibaldi may win a throne by the contributions of liberty-loving Englishmen which may become as plaguy as another President-Dictator whom we did our best to help to a seat, his security in which makes us uneasy.—FACT.

Would it be agreeable to the British Government that European Romanists should pour in treasure, enticement, and excitement into Ireland, to free it from the oppression it (as it is said) endures? "Do unto others as ye would others should do unto you."—L. K.

John Bull is far too apt in his honest zeal for freedom to credit pretenders—especially Italian ones—e. g., Mazzini, Gavazzi, &c., without certificate. Have we got full proof of Garibaldi's honesty of intention now? Have we no reason for suspecting the *Napoleonisation* of Italy?—A. N. Y.

Self-reliance is the only true basis of liberty. To acquire freedom by charity is to gain it without the struggle which gives it value. Cheap liberty is too likely to be thought worthless liberty; and the charity of to-day may be sold to the highest bidder to-morrow. The sympathy of Britain is enough to show Italy that it is right,—the pocket of Britain is very likely to lead them wrong.—TOUCH.

Private charities cannot secure national esteem; and hence, though we may help Italy to freedom, it will not feel bound to our land on account of that help, and it may prefer a neighbour nearer and more politic, who knows when to help a success just in time to make it look as if he had accomplished it. If it be right to help Italy, let us do it in our national character, and not in an eleemosynary manner; and we may rest assured our Government will never lend a hand as long as the people of Britain are willing to tax themselves for the performance of that duty which ought to devolve upon and be provided for by the State. Private charity is a public evil in this as in most cases.—TIM.

So long as the English people support and encourage Garibaldi's expedition themselves, so long will the Government hold aloof from affording any help. Governmental help alone can be efficient in the long run. For success in arms may be defeated by diplomacy. Let us, if help is really needed, which may be doubted, urge upon our representatives to give it, assuring them of our support, but do not let us fritter our efforts down into penny patriotism, and become mere pecuniary promoters of proletarianism. To be true to Italy we must see justice done, not charity given. Life and liberty are too precious to be holden as donations from anybody. —QUÆ.

The noblest nations have struggled for and gained liberty for themselves. Wallace, Tell, Hofer, Kosciuszko, Washington—who gave them penny subscriptions, bazaar profits, concert proceeds, theatre benefits, ninepin alley bets, &c., to help them to ennoble the people for whom they fought? The worth of liberty may well excuse any endurance to gain it but this—that liberty should be made a fashionable pauper. The Italians ought to be quite able to take liberty, without exposing themselves to the charge of being the mere lazzaroni

of European freemen. Honour the brave, do not dishonour them.—C. B. D.

National independence for Italy has ever been a dream, an unrealizable and entrancing vision; but it has never yet been other than a nympholepsy, because the Italians have never been able to believe that

"In native swords and native ranks,
The only hope of freedom dwells."

Italy must hazard all upon the die now cast, except honour, and if it do it will acquire independence independently.—EXCELSIOR.

We have no right to intermeddle with the internal relations of any country; to bribe a rebellion therein; or to covertly attain our own designs by urging on others to work our work in the belief that it is for their own good. —N. O.

There is a legal way of giving support to other countries; that is, through the State. Let us support the Italians by our representatives; or we may find that the support we give may be rendered only to be made null by the operations of the State machine.—CUT.

"Plenty and peace breed cowards; hardness
over—
Of hardness is mother."—Shakespeare.

G.

The Societies' Section.

Birmingham.—*Meeting of Readers and Friends of the British Controversialist.*—Through the efforts of a few earnest friends of our Serial, resident in this town, a large and interesting meeting was held on Friday evening, August 17th, in the Clarendon Chambers, Temple Street, under the presidency of Dr. Keyworth. Mr. J. A. Cooper, F.R.S.L., stated the circumstances under which the meeting had been convened, and the objects its promoters had in view, and then gave an interesting account of the origin of the *Controversialist*, the success which had attended it, and

the good it had been known to accomplish. Samuel Neil, Esq., author of "The Art of Reasoning" (who was on a visit to Birmingham), spoke of the proper province of controversy, and the advantages which must flow from it, when conducted in an earnest and kindly spirit. Mr. F. Derry bore testimony to the healthy influence of the Serial in dispelling prejudice, strengthening the reasoning faculties, and in promoting mental culture in general. Mr. J. S. Wright remarked on the advantages of written over oral controversy, and urged upon the assembly

the duty of individually supporting a Magazine the influence of which was so beneficial. The Rev. Henry Boyden, in an eloquent speech, advocated the claims of the Magazine, on account of its impartial character, and its high educational tendencies. Mr. Shrubbs expressed the interest with which he always perused the *Controversialist*, and stated that it was his custom to take in two copies per month, *one of which he circulated among his friends, with a view to induce them to become subscribers.* On the motion of Mr. S. Edwards, a cordial vote of thanks was presented to Dr. Keyworth, for his kindness in presiding, and to Mr. Neil for the favour of his attendance.

From the interest manifested in the meeting, we anticipate a large increase to our circulation in Birmingham. Might not the example thus set be successfully followed in many of our large towns, especially during the coming autumnal and winter months? We shall be happy to correspond with friends respecting the best means of getting up similar meetings.

Liverpool. (The Byrom Literary Society.)—The third annual meeting of this society was recently held in the rooms adjoining the Byrom Street Chapel. The chair was taken at eight o'clock, by Mr. B. H. Grindley (one of the vice-presidents of the society), and the attendance of members and friends was tolerably good. After the disposal of some preliminary business, the treasurer presented his account, by which it appeared that, in a pecuniary point of view, the year had been a most successful one, and closed with a balance in hand sufficient to meet all the working expenses of the ensuing session. The secretary then read the report of the committee, reviewing the operations of the society since its reconstitution in May last. Previous to this period, two societies were in existence in the same locality—the Byrom Mutual Improvement Society, and the Students' Society; both, however, were languishing; and it was decided, after a revision

of the rules, to merge the two societies into one, under the title of the "Byrom Literary Society." The Committee regretted that the interest exhibited by members at first had not been of a more permanent character, and that the depression under which literary societies had laboured during the year had been allowed to extend its influence to the Byrom. The number of members had slightly decreased. Eighteen meetings had been held during the year, five of which were devoted to debates, ten to essays, two to presidential addresses, and one (as an experiment) to readings and recitations, with criticisms. Essays had been contributed by the following members:—On "Economy of Time," and "Punctuality," by Mr. J. S. H. Evans; "Provident Societies," by Mr. Edwin Carver; "Friendship," by Rev. Thomas Dawson; "Popular Literature," by Mr. B. H. Grindley; "The Life and Character of Napoleon III.," by Mr. Robert McGowan; "Britain and her Slaves," by Mr. H. M. Latham, jun.; "Wit," by Mr. Thomas Linton; also a paper on a "Tour to Wales," by Mr. F. A. Latham. These meetings had been pretty well attended, and the numbers of visitors had greatly increased, during the last session, by the admission of ladies,—an extension of privilege which had worked most beneficially. The committee concluded by urging upon members the necessity for increased exertions and more diligent efforts in the pursuit of knowledge. The report was unanimously adopted, and the following officers elected for the ensuing year:—President, Mr. B. H. Grindley; vice-presidents, Messrs. W. B. Luckman and James Davies; treasurer, Mr. Thomas Linton; secretary, Mr. F. A. Latham; committee, Messrs. Edwin Carver, R. McGowan, Ed. Tinkir, jun., and William Robinson.

Shrewsbury Discussion Society.—This society originated, several years ago, with a few young men cultivating literary attainments, and two or three kind-hearted gentlemen, who wished to encourage the members, and cheerfully

gave them the advantage of their more extended education. The society has gradually augmented in numbers, and continued to hold free and spirited debates on the most popular and interesting topics of the day. According to annual custom, it adjourned for the summer months on May 16th, when its fourth session concluded by a meeting to audit and pass the accounts, after which the president, Mr. Robert Rogerson, delivered an address on the objects and advantages of debating societies. He commenced by describing the qualifications requisite to become debaters. He then engaged the marked attention of the audience by describing the untiring labours of Demosthenes, and the plodding perseverance of Cicero; and from ancient orators came down to modern times, and portrayed, in a graphic manner, the career and style of the illustrious orator and statesman, William Pitt, the late Baron Macaulay, Dr. Chalmers, and Lord Brougham. To be great, required the labour of a life, and the germs of greatness, in many eminent men, were first developed in debating societies. Both Dr. Chalmers and Lord Macaulay have left on record how deeply they were indebted to debating societies. We may, like them, learn to overcome difficulties; and though we may not become great,—for only a few attain to greatness,—yet we may improve ourselves, and be useful in our day and generation. He next remarked on the benefit of combining religion with education. In the decline of life, men of cultivated minds would derive happiness from their previous studies, while those who had neglected the improvement of the mind, would find time hang heavy on their hands.

Several other speakers addressed the meeting, and votes of thanks were given to the president and the honorary secretary. The society has, during the past session, held thirty-four meetings, with an attendance, on the average, of thirty-one members and seven visitors at each. There being a fund in hand, it was unanimously agreed to purchase

a complete set of the "*British Controversialist*," for circulation among the members of the society, and to continue taking it in.—J. TASKER, Hon. Sec.

Whitby Wesleyan Young Men's Association.—Some time ago, the members and friends of this young men's association held a social *réunion* on the last night of the session. The Rev. W. H. Bambridge presided, and gave an address on "Self-Respect." The secretary, Mr. John R. Price, read the report, from which we gather that the society was established in September last, its objects being, "to acquire and communicate information on the principles, and to further the interests, of the Wesleyan Church; to promote friendly intercourse among Wesleyan young men, and to furnish the means, by the diffusion of general and Christian knowledge, for the moral and intellectual improvement of its members." The association numbers thirty-six members, the average attendance being eighteen. Twenty-three meetings have been held. Five lectures have been delivered, three by the president, on "Young Men Wanted;" "Mercantile Morals;" "The Study of the Bible." "The Rise of Methodism," by Mr. R. T. Gaskin; "The Poetry of Longfellow," by Mr. J. R. Price. Essays have been delivered on the following subjects, with discussion or conversation afterwards:—Drunkenness; Sunday Schools; Restoration of the Jews; Morals of Business; the Promised Deliverer, and Introduction of the Typical Dispensation; Advantages of the Sabbath; Holy Places of Scripture; Insensible Influence; Witness of the Spirit; Class Meetings; Divinity of Christ; Prayer Meetings; the Study of Theology; Prayer; Unlawfulness of War. After votes of thanks to the president and secretary, a very pleasant and profitable season closed, with hearty words of counsel from the president, and a sincere prayer for the happiness of the members.

Dundee Eastern Literary Association.—The third anniversary festival

of this association was held in Lamb's Saloon, Reform Street. There was a large attendance of members, and a numerous gathering of ladies. After tea, Mr. D. Stephen Robertson, Vice-President, who occupied the chair, delivered an able address on "Self-Culture, in its moral and religious bearings." Mr. Nicoll, secretary, thereafter submitted his annual report, in which were enumerated the following questions, which have been discussed during the past session, viz.:—"Ought the Franchise to be extended?" "Is Reason confined to Man?" "Can Government Interfere in the Social Evil question?" "The Character of Queen Elizabeth;" "Is Machinery Beneficial to the Working Classes?" &c., &c. Essays on the following subjects have also been delivered:—"Charity;" "Public Amusements;" "Patriotism;" "Leaves from a Note-book;" "Watt and the Steam-engine;" "Self-education;" "Creation;" "Milton's 'Paradise Lost';" "Celebrities of the Present Generation" (No. I.); "Pictures of 1859;" "Portraits from Life;" "The Animal Creation;" "Home;" "Revelations of a Star;" "Hugh Miller and his Works;" "Books and Reading;" "Revivalism;" &c., &c.

The report also stated that a monthly manuscript magazine has been instituted in connection with the association, which is contributed to by the members, and is privately circulated among them, together with the *British Controversialist*; this enterprise is working successfully.

Mr. Preston, treasurer, then submitted his financial account, showing a good balance in hand. After a few songs and recitations from various members, Mr. Scott addressed the meeting on "Peter the Great," and showed the life and characteristics of that worthy. After an aria, with variations, on the violin, by Mr. Kinnes, an interval of fifteen minutes was allowed. On all having again assembled, a service of fruit and cake was served up. "The Irish Gentleman" was sung by Mr. McIntyre. Mr. Skinner then delivered

an instructive and somewhat amusing address on "Love," which elicited shouts of laughter. "Anticipation," by Mr. Scott, and the "Downfall of Poland," by Mr. Gibson, were well rendered. During the evening, a handsome copy of Southey's "Poetical Works" was given, by one of the ladies present, as a prize to the best elocutionist. The ladies acted as adjudicators; and, on the conclusion of the programme, they by a large majority awarded the gift to Mr. D. M. Nicoll, who took for his subject, "The Laird o' Luggiehead on *Marriage*" (!) Towards the close, votes of thanks were passed to the ladies, chairman, speakers, and Mr. Lamb.—THEOCRITUS.

Dundee Literary Association.—On Wednesday evening, 27th June, 1860, this association sat down to tea in Lamb's Saloon, when a numerous and intelligent auditory was present; Andrew Jones, Esq., president of the association, in the chair. In the course of an able and eloquent address from the chairman, he stated the objects of such associations—that their aims were comprehensive and far-reaching, leading men from the solitary walks of their own peculiar study into the broad and varied fields of kindred minds, extending the bounds of empirical knowledge, and thereby forming a basis for original thought; rebutting the flimsy argument that the pursuit of knowledge leads to self-conceit and pride, by the dictum of Lord Bacon, that great learning shows the littleness of men, and leads to humility. Mr. James Lumgair then gave a recitation, entitled "Spanish Champion," in a graceful and masterly manner. The song, "Death of Nelson," was sung by Mr. Bruce in a very high class style. A dialogue was then entered into between Messrs. McIntosh and McKay, entitled "Vanok and Valens," which was executed in a spirited manner. Mr. Alex. Rae delivered an address on "Patience and Perseverance," in elegant terms, with numerous and striking illustrations of the force of these virtues. Mr. J. McIntosh then recited "Lochia-

war" with great effect. An amusing song, "Hame cam' our gude man at e'en," was sung with characteristic effect by Mr. Rine. Mr. Beattie then told a very humorous story, entitled "A Love Exploit," amid the interrupted laughter of the audience. A dialogue from the "Stranger," between Messrs. Bruce and Dunn, was executed with dramatic effect; and a ludicrous recitation, entitled "Paddy the Swabber," by Mr. Clark, concluded the first part of the proceedings. An interval of ten minutes, with service of fruit; after which Mr. James Lumgair delivered an address to the ladies on "Love," which was enlivened throughout by broad bursts of humour and eloquence. The song "Rule Britannia" was sung in admirable style by Mr. McKay, while the audience joined heartily in the chorus. Mr. Bruce then delivered an eloquent and elaborate address on "Excelsior," abounding in apt allusions and telling illustrations of the value of this motto. A song, "My native home," was sung with true patriotic feeling by Mr. Dunn. The dialogue, "Clarence's Dream," between Messrs. McIntosh and Lumgair, was done in a highly artistic manner. A recitation, "Crescentius," was spoken by Mr. Burrie in a very commendable style; followed by a humorous and side-convulsing story by Mr. Mc-

Intosh; while "Auld lang syne," sung by the audience with great *déclat*, finished the proceedings of the evening. This association has been in existence for two years, and is in a very flourishing condition. Its regular attendants vary from twenty-two to twenty-four. An essay is read every Wednesday evening, varied by debates once a month, which are all prepared with great care by their several authors, and mostly treating subjects of great practical value to individual members. A manuscript magazine has been established among them, published monthly, which goes the whole round of the members, receiving generous and impartial criticisms thereon. Their annual meeting was held in their rooms, Dock-street, on the evening of the 2nd of May last, A. Jones, Esq., in the chair, when the secretary and treasurer read encouraging and satisfactory reports of last year's proceedings. Votes of thanks were then proposed to the president and other office-bearers, when the following gentlemen were elected for the following year:—president, A. Jones, Esq.; vice-president, Mr. Millar; secretary, Mr. Rae; treasurer, Mr. McIntosh; editor, Mr. Dunn; committee, Messrs. Robertson, Burrie, Bruce, and Lumgair.—A. S. R.

LITERARY NOTES.

It is said that the baton of the *Quarterly Review* has passed from the hands of the Rev. Mr. Elwyn into those of an erudite Scotchman, Mr. Macpherson. Are national alternations absolutely necessary in this journal?—Gifford, Lockhart, Elwyn, Macpherson. It must be an Englishman's turn next.

Mr. James Hannay, author of "Satire and Satirists," &c., is reported to have assumed the editorship of the *Edinburgh Courier*, the oldest Conservative newspaper in Scotland.

"The Isthmus of Suez" is the topic given out by the French Academy for the prize poem of 1861.

M. E. Bonnechese's "History of England" has gained the Halphen prize, by decree of the French Academy.

Editions of Pope and Addison are shortly to be produced by Murray, under the supervision of Mr. Elwyn; for Croker is dead, and Cunningham is ill.

The *Moniteur* for 1789 to 1799, containing materials for a history of the French Revolution, is republishing in Paris.

The *London Review* has commenced the issue of a series of inedited letters between Lord Nelson and Sir William Hamilton.

Griffin and Co. intend re-publishing

a collective edition of the philosophical writings of the Rev. F. D. Maurice for the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana."

Dr. Maine, Middle Temple reader in jurisprudence and civil law, has in the press a work on "Ancient Law in its Relation to Early History and Modern Thought."

The *North British Review* has again changed hands. It is now published by Messrs. Clark, Edinburgh.

"Species not Transmutable" is the title of an anti-Darwin work, by Dr. R. E. Bree, in the press.

Mr. E. Clifford is to issue a Biography of Edward I.

Cædmon's "Fall of Man" is to be translated from the Anglo-Saxon by W. H. F. Bosanquet.

Marcus Niebuhr, son of the great German historian, a courtier and an author (!), is dead.

Mr. Charles Wells has recently issued a "Treatise on Political Economy," in the Turkish language. Will it *medicine* "the sick man"?

Gerald Massey's "Poetical Works" are republished in America.

"Pages and Pictures from the Writings of J. F. Cooper," the American novelist, are preparing by a relative, Miss Susan Cooper, author of "Rural Hours."

Lord Stanhope is to enlighten men farther regarding the "Life of William Pitt;" and Mr. Motley is writing the "History of the United Netherlands."

A statue of Cromwell, raised by subscriptions from the million, is talked of.

Fox, the founder of Quakerism, is about to be biographed.

Miss Macready, daughter of the eminent tragedian, is to appear before the public as an authoress in "Leaves from the Olive Mount."

A volume of unpublished Voltaire letters, entitled "Voltaire at Ferney," has been issued by Didier and Co., Paris.

The mathematical writings of Leibnitz have been published, from original MSS. in the library of Hanover, and under the editorship of Dr. G. Pertz, at Berlin.

Kavanagh, the author of "How I Won the Medal," is appointed Assistant-Commissioner at Oude.

A French "Peerage" is about to be *officially* published at Paris.

Ponsard, of "Divine Williams" notoriety, has had his play, "What Pleases the Ladies," unequivocally perditionized at the Vaudeville, in Paris.

During July the theatre receipts in Paris amounted to £33,300.

An inedited dramatic sketch of Schiller's,—a domestic comedy of real life, in which himself and his friends are banteringly exhibited, is now in the possession of Herr C. Künzel, of Heilbronn, but is likely soon to be published.

A novel entitled "Galileo Galilei," by Raven, has been published by Brockhaus, Leipsic.

B. B. Woodward, Esq., is engaged on a Historical and Chronological Encyclopædia.

Signor Dall'Ongaro has lately completed, at Florence, a series of twelve conferences on Dante's "Inferno." In the autumn, he intends illustrating the "Purgatorio," and the "Paradiso." His poetico-political expositions of the work of the great Florentine, are well adapted to the present times in Italy, and highly popular.

"Fabian Mercer," a London mayor of the fifteenth century, is to become the subject of G. A. Sala's sketchy biographic pen shortly.

R. W. Dale's "Life and Letters of J. A. James" are to be published by Nisbet and Co.

The Notts "Young Men's Literary Association" will issue, early next month, essays, tales, poetry, &c., in "A Book without a Name."

Napoleon III.'s "Julius Cæsar" is in active preparation. Has he seen Shakespeare's work on that topic? Therein it is said,—

"Such men as *he* be never at heart's ease,

While they behold a greater than themselves,

And therefore are they *very dangerous*."

Epoch Men.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES.

IN one of those grave epochs of human history when polity, policy, morality, jurisprudence, and religion, are waning in their control over, or influence upon, the individual soul; and it has become a question among men whether these are the results of priests' fables, legislators' dicta, the mere fictions of poets, or whether they have an everlasting fountain in God, and an eternal applicability to man,—Socrates appeared. It was a time of crisis; a time when a *man* is needed who can sweep the whole horizon of speculation with an eye at once free and acute, and distinguish between the seeming and the true. It was one of those periods which recur in the process of the cycles when reform is needed but unheeded; when evils are felt, yet remedies are unwelcome. Effete formalism, and shameful shamming, abounded. There had been an apotheosis of humbug. He came, and the tremor of despair thrilled through the spasmodized hypocrisies of life thought, statesmanship, and ritual; for the sly laugh, the jocose twitting, the ironic reverence, and the *modest* questioning, which Socrates had for each and all, were worse to bear than outspoken disbelief and arrant heresy. In the very "fitness of things," he came to out-comedy in real life the humour of the dramatist, to carry into debate upon beliefs and laws the intense contentiousness and rude mirthfulness of Olympia and Nemea, and to out-sophistize sophistry itself.

Unwelcome intruder! disturbing the quiet of enjoyment, the patient sluggishness of soul, the *dolce far niente*-ism of the time: you have stirred up a strife of which you must "take the consequences." Why should it be needful to search into the *meaning* of worship and right, of law and life, of policy and honour, when we can attend to the *forms* of them all so much more easily than to their realities? Such heterodoxy is troublesome and vexatious; we will have "none of it." Innovation shall have no ovation from us; we are sick of investigation; we are bent upon enjoyment. To conserve our privileges is the only way to deserve our love. Crowd life with delight, and win our gratitude; torture us with probing inquisitiveness, and you will excite our hate. An adviser is seldom esteemed a friend; a critic, much more a censor,—never.

Coolness, coldness, resistance, opposition, enmity, are the states of mind that are entered into in quick succession, under the influence of censure, however honestly exercised, or however ably expressed, in ordinary men. It is quite easy to predicate that a reformer must be unacceptable to his own age, and must pass through a period of trial and endurance, before the day of his fame arrives. Socrates was a reformer, therefore he was criminal; "criminal, inasmuch as he acknowledgeth not the gods whom the state holds sacred, and introduceth new deities: he is likewise criminal, because he corrupteth the youth."

"So grows, so flourishes" among men the hate of innovation; and then all forms of procedure are considered legitimate, and even law itself may, it is thought, be twisted into injustice and injury. Nor are there wanting plausible grounds for this accusation:—the philosophic innovator in politics, Pericles,—Socrates' pupil,—had led the Athenians into the Peloponnesian war; the profane and profligate Alcibiades, another pupil, had hurried them into the Sicilian war, a war so perilous in its course, so disastrous in its end;—and the downward tendency given to the power of Athens by these events was consummated by the overthrow of the constitution by the Thirty Tyrants, one of the chief of whom, Critias, had also taken Socrates, for a while, as his Gamaliel. To reason from the *per hæc* to the *propter hæc* is a fallacy of no uncommon prevalence, even now; and in those days, when logic was only struggling into potency, it was a form of reasoning to which passion lent a wondrous relevancy. Socrates was condemned, and the hemlock settled for the nonce the awkward dispute of that age,—lately renewed in ours,—“On the worth of Socrates as a philosopher.”

On this subject the formation of a fair, impartial, and intelligent opinion is not so easy as it seems. Socrates “has been exaggerated to gigantic dimensions by Plato,” and he “has been dwarfed by Xenophon; he was in intellect a mean proportional, if we may so speak, between the Platonic and the Xenophontic Socrates.” But how is this proportion to be calculated? How reconcile and harmonize Plato's idealism, grace, pleasantry, inventiveness, and genius, with the cold, flat, dead-level, realistic, yet sagacious common sense of Xenophon,—the Ionic picture with the Attic statue,—the poetic exaggeration with the simple matter-of-fact,—the artistic and mystic, with the severe and the sincere? Plato's originality and wide stretch and compass of mind caused him to give, as Aristotle somewhere says, “a character of overtraining, bombast, innovation, inconclusiveness, and impracticability” to some of the reasonings which he puts into the mouth of Socrates; while the simple equibilty, the tranquil practicality, and the mere mirroring, not comprehending powers, of Xenophon's mind, rendered him unfit to become the expositor of the philosophic tenets of his

* Rogers's “Essays,” vol. i., p. 314. “Literary genius of Plato—character of Socrates,” an epitome of Platonism of great value and excellence, worthy of careful perusal and study.

master ; while they manifestly made him admirably suited for becoming his apologist,—say rather, defender. It is likely that the fair medium may never be struck ; for it is difficult to hold away from the reason the influences of the imagination ; and it is never an easy matter to strike the balance between the decisions of two powers so jealous of each other. Perhaps no proof could be given of the real “worth of Sokratēs as a philosopher” as this one fact,—that his life and doctrine impressed so fully, so deeply, so seriously, so lastingly, minds so much the opposites of each other, as those of Xenophon and Plato.

We shall not here attempt to re-argue, critically, and at length, a question which has so much and so tensely occupied philosophers, philologists, and historians, for ages ; because we believe that, in the main, the compromise proposed by Grote is feasible and fair. The following excerpts will put our readers in possession of the chief parts of the adjudication, and the reasons for it. The “*Memorabilia*” of Xenophon profess to record actual conversations held by Sokratēs, and are prepared with the announced purpose of vindicating him against the accusations of Melētus and his other accusers on the trial, as well as against unfavourable opinions, seemingly much circulated respecting his character and purposes. We have thus in it a sort of partial biography ; subject to such deductions from its evidentiary value as may be requisite for imperfection of memory, intentional decoration, and partiality. On the other hand, the purpose of Plato, in the numerous dialogues wherein he introduces Sokratēs, is not so clear, and is explained very differently by different commentators. Plato was a great speculative genius, who came to form opinions of his own, distinct from those of Sokratēs, and employed the name of the latter as spokesman for these opinions in various dialogues. How much in the Platonic Sokratēs can be safely accepted, either as a picture of the man, or as a record of his opinions ; how much, on the other hand, is to be treated as Platonism ; or in what proportions the two are intermingled, is a point not to be decided with certainty or rigour. . . . But though the opinions put by Plato into the mouth of Sokratēs are liable to thus much of uncertainty, we find, to our great satisfaction, that the pictures given by Plato and Xenophon of their common master are, in the main, accordant ; differing only as drawn from the same original by two authors radically different in spirit and character. Xenophon, *the man of action*, brings out at length those conversations of Sokratēs which had a bearing on practical conduct, and were calculated to correct vice or infirmity in particular individuals ; such being the matter which served him as apologist, at the same time that it suited his intellectual taste. But he intimates, nevertheless, very plainly, that the conversation of Sokratēs was often, indeed usually, of a more negative, analytical, and generalizing tendency ;* not destined for the reproof

* “*Memorabilia*,” Lib. i., 16.

of positive or special defect, but to awaken the inquisitive faculties, and lead to the rational comprehension of vice and virtue, as referable to determinate general principles.

Now, this latter side of the master's physiognomy, which Xenophon records distinctly, though without emphasis or development, acquires almost exclusive prominence in the Platonic picture. Plato leaves out the practical, and consecrates himself to the theoretical Sokratês, whom he divests in part of his identity, in order to enrol him as chief speaker in certain larger theoretical views of his own. The two pictures, therefore, do not contradict each other, but mutually supply each other's defects, and admit of being blended into one consistent whole. And respecting *the method of Sokratês*—a point more characteristic than either his precepts or his theory—as well as respecting the effects of that method on the minds of hearers, both Xenophon and Plato are witnesses substantially in unison; though here again the latter has made the method his own, worked it out on a scale of enlargement and perfection, and given to it a permanence which it could never have derived from its original author, who only talked, and never wrote. It is fortunate that our two main witnesses about him, both speaking from personal knowledge, agree to so great an extent.* Similar opinions might easily be multiplied, *e.g.*, "For the personal history and customary manners of Socrates, I need not inform you that you are to refer to Plato and to Xenophon, and to *form your estimate from both.*"† "To fill up the blank which Xenophon has manifestly left, we are driven back to the Socrates of Plato."‡ "The 'Memorabilia,' which of all the works of Xenophon have most of an historical value, with respect to Socrates personally, are in the same degree unsatisfactory as to his doctrines, since the author . . . was but ill-qualified to form a due estimate of the Socratic philosophy. The Platonic writings, in their scientific portions, are equally unavailable as guides in this inquiry; since, with the exception of a few unconnected remarks, they do not furnish us with any means whereby we might distinguish the Platonic from the Socratic."§

Even on this subject, however, we find striking differences of opinion expressed by men well qualified to judge; *e.g.*, it has been said that "In the Socrates of Plato we find both the Aristophanic and the Xenophontic Socrates,—the mere humourist and debater, and the mere moralist, uniting to form *the real man.*"|| Again, in direct opposition to this, it has been asserted that,

* "History of Greece," vol. viii., chap. 68, pp. 347—352.

† W. A. Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. i., lect. vii., p. 367.

‡ Schleirmacher, "On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher," "Berlin Transactions, 1815, and translated by Bishop Thirlwall in "The Philological Museum," vol. ii., 1832.

§ Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii., Morrison's translation. "Oxford, Talboys," p. 41.

|| Maurice's "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. Ancient Ency. Met.," p. 122

"We are not to look in the Socrates of Plato for the *real, living* Socrates."*

We have already given in our adhesion to the decision of Grote. We defer, for the present, the inquiry regarding the Socratic element in Plato's works, because that will naturally require careful consideration in our subsequent paper on "Plato; his Life and Writings:" though we need not here hesitate to express the general conviction that there are genuine Socratic elements in the "Apology" of Socrates, the "Crito," and the "Phædo;" and probably in the "Hippias," major and minor, "Phædrus, &c." As Xenophon can only turn up again incidentally, it may be advisable here to give a brief notion of the contents of his "Memorabilia" of Socrates.

It was during the absence of Xenophon, while engaged in the celebrated expedition of the Ten Thousand (B.C. 401—399), for the dethronement of Artaxerxes, and the enthronement of Cyrus, that Socrates was accused, condemned, and perished, by the unjust decree of the restlessly jealous and capricious population of Athens. In an undeserved exile,—perhaps in great part owing to his having been a disciple of Socrates,—and while superintending the education of his two children at Sparta, the warrior-historian penned the defence of his master in the "Memorabilia,"—a book which commences with the following *naïve* statement:—"I have often wondered by what *arguments* the accusers of Socrates *persuaded* the Athenians that he deserved death from the state." In the first book he examines and disproves, by facts known and patent, the accusation made; shows his piety to the gods, and the morality of his life. In the second book, the various branches of personal duty which were enforced by Socrates are mentioned, and insisted on, in the terms which his master used, as proofs of his innocence. In the third book, the opinions of Socrates on public duty, civil and military virtues, justice, &c., are reported and defended; and in the fourth book, the religiousness of Socrates is argued, maintained, and exemplified. There is contained in the "Memorabilia," therefore, a cumulative defence, viz.—a direct negation of *both* parts of the accusation, with exemplifications and facts in proof of his thesis,—the innocence of Socrates. Then there follow elaborate confutations, arising from the practices and tenets of the noblest of Athenian controversialists, with regard to self-government, or personal duty; justice, or public duty; and religion, or duty to the gods. Xenophon lived long in terms of close and observant intimacy with Socrates; he had no pretensions to originality of thought on philosophic topics; his own mind was essentially poetical; and he was but slightly skilled in the perceptive faculties to comprehend the larger and wider—the exotic—teachings of his master. The full sense and spirit of Socrates are not, therefore, likely to be exhibited in Xenophon. We are on this account, however, far more likely to have a genuine and unadulterated outline of such part of Socratic

thought as he reports upon, and was able to appreciate and expound. Plato again interpenetrated the Socratic tenets with the finer issues of his own original mind, and we cannot be sure that we have the thoughts of Socrates, though we may have his method and much of his expression. Xenophon appealed to the Athenians as fellow-witnesses with him of the truthfulness of his report. Plato appears to have indulged in a sort of dramatic idealization of his master; but then he would have destroyed the *vraisemblance* essential to his purpose, had we not in his dialogues much of the cast, tone, style, thought, mannerisms, &c., of his representative man. From both we gain much; from neither all. We must still construct, by critical thought, a Socrates for ourselves, and do that as honestly as we can. If we wish to comprehend "the philosophy of Socrates," we must rely greatly, it is evident, upon the vigorous Attic commander, as well as upon the Ionic thinker, whose grace, wit, and dramaticism have so much more captivated the world.

This question of authorities has really carried us much farther than we at first intended, and we must now resolutely turn aside from this criticism, and endeavour to bring before our mind's eye some clearly intelligible account of the peculiar tenets and opinions, practices, and personal beliefs, which enabled Socrates to take a place in the erudite city of Athens as one of the most remarkable citizens, and in history as an Epoch Man.

In philosophy, what constitutes an epoch? *A method.* "A method," says Lewes, with his usual emphatization of idea, "was his all in all. . . . Previous philosophies had shown the futility of speculation; certitude was nowhere to be had; all theories were but the conceit of knowledge. The method which he taught was that by which alone man could become wiser and better." Socrates thought explicitly, teaching no method or mode of searching for truth; he was himself consciously possessed of a system, a plan of procedure, a logic of investigation. This is evident, not only from the sameness of the course adopted by him in all his conversational exertations, but also from the genuine impression made upon his pupils, that science—knowledge—was the result of a process not so much of *education* as of *eduction*;—it was not taught, it was drawn out. Even when ignorant of the peculiarities and processes of his method, they were never at a loss to comprehend the special aim he kept constantly before him, viz.,—to make each man capable of *thinking for himself*. He sought by controversy to excite the mind to thought, in perfect confidence that, if it worked honestly, it would attain to truth, or something near it. Socraticism was, in fact, a cross-examining controversialism; a turning of thought against thought, "not to contradict nor to believe, but to weigh and to consider." His style of thought was a realization of the Miltonic maxim, "Let truth and falsehood grapple. Who ever knew truth to be worsted in a fair and open encounter?"

* "Biographical History of Philosophy," second edition, p. 134.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THERE is an old story which I dare say most of the readers of the *British Controversialist* have heard, over and over again, to the effect that when the celebrated Royal Society was in its infancy, the merry monarch, Charles II., who loved a good joke, proposed to the members the following question, "How can the *fact* be explained, that when a large fish is thrown into a tub quite full of water, the water will, nevertheless, not overflow the brim?" Many learned papers were read on the subject, and many were the theories devised to account for the extraordinary fact, until, at length, one of the members proved to the rest by actual experiment, that the singular fact which they had been trying to explain was, after all, no fact at all. I do not know whether any of my Protestant readers have noticed it, but I think they will find upon examination that the conduct of the negative writers in the present debate has been very similar to that of the members of the learned Society to which I have alluded. A great deal has been said which has not the slightest bearing upon the question at the head of these pages, we have had many answers to arguments which no one has advanced; we have been treated to long dissertations to show that certain texts do not prove the infallibility of the Catholic Church, when no one has said that they did; and, instead of showing that the Catholic Rule of Faith, *as laid down by the Catholic Church herself*, is "not true, our opponents have confined themselves to refuting some imaginary theory of their own, which they dignify with the name of the Catholic Rule of Faith. They have "set up a man of straw, for the pleasure of knocking him down."

Now, in the first article, "Ignatius" very properly commenced by explaining the nature of the Catholic Rule of Faith, and gave the definition of the Rule in the very words of the Council of Trent, the highest authority with Catholics. The definition which, to avoid, I suppose, all disputes about mere words, was given also in the original Latin, was elucidated from the comments of our best divines. Why have our opponents not attempted to show the falsity of the rule there laid down? Why are "Montgomery" and "Lex Scripta," and especially the latter, so angry with Ignatius for "stating" the Catholic Rule of Faith in the words of the highest Catholic authority? Simply because it is different from the imaginary rule against which their articles are directed, and they find it impossible to attack the Catholic theory without (unintentionally, perhaps,) distorting it. Where have our opponents found out that

the Catholic Rule of Faith is the priest of the parish? (page 164) where have they found out that the traditions of the Catholic Church are merely "old wives' fables"? (page 25) where have they found out that infallibility means exemption from sin? (page 168.)

Theophylact says in the first article, that the principal passage to which Catholics appeal to prove the infallibility of the Church is the text, "Thou art Peter," &c. Now, although part of this passage may be used for the purpose, it is not the principal text. The principal texts have been quoted by other writers on the affirmative side; and neither Theophylact nor any other writers have attempted to evade their force. I will venture to repeat them. "And Jesus came and spake unto his apostles, saying, All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Go ye, therefore, and *teach* all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe *all* things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, *I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.*" "And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may *abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth.* . . . You shall know him, because he shall *abide with you and in you*: but when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will teach you all truth." "My spirit that is in thee, and my words that I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, from henceforth and for ever." "He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you despiseth me." Before our opponents can disprove the infallibility of the Catholic Church, they must show that Christ has failed in his promise to be with His church till the end of the world; they must prove that the Spirit of truth has not abided with the church; they must prove that the Holy Ghost, who teaches through the church, does not teach truth; they must prove that the "words which Christ has put in the mouth of the church" have departed; they must maintain that Christ himself teaches error, for He has said to His church, "He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you despiseth me."

Theophylact, after informing us that "the Romish Church has no Scripture authority for the doctrine of infallibility," breaks off into a line of reasoning which would be much more appropriate in a debate on the supremacy of the Pope. All I can tell him is, that to give his theory even a semblance of plausibility, he would have to prove that our Lord was in the habit of speaking in the Greek tongue to a few illiterate Galilean fishermen. Almost every eminent Biblical scholar will tell Theophylact that the language in which our Lord conversed with his apostles was the Syro-Chaldaic, the vernacular language of the country. This is the language of the very few passages in which the very words of our Lord have been preserved; such as "*Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani!*" Now, in the Syro-Chaldaic language the words for Peter (or Cephas) and for rock are identical. The word which expresses both is ΚΙΠΗΘΣ,

from which the word Cephas is derived.* So that the passage would run thus, "Thou art KIPHOΣ, and upon this KIPHOΣ I will build my church." It is exactly the same in modern French; the words for Peter and rock are the same, viz., Pierre. The passage in both the Catholic and the Protestant version of the French Testament runs thus; "Tu es Pierre, et sur cette pierre je bâtirai mon Eglise." What now becomes of Theophylact's pretty theory?

A little further on in his article "Theophylact" gives us some passages of Scripture, and a few extracts from Catholic sources, which are *apparently* in opposition to the declaration of holy writ. As his extracts embrace so wide a variety of subjects, it would occupy more space than is allotted to me to attempt a reconciliation of the two columns. I will merely ask "Theophylact," if he could not produce similar apparent contradictions from the Bible itself? Would it not be very easy to fill whole pages with *apparent* contradictions such as the following?—

"The Father is greater than I."

"I and the Father are one."

"The poor ye have always with you;
but me ye have not always with you."

"Behold, I am with you all days,
even to the consummation of the world."

Another word on these extracts, and I am done with "Theophylact." There was no occasion to display his possession of that extraordinary talent which I believe is almost peculiar to no-popery writers,—I mean the habit of quoting from books which have never had any existence. The reader will find an instance of this in page 25, where, in No. XX., he pretends to quote from "The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori!" There is nothing in the extract itself to which a Catholic could object; but why throw suspicion on the rest of his authorities by pretending to quote from so self-evident an absurdity as "The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori"? The last quotation, page 27, proves that "Theophylact" can not only quote from works which do not exist, but also that he can perform the equally wonderful feat of extracting, from books which do exist, passages which they do not contain. I can assure my readers that Cardinal Bellarmine's work, "De Pontifico Romano," does not support any such absurd impiety as that contained in "Theophylact's" article, page 27. The work may be had of Messrs. Burns and Lambert, 63, Paternoster Row, for half-a-crown. Let the reader buy it, and judge for himself.

I really am at a loss to understand how "Lex Scripta" can presume to call his contribution a negative article on the question, "Is the Catholic Rule of Faith True?" He tells us that the *British Controversialist* has become a Roman Catholic caviller; that a vulgar labourer can pull a house down with a spade and a pickaxe; that no Catholic has ever *attempted* to prove his Rule of Faith,

* See Cardinal Wiseman on "The Supremacy of St. Peter." He refers to Dr. Lee, late Professor of Oriental Languages at Cambridge, in corroboration of his statement.

since the days of Chillingworth; that it is rash in the extreme to talk about British ignorance of Romanism; that the Irish pay divine honours to the blessed Virgin; that the Church of Rome grants indulgences to sin; that no *honest* or *sensible* man would call Protestant prejudices "the traditions of men;" and, after wasting a great deal of valuable space in vainly endeavouring to excuse a gross blunder which he made in the interpretation of a very plain sentence in the last debate, he withdraws, telling us that "The jury having retired for two minutes, returned with a verdict in favour of 'Lex Scripta.'" Such are the leading points of the article of one who boasts of his acquaintance with the "tactics of Rome."

"Montgomery's" article is more to the point. He objects that Catholics do not really know what their Rule of Faith is, because they sometimes say that it is the authority of the Church, and at other times say that it consists of Scripture and tradition. Precisely the same objection might be urged against Protestants, for they sometimes speak of the *Bible only* being their Rule of Faith, and at other times say the same of *private judgment*. The matter is very easily explained. The Catholic Rule of Faith is the whole Word of God,—all that He has revealed. This may be learned from the living voice of the Church, or from Scripture and tradition, interpreted by the Church. In page 164, "Montgomery" says that Christ "never promised any *visible* body that it should be guided into all truth for ever." The apostles were a *visible* body. Were not many such promises made to them? I have quoted several, near the commencement of this article. I must own that this is the first time I have heard, from a Protestant even, that these texts do not apply to the apostles; I always thought that the only dispute between us was as to the duration of the promise, Protestants maintaining that the words "for ever, unto the end of the world," mean during the lifetime of the apostles; Catholics maintaining, on the other hand, that the promises are still in force.

A little further on we are challenged to show from the writings of the Christians of the first four centuries, that they held any of the peculiar dogmas of the Catholic Church. I refer him to Baptist Noel's "First Five Centuries of the Church" (London, Nisbet), the object of which is to show that the Early Christians were rank Papists. If he has not access to this work, the nearest Catholic priest will be glad to show him "Waterworth's Faith of Catholics," a work in three large octavo volumes, consisting almost entirely of extracts or controverted points of the Catholic faith from writers of the first five centuries. Here are some inscriptions from the catacombs, date 2nd century:—"Atticus, thy spirit is in bliss; pray for thy parents." "Pray for us, because we know that thou art with Christ." From S. Ignatius, 1st century, "The Gnostic heretics do not acknowledge the Eucharist to be the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins."—"Ep. ad Smyrn., 36." From Justin Martyr's Apology, 2nd century,—"*We*

have been taught that the food which has been blessed by the prayer of the words which He (Christ) spoke, and by which our flesh and blood are nourished in the change, *is the flesh and blood of that Jesus incarnate.*" I could fill volumes of the *British Controversialist* with such extracts, but those I have given will, I trust, be a sufficient answer to "Montgomery's" challenge.

The passage from S. Gregory, in page 166, is not very correctly quoted, I suppose it is quoted from memory, or perhaps has been "corrupted" by being "handed down" from one Protestant writer to another. But what does it amount to? The Patriarch of Constantinople, in a fit of pride, and thinking that his pretensions will be supported by the Emperor, arrogates to himself the title of "Universal Bishop." Pope Gregory the Great writes to him, censuring his conduct in setting himself above the rest of the episcopacy. May I ask "Montgomery" how he can possibly construe this into an argument against the Papal supremacy? Does it not plainly indicate that Pope Gregory was the patriarch's ecclesiastical superior? Suppose that the Archbishop of Paris, for instance, were to claim to be "Universal Bishop," is it not very probable that he would receive a missive couched in similar terms from Pius IX.?

In the next paragraph we are informed that "the best interpretation" of the Bible "is that of its author, and Protestants may have that." "Ask, and ye shall receive, seek, and ye shall find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you." I presume that "Montgomery" means by this that if a Protestant reads his Bible, and prays for enlightenment, he will be infallibly guided to a correct interpretation. Well, Luther, as he himself tells us, read his Bible, prayed for enlightenment, and came to the conclusion that the words, "This is my body," teach consubstantiation, a theory of the real presence, differing very little from the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. Calvin read his Bible and prayed, and came to the conclusion that Luther's doctrine was "more blasphemous than the pope's." If what "Montgomery" says be true, why do those who read the Bible contradict one another?

But let us take the argument as it is stated. We may, it is said, be guided to a right interpretation of the Bible, if we ask the favour from God. If this be true of the individual, it is true of the church collectively. It is on a principle akin to this that General Councils depend. If all who read and pray for guidance receive infallible direction, the Bible has been clear to every saint of God from the beginning; it has been clear to the pastors and teachers of the Catholic Church, and they, therefore, have handed down its clear and certain interpretation. Why are individuals so sharp-sighted and unerring, and the saints of God and His Church at all times so blinded? This is but the recoil of your own argument.

I do not see anything that needs a reply in the rest of "Montgomery's" article. He tells us near the conclusion, that Protestants do not "deny the existence of a tribunal appointed by the Almighty

to explain His laws," but very curiously forgets to mention where this tribunal is: Until he gives us this piece of information, we are content to acknowledge the authority of that tribunal which was appointed with the words, "Go, *teach* all nations . . . and lo, I am with you all days, even to the end of the world." J. H.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

WE complained that "Ignatius" had devoted his whole paper to a *statement* of the Roman Catholic Rule of Faith, which required but a few paragraphs. We foretold that every future article would be as full of assertions, and as meagre in proofs. "Gregory" followed, to verify the remark, "showing the grounds upon which" that rule is founded, and then "leaving the question for the present" (page 93). "A Layman" follows in the same track, and though his is the *third* article, he gives but a promise that, "by the end of this discussion, 'Lex Scripta' will be unanimously declared a false prophet" (page 163). It is our intention in this paper to show how "Gregory" has based assumption upon assumption,—assuming all the points on which this controversy hinges. The Roman Catholic Rule of Faith is based upon a series of prepositions, the truth of each of which has to be established, before that rule can be accepted. If any one of them be false, the rest are worthless; but it is customary with its defenders to *assume every one of them*; and when they do agree, it is an argument based on these assumptions. This fact is abundantly proved by "Gregory's" article, as will be presently manifest.

There is, to our minds, a still more humiliating practice,—that of resorting to evasions. "I have written," "Gregory" remarks, "my article, without using those texts which 'Theophylact' conceives Catholics only refer to prove their Rule of Faith. It is hardly necessary for me to notice them" (page 92). It would have been more candid if he had informed us, if these are not the texts, what *are* the passages on which they rely. We foresaw this miserable evasion as in reserve, when we read the opening article of "Ignatius." We knew well that, unless an *avowal* appeared in the *British Controversialist* of the supports of Romanism, the negative writers would be treated precisely in this disingenuous style; and, in our former article, we refused to attack, until the enemy had unmasked his batteries. We should like some future writer to tell us where "most of the texts brought forward by 'Theophylact' have been replied to," as asserted on page 92. That it would be "easy to place Protestant opinions in juxtaposition with texts of Scripture," is perfectly true; but the rules of controversy required that "Gregory" should prove, instead of insinuating, that the same flagrant discrepancies between them would be manifest, as "Theophylact" has shown exists between the doctrines of Rome and the Bible. That it is as easy to "torture Scripture into the same apparent" contradiction, no one disputes; but it is, to say the least,

unhandsome towards an antagonist, to insinuate without taking the slightest pains to show, that "Theophylact's array of texts and notes from the Douay Bible" is the "torturing" process pretended by "Gregory" (page 92). Nothing is more damaging to Rome than to compel her to face the Word of God; and if a similar "juxtaposition" be as adverse to Protestantism, we feel assured that such a comparison would, long before this, have appeared in the pages of this periodical.

According to "Gregory," the Church of Rome "founds her interpretation upon the Holy Scriptures, and upon the true interpretation of them, as delivered by the apostles to the Fathers" (page 86). "Her interpretation!" Of what? If of the Scriptures—how founded upon them? An interpretation of any writing is founded upon the rules of grammar, criticism, and common sense; but how upon the thing itself, of which it is an interpretation? How, again, can that interpretation be founded upon another interpretation of the same thing, namely, that delivered to the Fathers? If, again, not only the Scriptures, but their interpretation, were delivered to the Fathers, and by them to "the Church," what need was there that that "Church" should be "under the immediate and constant guidance of the Holy Spirit"? To profess to found the interpretation of Scripture upon its true interpretation, if at all intelligible, is to prove too much. If the aid of the Holy Spirit is necessary rightly to interpret Scripture, then it is not true that the apostles handed down the interpretation. If, on the other hand, the writings are accompanied by the interpretation, then no interpreter is necessary.

Apart from such inconsistencies, observe the numerous points which are quietly assumed. Assumption *first*:—that the apostles delivered to the Fathers any interpretation at all of their writings, beyond what Protestants have, namely—the interpretation one passage affords of another, the Acts of the Apostles, and one epistle of another. There is no intimation in the New Testament that the apostles left any such "deposit." The early Fathers do not *pretend* to the possession of any such deposit. Had they done so, the writings of different Fathers disagreeing with one another, and the writings of the same Father contradicting themselves, as they notoriously do, would expose the nature of such a pretence. Assumption *second*:—that the Fathers delivered that "sacred deposit" to the Church. The Romish Church has preserved their writings; but where is the interpretation of the Scriptures bearing the marks of "the true"? If Rome has it, why not produce it, instead of advancing and reiterating such baseless assertions? Assumption *third*:—that the Fathers, assuming they inherited "the sacred deposit," have transmitted it pure and intact to the Church of Rome: and, assumption *fourth*:—that what that Church pretends to is the same "deposit" which the Fathers inherited from the apostles. Here are four grave assumptions of the very points which are to be proved in this discussion, before the "Roman

Catholic Rule of Faith" can be shown to be sound and true. Not one of these vital points has ever been proved, and in numerous Protestant works it has been demonstrated that not one of them is capable of proof. "Gregory," on pages 86, 87, proceeds to quote several prophecies, and adds that "in the Protestant Bible the above texts are, by the headings of the chapters, referred to the Church of Christ." Of this there can be no question, and the pages of the *British Controversialist* were not opened to inform the reader of this fact, but to afford "Gregory," and others, an opportunity to prove that *that* Church is *Rome*. Instead of attempting this, he tells us, what no one requires to be told, that "there is a Church *claiming* to be the only true one, which *declares* that the texts apply to her, and to her alone" (page 87). Let attention be fixed upon the words "claims" and "declares," which we have italicised. We ask for *proof*, and we are favoured with antiquated *claims*; we ask for *reasons*, and we are treated with arrogant *declarations*.

Again; "She alone can point, with unfailing and undoubted certainty, to the long line of teachers, from Peter down to Pius IX." (page 87.) Now this succession is pure imagination, in the opinion of Protestants; and their champions have been at the pains to show that it is a mere figment, invented for the purpose of supporting sacerdotal assumptions. To establish their Rule of Faith, "Gregory," and brethren, have to prove that this succession is not a dream of the dark ages,—that it is a mere delusion we intend to show,—and unless our arguments are answered, "Gregory" will assert and reiterate utterly in vain. First,—it cannot be shown that our Lord ever commissioned the apostles to appoint any persons, or body of persons, to be their successors, *in the sense in which they were successors of Christ*; that is, in the sense that these successors had the powers and the functions, either in part or whole, which were the privilege of the apostles. "Gregory" quotes our "Lord's promises" to the twelve, that he "should be with them *all days*, for ever," and then adds, "as these promises of the perpetual presence of Christ were made to those whom He sent to teach,—the practice of the apostles, in appointing successors, shows clearly that they conceived these promises as extending to the chief teachers of the Church, call them apostles, bishops, patriarchs, or whatever name you will. As they were not to live for ever, the words are unintelligible, unless they refer also to those who were to succeed them. That the apostles understood it in this sense, may be inferred from the fact of their appointing bishops," &c. (page 88). Now, the inference of "Gregory," though perfectly intelligible, is not justified by the promise of perpetual presence, for in none of the passages containing it is anything said of a *succession of apostles*. To see clearly this point, we have simply to borrow an illustration from what is taking place in Italy. Garibaldi occupies the seat of Francis II. at Naples, but no one who knows how to use texts correctly would say that the patriot general has *succeeded* the despot. It is true that Romish bishops occupied the place of the

bishops of the Primitive Church at Rome, but it is absurd to say that they succeeded them. It was a revolution, not a succession. Again; when apostles, who were not pastors or bishops, appointed pastors over the churches they had founded, these pastors did not *succeed* the apostles, any more than a viceroy, since appointed by a sovereign over a newly-acquired district, could *succeed* his sovereign. The *first* and vital point *assumed* is, then, the possibility of a *succession*. A perfectly intelligible sense of our Lord's words will be found in Protestant works, which have the merit of being based upon no assumption. The *second* assumption is that the apostles appointed *bishops*, that is, *diocesan* bishops. We have no time, and this is not the occasion to discuss whether "bishops" are a scriptural institution. Whatever may be proved from other passages, it would outrage common sense to assert that a provision of perpetual presence is the warrant for introducing *diocesan bishops* into the Church as the proof that *bishops* succeeded *apostles*. All that is promised in such passages as Matt. xxviii. 20, John xvi. 16, is, that in teaching and baptizing, the apostles, and, therefore, those that should succeed them in respect of teaching and baptizing, should be favoured with this perpetual presence. All, who scripturally teach and baptize, succeed the apostles in these inherited functions of teaching and baptizing, and, therefore, inherit the promise annexed. Men who are not *diocesan* bishops may now, as they did in the primitive church, lawfully teach and baptize, and do, in fact, inherit the promised presence. And, further, diocesan bishops, *as such*, do not teach or baptize. These are not, even in pretence, *episcopal* functions; and as the promise is in reference to these non-episcopalian functions, diocesan bishops, *as such*, have no promise of perpetual presence. In the passages quoted by "Gregory" there is nothing upon which he can ground his "inference." Indeed, he grounds it upon "the practice" of the apostles appointing bishops,—a practice not proved, as will be shown. The inference is not in itself legitimate, and the ground upon which he bases it is pure assumption, and in the face of historical evidence.

We are informed that "the teachers were sent by the apostles to the early churches *precisely* as our Lord sent the apostles; *only* the apostles were not sent to any special place" (page 89). The words "precisely" and "only," which we have italicised, simply destroy one another. The apostles were sent to the *foundation* of the church (Ephes. ii. 20; Rev. xxi. 14), and to "sit on thrones" for ever, "judging" God's spiritual "Israel"; and by their authoritative revelations and enactments, to open or shut the gates of the heavenly kingdom (Matt. xvi. 19; John xx. 23; 1 Cor. iv. 1). It was *thus* that Christ sent his apostles; and it was *not thus* that the apostles sent the teachers whom they appointed. To be an "apostle," it was necessary that a man should have "seen" Christ, and have received a personal commission from our Lord (1 Cor. ix. 1), and have had personal knowledge of Christ (Acts i. 22—28).

Their office is clearly defined, and their functions are sure to be, from their very nature, absolutely peculiar to them; and ceasing with them, according to the canon law, "a personal privilege doth follow the person, and is extinguished with the person." Nothing short of a standing miracle could give successors to such officers. In their writings their authority still exists, which may be usurped, but cannot be inherited. Their office has never been vacant (Matt. xix. 28), and no successor can fill it. They are at this moment the foundations of the Christian temple (Rev. xxi. 14), and to try to add successive foundations is to undermine it. Such are the radical differences between the commission of the apostles and the commission of the teachers sent by the apostles, which "Gregory" confounds by his "precisely." And the difference he admits does not exist in the two important cases he adduces, namely, Timothy and Titus. "Only," we are told, "the apostles were not sent to any special place." St. Paul expressly defines the duties of Timothy to be those of an evangelist (2 Tim. iv. 5), who was not sent to any "special place." Historical facts show that he was not "set over" the church at Ephesus as its first bishop, as *assumed* by "Gregory." Roman Catholics *assume* this point from the ambiguous expression, "abide still at Ephesus" (1 Tim. i. 3); but his abiding temporarily for a special object no more constituted him a diocesan bishop, than St. Paul abiding three years in the same city (Acts xx. 31) made him a bishop. Subsequently Timothy was re-called to Rome (Col. i. 1; Phil. i. 1). So Titus, left in Crete (Titus i. 3), is directed in the same epistle (iii. 12) that he would be soon required at Nicapolis; and in an epistle written subsequently (2 Tim. iv. 10), we find him at Dalmatia. The permanent location of these men at Ephesus and in Crete is a pure assumption; and upon it is founded another, that they were constituted diocesan bishops. If such had been their office and position, St. Paul would not have deemed it necessary to request Timothy to "abide still" in his supposed diocese, or to give Titus a reason for his being left in Crete, his supposed diocese. The passages adduced show that these teachers were evangelists, and *facts* show that, as such, they were sent hither and thither, assisting the apostles, but attached by local ties to no "special place." "Gregory's" "only" difference is *the* point in which Timothy and Titus did *not* differ from the apostles; and his "precisely" the same, interpreted by facts, means essentially different.

We are further informed that "the number of the apostles was peculiar,—twelve," and that it was to "them" that "certain promises were made"; and in a few lines after, "St. Paul, Titus, and Barnabas," are represented as *successors to these twelve*, and as not having "any personal promise" of the presence of Christ (page 88). Now, Paul distinctly, emphatically, and repeatedly, disclaims his being a successor to any or all of "the twelve," and asserts direct personal appointment and independent authority and inspiration (Gal. i. 12—24; ii. 1—10). Not an instance is or can be adduced

by "Gregory" in which "teachers" were appointed bishops by "the twelve." The two important cases he does adduce are of Timothy and Titus, who, whatever their functions, were "sent" by Paul, to whom no "personal promise" is said to have been made. Now, Paul did not succeed Peter, or any of the twelve, as declared by himself; and, as stated by "Gregory," had no "personal promise" of the presence of Christ. Paul, therefore, had no promise, and the teachers he sent could not inherit what was not bequeathed to Paul. Let it, then, be assumed, contrary to facts, that Timothy and Titus were diocesan bishops, and it will follow that they were not in the line of succession commencing with the "peculiar twelve," but in the line commencing with Paul, who was not in the line of the twelve, and having no personal promise, had no promise whatever. A succession of teachers through Timothy and Titus is then not "proved," as assumed by "Gregory" on page 89, and it is, therefore, not "admitted" that any such promise as he claims for them, was intended to extend to the bishops of the nineteenth century," and there is no necessity to have recourse to them "in matters of doubt upon any point of faith." Thus the Roman Catholic Rule of Faith is, at its very first step, shown to be founded upon misstatements and pure assumptions of the very points to be proved.

We have next to remark upon a statement which always compels a Protestant to summon to his aid all the patience and forbearance at his command. Rome, we are informed, "alone can point with unfailing and undoubted certainty to the long line of teachers from Peter downwards to Pius IX." (p. 87.) No attempt, on the principles of common sense, has ever been made to prove this notoriously false statement; and no attempt is made to refute the facts and arguments on which Protestants base their charge of falsehood. From age to age the Romanists continue to try our patience by reiterating what they refuse to *prove*. Let it, however, be conceded that there is an unbroken line, and that it is of "unfailing and undoubted certainty;" this concession is utterly worthless to Rome, if it can be shown either that the so-called successors claim what the apostles, their presumed predecessors, could not transmit, or that they claim what the apostles had not to transmit. We shall briefly show in the sequel, that Rome claims for her bishops both what the apostles could not transmit, and also what they did not possess, and, therefore, could not transmit.

But, first, the "long line" itself is nothing more than one of those "fables and endless genealogies," which the apostle foretold would "minister questions,"—a prediction which history verifies, in the rancorous feeling which Roman Catholics show towards Christians not of their own profession. Instead of a vain boast, it is incumbent upon "Ignatius," "Gregory," and others, to demonstrate by appeals to history that many, a great many, of the names on this catalogue are of persons who have any historical existence at all, and not fictitious,—mere names invented to fill up most unpleasant gaps in the succession. We demand "unfailing and un-

doubted certainty" in the line itself; not in imagination and assertions. If there be such "certainty," let "Gregory" produce competent historical evidence, for it would save the poor miserable man who occupies "Peter's chair" in Rome, and make him really what he is, in pitiable pretence, the head of Christendom. The first thing he must cease to assume, and begin to prove, is that St. Peter was ever at Rome; and having done this, it will have to be proved, not assumed, that he lived at Rome, and lived as its bishop. Barrow, in his treatise on the Pope's supremacy, has shown that it is impossible to maintain these vital points. If Barrow's facts and reasons are not facts and reasons, let this be proved; but we cannot allow "Gregory" to assume these points. The next step for him to take, is to account for the very suspicious facts, that Clement is made the first successor of Peter by Tertullian, Rufinus, and others; that Anacletus is made Clement's predecessor by Irenæus and Eusebius; that Anacletus and Cletus are both made the predecessors of Clement by Epiphanius and others; that again, Anacletus, Cletus, and Linus are made the predecessors of Clement by Augustine and others. Do these facts bear out the startling assertion of "Gregory" that "the long line is of unfailing and undoubted certainty"? Such words are, and will ever remain, in the opinion of Protestants, "great, swelling words of vanity," and for this impression "Gregory" and others are responsible as long as they withhold proofs. Eusebius, in the *fourth* century, declared his inability to find even "bare traces" of this certainty,* which is so "undoubted and unfailing" in the *nineteenth* century.

We should unduly extend this article if we were to indicate the numerous *canonical irregularities* which vitiate the integrity of a line itself broken in various parts. We have no time to show that deposed bishops went on ordaining bishops, and other irregularities, which were tolerated because they could not be entirely suppressed, which commenced at the close of the *third* century, and became hopelessly rife during the general confusion of the middle ages. Now, the Roman Catholic Rule of Faith is inseparably bound up with this apostolical succession, and cannot be proved till that succession has been proved.

"Gregory," again, represents "the body of Christians," "from the time of their founder," as having "priests to offer the eucharistic sacrifice, and to perform the various functions still exercised by the priesthood," and "deacons to assist at the altar and in the church" (pp. 85, 86). Here a priesthood, a sacrifice, and an altar are all assumed, and not a text given in proof that such institutions are *Christian*. The introduction of each of these notions was gradual, and the date of introduction is traced by the historian, and from the New Testament it has been repeatedly demonstrated that each one was a fresh revolutionary step in the church once existing in Rome.

The process by which "Gregory" shows that "the priesthood

and the sacrifice" of the Jewish dispensation "were not to be swept away" (page 88), is most extraordinary. "Christ himself" set the example of frequenting "the temple (which he chooses to call 'the church') at stated hours for prayer." Attending the temple for prayer, a proof that "the priesthood and sacrifice were not swept away!" Observe how the proofs accumulate: "Christ speaks of His own Church several times;" promises to "found it upon a rock;" describes it as "a city set upon a hill," "a light in the world," "a grain of mustard seed, growing up to an immense tree!" What imaginable connection is there between these doings and sayings of our Lord with "Gregory's" priesthood and sacrifice, which subvert the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ? Let the passages we cite below* be read, and the whole tenor and spirit of the Christian dispensation be duly considered, and it will be seen that no sacerdotal institution existed under the apostles, and that none were designed to exist after them. Let Mosheim and Neander be read in the next place, and the time and manner in which the simple Christian bishop appointed by the apostles was supplanted by the priests of Rome will be clearly perceived. It is incumbent upon "Gregory" to explain the fact that he cannot adduce a single instance in which the inspired authors of the New Testament employ *sacerdotal phraseology* to designate the functions of the Christian minister and deacon; whereas they do use sacerdotal phraseology to indicate the dignity and privileges of the *body* of Christians, who are constituted "a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices" (1 Pet. ii. 5). Rome has divested Christians, who blindly submit to so great a loss, of their spiritual functions, and pretends to invest the teaching and ruling class to whom, *as such*, Christ bequeathed no priestly function whatever.

In the absence of all warrant for the assumption of priestly functions, Roman Catholic writers resort to such passages as those to which we refer in the note below,† and in which "loosing," "binding," "remitting and retaining sins;" and "stewardship" of divine "mysteries;" are described as apostolical functions; and then *assume*, without proving first, that they imply *priestly* functions; and, secondly, that, as such, they were transmitted to their successors. We have already observed, that, except as teachers and baptizers, the apostles had not, and could not, have successors, and it remains only to be shown that it is a pure assumption that the apostles had any priestly functions to transmit. We have, under the Mosaic economy, a divinely constituted priesthood. Now; "Gregory" ought to have proved, not to have assumed, that *binding, loosing, remitting, or retaining sins* were the appropriate functions of the Levitical priesthood. Did Aaron, or any of his successors down to Caiaphas, ever blaspheme God (Luke v. 21), by pretending to absolve men of their sins? If not, it does not follow

* Rom. xii. 1; Heb. x. 19, 20; 1 Pet. ii. 4—10; 1 John ii. 1, 2; and the whole Epistle to the Hebrews.

† Matt. xvi. 19; John xx. 23; 1 Cor. iv. 1.

that apostles were priests because of their *peculiar* functions—functions which no divinely-constituted priests ever pretended to discharge. If they were not priests, their successors cannot be priests.

If, again, the functions of an apostle, denoted by “binding,” “loosing,” &c., are rightly interpreted by Rome, we have reason to expect some intimation that they, at least some of them, did absolve men from their sins. Romanists indicate their sense of the importance of such pretensions by giving prominence to them; and the apostles, supposing they also absolved men, could not have been ignorant of the importance of such a function; and yet, neither in their “Acts” nor their “Epistles” is there a single instance of the exercise of so awful a function. As interpreted by all Protestants, they imply that Christ commissioned the apostles as His ambassadors, to *unfold and enforce the terms* on which God forgives men their sins. The “Acts” and the “Epistles” show that they fully and finally discharged this their sacred trust; and, therefore, left neither room nor occasion for a succession, that is, made an apostolical succession a simple impossibility, and all pretension to it something akin to blasphemy.

If, as asserted, “the Christian was to take the place of the Jewish law, but to be a continuation and development of it—not its destroyer” (pp. 87, 88), it follows that the apostles “offered gifts and sacrifices for sins;” for “every high priest,” and therefore every *apostle*, “taken from among men,” was “ordained” for this very purpose (Heb. v. 1). St. Paul tells us, that this was *the* function of the priesthood, and if “Gregory” be right, it was at least *one* of the most important functions of an apostle; and in any description of the apostolic office, this priestly function could not possibly have been omitted. We have such a description in Acts i. 22, 23; 1 Cor. iv. 1—3, 9—17; and chap. ix. And yet not the barest allusion to anything sacerdotal exists in these passages. We have, again, qualifications of a Christian bishop specified in 1 Tim. iii. 1—7; but amongst them there is not one that has the remotest approach to *priestly* functions. We have, in Acts vi. 1—7, the institution of the diaconate, and in 1 Tim. iii. 8—13, a statement of the character of the duties of a Christian deacon, but in neither passage is there a word to bear out “Gregory’s” assertion that deacons existed to “assist at the altar and in the church” (p. 86). The whole tenor and spirit of Christianity is so antagonistic to sacerdotal ideas, that though, in certain communities, a Christian minister is *called* a “priest,” yet the man who should venture to “offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins” would be regarded as *insane*. The teaching of the whole New Testament, and even of the Old, so clearly declares Christ to be the only priest of this dispensation, His cross its only altar, and His body our only sacrifice, that even Gregory, in the plenitude of his assurance, does not, and *dare* not, cite the texts that would prove the contrary. The only way in which he does endeavour to show that the officers of the Romish Church are priests is by representing the Lord’s Supper as a “eucharistic sacrifice.”

But that the Lord's Supper is a *sacrifice*, is so pure an assumption, that we need not take any pains to explode it.

Having illustrated how "Gregory" has begged every essential point it was incumbent upon him to *prove*, it is unnecessary to enter upon the series of minor misrepresentations, which form the remainder of his article. "A Layman" writes the third article in support of "Gregory's" paper; but as it is in support of *assumptions*, it may, for the present, at least, be left unnoticed. The ground upon which the "Catholic Rule of Faith" is based is a quicksand. To trust that rule, a man must be credulous. To appreciate the arguments used in its defence, we must carefully abjure our reasoning faculties.

There is another point on which "Gregory" bases his Rule of Faith, namely, the *visibility* of the Catholic church. A few paragraphs allow sufficient room to assume this dogma of visibility, but it cannot be exposed without writing a separate article. If the Editor can protract the discussion, we should gladly take up the subject in the next number of this periodical. If not, we trust that "Theophylact" will, in the closing negative article, show what the assumption is worth.

LEX SCRIPTA.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SUCH is the consternation produced in the world of dogmatism by the "Vestiges of Creation" and the "Origin of Species," that, were we guided alone by their fears, we might speedily anticipate the closing scene of this world. We are not of those who tremble at every theory the busy intellect of man may publish to the world. He who sitteth on high in the heavens, guides the mighty stars in their courses, and with equal facility superintends the progressive life of the tiny animalculæ. Our faith in truth is strong, and still stronger in the God of truth, that He does all things well, while we erring mortals go on groping in the dark with our poor, mean, and meagre capacities, fixing the limits of His power, the propriety of His action, and the wisdom of His laws. Pietists may exclaim with frantic anger, may quake with fear, or dogmatize with arrogance. Still the world moves on, inquiry progresses, theories are propounded, criticized, and exploded, while truth gradually cumulates, facts take the place of fiction, and man advances in civilization and knowledge. The outcry raised against this theory is proof positive of the weakness of that faith in truth, nature, and nature's God, which all pietists and theorists should alike possess.

The following extract from the last number of the *Quarterly Review* seems so perfectly apposite with our present feelings, that we cannot resist the inclination to present it to the reader:—"He

who is as sure as he is of his own existence that the God of truth is at once the God of nature and the God of revelation, cannot believe it to be possible that His voice in either, rightly understood, can differ, or can deceive His creatures. To oppose facts in the natural world because they seem to oppose revelation, or to humour them so as to compel them to speak its voice, is, he knows, but another form of the ever ready feeble-minded dishonesty, of lying for God, and trying by fraud or falsehood to do the work of the God of truth. It is with another and a nobler spirit that the true believer walks amongst the works of nature. The words graven on the everlasting rocks are the words of God, and they are graven by His hand. No more can they contradict His word, written in His book, than could the words of the Old Covenant, graven by His hand on the stony tables, contradict the writings of His hand in the volume of the new dispensation. There may be to man difficulty in reconciling all the utterances of the two voices. But what of that? He has learned already that here he knows only in part, and that the day of reconciling all apparent contradictions between what must agree, is nigh at hand. He rests his mind in perfect quietness on this assurance, and rejoices in the gift of light without a mis-giving as to what it may discover."

Although it is not our purpose to follow the arguments, in their present *ex parte* condition, of the veteran controversialist, "L'Ouvrier," in passing, we would express our thorough appreciation of the religious tone with which he has introduced the question: as our opponent, we agree with him, that by "friendly counsels and mutual instruction," the thoughtful student of nature is assisted in the attainment of truth. Much stress is not laid by advocates of this theory on the evidence obtained from geological science, although firmly believing that it preponderates in their favour. It is chiefly by the facts of every-day life in the natural world by which we are surrounded, that the theory is and must be supported. Great confusion exists among naturalists as to what is and what is not a species. Consequently, some instances, both in the animal and vegetable world, are classed by different naturalists in more than one species. This, while it retards the extension of accurate knowledge, does not affect the question now at issue. It is sufficient for our present purpose to take the common acceptance of the term; we shall then understand a species to be a division of organic life, in which certain peculiarities are possessed by every individual: these peculiarities being considered either as morphological or physiological essentials, however much they may differ among themselves as to other varying peculiarities.

That all organic life has descended from a few primordial forms must be apparent to every student of nature, whatever may be the peculiar theory he may have adopted with reference to their original creation. We read, in the second chapter of Genesis, that all things were created by God *before they grew*, and that they all possessed these peculiarities by which they were to be propagated upon the earth. Hence it is unnecessary for us to enter upon any theory to

account for their existence; that is a fact, and we have now only to do with things as they do and may exist.

Much variety is found in all animals and plants with which we are most familiar. The question is, How is this variety to be accounted for? Dogs are so greatly varied, that but few can tell the catalogue of their names and characters. Yet perhaps no animal has become so plastic under the controlling care of man. Who shall dare to assert that a new race, crossed between two varieties of this animal, may not possess such peculiarities as to recommend them to the particular care of man as his servants, to the exclusion of their original parents, and perhaps to the utter extinction of the original races from which the mongrel has sprung? In such a case, what would be the position occupied by the mongrel race, supposing all living specimens of their originals to have failed? Would it then be regarded as a race, a variety, or a species? The horse presents great varieties; yet who will say that the pure Arab steed, in his native clime, is not morphologically a distinct animal from the dray-horse of the city of London? Are we to call this difference a race, variety, or a species? And if these differences are so perceptible, and so capable of production within a limited historic time, why may not still longer times produce still greater deviations? The argument of infertility, as applied to hybrids and crosses, is without effect, because facts show equal evidence for and against fertility. The permanence of the peculiarity in any line of race is strong evidence of the possibility to originate new species, or beings essentially different to their progenitors. The rock pigeon is said to be the parent stock of all the varieties of pigeons; and from this man has selected certain peculiarities of form, colour, or habits; and these peculiarities he has carefully propagated, so that they are comparatively permanent. Now supposing this had taken place in nature far from the influence of man, and that variety farthest removed from the rock pigeon in form, colour, or habits, had shared with its original the domain of life, extinguishing all transitional or intermediate forms, would these two kinds of birds on their first discovery have been considered as the same species, but of different varieties, or would they have been placed on the records of science as different species? We are inclined to believe, that had they fallen into the hands of a naturalist with leanings in favour of a morphological classification of species, he would have ranked them as separate and distinct species.

Again, counting up the points of divergence, do we not find that there are points more distinct, more divergent, and more numerous between the so-called varieties of dogs, horses, and pigeons respectively, than there are between some species?

The delicately formed Italian greyhound, the lady's pet, is much more divergent in its morphological peculiarities from the bulldog and the mastiff, than the wolf is from the pointer, or the fox from the English terrier.

In like manner, the ass is nearer in many respects to the Welsh

or the Shetland pony than the rough, uncultivated English carthorse is to the pure Arabian.

Instances might be continued *ad libitum*, but we trust we have indicated sufficient to lead the judgment without wearying the attention.

Thus we perceive that—how creation was effected is no part of this question; that all things had planted in their nature, by the act of creation, power to propagate their kind with variations; that these variations are susceptible of increase according to the circumstances of their being; and that, such being the case, variety may become more potent than the original peculiarity: that those possessing the original peculiarity may be displaced from the sphere of organic being; and that hence, the more potent peculiarity may become a new species.

Nature delights in change, orderly change; and all things assume, however closely they may be examined, a progressive development towards perfection: such poets sing, historians record, and science observes. Then far be it from the *British Controversialist* to fossilize themselves in the cold dogmatism of an exploded fallacy, while they can marshal themselves under the banner of intellectual progress raised by the authors of "Vestiges of Creation," and "The Origin of Species by Natural Selection," the foremost advocates of the Development Theory.

DELTA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"This is the origin of the heavens and the earth when they were created, in the day that the Lord God *made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb before it grew.*"—Gen. ii. 4, 5.

HAVING, in our previous remarks introduced the Theory of Development to our readers, as we believe impartially, and shown some reasons for disbelieving the theory, it is our duty, on the present occasion, still farther to show, that it is contrary to fact, opposed to reason, and logically false, being based on assumptions which are incapable of proof.

We are not of that number who would fear the results of the Development Theory, if generally received as truth: we believe that the more exact our knowledge of nature, the more earnest becomes our faith in the divine record; and the more perfect our intimacy with the sublime sciences of astronomy, geology, and natural history, in like proportion we are led to admire the wisdom and perfection of inspiration. It is true, this theory of development and the transmutation of species had their origin in an age of scepticism, and have received much favour from the great doubters of all time since their first promulgation; but Holy Scripture has stood the test of many fiery trials, and we still find it is written, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction in righteousness, that the man of God might be thoroughly furnished to every good work," and we con-

tinued to learn "how the worlds were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them," in the simple language of narrative; so that the poorest peasant may read and understand as much of the grand mystery of creation, as the most erudite philosopher who has ever sought glory or fame in the literary world.

The Development Theory assumes that the earth, as originally formed from nebulous matter, consisted entirely of what is understood by geologists as the metamorphic rocks, which have never yet yielded any evidence of life upon the earth during their formation; upon these all other rocks rest, and are of a stratified character, showing a progressive formation, or deposit of a particular character, according to the nature of the circumstances under which they are found; these stratified formations all exhibit fossiliferous remains of various forms of life. The advocates of development assert that the lowest strata afford only the lowest types of life, both vegetable and animal, and that each ascending stratum in regular progression ascends in the character of its fossils, until the highest point is reached, or that on which man is made to perform his part as God's vicegerent, creation's chief handiwork.

Ten formations are reckoned, from the azoic rocks upwards—viz., the Lower Silurian, the Upper Silurian, the Devonian, the Carboniferous, the Trias, the Oolitic, the Cretaceous, the Eocene, the Miocene, and the Drift. The three first of these formations are distinguished as the Primary age; the next four compose the Secondary age; the Tertiaries form the third age; and the last is called the Modern age of the world; and they are still further characterized respectively as the reign of fishes, of reptiles, of mammals, and of man.

Throughout the whole of this geologic cycle, by the Development Theory, life is made to commence with the lowest possible form, and gradually, yet steadily, to advance, one form and one organism running into and becoming another and a better form—each succeeding organism being an improvement and gradual perfection of its predecessor; it being essential to the theory, and boldly maintained by the theorists, that the simplest, lowest form of life, is never coeval with any higher or the highest grades of organic existence: that such is their assumption, we appeal to their works, *passim*.

The Silurian system being the lowest formations, and resting immediately on the granite or azoic rocks, is represented by the theorists as entirely devoid of life, excepting such as belongs to the humblest divisions of the vegetable and animal kingdoms. "The radiata, articulata, and mollusca, were, according to their report, represented by their simplest forms, while the higher and more perfect divisions were wholly wanting."

It must be remembered that the Lower and Upper Silurian systems are divided into the lowest or Llandeilo formation, next the Caradoc, thirdly, the Wenlock, and, highest of all, the Ludlow formation. Now, "in 1838, Sir R. Murchison found the *onchus Murchisoni* and *onchus tennistriatus*, the highest order of placoids, in Llandeilo flags." "In 1842, Mr. Phillips found 'innumerable small teeth

and spines,' just above the Aymestry limestones; and in 1845, 'a portion of a fish belonging to the ostracodont family of the placoid order was found in the Wenlock limestone.' "In 1847, 'defensive spines of fishes' were found in the Upper Llandeilo flag, by Sir R. Murchison; and afterwards similar spines were found in the Bala limestone by the Government Survey. The Bala limestone is below the Lower Silurian group." The onchus is as perfect in the Bala limestone as it is in the Ludlow rocks, although ages, beyond our powers to calculate, must have intervened between the existence of these specimens of the onchus found in these two formations, so widely differing in their historic position. "Professor Agassiz found on comparison, that the spine of the onchus which was found, is more than twice as large as the spine of the dog-fish, or that even of the Port Jackson shark. These early placoids were found to be larger than those of the present day. They were not mere abortions or pigmies, but true and noble vertebrata, of enormous proportions, armed with defensive spines, five times as large as the dog-fish of the present era,—Adams at their birth, admitting of no improvement, and proving, by comparison, that none has ever taken place."—(*Taylor's Indications* pp. 74, 75.) So much for the Cambrian and Silurian systems, in which the friends of Development found nothing but the lowest forms of animal life. Fact is contrary to their theory, and although this one fact were sufficient disproof of their theory, we shall see further proof of a cumulative character as we proceed.

In the Old Red Sandstone the theorists found a few fishes, but "they were manifestly of an inferior character to those which succeeded them;" these "inferior" creatures are the ganoids and placoids of the preceding formations, and are said only to possess "a rudimental or cartilaginous skeleton," whereas they possessed a real osseous skeleton, and are placed by eminent naturalists among the most perfect of their order: recent knowledge, however, is acquired of an extraordinary fish, the *asterolepis*, in this formation. This fish was discovered by the lamented Hugh Miller, in Stromness, in 1848, and again by Mr. Peach, in Cornwall, in 1850.

Here, at the base of the Old Red Sandstone, are discovered the remains of a giant fish of most remarkable structure; the *asterolepis* was covered with true osseous scales, and well supplied with free and protected gills; the osseous plate or cranial buckler measures in some specimens eighteen inches or more in length, and the defensive spines seven inches long, representing fishes of not less than nine to twelve feet in length, with all the marks of their high order. "Thus," says Hugh Miller, "in the not unimportant circumstance of size, the most ancient ganoids yet known, instead of taking their places, agreeably to the demands of the development hypothesis, among the sprats, sticklebacks, and minnows of their class, took their place among its huge basking sharks, gigantic sturgeons, and bulky sword-fishes. They were giants, not dwarfs."

. . . . In cranial bucklers, in which the average thickness of

the plates does not exceed three *eighth* parts of an inch, their thickness in the centre of the ridges must have been three-quarters. The head of the largest crocodile of the existing period is defended by an armature greatly less strong than that worn by the *asterolopis* of the lower Old Red Sandstone. Why this ancient ganoid should have been so ponderously helmed, we can but doubtfully guess; we only know, that when nature arms her soldiery, there are assailants to be resisted, and a state of war to be maintained."

A reviewer, speaking of this *asterolopis*, says, "This fish," to speak in the technical language of Agassiz, "undoubtedly belongs to the cestraciant family of the placoid order, proving to demonstration that the oldest known fossil-fish belongs to the highest type of that division of the vertebrata."

It is, however, upon the brainular development of animals that we must depend for their true position in the scale of being, not on their osseous system only; for if mere bone were to mark the highest position in the scale of being, then would man dwindle into mere dwarfishness beside the giants and monsters of the Tertiary period. Judging from the brainular standard of animal life, "which is undoubtedly the true one, the placoids and ganoids of the Lower Silurian and Cambrian, and the Old Red Sandstone systems, take their places high up in the scale of Ichthyic existence,—not at the foot of the list of fishes, but at the head; real giants, constituting the highest and best specimens in their order." "The *asterolopis* is not the only large and well-developed fish whose history has been written on the rock-book of that era. There are many. To use the language of H. Miller, this series 'could supply with ichthyolites, by the ton and ship-load, the museums of the world.' A few only of the many witnesses have been interrogated; but these, we think, fully contradict the idea of development." Besides evidences of air-breathing animals, monster reptiles having lived in this ancient period have been discovered by Mr. J. Lea, in America, and are authenticated by Sir C. Lyell.

We could, in like manner, adduce from each geologic age facts equally potent to contradict the theory; but space is wanting for so detailed an examination and refutation. Suffice it, then, for our present purpose, to remind the reader that the theory assumes the commencement of life to be of the humblest forms and lowest types. Known and well-attested facts show this to be an assumption without proof; that the theory is contrary to fact, so far as the fossil history of the earth is concerned. The theory is not more supported by fact in the historic era of the earth. No man has ever recorded a single fact in support of the theory; many assumptions are made; hypotheses with their *ifs* are plentiful; but facts are things of such a stubborn nature, that they are utterly regardless of the service required from them by the theorists, and refuse to yield any evidence in their favour. A pigeon is a pigeon, whether it may be called fantail, pouter, tumbler, carrier, or common rock. A horse is and always has been a horse, whether it has lived amid

the splendours of Egyptian and Assyrian greatness, carried warriors to the siege of Troy, or now draws a brewer's dray along the crowded streets of our metropolis. The gazelle may have acquired timidity, agility, velocity, by the circumstances in which nature has placed it, but it is still the gazelle. The fox or the wolf show no traces of transition or transmutation into the form, character, habits, or constitution of a dog. Neither have we any transitional form, to show that the chasm hitherto dividing the human family from the lower orders of animal life is possible to be passed by anything short of an independent act of creation—the will of the Almighty God; although, to the disgrace of humanity, many instances are found in which man degrades himself below the brute creation, by doing that which the instinct of inferior beings forbids them to do. These remarks necessarily lead us to that phase of the question assumed in the “Origin of Species by Natural Selection.” All that is true in this system is not new, and all that is new is not true.

That the strongest of all organic life is most likely, nay, will become victor in the struggle for continued existence, is so trite an observation, that we feel surprised any amount of scientific celebrity is necessary to give it currency. That, under favourable circumstances, organisms will become improved, stronger, better, more perfect, needs not a second Daniel to inform us, nor is a Solon necessary to prove that many forms of animated being are apparently designed for the sustenance of others of their fellow-mortals. But that an apple may become a pear, a cherry improve to a peach, the acorn give birth to a cedar of Lebanon, or the rose tree have for its genealogic successor the banian tree of India, would induce us to look for more than a second Daniel, or even a Solon. Yet all this must be believed, if we adopt the whole theory, time and circumstances alone being requisite to conduce to this end.

The only instance in which Mr. Darwin has attempted to show anything like transition is mentioned at page 191 of his work on the “Origin of Species,” where the pedunculated cirripedes are said to graduate into the balanidæ, or sessile cirripedes, and *vice versa*: but, we submit that not one word is found to demonstrate those relations of the folded membranes in the balanidæ with the heart or muscular system, which could alone prove the respiratory function of such membranes.

Therefore, whether we take the facts of past time or present, or look to the works of the most celebrated authors, we are necessarily led to conclude that facts are against the theory, and the instances adduced in support of the theory are assumptions without proof.

But we have said that the theory is contrary to reason. Reason, looking at the whole field of organic life, and gathering up the observations of many ages, infers this general law—that all existences have an ordained course of being; that this course of being is the same for each individual of his stirps, or line of being; and, although great difference may exist between the several stirpes, no

essential difference exists among the individual of any one stirps. Such being then the ordinary course of nature, it must necessarily be irrational to assume, without positive and most irrefragible proof, that one species may become another, either from outward circumstances, however potent in their character, or from inward influences of the most impulsive nature. To suppose the change to arise from inward impulse, is to suppose a cause contrary and superior to the ordained course of its being—a supposition of glaring absurdity; and to suppose the change to be effected by outward circumstances, is to give to secondary causes of an unintelligent and inanimate nature a power to override and render nugatory the great First Cause of being, the intelligent Creator of the universe, which is a species of reckless daring amounting to blasphemous impiety. Nor can objection be taken to this view of the reason of the thing, from the apparent similarity of all organic existence at the beginning, or during the period of embryonic existence. The germinal cell may appear to us similar in all cases, but its appearing so to us, with our limited powers of knowing whether it is so, is no proof that it does not possess distinctive peculiarities sufficient to act as natural and efficient causes to produce those results which the ordained course of its being requires, in each particular individual, according to its genealogic relations.

In like manner, the embryonic condition of organic life may present certain analogous appearances, with the same mysterious deviations at certain ordained times; but these deviations occur according to the ordained course of that stirps to which the individual embryo belongs. We submit that the order and regularity of the change proves the existence of an efficient cause, in accordance with the laws of the Great Creator, implanted in the germinal cell, and continued throughout its embryonic state, until maturity is secured. To suppose otherwise, were to resist reason, facts, nature, and nature's God.

That the principles of the theory are assumptions without proof, is evident to the most casual student; for a theory is started, and facts are distorted; hypothesis is taken as the groundwork, while the ignorance and weakness of the human intellect are made the superstructure upon which the whole theory is elaborated. It has been well observed, that one fact would have done good service in support of the theory; but the absence of all well-authenticated facts, the opposition of all known facts and experiences, combined with the irrationality of the theory, stamp it as a futile, fallacious folly—a monument erected to commemorate the vagaries to which scientific men have committed themselves in the nineteenth century.

In conclusion, we submit, since science demands it, that this theory, in common with all other theories which are contrary to observation and the historic experiences of this world's life, should produce demonstrable proof of each and every step in the theory, from its foundation maxim upwards, to the most minute

detail. Until this is done—and we contend, the *onus probandi* lies with the theorists—our conviction of the permanence of species must remain, and be utterly opposed to the idea of development as hitherto propounded.

L'OUVEIR.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It appears to us that this question is unfairly put, as it assumes that counsel usually know whether the criminals whom they are defending be guilty or not. This, we believe, is seldom or never the case; but granting, for the sake of the present discussion, that it is, we yet affirm that even then an advocate is justified in defending the criminal with whose guilt he has been professionally made acquainted; and we hope we shall be able to adduce sufficient reasons to justify our position. Far be it, however, from us to wish for the painful spectacle of eminent advocates calling on the Deity to attest the innocence of known guilty clients, or, with tears in their eyes, declaring that they believe them to be injured persons; but even in such cases, the excitement of the moment, the pale faces of the criminals, the shadow of the gibbet, and the impending sentence of the law, furnish many excuses for this error in advocacy.

In order to set the question more clearly before our minds, let us suppose, for the moment, that it stands thus:—"Is counsel justified in defending from *legal* punishment a criminal of whose *moral* guilt he has been professionally made cognizant?" Should we give a negative or an affirmative to this proposition? Undoubtedly an affirmative.

Let us correctly ascertain, then, in the first place, what is the precise position of the prisoner as he stands before the dread tribunal of the law.

He is arraigned by the law, to answer to the law, whether he has offended that law or not. He has been domiciled in the place where the law before which he is arraigned has been in operation, and he has, therefore, the right to any and every protection which he can derive from that law, in his hour of need; and he has as good a title to that protection as the purest in the land, even though his guilt were as deep-dyed as that of the notorious Palmer.

Twelve of his fellow-men have been summoned to decide whether he has offended against the law or not,—each being under the

protection of the same law. The prisoner has then read over to him an indictment,—a legal instrument,—detailing those parts of the law against which he is supposed to have offended. He is then required to say whether he be guilty or not, which simply means, “Do you wish to be tried, or do you not?” and he makes his reply according to his own pleasure; but whichever way he may choose to plead, he must be *found* guilty by the jury, for the judge cannot sentence the man, although self-convicted, till he is likewise convicted *by the law*; and, according to law, he is not guilty till he is found and proved to be so; and, in many cases, it happens that, although he may be guilty of *an* act against the law, yet he may not be guilty of *the* act imputed to him.

Mr. Baron Martin, some short time ago, was the judge before whom a young man was indicted for wilful murder. When called upon to declare himself “guilty or not guilty,” he chose the former; but the learned judge did not like to take this confession, and pressed upon him the importance of pleading “Not guilty,” at the same time explaining to him that he would in no way compromise his conscience by so doing, as he thereby merely expressed his wish to have the matter proved, one way or the other. He even humanely offered to grant him a day for consideration; but, although the young man persisted in his course, it was with the sincere tears of genuine feeling in his eyes that he pronounced upon him the fearful sentence of the law: and all honour, we say, to that judge, for his humanity, in not wishing to doom his fellow-man to destruction, if it could be avoided.

It is the duty of the administrators of the law also to study justice; and it is, or ought to be, the spirit and intention of the laws of a Christian country not so much to punish as to reform; not to send the man out of the world unprepared, nor to turn him into the world with the brand of the felon on his brow, but to make him, if possible, a fit and useful member of society, remembering the Divine injunction, “He that is without guilt, let him cast the first stone!”

In the next place, let us ascertain what is the duty of the English advocate. It is his sacred duty to throw the shield of protection over the weak, to defend the defenceless, to give counsel to those who need it, to help his fellow out of the “Slough of Despond,” and finally, as Lord Brougham declares, to know no one but his client, to believe none other, and to do his best for that client, utterly regardless of any consequences that may accrue; this then is the duty of the advocate, and we believe every man to be justified in doing his duty, whatever that may be.

Surely, then, if the prisoner *should* have acknowledged to his counsel that he is guilty, as he stands arraigned at the bar, to answer for his life, or liberty, with, perhaps, a few circumstances in his favour, he is a proper subject for the English advocate to extend the strong hand of protection to. Take, for instance, the extreme case of murder, and grant that the advocate is aware of the criminality

of the accused, yet there may be circumstances in extenuation of the crime—circumstances of provocation, or extreme wretchedness, or blindness through drink, or other matters—which can only be drawn out of the witnesses by a counsel used to dealing with them, although they have been sworn to give the “whole truth;” and who can so well as a disinterested person show the effect these circumstances may have had upon the mind of the criminal, whereby he may have been insanely urged to the committal of the deed of blood?

Surely, in this age of civilization, it will not be argued that it is unjustifiable for an advocate to endeavour to produce all the favourable evidence and extenuating circumstances he can, to mitigate the blackness of the offence. To this may be traced the fact of many lives being saved through recommendations to mercy, brought about by favourable evidence thus adduced, and which would, otherwise, never have come to light. Far distant be the day when the justice of the interference of counsel to protect even the guilty shall be universally denied! We think this is one of the foundation-stones on which the gorgeous superstructure of free English jurisprudence has been raised, and we hope we may never live to see the time when it will be thrown from its place and trampled upon.

Again: it is a well-known fact that there are so many different shades of offence, that it might happen, but for this interference of counsel, that the prisoner, although guilty of an offence, might receive punishment for some offence never committed. Thus it so frequently occurs that prisoners accused of murder are often only guilty of, and receive punishment for, manslaughter; and the same holds good for all offences.

Let us refer to the famous state trial of Simon Bernard, for aiding in the attempt against the life of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. There can, we think, be very little doubt that he was really guilty of that crime (if crime it was), but, according to the ancient usages and laws of England, he was not legally guilty, and the jury refused to convict him. Will it be said that his counsel acted wrongly in defending him from punishment? Surely not.

But it is better that ten guilty men be liberated, than that an innocent one suffer; and it is rarely or never the case that the guilty man obtains an acquittal, whatever may be the ingenuity of his counsel. Although he may not be convicted of the capital offence for which he is indicted, yet it usually happens that he is sentenced on the lesser charge.

The well-known case of Astlett exemplifies this principle. Through the ingenuity of Lord (then Mr.) Erskine, he was acquitted from the charge of forging Exchequer bills, and, without entering into the details, we may say that this was a verdict strictly in accordance with every principle of truth. But what then? He was sentenced and imprisoned on a charge of stealing pieces of paper, of which he was guilty. No prisoner should be sentenced for forging, if he be not guilty of it; and if it can only be detected by an advocate, we

think that advocate is fully justified, although he may be aware that he *is* guilty of some crime.

In conclusion,—whenever a prisoner stands before us, we should remember that we see a man, a brother in trouble, it may be, with a heart seared and a conscience blackened by the committal of crime; but he is weak and helpless, and perhaps repentant, therefore we hold it to be the duty of every one of us, as far as we can, to shield him from destruction, and to endeavour to find some good in him still, to save him from punishment, if we can, and turn him, if possible, into a right path; to succour and assist him, knowing not to what temptations and severe trials he may have been subjected, nor through what fiery furnace of affliction he may have had to walk to the criminal's position.

H. K.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SIMILAR or the same arguments should be used to prove the above question in the affirmative as would be employed to prove all punishment wrong: since the success of a counsel who defends guilty men tends to prevent all punishment. If it be wrong to punish, it cannot be wrong to assist a criminal to escape punishment; but if it be right—nay, even necessary—to take vengeance on guilt; then it seems to us the question is answered, and there remains little need for discussion. Yet, as it is probable the busy, acute brains of some intelligent contributors may discover reasons why an advocate should defend a guilty man, we shall endeavour briefly and conclusively to show it to be both unjustifiable and immoral.

With respect to the criminal, it may perhaps be said that he was driven to his deed by drunkenness or by hunger; that he is weak and unfortunate; and that his case will be made worse than it is by the counsel for the prosecution. Certainly he is to be pitied, but bad as his condition is, he is plainly answerable for it. If he was drunk when he acted wrongly, it was himself who put the "serpent into his mouth that stole away his senses." If hunger urged him on—and that is the very best excuse we can imagine a prisoner alleging—he still had no right to take what was not his own. If the prosecuting counsel makes the case appear worse than the truth, it is then the proper work of the prisoner's advocate to show where the exaggeration is. Still he is a criminal, and must be treated as such. As he is a man, we mourn over him; as he is fallen, we pity him; but as he is guilty, we punish him.

Of the advocate it may be said, that his knowledge of the prisoner's guilt was obtained professionally; and an attempt may be made to endow him with a sort of dual existence, to separate the man from the counsel, and to allow in the special pleader what is not allowable in the man. To a person who is guided by the moral principles which no one likes openly to scoff at, it will not seem excuse sufficient to say, that because he would not have known except professionally, he was therefore justified in lying professionally. And what must we think of a profession that assumes the right of pre-

venting the execution of the laws, and boldly laughs at justice and truth?

Let us put a case clearly before you. Bill Sykes is in trouble. He was in want of money, and his soul abhors honest labour. So he watches old farmer Thompson coming home from market, rather the worse for liquor, and with a tempting sum in his pocket. Bill Sykes easily dispatches him, and bears away the spoil. He has the marks of blood upon his clothes as well as upon his soul. By some train of circumstances he is suspected, arrested, and put in prison, with every prospect of a short shrift. Consequently, he is in trouble, and the question is, how can he get out of it? He engages Mr. Sergeant Twister, famous for getting the guilty clear. He will defend him, but he must be told everything, to be prepared for all possible evidence. When the judge and jury are met to settle the affair, Mr. Sergeant Twister cross-examines and browbeats, pleads and supplicates, and finally succeeds, by indignant protests and weeping appeals, in deceiving the soft-hearted jurymen into a verdict of "Not Guilty." And so they turn upon society a wretch whose appetite for blood is simply whetted, and whose dread of punishment is changed into a feeling of impunity. The question for you, impartial reader, is whether Mr. Sergeant Twister is justified in his lying, or whether he is not a sharer in the guilt of the murderer? Now we don't wonder that Bill Sykes engages a counsel. We should marvel if he did not. He is in a fair way of ending his days in a very unpleasant manner. He loves life, miserable as he is. But how is it that Mr. Sergeant Twister, a learned and a respectable gentleman, can lend his assistance to Bill Sykes? He might just as well supply him with files and ropes, and make the turnkey drunk.

The prisoner "is allowed to have a counsel, to assist him not only in the discussion of any point of law which may be complicated with the fact, but also in the investigation of the fact itself; and who points out to him the questions he ought to ask; or even asks them for him. This is only done through custom and the indulgence of the judges."* This is a wise and merciful privilege, for it may often happen that a prisoner, although innocent, may still find it impossible to disprove the evidence against him. To be allowed the assistance of one practised in law, and accustomed to carefully sift the testimony of witnesses, is truly a blessing to the man whose character or liberty, or whose life even, is at stake. To strive for the acquittal of some unfortunate individual, who is unjustly charged with crime, is a noble enterprise. We can imagine none nobler than to vindicate the cause of the weak, and to rescue the guiltless from the penalties designed for the guilty alone. How different must our estimate be of the efforts of a man whose application and talents are all devoted to making "the worse appear the better reason."

It is true we cannot repress a feeling of commiseration for the poor wretch whose fate depends on the jurymen. But have we the

* De Lolme.

divine faculty of being both merciful and just? If we indulge our good nature, and through kindness refrain from punishing crime, where is the sacrifice we shall offer instead? "A king is a mortal god on earth." It is his duty to vindicate the laws; for they are only a terror to evil-doers, and those countries are always most unhappy where the laws are not respected. If guilt is not visited with its due punishment, the first and chief bonds of society are broken, and licence and anarchy ensue. If, then, it is right to punish, it must be wrong to prevent punishment. Nor does it avail to say that the counsel stands in place of the prisoner, and merely acts for him; can that absolve an individual from his duty to society, to truth, and to God? Has any man a right to cause truth to be disbelieved, to render vain the expensive efforts of society to preserve national morality, and to commit a crime against the public good, just because he is—paid for it?

We can imagine some one saying, "Are you not going too far? Are you not hyper-virtuous? This is a thing that is done every day. It is understood that a counsel does all he can to get his client off. You are straining when you talk of public morals and bonds of society, of crimes against God and man." Yes, sir, it is a common thing, and so is sin, but it is not the more right on that account. Suppose Sergeant Twister to be always successful. Every criminal is acquitted, and cannot again be tried for the same offence; how soon would security of life and property give place to lawless times, in which honest people would be driven to the unseemly expedient of Lynch law. So that when we talk of sinning against society, we are not wronging the venal advocate. As a citizen, he cannot be justified, because he arrays himself on the side of the enemies of law and order. And, personally, he is as culpable as any other man who wilfully "maketh and loveth a lie." We cannot imagine a single veritable reason that acquits an advocate of blame who acts in a manner, which, in any other situation of life, would be accounted false and dishonourable. Not that it is wrong to advocate the cause of a guilty person. There is good scope for the abilities of an ordinary man in preventing the crime of the accused being magnified, in laying before the jury the extenuating circumstances of the case, and in softening the harsh charges of opposing counsel. We contend that, beyond this, a person who believes in a difference between Truth and Falsehood cannot conscientiously go. To the man who acts thus—honour and praise; but to him who sells truth for pelf—contempt and ignominy.

"If," to quote "Nona's" words, "a guilty person be condemned when the evidence is either incomplete or conflicting," the sin would clearly lie at the door of the prosecuting counsel, of the jury, and of the judge. We don't deny the justice of allowing a guilty man an advocate. Let him have one, and let him see that the "law be not strained ever so slightly." And the law has made so many reservations in favour of an accused person, holding him innocent till proved guilty, and giving him the advantage of every doubt,

that he will be assisted by the law itself. It is a privilege we boast of, but surely there is nothing in it that excuses a man in defending a criminal from punishment. We agree with "Nona" that it is better that ten guilty escape, than that one innocent suffer. But "Nona's" reason is, that "what is socially right cannot be morally wrong." Where is the proof that socially it is better for ten guilty to escape than for one innocent to suffer? "If," says Paley, "by better be meant that it is more for the public advantage, the proposition, I think, cannot be maintained. The security of civil life is protected chiefly by the dread of punishment. The misfortune of an individual (for such may the suffering, or even the death of an innocent person be called when they are occasioned by no evil intention) cannot be placed in competition with this object." If, then, it is not socially right, what becomes of "Nona's" argument? And what becomes of his cause, which he is willing to risk upon it being for the public good?

There is something amusing in "Nona's" endeavours to show that counsellors are philanthropic gentlemen, who devote their time, firstly, to the study of the law; and, secondly, to the rescue of unfortunate rogues and murderers, whose trade is interfered with by meddling justice. Good, kind testimonial; deserving creatures, what slanders an envious world raises about golden fees!

But let the truth be spoken, even if it be to the disadvantage of these worthies. Let us see what "Nona" says about them:—"The defence of his client does not imply his belief in that client's innocence, any more than the appearance of the counsel for the prosecution indicates his belief in the prisoner's guilt." Well may they exclaim, "Save us from our friends!" And well may we inquire how it has come to pass that no one supposes an advocate to have a conscience. And if the question be asked, will not the answer be found in the bold and confident manner in which they have defended some of the greatest scoundrels that ever cursed the earth?

R. T. G.

The Essayist.

SHAKESPERE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

IV.—FAME—FORTUNE—LEISURE—DEATH.

"Oh! his desert speaks loud; and I should wrong it
To lock it in the ward of covert bosom,
When it deserves, in characters of brass,
A fortified residence 'gainst the tooth of time,
And rasure of oblivion."—*Measure for Measure*.

1598. The most direct, trustworthy, and unimpeachable evidence of Shakespeare's position in the literary world appears in "A

Comparative Discourse of our English Poets with the Greek, Latin, and Italian Poets," contained in eight pages of a thick little 12mo., entitled "*Palladis Tamia; Wit's Treasury; being the Second Part of Wit's Commonwealth: by Francis Meres, Maister of Artes of both Universities.* London: Printed by P. Short, for Cuthbert Burbie, 1598." Meres was born in Lincolnshire; was a clergyman, schoolmaster, and compiler of school-books; and Heywood calls him "an approved good scholar." In this work—which contains an enumeration and classification of the most celebrated poets up to and at the time when it was written, not only in the judgment of the author, but by general repute—Shakespere is ranked among the most esteemed contemporary poets in different branches of art; as alone and unrivalled in tragedy and comedy; and is specially marked out as an improver of the English tongue. No fewer than nine times does the name of Shakespere flow to the pen-point of the writer, as worthy of mention and praise. No other poet is noted so frequently. Spenser and Drayton stand next; but at a considerable distance. Though no play had as yet been published with Shakespere's name, Meres speaks of them as matters of public notoriety, and indicates by special mention several, as instances in proof of his assertions regarding his merit. Lest, however, our account be held to be too favourable, we shall show, in the author's own words, the opinion of Shakespere entertained and published in 1598. We quote as briefly as possible, but *verbatim*, the allusions Meres makes to the great dramatist, viz.:—

"*The English tongue* is mightily enriched and gorgeously invested in rare ornaments and resplendent (h)abilliments by Sir Philip Sidney, Spenser, Daniel, Drayton, Warner, *Shakespeare*, Marlow, and Chapman."

"As the soul of Euphorbus was thought to live in Pythagoras, so the sweete, wittie soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous and honey-tongued *Shakespeare*. Witness his 'Venus and Adonis,' his 'Lucrece,' his *sugred sonnets* among his private friends," &c.

"*Shakespeare*, among the English, is the most excellent in both kinds (i. e., tragedy and comedy) for the stage. For comedy, witness 'Ge[n]tleme[n] of Verona;' his '[Comedy of] Errors;' his 'Loves Labours Lost;' his 'Loves Labours Wonne;' his 'Midsummer's Night Dream;' and his 'Merchant of Venice.' For tragedy, his 'Richard the II.,' 'Richard the III.,' 'Henry the IV.,' 'King John,' 'Titus Andronicus;' and his 'Romeo and Juliet.'"

"The Muses would speak with *Shakespeare's* fine-filed phrase, if they would speak English."

"As Ovid saith of his work,—

"*Opus cægi, quod nec Jovis ira, nec ignis
Nec poterit ferrum, nec edax abolere vetustas.*"

And as Horace saith of his, 'Exegi monumentu[m] aere perennius; et fuga temporum;' so I say severally of Sir Philip Sidney's, Spenser's, Daniel's, Drayton's, *Shakespeare's*, and Warner's workes,

"Non Jovis ira, imbres, Mars, ferrum, flamma senectus,
Hoc opus unda, lues turbo, venena ruent."

"As Pindarus, Anacreon, and Call[imachus] among the Greekes, and Horace and Catullus among the Latines, are the Lyrick poets, so in this faculty the best amo[n]g our poets are Spenser, who excelleth in all kinds, Daniel, Drayton, *Shakespeare*, Breton."

Again, after naming the chief "tragicke poets" of Greece, and "among the Latines," and some of the earlier English dramatists, he enumerates "Marlow, Peele, Watson, Kyd, *Shakespeare*, Drayton, Decker, and Beniamin Jonson;" and having done the same for "the best poets for comedy," he mentions "Lillie, Lodge, Gascoyne, Greene, *Shakespeare*, Thomas Nash, Thomas Heywood, Anthony Munday, our best plotter, Chapman, Porter, Wilson, *Hathway*, and Henry Chettle: again, having spoken of those famous "for elegies," he says, "These are the most passionate among us to bewaile and bemoane the perplexities of love, Henrie Howard, Earl of Surrey, Sir Thomas Wyat the elder, Sir Francis Brian, Sir Philip Sidney, Sir Walter Rawley, Sir Edward Dyer, Spenser, Daniel Drayton, *Shakespeare*, Whetstone, Gascoyne, Samuel Page, sometime fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, Churchyard, Bretton."

Some discussion has arisen as to the period at which the landlord of New Place began to write for the stage. In leisure and affluence he is reported, by tradition, to have produced two plays a year. That seems to have been about the average of Ben Jonson and of Philip Massinger; nor do Beaumont and Fletcher seem to have done more than four, on an average, between them. Unless, therefore, we assume an extraordinary speed and productivity in *Shakespeare*, and that, too, while he had the duties of an actor and theatrical proprietor, as well as *probably* some other business in relation to his sales and purchases, we ought to have a good means of inferring, with some approximation to truth, the age at which the dramatist began his career. Meres' book was probably written some time before it was published—but let that pass—and he mentions, besides "Venus and Adonis," "Lucrece," and "Sonnets," no fewer than twelve plays, exclusive of "Pericles," if it was *Shakespeare's*, and of the three parts of "Henry VI." We have, then, in 1598, sixteen plays, two lengthy poems, besides (some) sonnets attributed to *Shakespeare* at the age of thirty-four. If we average the production of plays to two each year (intercalating two years for the production of his other poems), we find a probable commencement about 1588; though it is likely to have reached even farther back, for we can scarcely believe Greene's jealousy of a four years' old playwright to have been so speedily aroused, so soon intensified, or its occasion to have flashed so suddenly into fame. Knight begins his chronology of *Shakespeare's* plays in 1585; Malone in 1589; and *between* those periods the truth seems to lie.

The publisher of Meres' "*Palladis Tamia*," when the anonymity had been dispelled, issued "*Love's Labour Lost*"—"as it was presented before Her Highness this last Christmas"—newly corrected and augmented by "*William Shakespeare*" in 1598; and Andrew Wise re-issued "*Richard II.*" and "*Richard III.*" with *named* title-pages immediately thereafter, though he had but a short time previously published "*The Historie of Henrie the Fourth*," with the humorous conceits of Sir John Falstaffe," in "*Paule's Churchyard*, at the sign of the Angell," without mentioning the author.

Richard Field laid the third edition of "Lucrece" before the public in the same year.

So much for the literary activity and recognition of this year; and now for the signs of personal life. On 24th January, 1597-8, Abraham Sturley wrote from Stratford a letter to his brother-in-law, Mr. Richard Quiney (father of Thomas Quiney, who subsequently married Shakspeare's youngest daughter), then in London soliciting Lord Treasurer Burleigh, on behalf of the town of Stratford, for exemption from subsidies and taxes, as well as for a grant of a portion of £36,000 for the relief of decayed cities and towns, in consideration of two furious fires that had raged in Stratford—in which New Place had narrowly escaped—in the years 1594 and 1595. In this letter the following sentences occur: "It seemeth that our countryman, Mr. Shakespere, is willing to disburse some monei upon *some od garde land or other at Shottre*, or near about us. He thinketh it a very fit patterne to move *him* to deal in the matter of our *tithes*. Bi the instructions u can geve him thearof and *bi the frindes he can* make thearfore, we think it a fair mark for him to shoot at, and not impossible to hitt. It obtained, would advance him indeede, and would do us much goode."

On 4th February, 1598, in an inventory of corn and malt in "Stratforde Borroughe Warwick," taken in apprehension of a scarcity, William Shakespere is entered as possessing ten quarters, being the third largest holder in his ward, the other two having, respectively, seventeen and a half, and eleven quarters. In the town accounts of Stratford for this year, Halliwell says this entry occurs, viz.:—"Pd. to Mr. Shaxpere for on lod of stone, Xd." Richard Quiney wrote on 25th October, 1598, to his "loving good friend and countreyman, Mr. William Shackespere," from the Bell, in Carter Lane, London, asking the loan of £30; and he wrote to Mr. Sturley on the same date to the import that "our countryman, Mr. Wm. Shak., would procure us money." It may, therefore, be presumed that Shakespere was able to, and actually did, lend the money desired.

In "Poems in Divers Humours," by Richard Barnefield, published in 1598, we read,—

"And *Shakespeare*, thou whose honey-flowing veine
(Pleasing the world) thy praises doth obtaine,
Whose 'Venus' and whose 'Lucrece' (sweets and chaste)
Thy name in Fame's immortal book hath plac't,
Live ever you, at least, in Fame, live ever.
Well may the bodye dye; but Fame dies never."

In 1598, an amended copy of Ben Jonson's play, "Every Man in His Humour," was performed at Blackfriars Theatre (*it is said*) at Shakespere's interposition and suggestion; it had formerly been (1596) played at the Green Curtain. In this play Shakespere occupies the head place in a list of the "principal comedians" who represented the *dramatis personæ*. It is *supposed* that he acted the

character of Old Knowell. This is said to have been the occasion of a life-long friendship between—"gentle Willy" and "rare Ben."

In a subsidy roll of date 1st October, 1598, discovered by the Rev. J. Hunter, in the Carlton Bide Record Office, William Shakespeare is assessed in the parish of St. Helen's, Bishopsgate, at 25, and rated in the sum of 13s. 4d. The entry reads thus:—"A^{ffid}. William Shakespeare, v li.—xiijs. iijd."

"The Merchant of Venice" was entered at Stationers' Hall, 1598. 1599. The "Historie of Henrie the Fourth," which Andrew Wise issued in 1598, was re-issued in 1599, "newly corrected by William Shakespeare" being on the title-page. A second edition of "Romeo and Juliet" was published by John Dunter; and a small miscellany of poems—several *not* from Shakespeare's pen, entitled, "The Passionate Pilgrim." By W. Shakespeare: at London, Printed for W. Jaggard, and are to be sold by W. Leake, at the Greyhound, in Paule's Churchyard," were issued in 1599. This publication is good evidence of the worth of Shakespeare's name on a title-page. It would not have been put to this piratical work unless it had been regarded as a *taking* one.

Among Weever's "Epigrams," published in 1599, we find one—

"AD GULIELMUM SHAKESPEARE.

"Honie-tongued *Shakespeare*, when I saw thine issue
I swear Apollo got them, and no other;
'Their rosie-tinted features clothed in tissue,
Some heaven-born goddess said to be their mother.
Rose-cheekt *Adonis* with his amber tresses,
Faire fire-hot *Venus* charming him to love her;
Chaste *Lucretia*, Virgine-like her drosses,
Proud lust-stung *Tarquine* seeking still to prove her:
Romeo, *Richard*, more whose names I know not,
Their sugred tongues and power-attractive beauty
Say they are saints—although as saints they shew not,
For thousand vowes to them subjective dutie,
They burn in love, thy children, *Shakespeare*. Let them;
Go, woo thy muse! More nymphish brood, beget them."

1600. At this turning-point of time the contemporary recognitions of Shakespeare became unusually numerous.

In this year fourth editions of "Venus and Adonis" and "Lucrece" were issued by John Harrison.

"Titus Andronicus" (if Shakespeare's) was republished, but without his name, by "J. B. for Edward White," at "the sign of the Gun." Two editions (apparently rival ones) of "A Midsummer Night's Dream" (named), one "printed by Thomas Fisher," and another "printed by James Roberts," belong to this year; as do also two editions of "The Merchant of Venice," one "printed by J. B. for Thomas Heyes," and another printed by James Roberts.

On the 28rd August, 1600, "Much Adoe about Nothing," and "The Second Parte of the History of King Henry the IIIth," are

entered in the books of the Stationers' Company. They were printed by V. S., for Andrew Wise and William Apaley, and published by them, 1600. "The Chronicle History of Henry the Fifth" was "printed by Thomas Creede for Tho: Millington and John Busby," and was sold by the printer in Carter Lane in 1600.

Robert Allot, a literary bookseller in London, published a work called "England's Parnassus: or, the Choysest Flowers of our Modern Poets," &c. Allot "had picked these flowers of learning from their stem" himself. Extracts (arranged under distinct heads, like a modern Dictionary of Quotations) are given from forty-four different poets; and Shakespeare furnishes ninety excerpts (of which eighteen are upon Love).

In "Bel-vedere, or the Garden of the Muses," a somewhat similar work, several quotations are made from Shakespeare; and in "England's Helicon," three pieces, attributed to Shakespeare, are inserted.

1601. Attached to Robert Chester's "Love's Martyr; or Resalin's Complaint"—"the first essay of a new British poet"—there are a few poems "done by the best and chiefest of our modern writers, with their names subscribed to their particular works, *never before extant*." These are, among others, by Ben Jonson, Marston, Chapman, and Shakespeare, to whose pen one piece is ascribed.

The "Merry Wives of Windsor," written, it is *said*, by command of Queen Elizabeth, was entered in Stationers' Hall in 1601.

In a list of witnesses (?) in an action for trespass, the name of "Mr. John Sackespeare" appears in 1601; and again the same name appears in the burial register of Stratford—

"1601, Sept. 8. Mr. Johaⁿes Shakspeare,"—

and the dramatist was *fatherless*. Grief was in Henley Street and in New Place; and Shakespeare laid his father's grey hairs in the grave with a humbled heart as he, with self-reference, felt,—

"I, once gone, to all the world must die;
The earth can yield me but a common grave."

Thomas Whittington, shepherd to Richard Hathaway, died in 1608, having made a will in which he bequeathed "unto the poor of Stratford 40s. that is in the hand of Anne Shaxspere, wyfe unto Mr. Wylllyam Shaxpere, and is due debt unto me, being paid to mine executor by the sayd Wylllyam Shaxpere or his assignes."

1602. Can we fancy Queen Elizabeth coveting the incense of *one* poet in her reign that she did not receive unasked? There is a tradition that a play was composed by Shakespeare at the request of her Majesty; and those who read attentively the sonnets 82—85 will find a most ingenious excuse offered for an apparent negligence, such as might befit an incident like that which our fancy has shadowed. The play to which this tradition refers was printed in 1602 as it had been "acted before her Majesty and elsewhere." It is a well-known, and not an improbable story either, that while he

was playing once, so engrossed in his part as not to notice her Majesty, that she returned, and dropped her glove—a token of high favour; the poet stooped, picked it up, saying (in character)—

“And though now bent on this high embassy,
Yet stoop we to take up *our cousin's* glove,

then withdrew, and delivered it. This is *pretty* chiding; and the sonnets mentioned above *may have been* the poet's reply.

The fifth edition of “*Lucrece*” was published in 1602; as well as a second edition of “*Henry V.*”

At Harefield (Middlesex), the seat of Sir Thomas Egerton, the sum of £10 was paid to “*Burbidge's players*,” for performing “*Othello*” before Queen Elizabeth, 6th August, 1602.

1603. These lines from John Davies’ “*Microcosmos*,” p. 125, 1603, appear from a marginal note to refer to Shakespeare and Burbadge. The reference, too, is made more palpable and pertinent from an allusion to Sonnet cxi., beginning,—

“Oh, for my sake do you with *Fortune* chide,” &c.

“Players, I love ye, and your qualitie,
As ye are men that pass-time not abused,
And *some* I love for painting poesie. W. S. R. B.
And say fell *Fortune* cannot be excused
That hath for better uses you refused
Wit, courage, good-shape, good partes, and all good,
As long as al these goods are no worse used;
And though the stage dothe *stain* pure gentle blood,
Yet generous yee are in minde and mood.”

Ben Jonson’s “*Sejanus*” was produced on the stage in 1603. In a printed list of the personators of the characters in that drama, the name of Shakespeare holds a place; but if we read and reason rightly a passage in the author’s address to the readers, it may, we think, justly be *inferred* that in its earliest form for presentation it was indebted to the pen of Shakespeare; for in that advertisement there appears the following passage, viz.:—“I would inform you that this book, in all numbers, is not the same with that which was acted on the public stage; wherein a *second pen* had good share: in place of which I have rather chosen to put weaker, and, no doubt, less pleasing of mine own, than to *defraud so happy a genius of his right* by my loathed usurpation.” To what *other* dramatist than Shakespeare would Ben Jonson be likely thus publicly to knuckle down? What *other* would or could he have so praised? As our hypothesis regarding the meaning of this sentence accords with the tradition of Shakespeare’s kindly dealing with Jonson as formerly mentioned, and with the amiability always spoken of as characterizing the great dramatist, it may be that this *fancy* is neither impossible nor unlikely to be true.

We have already alluded to Shakespeare’s reticence in praising Queen Elizabeth, as well as to the tradition that she favoured him. Both are alluded to, in the following unmistakeable language, by

Henry Chettle, editor of Greene's "Groatsworth of Wit," in a poem entitled "*England's Mourning Garment.*"

"Nor doth the silver-tongued Melicert
Drop from his honied muse on sable teare
To mourne her death *that graced his desert,*
And to his lines opened her royall eare,
Sheapheard—remember our Elizabeth
And sing her rape done by that Tarquin—Death."

Elizabeth died 29th March, 1602-3. James I. and VI., her successor, reached London on the 7th May, 1603. He resided first in the Tower, and then removed to Greenwich. A warrant, under the privy seal, was issued from "our mannor of Greenewiche, the seventeenth day of May, 1603," by which "our servants, Laurence Fletcher, William Shakespeare, Richard Burbage, Augustine Philipps, John Hemmings, Henrie Condell, William Sly, Robert Armin, Richard Cowlye, and the rest of their associates," are licensed and authorized "to use and exercise the arte and faculty of playing comedies, tragedies, histories, enterludes, moralls, pastorals, stage-plaies, and such other like as thei have already studied, or hereafter shall use or studie, as well for the recreation of our loving subjects as for our solace and pleasure, . . . as well within theire now usuall howse called the Globe, within our county of Surrey, as alsoe within anie towne halls or mont halls, or other convenient places within the liberties and freedome of anie other citie, university, towne, or borough whatsoever within our said realms and dominions," &c. So that we see Ben Jonson uses no hyperbole when he speaks of—

"Those flights upon the banks of Thames,
That so did take *Eliza* and our *James.*"

1605. On 24th July, 1605, "Wm. Shakespere, of Stratford-uppon-Avon," bought from Ralph Hubande the unexpired term of a portion of a ninety-two years' lease, dating from 1544, of the tithes of Stratford, Old Stratford, Bishopton, and Welcombe, for the sum of £440 sterling. (The indenture for this purchase is printed at full length in Halliwell's "*Life of Shakespere,*" pp. 210—216.)

Augustine Philips, a fellow-actor and co-proprietor of the Globe Theatre, in his will, of date May, 1605, bequeaths to "William Shakespeare a thirty-shilling peece in gold."

In the "Accounts of the Revels" the following entries occur:—

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|-----------|
| "By his Ma ^{ties} plaiera. | Betwin Newers day and Twelwe day
a play of 'Loves Labours Lost.' [1605.] | |
| "By his Ma ^{ties} plaiera. | On the 7 of January was played
the play of 'Henry the Fift.' [1605.] | |
| "By his Ma ^{ties} plaiera. | On Shrove Sunday, a play of the
'Marchant of Venia.' [Mar. 24th, 1605.] | Shaxberd. |
| "By his Ma ^{ties} plaiera. | On Shrovetuesday, A play cauled
'The Marchant of Venia,' againe
commaunded by the Kings Ma ^{ties} ." [Mar. 26th, 1605.] | Shaxberd. |

About this time we may mention the *tradition* that "King James the First was pleased with his own hand to write an amicable letter to Mr. Shakespeare," which letter, on the testimony of "a creditable person now (1710) living," is said in Lintot's edition of "Shakespeare" to have remained long in the hands of Sir William Davenant. Oldys says that Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham, told Lintot he had seen that letter. It is now, however, and at all events, *lost*, if it ever existed.

1606. In a Survey of Rowington Manor of date 1st August, 4 James I., 1606, William Shakespeare is noted as holding the house in Walker Street, otherwise Dead Lane, near New-place, surrendered to him in 1602 by Walter Getley, and from the form not having been filled up, it has been *concluded* that at that time he was not in Stratford.

1607. The following lines, in "The Scourge of Folly," by John Davies (of Hereford), published in 1607, are addressed—

"TO OUR ENGLISH TERENCE, MR. WILL. SHAKE-SPEARE.

"Some say—good Will—which I in sport do sing,
Had'st thou not plaid some kingly parts in sport,
Thou had'st bin a companion for a king,
And bene a king among the meaner sort.
 Some others raile, but raile as they thinke fit;
 Thou hast no rayling, but a rainging wit:
 And *honesty* thou sow'st, which they do reape,
 So to increase their stocke, which they doe keepe."

Shakespeare's eldest daughter, Susanna, aged twenty-four, was married, June 5, 1607, to Dr. John Hall, medical practitioner in Stratford. On 31st December, 1607, Edmund, the youngest brother of William Shakespeare, was buried in the church of St. Saviour's, Southwark. He is entered on the register as "a player." On this occasion twenty shillings were paid for a "forenoon knell of the great bell," *probably* by his brother, who would, in all *likelihood*, be present at his interment.

A new edition (the *fifth*) of "Venus and Adonis," and another of the "Rape of Lucrece" (the *sixth*), appeared in 1607. This edition was published by John Wriettoun, in Edinburgh! "King Lear" was entered in Stationers' Hall on 26th November, 1607.

1608. During the year 1608, Nathaniel Butter printed *three* editions of "Mr. William Shakespeare; his True Chronicle History of the Life and Death of King Lear and his three Daughters. With, &c. . . . As it was plaid before the King's Majesty at Whitehall uppon St. Stephen's Night in Christmas Hollidaies. By his Majistie's servants playing usually at the Globe on the Banck-side."

Again the melancholy finger of Death comes near the heart of the poet; for the burial register of Stratford contains the following entry:—"1608, Septembr 9, Mayry Shaxpere, Wydowe," and filial piety and duty become to him memories only, not incitements to labour, effort, and aspiration.

On 16th October, 1608, Shakespere stood sponsor for his "god-son, William Walker," to whom in his will he leaves "20s. in gold." A *third* edition of "Richard II.," with *additions*; a *fourth* of "Richard III.;" and a *fourth* of "Henry V., Part I.," belong also to this year.

In 1608, "Hallam" (vol. ii. p. 175, note), says, "The Yorkshire Tragedy" was published, with Shakespere's name on its title-page as the author. This was probably a trade trick; but it shows that his name was a selling and a telling one in the market.

1609. Dryden, in a prologue to Davenant's "Circe," 1635, says,—

"Shakespeare's own muse his Pericles first bore."

Whatever may be the value of this tradition, we know that it was first printed with Shakespere's name on the title-page in 1609; and that it was published separately three times prior to the issue of the folio of 1623—in *which it does not appear*. It is noticed with a sort of sneer in the prologue of Robert Tailor's "Hog hath Lost its Pearl," 1612, thus:—

"And if it prove so happy as to please
We'll say—'Tis fortunate like *Pericles*."

The external testimony of its authorship by Shakespere is esteemed by critics much stronger than the internal evidence.

"The famous historie of 'Troilus and Cressid,' . . . written by William Shakespere. London, imprinted by G. Eld, . . . are to be sold at the Spread Eagle in Paule's Churchyard, 1609:" and a second edition appeared within that year.

"Shakespere's Sonnets. Never before *imprinted*. At London, by G. Eld, for T. T., and are to be Sold by John Wright, dwelling at Christ Church-gate, 1609," is the title of a small quarto which contains 154 sonnets, and "'A Lover's Complaint,' by Wm. Shakespere." In the Stationers' registers, the entry—"2nd May, 1609, The Thorpe. A booke called Shakespere's Sonnets"—occurs; and from this we learn the name of the T. T. who signs the following dedication—"To the only begetter of these iusuing Sonnets, Mr. W. H., all happiness and that eternity promised by our ever living poet, wisheth the well-wishing adventurer in setting forth. T. T."

[The begetter, *i. e.*, collector of these mystery-shrouded poems, we guess to have been William Hathaway, fourth son of Richard Hathaway, and brother-in-law to Shakespere.]

On 15th March, 1609, the Records of the court of Stratford show that Shakespere instituted a process for £6 of debt, and 24s. damages and costs, against John Addenbrooke. He could not be found, and the dramatist pursued his surety, Thomas Horneby, on 7th June thereafter. A proof not only that he had business in Stratford, but that he attended to it.

1611. Fourth and fifth editions of "Hamlet" were printed, with the author's name, "for John Smethwicke," in 1611; also a second edition (unnamed) of "Titus Andronicus." The "Accounts of the Revels at Court" contain the following:—

- "By the King's players. Hallomas nyght was presented att Whithall before the Kinges Ma^{ty}. a play called 'The Tempest.' [Nov. 1st, 1611.]
- "The King's players. The 5th of November: A play called 'The Winter Nightes Tayle.'" [1611.]

In a list of donations "collected towards the charge of prosecuting the bill in parliament for the better repaire of the high waies, and amendinge divers defects in the statutes alreedy made, Wednesdays the xjth of September, 1611," the name of "Mr. William Shakespere" is found, showing that he was able and ready to help forward public improvements.

In Trinity Term, 1611, a fine was levied upon the property [and twenty acres of pasture land more] which William Shakespere had bought from William and John Combe in May, 1602.

1612—13. The Burial Register of Stratford contains the following entry, viz.:—"1612. February 4. Rich: Shakespere."

By an indenture of conveyance, dated March 10, 1612—13, preserved in the City of London Corporation Library, Guildhall, in a glass case, we learn that at this time Shakespere bought a house (with ground attached) near Blackfriars Theatre, "abutting upon a street leading downe to Pudle Wharffe, on the east part, right against the Kinges Majesties Wardrobe." The purchase-money of this house was £140, but Shakespere only paid down £80, and mortgaged the property the next day for the balance, and leased the house to John Robinson for ten years.

In 1612 we have the following publication, viz.:—"The passionate Pilgrime. Or Certaine Amerous Sonnets, betweene Venus and Adonis, newly corrected and augmented. By W. Shakespere. The *Third* Edition. Whereunto is newly added two Love-Epistles, the first from Paris to Hellen, and Hellen's answer backe againe to Paris. Printed by W. Jaggard, 1612." This *cunningly* contrived title, in which the authorship of the latter part is merely implied, not stated, did not save the tradesman from exposure. In Thomas Heywood's "Apology for Actors," published in 1612, by Nicholas Okes, the following passage occurs in a letter to that bookseller, viz.:—"Here likewise I must necessarily insert a manifest injury done me in that worke, by taking the two Epistles of Paris to Helen and Helen to Paris, and printing them in the name of another, which may put the world in opinion I might steal them from him; and hee to do himselfe right hath since published them in his owne name: but as I must acknowledge my lines not worthy his patronage under whom he hath publiht them, so *the Author I know much offended with M. Jaggard that (altogether unknowne to him) presumed to make so bold with his name.*" That this [and *probably* other agencies] had some effect is presumed from Malone's having a copy of the book, of date 1612, with *two* titles, one with, the other without the author's name. N.B.—Though this purports to be the *third* edition, there is no known intermediate issue

between 1599 and 1612, and Jaggard's conduct being suspicious, it is *probable* there was none.

The draft of a bill in Chancery, endorsed "Lane, Greene, and Shakespere, Com[plainants]," intended to be presented to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, is in the possession of the Shakespere Society, and is referred to date 1613, from which it appears that on the moiety of tithes purchased by Shakespere in 1605 a larger proportion of the reserved rent than was right fell to be paid by him and his fellow complainers, because of the remissness of others, much to the injury of the persons raising the action. Besides this, we gather from the draft that Shakespere's annual income from these tithes was £120.

A letter from Thomas Lorkin, dated "London, this last day of June, 1613," says, "No longer since than yesterday, while Bourbege his companie were acting at the Globe the play of Hen[ry] VIII., and there shooting of certaine chambers in way of triumph, the fire catched and fastened upon the thatch of the house and there burned so furiously as it consumed the whole house, and all in lesse than two hours, the people having enough to doe to save themselves." In this fire, most probably, many of Shakespere's MSS. were burnt; if, indeed, he was then no otherwise interested in the property. In some MS. notes to Stow's "Annales" it is stated that the Globe was "newe built up againe in the year 1613 [1614?] at the great charge of King James, and many noble-men and others."

A *fifth* edition of "Henry IV.," part first, was issued (named) in 1613.

1613. Among the plays performed during the marriage festivities of Frederick V. and the Princess Elizabeth, before Prince Charles, the Lady Elizabeth, and the Prince Palatine Elector, in 1613, Shakespere's hold no mean prominence, as may be seen from this excerpt from the accounts of Lord Harington, treasurer of the chamber to James I.,—"Paid to John Heminges uppon the Councel's warrant, dated at Whitehall, xxth day of May, 1613, for presentinge before the Princes Highnes, the Lady Elizabeth, and the Prince Pallatyne Elector, fourteene severall playes, viz., one playe called 'Filaster;' one other, called 'The Knotte of Fooles;' one other, 'Much adoe aboute Nothings,' 'The Mayed's Tragedie,' 'The Merye Dyvell of Edmonton,' 'The Tempest,' 'A Kinge and no Kinge,' 'The Twin's Tragedie,' ['The Comedy of Errors?'] 'The Winter's Tale,' 'Sir John Falstaffe' [i.e., 'The Merry Wives of Windsor?'] 'The Moor of Venice,' 'The Nobleman,' 'Cæsar's Tragedye,' and one other, called 'Love lyes a-bleeding,' all which playes were played within the tyme of this accompte." Shakespere was, we see from this, equally popular with court and people, a proof not only of the universality of his genius, but also of the truthfulness and accuracy of his representative delineations of human life in all its phases, forms, and modes.

1614. In the summer of 1614, fifty-four houses were burnt

down in a great fire in Stratford, and in the same year the town was agitated by some projected enclosures of common lands. The corporation opposed the enclosure. In memoranda of property whose owners would have claims for compensation, of date 5th Sept., 1614, among the "auncient freeholders in the fields of Old Stratford and Welcombe," the name of "Mr. Shakspeare occurs." On 8th Oct., 1614, Shakspeare enters into legal covenant for his own safety, "and one Thomas Greene, gent.," with Wm. Replingham, of Great Harborrow, regarding compensation for injury done, "by reason of anis inclosure or decaye of tillage there ment and intended by the said Wm. Replingham." Thomas Greene, clerk to the Corporation, was sent on this business to London, and in notes of his stay, of date 17 Nov., 1614, he says, "My cosen Shakspear comyng yesterday to town, I went to see him how he did. . . . And [with reference to the enclosures?] he and Mr. Hall say they think ther will be nothing done at all." On 23rd Dec., 1614, there was held "a hall" of the corporation, and there were "lettres wrytten, one to Mr. Manyring, another to Mr. Shakspear, with almost all the companies' hands to either;" and Greene adds, "I also wrytte myself to my cosen Shakspeare the coppies of all our acts, and then also a note of the inconvenyences wold happen in the inclosure." Mark in all these the confidence reposed in Shakspeare, the importance attached to his aid, and the seemingly prideful claiming of relationship to him by the clerk.

The 92nd of a collection of epigrams, entitled, "Rubbe and a Great Cast," by Thomas Freeman, Gent. (whom Wood mentions along with George Chapman among the friends of Shakspeare), is addressed "To Master Wm. Shakspeare." "Perhaps the happiest encomium that Shakspeare had yet received as a dramatist," is in Mr. Dyce's opinion contained in a rare narrative poem, entitled, "The Ghost of Richard the Third," by C. B., whom Collier supposes to be Charles Best, published in 1614.

1615. A *fourth* edition of "Richard II.," with the author's name, was published in 1615.

1616. On 10th Feb., 1616, Judith, the poet's youngest daughter, then aged 31, was married to Thomas Quiney, vintner and wine merchant, Stratford.

On 25th March, Shakspeare executed his will, and prepared his worldly affairs against the sudden advent of the

"Last scene of all in life's eventful history,"—

his *death*,—which took place, as is generally believed, exactly on his fifty-third birthday, 23rd April, 1616,—for two days thereafter the Stratford burial register was supplied with the following addition to its contents, viz.,—

"1616, April 25. Will. Shakspeare, Gent."

Of the manner and cause of his death nothing is certainly known. A tradition, extant forty-five years after his demise, asserts, "Shake-

spear, Drayton, and Ben Jonson, had a merrie meeting, and itt seems drunk too hard, for Shakespear died of a feavour there contracted." It is hard to believe this. We should have preferred knowing that reflections such as these occupied the last earthly hours of *William Shakespere*!

" Poor soul! the centre of my sinful earth,
 Foiled by those rebel powers that thee array,
 Why dost thou pine within and suffer dearth,—
 Painting thy outward walls so costly gay?
 Why so large cost, having so short a lease,
 Dost thou upon thy fading mansion spend?
 Shall worms—inheritors of this excess—
 Eat up thy charge? Is this thy body's end?
 Then, soul! live thou upon thy servant's loss,
 And let that pine to aggravate thy store;
Buy terms divine by selling hours of dross;
Within be fed, without be rich no more;
So shalt thou feed on Death, that feeds on men:
And Death once dead, there's no more dying then!"

NOTES ON THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM COWPER.

THE American essayist remarks concerning history that "there is, properly, no history but biography." There is an ambiguity about this idea which can only be explained by the same writer's words, that the student of history should "live all history in his own person;" that he must individualize "all public facts," and generalize "all private facts;" "then, at once, history becomes fluid and true, and biography deep and sublime." Some there may be who do not go so far as this; but there are none, we presume, who will not grant that biography is the main element of history; that as a nation consists of individuals, so its history, for the most part, must necessarily contain the life, character, and actions of individuals who sustain the representative character. History is, therefore, more or less perfect, according as it gives the true character and principles of those who, by the public consent, stand forth as national representatives. Thus, as a general rule, individuality is the symbol of nationality in all true history. The old proverb is still true, especially in all free institutions, "As the people, so the rulers." History, like all other great topics, is viewed by many through limited and false media. To some, history is little more than a branch of education confined to one's youth, and the borders of the academy. To such, Goldsmith's or Hume's histories are sufficient, perfect, and infallible; to others, history is one of those great, deep, and sublime subjects, the study and investigation of which is to be, and actually becomes, a life work,—a source of constant mental fruition; for the study of history cul-

minutes in spiritual good. Such persons realize the great truth that "there is a relation between the hours of our life and the centuries of time :"—that each of us may see ourselves in the lives of those who have gone before ; and thus may we live "history in our own person."

History is the sum total of individual experience, in all ages, of all nations, civilized or uncivilized, Christian or pagan. If there is one class of men whose influence has been greatest in the formation of the character of the nations, in all ages, but whose individual history and life have been most obscure, and veiled from the public view, it is the poet's. We learn much of the characters of Homer or Anacreon from their respective works, but much more should we learn from their lives, if we had the account of them. It is to the life, or to a portion of the life, of one of our modern poets, that we wish now to direct the reader's attention ; and some will say, "What is there concerning Cowper which his biographers have not told us?" We reply,—much that will be found in his autobiography. Dr. Southey is the only biographer of this poet that plainly informs the reader of its existence, or quotes to any extent from it. This memoir is invaluable, as it shows plainly the actual life of the poet during the otherwise most obscure portion of his history, from his early youth up to his settlement in Mr. Unwin's house, November, 1765, a space of not less than thirty years. The perusal of this memoir will, no doubt, be a source of interest and satisfaction to the reader, inasmuch as it throws open that which is of the highest moment in the poet's life,—his spiritual experience,—as it briefly, plainly, and awfully sets before him this important phase of the poet's history, in all its terrible reality, and in the beautiful simplicity and exactness of his own language. The readers of the popular biographies of Cowper believe he was naturally of a timid, retiring, and melancholy disposition, but to what extent they know not, nor would it have been possible for any one to have known, if he had not left it recorded in his own words. It is our desire to publish the fact more extensively, that this portion of the poet's existence may be as generally known as his works, and that, ere long, Cowper's poems and autobiography may appear, for the first time, bound together. The obscurity of this valuable memoir probably arose from the circumstances under which it was written, and circulated amongst a few of his friends. We are indebted to the widow of one who knew Cowper personally, and who was favoured with the perusal of this memoir in manuscript, for this information. It was the poet's request that it should be read by three persons only during his life, and after his decease be circulated among those of his friends who wished to peruse it. The document was preserved during his life, and published some time after his decease. With it we have three short poems, one of them in Latin, which was published for the first time with his autobiography, and which we shall mention hereafter, as it is highly indicative of the poet's state of mind at the time

when it was written. Strictly speaking, this work is more an epitome of the author's spiritual experience, and the severe mental discipline through which he passed for years, than an autobiography, according to the popular idea.

We cannot do more than give a superficial survey of the autobiography. The poet, conscious of the real nature, greatness, and importance of the task to which he was about to apply himself, commences, not with his parentage or birth, but goes directly to the crisis of his spiritual history, and writes thus:—"I cannot recollect that, till the month of December, in the thirty-second year of my age, I had ever any serious impressions of a religious kind, or at all bethought myself of the things of my salvation, except in two or three instances." Thus was he nearly thirty-two years ere he recognised the great object of his existence,—ere he began to live and sing the psalm of life. What light does this circumstance throw on the deep and solemn spiritual import of that pathetic and inimitable poem, written some twenty years after, beginning thus:—

"O that those lips had language! Life has pass'd
With me but roughly since I heard thee last.

Me howling blasts drive devious, tempest-toss'd,
Sails ripp'd, seams opening wide, and compass lost,
And day by day some current's thwarting force
Sets me more distant from a prosperous course."

More than fifty years had the poet weathered the storm of life when he penned these words. He then refers to those instances which he would not have mentioned had he not intended this sketch, as he says, to be a history of his heart. This is the essence of biography, without which the life of a good and great man can have no practical influence on the mind of the reader. This sketch, then, is the history of his heart, traced through the storms vicissitudes, and sorrows of his inner life, up to the thirty-fourth year of his age. All this he gives in a few pages. Aptly has he termed that severe and awful spiritual discipline through which he passed, the "horror of darkness," in the midst of which he thus wrote:—

"Et, fluctuosum seu mare volvitur,
Dum commovebar mille timoribus,
Coactus, in fauces Averni,
Totus atro perii sub amni!"

These seasons of darkness and melancholy were temporary, and came upon him several times during his life, arising partly from mental despondency, and his constitutional tendency. There were, however, as his works plainly testify, periods of an opposite nature, in which his joy and peace flowed as a river, and his poetic genius shadowed these forth in such poems as "Light Shining out of Darkness;" "Joy and Peace in Believing;" "O Lord, I will Praise Thee."

The poet then refers to the cruel treatment which he suffered from one of the boys, who singled him out "as a proper object upon whom he might let loose the cruelty of his temper," when at school, and at an age when he was most susceptible of lasting impression. This seems not only to have increased his constitutional melancholy, but to have made it almost habitual, as it attended him more or less all his days.

Here we may venture a remark concerning those who have the care of youth. It is a lamentable fact that the majority of teachers never study the mental tendencies, or constitutional defects of their pupils; and that the school-boy experience of Cowper has been the lot of many youths, arising from the treatment which they met with at an early age. Another important fact he mentions, from which the guardians and teachers of youth may gather wisdom. His "seven years' apprenticeship to the classics," he tells us, "was carried on at the expense of knowledge much more important." How many well-educated persons could testify to the same? If there be one period of a youth's education, when the inculcation of religious truths and principles is more necessary than at another, it is during the study of the classics.

While at Westminster he passes through St. Margaret's churchyard late one evening; his curiosity is excited by a glimmering light in the midst of it; he approaches the spot, and beholds a grave-digger at work by the light of his lantern, who, on throwing up a skull, struck the contemplative youth on the leg. The dark night, the gloomy churchyard, the flickering light, the earnest sexton, the open grave, the rolling skull, the silent heaven, and slumbering dead, aroused him to thoughtfulness, awoke his spirit, and alarmed his conscience; therefore did he mention "this little incident" as "among the best religious documents which I received at Westminster." The impression wears off; he imbibes the notion that all men are mortal except himself. This, however, soon forsakes him; he desponds, and thinks himself consumptive; and believes he is mortal. He prepares for confirmation; he attempts to pray in secret; he finds it a heartless work, and a painful task, and is frightened at his own insensibility. The ceremony is no sooner over, than he relapses into a total forgetfulness of God. Another visitation comes in vain. He recovers, and becomes "an adept in the infernal art of lying," and "capable of deceiving the wisest." At the age of eighteen he leaves Westminster tolerably well furnished with grammatical knowledge, but as ignorant of all kinds of religion as the satchel at his back. After nine months at home, he goes "to acquire the practice of the law with an attorney." And at twenty-one we find him in "possession of a set of chambers in the Temple." Not long after his settlement there he was again visited "with such a dejection of spirits, as none but they who have felt the same can have the least conception of. Day and night," he says, "I was upon the rack, lying down in horror, and rising up in despair." While thus enduring the "horror of darkness," he meets with Herbert's poems,

and finds in them a strain of piety which he admires. He reads them oft and long, as though they had been the chapters of Christ's Gospel! He finds no cure for his malady in them! He lays them aside, and after twelve months' experience in "the inefficiency of all human means," seeks his God in prayer! He visits Southampton, and there realizes in his own experience the fulfilment of the glorious prophecy concerning those "that mourn in Zion." He suffers another relapse, returns to London, burns his prayers, and casts away from him all thoughts of devotion and of dependence upon God.

Twelve long years in the Temple, in an uninterrupted course of sinful indulgence, passed away, he clearly perceiving "that, if the gospel were true, such conduct must inevitably end in destruction." He keeps company with Deists, and argues with them concerning the "truth of Scripture, in the very act of rebellion against its dictates!" His patrimony well nigh spent, he is "apprehensive of approaching want." He desires the death of him whose station in life he covets. The poor man dies, he obtains his "heart's desire," but with it comes unutterable agony. In the meantime he is presented with a more lucrative appointment. He accepts it, not reflecting upon his incapacity to perform its duties. "I returned to my chambers thoughtful and unhappy; my countenance fell;" with thought came perplexity and misery. Convinced of the impossibility of keeping the office, he writes a letter to his friend entreating him to accept his resignation, and grant him the office he first desired. He carries his point, and his mind is somewhat relieved. "But, behold, the storm was gathering all the while, and the fury of it was not less violent for this gleam of sunshine." An opposition is raised against the right of his friend's nomination. He was to expect an examination at the bar of the House. "All the horrors of my fears and perplexities now returned: a thunder-bolt would then have been as welcome to me as this intelligence." He attends the office regularly, but reads and studies to no purpose. Month after month passes away, and he despairs of ultimate success. He escapes to Margate, and spends his time either in forgetfulness of the future, or in misery. In October, 1763, he is required to attend the office again, to prepare for the dreaded event. He returns, and his misery increases ten-fold. "As Saul sought to the witch, so did I to the physician, Dr. Heberden." He anticipates madness, *and hopes for it*, in order to avoid appearance at the bar. "Now came the great temptation, the point to which Satan had all the while been driving me,—the dark and hellish purpose of self-murder." He reconciles himself to the thought, and falls in with the opinion, that man is at liberty to die as he may see convenient. Again and again he attempts it, but as often his plans are frustrated by an unseen hand. The morning of the day arrives on which the examination was to take place, and his mental state is such, that his appearance before the bar is impossible; and thus ended all connection with the parliamentary office. From about this period we

may date the "great change" in his life. Henceforth he is "a new creature." His state, prior to this, was wretched indeed, but brightest days oft succeed the darkest nights. He removes to St. Albans, where he is visited by his brother, who is the means of giving the poet some relief on religious points. Referring to the change in his spiritual experience, he says,—“Unless the Almighty arm had now been under me, I think I should have died with gratitude and joy. My eyes filled with tears, and my voice choked with transport; I could only look to heaven in silence, overwhelmed with love and wonder.” He leaves St. Albans for Cambridge, on his way to Huntingdon, where his brother had taken lodgings for him. Not long after his settlement in Huntingdon, he forms an acquaintance with the Rev. Mr. Unwin's family, whither he is directed to find a happy home, and a kind, intelligent friend who should be his spiritual comforter through many future hours of bitter anguish. Of her he thus writes in the "Task"—

“And witness, dear companion of my walks,
Whose arm this twentieth winter I perceive
Fast lock'd in mine, with pleasure such as love,
Confirmed by long experience of thy worth
And well-tried virtues, could alone inspire—
Witness a joy that thou hast doubled long.”

The poet took possession of his new abode, Nov. 11th, 1765. Here this truly affecting, interesting, and instructive narrative ends. We can but express our earnest desire that those, who may by this imperfect sketch be led to peruse it, may derive as much satisfaction and profit from it as we have.

E. W. S.

Poetic Section.

Leaves from the Olive Mount. By CATHERINE FRANCES B. MACREADY.

Various Poems in Manuscript.

Is it not passing strange that in the heat of life's conflict man finds both time and heart to cultivate the gentler emotions of his nature? Strange, that on the field of battle the wounded man enjoys the glories of the sunset. Strange, that Garibaldi, whose path has been by the red river of strife, should stay to pluck a flower, and listen to the nightingale's song, whilst the cloud preceding the march of despotism darkened the air. Strange, that in the midst of controversy, the battle of opinion, and the conflict for the right, men should stay to listen to the quiet flow of poetic utterance. Yet thus it is, that nature, speaking with the voice of flower and stream and sunshine, as the quiet moon rules the restless waters, rules and controls, and ever charms, quietly, but powerfully, the turbulent tumult of the souls of men.

Poetry is the voice of nature,—a song-voice uttering in musical cadences the hitherto unutterable meanings of the world's grand hieroglyphs.

The poet is nature's interpreter. Serving in the temple are many. Some are high priests, some but wave the incense, all help in the quiet on-march of love, of truth, of liberty.

At the head of our article is a book of poems by Miss Macready, the talented daughter of our famous tragedian.

Miss Macready opens the volume with a dedication to her father, which tells of a true heart and its unutterable yearnings.

TO MY FATHER.

For ever loved, revered,—my heart's first friend,—
Tender as love itself, and true as truth,
I would that men might see thee with my eyes,
Know thee as I have known—then should fame's wreath
(Bound on thy brows of yore) new semblance take,
And show thee halo'd with celestial light!
Yet I, who know thee best, and have enshrined
Thy virtues in my soul, shall feeblest prove
To speak, how dear thy worth!—That which has been
Most noble in thee, never can be known.
Oh, loving lips, long silent in the grave,
Could but the old life warm them for a space,
How would they echo now my poor applause!
And oh, if this adventurous tongue can boast
The transcript of one pure intent, true thought,
Or generous aspiration, unto thee
Alone be praise! All good my life can show
Is of thy teaching, and in offering thee
This lowly tribute of my grateful love,
God knows, I give thee but thine own again!

The poem of the book is "The Passion Flower," a tale of simple construction, with a slight dash of the improbable running through it. The imagery is not striking or vivid; the fancies are not brilliant; but the fervour of each thought makes that thought felt, and the tone of true brother-love that breathes in every syllable more than atones for the lack of gorgeous drapery or brilliant oratory.

We have a faithful portait of the inner life of a true poet in the following:—

"To see before and after—know too much
And yet too little—suffer in excess,
And taste of joy the veriest ecstasy—
Hope, yearn, and strain for what to others' eyes
Are shadows, fashions of a fevered dream—
Love with a love, before whose fires the light
Of human passion flickers faint and dim,—
Such is the poet's lot."

"Ah me! some lips there are
 With power to frame our unformed fancies, give
 Our vague emotions utterance; some eyes,
 Interpreting and answering with a look
 Of mutual exaltation and despair
 Our soul's aspirant questionings, and moods
 Of deep despondency! by such great gift
 Are poets, like their father-prophets, made
 'Revealers of the thoughts of many hearts.'"

"Hope was mine,
 To sing one song at least of love and truth,
 Ere my lips close for ever. Oh, to leave
 Some sign, however feeble, just to show
 That we have been! that we have loved and wept,
 And sinned, and been forgiven, and sinned again,
 Frail, loving, suffering souls, such as we see
 Living and dying round us every day!"

The truest of all poetry is that which claims kinship with heaven.
 In the following we think we see the reflected radiance:—

"Where turn our thoughts in all distress and pain,
 When mortal love deceives us? when the leaves,
 Which hope puts forth so green and fresh in spring,
 Lie in dead heaps upon our path, long ere
 The summer's ended? Life is dull and cold—
 The heav'n's look gloomy grey—one spot alone
 (To our sad fancies) on the dreary earth
 Seems bright with sunbeams—even that hallowed mount,
 Whereon of old the gracious lips proclaimed
 A blessing on the mourner! Our wan eyes
 Strain towards it thro' their tears, as though thereon
 They might ev'n now behold Him, the Beloved,
 The world's great Comforter, in light enthroned
 Breathing forth consolations, speaking peace
 To all perturbed and sorrow-laden souls."

The following ballad is deserving of high rank beside the already
 rich collection which our country so proudly boasts:—

ICHABOD.

"Oh, wherefore is my mother's face,
 So sad and wan?" I said;
 And when she sighed, "Thy father,
 child!"

I knew that he was dead.

Upon her bosom, three months old,
 My baby brother lay:
 "And you must be his mother, child,
 When I am called away."

The glory of my life lies low
 Beneath the churchyard sod;
 Then take my son, to sorrow born,
 And name him Ichabod."

I took him from her dying arms,
 And in my anguish cried,
 "Love is the curse of life! of love
 My gentle mother died!"

I will not love, save this young child,
 This orphaned Ichabod;
 And, as I give my heart to him,
 So give I his to God.

Nor dream of joy shall tempt us here,
 Where naught to last is given,
 But all our thoughts, and hope, and love,
 Shall wing their way to Heaven!"

Years past,—I bore him in my arms,
Till active, grown, and strong,
We played together in the fields
With laughter, dance, and song;

And every night his little prayers
He said beside my knee;
And oh, whate'er is best in life
My brother was to me!

And when the seal of manhood first
Was set upon his brow,
Upon the altar-steps he took
Th' irrevocable vow,

And decked him in the priestly robe,
And all his days consign'd
To bear the Cross of Him, who died
In love to human kind.

So beautiful, so grand he stood
In those too sanguine days;
I sigh to think how proud I was,
When all men spoke his praise!

What blessed days in works of love
And tranquil joy we spent,
Our hearts at peace with all the world,
And with ourselves content!

At ev'n we walked beside the sea
To watch the setting sun,
And breathe the fresh cool evening
breeze,
When all our toil was done.

Oh, wherefore, sorrow, didst thou take
A form so frail and fair
To lay my pride with chast'ning low,
And change it to despair?

When first I marked her sweet sad face
And meek uplifted eyes,
I took her for some messenger
Of mercy from the skies!

The pomps of earth weighed heavily
Upon a form so light,—
The daughter of an Earl was she,
Betrothed to a Knight.

Oh, fatal was the day, when first
Across our path she trod,
For she was in her beauty's prime,
And so was Ichabod!

And, free from guile, nor fear of sin,
Nor danger marred their rest,
Till friendship's flame unconscious grew
To love in either breast.

As blind I trusted in his strength,
Till time its frailty proved,
So mad I writhed with grief and shame,
When first I knew they loved.

Cold horror seized the luckless maid,
Remorse and wild dismay,
To find her heart, unweeting, drawn
Thus fearfully astray.

I knew the anguish of her soul,—
But what was that to me?
I had not pity, thought, or care,
Save, Ichabod, for thee!"

The organ-tones had died away,
The midnight mass was o'er;
I stood upon the altar-step,
She knelt upon the floor.

Her forehead touched the marble stone,
Her hands were clasped in prayer:
The dying lamps threw fitful gleams
Upon her golden hair.

And as she raised her face to Heav'n,
So sad, and wan, and meek,
The saints themselves had wept to see
The tears upon her cheek!

But I,—her cold hands crushed in mine,
I could have laid her dead!—
"Thou serpent in an angel's form,
God judge thy sins!" I said.

"He was the chosen of his Lord!
A seal was on his brow,—
But thou the temple hast profaned,
And laid his glory low!"

She clasped my knees,—“Oh, curse
me not!”
With frenzied sobs she pray'd,
“But bid me live, or bid me die,
And thou shalt be obeyed!”

“Go, bid thy bridal guests,” I said,
“And wed thine injured knight,
And hide thy fatal witcheries
For ever from our sight!”

Oh, lightly lay the morning dew
 On grass, and flower, and tree;
 And softly crept the summer breeze
 Across the deep blue sea!

And village maidens, far and near,
 Brought wreaths and garlands gay,
 To strew beneath the young bride's feet
 Upon her marriage day.

I saw the church with faces thronged,
 I saw the hapless maid,
 A victim in her bridal robe
 For sacrifice arrayed!

I saw my brother's pallid lips
 Convulsive move in prayer;
 His ashen brow and sunken cheek,
 And eyes that looked despair!

I heard him seal with hollow voice
 The everlasting vow:—
 "And God be thanked," I said, "his
 soul
 Is safe from evil now!"

I hurried from the fatal spot;
 I dared not stay to see
 My idol humbled to the dust
 In silent agony!

I sat down to the bridal feast
 Within the castle wall.
 But pale and silent were the guests,
 And gloom hung over all.

The bride upon her chair of state,
 Arrayed in gems of gold,
 With front erect and fixed look
 Sat speechless, calm, and cold.

They called her name, and chafed her
 hands,
 And loosed her jewelled vest;
 But life nor lingered on her lip,
 Nor fluttered at her breast!

The guests shrunk back; the bride-
 groom raved
 Like one with grief gone wild;
 The wretched father wrung his hands,
 And called upon his child.

We bore her to the bridal bed,
 And robed her limbs in white;
 And thro' the darkened chamber lamps
 Were burning day and night.

We wreathed her brow with orange-
 flowers,
 With roses strewed her o'er,
 Till mortal bride had never looked
 So beautiful before!

We knelt beside her grave and wept,
 "Thy will be done, O God!"
 Then up I rose, and hurried home
 To comfort Ichabod.

I sought him high and low; explored
 The empty house in vain;
 I called him in despairing tones;
 He answered not again!

O'er hill, and dale, and moorland wide,
 Like some distracted ghost,
 That never rests, in hope to gain
 The heav'n too early lost.

I wander'd, even to barren wastes,
 By human foot untrod,
 And made the rocks and caves resound
 The name of Ichabod!

I paced the noisy city streets
 With weary foot and sore,
 But no man asked me whence I came,
 Or oped to me his door!

The night was dark with wind and rain,
 Upon the bridge I stood;
 With rushing sound beneath me rolled
 The river's angry flood.

I saw the threat'ning clouds above,
 The threat'ning tide below:
 "There is no refuge, God," I said,
 "Save death, to whom I go!"

Upon the verge of fate I hung,—
 When lo! a sudden gleam
 Of moonlight thro' the darkness broke,
 And glistened on the stream!

And in its silver rays I saw
 The pale and lovely face
 Of her, whom long ago I deemed
 A messenger of grace.

The flowers yet hung upon her robe,
 And wreathed her golden hair,
 And lingered on her lips the smile,
 That holy angels wear.

I sunk repentant to the earth,
And prayed in lowly plight,
That God would still be near my soul,
And keep His Heav'n in sight.

"And I will seek thy grave," I said,
"Thou mistress divine,
And tame my proud, rebellious heart
To patience such as thine!"

'Twas evening, and the summer sun
Was fading in the west;

I stood among the low green graves,
Where lay the dead at rest.

I marked the sculptured tomb, where
death

Long since received the bride,
And all o'ergrown with turf and flowers
A lowly grave beside!

A marble Cross above it stood
To guard the sacred sod,

And there with wond'ring joy I read
The name of Ichabod!

I hung my arms about the Cross
With tears and kisses vain,
As if the cold hard stone could speak,
And answer me again!

"O thou, too much my crown of life!
Thou Idol of my heart,
Too late upon thy grave I learn,
How frail a thing thou art!

Too late deplore the cruel vow,
That marred thy hapless past,
To curses all earth's blessings turned,
And broke thy heart at last!

Presumptuous Priest! such vows pro-
fane

The hallowed laws of God!
Bear witness many a blighted soul,
Like my poor Ichabod!"

It is well that we have among us hearts that dare utter the truth. Amid the purposeless, soulless, yet alluring fascinations of much of the poetry of modern growth, such books as this come as saviours, offering to guide the thought and pen of the worker away from the flatterer's pathway, out of the field of the cloth of gold, into the field of the world's million-heart harvest.

A. S. H. contributes a lengthy piece, called "An Emblem of Life." As a recital of events, and the emotions aroused by those events, it reads pleasantly and prettily; but the chief thing in a poem being the THOUGHT therein contained, both in quality and quantity, this has too little for the space occupied in relation. A lighted candle in a small room fills that room with light, but placed in a long hall, it only makes darkness visible; and a good thought compressed into a sonnet or a stanza gives appreciable light and pleasure, but if diluted in a hundred lines, both the light and the pleasure are diminished immensely. The following, on the moments succeeding a storm, is vigorous, truthful and poetic:—

"The air
Again was pure and cool, but seemed
To be more laden than before,
With varied and with sweet perfume,
As though the storm had beaten out
A hidden odour from the flowers
More rich than erst they breathed."

"Iota" sends two pieces; one called "The Astronomer's Address to the Sun," which is too familiar far to elicit anything but dignified silence from the sovereign addressed,—

"Prince of the universe! bright orb of day!
 Pouring on earth thy self-productive light,
 Save in the true alternate change of night,
 Which in quick order melts at thy first ray,
 Say what thou art: and if thou wilt *just stay*
 And satisfy my search."

The other, called "Ever Parting," has much sweetness, but lacks the right words to express what it only dimly shadows forth. If "Iota" read Trench "On the Study of Words," and persistently studied the structure of some of our best prose authors, he would reap incalculable benefit therefrom. Thoughts are feeble indeed, if ill-expressed; but are all powerful when properly stated.

F. S. Mills favours us with two ballads, which have much sympathetic, but little poetic, merit. We can find only one couplet that is at all poetical. The pale, thoughtful, injured wife of the drunkard opens the door to him after long hours of waiting,—

"Twelve years ago this day, was she wed,
Two children had she, two children are dead."

"Llieweillyan" sends a poem called "Christabel," a name already made famous as a title by Percy, Coleridge, and Massey. The diction is good, and the imagery well drawn; occasionally the metre is defective,—a fault which careful training may speedily correct. We would recommend our author to read much, think much, and write little, for a year or two, and believe that then his efforts might meet with much success.

"Christabel stands alone, pale and trembling.
 The ice-drops of her fear upon her brow
 Hang glistening like a coronet of pearls.
 A dream of tombs, of arching sapphire skies,
 Of ocean's pearly halls, distracts her soul.
 Even as a lily wet with tempest-rain
 And nodding in the blast, she shakes with fear."

"E—s," who, we are informed, is blind, writes two very pretty poems, which, in their quiet, unaffected utterance breathe as with a soul in them. One we insert.

EVENING.

Gentle praise is crowning
 Every hill and dell;
 Nature slumbers, owning
 Night's enchanting spell.

Still with wild endeavour
 Leaps the stream below,
 Gurgling ever onward
 With unceasing flow.

Ne'er doth night allure it
 Sweet repose to try;
 Ne'er the tinkling vespers
 Sound its lullaby.

Soul in all thy longings,
 None, but God beside,
 Can bestow upon thee
 Rest at eventide.

"Pictures of Solitude," a very long manuscript by E. P., is too discursive for a poem. Few readers care to trust themselves

to twenty or thirty pages of reflections, be they ever so well strung. In this, as in the poems previously reviewed, the leading defect is want of *mechanical* skill and knowledge: the *art* of poetry must be studied, if you would be a poet. The A B C of poetry must be learnt, or the eloquence of poetry can never be taught.

We would say to one and all, aim high, look *up* always; but see to it that your foothold is good. If you tremble at the danger of the way and its difficulties, stand on one side, and let the stout-hearted pass you. Occasional effort never yet made a poet.

Hard work is the soul of success. Let those work who will, and those who will, let them play. The sum of each life will be in its successes equal only to the sum of its efforts. To be a true poet, great or small, is the noblest aspiration possible to the soul of man.

F. G.

The Reviewer.

Caius Marius; the Plebeian Consul. By THOMAS DOUBLEDAY.
Second Edition. London: Smith, Elder, and Co.

THIS "Historical Tragedy" has life, energy, and action in it. The language is more distinctly of the Elizabethan age than that of most modern dramas, and the cast of thought is well modelled after the great dramatic authors of that era. As a contribution towards *realizing* Roman history, and teaching us the secrets of the inner life of these times, it merits perusal. It *reads* well, and, we think, should *play* well. The characters are well discriminated, and some of the poetical passages are of intense power, *e. g.* :—

"Night falls apace. How awful is this spot!
Here fell the bolt of Scipio! And here Carthage,
The naval crowned queen, blue Neptune's daughter—
Strong as the storms, and richer than the seas
With all their untold gems—before the Roman
Sank down in blood and ashes."

We cordially commend this work to any reader of the drama of Britain.

Sects in Syria: or Notices of the different forms of Religion professed in Syria and Palestine; with Observations on the Recent Outbreak, its Causes, &c. By B. HARRIS COWPER. London: Henry James Tresidder.

This is a useful and timely publication, giving as it does, in a few pages, a reliable account of the opinions and peculiarities of the religious sects of Syria, and particularly of those who have been brought into special notice by those recent distressing events which have occurred in that misgoverned land.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

107. Would any of your readers be kind enough to answer the following queries:—1. Is there in existence any Latin grammar designed specially for the use of those who wish to teach themselves? and, if so, what is the price of the work, and where may it be obtained? If not—2. What grammar is best calculated to answer such a purpose, the price of it, and the publisher's name? 3. Similar information with regard to a work on the French language. A reply would greatly oblige—SYLVIA MAY.

108. We live in an age of progress, when men's opinions, especially on religion, are freely discussed both by the press and the pulpit; and as this is generally best done by endowed lectures, both among Episcopalians and Nonconformists, I should be glad if some of your readers would supply me with an account of the Hulsean Lectures, delivered in Cambridge, stating the name of the preacher or lecturer, and the subjects discussed, say for the last twenty years. Also the same of the Donnellan lecture, preached in Dublin. As these lectures contain a statement or defence of some points of theology, and are intended to grapple with any prevailing heresy that might arise, the information sought would be acceptable to students in divinity, as it would supply them with material for thought on the current and progressive state of theological literature.—ADMIRER.

109. Could you, or any of your readers, inform me whether there is any magazine, or other medium, wherein short musical compositions might run the chance of being criticised or inserted, or what publisher is most likely to favour such pieces?—BETA.

110. In reading a biography of Fichte, in Chambers's papers, I met with a reference to certain views respecting the human will, named *Determinism*. Can any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me where I can obtain information respecting the above-named views?—S. S.

111. Will some one of the correspondents of the *British Controversialist* kindly inform me what was the origin of the village feasts which are annually celebrated in Cambridgeshire and other English counties?—S. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

99. *A Curious Book*.—C. A. inquires after a book neither written nor printed; I beg to give the following information:—It was composed of the finest vellum, and had the letters cut out of each folio; the whole being interleaved with blue paper, was as easily read as if printed. Its title was, "Liber Passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi, cum figuris et characteribus nulla materia compositis." In the year 1640, Rudolph II. of Germany offered 11,000 ducats for it. It is said to be in existence in France, and as it bears the royal arms of England, it is extremely probable that the whole is an English production.—BETA.

101. *Quotations*.—The best book for the purpose of quotation is, "Great Truths illustrated by Great Authors," a collection of 4,000 quotable passages culled from the first flora in the fields of literature. Published at 6s., and to be had of any bookseller.—J. O.

103. *Trollius, or Globe-flower*.—Professor Macgillivray, in his edition of Withering's "British Plants," gives the origin of every generic name used therein. He states that the word "Trollius" is derived from "troll,"

which, in some of the Gothic dialects, signifies a ball.—W. W.

106. *Age of the "Te Deum."*—This eminently majestic hymn of praise is generally supposed to be at the least thirteen hundred years old. The authorship is, we believe, ascribed to St.

Ambrose; and the occasion for which it was composed was the baptism of St. Augustine.—J. W. W. P.

The "*Te Deum*" was composed by St. Ambrose, of Milan, about A.D. 373.—J. H.

The Topic.

OUGHT THE GOVERNMENT SCHEME OF FORTIFICATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT?

AFFIRMATIVE.

Our conclusion to support in the affirmative this question is dictated neither by craven fear, nor is it the offspring of an ordinate desire to see England maintain a foremost place in the military roll of the world; but it arises from a spirit of conservatism, jealous of our institutions, our liberties, and our homes. These we desire to see bulwarked by all that genius can suggest, science achieve, and a wise expenditure accomplish.—LUTHER.

Though our volunteers deserve great praise and encouragement in their noble determination of fighting for "our country, our altars, and our homes"—though never engaged in any real battle, they have acquired a tolerably proficient knowledge of the tactics of war—though they have shown that "British pluck" has not yet died out of this "nation of shopkeepers"—yet let us not expect too much from them as being perfectly able to repel an invasion. How can we expect that men, "though brave as brave can be," who were never employed in bloodier affray than that on Wimbledon Common, would be able to oppose successfully those warlike "devils" of African training? And if victory were ours, with what loss of precious life would it be gained! Let us, then, carry out the Government scheme, which, augmenting our means of defence, will also increase our security; and, in case of

invasion, will enable us to defend ourselves with greater hope of success.—G. M.

We have before advocated the cause of "increased national defences;" and as we consider "the Government scheme of fortifications" as tending to an increase of safety, we would support it now. There can be no doubt that, if other nations, particularly those of Europe of greater size than England, increase their army, strengthen their navy, and make other warlike demonstrations, "our tight little island" ought not to remain unprotected. At present she is comparatively so, and is therefore at the mercy of any invader. And who can say at this time that no foe will attempt an intrusion? Who would venture to assert, in the present troubled state of affairs, that England "need fear no evil"? Those of the "Peace-at-any-price" school will do so of course; but we appeal to persons of common sense and upright principles. We consider that the "Government scheme of fortifications" tends to the greater safety of England, and therefore we consider that it should be carried out.—BETA.

Yes, by all means, our coasts should be fortified, and that immediately, for who can tell the moment when "grim-visaged war" may hurl his thunderbolts into the heart of our peaceful island home? History shows us that war is forced upon a nation when it is

not prepared for it. Then let us spare no money; to defend our Old England from the ambitious designs of a foreign enemy.—S. C.

Any scheme of fortification for the protection of the nation is better than none; and as there is no better one proposed, the Government scheme ought certainly to be carried out. We must consider that until some sort of fortifications are completed, we shall be open to an invasion, but afterwards no country will dare to threaten us with impunity, as long as there are British hearts and hands upon our shores.—F. S. M.

The Government scheme for internal fortifications deserves the notice of every one interested in the welfare of his country; the independence of which he desires to remain intact, as regards invasive attempts from external foes. The importance of this measure *has not yet, I am aware, taken full possession of the minds of all the British people*, because they have not fully weighed the matter; they consider our navy equal to any emergency that may occur. Looking at the modern improvements introduced into the increasing navies of other nations as well as our own, chances exist for successful attempts to subdue our independence. How long would the steamers of France be in throwing her hosts upon our shores? It is probable that such events might occur, even before our Channel squadron had received any intimation of the fact. What is Garibaldi doing at this moment, under the *combined influences of darkness and steam*? Surely we have something to protect, adequate to the estimated expenditure.—S. F. T.

Fortifications are the safeguard of nations; they form a wall of defence, and behind which the people of this country may work in perfect peace and safety. They have resisted successfully even the people of England; but when defended by English hearts and English hands, how much more powerful will they be, and what a guarantee will they give of security to its inhabitants.—WHITE.

If the navy, our first line of defence, met with any reverses, we should have nothing to fall back upon. Therefore fortifications are necessary, and will make invasion almost impossible.—RED.

National prosperity is concomitant with, and synonymous to, realised security. National security, like personal, is resultant from capability to meet exigencies, either existing or anticipatory. Exigencies are measured and calculated from the experience of the past; the sole data of *the will* being, necessarily, the *what has been*; and although history may never actually repeat herself, with inscrutable identity she ever repeats herself under varied modifications and divergencies; the whole phenomena of political, social, and individual life, in 1860, being strictly identical in spirit with what has been in every age of the world's history. Every nation has its prejudices, its preferences, and its foibles; they may be healthful or injurious to the national weal; but, as one or other predominate, they mould and mark their impress upon the state and people, and when so impressed, we call them national characteristics. These prejudices or preferences may be resultant from a variety of causes, known to philologists; among others, none are more effective than climate, race, and geographical position. These we term natural causes, and those less liable to derangement from external agency. If, then, a nation possesses a defined character, resulting from natural causes, over which they have but little control, and can only modify by circumstantial intervention, and then only affect the superficial strata, does it not follow that, in our survey of man, or a conglomeration of men, which we call a nation, that we view that which is what it is, by an arbitrary law of nature? Take one or two instances:—The inhabitants of warm, or tropical countries, are notoriously indolent, not because they possess less physical powers than those of colder climates, but it is attributable to the fact that nature, in warm climates, is

more prolific than in cold, and needs less the auxiliary aid of man. Hence he has fewer stimulants or incentives to industry, and becomes indolent; while, owing to the comparative sterility of nature in cold climes, man is forced to exertion to assist her operations, and habits of industry become part and parcel of his being. Again,—islanders, from their constant contact with the ocean, become fearless of its dangers, while those unaccustomed to the water imbibe a natural dread of its perils. The inhabitants of a hill country, familiar with the precipice and the gorge, the abyss and the gulf, are careless of its dangers, and possess a courage and an independence of nature unknown to the denizen of the city. So, also, are the inhabitants of a continent affected by geographical position; and these, acting on the mind, have produced some of the great political phenomena in the world's history; and when in combination with race, causation has been greatly intensified. We have not space to go into details, but will simply allude to the great race which inhabits continental Europe—the Caucasian—who, by their superior intelligence, have made recede before them all the inferior races, so that we may justly call them a conquering people. The inhabitants of countries of great extent have opportunity of expansion which those living in more contracted spaces do not possess. Citizenship affects the mind; and in proportion to the character and position of the state, is the mind of the citizen affected. The inhabitants of a small and mean country have nothing to incite to pride, or, as our neighbours would say, to "glory;" while the native of a rich and powerful state has much to cause independence of character. This independence, rightly guided, becomes a source of good to society at large; but if misdirected, is the root of many of the evils which afflict the world. Perhaps the greatest has been that spirit which has been engendered by a consciousness of power, developing

itself in aggression and encroachment upon other than its own. It is embodied in the *imperial ideal*—an ideal for which ambitious spirits, in every age, have fought, conquered, succumbed, or died,—an idea over which even now dark thoughts are brooding in the cabinet and the closet. Did we say now? Yes, even now; after 6,000 years of the butchery and massacre of man; after his sacrifice in perpetual holocausts; after the fairest portions of earth have been deluged with blood, and 10,000 cities razed and ravaged; after infuriated hate, and diabolical spleen has racked its brains to torture its fellows, all for this one ideal,—we say—we use no poetry, nor are our words those of hyperbole, when we repeat that the same dark spirit, which has cursed and blighted the world so long, is as rampant now as ever. The imperial idea—as old as Babylon, as expanded and as expansive as the world—is as much alive in this our day, as when Alexander led his phalanxes to India's scorching clime, or when Julius Cæsar carried his eagles to the distant British isles, when Attila traversed Germany, or when Napoleon ravaged the plains of Europe. We say this "ideal" exists now (recent history attests it), and it is only by the jealous guardianship of the high privileges which destiny has confided to Europe, that that ideal shall not become embodied again.* At the present moment there are two great powers coveting universal supremacy, Russia and France. Of the former, Europe has no immediate dread; she has elements which, for many ages, will incapacitate her for supreme rule; but it is France which Europe in reality dreads (not a dread of the final result, but a dread of the suffering and sacrifice of life which the contest to thwart her will cost); for the line of conduct which her present Emperor is following is identical with that marked out by the first Napoleon. Will Europe stand by and see that line followed? We answer for England alone. Every motion in France

will meet its response in England; watchful and vigilant, she will follow her every track. If France wishes war, England will not shrink from the contest. Those that at Agincourt and Cressy, those that triumphed at La Hogue and Trafalgar, now, as ever, possess the same blood, energy, and invincible courage. Freemen by birth—their country untrod by foe for 800 years,—they are prepared, come what may, to stand for England's glory and England's weal. That is why, when France builds her fleet, England launches her liners; when France improves her gunnery, the echo of England's Armstrongs is wafted by the breeze over Cherbourg's ramparts; when France mobilized her army, and threatens aggression, England's sons unite, and 150,000 stand in immovable column; and when France erects her batteries, *England does and will fortify her coasts*; and, duty done, awaits results. —D. S.

NEGATIVE.

In France, we believe, there is in existence a law which constitutes the raising of a false alarm a misdemeanour, punishable by imprisonment. We wish such a law were in force in England. From our childhood we have heard dark rumours circulated about an expected French invasion, and from those happy days when we thought that "the gun" above the fireplace was a match for a legion of Frenchmen, we have never known those rumours to assume a tangible form; but they have always continued, in their pristine purity, to be nothing but—rumours. What inducements have the Government to undertake such gigantic measures of fortification? None but the alarms raised by a number of newspaper editors, who are often at a loss for something to write about. Is it fair to an already overtaxed people, to saddle them with millions of money to allay the fears of some few timid beings who think their country is not well enough fortified by a vast fleet on sea, and

thousands of soldiers, militiamen, and volunteers on land, not to speak of thousands of unostentatious good hearts and true, who are ready, when the danger comes, to—

"Shoulder the rifle, and gird on their thigh

The sword that grows brighter as danger draws nigh."

In order to maintain inviolate their liberties, their altars, and their homes—leaving the question of expense—we think it is a work of supererogation fortifying like a citadel the shores of such a country as England. We give the Emperor of the French credit for being the possessor of a good deal of cunning; but we think we do not show our appreciation of his craftiness—in fact, we do him an injustice, according to the opinion we have formed of him—when we suspect him of cherishing aggressive designs towards our sacred soil. *He knows better, if his boasting colonels do not.*—J. I.

Although I admit there have been grounds for some anxiety as to our position, I consider that much false alarm has been raised throughout the country. The expense of the proposed fortifications would be immense, and it should not be forgotten that we are already an overtaxed people. The large number of volunteers, rifle and artillery, ought to make us feel more secure than hitherto; and, as no substantial reasons have been assigned for expending so large an amount of money, I think that the Government scheme should not be carried out.—TNEJBOR.

Notwithstanding that the present Government is composed of clever, far-seeing men, whose experience of State matters and State defences has undoubtedly been great, we believe that the scheme of fortifications they have brought forward is totally unnecessary and inconsistent. It is unnecessary, because, as a nation, our resources, and the means of transporting our army from one end of the country to the other, are immense. If an invading

army were about to descend upon our shores, are we to suppose that our navy and army would prove ineffectual in such a case, when they both involve such an expense upon the country? It is inconsistent, because we are professing to be a peaceable nation, and endeavouring to obtain mutual confidence with our nearest ally; while at the same time we show him that we distrust his friendship, and are doing all we can to destroy mutual confidence. —*LOTA.*

We say decidedly, No. We think that the recent parliamentary vote is the most foolish one that has been adopted for many years. It is the latest manifestation of that Anti-Gallican policy which led, in years gone by, to the great French war, and will, in these times, most assuredly lead to a similar result if persisted in. When all the money to be spent on these fortifications has been so spent, England will not be *one whit* the more secure against invasion. The fortifications to be erected will not stop an invading enemy for an instant; and all the money will be utterly thrown away. The idea of invasion is itself most absurd. What could the Emperor of the French, or any one else, gain by landing troops in Britain? The first Napoleon, brave as he was, never attempted it. What should we think of a man, who, living in a very good house, which had never showed the least signs of decay, suddenly began to prop up the sides and roof of his dwelling, in the fear that it *might* some time fall down, and then strengthened the props, lest they *might* break? Should we not say of his conduct, as Mr. Bright said of that of the Defence Commissioners, that it was *insane*? —*J. G. J.*

Unity and goodwill between nations are great blessings. The flourishing state of commerce and manufactures tends much to a nation's prosperity. Men of talent and foresight know that war and the love of conquest are sure to sever the commercial relations which exist between nations. Louis Napoleon

is eminently distinguished for his talent and foresight. The Emperor, we believe, is anxious to avoid falling into the fatal mistake which first shook, and then overwhelmed the power of his uncle. *That great mistake was his quarrel with England.* It is the object of the Emperor Napoleon III. to establish a Buonapartist dynasty. He knows that this cannot be effected if at any time England should become his enemy. Under such circumstances he might possibly maintain his power for his own lifetime, but we firmly believe the doom of his family would be fixed. But our opponents will argue, that Napoleon III. is not master of his position; and that his army may compel him to make an attempt on England. We deem this extremely chimerical. But even in that case we do not think the Government scheme of fortification would be needed. When a single county can turn out 10,000 amateur soldiers, well armed, well drilled, and unsurpassed in physique, we say, England need not fear. Who that saw the 20,000 volunteers, assembled in Hyde Park to be reviewed by our dearly beloved Sovereign, can fear an invasion of the French? We would ask, Are we not likely to increase and foster the warlike spirit and warlike preparations of the French Government, by pushing our own to too great an extreme? We wish England, and England's honour to be well guarded, but we think she is safe, without an outlay of £12,000,000 on fortifications. We believe that the sturdy spirits of her stalwart sons, their love of country and home, will ever protect her shores from the hostile tramp of a foreign enemy. —*T. L. P.*

At the risk of being called "prejudiced and unthinking," a disregarder alike of the late Duke of Wellington's pathetic appeal, and of Lord Palmerston's "straightforward and manly enunciation," when introducing his motion for the contemplated scheme of fortifications—to all and each part of that scheme, our negative is frankly and firmly given. We are told, that "no

such thing as panic enters into the consideration of this question." What is it but panic that has filled the heads of a goodly portion of the people with imaginary fears?—who see in imagination our navy in flames, or at the bottom of the sea, and the victorious enemy in full march upon London;—who have characterized all who object to their wanton and needless expenditure of the public money as "cowards or niggards, or amiable zealots," who "cry peace, when there is no peace"—who, by a strange kind of logic, tell us that "the stronger we are, the better our ally ought to love us." The knowledge of strength might cause fear; but seldom does it produce the feeling of love: such arguments can be used, like a two-edged sword, to cut both ways. From the same cause we ought to love the Emperor of the French, because we acknowledge him to be the most powerful. Do the contemplated fortifications show whether we love or fear? Let their eulogizers answer. Britain, for the first time in the annals of her progress, has in the face of the world proclaimed her terror of a foreign foe; for the first time she has renounced her faith in the prowess of her naval heroes, and the proved valour of her unconquered soldiers: her Government has said, "Our soldiers will henceforth fight behind stone and mud walls." The fact of their allowing that fortifications are needed, implies that our navy is useless for purposes of defence. The sooner that branch of the service is broken up, the more means will be placed at their disposal for the carrying out to its full extent that system upon which they say "the very existence of Britain, as a nation, depends." But, alas for the perfectibility of the scheme, no two authorities are agreed upon the most efficient plan of procedure! though they all see the impending ruin that is sure to fall upon us by the hand of the avenging Gaul, if their particular theory is not adopted. Like all other national schemes, the fortification scheme must be wrought in the dark, with much

waste of the public money, in the end to be abandoned as useless—another monument added to the folly of our rulers, and another example of the nation's capability for paying taxes.—M. W.

Since the days of Carannius to the present time we could boast, without vanity, and exult, without pride, of the superiority of the British navy. But its requiem has been chanted, and its death-blow dealt by her present Government; the victories of Blake and Nelson are tarnished, and the power of our navy for defensible purposes are by them acknowledged to be inadequate. No longer can we say, with conscious pride, in the words of the poet—

"Britannia needs no bulwarks,
And no towers along the steep."

The glorious memories of a thousand years are extinguished, and the humiliating fact of a nation of freemen defending themselves behind ramparts of stone and mud, mark the decline of our greatness. Jobbery and waste are eating, canker-like, into the very vitals of the nation. Fourteen millions yearly are not enough for army purposes, two millions more are required as a first instalment to erect fortifications, in a few years to fall to decay, and to be held as useless for defence as the huge war-vessels that now rot in our docks, or are falling to pieces for want of rivets to hold them together. Let this country depend on her heretofore invulnerable navy, and in the strong arms and willing hearts of her volunteers, who have raised "a wall of fire around our much-loved isle" that would crumble the pride of boastful Gaul, and scatter to the winds the world in arms:—

"This England never did (and never shall)

Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror
But when it first did wound itself—
Come the three corners of the world
in arms,
And we shall shock them, mought
shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true."

D. R. R.

The Societies' Section.

Liverpool.—Meeting of the Readers and Friends of the British Controversialist.—On Tuesday evening, August 28th, a meeting of the friends of this Magazine was held in Hope Hall—which, notwithstanding the unfavourable state of the weather, was numerously attended. We copy the following report of the proceedings from the *Liverpool Daily Times*. Dr. F. J. Bailey, on taking the chair, read letters, regretting their inability to attend the meeting, from the Rev. Dr. Hume, John M'Laughlin, Esq., &c., &c.; and remarked on the great benefits that the Magazine had conferred, of an intellectual character, causing many of its readers to enter into various spheres of usefulness, and increasing materially the mental activity of all who studied its pages; and concluded by introducing Mr. J. A. Cooper, F.R.S.L., who, after explaining the reasons for holding the meeting, fully described the character and objects of the Magazine, which he characterized as unsectional and unsectarian; it belonged alike to no party, but was open alike to the opinions of all. The Magazine, he said, besides being a controversial, was also a literary work, and contained essays, reviews, &c. To literary societies it was invaluable, and was in a great measure devoted to their promotion and extension. He concluded an eloquent address amidst much applause. Samuel Neil, Esq., who was well received, next addressed the meeting in an able speech on the benefits and usefulness of controversy, and indignantly denied that the promoters of the *British Controversialist* had any peculiar opinions of their own which they wished by that serial to propagate. Every one ought to know that error hated controversy; they, however, believed in truth, and above all, and more than all, in God's truth. (Loud cheers) Dr. Barnes then moved the following

resolution:—"That in the opinion of this meeting the *British Controversialist* has been the means of imparting instruction to many, of largely promoting self-culture, and causing an increased mental activity amongst its readers; farther, it has fully demonstrated the benefits attendant and derivable from written controversy." Mr. Thomas Ham, in seconding the motion (which was carried unanimously), fully agreed that the benefits conferred on the readers were great, and showed most lucidly the benefits of written controversy. Mr. Grindley moved the following motion:—"That the *British Controversialist* has conferred great benefits on our mutual improvement and literary societies by the information it has afforded, and the active interest in their welfare it has evinced, and that this meeting tenders its thanks to the editors for their valued exertions, and pledges itself to aid in increasing the circulation of the Magazine," and strongly urged the claims of the work on the members of literary societies, and earnestly recommended the same to their attentive study and perusal. Mr. Silverlock briefly seconded the motion, and Mr. Edward George supported it, when it was carried, *nem. con.* Mr. Cooper, in conclusion, moved a vote of thanks to the chairman, which concluded a very instructive and interesting meeting.

Faversham Mutual Improvement Society.—The sixth annual meeting of this institution was held in the Public Rooms, on Wednesday evening, September 12th. The President (Mr. F. W. Monk) occupied the chair, and after some introductory remarks, called upon the Secretary to read the report for the year 1859—60, and of which the following is a summary:—

The number of members had increased during the year from 860 to

487, and since the preparation of the report, several persons had been proposed for membership, so that in the course of a few days there would be upwards of 500 members. Nearly £40 had been expended upon the library, and it was gratifying to know that the circulation of books had very considerably increased, whilst through the attention and vigilance of the librarian not a single volume had been lost. Amongst the works added to the library were copies of "McClintock's Voyage of the *Fox*," "Arago's Astronomy," "Buckland's Geology," "Tennyson's Idylls of the King," "Russell's Diary in India," "Humboldt's Life Book and Travels," "Strickland's Queens of England," and "Humboldt's Cosmos." The thanks of the society were due to Giles Hilton, Esq., for a valuable present of books. The last lecture season had been a great success; the lectures were good; the average attendance large; and, although the price charged for admission was very small, yet a profit of between four and five pounds had been realized by the course. The annual *soirée* held in February last was attended by a large number of members and their friends, and the results in all respects were satisfactory. It had tended to unite the members in one common cause—the cultivation of social friendship and the furtherance of intellectual advancement; and it had in no way infringed on the ordinary funds of the Society, as the amount realized by the sale of the tickets more than covered the cost of the entertainment. The attendance at the ordinary meetings had not been large, owing mainly to the inconvenience of the Society's room. At those meetings the following lectures and readings had been given:—Mr. Webb, of Eynsford, on "The Reformation;" Mr. Monk, on "Geography;" Mr. Kirby, on "Great Painters;" Mr. Boorman, on "The Pitcairn Islanders;" Mr. Johnson, "A Reading from Shakespeare;" Mr. Monk, "A Reading on Lord Macaulay." The institution had been placed in union with the Society

of Arts, and would derive therefrom the advantages enumerated in the Society's prospectus. The attention of the members was invited to the arrangements for the new season. And first, there was the course of lectures as follows:—Mr. Barnett Blake, of Leeds, "On the Philosophy of the Breakfast Table;" Mr. Henry Vincent, on "Home Life, its duties and its pleasures;" Mrs. Balfour, on "Charlotte Brontë;" Mr. Wheeler, on "The Planets and their Attendants;" Mr. Gerald Massey, on "Robert Burns;" Mr. William Parsons, on "Old Homer and his days;" Dr. Letheby, on "Ancient and Modern Alchemy;" the Rev. E. Paxton Hood, on "Kings Crowned and Uncrowned;" Dr. Lankester, on "The Sea-shore, its Products and its Lessons." To the whole of this excellent course of lectures members might be admitted to the front seats for two shillings, and to the back seats for one shilling. It was clear that nothing but a large sale of tickets would suffice to cover the expenses, and one powerful reason why a great effort should be put forth to secure this *desideratum* was the fact, that a loss upon the lectures would prevent the committee from purchasing many new library books. It was pleasing to know that up to the present time about thirty pounds' worth of tickets had been sold, but it was evident that the sale must continue to grow, in order to prevent disappointment. A new feature in the Society's operations was the offer of prizes to stimulate a spirit of laudable emulation in the production of works of literature or art. The following prizes had been offered:—A guinea edition of "Keith Johnson's Atlas of General Geography," for the best (and, if the competitors number ten, a twelve-and-sixpenny edition of the same work, for the second best) "Map of England and Wales;" also, a guinea edition of "Longfellow's Poema," for the best (and, if the competitors number ten, a half-guinea edition of the same work for the second best) "Essay on Recreation." Up to the present time, ten members had given their names as com-

petitors in the construction of the maps. A special fund had been formed, by shilling subscriptions, for the purchase of the rewards. It had been arranged to hold the ordinary meetings monthly, in the Public Rooms, and the time was to be occupied by the production of the report of the Society's proceedings, discussion upon the affairs of the institution, and readings and conversation upon the writings of great men, as Shakespeare, Longfellow, Lord Macaulay, and others. The report concluded with an appeal for renewed and mutual exertion on the part of the members, that the Society might continue the noble work it had begun, and extend its operations to a wider field.

Mr. Bryant moved the adoption of the report, which was carried unanimously.

The chairman stated that the next business was the election of officers for the ensuing year. In accordance with the provisions of a new rule, the president, two vice-presidents, treasurer, secretary, one librarian, and four directors, were to retire annually, in rotation. As that was the first annual meeting since the formation of the rule, it was necessary to draw lots to determine upon the gentlemen who should on that occasion retire. Lots were accordingly drawn, and the result was that Messrs. J. Tong and F. Palmer, vice-presidents; Mr. W. Dobbie, librarian; and Messrs.

H. Anderson, Boorman, C. Smith, and Holloway, directors, had to retire.

S. G. Johnson, Esq., in an eloquent and complimentary speech, proposed the re-election of Mr. F. W. Monk, as president. The proposition was most favourably received by the members, none of whom availed themselves of the opportunity of moving an amendment; and Mr. Monk, having thankfully acknowledged the kind manner in which his name had been received, expressed his willingness to accept the office for another year.

The election of the other officers was then proceeded with in the most pleasant manner, and the result gave the following as the committee of the present year:—Mr. F. W. Monk, president; Messrs. S. G. Johnson, V. Court, C. Smith, and T. Goff, vice-presidents; Mr. J. Tong, secretary; Mr. H. Kirby, treasurer; Messrs. B. Mills and W. Dobbie, librarians; and Messrs. Boulden, W. Tong, Paine, J. A. Anderson, H. Anderson, C. F. Dane, A. Bate, and Stevens, directors. Messrs. Difford and Hood were next elected auditors.

Mr. Hood proposed that a vote of thanks be given to the president, secretary, and committee, for their services during the past year, which was carried unanimously, and acknowledged by the chairman, who then declared the meeting at an end.

LITERARY NOTES.

The King of Saxony has translated "Dante."

Jules Janin has issued an edition of "Horace," text, translation, and notes.

Horace Mayhew is understood to be engaged in preparing "Transatlantic Sketches; or, Model Men and Women of Canada and the United States," from a tour in which lands he has but recently returned.

Oehlenschläger, the Shakespere of Denmark, born 14th November, 1779; died 28th January, 1850; is to have a monument raised to his memory.

Professor C. Lobeck, author of "Aglaophamus," and other critical works composed in severe Latin, died at Königsberg—where he was professor of eloquence and Greek Literature—on 27th August, aged 80. Having been appointed in 1802, he was two years the colleague of Kant.

An Art-Biography of Michael Angelo has been issued by Herman Grimm; and Professor Springer, of Bonn, is preparing a "Life of Albert Dürer—whom his tombstone at Nürnberg characterizes as "light of the arts—sun of artists—

painter, engraver, sculptor without equal."

Kosegarten, the philologist, expired at Griefswald.

R. W. Emerson, "On the Conduct of Life," is announced.

The sequel to Sir William Hamilton's "Dissertations on Reid," for which the philosophic world has so long and so patiently waited, is promised shortly by Messrs. MacLachlan and Stewart.

The editor of the "New Quarterly Magazine" has obtained from a relative of the famous Scottish poet, Motherwell, some of his unpublished pieces, which he intends to insert from time to time in the "New Quarterly Magazine." One or more of these will appear in No. IV. for November.

Gustave Liebert has written a work entitled "Milton; a contribution to a History of the English Mind." It is published by Meissner, Hamburg.

Madame Ida Pfeiffer's "Autobiography," edited by her son, is announced.

There are 2,000 booksellers in Leipzig.

A monument to Duncan Ban Macintyre, a Gaelic poet, was inaugurated at Dalnally, New Brunswick, on the 14th ult.

Napoleon III.'s "Julius Cæsar" is in the press, and it is to be republished in a translation executed from an advance copy by Miss Mary Booth.

Joseph Locke, Esq., M.P. for Honiton, President of the Institute of Civil Engineers, and joint author with Robert Stephenson of "Observations on Fixed and Locomotive Engines," died at Moffat, on the 18th ult.

Smiles, the biographer of Stephenson, is collecting materials for a "Life of Sir Hugh Myddelton," the New River engineer.

Hood's "Poems" have been translated into German.

The reign of Queen Anne is said to be engaging the attention of Mr. Thackeray, with the intention of making a history of it.

The Cottonian Library at Plymouth has lately been enriched with several

MSS. of Sir Joshua Reynolds', who began his painter's career in that town. They consist of autograph letters, notes and observations on paintings, his notebook for 1755, &c.

It is proposed to erect a statue of John Locke in the county hall of Somersetshire, at Taunton. Having inaugurated a monument to Blake—the *doer*, the men of Somerset have resolved to honour Locke—the *thinker*.

"Carthage and its Remains" is shortly to be issued by Bentley, from the pen of Mr. Davis.

Dr. Bocher, the explorer of Central Africa, was killed by two natives of Zanzibar with poisoned arrows.

Several letters of Napoleon I. have been published in the *Moniteur*. They refer to the Egyptian expedition; but are evidently issued with what logicians call—a *second* intention.

Mr. William Bain, the distinguished psychologist, has been appointed by Sir G. C. Lewis—for the Queen—to the Professorship of Logic in the University of Aberdeen.

The Hon. James Wilson and Sir Henry Ward, both literary men and statesmen, are now names of the dead yet living exponents of finance, politics, and government.

C. G. Leland (translator of Heine's Poems) is editor of "Vanity Fair," the American Thackerayish *Punch*.

Dickens is said to be employed on a new monthly serial story.

F. von Wessenberg, a historian, essayist, and poet, one of the most learned of the bishops of the Roman Church, died at Constance, 10th ult., aged 86.

Miss Vandenhoff (Mrs. Swinburne), authoress of "Woman's Heart," &c., died in Liverpool, on 15th ult.

A. A. Knox, one of the *Times*' staff, has been raised to the magisterial bench.

We understand that Her Majesty is a subscriber to Mudie, "the Napoleon of librarians," and that the Prince of Wales took with him, to Canada, a finely selected stock of books from the Oxford-street *bibliotheca*.

Epoch Men.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES.

THE controversialism—what Grote calls the “apostolic dialectics”—of Socrates was regarded by Plato as the characteristic of his master. He calls him “an elenctic (*i. e.*, a refuting) cross-examining god, going about to argue with and so to convict the infirm in reason.” Over the logic of refutation Socrates had an unparalleled mastery. Through all the turnings and windings of a lengthy and ingenious debate, he never lost sight of the single aim with which he started, and he never closed without having reduced his opponent’s opinion by an irrefragably destructive process of analysis. There was a sleuth-hound-like* persistency in the manner in which he pursued an error, and run it out of every fastness and retreat it might choose or attempt. He had an escapeless keenness of intellect, from which no fallacy could conceal itself. It was his mission to make the Athenians practical logicians. Zeno had invented dialecticism, but Socrates had to prove it to be a workable agent—as George Stephenson had to do with Trevithick’s steam-engine. Men had then, as now, got into the habit of mouthing platitudes and commonplace under the name of wisdom, and of using words eloquently arranged, maxim-like, or epigrammatic, as if they were in reality *thoughts*. The nicely balanced period, and well-rounded sentence, which titillated the ear and struck harmoniously on the tympanum, was taken or mistaken for sagacity. But it was the wont of Socrates to probe the minds of his hearers, that he might discover the true state of the thoughts of those whom he addressed, when the veil of words was withdrawn, and the disguise of quibble and quillet was taken away. He had an easy, natural, apparently common-sense way of putting his questions, or expressing his sentiments; a clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable precision of language—simple, unostentatious, unrhetical, yet withal pliant, knowing, and pointed,—which, though it did not at first reveal the drift and purpose of his speech, was so engaging and ingenious as to be at once attractive and argumentative—presented a well-chosen *experimentum crucis* for the acceptance or rejection of the mind. Not that he seemed much to care for the synthetic upbuilding of dogmatic truth, or of systematic philosophy; *that* was sure to come, and to come right too, he believed, when men had their minds freed from error, and had become thinkers. To lay the axe, therefore, at the root of the tree, with the sturdy blow of a genuine backwoods

* A “Laconian dog” is the simile Plato uses in the “Parmenides.”

clearer, was his aim, duty, and delight; good could scarcely fail to spring up in the thoroughly cleared soil when the seed of right-thought fell into fitly prepared places. General notions, he knew, were logically aggregated from inductions derived from many particular instances; by the arrangement and distribution of individuals into species and genera. These, however, he found were seldom re-tested by the realities from which the notions were gained, and so very frequently contained latent fallacies and lurking errors. To resolve these generic terms into their specific, and then into their particular significations—to retrace the steps of generalization—and to compare, at each step, the word with the thought and the thing—these seemed to be processes by attention to which truth, or at least consistency of thought, could be attained. This is the action of mind to which Locke has given the expressive designation of *bottoming*, and of which he says it is necessary “to accustom ourselves, in any question proposed, to examine and find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the difficulties that come in our way, when well considered and traced, lead us to some proposition, which, known to be true, clears the doubt, and gives an easy solution to the question; whilst topical and superficial arguments, of which there is store to be found on both sides, filling the head with variety of thoughts, and the mouth with copious discourse, serve only to amuse the understanding, and entertain company, without coming to the bottom of the question, the only place of rest and stability for an inquisitive mind, whose tendency is only to truth and knowledge.”*

To comprehend a truth—root, sap, trunk, branch, leaf, flower, fruit, and use—that is man's business, if he have any at all in this universe, whose God is “a God of truth.” Specially is it requisite to *know ourselves* as we are in truth—not in the soft and delicate flatteries of self-love and egotistic deception. To know what we are and can do, to know what we purpose, and why, and how—to know what we speak, think, do, and believe—to know what we ought to be and become—these are the all-important duties of humanity, no less requisite now than in the long-past age of the sage, whose whole life was a practical teaching of the elder thinker's maxim, “*Know thyself*.” This knowledge, however, is not to be sought for itself alone, or the mere gratification of the irking curiosity of the ever-active mind; it is to be acquired, that we may in act and life be and do right. Hence, truth, above all possessions of the mind, is the most precious; and sincerity, above all other manifestations of being, becomes man best. Truth and sincerity are, indeed, alike in this, that they demand the very impress, image, and self-sameness of thought, to be expressed or shown in word and deed—that no thwart, distortion, or intermediate change should be permitted to occur or have place between the thought or desire, and the utterance or act by which the inner life is manifested outwardly. That the sign shall really be the type of the antitype it signifies; that

* Locke's “*Conduct of the Understanding*,” par. 44.

mankind should rightly and conscientiously mirror the inner activities of their being in the outer media through which they desire them to become known; that not "through a glass darkly," should thought be seen, or desire expressed, or aim exhibited; but that, at all times, the form of outward showing, and the fact of inward being, should be able to stand "face to face," and be known by reference to each other, in perfect and unimpeachable truth of likeness—are the demands made by truth and sincerity. Without these man is not man, but something lower, worse, and baser. Hence, above all things, oh, man! be truthful and sincere to thyself, and know thyself, that thou mayest be what thou shouldest be. This is the chief knowledge—the seedling out of which all useful knowledge grows. *Useful* knowledge! Why those terms? Is there a *useless* knowledge? Is not that rather ignorance? Out of knowledge use springs, not out of use does knowledge germ and bud. Mere *use* is the basest of all aims and intents. Man ought to seek to *know* that he may *be*, not that he may *use*. His own nature is higher and holier than all utilities, and, in its noblest manifestations, sacrifices—as martyr, patriot, student, and teacher—all the utilities of life, that being may have full growth. The measure of human nature can never be taken by the stunted fathom-line of utility, nor ought man to shrink his capacities into the shrivelled worthlessness, weakness, and narrowness, of perceptible utility. Every power has a godlike use, which will only manifest itself when the honest outgrowth and expansion of our being brings us into contact with it; but so long as we limit our life-culture to the palpable and the seen, to the apparent only, we can neither be nor know ourselves. All conventionalities, moralities, customs, creeds, expectations, habits, forms of thought, aims, aspirings that tend to circumscribe and limit the whole legitimate growth and activity of humanity, ought to be looked upon as hindrances, not helps; and to know ourselves is the only sure way of knowing what manner of men we ought to be.

For look at the *cant* of every-day life—its indefinite, pretentious, insincere, untruthful words, how they belie humanity! Examine the so-called knowledge of those "most potent, grave, and reverend signors" who march about in state and majesty as the instructors of our race; how cunningly contrived their speech—how little adapted to our real wants—how sedulously it avoids touching the points that interest our souls, and make us feel, and know, and long, to act as men! And turn to the civic forms of being; how unreal the distinctions set up—how touchy and testy are men regarding any infringement of them—how cramping and hypocrite-making are the courtesies, the allurements, the greetings, the meetings, the tradings, and the rulerships, of civic life! Yet might all citizenship and companionship of man with man be so purified and humanized, as to be the very sap of life to the tree of thought. But to be this they must be made truthful and sincere; they must be legitimated by a right and conscientious life—a life which, from the innermost core of the soul to the outer and uttermost trifle, shall

be at one in and with itself. Hence it is that the revision of all thought, policy, life, is urgently required; and that logic must be applied to every dogma, opinion, practice, and fashion, that it may be seen how far each is based on certain and definite realities, or merely on a sandy and slippery mass of seemings and schemings. The philosophy of the outward world, and the causes and agents of all that totality of changes which move in marvellous procession round us, it would be well to know. Speculative cosmogony, with its grand and glorious glimpses into the far-reaching depths of causative power—the stirring and curious inquiries which the physical sciences bring before us, their vast and wondrous problems, their acute guesses and their singular discoveries—it *would* be pleasing to learn the secrets of; but before and above all these, there are things it behoves us to study and know. What is piety?—what impiety? What is honourable?—what base? What is just?—what unjust? What is courage?—what cowardice? What is a State?—and who should bear rule therein? These are the true and primal topics of human interest; upon these ought our cogitations and our reasonings to be exercised. And how is this best to be done? Plainly by sounding with the truest fathom-line of thought the sea of speculation; and finding, if haply we may, a genuine anchorage for the soul. The aim of the Socratic method was to accomplish this; and all its demurrings, debatinge, and ironical questionings, were directed to this end. The purpose and *modus operandi* of Socrates have been thus ably and concisely described and exemplified by Grote:—"On such questions as these, What is justice?—What is piety?—What is a democracy?—What is a law? every man fancied he could give a confident opinion; and even wondered that any other person should feel a difficulty. When Sokratēs, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given off-hand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be the explanation or definition of a term—familiar, indeed, but of wide and comprehensive import; given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokratēs put fresh questions, applying it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first; thus showing that the definition was either too narrow or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer; but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original query, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or, if he did not himself admit this, the hearers, at least, felt it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the questions proposed to him, in a manner consistent and satisfac-

tory even to himself. Sokratēs, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who should be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised."* Yet all the while, the whole tenor of his questions, though destructive of the respondent's opinion, and seemingly only negative, has all along been such as to *suggest*, and often even to imply, a distinctly positive teaching; and so to cause the truth to creep into the heart without offensive dogmatism on his part, and with the pleasant though fictitious feeling on the part of his hearers, that they had thought out the truth for themselves. Without distinctly asserting his own opinion, and even while professing to have none, Socrates managed to make his audience embrace with favour and fervour the just and indisputable conclusions to which the discussion led or tended. Through continuous exclusion of the wrong, a knowledge of the right is gained. As fallacy after fallacy fails and falls before the strong practical intellect which directs its energies against them, and they are thrust by the onlookers into the limbo of the extravagant, the ludicrous, the sophistic, the incorrigibly false, the eye turns upon that which is unhit and undemolished, and sees that *that* alone is unassailed, and is evidently unassailed, because impregnable. This polemic, free though it is from profession, is a strong weapon in the armoury of controversy; it commits the opponent to little, if to anything; but fastens down the respondent to every previous assertion or inference, however mistaken. Assent and approbation mingle so cunningly with double-thoughted queries, which give no indication of contrariety of opinion or of feeling until the speaker is fairly committed to some indefensible thesis, and is compelled to surrender, at or without discretion. The tact necessary to concoct such arguments—

"As by the strength of their illusion,
Shall draw *one* on to his confusion,"

Socrates possessed, and exercised with a will and efficacy which annoyed the Sophists, awakened the jealousy of the ambitious, and excited the hatred of the thoughtless.

In the preceding paragraphs we have aimed at being explanatory rather than expository. Though, to accomplish this more efficiently, we have slightly modernized both the thought and the expression, we believe we have neither misrepresented the tenor nor the form of the Socratic method of teaching. The following passage, put into the mouth of Varro by Cicero, in his *Academic Questions*, appears to us fully to substantiate all that we have advanced. Cicero was not only a student of Greek, but of Greek philosophy; and he may be accepted as an evidence of the historic position assigned to Socrates by the interpreters of his age. "It is agreed on all hands, and, I think, justly, that Socrates was the first

* Grote's "History of Greece," vol. viii. chap. 68, page 285. Digitized by Google

person who called away philosophy from the study of occult things, purposely concealed by Nature herself, in which all the philosophers before him had been occupied, and introduced her to common life; making virtue and vice, good and evil, the objects of his inquiry; but esteeming the higher branches of natural philosophy (*cosmetica*) far removed from our cognizance, or at all events, if they were ever so well understood, of no importance toward living well. In all those discourses which have been committed to writing, with great variety and copiousness of language, by those who heard him, his method of disputation is, to affirm nothing himself, but to refute others: he professes to know nothing, except the fact itself of his knowing nothing; and says, that in this respect he excels other men, who fancy that they know that which they do not know; whereas, all his own knowledge consists in the consciousness of knowing nothing; and he assumes that Apollo had pronounced him to be the wisest of mankind, because the whole of true wisdom consists in a man's not thinking that he knows that of which he is ignorant. This being the constant tenor of his discourses, and his fixed opinion, all his eloquence was expended in praising virtue, and in exhorting all men to the study of virtue; a fact sufficiently evident from the writings of the Socratic philosophers, and especially of Plato."

This bantering debate—this double-meaning and trenchant controversialism—this peculiarly Socratic dialecticism, is called by the Greeks *siporeia*; an ignorance purposely affected, to provoke or confound an opponent. It proceeds by a constant contrast of expression and impression, of word and meaning. Every outward demonstration of respect for the opinion of an adversary is solemnly offered, while all the time the speaker is sedulously employed in withdrawing, one by one, the supports on which that opinion rests. With the most humble deference, and seeming unassumingness, he hears, considers, suggests, and queries, until the base of the opinion is wholly undermined, and it sinks into the bathos of the absurd. This is not merely refutation; it is the art of charming one in perfect confidence in his errors till he has been led into thickets and dangers altogether unperceived by him, and then to open his eyes to the manifest danger to which he has become exposed by his thoughtless trust and unreflectiveness. It then effects conviction by the surest process; for it merely reduces the opinion expressed to a supposed rather than a real danger, and then shows its untenableness and want of safety. The false security of mind, into which the fallacy lulled one, is exposed, and the inclination to retrace one's steps, and regain a fresh and firmer foundation, is irresistibly excited. This unmalignant, ironic dialectic, was the grand Socratic organon. Into the stiff, tame, formal, pedantic, and lifeless speculations of his age, he threw the stirring energy of his own intellectual being; and with the fresh and vigorous investigative processes of his logic, broke through the dull monotony and form of the Sophistic reasoning, and at once widened the boundaries, and inten-

sified the aims of philosophy, by introducing other rules of thought, and bringing within the limits of philosophy the long-exiled questions of the nature, duty, and destiny of man.

He never opened a school, nor did he deliver showy lectures, like the Sophists; neither did he stain his palm with the receipt of fees. He devoted himself to the self-imposed task of thinking, teaching, and controversy; to awaken the Greeks to inquiry rather than inquisitiveness; and to "arouse the sensual and the vain" among the Athenians to raptures of a newer and nobler kind—those which true knowledge yields. His surpassing capacity for clear explanation, ready suggestion, acute questioning, and unwearied thought, gave him an immense advantage over the Sophists, and made him the antagonist of every false appearance, and every conceit of knowledge.

This last statement leads us to mention, that though we have explained the dialectical irony which Socrates employed as consisting of a continuous *stratum* of apparent coincidence of thought with a *substratum* of real hostility, we do not intend to intimate that there was any dishonest seeming in his style of controversy. It had always a double meaning in it, but it had no double dealing. The great tact he possessed in so doubling his thought as to bring out, at once and invariably, a test-instance which possessed an apparent congruence with his respondent's theory or thought, and yet, in reality, was fully charged with a destruction-dealing potency, is one of the marvels of this great man's nature. The firm hold which, amid all his vivacity, humour, pleasantry, and even equivogue, he held of the leading thought or principle which he had in view, was most extraordinary, and his faith in the method of ironic controversy was so great, that he could even surrender himself to the passing current of the moment, and converse on any and every conceivable topic, in the full confidence that out of the talk would arise an opportunity of insisting upon and impressing the great moral truths about which he was most concerned, and which also most concerned man as man.

This strength of mind and purpose might, if we rightly understood it, enable us to comprehend the much vexed question of the genius or "demon of Socrates." This extraordinary faculty of judgment—which so unerringly, intuitively, almost even instinctively, led him to apprehend and know results from an acquaintance with their antecedents—which gave to him almost the power of prophecy, always the capacity to decide and determine—which he had learned to look upon as his unfailing help in argument, and his infallible guide in life—was it in reality natural or supernatural? When he looked abroad upon the flighty, unsettled, fickle Athenians, "tossed about with every wind of doctrine," and veering continually as the tenor of a discourse changed; when he conversed with the reputed wisdom-mongers of his day, and found them each opposing the other, and yet unable to give him explicit and unequivocal grounds for the belief they strove to inculcate on the minds of men; when he saw

worships, politics, parties, &c., changing to suit the changing fashions of the time, and yet felt within himself a spirit of fixed and firm-built faith—an instantaneous decisiveness of thought—a resolutely unswerving method of life,—what could he fancy but that there was in him a something, an agency, a spirit, which was not equally operant in other men. The very earnestness and force of his imagination, the very power and intensity of his intellect, would give a feeling of inspiration to him at some moments; and he would fancy, in these supreme hours of thought,—as the poet in his rapt and excited moods fables himself submissive to the muse—that a Divine teacher whispered to his soul, that a wisdom higher than man's spoke in his thoughts, and that his genius really taught him to distinguish *false* from *true*.

An idea, something like this, was mooted in the early ages, in the Platonic schools. Apuleius, in "The Demon of Socrates," says: "According to a certain definition, the human soul, even when it is still located in the body, is called a demon."

"Dine hunc ardorem mentibus addunt
Euryale?—an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido?" *

If, then, this is the case, a longing of the soul, that is of good tendency, is a "good demon." Similarly, Olympiodorus, in his *Scholia* on the *First Alcibiades* of Plato, says:—"The allotted demon is *conscience*, which is the *consummate flower* of the soul." Menander, the Greek poet, who was a pupil of Theophrastus, the successor of Aristotle, gives currency to a similar thought. One of his fragments is to this effect:—

"To every mortal, *conscience* is a god."

Many ingenious hypotheses have been framed upon this topic, ranging from lunacy to inspiration,—a pretty wide sweep of the pendulum, unless, indeed, we consent to believe,—despite the eloquent disclaimer recently produced in *Blackwood's Magazine*, that—

"Great wit to madness nearly is allied."

But the most rational, and withal the most consonant with the Socratic life, is that which we have attempted to suggest here. "We ought to understand that this seeming was once a reality; that not poetic allegory, least of all that dupery and deception, was the origin of it. Men, I say, never did believe idle songs; never risked their soul's life on allegories." "Let us try if, in our elucidation of them, we cannot convince ourselves that such things were not refuges of lies, but that there was a kind of fact at the heart of them; that they, too, were not mendacious and distracted, but, in their own poor way, true and sane." The hypothesis

- * "Do the gods, O Euryalus! add this ardour to our souls?
Or does each one's strong-felt desire become to him a god?"

Virgil's Æneid, IX. 184—5.

we support seems best to secure this desirable point, and, therefore, seems to us the best attainable one.

Hastily and inefficiently, we feel, have we run over the most marked characteristics of the Socratic philosophy. So grand a theme was worthy of greater care, and more extended exposition. Much space might be occupied with debateable and debated topics to little purpose. We have sought to seize upon the salient points, and to present these to the reader. We have endeavoured, however ineffectively, to indicate the place of Socrates as a thoughtman among the thinkers of ancient—of all times,—and we do not scruple now to endorse the estimate of Mitford:—"The singular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and usefulness of his manners and conversation; the clearness with which he saw, and the steadiness with which he practised, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the disinterestedness and the zeal with which he devoted himself to the benefit of others; and the enlarged and warm benevolence; whence his supreme and only pleasure seems to have consisted in doing good. The purity of Christian morality—little enough, indeed, seen in practice,—nevertheless is become so familiar in theory, that it passes almost for obvious, and even congenial to the human mind. Those only will justly estimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who will take the pains to gather, as they may, from the writings of his contemporaries and predecessors, how little conception of it was entertained before his time; how dull to a just moral sense the human mind has really been; how slow the progress in the investigation of the moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greatest abilities zealously employed; and when discovered, how difficult it has been to establish them by proofs beyond controversy, or proofs even that would be generally admitted by the reason of men. It is through the light diffused by his doctrine, enforced by his practice, with the advantage of having both the doctrine and practice exhibited to the highest advantage in the incomparable writings of disciples such as Xenophon and Plato, that his life forms an era in the history of Athens and of men." S. N.

The bibliography of works on Socrates is very extensive. We recall, at present, as among the most useful and interesting, in addition to those already quoted and referred to, Wigger's "Life of Socrates;" Stapfer's article, "Socrates," in the "Biographie Universelle," as well as his monograph, Berne, 1786, "De Philosophia Socratis;" Heller's "Socrates," Frankfort, 1789; Gilbert Cooper's "Life of Socrates," London, 1749; the chapters on "Socrates," in Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," second edition; Potter's "Socrates and Plato," the article, *sub voce*, by Janet, in the "Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques;" and by Brandis, in Smith's "Dictionary of Classical Biography," &c. A great collection of other references are to be found in Tennemann's "Manual of the History of Philosophy" (Bohn), and in several works referred to above. They need not, therefore, be mentioned here.

Religion.

IS THE CATHOLIC RULE OF FAITH TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

As all the principal objections of the negative side have been disposed of by J. H., I propose, in the present article, to notice the paper of "Lex Scripta," which appeared in the last Number, and then to lay before the reader a summary of the reasoning generally employed to demonstrate the Catholic Rule of Faith, in order to supply a connecting link between the articles which have appeared on the affirmative side.

The purport of "Lex Scripta's" article is to show that the affirmative writers have assumed many points without demonstrating them. He goes through the articles of his opponents, and wherever he meets with a passing allusion to a Catholic doctrine, he insists upon the proof of that doctrine. If a simple historical fact is mentioned, he insists upon having the evidence for that fact. If the Papacy is alluded to, he asks us to demonstrate that every single pontiff really did exist. If St. Timothy is alluded to as a bishop, he would compel us to go into the controversy between Episcopalians and Presbyterians. When "A Layman" quotes a number of passages from the early Fathers to show that *their* Rule of Faith was identical with that which Catholics now hold, "Lex Scripta" declares that "the whole article is based upon assumptions;" the "assumption" being, I suppose, that these authors really did exist, and that they wrote the works from which "A Layman" quotes. I do not know what the readers of the *British Controversialist* may think, but, to my mind, the mere subterfuge to which "Lex Scripta" seems obliged to have recourse, indicates his utter inability to answer our arguments on the question under discussion. I could very easily retort his accusation. His own article is full of the wildest assumptions. He tells us that a large number of the Roman Pontiffs were purely imaginary persons. Where is his proof? He tells us that the apostles did not deliver anything to their successors which they did not also commit to writing. Where, again, is his proof? In opposition to the testimony of every respectable historian, he tells us that St. Peter never was at Rome. Where is his proof? Do not all historians agree that he was martyred there, with St. Paul? Does not St. Peter himself inform us that he was there, in his first epistle (chap. v. 12, 13)? It would occupy too much space to attempt to expose even a few of the extravagant statements of which his article is composed; besides, I do not think that anything I could write would go far to convince a writer who threatens, if the editor can allow him another

article, to disprove a fact so patent to all the world as the *visibility* of the Catholic Church.

In accordance with my promise, I will now lay before the reader an abstract of the line of argument generally used to demonstrate the Catholic Rule of Faith.

Let us suppose that a Catholic, not content with the more compendious method whereby God brought him, through baptism, and early instruction, into the possession of the faith, were desirous of investigating the authority of its principles. He naturally commences with the Scripture; he takes up the Gospels, and submits them to examination. He abstracts, *for a moment*, from his belief in their inspiration and Divine authority; he looks at them simply as historical words, intended for his information. He finds, in the first place, that to these Gospels, whether considered in their substance or their form, are attached all those motives of human credibility which he can possibly require; that there is throughout them an absence of everything which might create a suspicion that there has either been a desire to deceive, or a possibility of having been mistaken. He finds a body of external testimony sufficient to convince him that they are documents produced at the time at which they profess to have been written, and that those persons were their authors whose names they bear. As the writers were eyewitnesses of what they relate, and give us in their lives and characters the strongest security of their veracity, he concludes that all they have recorded must be certain and true. We thus arrive at the discovery that, besides the mere narrative, they unfold to us a system of religion preached by One who wrought the most stupendous miracles to establish the Divinity of His mission. In other words, we are led, by the simple principle of human investigation, to an acknowledgment of the authority of Christ to teach as one who came from God; and we are thus led to the necessity of yielding implicit credence to whatever we find Him to have taught. So far the investigation, being one of outward and visible facts, cannot require anything more than ordinary historical or human evidence.

Having once established the Divine mission of Christ, we naturally ask, "What did Christ teach?" We find that He was not content with teaching certain general principles of morality—that He was not satisfied with unfolding to mankind doctrines such as none before Him had attempted to teach, and thereby making man acquainted with his own fallen nature and his future destiny, but that, moreover, He adopted means to preserve those doctrinal communications to mankind. He selects a certain body of men; He invests them with great authority and power; He makes them a promise of remaining with them, and teaching among them, till the end of time. From the very words of the commission which Christ gave to His apostles, we conclude that there exists now, and that there will exist to the end of time, a corresponding institution for the preservation of those doctrines, and for the perpetuation of

those blessings which our Lord came to communicate; and moreover, that this institution, in consequence of its being guided by Christ and His Spirit, delivers these doctrines to us inviolate.

Thus, merely proceeding by historical reasoning, such as would lead an infidel to believe in Christ's superior mission, we come, from the word of Christ, whom historical motives oblige us to believe, to acknowledge the existence of a body, the depository of those doctrines which He came to establish among men. This body we call the Church. From the moment we are satisfied that Christ has appointed a succession of men, whose province it is, by aid of a supernatural assistance, to preserve inviolate those doctrines which God has delivered,—from that moment, whatever this body of men teaches, is invested with that divine authority which we had acknowledged in Christ upon the evidence of His miracles.

The Church now takes upon herself the office of teaching, and informs us that the sacred volume, which we had hitherto been treating as mere history, commands a greater degree of respect and attention than any human motives could possibly bestow. She says, "Under that guarantee of Divine assistance, which the words of Christ, in whom you believe, have given me, I proclaim that this book is the revealed Word of God, and is inspired by the Holy Spirit, and that it contains all that has a right to enter into the sacred collection." It is thus that we arrive, on the authority of the Church, at those two important doctrines of the canon and inspiration of Scripture, which, as several writers endeavoured to show in the preceding debate, could not be proved by any course of ordinary human investigation.

Having thus arrived at the fact of the inspiration of the Bible, we open it, and find that it confirms the authority of the Church. In the prophecies, we find God saying of the Christian Church, "I will direct their work in truth, and I will make an everlasting covenant with them (Isa. lxi. 8)." "The eyes of the blind shall be opened, and a highway shall be there, and it shall be called the way of holiness . . . so that fools shall not err therein" (Isa. xxxv. 5). "There shall come a Redeemer to Zion . . . as for me, this is my covenant with them, *my Spirit that is in thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth*, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, from henceforth and for ever" (Isa. lix. 20, &c.). And turning to the New Testament, we find a distinct promise that the Spirit of God shall guide the Church into all truth for ever (John xiv. 6—17, and xvi. 13). We find, in consequence of this promise, that the apostles prefaced a doctrinal decision with the words, "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us" (Acts xv.); words which are used for the same purpose in the Catholic Church to this very day.—We find it promised that "the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church," which is Christ's kingdom. "The Church of the living God, the *pillar and ground of truth*" (1 Tim. iii. 15).

Our reason, moreover, tells us that a Church which could teach

error is evidently unworthy of a good God. He who was so solicitous to save, as that He sent His only Son to die for us, could not commit us to the blind guidance of an erring, fallible teacher. To have true faith, we must have a teacher that cannot err. Christ does not teach us himself personally, the apostles have long since left the world; the Bible is only an infallible guide when infallibly interpreted; and what individual can pretend to this gift? Private interpretation of the Scripture is made, as we may see by looking around us, to teach every absurdity. It therefore remains that the infallible teacher, which the necessities of man require, can be no other but that Church which was appointed to teach all nations by Christ Himself.

I have been at the trouble to go thus minutely into the subject, because our friend "Lex Scripta" has said that our demonstrations have been all along founded upon mere assumptions. I have given a bird's-eye view of the whole argument: point out an unwarrantable assumption, if you can.

And now I must conclude. For nearly twelve months we have been discussing the two questions upon which all the differences between Catholics and Protestants are founded, questions upon the right solution of which our salvation depends. Both sides, no doubt, have written words which, upon mature deliberation, they would gladly withdraw; both sides have, no doubt, been guilty of occasional *lapsus penne*; but nevertheless, the discussion has been conducted, I am happy to say, with an amount of good feeling and moderation which is rare in religious polemics.

"And if any one should have felt his previous system of faith, even in its smallest part, shaken, let it be but a reason with him to try the security of the whole building. If some small cloud shall appear to have cast a shadow over the serenity of his former conviction, oh! let him not scorn or neglect it, for it may be like that which the prophet commanded his servant to watch from Carmel—rich with blessing, and fertility, and refreshment to the soul that thirsts for truth."*

IGNATIUS.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

As the present debate has been viewed as a continuation, under another aspect, of the preceding one,† so we shall, in this reply, take a comparative review of both; for by so doing, we shall have a clearer comprehension of the whole subject, and be more likely to form correct opinions upon it. We purpose, therefore, laying down a few general principles by which to test the soundness of the arguments adduced to establish the claims of each party. Our limited space forbids us entering minutely into all the arguments brought forward; but we hope our readers will *study* both the debates with calmness and a sincere desire to arrive at the truth, and we have no fear as to the result.

* Cardinal Wiseman.

† Vol. XII. Digitized by Google

Our first inquiry should be, What is a Rule of Faith? H. B. says, "By the term 'Rule' I understand a *measure* or standard by which we may compare or try a thing, thus testing its correctness. A Rule of Faith, therefore, must be that *measure* by which we are to regulate not only the *agenda*, or things to be done, but also the *credenda*, or things to be believed." This definition is a good one; and the sixth article of the Church of England limits the Protestant Rule of Faith to the Holy Scriptures. But the Church of Rome says that her "Rule of Faith is the *whole Word of God*, viz., Holy Scripture and Divine traditions" (p. 15). This definition does not contain the whole of it; for the *Douay* note to 2 Tim. iii. 16, says:—"But if we would have the *whole* rule of Christian faith and practice, we must not be content with those Scriptures which Timothy knew from his infancy, that is, the Old Testament alone, nor yet with the New Testament, without taking along with it the '*traditions*' of the apostles and the '*interpretations*' of the Church, to which the apostles delivered the book, and the true meaning of it." This note assumes the Apocrypha to be part of the Old Testament, though it is well known that it does not and never did form any part of the Jewish Scriptures; and to the Jews were committed the oracles of God (Rom. iii. 2). It will be seen from this, that the *statement* of "Ignatius" (p. 15) concerning the "Catholic Rule of Faith," though taken from the decree of the Council of Trent, is *faulty*; or else some one has added the "*interpretations* of the Church" to "*the whole Word of God*, viz., Holy Scripture and Divine traditions." We should like to know by what authority this was done. From this statement it will also be evident that both Protestants and Roman Catholics are agreed respecting the Divine inspiration and authority of the BIBLE; and that they are *not* agreed respecting the Divine authority of the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations" of the Romish Church.

This leads us to inquire, What truth or truths ought we to have assumed as the basis of our propositions and arguments in these debates? First, we ought to have assumed that a Divine Rule of Faith was necessary for man; second, that God has given him one; and third, that the Holy Scriptures are divinely inspired. Respecting the first two we need say nothing at present, but believing, as both parties do, in the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, we perceive the fallacy of "Ignatius" in laying down the "complicated and laborious inquiry" on p. 99 of the last volume. Were we discussing the Divine inspiration of the Bible with an *infidel*, such an inquiry might be instituted by him with propriety; but for one who believes the truth of these things equally with his opponent, to require *him* to do so, is "mere cavilling and captious trifling." Nor do we think an infidel would, like "Ignatius," illogically conclude that because the Bible has no proof of its Divine inspiration is itself in not having "a list of inspired books," that, therefore, the Bible alone is not a sufficient Rule of Faith (p. 104, vol. xii.).

Assuming, then, that the Bible is divinely inspired, we are led

to inquire, Is the Bible, without the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations" of the Romish Church, sufficient to guide man to heaven? or, in other words, Does it contain all doctrinal truths necessary to be believed, and all precepts necessary to be obeyed, in order to secure eternal salvation? If it does not, Are the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations" of the Romish Church divinely inspired? The *onus* of proving the Bible *alone* sufficient rests upon us Protestants; and the *onus* of proving the Divine authority of the Apocrypha, the "traditions" and "interpretations," rests upon our opponents.

As we both believe the Bible to be the Word of God, we ought to receive its testimony and authority as unquestionable in these debates. But while our opponents appeal to the Bible to try to show its insufficiency as a Rule of Faith, they coolly say to us, "But it is to no purpose at all to refer to the Bible for any proofs, without you first prove the genuineness, authenticity, and inspiration of it. Until this is done, argument is useless" (p. 383, vol. xii.). It is evident, even from this "captious trifling," that they feel the force of our appeals to the Divine authority of the Word of God; and also that they are obliged to admit the legitimacy of proofs from the Bible when its inspiration is acknowledged. And since this very point is *necessarily assumed* by us both, we shall perceive the propriety of H. B.'s proposition (p. 11, vol. xii.), namely:—"Because the Bible bears testimony to its own sufficiency as a rule of faith, and the Bible being the Word of God, its testimony must be true." This is not *naively* begging the question of the canon and inspiration of the Bible, as asserted by "Augustine," but *properly assuming* the truth of what we both believe in, and appeal to as an authority on the subject.

We shall not be able to notice the arguments adduced in the previous debate further than to briefly reply to the article of "A Layman," which "Gregory" says, "has hardly been noticed by subsequent affirmative writers." "A Layman" asserts "*that the Divine Rule of Faith must necessarily be both CLEAR and INFALLIBLE* (p. 164). "Gregory" says, "*that if the Bible be so clear, it must teach EVERY ONE with UNERRING certainty the SAME BELIEF.*" Putting this and that together, it amounts to the following syllogism, namely:—

The Divine Rule of Faith must be so *clear* and *infallible*, as to teach *every one* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*.

The Bible does *not* teach *every Protestant* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*. Therefore the Bible is *not* the Divine Rule of Faith.

We reply as follows:—

The Divine Rule of Faith must be so *clear* and *infallible*, as to teach *every one* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*.

The Bible, with the Apocrypha, "traditions," and "interpretations" of the Romish Church, do *not* teach *every Roman Catholic* with *unerring* certainty the *same belief*.

Therefore *these* together are NOT *the Divine Rule of Faith*.

Having thus shown the fallacy and absurdity of "A Layman's" proposition, on which his arguments depend, it is needless further to notice his paper.

We now turn to a review of the present debate; and in so doing, cannot but express the astonishment we felt when reading our opponents' articles, at the assumption of everything essential to establish the "truth" of their Rule of Faith. We fully agree with "Lex Scripta" that they have based assumption upon assumption—assuming all the points on which this controversy hinges. And we hope to make this apparent to our readers before we conclude.

We have shown that that portion of our opponents' Rule of Faith which is disputed is the Apocrypha, the "traditions," and "interpretations," and that the only *indisputable* authority to which we can both appeal, is the BIBLE. We also showed that these controverted points depended upon the question or fact of Peter being the *rock* of that Church. And although "Ignatius" (p. 17) lays great stress upon its *infallibility*, and "Gregory" (p. 88) says:—"He (Christ) declares that it is to be founded upon a *rock*, which name He bestows upon the disciple who was to be the HEAD and KEYSTONE of it, and that 'the gates of hell should not prevail against it;'" and although "A Layman" (p. 160) quotes from S. Cyprian, a reference to the same passage of Scripture, and from S. Jerome and Augustine, references to the authority of *the chair of Peter*, i.e., his *supremacy*; yet "Gregory" (p. 92) says:—"Theophylact' has endeavoured to show that S. Peter was not the *head* of the apostles, nor the *rock* of the Church. *This has nothing to do with the question.* The primacy of S. Peter might form the subject of a separate debate, but it certainly is not the Catholic Rule of Faith." Why, then, did "Gregory" and others refer us to the *infallibility* of the Church and the *supremacy* of Peter as the *ground* of the "truth" of their Rule of Faith? And why did "Gregory," with our article before him, instead of answering our arguments on Matt. xvi. 18, quote it, and then say:—"I have written my article without using those texts which 'Theophylact' conceives Catholics rely upon to prove their Rule of Faith?" *Error* is always *inconsistent* with *itself* as well as with TRUTH. Why did he not try to prove that *his Church* might be *infallible*, although the *rock* or *head* of it were *fallible*? We argued (p. 22) that the *infallibility* of the Church would depend upon that of the *rock* upon which it was built. The house built on the *sand* perished, *because* it was built on the *sand*; while that built upon the *rock* withstood the storm and tempest, *because* it was founded upon the *rock*. But "Gregory," after denying the *infallibility* of the Pope, and asserting the *fallibility* of Peter and the other apostles, affirms that the Church, built upon *poor fallible Peter*, (only think of a *fallible head* and *keystone*!) is an *infallible Church*. The summary of this is, that "Gregory" first *asserts* or *assumes* that Peter was the *head*, *rock*, or *keystone* of Christ's Church; he then affirms that *this has nothing to do with the*

question at issue; next, he denies the *infallibility* of *Peter* and the *Pope*, and then, lastly, *assumes* that the Church, built upon *fallible Peter*, supported by a *fallible keystone*, and governed by a *fallible head*, the *Pope*, is an *infallible Church*! By what rules of logic he deduces such a conclusion from his contradictory premises we know not; but we do know that this shows the *hollowness of the grounds* of his Rule of Faith, and the *worthlessness of his assumptions*.

We now notice the fact that not one of our opponents has offered a word in reply to our arguments (pp. 23, 24) respecting the *Divine* authority of the Apocrypha. We there showed that inasmuch as *they* affirm the Jewish Church to be *infallible*, and thence argue the *infallibility* of their own, so, by their own confession, the Jewish Church was *infallibly* right, when they, on the grounds adduced, did not receive the Apocrypha. And though our opponents should prove the "truth" of the other controverted points, yet until they show *their infallible right* to set aside the *infallible decisions* of the Jewish Church in this matter, the fact will still remain that the "Catholic Rule of Faith is not true."

We have showed that the *onus* of proving the *Divine* authority of the controverted points rests upon our opponents, and we have just seen that, respecting one of them, they have not offered a single word in proof. Regarding the others, they have based their arguments upon the assumption of their Church being *exclusively* the *Catholic* or *Universal Church* of Christ; and that, *as such*, she cannot teach *error*. Both these assumptions our readers will perceive are false and groundless; for the term *Catholic* is, and always has been, denied to belong to the Church of Rome exclusively; and as long as the Greek and other churches remain in existence, or on the page of history, over whom the Romish Church *never did* exercise jurisdiction, and whose existence was antecedent or coeval with that of Rome, the absurdity and baselessness of such an assumption will be apparent. But even this assumption is based upon another, which is the *supremacy of Peter*, and this we showed in our opening article to be "as baseless as the fabric of a vision."

On page 26, "Gregory" says:—"I shall, therefore, proceed to show that the authority upon which a Catholic believes in Christianity is founded upon truth; and that the Church, whose Rule of Faith we are now discussing, is the *true Church*, and, in consequence, teaches us the *true faith*." The "authority" on which a Catholic believes Christianity is that of his Church; consequently, "Gregory" undertakes to prove that it is founded upon truth. He is next to show that it is the *true Church*, and that, *consequently*, no *error* is taught therein. We have already shown that the Romish Church cannot be *EXCLUSIVELY* the *true Church*, but that she is a *part* of the Universal or Catholic Church we admit and maintain. We also maintain that a *TRUE Church* may fall away—may teach error. Were we to assert the opposite, we should give the lie to the plain facts of history. Was not the Jewish Church a *true Church*? and did not our Lord himself charge its members with "teaching for

doctrines the commandments of men—making the Word of God of none effect through their tradition? Mark vii. 7. The Galatian Church was a *true* Church, yet they fell into error in teaching the necessity of circumcision and the observance of the Mosaic law. Those of Pergamos and Thyatira were true Churches, yet they, even in apostolic times, taught error. And what is the Church of Rome more than they? That the Romish Church has taught errors we believe is indisputable. Let our readers judge by comparing the teaching of the BIBLE and the CHURCH OF ROME on pp. 25, 26. We think, then, that we have shown the fallacy of "Gregory's" proposition, and that all his arguments founded thereon are therefore fallacious.

Respecting the *visibility, unity, catholicity, holiness, and apostolicity*, which "Gregory" claims as the property of his Church, we have not time nor space to enlarge upon. We must leave them with our readers; but we hope they will bear in mind that though all these marks were true of the Romish Church, they would not prove her to be *exclusively* the Church of Christ, nor yet make her incapable of teaching error. It is one thing to *claim* these marks, and another thing to prove the *possession* of them. Those who are acquainted with Church history will readily call to mind periods which will give the lie to the possession of these by the Romish Church. Just one instance, and we close this topic. "Gregory" says:—"Although the Church invites her children to *practise holiness*, it has not, of course, *the power to COMPEL*. *It is left, as God leaves our own salvation, in our own hands, to accept or reject AS WE THINK PROPER*" (p. 90). We ask, then, *why* the persecutions and wholesale slaughters of the Waldenses and Albigenses because they refused to submit to the Pope, and preferred to be guided by the simple Word of God, as their forefathers had been? *Why* the massacre of St. Bartholomew? *Why* the blazing fires of Smithfield? *Why* the Inquisition of Spain and Rome? *WHY all these* if the Church of Rome be holy, and her children left "to accept or reject as they think proper"? The marks of holiness, &c., are made the *ground* of the "truth" of the Catholic Rule of Faith. Hence the hollowness of that ground and the falsity of her Rule of Faith.

On page 167, "A Layman" asserts that the Church of Rome was in the possession of the true faith during the lifetime of the apostle Paul. But surely he does not infer therefrom that she has it *now*. He asks *when* the Church of Rome fell into error. Shall we conclude that because a sick man cannot tell *how* or *when* he received the seeds of his complaint, that he is not sick, or that he is not so because *we* cannot tell? But if we bring plain and strong evidence from the Scriptures that the Church of Rome *now* teaches doctrines contrary to the Word of God, no sensible man would doubt of her having fallen into error, although neither he nor we might be able to tell *when* this error first arose.

The quotations which he has given us from the Fathers, Irenæus, Cyprian, Origen, Jerome, and Augustine, seem to have small

connection with the subject of debate. There is little in them from which any Protestant need dissent. Most of these extracts do not refer to the Church of Rome at all; while the utmost that can be proved from the remainder is that the writers agreed with the doctrines which were *then* taught by her. Not one of these Fathers held the Rule of Faith of the present Church of Rome. Irenæus writes of the heretics of his time, that,

"When reproved with the Scriptures, they begin to accuse the Scriptures as if they were not correct, nor of authority; and as if they were ambiguous, and as if the truth might not be discovered from them by those who knew not tradition."*

Hear Cyprian. In the celebrated controversy between him and Pope Stephen, respecting the re-baptization of those baptized by heretics, it was pleaded by Stephen that "tradition" was against it. To this Cyprian replies,—

"Whence is that tradition? Does it descend from Dominical and Evangelical testimony, or does it come from the commands and epistles of the Apostles? For God declares that those things are to be done that are *written*. . . . If, therefore, it is either commanded in the Gospel, or contained in the Epistles or Acts of the Apostles, let that divine and holy tradition be observed."†

Hear Origen:—

"We must take the Scriptures as witnesses. For our doctrines and interpretations, without such witness, are not to be believed."‡

We recommend the following to the special attention of J. H.:—

"Ye ought to know that the things read from the sacred volumes are worthy of being uttered by the Holy Spirit; but we need the grace of the Holy Spirit to interpret them."§

Hear Jerome:—

"The other things also, which they find and feign of themselves, without the authority and testimonies of the Scriptures, as if by apostolical tradition, the sword of God smites down."||

"As we deny not these things that are written, so we reject those things that are not written. That God was born of a virgin we believe, because we read it; that Mary married after the birth, we believe not, because we read it not."¶

Hear Augustine:—

"Either with respect to Christ, or His Church, or anything else whatever, that pertains to your faith or life, I will not say 'we;' because we are by no means to be compared to him who said, 'Although we;' but certainly I will say what he has followed it up with, If an angel from heaven shall have preached to you anything beyond what ye have received in the Scriptures of the Law and the Gospel, let him be anathema."**

* Adv. Hær. lib. 3.

† Epist. ad Pompeium. Oxon. 1682.

‡ Hom. in Jer.

§ Hom. in Josh.

|| In Aggæum, c. 1.

¶ Adv. Helvid.

** Contra litt. Petil. lib. 3.

"A Layman" next proceeds to inform "*Lex Scripta*" that, on reference to any book of instruction used by Catholics, he will find that "every degree of honour is to be paid to the Blessed Virgin, save Divine honour." In a book of instruction not much used by Catholics, "A Layman" will find that every degree of religious honour is to be paid to God alone—none to any creature:—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with *all* thy heart, and with *all* thy soul, and with *all* thy mind, and with *all* thy strength," (Mark xii. 30.) "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him *only* shalt thou serve," (Matt. iv. 10.)

We fear, however, that such references may be distasteful to "A Layman." Perhaps the following may suit him better:—

"I will confess thee, O Lady, because thou hast hid these things from the wise, and hast revealed them unto babes. Thy glory has covered the heavens, and the earth is full of thy mercy. O Blessed Virgin, thou savest whom thou wilt, and he from whom thou turnest thy face dies."

"O Lady, permit me not to be delivered over to the fury of God, that I be not judged in His anger. Incline the face of thy Son towards us; *oblige* Him to have pity on the sinners."

"The world remains by thy *Providence*; for it is *Thou who at the beginning founded it together with God!* I am wholly thine: O Lady, save me."

The author of the above blasphemies is a canonized saint of the Church of Rome. On the 14th of July in each year, every Romish priest thus prays:—"O God, who didst give blessed Bonaventure to thy people for a minister of eternal salvation, grant, we beseech Thee, that he who was the instructor of our life here on earth may become our intercessor in heaven." The "*Psalter of St. Bonaventure*," from which we have quoted these passages (almost at random), is a book in extensive use on the continent. Ten editions of it were issued at Rome, from 1834 to 1844, with the express sanction of the last Pope, Gregory XVI.; and other editions during the present pontificate, with the official imprimatur.

"A Layman" next affirms that "the power of the Pontiffs to grant 'Indulgences to sin' has never existed, save in the imagination of such Protestants as '*Lex Scripta*.'" For the better information of "A Layman," we quote the following from the decretals of Pope Gregory IX.:—*

"De adulteris vero et aliis criminibus quæ sunt minora, potest Episcopus cum clericis post peractam penitentiam dispensare." "But of adulteries and other lesser crimes, the bishops may grant dispensation to the clergy after penance has been performed."

The passages quoted by J. H. on page 224 are all very well in their place, to prove the universality of the mission of the apostles,

* Lib. ii. cap. iv. Paris, 1595.

and the perpetuity of Christ's presence with His ministers and church throughout all ages; but until J. H. has proved the *exclusive claim* of the *Church of Rome* to these promises, we must still say that they are claimed upon unwarrantable assumptions. Instead of our having to prove that Christ has failed in His promises to His Church, in order to prove the fallibility of the Romish Church, our opponents must prove the *exclusive right* to every one of them.

In answer to the objection of J. H. respecting the meanings of *Petros* and *Petra*, we observe, that although the vernacular language in which our Saviour spoke was the Syro-Chaldaic, and although it possessed but one word, *KIPHOE*, to express both *rock* and *stone*, yet the language in which the apostles wrote must guide us, and form our authority as to the *true* meaning of these words; because they, being *inspired* men, would not give us a wrong meaning; if they did, they would teach *error*; and although the *French* is in the same predicament as the Syro-Chaldaic, yet we are happy to say that the *Latin* is not so faulty. And surely our opponents will not reject the authority of their own *Vulgate*! Listen to its voice:—*"Et ego autem tibi dico, quia tu es PETRUS, et super hac PETRA,"* &c. The word *Petrus* is a noun masculine, and *petra* a noun feminine.

We need not say anything respecting the two columns of comparative teachings of the BIBLE and ROME, since no one has attempted to reconcile them. But respecting the quotation from "The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary Liguori!" we remark, that we should have heard no complaint from J. H., had there not occurred a typographical error. If our friends and J. H. will put a period after *Mary*, it will read thus:—"The Liturgy of the Heart of Mary. Liguori." We understand that Liguori was made a saint in the year 1839, and that Cardinal Wiseman assisted at the *operation*.

In reply to the grave charge of quoting from books which do exist passages which they do not contain, we plead NOT GUILTY; and justify our plea by observing, that we did not quote *direct* from Bellarmine's work, but from Poole's "Dialogues," published by the "Religious Tract Society," 1839, and that we gave the *page* of the book by saying "*Ibid.*" If the work of Bellarmine does not really contain the words, and NEVER did, Matthew Poole is to blame, and not ourselves. But we find at the beginning of the book the following notice:—"Reprinted from the last edition, as corrected and amended by the author. In this reprint the texts have been verified." Matthew Poole flourished in the times of the Commonwealth and Charles II., so that this has been before the world long enough to be detected of fraud if he be guilty of it. Besides Matthew Poole, we have the testimony of the Rev. Charles Leslie, a contemporary of our authority, for the existence of the passage in Bellarmine's work extant at that time. In Leslie's "Short and Easy Method with the Deists," (chap. xi.) we have the following passage:—"This was the current doctrine (namely, *infallibility*) of

the divines in the Church of Rome in former ages, as you may see in Bellarmine (*De Rom. Pontif.*, l. iv. c. 5), where he carries this so high as to assert, that if the Pope did command the practice of vice and forbid virtue, the Church were bound to believe that virtue was vice, and that vice was virtue. And in his preface he calls this absolute supremacy of the Pope the *summa rei Christiana*—the sum and foundation of the Christian religion; and that to deny it was not only a simple error, but a pernicious *heresy*." So that, on the testimony of these two gentlemen, we are bound to believe that Bellarmine's work did originally contain the passage to which J. H. objects. We know that there is such a practice as *expunging* from works such passages as are obnoxious; and though the work of Bellarmine should not *now* contain the passage in question, it *may* have contained it; and our opponents have to prove against this, our evidence, *that it never did*. We must now leave our case with our jury of readers to decide whether we have or not substantiated our plea of NOT GUILTY. One thing will be evident to all, namely, that J. H. charges Cardinal Bellarmine with *impiety*, and the Cardinal condemns J. H. with being guilty of *heresy*. So much for the *unity* of our opponents.

In conclusion, we say to the supporters of the Romish Church—When you have proved the points assumed by you throughout this debate—namely, the *Divine* authority of the *Apocrypha*, the *Supremacy* of *Peter* and the *Pope*, the *Catholicity* of your Church, and its *Infallibility*,—we shall be bound to believe your Rule of Faith to be "*true*;" but not till then. And all our readers we exhort, in the words of John Locke, to "study the Holy Scriptures, and especially the New Testament: therein are contained the words of eternal life. It has God for its author, salvation for its end, and truth without any mixture of error for its matter."

THEOPHYLACT.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HAVING stated in a previous article the grounds on which we consider the Development Theory entitled to be received as true, we proceed to examine what has as yet been advanced in opposition. We find "L'Ouvrier" admitting that the propounders of the theory are animated by "an ardent love of God's great and wonderful work of nature" (p. 175), and yet asserting that the principles which they advocate ascribe to "nature a power to override and render nugatory the great First Cause of being, the intelligent Creator of

the universe, which is a species of reckless daring, amounting to blasphemous impiety" (p. 245). We are at a loss to see how those accused of such impiety can be actuated by such love. And, with equal consistency, he assures us that he is "not of that number who would fear the results of the Development Theory, if generally received as truth," though "blasphemous impiety" characterizes it, and though it be a "futile, fallacious folly" (p. 245). We pass over these inconsistencies, as not affecting the question at issue, referring to them only as indicative of the amount of dependence to be placed on the assertions of our antagonist.

In his first article, "L'Ouvrier" combats the supposition that inorganic matter may become organic by natural law, and states that if such a change were the law of nature, "we should at least be able to see some plainly marked instance . . . within the limits of the historic era" (p. 178). We might, with equal reason, demand a modern instance of inorganic matter becoming organic by creative act. The absence of an historic instance of either kind, does not disprove either of the two theories which profess to explain the commencement of life; and indeed, it may be said rather to favour the Development Theory. For it is manifestly unreasonable to claim a recent instance of matter becoming organized, of that theory which considers such a change to have occurred only when life first became existent, all other subsequent forms of life being developments therefrom; whereas, on the other hand, it is not at all unreasonable to suppose, that if organic beings have, during all ages, been constantly created from inorganic matter, historic instances may occur. According to our theory, the earth, after its creation by the Divine Being, existed for a considerable period in a state of chaos, quite incompatible with the presence of life, during which time, under the influence of physical law, it developed through a series of changes which ultimately rendered it suitable for the existence of life. At the arrival of the time when life became possible, that is, when the prevalent conditions no longer were such as to restrain certain inherent properties of matter, these latent forces became active, and inorganic matter, to the extent that the then conditions of external circumstances permitted, assumed organization. This view of the subject in no way militates against God's prerogative of creation; for the production of life in matter, by means of law, as one of the most essential attributes of matter, is as much originally referable to the Creator as would be successive creations subsequent to the great pristine creative act; and, giving credence to this theory, we deem an indication of much greater faith in the Omnipotence of nature's God, and much juster appreciation of the Divine skill, wisdom, and power displayed in creation, than is that exercised by those who, while allowing that the Creator has left the operations of the heavenly bodies to the inherent law of gravitation with which He has gifted the starry system, yet cavil to admit that He may have similarly gifted the integral parts of those systems with self-acting law for effecting their minor and less

momentous operations, and brand as guilty of "blasphemous impiety" those who feel that by so believing they most glorify the great Author of all things, whose grandest works are achieved by the simplest means.

"L'Ouvrier" very confidently asserts, with italicized emphasis, "that a germinal cell produces *its specific form* of vegetable or animal life, and *no other form*." Now, that this is not the fact, but, indeed, positive falsity, we have but to refer as proof to the existence of hybrids. It is a notorious fact that, not in a few exceptional cases, but in many well-authenticated instances, the germinal cell of a given species of animal, if submitted to the embryonic conditions of some other species, will produce an offspring different from either. We adduce this rather to show the erroneousness of a proposition on which our opponent lays stress, than as an illustration of development; for our theory does not claim, except, perhaps, in some instances, the origination of species by means of hybridization, though this phenomenon is useful, as confirmatory of the fact that elemental life, when exposed to an unaccustomed series of plastic circumstances, will assume a new form of organization. While on this topic, we will deal with the objection that hybrids are infertile. Now this we imagine to be a consequence of a non-continuance of the new conditions which gave rise to the new animal; for it is manifestly impossible that the germinal cell of a hybrid can be identical with that of its progenitor, neither can the embryonic conditions of a hybrid, to which it is subjected, resemble those which were influential in its own first stages of development. So that to bring forward the infertility of hybrids as antagonistic to the principles of development, is begging the question, for the very continuance of the changed conditions which is necessary for the permanent change of species, is unavoidably wanting in the intercourse of hybrids. We have already suggested the possibility of a structural modification following a change in the foetal conditions, to which the germ of life may be subjected (see p. 173*), and this is confirmed by the occurrence of hybrids.

We now proceed to examine what is advanced as an insuperable objection to the Development Theory. It is urged that organic traces found in the earliest rocks are those of highly organized animals, whereas the theory we advocate is assumed to require that development should invariably proceed from the simpler to the more complex organisms. We shall treat this objection in two ways:—First, by showing that proof is wanting that highly organized animals were the first to exist; and, secondly, by bringing forward the fact that development may be retrogressive as well as progressive.

* Line 24 from the top, on that page, should read, "without the agency," for "with the agency." In the last line of page 170, the comma should be between "designs, alike," instead of between "accuracy, all;" and at page 172, line 19 from the bottom, read "tends" for "sends."

First, then, we say that our opponents, by adducing instances of the fossil remains of animals that occur in the earlier formations, do not by any means substantiate the assertion that these were the first forms of life; for not only is their position ever open to the objection that a more ancient fossil of a lower order may be found to-morrow, geological research having been in no wise so extensive as to warrant positive induction; but,—and this is important,—the physical conditions prevalent at the time of the deposition of the earlier stratified rocks, though quite compatible with the existence of certain living organisms, were such as to destroy all organic forms when life became extinct, with the exception of only a few higher species whose more developed framework of bone resisted the decomposing influences at work. As the result of experiments conducted by Dr. Lindley, by immersing plants in water, with the view to ascertain the effect of certain natural causes in obliterating traces of their existence, “it was found that the dicotyledonous plants, in general, had wholly disappeared, whence it was inferred that they were unable to remain for two years in water without being totally decomposed. . . . Grasses and sedges had perished; whence it was inferred that we have no right to assume that the earth was not originally clothed with these, because we no longer find their remains. Fungi and mosses, and all the lowest forms of vegetation, had disappeared; even *equisetum* had left no traces behind.”* In the same way, the absence of the remains of the lower orders of animals is accounted for. Certain agencies, such as intense heat, were so active during the formation of the first deposits, that whole series of strata have become crystallized, and are hence known under the name of metamorphic rocks; so that little stress need be laid upon the non-preservation, under such circumstances, of the simpler forms of organization, the majority of which indeed have no bony structure. And it cannot be objected that these were circumstances in which life could not be sustained, for we know that great warmth, combined with a humid atmosphere, which must have resulted from the rapid evaporation consequent on such heat, are the very conditions most favourable to the existence of the inferior forms of animation. So that, if life existed at this period, and it may be taken as an axiom, that life is never absent where the conditions prevalent favour its presence—that Nature does “abhor a vacuum”—it must have been in those very forms whose preservation in a fossil state was impossible, not only on account of the conditions best adapted to that development, but also because of the very simplicity of their structure.

Then, secondly, we meet the objection under consideration by the fact that development need not necessarily be progressive, but may be the reverse. That is, the conditions requiring a new form of structure for the continuance of life may not be such as to require one more complex or more highly organized. The new form may

be simpler, and yet quite as perfectly adapted to the existent circumstances; and, though it may have developed from a higher order of organism, its development is quite as reasonable, and as much within the scope of our theory, as that development which is said to be progressive because it assumes at each successive stage a higher order of structure. The reader of Hugh Miller's "Footprints of the Creator," which was written to combat the Development Theory, will remember how frequently and emphatically he dwells upon the fact that each class of extinct animals, after having attained the acme of their existence by the occurrence of their most perfect forms, have been subsequently represented by a series of species gradually retrogressive, till the race became extinct. This fact, which is thought to militate so much against the Development Theory, we deem an argument in its favour; for after an organism has, through a series of species, reached that stage when the prevalent conditions are favourable to its highest development, it must manifestly follow that at the next change of conditions it must, to preserve its continuance, assume a form consistent with those new conditions; and being already at its highest stage of organism, a retrogressive development is the alternative of extinction. Let it be borne in mind, also, that the classification of animals, as of inferior and superior orders of life, is but, to a certain extent, an artificial scheme adopted by naturalists for convenience; and that, when a change in physical condition took place, it was by no means considered by Nature whether the new circumstances were such as should favour the existence of those animals and plants that were next on the list of Cuvier and Linnæus.

In conclusion, we will just refer to one of the absurdest and most frequent propositions advanced by the opponents of the Development Theory. It is put in this among other forms by "L'Ouvrier,"—"The fungi have never been observed to develop into the stately oak." Now it is almost unnecessary to state that we never supposed such a phenomenon possible. All that we assert is, that at one period of time a form of vegetation, very similar to the oak in structure, was subject to agencies which necessitated its assumption of that form as a *sine qua non* of its continued existence. By a long series of developments such as these, a connection may exist between these extremes of vegetation. But putting the connection in the abrupt form our opponent does, is only an exaggeration without logical purpose.

If in the foregoing remarks we have written anything calculated to annoy our opponent, such has been far from our intention. Our antagonism is to his opinions and not to himself. Admiring the tone of his article, we would imitate his courtesy, and if we have failed to do so, we sincerely regret it.

E. M., Jun.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WE have read with deep interest the articles which have already appeared in this debate, referring, as they do, to what has been

designated "the mystery of mysteries," viz., the exercise of creative power, in distinction from the results of animal instinct and the effects of surrounding circumstances. We cannot, however, but remark, at the outset, on the very meagre support which our opponents have been able to give to the Development Theory, and the very subdued tone in which they have spoken its praise. We cannot also but express our surprise, that neither of the preceding writers on this question have favoured us with a definition of the principal terms used in the debate; and we shall at once attempt to supply this their lack of service.

The word "Development" signifies an unfolding, and for some time was principally employed to express those organic changes which take place in animal and vegetable bodies, from their embryo state until they arrive at maturity; but it has at the present time a much wider application, and is of very frequent occurrence in the composition of our would-be-thought profound ones. By the Development Theory is meant that speculation of philosophers which attributes the present order of things, and the variety in plants and animals, to the working of certain laws impressed upon matter, rather than to the creative fiat of an all-wise and all-powerful God. Hence, in 1748, Demaillet propounded his theory of the origin of *different* kinds of animals from one another. He taught the direct *transmutation* of individuals, through altered circumstances and volitional impulses. By way of illustration, he supposed that a *flying fish*, blown on to land, might, by some efforts of its own, aided by some internal forces, become gradually metamorphosed into a bird! In 1809, Lamarck, a most profound naturalist, gave a more scientific aspect to this transmutation theory. "He supposed the necessary metamorphoses to occur, not in individuals, but in a *succession of individuals*, and to be produced by accumulated changes, the result of certain adaptations between long-continued alteration in external conditions, such as heat or cold, dryness or moisture, or other surrounding influences, and continuously inherited internal tendencies and powers of many generations of individuals." "He supposed that the whole series of animals commenced from two primordial stocks, viz., a worm, and an infusorial animalcule, the earliest beginnings of each of which originated in a direct or spontaneous generation! The former line he imagined to pass through worms, barnacles, and shell-fish; and the latter through infusorial monad, polypes, star-fish, insects, spiders, and crabs,—both to meet in fishes, from which the vertebrata, *including man*, were in gradual procession derived!"

In the year 1846 this theory attracted great attention by the publication of that clever but unsatisfactory book, the "Vestiges of Creation." It is unnecessary for us here to state the peculiar views advanced by the author of this work, as our friend, "L'Ouvrier" has already so fully noticed them (page 176). To show, however, the dangerous tendency of the book, we may remind our readers that it was published anonymously, and that a little time ago, a

popular author and publisher was most anxious to clear himself from the accusation of being concerned in its authorship!

The absurdity of this Development Theory, when stripped of its technical terms, is very apparent. Diaræli thus amusingly expounds it:—"You know," says he, "all is development. The principle is perpetually going on. First, there was—Nothing. Then there was—Something. Then (I forget the next) I *think* there were shells—then fishes—then we came. Let me see—*did* we come next? Never mind that; we came at last. And the next change there will be something very superior—something with wings! Ah! that's it: we were fishes; and I believe we shall be—crows!"

Ridicule appears a lawful weapon to employ in combating such hypotheses as these, and ably has a writer in a recent publication used it, a somewhat lengthened sample of which we are tempted to quote:—"You visit the monkeys in some great zoological collection. If yonder orang-otang or chimpanzee could speak, as animals used to do, in the days of the fabulists (and very sensibly, too, in general), what sort of an harangue would it deliver? 'Gentlemen of the human species,' it might say, 'You may laugh at us as much as you choose. *Quid vetat?* It is very true that we are clumsy, inelegant brutes. I admit it. Our arms are undoubtedly very long and ungainly. The toes of our feet are turned inwards, and in consequence we are compelled to waddle along in a rather facetious way. Our thick lips, wrinkled cheeks, and protruding snouts, do not exactly constitute the most prepossessing features in the world. I grant, too, that our facial angle—so your Mr. Camper called it, when he measured us with his callipers, as he pretended to do everything, from a mouse to a Bourbon—is shockingly small. In fact, I am free to confess, that my cousin, the baboon, yonder, is as hideous a fellow as ever lived. And our habits, you say, are low and grovelling? By no means improbable! We don't pretend to be fit creatures to sit down at fine tables, or lounge in gilded drawing-rooms. But what of all this? Just a word in your ear, gentlemen. Are you aware that you and we have come from the same stock, that we are all descended from one common ancestor; that we, vile, despicable brutes, as you deem us, are, in truth, bone of your bone, and flesh of your flesh? Yes, my dainty young lady (you with the gay parasol and copious crinoline), pray don't look so indignant when I venture to suggest that there would be nothing particularly outrageous (that's my candid opinion) in your selecting a husband from this very menagerie. I am willing to make you an offer myself. It is true, we are only 'poor relations,' as one of your would-be wits has styled us; but the simple difference between us is, that you have got on faster in the world than ourselves, and consequently hold your heads a little higher than you had ought. Consult the writings of Monsieur Lamarck on the subject. He is my authority. You can't surely object to the testimony of one of your own condescended species. I would recommend you, therefore, to be a little more civil. Let us be on friendlier terms for the future. Remem-

ber, that if we are not exactly men, we are next door to humanity; if not brothers, we can yet boast of the same lineage, and are entitled to wear the same coat of arms as yourselves. Such as I am now, such was once the very, very great grandfather of your race, and, therefore, when you next 'stir us up,' be pleased to do it with a little more tenderness, and if not with fraternal leniency, yet with some recollection of the respect which is due to the common progenitor of men and monkeys."—*British Quarterly Review*, April, 1860.

It is not surprising that a theory which involved such manifest absurdities as these should, in this stage of its "development," have been generally rejected by intelligent naturalists, and supported only by a few sceptical philosophers. It was, however, reserved for Mr. Darwin, by the publication of his admitted erudite work on the "Origin of Species," to bring about that metamorphosis in the Development Theory which tardy nature has never yet been known to effect in any living being.

By "Species" has been usually understood a collection of individuals that are alike in every character, not capable of change by any accidental circumstances, and capable of uniform, invariable, and *permanent continuance by propagation*. All changes produced by accidental causes, in individuals of a species, indicate and mark what are called varieties. But Mr. Darwin, in opposition to these views, maintains that species are mutable, and that by what he calls the "principle of natural selection." What we have considered mere temporary *varieties*, are capable, in lengthened periods, of producing *species*, and even genera, and orders; and following out this train of thought, he infers, "from analogy, that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator."

Mr. Darwin's reputation as a naturalist, his careful and extensive observations and investigations, and, above all, the candid and truthful spirit in which he has written on this subject, have secured for his views no ordinary amount of attention. There are those who eagerly espouse his views, on account of their novelty and ingenuity; and there are not wanting others, who welcome them because they see in them the limitation of the idea of the exercise of creative wisdom and power. At the same time, it is important to know, on account of the bearing of the fact upon the credibility of the theory itself, that some of those who, for the reason last stated, might be expected to receive Mr. Darwin's views with extacies, candidly confess that they are far from being consistent throughout, and are to be regarded as merely introductory to something higher (?). Thus, the well-known anti-religious *Westminster Review* says,— "After much consideration, and with assuredly no bias against Mr. Darwin's views, it is our clear conviction that, as the evidence stands, it is not absolutely proven that a group of animals, having all the characters exhibited by species in nature, has ever been

originated by selection, artificial or natural." Such, then, being the fact, and as little or nothing has been advanced by the affirmative writers in this debate in defence of Mr. Darwin's modifications of an old theory, we may at present dismiss them without further comment.

A few words respecting the affirmative articles seem called for. That in the last number of the *Controversialist*, by "Delta," is of a singularly unsatisfactory nature. The remarks with which he opens are quite gratuitous and uncalled for; and the vigilance with which religious men watch the discussion of all subjects having a bearing upon the truth of the Scripture, is a pleasing sign of the times;—it is no manifestation of fear or anger, but a proof of the fact that

"Piety has found
Friends in the friends of science, and true prayer
Has flowed from lips wet with Castilian dew."

The beautiful extract with which "Delta" favours us from the *Quarterly Review*, occurs in a negative article on this very question, and may be taken as expressive of the views of the disparaged "pietists" as well as of his own. The assertion of our opponent, that "it is chiefly by the facts of every-day life in the natural world that the theory is and must be supported," is very damaging to his cause; for while Mr. Darwin's work abounds with most interesting facts and statements, they supply no direct evidence in support of his theory. Throughout the whole range of nature there is not, and, as far as we can learn, never has been, any development of new organs in animals, nor any proof of the transmutation of animals from the lower to the higher forms. When, therefore, a little further on, "Delta" informs us, "that all organic life has descended from a few primordial forms," we ask him for "the facts of every-day life" which support this statement, and wait with interest for them to be brought forward.

We cannot but express our admiration of the healthy religious spirit and reverent tone which pervade the article by E. M., Jun.; but we would remind this writer that, if all that he advances were admitted, it would still leave the question of the truth of the Development Theory utterly unestablished. We therefore leave his article without further examination, and beg of its writer to give us something more conclusive, or to admit the weakness of his position.

A. J.

That religion is false which, professing to be intended for the use of all nations, is distorted in its doctrines, and narrowed in its precepts, by the prejudices and manners of any one particular age, and any one particular country. That religion is probably true which, challenging the inquiries, and demanding the obedience of every age and every country, is calculated to promote their temporal as well as eternal interest; to co-operate with every useful quality in their government, laws, and manners; and gradually to correct whatever is defective and injurious in them.—**DR. PARR.**

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In taking part in this debate, I may perhaps be permitted to state what, however, some of my readers might doubtlessly discover, that I am neither a barrister nor a lawyer; and, having said thus much, I think it right gently to hint that I have no personal interest *whatever* to be promoted by the establishment of an affirmative position in the solution of this question.

In the course of this debate, it has been stated that it is not the function of counsel to defend the guilty from the due punishment of his guilt. But the practical question remains unanswered, *how* is counsel to know that a man is guilty? Surely, this is a question for a jury to decide, after hearing the evidence. It is the duty of counsel to point out any discrepancies in this evidence, so as to prevent the possibility of unfair advantage being taken of a criminal's position. It is a grand principle in the English law, that we are to look upon a man as innocent, until he be *proved* to be guilty; and it would be an unhappy time for England if this were otherwise.

It appears to us that the question we are called upon to discuss is based upon a pure hypothesis. It has not yet been proved that counsel are ever made cognizant of a prisoner's guilt. *How* can they be supposed to discover it? Is a criminal to employ a solicitor, and tell him the secret in a similar way to confessing to a Romish priest? and then is the solicitor expected to go to counsel, and inform him that the man admits his guilt? Or is counsel to be called upon to examine the evidence, and form his judgment of such guilt? Assuming that some such a mode could be adopted, and that the unfortunate man would stand at the bar undefended, is it not possible that the judge and jury might be less careful in seeing that he was *proved*, according to the evidence, to be guilty, in case he pleaded "not guilty"? If so, a man would be transported, or hung, without being fairly and properly tried.

Supposing, again, the possibility of a murder being committed, and of certain individuals, who had a dislike for a person, being wicked enough to give false evidence of that person being the murderer, the man would be committed for trial, a report of the case would be circulated in the newspapers, and, amongst others, counsel might be deceived, and believe the person to be guilty, and, entertaining that belief, counsel would decline to defend him. The man might be ignorant, or nervous, and unable to speak for himself; and,

consequently his very manner and appearance, under such awkward circumstances, would be against him. The false swearers would come forward, and all would *appear* plausible and truthful; accordingly, the man would be condemned to the gallows, and would die innocent, solely because he was undefended by counsel!

The writers on the negative side, in order to argue their case, are bound to *imagine* that counsel, generally, are an unworthy class of persons. It has been asked what there is in the profession of an advocate, to invest him with power to set aside the great command of God, "Thou shalt not bear false witness *against* thy neighbour"? I answer that there is nothing which gives such a power, nor is counsel justified in claiming it. There is a vast difference, however, between trying to show wherein evidence may be imperfect, and affirming that the criminal is, beyond all doubt, innocent. Even if counsel were boldly to plead the innocence of the known guilty party, he would not, then, bear false witness against, but in *favour* of, his neighbour. So that the command referred to would not exactly meet the case.

In the 35th chapter of Numbers, and at the 30th verse, we read, "Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses; but *one* witness shall not testify against any person to cause him to die." In the 19th chapter of Deuteronomy, and at the 15th verse, it is said, that "*one* witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or any sin that he sinneth." So that the Bible is in favour of a criminal being fairly and lawfully tried, by advocating the necessity of more than one witness; and I hold, that if witnesses are requisite, it follows, as a matter of course, that those witnesses ought to be questioned, on the part of a prisoner, by competent persons, or counsel, in order that he may be defended from improper treatment, and his prosecutors be compelled to attempt to *prove* him legally guilty.

"Great men are not always wise" (Job xxxii. 9), and, therefore, judges and juries are liable to mistakes. This being so, every man is entitled to legal assistance, whatever his "iniquity" or "sin" may be.

L'Ouvrier quotes the opinion of Jeremy Bentham, as to defending a known criminal:—"A man has committed a theft; another man who, without a licence, *knowing* what he has done, has assisted him in making his escape, is punished as an accomplice. But the law—that is, the judges by whom in this behalf the law has been made—has contrived to grant to their connections, acting in the character of advocates, a licence for this purpose. *What the non-advocate is hanged for, the advocate is paid for, and admired.*" Now, it has been my lot to be present at numerous trials for theft, &c., and I say, without hesitation, and with perfect confidence, that the knowledge of an accomplice, as to guilt, *cannot* be compared with the knowledge of an advocate; for the former is acquainted with the fact from *presence and sight*; whereas, the latter can, under any circumstances, only be aware of it from *information furnished* to him. Again, the

"escape" which an accomplice might effect, would be before, and in order to prevent a trial. But the "escape" which an advocate might succeed in affording would be after that legal proceeding had been gone through, and the "mouth of witnesses" had failed beyond doubt to *prove* the prisoner guilty; for, it should be remembered, that there ought to be *no* doubt whatever, when a man's character, liberty, or life happens to be in danger. Further, how inconsistent it would be for counsel to be allowed to act on the part of prosecutors, whereby every point would be fully brought out against the accused, and argued with force and ability, leaving the prisoner without the least protection. Some may, however, say that criminals are such disreputable beings, that they ought to have no favour shown to them. But, on the contrary, it appears to me to be our bounden duty, as Christians, to give every man, however wicked, when placed upon his trial, an opportunity of defending himself in such a way as he may think best; and, if he prefer legal assistance, he should be permitted to obtain it.

Better far that a few should escape in this world, on account of the advocacy of counsel, leaving our heavenly Judge and Master hereafter to award such punishment to sinners as seemeth to Him just and proper, than that even one should innocently suffer in consequence of an unfair or imperfect trial, for want of professional assistance.

The more we consider the subject under discussion, the more we feel certain of the justice of the view we, and those who think with us, take on this side of the question.

R. D. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It is amusing to remark the innocence and earnestness with which our leading opponent, "Nona," carries the present literary campaign into a territory altogether neutral. Any one casually reading his clever and argumentative paper might naturally suppose the question to be, "Is counsel justified in endeavouring to limit or diminish the punishment of a criminal of whose guilt he has professionally been made cognizant?" And such a question would form an admirable groove for the opinions which this writer has expressed. But with the present question they have simply nothing to do. We hold the language, which heralds this discussion, to be sufficiently explicit and precise; that the query—whether an advocate would be justified in endeavouring to *defend from punishment* an acknowledged criminal?—is only susceptible of one meaning—*i. e.*, whether counsel can be sanctioned in attempting to prove a known criminal's *innocence*; this being the only means of effecting the desired exemption from punishment, and of meeting the terms of this discussion.

The area of debate being thus clearly defined, we will suppose a criminal to have been arraigned on a charge of murder. His guilt is well known to his counsel, though only, by powerful circumstantial evidence, apprehended by the prosecution. The advocate may

entertain an inward horror of capital punishments; he may consider it outrageous that the sacrifice of one life should involve the sacrifice of another; and some romantic idea may have entered his thoughts of a far more preferable method of entombing the guilty in some asylum during the balance of their existence. And in his enthusiasm he may have supposed that such an asylum would be an admirable moral guarantee, excellently adapted for the lustration of a depraved moral character. These rosy views may be entertained and believed with all the tenacity that self-opinionativeness supplies; and the advocate may permit his opinions and his arguments to be swayed by their surging force. But, in allowing himself to be guided by such considerations, he is silently offending against, though not ostensibly opposing, the laws of his country; and is himself, *virtually*, no inconsiderable offender. Should he prove successful in veiling the deeds of the assassin, the result would necessarily be the acquittal of the prisoner, and a severe wound would thereby be inflicted on public peace and social order. And no private convictions or conclusions ought to bias a question of guilt or innocence, where these convictions and conclusions are oblique to the existing state of the law.

The above is the most charitable supposition that we can advance of the conduct of an advocate in defending an acknowledged criminal. Listen, however, to "Nona." "The evidence of a prisoner's guilt being conclusive, it is no less necessary that the law, which he is believed to have violated, be distinct, precise, and perfectly applicable to his case." This the bench themselves will have the most ample means of ascertaining. Following the stream of our opponent's argument, we find it shortly afterwards taking a most unexpected angle into alien territory—as the following:—"Not a week elapses but some one is accused upon suspicions almost groundless. Now it is a bank official on a charge of embezzlement, who is afterwards dismissed without the slightest imputation on his character," &c., &c. Any eye, that can discover a connecting link between this excerpt and the text, must certainly be endowed with peculiar power. No one, indeed, questions that an advocate is entirely justified in defending a prisoner whose guilt is doubtful and unconfessed; and when the evidence inclines him to regard the prisoner as innocent of the charge brought against him. We would not have the law, that allows counsel to *every* prisoner, changed. The *morale* of the bar ought to prevent the *contre-temps* of a barrister staining his talents by defending one who has revolted against the laws of his country, and rebelled against the dictates of his Creator.

We should have thought it impossible, had we not a visual testimony, that any photographer of thought could have perpetrated such an argument as the following:—"Supposing that the advocate determines to cut the connection" between himself and the criminal, "what is the obvious result? Why, that his client goes to other counsel, from whom he carefully conceals as much as he can; and the

chances are, that the ends of justice will be defeated by the latter advancing bold and skilful hypotheses, which he would not have done, had he been better acquainted with the merits of the case." So that any robber might be justified in plundering an individual, if he were assured that others were intending, for the sake of spoil, not only to rob but to murder the man; that, by stripping the intended victim of his property, he would remove a temptation to others, who would not shrink at committing a deadlier deed. If it be wrong to defend a guilty individual, no healthy or unhealthy anxiety to further the "ends of justice" ought to induce him to do so. The principle is one which only a Machiavelli could sanction.

We are informed by "Nona" that the law of the land exacts a strict observance of the truth on the part of the advocate. We will not suppose that he directly infringes this requirement—indeed, if he did, it would be entirely useless. Statements of fact, unweighted by evidence, would only afford a banquet of amusement. But there is the utterance of half truths, equivocation, the suppression of facts—and, above all, the ingenious framework of specious argument—all of which are no less infractions of the truth than the most direct falsehoods. When to the foregoing pre-requisites are added a distinct and happy delivery, a continuous cascade of language, a felicitous and delightful imagery, an enthusiastic and vigorous expression, the triumph of the advocate is often complete; and when he has succeeded in saving the guilty one from punishment, when he has triumphed in unloosing upon society a criminal, the stung thought of it will afterwards afford no pleasure, no satisfaction. Its sting will indeed be felt in every resurrection of the past.

Further; forensic talents, perversely employed, inflict no inconsiderable injury on the administration of justice itself. An advocate employing his talents to defeat the "ends of justice"—to release, if by his utmost efforts he possibly can, a person of acknowledged criminality from deserved punishment, is virtually as much a violator of the law as the man who endeavours to obstruct a policeman in the performance of his duty; or as one who attempts to further the escape of a prisoner. All are equally guilty in impeding free action of the law.

Can "Nona" imagine the debasing influence which the continual and deliberate defence of admitted criminals must eventually exert on the advocate's character? How every architect of falsehood, and obstructor of justice, must gradually lose his self-respect, and by practice still less hesitatingly enter into a defence of the vile; and with less and less difficulty wildly embark in the most disgraceful sophistries and deceptions! We have a witness to the invincibility of our position, far higher than any that mere argument can boast,—a witness, to whose autocracy, nations past and present, peoples barbarous and civilized, have willingly submitted—a witness regnant in the minds of the slave and of the free, of the conquered and of the victorious—a witness enthroned in man himself—to his eternal conscience we appeal for the decision of this great question.

The Essayist.

SHAKESPERE FACTS, FANCIES, FORGERIES, AND FABRICATIONS.

V.—THE FAME, FAMILY, FAITH, AND FRIENDS OF SHAKESPERE.

SHAKESPERE was buried in the chancel of the church of the Holy Trinity, Stratford. A flat stone, underneath which his body is said to lie, bears an epitaph in wretched doggerel, traditionally reported to have been "made by himself a little before his death," but worthy only, as De Quincey thinks, of the grave-digger or the parish clerk. The oburgation is certainly more forcible and fierce than *gentle*, which was the prescriptive characteristic of the dramatist. It is as follows:—

" Good frend for Jesus sake forbear,
To digg the dust enclosed heare ;
Blest be y^e man y^e spares these stones,
And curst be he y^e moves my bones."

If we doubt the authorship of these verses, is not our doubt made greater by looking on his monument, on the north *wall* of the church, which bears these lines?—

" Judicio Pylum, genio Socratem, arte Maronem,
Terra tegit, populus moeret, Olympus habet."

" Stay, Passenger, why goest thou by so fast ?
Read, if thou canst, whom envious Death bath plast
Within this monument. SHAKESPERE, with whom
Quick Nature dide: whose name doth deck this tombe
Far more than cost; Sith all that he has writt,
Leaves living Art but page to serve his Witt.

Obiit Año D^o 1616,
Ætatis 53, die 23 Ap^o"

[Who wrote this inscription, Jonson, Drayton, or Dr. Hall?]

At the time of Shakespere's death, his family consisted of his wife; Susanna, married to Dr. Hall, whose only daughter Elizabeth was alive; and Judith, married to Thomas Quiney.

On 23rd November, 1616, Judith's son was baptized, in memory of his grandfather, as appears in the register—" *Shakesper*, filius Thomas Quiney, gen."

On 3rd February, 1617, we know that Dr. John Hall, Shakespere's son-in-law, inhabited New Place.

On May 8th, 1617, *Shakespere* Quiney was buried.

Anne Hathaway survived William Shakespere seven years. She died on 6th August, 1623, and was buried beside her husband on the

8th of that month, nearer to the wall than the *Siste Viator* stone of cursing. On her tombstone a brass plate bears the following inscription:—"Heere lyeth interred the body of Anne, wife of William Shakespeare, who derted [departed] this life the 6th day of Aug., 1623, being of the age of 67 yeares.

"Ubera tu, mater, tu lac vitamque dedisti:
Væ mihi, pro tanto munere saxa dabo.
Quam mallem amoveat lapidem bonus angelus ore,
Exeat [ut] Christi corpus imago tua
Sed nil vota valent: venias, cito, Christe, resurget,
Clausa licet tumulo, mater et astra petet."

Gravestones are almost "licensed to lie," but this *seems* to speak some truth of feeling. Was it composed by Dr. Hall, Susanna's husband, as an expression of *her* feelings? Hall could write Latin, we know; and Susanna is represented to have been "wise to salvation."

It is scarcely credible that *such* a mother as is here represented could have been a wife otherwise uncongenial to the *gentle* Shakespeare.

In the same year (1623) Shakespeare's plays were published.

In 1625 Dr. Hall sold the tithes inherited from Shakespeare.

Elizabeth Hall, Susanna's daughter, was married to Thomas Nash, of Welcombe, 22nd April, 1626.

On the coronation of Charles I., Dr. John Hall, though possessed of sufficient property and income, declined to accept [and pay for] the honour of knighthood, and paid a composition fee of £10.

John Taylor, the water-poet, in his works (iii. 72, 1630) says,—

"Spencer and Shakespeare did in *Art* excell."

November 25th, 1635, Dr. John Hall died, aged 60.

In "A Banquet of Jestes or Change of Cheare, 1639," the following words form the introduction to one of the "merry conceits," viz.:—"One travelling through Stratford-upon-Avon, a towne *most remarkable for the birth of the famous William Shakespeare,*" &c.

In Bancroft's "Two Bookes of Epigrammes," 1639, there are two [118 and 119] complimentary verses to Shakespeare. In "Jocabella, or a Cabinet of Conceits," 1640, it is related,—“One asked another what Shakespeare's works were worth all being bound together; hee answered, not a farthing. Not worth a farthing, said hee; why so? He answered that his *Playes* were worth a great deale of money, but he never herd that his *Workes* were worth any thing at all.”

Shakespeare's sister Joan was buried 4th November, 1646.

From a poem dedicated [1646] by S. Shephard to Philip, Earl of Pembroke, the friend of Shakespeare, and entitled "The Times Displayed," Malone has quoted this passage:—

"See him whose tragic scenes Euripides
Doth equal, and with Sophocles we may
Compare great Shakespeare: Aristophanes
Never like him the fancy could display."

Witness the Prince of Tyre, his Pericles;
His sweet and his to be admired lay
He wrote of lustful Tarquin's rape; shows he
Did understand the depth of poesia."

"Susanna, wife of John Hall, gent.; y^e daughter of William Shakespeare, gent.;" "deceased y^e 11th of July, A^o 1649, aged 66." Her grave-stone bore, and now bears [restored by Rev. W. Harness, from Dugdale's "Diary," 1653], these lines:—

"Wittie above her sexe, but that's not all,
Wise to salvation was good Mistries Hall.
Something of Shakespeare was in *that*; but *this*,
Wholy of him with whom shee's now in blisse.

"Then, passenger, hast ne're a tear
To weep with her who *wept for all*?
That wept, yet set herselfe to chere
Them up with comforts cordiall.
Her love shall live, her mercy spread,
When thou hast ne're a tear to shed."

A most unwarrantable inference—ought we not to call it fancy?—has been wrought out of these lines by Mr. Halliwell, in his "Life of Shakespeare," p. 270, viz. :—"The poet may possibly have become piously inclined in his latter days, but I think most direct testimony is against such an opinion, and the epitaph on his daughter seems to imply the contrary." He makes these verses signify from Shakespeare she derived her powers of *wit*, but none of the influences which conduced to her *salvation*. This appears to us to be a complete misapprehension. The lines are an almost doctrinal expression of the Protestant idea of "justification by faith alone," and do not bear at all a personal or reflective second intention. From the manifest paraphrase of the text, "Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep,"* we incline to attribute to the lines a clerical authorship, and hence infer a dogmatic assertion of the chief item in the creed of Protestants, which at the special period required distinct emphasis to announce her Puritanic faith as an example to her neighbours, and as a warning to the wrongheads who were otherwise inclined.

The above paragraph naturally recalls to us what Halliwell justly terms the incredible "assertion of Davies," that Shakespeare "died a Papist."

We cannot suppose impiety in Shakespeare. In his works, wherever a holy subject is touched, it is done with an apparently unaffected feeling of deep reverence and sacredness of speech. Shakespeare and Massinger are the holiest of the whole race of dramatists, and there are fewer expurgatory sentences in his plays than in any other playwright of his time. Him you can read aloud—with few skips; many others you dare scarcely open your own eye upon. We incline on this head to regard him as certainly Protestant in tone,

* Rom. xii. 15.

sentiment, and feeling. The pulpit literature of Britain is jewelled with quotations from his works.

The oath of supremacy required to be taken and kept under pain of præmunire and high treason by all magistrates by the statute of the 1st of Elizabeth, 1558-9. As John Shakespeare was chief magistrate of Stratford, viz., high bailiff, in 1568, he must not only have conformed, but been conforming, to the Protestant religion—the religion established by law. His son must have been brought up in the publicly confessed creed of his father, or John Shakespeare must have been a conscienceless hypocrite before his own children.

The master of the grammar school of Stratford was Thomas Hunt, curate of Luddington—*probably* the very person whom married John Shakespeare and Mary Arden. He must have taught the creed he was bound to preach, and Shakespeare must have learnt the Scripture tasks set him by the schoolmaster.

"*Kliza* and our James" could scarcely publicly have favoured a recusant, nor could the Pembrokes have given him their patronage had he been an alien from the faith. Such things would certainly have been marked and remarked upon.

John Ward, vicar of Stratford, would certainly have noted *that fact* with some prominence had the case been so.

John Milton, the Puritan, whose verses were prefixed to the second folio in 1682—sixteen years after Shakespeare's death—could scarcely have been ignorant of an important item like that in the great dramatist's life; and yet, in Edward Philip's "*Theatrum Poetarum*," which is held to have been indebted to Milton in much, we find no note of anything of the sort.

It is almost impossible that, in the days of Elizabeth, a Roman Catholic could have been the most *popular* of playwrights.

Shakespeare's children *appear* to have been baptized in the church of Stratford, and so he must have been a conformist. Without referring to the passages in his works, from which the question might be further argued, we conclude not only that Halliwell's inferential charge of impiety is unsubstantiated, but also that Shakespeare was a Protestant—at least not a Roman Catholic.

The confession of John Shakespeare, found, in 1770, between the rafters and the tiling of the house in Henley Street, we, of course, regard as a *forgery*, and a coarse product of the early age of Shakespeare fabrications—before cunning study had made it an adept's art.

We have been unwittingly led in the preceding arguments to rest a little stress upon the character of Shakespeare's friends. We do not think this an illegitimate process of reasoning: "A man is known by the company he keeps." "Want of true friends," Bacon says, "as it is the reward of perfidious natures; so it is an imposition upon great fortunes. The one deserve it, the other cannot scape it." Shakespeare was in neither of these plights. As *gentle* Shakespeare, his reputation is traditional, and evidence upon that point might be multiplied. Does he not appear as if he had very fairly acted up to his own precept?—

"Love all, trust a few,
Do wrong to none; be able for thine enemy
Rather in power than use; and *keep thy friend*
Under thy own life's key: be checked for silence,
But never taxed for speech."

If he did, then, in some sort, though reflexly, by knowing his friends we may guess in part what manner of man he was, and so be able to add to our admiration of the *poet* our love also of the *man*.

Among his *patrons*, we find Queen Elizabeth and King James, the Earls of Pembroke and Montgomery, and Lord Southampton. Among his personal friends, we know we can rank Ben Jonson, Michael Drayton, George Chapman, Leonard Digges, Nathaniel Field, Thomas Freeman, John Davies, John Marston, Richard Barnefield, and others of the literary men of his day; then among his "fellows," the actors, we have special proofs of the interchange of good offices between him and Richard Burbage, Heminge and Condell, Kempe and Armin, &c. Among the inhabitants of Stratford-upon-Avon, we find him the friend of John and William Combe, of Hammet Sadler, Henry Walker, Francis Collins, Thomas Russell, Julius Schawe, &c., some of the most influential people in his neighbourhood. We know he was helpful to the poor in their necessities, trusted by the council of his native borough, looked upon as a boast by his kinsmen, and respectfully loved by his wife, children, and sons-in-law. "He was the best of his family." . . . "His wife and daughters did earnestly desire,"—says Dowdall, 10th April, 1693, on the authority of a clerk of the church at Stratford, above eighty years old,—*"to be layd in the same grave with him."* So they are; and on their tombstones special mention is made of their connection with the bard whose monument adorns the church where they too are sepulchred. Does it not seem as if they felt an echo of these words of his arising in their hearts? [and may we not lawfully feel so, too?]

"Blessed are *you*, whose worthinesse gives scope
Being had to triumph; being lacked to hope."

VI.—THE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE.

"Remember
First to possess his books."—*Tempest*.

As we have seen, in the preceding pages, the earliest work published with the name of Shakespeare was the poem of "Venus and Adonis," 1593. This was followed, in 1594, by "Lucrece." They were both dedicated to Lord Southampton, with choice but not fulsome compliments. They were frequently reprinted during the author's lifetime. Besides his plays, he was the author of that small collection of poems entitled "The Passionate Pilgrim," first issued in 1599, and of 154 "Sonnets," and "The Lover's Complaint," published together, though known to be extant long previously, in 1609.

The following plays, either really or imputedly the productions of Shakespere, were published during the life of the great dramatist, at dates varying between 1594 and 1609, viz. :—*Titus Andronicus*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Love's Labour Lost*, *Midsummer's Night's Dream*, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Merchant of Venice*, *Lear*, *Troilus and Cressida*, *Pericles*, *Richard II.*, *Henry IV.* (parts *first* and *second*), *Richard III.*, *Hamlet*, *Henry V.*, *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, *The first part of the Contention between the Houses of York and Lancaster*, *The true Tragedy of Richard, Duke of York* (constituting the *second* and *third* parts of *Henry VI.*), and *The Yorkshire Tragedy* (regarded as spurious). "*Othello*" was published in 1622, with a prefatory address to the reader, by Thomas Walkley, who is supposed to have had a copyright interest in the work. The various editions of the above-mentioned plays are known and spoken of by critics as the "*Quartos*,"—that having been the form in which they were issued.

We know, from Meres, that, prior to 1598, Shakespere was the author of the following plays, not enumerated above, and not, so far as is yet known, printed while he was alive, viz. :—*The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, *Comedy of Errors*, *Love's Labour Won* (which has been variously supposed to be either *All's Well that Ends Well*, *The Tempest*, or *The Taming of the Shrew*), and *King John*.

The earliest collected edition of Shakespere's dramatic works appeared in 1623, seven years after his own death, and after the demise of his widow. It has been inferred, from this and other circumstances, that Shakespere, and his widow after him, possessed a copyright and life-rent interest in the plays, which lapsed, after their death, to the proprietors of the Globe Theatre; and that it was only then they could be made available by the players as a publication. It might also be further inferred, we think, from several expressions in the "*Dedication*" and "*Address*," of the folio of 1623, that Shakespere intended to produce a revised and amended edition of those works himself, had he been spared, in the ease and comfort of his Stratford home, to complete his design. How else shall we account for the regretful expression, emphasized by a parenthesis, "He not having the Fate, common with some, to be exequutor to his owne writings"? or this: "It had been a thing, we confesse, worthie to have bene wished, that the author himselfe had lived to have set forth and overseen his owne writings; but since it hath been ordained otherwise, and he by Death departed from that right"? &c. Do they not seem to imply regret at an unaccomplished design, as much as, if not more than, at a haughty, indolent, or heedless negligence of works so meritorious and so wonderful? There is a singular eagerness about sales, in the address to the readers, which seems to argue an interest in the work, greater than that expressed in the dedication, viz. : "*Onely to keepe the memory of so worthy a Friend and Fellow alive, as was our Shakespeare.*" If this is not altogether a *fancy*, it would go far to substantiate the idea of the community of interest in keeping them

unpublished during the LIVES of the other holders, and the hasty thrusting of them into the market immediately upon the demise of their latest *beneficiare*.

The edition of 1623, collected together and published under the names, if not with the editorial care, of John Heminge and Henrie Condell, is called, now-a-days, "*The First Folio*." It bore the following words upon the title-page:—"Mr. William Shakespeare's Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies. *Published according to the true original copies*. London. Printed by Isaac Iaggard and Ed. Blount, 1623." A portrait of the author, by Martin Droeshout, graced the work; and Ben Jonson attested his own veneration for Shakespere, and the essential accuracy, considering the art of engraving then, of the likeness, by these lines, placed opposite it:—

"To the reader:—

This Figure that thou here see'st put,
It was for gentle SHAKESPEARE cut;
Wherein the graver had a strife
With Nature, to out-deo the life.
O could he but have drawne his wit
As well in brasse, as he hath hit
His face, the print would then surpass
All that was ever writ in brasse;
But, since he cannot, Reader, Looke
Not on his Picture—but his Booke. B. J."

Several other commendatory verses are prefixed to the work, as was then the custom; "the names of the principal actors in all these playes" are also given; and there follows "A catalogue of the severall Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies, contained in this Volume."

This edition contains all the thirty-seven plays, now commonly accepted, with a few reservations, as Shakespere's, except "*Pericles, Prince of Tyre*;" though "*Troilus and Cressida*" seems only to have got a place in it by an afterthought, as it does not appear in the list, but holds a place, *unpag'd*, in the body of the volume.

In nine years thereafter, viz., 1632, a second edition appeared in the same form, with a few verbal alterations, but no additions. This is called "*The Second Folio*."

The first edition of "*The Two Noble Kinsmen*," published in 1634, was said, on the title-page, to be written by Fletcher and Shakespere. It is now included in the works of Beaumont and Fletcher.

There is preserved in the Bodleian Library a volume of poems, mostly short, published about 1660, with the following title:—"Cupid's Cabinet Unlock't, or the New Academy of Compliments, Odes, Epigrams, Songs and Sonnets, Poesies, Presentations, Congratulations, Ejaculations, Rhapsodies, &c., with other various fancies. Created partly for the delight, but chiefly for the use of all Ladies, Gentlemen and Strangers, who affect to speak Elegantly, or write Queintly. By W. Shakespere." The volume is curious,

but has no authoritative evidence of authenticity, of which we are aware. It proves the continued popularity of his name, and its availability, as a trade mark, to sell a book; but it can only be received as his on due proof offered, and as this has not been given, critics remain sceptical. We have been unable to discover that it bore even the remotest internal evidence of a Shakspearean authorship.

The third folio was brought out in 1664, but is scarce, because it may be presumed many copies were burnt during the Great Fire, 1666. It contained a reprint of all the plays in the former editions, and *seven* more, viz. :—Pericles, The London Prodigal, The History of Lord Cromwell, Sir John Oldcastle, Lord Cobham, The Puritan Widow, A Yorkshire Tragedy, and The Tragedy of Locrine. The first only of these is now reprinted among Shakspeare's plays.

The fourth folio, of 1685, is a mere reproduction of the third, and is very much disfigured by errors.

About the middle of the seventeenth century, Kirkman, a bookseller who dealt in and studied old plays much, attributed "The Merry Devil of Edmonton" to the pen of Shakspeare. It, however, appears in the books of the Stationers' Company, in 1608, as being written by an author whose initials are T. B. It was highly popular, but it is not likely it is Shakspeare's.

"The Birth of Merlin" was published in 1662, as written by William Shakspeare and William Rowley, but Kirkman is here again the only authority, and he is *supposed* to have used popular names to work off his stock.

"George-a-Green," and the comedy of "Mucedorus," have with equal, indeed greater unlikelihood, been proposed as additions to his works.

In 1728, Lewis Theobald, one of the editors of Shakspeare's works in opposition to Pope, printed a play entitled "The Double Falsehood," as an original drama, found in manuscript, written by William Shakspeare; but his restless vanity, and love of notoriety, urged him to claim an admired passage as his own, and so threw doubts upon the whole; and it is, of course, now regarded as an imposture, a forgery, and a fabrication—

"A past, vamped, future, old, revived, new piece."

Farmer attributed this play to Shirley; and Pope, who could see no good in Theobald, thought it belonged to the era of Shakspeare. There is no need for any such supposition. Theobald was the author of twenty other plays; and there is nothing in this one to give it such a supremacy. His "Shakspeare Annotations" are his greatest service to literature.

In 1760, Capel printed "Edward III.," as "a play thought to be writ by Shakspeare," from internal evidence, and from the external fact that it was acted before 1596, when there was no other known dramatist equal to the production of such a work. One piece of internal evidence against this theory appears to have escaped the

critic's eyes, viz., the following [anachronistic] allusion to Shakespere's "Lucrece" (P)—

" Arise, true English lady, whom our isle
May better boast of than e'er Roman might
Of her whose ransacked memory hath tasked
The vain endeavour of so many pens."

Would Shakespere, if the author, have spoken so? We fancy, no.

In 1770, "Arden of Faversham," first published in 1592, was reprinted by Edward Jacob, historian of Faversham, as *probably* a play of Shakespere's; but the reasoning in its favour does not seem to be conclusive, even to Mr. Charles Knight's Shakespere-loving mind.

The latter part of the eighteenth century was pre-eminently the age of Shakesperean commentatorship, and of literary imposture. Modern antiques then were fashioned in abundance. Of these, the chief were the Ossian-Macpherson, the Rowley-Chatterton, and the Shakespere-Ireland poems. They were each the cause of keen controversy, much of which is now forgotten. Only the last of this triumvirate of poets, whose works were somewhat "with rusty age o'erdusted," concerns us at present, and even to him we can give scant space.

Samuel, father of William Henry Ireland, was a collector and publisher of literary curiosities. C. M. Ingleby, LL.D., says:—"The house of the Irelands was, in fact, a manufactory of forgeries, done for the sole object of making money." A magnificent two-guinea folio was, after due exhibition of the pretended parchments and papers in Norfolk-street, London, and fitting reverential admiration from "black-letter dogs," published in December, 1796, with this title, viz.:—"Miscellaneous Papers and Legal Instruments under the Hand and Seal of William Shakespere, including the Tragedy of King Lear, and a small Fragment of Hamlet, from the Original MSS." Samuel Ireland was the editor. The work contained, among other things, a confession of the Protestant faith (in opposition to that of 1770, represented to have been by John Shakespere), a mortgage-deed, conundrums, or epigrams, letters to his wife, memoranda relating to theatricals, as well as the altered play of Lear, and the scrap from Hamlet. The success of the imposture was at first complete. The worshipful critics were hooked and made gudgeons of. Emboldened by the stupidity of the *cynoscenti*, a new speculation was set on foot, and the tragedy of "Kynge Vortygerne," or "Vortigern and Rowena," having been got up, Parr, Pye, Boswell, Chalmers, Pinkerton, &c., were invited to inspect it. It exhibited (they decreed) all the signs of the inimitable intellect of Shakespere, and so was declared fit and proper for the stage. Drury Lane was opened for its representation. Kemble took the leading character, and Sir J. B. Burgess composed a prologue, in which it is said—

"From deep oblivion snatched, this play appears;
It claims respect, for Shakespere's name it bears:"

and the audience is asked to—

“Assert your poet's fame,

And add new wreaths to Shakespeare's honoured name.”

Charles Knight says:—“The *people*, however, settled the question. When Mr. Kemble uttered the line—

“‘And when this solemn mockery is o'er,’

the most discordant howl echoed from the pit that ever assailed the organs of hearing. Shakespeare was vindicated.”

The greatest of the extinct verbalist school of Shakesperean critics, Malone, as he was the earliest to detect and expose the Rowley-Chatterton forgeries, was the first to lodge a protest against the reception of the Ireland fabrications. This he did, in 1796, in the form of a letter to Lord Charlemont, entitled, “An Inquiry into the Authenticity of the Shakespeare Papers.” His whole argument was founded on matters external to the poetical or literary merits of the production, but it was conclusive in itself. One is now almost constrained to despise the criticism that expended itself on paper water-marks, the colour of the ink, forms of superscription, dates of notes of hand, legal *formulae*, and modes of spelling, to show that such trickster's trash could not be Shakespeare's,—but we are restrained, by feeling that even in our own day such methods of inquisition are not unnecessary in literary controversy. The whole Dunciad of criticism was aroused by Malone's tractate, and the courtesies of men of letters were freely distributed in all sorts of pamphlets. W. H. Ireland's “Authentic Account” appeared in the same year. Then came Samuel Ireland's “Vindication.” George Chalmers wrote an “Apology for Believers” in these fabrications, in 1797, and supplemented it in 1799: and then Ireland—“to raise the wind,” Ingleby says—published his “Confessions.” These he used as a make-sell in the preface to “Vortigern and Rowena.”

Forgery and fraud are neither attractive nor remunerative, unless there is a public interest to be caught. About the same time as the Ireland forgeries, the Lucy-ballad seems to have been got up. John Jordan, the Stratford guide, a rhymist well versed in Shakespeare, wrote [P] some doggerel, and said it “was found in a chest of drawers that formerly belonged to Mrs. Dorothy Tyler, of Shottery, near Stratford, who died in 1778, at the age of eighty.” This “complete copy of verses” was inserted in the appendix to Malone's posthumous “Life of Shakespeare,” but he expresses a belief that “the whole is a forgery.” Rowe, 1709, reports that the traditional ballad was lost. In 1730, Cheetwood, in a history of the stage, inserts two verses on the same subject, but in a different versification, said to have been gathered from the singing of an old woman in an inn at Stratford, about 1690. In the MS. notes of Oldys (who died 15th April, 1761), a verse of “that bitter ballad” is copied from the recitation of a very aged gentleman in the neighbourhood of Stratford (where he died, fifty years since).

Capel, in 1779, had transmitted to him, "by an ingenious gentleman, grandson of its preserver," a Mr. Thomas Wilkes, the first verse of this ballad, which a Mr. Thomas Jones, who dwelt at Tarbick, a village in Worcestershire, a few miles from Stratford-on-Avon, and died in the year 1703, heard from several old people in Stratford. This verse, and that quoted by Oldys, are precisely similar in their source and in their words. These having been published, and *accepted* by the critics, the lost ballad was quickly discovered, or recovered [*query*, made ?], but yet so palpable a fabrication, that its parts are incoherent, its style is not Elizabethan, not to say Shakesperean, and its doggerel rhyme is not even uniform. Here the law of growth is clearly traceable. The ballad was lost, and so the poaching anecdote required substantiation. It was desirable that this should be got;—one portion is manufactured, and then another. The desire created the mythical verses; the public interest as is often the case, excited to and brought into existence the forgery.

After the folio of 1685, the editions of the eighteenth century deserve chronicle, if only to show the interest taken in the works of the wondrous dramatist, and the immense amount of varied learning which was expended on their elucidation. Rowe published editions in 1709 and 1714; Pope edited others in 1725 and 1733; Theobald followed, and rivalled him, in 1733 and 1740; Sir Thomas Hanmer, in 1744; Warburton, in 1747; Dr. S. Johnson, in 1765; George Steevens, in 1766; Capel, in 1768; Johnson and Steevens were co-labourers in 1773 and 1779; Capel's "Notes" (posthumous), 1783; Malone's Supplement to Johnson and Steevens, in 1780; Isaac Reed's first edition, a revision of Johnson and Steevens, belongs to 1786; Malone's own, to 1790; and Rann's from 1786 to 1794.

The nineteenth century begun with Reed's second edition, 1803, and Malone's in 1816. But the most renowned of Shakespere's editors, during the present century, are Collier, Dyce, Campbell, Singer, Halliwell, Knight, and Staunton. Of these, in detail, it would be as unbecoming as unnecessary to speak. In all of them there is much of a valuable character. Biographical, bibliographical, critical, and textual composition; original research; valuable speculation, and careful consideration of the times and texts of Shakespere, in less or greater degree, distinguish each. There is only one of these, however, whose editions require comment at our hands, viz., Collier's, whose "Notes and Emendations of the Text of Shakespere's Plays," 1852, 3, 6; one-volumed edition of Shakespere, 1854; and six-volumed edition of Shakespere, 1858, have excited the literary public for the last few years, and have raised a controversy, unequalled in its virulence, since the days of Macpherson, Chatterton, Ireland, &c. Such matter as we have to present to our readers on this topic will, however, fall more naturally into the chapter devoted to a consideration of the Text of Shakespere, to which we relegate the subject.

VII.—THE TEXT OF SHAKESPEARE.

"To blot old books and alter their contents."—*Lucrece*.

"I'll have grounds

More relative than this. The play's the thing."—*Hamlet*.

The text of Shakespeare has long been one of the "vexed questions of literature. The original authorities for a genuine text—the manuscripts of Shakespeare—are not to be had. We have, then, only the copies of his works issued during his own lifetime, the "Othello," published in 1622, and the first Folio, as the groundwork of a *textus receptus* as nearly approaching to the original sources as are now obtainable. None of these, of course, possess absolute authority, except the "Venus and Adonis," and the "Lucrece," which are *known* to have been published with the concurrence of, and, in fact, by the author. Of this, the dedications are sufficient evidence. The early quartos, even when least carelessly printed, do not appear to have undergone either an author's or an editor's revision—indeed some of them do not even seem to have been what is technically called *read*, so numerous are the errors, palpable and acknowledged, with which they abound. Several of them are generally believed to have been piratical and unauthorized publications, hurriedly brought out, and made up from the repetition of actors, from prompters' books, and from reporters' notes, to catch the popular tide, as what were then called "get-pennies." The first Folio is declared to be printed "according to the true originall copies," and to be "absolute in their numbers, as he conceived them;" but it is, in fact, a very ill-printed book, abounding in typographical errors, in nonsense lines, in incomprehensible passages, in metrical defects, in absurd punctuation, and in obscure or imperfect speeches. These things seem to indicate that the editors either did not oversee the work, or were not capable of supervising, much less of revising it. These disfigurements destroy its authoritativeness, and make the attainment of an authentic text a matter almost of impossibility.

An authentic text is plainly not to be got at by mere black-letter reading, however extensive. Some authority must be accepted; and those plays, that were really produced under superintendence, seem to have the best claim to being the true theatrical, as opposed to the literary, texts; the text meant for the ear, not the eye; for the stage, not the closet. The characters of Heminge and Condell have not been impeached; they have not been alleged to be fabricators; no suspicion has been excited about them, or has been attached to them; on the contrary, most positive and reliable testimony has been given to the essential truth of their book, from persons who were clearly capable of knowing. The book they offered to the public was accepted. It is true it is, like most books of the time, sadly unrevised, but that cannot justify radical changes. The commentators, by treating the "plays" as a *reading* literature, have been led to expect what was neither intended nor attempted—a systematic and strict versification—*poems*, in fact, when only *plays* were made;—and so "scenes, invented merely to be *spoken*," have

been "enforcively published to be read." Many faults are permissible in spoken, that cannot be allowed in written, literature; and he who would criticize an oration by the same strict rules as a deliberate composition, would not fail to be regarded as hypercritical. This is the mistake of the commentators, and so they have gone on seeking an ideal and enforced perfection which was never aimed at. This has led to the introduction of many changes in the text, and specially to several recent re-issues of Shakespeare's Works, &c., by the author of "Reasons for a New Edition of Shakespeare's Works, containing Notices of the Defects of Former Impressions," 1841 (J. Payne Collier), which have a curious history, and are the occasion of one of the keenest and most singular controversies of the day; of both of which we shall endeavour to present a brief outline.

In the spring of 1849, Mr. J. P. Collier was in the shop of Mr. Rodd, bookseller, Newport Street, when a large packet of old books arrived from the country. It was opened, and found to contain, *inter alia*, a torn, corner-cropt, greasy and old-of-cover, blurred, beer-stained, and blotted copy of the *second folio* edition of Shakespeare's "Plays," 1632, and a copy of Florio's "New World of Worlds," date 1611. These Collier bought for 30s. and 12s. respectively. With the former he expected to complete another edition he had at home, but he found, on trial, that the leaves he wanted were short, damaged, and defaced; so he sold his former copy, and laid past his recent purchase. When making a selection of books to take with him on leaving London, he chose this Shakespeare as one, and then first discovered marks on its margin. Some time after, when consulting it, he was induced to examine it, from supposing that Thomas Perkins (whose name it bore), might have been the actor in Marlowe's "Jew of Malta," in 1633. This was a mistake; his name was *Richard* Perkins. Then he saw that there was hardly a page which did not present, in a handwriting of that time, some emendations in the pointing or in the text, while on most of them they were frequent, and on many, numerous. After consideration, and due announcement in the literary organs, he published, in 1852, the "Notes and Emendations to the Text of Shakespeare's Plays, from Early Manuscript Corrections in a copy of the Folio, 1632, in the Possession of," &c. Favour greeted him at first; but the genuine Shakespearians were alert right early. S. W. Singer, Rev. A. Dyce, &c., entered protests against the marring and mutilation of the text thus proposed, and expressed or implied doubts of the authenticity of the history, and the genuineness of the writing.

A Shakespeare-criticism epidemic broke out in consequence. Pamphleteers and periodical writers busied themselves with the debate, and new editions became the order of the day. The controversy has grown hotter every day since, until it has almost acquired a personal interest for the respective combatants.

Collier, in 1842-4, had edited an edition in accordance with the view contained in the "Reasons," published in 1841. This discovery [?] changed his point of view or interest, and he issued his "Notes and

Emendations," 1852-3; a mono-volumed Shakespere, incorporating them in 1854, followed; a list of them was introduced into a work on Shakespere and Milton, in 1856; and in 1858 an eight-volumed edition was passed through the press under his editorship. Meanwhile, opposition was gaining ground, and at length burst into energetic activity early in 1860. The following is an abstract of the opposing arguments, culled from the writings of Mr. Collier, articles in the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Athenæum*, &c.; and from the works of Messrs. Hamilton, Ingleby, Staunton, Mr. Arnold's papers in *Fraser's Magazine*, pamphlets by Mr. Singer and the Rev. A. Dyce, &c., besides several letters, contributions, &c., for and against, in the *Times*, the *Literary Gazette*, the *Critic*, and some of the provincial newspapers as well as the magazines of the day. They have been arranged with the utmost impartiality in our power, and have been adduced in their full force, though frequently in an abbreviated form. They form, as we have arranged them, the heads of a debate on this subject, which may interest many of our readers.

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

In the 1842-4 "Shakespere," edited by Mr. Collier, the rule adopted by him was to adhere implicitly to the readings of the old copies wherever the words imputed to the Dramatist on their authority could be reconciled with even a plausible meaning; but now he does not hesitate to accept changes made—allowing him the hypothesis he puts forth—from recitations made prior to the suppression of the theatres, which had crept in from time to time to make sense out of difficult passages, but which do not represent the authentic text of Shakespere. This change of view-point is regarded as suspicious, not in itself only, but also as leading to three profitable (?) issues of the said emendations.

The various prefaces, letters, accounts, affidavits, &c., given by Mr. Collier as justifications of his inferences, acts, editorial changeableness, and publications, are inconsistent with themselves, the books, and other facts.

Mr. Collier "has elsewhere printed as genuine and authentic documents respecting Shakespere which other and competent judges have pronounced to be spurious, and therefore his opinion [statement] is not to be implicitly relied on in a case . . . fraught with suspicion."

The coincidences between the editorial suggestions of Collier and the

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

The emendations are, taking them all in all, of much value and probability—the work of a person "possessed of extraordinary powers of Shakesperean criticism." It is highly unlikely that so many emendations could be the results of mere conjectural annotation, and hence these may have possibly had a prompter-book or stage-usage authority. They at least "present us with better readings than his original editors, or his whole army of commentators."

Collier's affidavit before the Lord Chief Justice in the Queen's Bench relates the circumstances attending the purchase of the folio and of the discovery of its unexpected contents, and is therefore removed from literary to legal criticism. The number of the Perkins-folio corrections (about 20,000); the laboriousness of the task of so forging; the mental and manual toil and trouble; the elaboration of the work,—are in themselves proof of a pains-taking, studious, reverential love of Shakespere, not of secret and self-seeking crime.

Insanity could not be more effectually proven than by showing that any corrector, of such powers of comprehension, such minute and accurate industry, such patient silence, had passed off his work as another's, and so deprived himself of the honour—the literary student's

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

emendations of [the supposed] Perkins are so frequent and so close, as to produce a disbelief in their fortuitousness—a belief in an origin capable of explaining this singularly happy concurrence of view—which would place the discoverer of the folio so far ahead of all contemporary Shakespeare editors.

That the phraseology and idioms employed by the so-called corrector—as Mr. Singer asserted—are often not of the Shakespearean age.

That the number of adaptations—not to say plagiarisms—of the readings proposed by the old commentators indicates contrivance, use, invention, and intention.

Mr. Collier, throughout his dealings with the [so-called] Perkins *emendations* and their assailants, has, or at least appears to have, at every turn, done or omitted something to foster suspicion.

Singular *lacunæ* in the evidence occur, and these have been filled up by hypothesis—the former look like *suggestiones veri*, the latter like *suggestiones falsæ*.

At no time has there been a want of appreciation for Shakespeare's text, such as would make it likely that the corrector should want inducement to let his labour be known. The folios of 1623, 1632, 1664, and 1685, in the seventeenth century, were followed by at least a dozen editions in the eighteenth, and many more in the nineteenth, in all or most of which conjectural *emendations* formed a chief feature. Why did this corrector retain his silence, and continue his solitary and uncheered labour, while reward and praise were exciting so much Shakespearean activity around him?

The intentional ignoring of former *emendations*, in the zeal of editorship which Mr. Collier exhibited, indicated an interest other than the mere attainment of a true text, e. g., in Tranio's line, "Or so devote to Aristotle's *checks*," in "The Taming of the Shrew," Sir W. Blackstone had sug-

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

dearest remuneration—of this careful and thoughtful revision of the text.

The unexpected novelty, ingenuity, and felicity of many of the *emendations* are such as to lead the unprejudiced mind to accept and believe them as having been accidentally discovered, not thought on and worked into the book by a forger—else we suppose a skill working for its own dishonour.

The great mass of ingenious labour, apparently unnecessary, for the accomplishment of any forger's end; and hence multiplying the chances of detection; the large amount of nonsensical *emendations* proposed also increasing the likelihood of suspicion:—seem warrants for the *bona fide* nature of the notes and of the correctness of the hypothesis that attributes them to a non-literary person—one working to fit the dramas for stage representation, not for closet reading.

A fabricator would at once have seen that the more wild, wayward, and apparently unnecessary the innovations made on a text would result in damage to his aim; but the Collier-Perkins changes are very numerous, often needless, frequently prosaic, many times wrong-headed, occasionally absurd, and sometimes absolutely nonsensical. This, as it would scarcely have been done by a forger, seems to evade the charge made against Collier, though it neither substantiates nor authorizes the *emendations*.

A fifty years' reverential exploration of the hidden nooks and corners of old English literature and devotion to Shakespearean and dramatic criticism, would be ill-ended by such an offence [or mistake] as that laid to the charge of Mr. Collier. He would thus appear to have educated a taste expressly to detect himself, or have exposed himself to detection by the very antecedents of his own life. Either way, if guilty of fault or inadvertence, he has been or become voluntarily the destroyer of his own reputation. Mr. Collier is calmer in judgment and more cautious in manner than to do so.

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

gested, and Steevens, Singer, Dyce, &c., had adopted, the reading, *ethics*; but Collier shuts his eyes to this, and says that such [viz. *checks*] has been the invariable text from the first publication of the comedy in 1623 *until our own day*."

"A portentous amount of nonsense, and an enormous mass of unnecessary work," have been accumulated into a volume, and are now sought to be incorporated with the text of Shakespeare by an ingenious contriver, apparently only that he might mislead the judgment, and put inquirers off the scent.

If it be admitted, as some apologists suggest, that the Perkins-Collier folio is a stage-manager's copy adapted to a more modern taste and style of speech, what value, as Shakespeare emendations, can the so-called corrections have? None. They are clearly fabrications, by whoever made.

These textual corrections were just discovered (?), when debates regarding the value of different readings had filled our literature with a number of bilious verbal criticisms. They had an apparent second intention—the substantiation of the readings proposed by the discoverer; and they were patiently and grossly used for gain-making by the three successive publications to which they gave rise. They thus fulfilled the antecedent probability of an imposture suited to the time and circumstance, and the subsequent probability of a fabrication being used for a gainful purpose.

The suspicious inconsistency of Mr. Collier in his treatment of the Perkins folio must not be overlooked. 1. His "Notes and Emendations" contained conjectural matter *besides* those in the folio, and only *some* of the corrections themselves. 2. His mono-volumed Shakespeare professed to *incorporate all* the corrections with the text, but only did so with *some*. 3. In "Seven Lectures on Shakespeare and Milton," he gave "a list of *every* note and emenda-

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

That the chief emendations are made on the best *acting* dramas, and not on those that are most poetical or philosophical, most read in the closet, and that many of these alterations consist of omissions—in some plays, such as Hamlet; as many as 200 lines are struck out—is in itself a proof that the changes were not made for a *literary* but a *theatrical* purpose, and were not intended for publication by the corrector. This is farther proven by the rhyme-endings, which are so frequently introduced—stage-managers' poetry and fustian. Neither Collier nor any other *literary* man would have made *such* changes in the hope of commending their labours to the present age.

The quantity, and particularly the quaint and daring nature of the corrections—many of them relating merely to punctuation—the variety, changeableness, and apparent fickleness of purpose, indicated by change of penmanship, ink, mode of correcting, &c., all of which are held to be arguments against the antiquity of the corrections—are in reality strong evidence that they have not been the work of a solitary, persistent forger, who would guard against such (as they would appear to him) suspicion-creating circumstances.

Regarding the pencil-jottings and their modern cursive character, it is a well-known fact that, in general, pencil notes are freer and more diffused than pen ones, and that a *fac simile* of one's pencil notes would afford but a poor means of judging of one's ordinary penmanship. It is very natural that annotations, when they first strike the mind, should be jotted in pencil, that farther thought may be given to the suggestion before its registration in the less perishable ink-character. There does not, therefore, seem to be anything puzzling in this fact.

Mr. Collier has been an assiduous student of Elizabethan literature for upwards of forty years; he has been well mixed up with Shakesperian polemics, and has exposed himself to

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

tion in Mr. Collier's copy of Shakespeare's works," *yet scarcely gave above a third*. There was here evidently something to conceal. Now he trusts his memory, and distrusts his notes; again he distrusts his memory, and trusts his notes, and rambles about his story in a most inconsequent manner. Moreover, he roundly asserts that he "*never* made a single pencil-mark on the pages of the book, excepting crosses, ticks, or lines, to direct attention to particular emendations; while there are to be found in it "an infinite number," Mr. Hamilton says, "of faint pencil-marks and corrections on the margins, in obedience to which the supposed old corrector had made his emendations;" yet these Collier never mentioned in his description of the work. The pencil-writing is said to underlie the ink, and may, it is said, be often seen below it and beyond it. Indeed, continual blundering is the mildest term that can be used for the vague, long-winded, different methods in which he tries to quibble himself out of a difficulty—when straightforward truthfulness could only have one possible way.

The following external characteristics of fabrication are observable in the Perkins-folio, viz.:—1. The handwriting is [to all appearance] feigned. 2. The alterations made in ink are [i. e., have been] suggested by marks made with pencil. 3. The pencil-writing is modern. And 4. The same handwriting seemingly appears both in the pencil and the pen alterations.

The Perkins-folio is of date 1632. Collier says it had been once a Mr. Parry's. Parry's was a 1623 copy, and differed in binding, corrections, &c., from that of Mr. Collier—who says he showed him the Perkins-folio, and that he acknowledged it; while Mr. Parry disclaims having seen it till he had it presented to him in the British Museum by Sir F. Madden. Again, Collier bought the book for thirty shillings just when the parcel was opened; and he says, "when I took it home," whereas

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

the usual consequences of antagonism, doubt, and hate. It is consonant with human nature to suppose that, opportunity arising, there should not be wanting defamers to hint a doubt, or damn with cunning leer.

To believe the folio corrections forged, or rather fabricated, we must believe some one, possessed of more Shakespearean knowledge than all living and ancient commentators put together have had, was content to act more foolishly than a common begging letter-writer, and jeopardizing his whole aim by learning his rôle imperfectly.

The tone and temper of the controversy on this question are singularly provocative of the thought that literary jealousy and personal pique override the love of truth. There are a virulence of tone and a ferocity of temper displayed in this controversy, which is singularly alien to the consideration which should be given to the works of gentle Shakespeare.

No test-word, anachronism, or chronological difficulty has yet been discovered by which the validity of the hypothesis of Collier might be tried, and the falsehood [if any] precipitated by such a drop of pure logic as might make it unmistakably apparent. Singer suggested "*wheeling*;" Dyce, *unheard*; and Ingleby, *cheers*; but they have each been shown to be untenable as objections. Besides, Halliwell has shown that the folio of 1632 has undergone some modernization, and so may much more probably an acting copy have done.

Even the test of imputed plagiarism fails when put to trial. Hamilton adduces "Hamlet," of which there are three quartos, as a test of the deficiency of originality in the emendations; but this is evidently an unfair selection; for the nearer the corrector came to the truth, the more nearly must he have approached to the readings of the original text. Dr. Ingleby acts more fairly. He chooses "*Measure for Measure*," collects the conjectural emenda-

ANTI-COLLIER PERKINS.

Dr. Wellesley, on whose testimony he relies, says that Rodd "had put it by for another customer." These appear to be fatal discrepancies in a story which might and ought to be so plainly told.

The intense agony and self will with which Collier maintains the thesis of the [supposed] Perkins corrections is a singular corroboration of self-identification with the [reputed] author, and is hence suspicious; and all the more so that, in doing this, Collier acts in opposition to his antecedents as a Shakspeare editor—a scrupulous adherence to the old texts. And all this "froth and fury" is for the honour of a hypothetic, not a real, being!

The unequivocal decision of the greatest palæographers of the day, Sir F. Madden, Messrs. Bond, Hamilton, &c., is that the "Old Corrector" never lived in the seventeenth century, but that the notes were fabricated at a recent period. In this opinion, Messrs. Ingleby, Staunton, Maskelyne, Arnold, Watts, Professor Bodenstedt, &c., are understood to concur. The opponents of the Collier-Perkins folio corrections have given their names to the public as a pledge of their honesty. The defenders have carefully adopted and retained the anonymous. The better Shakspeareans hold aloof from the contest, and so show that they sympathize with the adverse party.

PRO-COLLIER PERKINS.

tions of former commentators or editors; and finds that of fifty-five alterations proposed by the Perkins-folio corrector, twenty-nine coincide with other suggestions, while twenty-six have no known authority except this Old Corrector. He, whoever he was, then, who annotated this folio, has made nearly as many original emendations on this play as all the commentators during two centuries—supposing that he had actually borrowed *all* the others. This shows a power and boldness not easily to be accounted for on the score of falsehood, fraud, and wilful imposition. Even in the "Hamlet" there are *no* coincidences between the suggestions of contemporary critics—or of any editor more modern than Johnson, 1765—1779. If the former fact gave evidence of unhesitating boldness, will it do here to argue that the supposed forger was afraid to "take" or "convey" more modern readings? Does it not rather force us to believe that the folio corrections here are of a date anterior to Collier's birth? Ingleby's "True Restoration," viz., *writing*, in "Hamlet," is pressed into the service of the antagonists of the folio by a very roundabout logic—scarcely trustworthy as *reasoning*.

Collier's position, as a Shakspearean critic, had been already *won*; and he is not likely to have hazarded *that* by any act so certain to displace him from his "coigne of vantage," as a wilful fraud or forger.

We have now, as well as possible in our space, with our means and in our circumstances, presented a *résumé* of the chief items requiring notice in the life and about the writings of Shakspeare. We have aimed at little more than supplying our readers with a distinct notion of the poet, the man, his works and his ways, so far as they could be gathered or guessed from the stray materials known of his and their history. We hope we have succeeded in being useful, if not agreeable, companions in this investigation into the "Shakspeare facts, fancies, forgeries, and fabrications," in which all thinking men are now interesting themselves. If so, we shall be glad.

S. N.

HARD WORK.

SOME years ago—in that period of human development outwardly symbolized by pinafores, when a confectioner's window was our school of design, a pocket full of marbles (not bought, but *won*) the consummation of happiness, and the Arabian Nights our book of books, the very king and emperor of books—the wonder was, to me, how it happened that a great, gaunt, hideous, and altogether frightful genius (instead of a silver-winged fairy) should have power, at the command of the owner of the magical lamp, to call into existence all that desire could crave, or imagination invent. I was troubled not a little also, that a scamp like Aladdin should have fallen upon so valuable a treasure.

Time reveals all things; and so in the process of years experience, whose teaching is always *practical*, has taught me this:—that, like Aladdin, we are one and all adventurers; that the lamp of power, the revealer of hidden thoughts and things, is wisdom; and that he who once holds this wonderful lamp, even for a moment, stands that moment face to face with the grim, knit-browed, giant-limbed, determined-looking devil called hard work; and the owner of the lamp commands, and the sinewy giant obeys. And all that is worthy in philosophy, science, poetry, government, and commerce, is the handiwork of this greatest of all the great powers.

A long time ago a certain curse was decreed: "By the sweat of thy brow shalt thou earn thy bread." From childhood we have brought one memorial up into our maturity—its petulance—else would we always have seen that there is love, the truest love, at the root even of God's curse. The hand strikes the offending child; but the heart pities it. The tempest rages; but what mean these flowers afterwards, these herbs, and this grain? If the storm and the rain had not been, these had not been. What sounds are those of praise, of love, of rejoicing, that we hear from cathedral, chapel, hall, welling up, pealing out in rapturous thrills of harmony? What mean those leviathans that lie on the breathing sea; those engines that pant with the haste of commerce? those sacred temples that point, ever by sunlight and by moonlight, with index spire, up to the soul's "sweet home"? those songs of Paradise lost and gained, those sculptured marbles, and those paintings so like life? They mean this:—they are the flowers after the storm, the wheat after the rain; they are the blessings that have grown up out of the deep, rank soil of the first curse; they mean that man has seen the grim genius of hard work, and has commanded him; and these things, behold, **THEY ARE**.

Civilization is another name for hard work; just as barbarism is a synonym for idleness. And so the idler and the savage are twin brothers. The savage eats earth rather than till the ground for its produce; the idler lives an earthy life, has earth-thoughts, earth-hopes, earth-memories, earth-fooleries, and earth-fopperies; and lo! the image of the heavenly becomes the image of the earthly, and

crumbles hopelessly into nonentity and completest oblivion. Idleness leaves no memorial in this world of hard work.

Education is that which would lift man from the pillow of idleness to the throne of wisdom. Just as education in art teaches how to give earth's dullest ore a mirror surface, so education in thought turns the dull, inactive mind into a bright, reflective one. For, after all, education is not only a drawing forth, but a process of twofold revealing. Nature finds the metal for the wires; thought compels the electric fires. Seeing and understanding are the two processes;—the what is it, and why is it? These questions have given us our heroes; and hard work has been at the bottom of all.

If we cannot be Raphaels, Handels, Miltons, Stephensons, we can be *all we can*. Let us—and as a sign that we mean to be, and to do, and to suffer—let us at once cast off every unmanly fear, strip off all the mummy bandages of fashion, loose all the silken bonds of idleness, and thus give our panting souls room for their wings to expand. No pillars of salt, no castles in the air; present work and present success. In every grain of garnered wheat is a germ. In every success is a hope. The hard husk holds in its heart the future flower. The palace of a true education and of a true life springs up only at the command of the owner of the lamp of wisdom, given to the genius of hard work. F. G.

A VISION OF THE FUTURE.

THE *British Controversialist* has now entered upon its second decade. The hopes and fears of those associated with its interests, from its commencement to the present hour, have been neither few nor small, while its present literary position affords bright hopes for a glorious future of extensive usefulness to the rising and maturing thought and reason of its numerous readers. At first decried as a medium for free-thinkers, in an offensive sense, then cavilled at as an arena for petty squabbling, and literary inanities; again, its name complained of, while its matter was approved, but eventually tolerated, merely as an harmless (!) nuisance,—it has become an established fact. Prophets have proved false, friends have stood true, and have become a numerous band, exhibiting to the world a triumph unique in its excellence, unparalleled in its beneficent effects, and enduring as eternity in its moral and intellectual results.

Those papers which have formed a distinctive feature of its educational department, from the pen of our worthy friend, S. Neil, Esq., on Logic, Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Epoch Men, have won for themselves and the *British Controversialist* a wide reputation. The controversies have included all the most stirring subjects which have occupied the human mind for many years, and its pages have recorded the thoughts of men of every shade of opinion, and of every rank in literary fame and merit.

But our reader may impatiently ask, Why tell me of this?—why grandiloquise upon this trite subject? This is all known; and this it is which constitutes the peculiar title of this serial to be designated *Our Magazine*. Gentle reader, we do not wish to waste your time, nor provoke your ire; we are fully aware that all this is admitted by you, but these pages will, we hope, reach the hands and come under the notice of many persons who are not privileged, like ourselves, to be perfectly familiar with the history and merits of the *British Controversialist*; hence we claim your patience and forbearance under the infliction to which our peccadillo has thus far subjected you. Our friend, Mr. Neil, has conferred a great benefit upon us all by the papers he has written for our particular service; they have given us the means whereby we may acquire still further knowledge of a systematic character in other cognate subjects to those he has written upon; and we therefore respectfully inquire why those cognate subjects should not be introduced into these pages, and be treated systematically, as a sequel to logic and rhetoric?

We can readily imagine the reader casting about in his own mind to know what subjects we refer to in this strange and awkward manner. Well, we will at once reveal the great secret which has troubled our mental rest, like that fabled incubus said to disturb the somnolent hours of the dyspeptic. But, wait,—let us do it orderly,—according to the dictates alike of philosophy and theology. Well, we are now quite calm, collected, and demure; calm as a philosopher; collected as a practised general in the crisis of battle; and demure as a would-be orator on his *début*.

A knowledge of the arbitrary signs and sounds by which thoughts are communicated is a *sine quâ non* to every reader of this Serial. The method or art of using these signs and sounds, in the best possible manner, both in the acquisition and communication of knowledge, is made equally necessary and facile by the logic and rhetoric of our earlier volumes. Grammar was the pre-requisite; then we had logic and rhetoric. Thus we are possessed of the means to acquire and to communicate; and the question becomes, What shall be the subject of acquisition and communication? If a man, starting from this point, turns his thoughts within, the first question occupying his attention is the science of being,—he thinks and feels,—therefore he says, "I am." He looks forth into the world, and finds many another self, and he therefore thinks and feels there are relations of duty and obligation; he is conscious of time, space, number, cause and effect, and looks to an intelligent first cause. Moreover, he finds himself surrounded by existences, animate and inanimate, possessing peculiarities of a more or less permanent nature. Of these he is influenced, favourably or unfavourably, and his comfort or discomfort is affected. Men call those sciences "arts," or methods by which these departments of knowledge are classed, for acquisition or communication, as mental philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, political economy, political philosophy, jurisprudence, theology, physics, or natural philosophy, and

natural history. Why should not all, except the last three subjects, be systematically treated in these pages? Reader, it is for you to say; if you and wish it, the means are within your reach, and you alone can employ them. Do you ask, *How?* We answer,—first make up your minds that *you need a knowledge of the subjects named, to constitute yourself a good citizen*; then place the means to provide the supply within reach of the conductors of *Our Magazine*, by doubling the monthly circulation of the *British Controversialist*. We humbly desire you to remember we do not implicate the conductors in any promise,—we only say, Do as we do,—express your wants and wishes on this question, and get your friends, who are like-minded with yourself, to subscribe regularly for the Magazine, and your wants and your wishes, we venture to predict, will be realised.

In conclusion, we must own we feel puzzled to know by what title to designate this brief paper. We cannot call it *the* "Roundabout paper"—although it is a roundabout paper—because the title is given by one of our brethren to his gossip with his readers. Suppose we call it a Vision of the Future of the *British Controversialist*? Well, we think it will do; and we hope it is a vision that will be verified.

VALE.

[We for some time hesitated to give publicity to the above communication; but, having done so, we earnestly invite an expression of opinion from our readers on its suggestions.—ED. B. C.]

Poetic Section.

ORIGINAL POETRY.

REST.

THE sun-down past: still moonbeams stealing,
Like bright fire-flies round the caves:
And weary earth, her gold hunt ceasing,
O'er by-gone contentment grieves,
And I rest.

The twilight past: remembrance stealing,
Flushed with child-loves, to my heart.
Heaven's darkness still one star revealing
Horn of healing from life's smart.

And I rest.

The night gloom past. Dawn-music gladdening,
Wildly gladdening o'er my soul;
And thus it chimes, "He who sits saddening
May not, can not, reach the goal

Of true rest."

The morning past: full day is glowing,
 Golden-eyed upon the fields;
 And he who works, though Time be mowing,
 Reaps the fruit that summer yields.
 Wherefore rest?

The summer past: the eterne stealing,
 Glory laden, to my face,
 And voices through the breath-hush pealing,
 "Peace to him who ran the race."
 And I rest.

The whole year past: a mourner kneeling
 Where the sheaves lie turf'd with green,
 And voices through the silence pealing,
 "Heaven for the heart that once hath been."
 And I rest.—F. G.

SERENADE.

Bright moonlight bathes the night
 In seas of silver sheen,
 And Ada sleeps in fairy bower,
 The linden trees between.

Heaven wears no frown to-night;
 The spiritual moon
 Embalms in soul-subduing light
 The stilly midnight noon.

How sweet the voice of night!
 'Mid lilies Ada lies,

And Seraphs guard the golden light
 That rests within those eyes.

My heart is freed to-night
 From all its carking cares;
 For voices whisper that I love
 An angel, unawares.

Bright moonlight bathes the night
 In seas of silver sheen:
 My heart lies hid in yonder bower,
 The linden trees between.

FRED.

SONG.

Maiden, mark! the day is waning!
 Swift the last hour glides away;
 See how sable night is gaining
 Fast upon the twilight grey.
 See, sweet maiden, see how swiftly
 Night succeeds to joyous day!
 Thus so gently, softly, swiftly,
 Our fond dream hath pass'd away!
 Oh! I think upon the morrow
 With a bitter pang of sorrow.

Yet we oft the hours have chidden
 For their torpor and delay;
 Oft in fancy have forbidden
 Night to close the fleeting day;
 Ah! then, why has longing perish'd
 For the morrow's quick return?
 Why is Hope no longer chetish'd?
 Hath Love's ardour ceased to burn!
 Ah! to-morrow we must sever!
 And, sweet maid, it is for ever!

BETA.

TO LITTLE NELLY.

They say bright angels sometimes come
 All shining from the skies,
 And clad in bright and deathless bloom,
 Look on us with Love's eyes.
 And how, in many a cottage home,
 All circled with sad cares,
 The pure in heart oft entertain
 These angels unawares.

I know a maiden now of earth,
 Six summers since of heaven,
 Whose dimpled cheeks rose-red with
 mirth,
 A world of woe might leaven.
 If every home such sunshine held,
 All gleaming in its heart,
 I ween our earth and heaven's fair court
 Would be less wide apart.—F. G.

MAYING.

My heart goes maying all the year.
Oh, happy heart! oh winsome world-
home!

And not one melancholy tear,
Nor treacherous sigh, nor tremulous fear,
Can come this happy heart a-near,
Since life is love, and love the heart's
home.

My hopes go maying all the year.
Oh, the world is fair, but the soul is
fairest.

And not a trace of cloud or tear
Is ever shadowed through the clear
Ambrosial air, that *far* and fair
Embalms the beauty that is rarest.

My heart goes maying all the year.
Oh, who dare say that life is sadness?
Into this lily-cup I peer,
Where Heaven in love has dropt a tear;
Sky, stars, and moon, are mirrored here;
Dreamt ye your *home* was all so near?
But Love crowns life, and life is gladness.

PANLOTA.

MY MOUNTAIN HOME.

Ye who are tired of your city wiles,—
Tired of the toil that knows no smiles:
Come, where the valleys are pranked with flowers.
Come, where the shadows beguile the hours
With sunny smiles and rainbow showers;—
Come to my mountain home.

Ye who can love your mother-earth
The better for knowing the woeful dearth
Of brotherly love, in the peopled plains,
Where strife and sorrow, and conscience stains,
Make up the price of its golden chains,
Come to my mountain home.

Ye who would know of the fairy spells
That haunt the deep hollows and hallow the dells;
Of the voices that hymn of the distant sea,
Of the winds and their weird wild melody,—
Of all that is chainless, and stainless, and free;
Come to my mountain home.—F. G.

“THREE HUNDRED SONNETS,” REVIEWED IN ONE.*

“List, list! oh, list!” “Three hundred Sonnets” here,
Dripped from the pen of MARTIN FARQUHAR TUPPER
While seated just before his horse’s crupper,
In “Rides and Reveries,”—at times quite near,
And seasons distant,—while his mind sought rest
From working into foolish cramo rhythm
The common-places he aye carries with’m,—
“Proverbial Philosophy” exprest

In lines of thunderous no-meaning sound,
Claim our attention, and demand our ear.
Impatient reader, be forewarned,—forbear
To tread upon the bard’s fantastic ground.
Else will you feel your inmost nature creep
With a most potent spell,—the wish to sleep.—N.

* “Three Hundred Sonnets, by Martin F. Tupper, D.C.L.” London: Hall, Virtue, & Co.

TO ANNIE.

I love thee; *not* because thou hast
 A face for beauty unsurpass'd;
 An eye that shines with lustre bright,
 And flouts the diamond's lesser light;
 A queenly tread, an air divine,
 A form without a faulty line.
 Nor yet because in jetty glow
 Rich raven tresses softly flow
 O'er shoulders white as mountain snow.

No! tho' thou wert supremely fair
 Amongst the loveliest things of earth,
 Without a loving heart were there,
 Say, what were all thy beauty worth?
 'Tis but a passing, transient charm,
 That shrinks beneath the glance of age,
 It blooms while lifetime's summer's
 warm,

And withers 'neath the winter's rage.
 But a heart confiding, loving, pure,
 Will to the end of life endure.
 Tho' sickness come, tho' misery fall, —
 'Twill cheer, subdue, and soften all.
 'Tis true, when every friend hath fled,
 It lives when Beauty's flower is dead.

As when with stern, resistless sway,
 Grim clouds eclipse the lord of day,
 Red lightnings leap across the sky,
 And thunders roll, and tempests fly,
 One fairy form alone is seen,
 Love-like, high o'er the troubled scene.
 The rainbow hangs in glittering sheen,
 Surrounds the earth with arms of peace,
 And bids the tempest-struggle cease.
 So, when misfortunes darkly lour,
 And on the soul their tempest pour, —
 When man, oppress'd with heavy care,
 Yields to thy iron band, Despair!

There rises through the thick'ning
 storm
 One soul-exalting, lovely form,
 That whispers of a better day,
 And points with love-lit eye the way;
 That ever strives to cheer and please;
 And brighter glows as storms increase;
 That bids the pangs of woe depart,
 And 'tis a love-confiding heart!

And such a heart is thine. Thou hast
 A soul for goodness unsurpass'd;
 That melts in tears at others' grief;
 Finds pleasure to afford relief;
 That laugh'st not at the widow's wail,
 Nor scoffs the needy orphan's tale,
 Nor arrogant, nor haughty state
 Lords o'er the poor unfortunate;
 That ever striv'st the force to stay
 Of misery's cold and cruel sway.
 And these are greater charms for me
 Than Wealth or Beauty's phantasy —
 And these are wherefore I love thee.

While Beauty thrills the amorous eye
 With all-absorbing ecstasy;
 While thoughtless Folly fondly proves
 The emptiness of heartless loves;
 While outward show to hapless pairs
 Its woeful load of discord bears,
 Will we in bless'd contentment live
 The little life that God may give.
 And while with soft, propitious gale
 Love gently fills the yielding sail,
 Our boat adown the ebbing tide
 Of life shall calmly, smoothly glide,
 Myself will tend the sail, and thy fair
 hand shall guide!

Whitby.

ALFRED.

LIFE THOUGHTS.

I would my destiny might be
 To battle for the Right, —
 To live and die for Liberty!
 An angel whispers, "Hope and see!
 Hope is the heart of might."

I would my life some tale might tell
 To all the coming years,
 Of moments reaped and garnered well.
 An angel whispers, "Work! then sing
 Thy song of smiles and tears."

And if my life might only be
 A sunbeam in the world,
 To wake some soul from apathy.
 An angel whispers, "Pray; then see
 The flag of Love unfurled."

My life sits brooding at my heart,
 And sings wild songs to me;
 I'll up! and, manlike, take my part,
 In all that Heaven has set apart
 For me to do and be. — F. G.

The Reviewer.

Report of the Yorkshire Union of Mechanics' Institutes. 1860.

Leeds: Edward Baines and Sons.

WE have here the twenty-third annual report of an association which is designed to promote the prosperity of mechanics' and other institutions by exchanging Essays and papers, by facilitating the engagement of lecturers, and by employing an active agent to devote his whole time to the interests of the union. By these means, some seventy-five institutions have been drawn into association with each other, and a very healthy stimulus has been brought to bear upon them. The general report of the union, and the various reports of the institutions of which it is composed, are for the most part of a very cheering character, and reveal an amount and variety of educational effort which is truly astonishing.

The enumeration of the contents of this goodly pamphlet of 125 pages will afford the best evidence of the extent and utility of the operations of the union. We have the rules, list of the central committee, proceedings of the annual meeting, report, agents' report, Leeds Educational Board, Yorkshire Union Village Library, hints to persons wishing to establish a mechanics' institution for a small town or village, West Riding Penny Savings' Bank, rules for a mechanics' institution, essay and discussion class, Society of Arts' examinations, conditions essential to the attainment of a prosperous mechanics' institute, illustrated village lectures, lectures of Mr. Barnett Blake, advantages of belonging to the Yorkshire Union's Manuscript Lectures, gratuitous lectures, paid lectures, aid to instruction in science, Examination of Society of Arts, 1861, Leeds Educational Board Examination, cash accounts and subscription lists, reports from the associated institutes, in alphabetical order, tabular view of the institutes comprised in the Yorkshire Union, &c.

An organization, with such extensive and well-directed operations as these must be productive of much good; and it would be well for the literary institutions of England if every county possessed an equally vigorous "union."

The Student. An Address. By Rev. G. W. CONDER. London: Kent and Co.

THIS is a spirited, lovingly powerful, and intellectual oration delivered to the members of the Spring Hill College, near Birmingham, but worthy of being thoughtfully read by every one aiming at living that life of thought which characterizes the student. To such we can honestly commend it.

The Best Safeguard for a Young Man. By GEORGE HILL SMITH. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

THIS is an interesting and well-written essay, for which a handsome prize of books was awarded to the writer by the Committee of the Young Men's Literary and Commercial Association, Dublin. In a spirit of Christian earnestness the writer enforces many wise and weighty counsels.

The Topic.

OUGHT THE USE OF TOBACCO TO BE DISCOURAGED?

AFFIRMATIVE.

The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because its effects are injurious, both physically, mentally, and morally. It is physically deleterious. Its use is injurious to the mental faculties, and is intimately connected with and leads to other injurious habits. Though it has not in the same degree injurious effects upon all who use it, yet its natural tendency is of a degrading, debasing, besotting character. The great extent to which it is employed incurs a vast waste of both time and money. Its use tends to lessen a man's self-respect, as well as to lower him in the estimation of those whose esteem is most valuable. It is a most senseless, vapid, and inane employment for an intelligent being to spend time in inhaling and expiring tobacco-smoke.—S. S.

If we consider this question in a physical or economical point of view, it would lead us to the conclusion that the use of tobacco ought to be discouraged; it creates an appetite for an unhealthy stimulant, which drains the capital of the country of a large amount.—A. W.

At best the virtue of tobacco is medicinal, not nutritive. The habitual indulgence in it squanders a large amount of money, which, when the smoker has puffed it away, leaves him without the least shadow of an equivalent in either bodily or mental stamina; consequently, the money expended is entirely wasted. Wherefore we conclude that the use of tobacco ought to be strenuously discouraged, excepting as a medicine.—LUTHER.

Tobacco smoking does not improve the man; we see, alas! the majority of those who indulge in it do so in connexion with the curse of the land—drink. Whiskey-drinking and smoking

go hand in hand, the drinking-cup and the tobacco-pipe are very seldom absent from each other's company. Young men, especially, should beware of the use of tobacco, on account of the evils to which it leads.—J. W. L.

We make laws for the consumption of smoke, and yet we enter the smoking room, and sit enjoying the narcotic weed, while the atmosphere is filled with its effluvia. If a habit exists, which is prejudicial to health, it ought to be discouraged. If we use an agent which acts injuriously upon the system, that agent ought to be abandoned. The use of tobacco exists to a very large extent, and is prejudicial to health, for it is an active narcotic agent, and acts deleteriously upon the nervous system. Consider the chemical ingredients of tobacco; its volatile oil, its volatile alkali, and its empyrenematic oil—the two last possessing poisonous qualities to a large degree—and then inquire if this does not account, to a great extent, for the nervous and stomach complaints which are so prevalent? Therefore, we would say, discourage the use of tobacco (especially among the young); for by doing so you improve the health of the community, and tend to prolong life.—J. T. K.

The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because it contains poison, which enters and pervades the human system to the gradual but certain detriment of physical and mental faculties. The first use of it deranges the whole system, and the stomach naturally revolts from it. The use of tobacco promotes drinking habits, which lead to inferior and demoralized society. As the inner man of smokers becomes disordered, so does the outer man; their dress, apartments, and whole household, present a slovenly, not to say, dirty, appearance. Smoking or chewing induces habits of indolence, listlessness,

apathy. The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because it is a waste of money and time; and because it tends to uphold the villanous and ever-to-be detested slave-trade. Arguments on the negative side of this question must inevitably end in smoke!—BETA.

Time is man's estate—his greatest treasure. It is the "bounden duty" of all to use it well, and exercise, with respect to it, the very greatest economy. The use of tobacco tends to form a habit of wasting time, by inducing a dreamy habit of obliviousness, which all men should be careful to avoid. "Do thyself no harm," saith the Scripture. We ought to avoid all practices which war against health—one of the most-to-be desired blessings that a man can enjoy. The use of tobacco often proves hurtful to the human frame. Borghi relates an anecdote of a man who had so dried his brain by smoking, that, after his death, a little black lump, made up of membranes only, was all that was found in his skull. Economy in money matters is also of great importance. It has been computed that £48,000,000 are annually spent in this country upon strong drinks and tobacco. Does not this single fact speak volumes? We should rigorously avoid all habits which tend to make us unmindful of the comfort of others. The use of tobacco, especially when carried to an extreme, has this effect.—T. L. P.

It is a matter of regret, that so many of our youth (nay, mere boys) are to be seen indulging in the habit of smoking; allowing it to have the mastery of them, and thereby clinging to them through life. That the evil effects of smoking are great, we have sufficient medical testimony to prove; and as no benefits accrue from its use, we say, Let its use be discouraged.—T. I. M.

The use of tobacco ought to be discouraged, because it injures the brain, weakens the memory, and prevents the right development of the intellect. It is altogether a bad habit, and is an outward sign of an inward infirmity.

I can for two ounces of tobacco become a subscriber to the *British Controversialist*; and while smokers are darkening their intellect, I can be improving mine by the most excellent discussions contained within these pages.—J. W.

The following remarks, founded upon experience, may serve to show that the chewing and smoking of tobacco is injurious, even when used moderately. It is a well-known fact, that almost every individual who learns to smoke does so at the expense of his comfort; for he has frequently to go away from the company he may be in to some quiet corner, in order to gratify his passion. Having a few hours every day to devote to study, I sometimes resolve to accomplish a certain amount of work—perhaps to write an exercise, or read a philosophical book: but, before proceeding to do so, I indulge in smoking for a short time, and find, when I commence to write, that my hand is tremulous; and when I begin to read, my brain is sluggish, and entirely incapacitated for exertion. These are the effects of smoking upon almost all who indulge in the practice; therefore, the use of tobacco ought to be discouraged.—J. L.

There are few habits with which so many peculiar considerations are connected as with tobacco-smoking; or which are more purely artificial, or more repulsive to the natural taste. King James says, "Herein is not only a great vanity, but a great contempt of God's good gifts, that the sweetness of man's breath, being a good gift of God, should be wilfully corrupted by this stinking smoke." The fragrant cloud that arises from this weed, when in a state of ignition, may possibly not be unpleasant to those who do not smoke, but the reeking, nauseous effluvia which remains after its use, is disgusting even to those accustomed to tobacco. Though tobacco at this time may be pronounced cheap in comparison with its price in former years, yet the habitual use of it involves an expenditure which may be far more advantageously employed. Smoking is the common resort of idle

persons; it unfits both the mind and body for that sedulous application without which no success can be obtained in any difficult undertakings. And thus the smoker—

"Murders time, he crushes in the birth
A power ethereal, only not adored."

Experience tells us that the indulgence in this narcotic weed is productive of consumption, an emaciated frame, a parched throat, a propensity to drink. The slave to smoke never enjoys the hilarious sensation of a vigorous health; he begins his day's pursuits with a feverish throat, a clammy mouth, an enfeebled pulsation, and a low, despondent mind. We therefore condemn the use of tobacco on the ground of its being a *filthy, expensive, time-consuming, and pernicious habit*.—FRED. A. R.

What fills our gaols with men from whom every human feeling seems to have fled? What crowds our work-houses and lunatic asylums? What brings to poverty and wretchedness hundreds of husbands, wives, and children? The blighting influence of one great national evil, "Drink!" Shall we, then, who are the fathers of children, fresh in life's rosy morn, foster in our midst another habit, which, from its tendency to lead youth into evil company, is equally pernicious. No! let us beware; and not, for the sake of what may seem a pleasure, sacrifice the well-being of those from whose joy we should derive one great source of our own happiness.—E. G.

The habit of smoking is *expensive*. Though all smokers come not up to the average of "from ten to twenty-five cigars daily for each individual,"* as we are told is the case in Rotterdam, yet there is not a smoker of your acquaintance but will tell you that his pipe or cigar costs him a pretty round sum in the year. It is *idling*. A fellow tells you he is going "to have a smoke," just as he would tell you he was going to his dinner. Possibly the former has

greater attractions for him; at any rate he as willingly gives up his time to it. It is a *filthy* habit. Smoking or chewing—it's all the same; spitting is a consequent upon both; while blinding and choking smoke, and an offensive smell, result from the former. Such reasons, one would think, were sufficient to banish from civilized society any mere *luxury*. But the friends of the weed put forth higher claims for their client; they actually contend that it innocuously smooths the rough path of life before them. But is it so? Were such the case, man might well be pleased to buy at a little sacrifice so great a good; while woman would gladly suffer some inconvenience in order that he who toiled might soothe both body and brain. Here, however, we turn the tables, contending that tobacco is *absolutely hurtful*. This is no jumped-at conclusion. It is arrived at by chemically assigning tobacco its proper place. Sir Benjamin Brodie does this distinctly, when he ranks it with "alcohol" and other vegetable productions," which act "upon the nervous system." Dr. Marshall Hall, in a letter² to the junior members of the medical profession, says, "It is plain tobacco acts on the cerebrum, the medulla oblongata, and the heart; its effects are stupidity, defective breathing, defective action of the heart—forms of debility and impaired energy. These phenomena are primarily physical and physiological; no doubt the blood is poisoned, and in its turn poisons the brain, the medulla, and the heart. Sometimes, in those who smoke for the first time, these symptoms occur in a form even of danger." Immediately following, he gives the details of a case illustrating his remarks. Dr. Geoghegan, of Dublin, a high authority in such matters, speaking some time since to a friend who is addicted to the pipe, bore a strong testimony against it, warning him of its eminently injurious consequences. Finally, is it not an *unsafe principle* to

* *Irish Times*, Oct. 9, 1860.

* See the *Lancet*, for October, 1857.

hold that pleasure is to be sought for its own sake? Is it not much more so when the pleasure-giving habit is injurious? This is the case with the use of tobacco. Does the weed lessen hunger, and soothe the mind in times of distress? It does so by partially deadening the natural susceptibilities. Surely this is not allowable. When body or mind is in an abnormal condition, should not natural means be resorted to, to restore their tone, and not such as tend to render them still more abnormal? Seeing, then, that tobacco is a *positive nuisance*, and a *positive evil*, ought it not to be banished by common consent from this world of civilization, science, and Christianity?—D.

NEGATIVE.

Abstractedly speaking, it is perhaps better not to smoke, as, abstractedly speaking, it would be better to drink nothing but water. But we are not dealing with abstractions. In real life water almost always tastes of pills, and is otherwise an unsatisfactory beverage: and in real life people, who work, want something to look forward to. All we can say for tobacco is, that taken in moderation, it supplies that something in a cheap, accessible, and harmless form.—SAMUEL.

Though tobacco does some harm, its main effect is to furnish the greatest amount of enjoyment which is derived from any one source of physical gratification. No one can watch the labourer enjoying his mid-day rest, or plodding home at night, or sitting after the day's work at his cottage-door, without understanding that tobacco is the one great luxury of his existence. Such a man has not to trouble himself with the amount of duty it has paid. Be that as it may, he knows that it comes well within the reach of his scanty means, and that is about the only nice thing that does.—HORNHAND.

The fact that certain squeamish, asthmatical old women flash their prophetic eyes far into the fuliginous future, and see emaciated generations wasting

away before the poisonous drug, does not in the least affect us, inasmuch as the abuse of an article like tobacco does not seem at all likely to prevent its use with all strong-minded men who act out the precept, "Enough is as good as a feast."—SPIRITROOM.

Kane, the Arctic explorer, told an Englishman very shortly before he died, that it was tobacco that had enabled him to keep up the spirits and the courage of his men under their dreadful sufferings. He was opposed to their having much alcohol, and he found that they would go willingly without stimulants, and preserve their equanimity and elasticity of spirits, if he did but supply them with a moderate quantity of tobacco. This fact, I think, ought to weigh with those who oppose the use of tobacco without any better reason than that they don't like it, forsooth, because they never felt the want of it. I hope they never will, but I much question it.—PUFF.

Spenser calls it "*Divine tobacco*," and Lilly, "*The holy weed Nicotian*." Great, however, have been the obstacles through which the divine weed had to struggle. Christian kings wrote big books against it. Pope Urban excommunicated those who used it in churches (not, we allow, altogether without reason). The Czar of Muscovy cut off the noses of the snuffers. And Shah Jehan tortured all smokers. Christendom and Islam combined in vain against tobacco. There must be something very congenial to human tastes in what resisted this combination of persecution, unless, as in more momentous matters, the sufferings of the martyrs of tobacco were the seeds of its triumphs.—S. E.

Of all the luxuries in which Englishmen indulge, smoking is the most harmless, and affords the greatest amount of innocent gratification. Its soothing influence is felt by thousands, and thoroughly enjoyed by all who follow the example of Sir Walter Raleigh, who conferred so small a blessing upon his fellow-countrymen by the in-

introduction of tobacco into England. The labouring classes of this country, who are dependent for their daily bread on the sweat of toil, need some stimulant to enable them to work on day by day, and through the influence of tobacco are they alone able to achieve so much, for it is a stimulant, without any of those evil effects which follow the use of alcohol. Dr. Kane, the celebrated Arctic traveller, says that without tobacco his followers would never have been able to overcome all the difficulties they had to encounter. The merchant, during the cares and troubles of the day, looks forward with pleasure to the time when he shall derive some comfort from a smoke in the evening, for over his meerschaum he plans and schemes for the future. The old boys of Greenwich love a smoke as much now as when it helped to cheer them through the storm, or beguile away many a lonely and weary midnight watch. And so on, through all trades and professions smoking is enjoyed; and should any measure be brought forward to discourage its use, such a storm of opposition will be raised against it, that it will be powerless. For smoking leads to thinking and enables man to forget for the time the cares of the world. Around, and often during the few quiet minutes which he enjoys while smoking, thoughts are suggested which lay the foundation of future prosperity; and whatever any old crusty philosopher may say, his is a theoretical, philosophical view of the question; ours is a practical one,—and practice before theory, all the world over.—S. W.

Notwithstanding the strictures of Sir Benjamin Brodie, I think the use of tobacco ought not to be discouraged. I can advance nothing original to support my opinion, which is based on the following reasons:—Tobacco is one of the most effectual and pleasant sedatives we possess; a fact which can only be proved by those who use it. It is used by the inhabitants of all nations without exception, and its use is increasing

yearly in Great Britain and Ireland, as shown by the Custom House returns. Surely an article of such universal consumption must have some virtue in it. Its use, instead of undermining the constitution of man, enables him—so far as my experience goes—to endure hardships with a cheerfulness which, under the circumstances, could scarcely be expected. The experience of men every way as well qualified as Sir Benjamin Brodie of judging of the effects of tobacco must be taken into consideration. Dr. Pritchard, at the recent meeting of the Social Science Association, tells us that by means of tobacco he has been enabled to enter climes and places, where others had failed. The opinion of this eminent traveller is corroborated by Dr. Laakester, the able editor of the *Sanitary Review*. My remarks apply to the use of tobacco. Concerning its injurious effects when abused, I presume there are not two opinions; it is difficult, I admit, to draw the line of demarcation between moderate and excessive smoking; it remains for lovers of the weed to show by moderation, and a regard for the comfort and convenience of others, that the assertions of the anti-tobacco-nists are without foundation; it is, in fact, my opinion, that they may attempt to suppress sunshine with as great success as smoking.—J. W.

This is a subject upon which capital arguments could be adduced “on both sides of the question;” but as my convictions tend, so will I uphold; and I proceed, therefore, briefly to state my reasons for affirming that the use of tobacco ought not to be discouraged. Generally, in the first instance, tobacco-smoking is not an absolute necessity, as that health can be retained without it, this is a fact that needs no demonstration; but after the use of it has been indulged in for a short period, the pleasure and comfort derived therefrom induces the habit to become continuous, and we have to consider whether this habit is injurious to the health. Sir Benjamin Brodie admits that an occasional indulgence is not deleterious;

But the term occasional is a *vague* expression, and subject to several constructions. As there are some who would deem smoking a pipe once in a week as coming under that head, whilst there are others who would severally consider it an occasional indulgence down to two, or even three pipes in a day. Taking, however, one pipe in a day as a moderate medium, or less if this can be proved to be really injurious to the health, then we arrive at this interrogatory:—Should we discontinue a habit from which we derive pleasure and genial comfort, and which does not injure the health, simply because if it were indulged in to *excess*, it would injure the health? Why, if such reasoning as that were good, it would also apply to the rise of numerous other actual necessities, such as tea, water, ale, &c. *Excess* in any of these would also be deleterious; and should we on that account destroy their use altogether? Most decidedly, No!—J. C.

Dr. Close, Dean of Carlisle, condemns the use of tobacco on religious and moral grounds. Sir Benjamin Brodie and Sir C. Hastings confine themselves more particularly to the effect it produces on the nervous system. Some condemn the use of tea; some of coffee; some of flesh; and we have no doubt there could be some found who condemn the use of cabbages. The allopathist condemns the homœopathist, and the hydropathist condemns them both. One medical authority says that "he has used tobacco for twenty-three years, without observing any injurious effects." Another says:—"It has the effect of deranging the nervous system; of rendering the smokers lazy and listless, indisposed to bodily, and incapable of much mental exertion." Tobacco is used very generally by working men: are we to infer that working men, as a class, are "lazy and listless, and indisposed to bodily exertion"? To admit such, would be a libel upon the industrious orders of our country. All the arguments that have been used against the use of tobacco, if not convincing, might

have been very instructive, had they been confined to the abuse of it. "Everybody believes that it is bad to smoke in excess; and a man knows when he has smoked too many cigars, just as he knows when he has drunk too much wine, or eaten too much pudding." But we are told, that to use it at all is destructive alike to sound health and good morals. It is characterised as a "useless, feellish, vulgar, offensive, and demoralizing habit." A reverend gentleman goes to the length of saying:—"The use of tobacco is a criminal indulgence, unbecoming the professors of the wisdom of God." By what train of reasoning he found out that tobacco was "a criminal indulgence," we have no means of knowing. Acts of a criminal nature are, in general, done in secret; smokers do it openly. We are inclined to suppose that the reverend gentlemen meant to say that, if he had the power, he did not want the inclination to make the person using tobacco a criminal, and to punish him accordingly. We don't doubt it. Dean Close has given to the world one real case of cancer in the tongue, and considers it as sufficient evidence for smokers to fling away their pipes and cigars. We may yet hope to hear of some one insisting that the use of turnips should be given up, because a case of colic had occurred through using them. All classes of the community, with a few exceptions, use tobacco, in some form or other. It would be a very interesting and curious inquiry if, by any means, reliable statistics could be collected of a given number of smokers and non-smokers (other things being equal), to note accurately the various phases, as they occur, of the rapid development of the non-smoker in physical strength, moral excellence, and intellectual vigour, with the gradual deterioration of the smoker,—stunted stature, physical debility, and an intellect shrouded and "wasting away before the poisonous drug; the glories of Britain eclipsed in clouds which her own children have helped to make." We hold that the use of tobacco is the source

of an innocent and harmless enjoyment to thousands. Let its opponents point out the actual amount of injury the use of tobacco is capable of producing; give us something that we can grasp, and it will deserve the attention and serious consideration of all who wish the social elevation of mankind. We must have more than a few isolated facts, and inconclusive abstractions,—some tangible reasons why the use of it should be abandoned. The facts for its use are all on the side of the smoker. Its soothing influence is attested by the smoke of a million pipes. The gentle curl of the ascending "cloud" from a million cigars proves incontestably that

its use is approved, and acted upon by almost general consent. To use one of their own arguments, "one page of personal experience is worth folios of the *creta funcies*." We say, then, from our own experience,—let those who use tobacco, use it still;—the immoral, the feeble in frame, and the weak in intellect, are not alone to be found in the ranks of those who are partakers of the "poisonous plant." We know of many instances where the use of tobacco has proved highly beneficial, and are of opinion that no reliable reasons have been given for its discouragement.

D. R. R.

The Societies' Section.

The Southampton Society for Mutual Education.—The half-yearly meeting of the above society was held at the Society's Rooms, Hanover-buildings, on Friday, October 5th. There was a good attendance of the members. The secretaries read the report, which showed that the number of members on the books was smaller than had been for some time before, principally owing to the fact of several having left the town; it is fully expected, however, that in a few weeks the number of members will be as large as ever. The magazine still continues to be one of the chief features of the society, and the library has been made good use of. The report having been unanimously adopted, the following officers for the next half year were elected; Eustace H. Jones, Esq., President; Messrs. Pooley and Marshall, vice-presidents; Mr. Edward J. Knight, Editor; Mr. Bance, Secretary. The lectures (the whole of which are delivered by members of the Society) will be commenced during the present month.

The Amateur Literary Society.—The council of this Society has resolved, in compliance with numerous requests, to

abolish the annual subscription heretofore required of members, and thus the great objection of expense which has been urged is for ever done away with. This association consists of those who are desirous of ensuring purity and correctness of thought and style in literary composition, whether for the ordinary purposes of life, or with a view to following literature as a profession. It is by no means exclusive, but admits into full communion all grades and denominations; and gentlemen who wish to enter for the ensuing session should at once communicate with the Honorary Secretary, William Whyte, Esq., 23, St. Vincent-place, Glasgow. Every candidate for admission must send in a probationary essay or poem, and, if this be approved of, he will be enrolled on payment of the entrance fee of 3s. 6d. The Honorary President of the Society is the Rev George Hiff, of the Grange School, Sunderland, author of "An English Education," &c. The President of Council is John W. W. Penney, Esq., B.A., author of "Talk and Talkers," &c.; and the Honorary Fellows are Rev. G. Gilfillan, M.A.; W. M. Thackeray, Esq.; Charles Dickens,

Esq.; J. A. Cooper, Esq., F.R.S.L.; Alfred Elwes, Esq., President of the British Literary Society, author of "Frank and Andrea," &c. The "Societies Magazine," noticed in our last number, is published quarterly,

and contains essays, tales, poetry, critiques, &c. Three numbers are already out, and may be had, post free, for 1s. 6d., from the publisher, J. F. Hope, 16, Great Marlborough-street, London.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

112. Can any of your numerous readers tell me who wrote the National Anthem, and when?—J. EVANS.

118. In Gilfillan's "Literary Portrait of De Quincey," there is the following passage:—"It is painful to be compelled to inscribe upon such a shield the word *Desdichado*." The sentence is to me unintelligible, from my unacquaintance with the concluding word. Would you kindly give an explanation in the "Inquirers' Section," and any hint as to supplying the desideratum, under which it will be seen, and the labour will be gladly acted on?—SELF-TAUGHT.

114. Be good enough to inform the subscriber if any of the works of the celebrated Spaniard, Lope de Vega, are to be found in England; and, if so, the particulars thereof. English translations are what is wanted.—ADOLESCENS.

115. Can any of your readers inform me whether any of the mitres of the bishops of the Church of England are still in existence? and, if so, on what occasions are they worn?—CHURCHMAN.

116. Where can I find an account of the lives of the Lord High Admirals of England?—J. E. H.

117. Can any of your correspondents inform me where a history of the Irish Houses of Parliament may be procured, and where one might be enabled to find the names of the Speakers of the Irish House of Commons?—J. E. H.

118. What is the most complete

history of the Isle of Wight, and who are the publishers?—VECTIS.

119. Can any of your readers inform me where the chapter relating to scholarships of "Normal Seminaries," under the Minutes of Council of 2nd June, 1856, is to be got? An early answer will favour.—D. R. R.

120. Can any of your readers give me an idea of the approximate number of distinct species of animals now existing?—E.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

101. *Quotations*.—May I be permitted to inform "Augustine," in the pages of your valuable serial, in reply to his inquiry, that I have found the "Homilist" in valuable as a mine for originality, and condensation of eloquent passages and gems of thought, and doubt not the work would be equally valuable to him?—W. G.

107. *Latin and French Grammar for self-instructors*.—In respect to the question asked by "Sylvia May," in the October Part, I may say that the best manual for students instructing themselves in the Latin tongue, is the work called "Lessons in Latin," by the Rev. J. R. Beard, D.D. London: John Cassell. Price 3s. It contains all that is to be found in ordinary Latin grammars, conveyed in a more lucid and intelligent manner, with easy and progressive exercises, to test the advance of the learner. It is specially designed for those studying Latin without a master. For French, I may recommend the "Lessons in French," by Professor

Fasquelle, price 4s. 6d., published by the same firm.—FRED. A. R.

107. Cassell's "Lessons in Latin; Latin an Elementary Grammar of the living Language; intended especially for those who are desirous of learning Latin without a Master." Cloth, 3s. Cassell's "Lessons in French," by Professor Fasquelle. Complete in one vol., 4s. 6d. The above works are likely to be useful to "Sylvia May." They are published by Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, London. If, however, "Sylvia May" is one of the earnest students of the *British Controversialist*, and is determined to obtain a thorough mastery of the Latin tongue, if he will *rigidly* follow out the plan we are about to lay down, we can promise him an amount of success no less gratifying than encouraging. Procure, at once, Kennedy's "Latin Grammar" (in which the quantities are all carefully marked), price 3s. 6d.; Longman and Co.; and Virgil's "Æneid," Book I. (with interlinear translations), price 1s. 6d.; Walton and Maberly. Study these two works with the greatest care, taking a few lines of Virgil and a very small portion of the grammar DAILY. Let it be done thoroughly. When "Sylvia May" has thoroughly acquired a knowledge of the words, and their meanings, in his first author, let him procure "Parsing Lessons to Virgil," price 1s. 6d.; Walton and Maberly. Let a few words be taken at first, and let each noun and each verb be carefully worked out. Be careful not to overstrain the attention by taking too great a range at one time. When these two books have been mastered, a school-like acquaintance with the First Æneid will have been obtained, as well as a general knowledge of the grammar. This much accomplished, let "Sylvia May" procure the "De Amicitia," "De Senectute," and "Brutus," of Cicero, published at 1s., by John Weale; also Riddle's "Young Scholar's English-Latin and Latin-English Dictionary," price 12s.; Longman and Co. Translate, every day, one page of the "De Amicitia"

into close but idiomatic English, and on the day following, re-translate it into Latin, and correct it from the text. Let this be done throughout. Then read the whole in course, and copy it out, *verbatim*, three or four times. This is hard work, but it brings a glorious harvest. The practice of reviewing is a very great help to accuracy and thoroughness. Every day let the lesson of the preceding day be gone over; at the end of the week, the studies of the week; and so on. If "Sylvia May" will unswervingly follow our advice, he will acquire a foundation, *strong and firm*, on which he may, at his leisure, build a knowledge of the Latin language both sound and critical.—T. L. P.

111. *Origin of Wakes or Feasts*.—"The festival of the day on which the church of any parish was dedicated, is specially enjoined in the law of Edward the Confessor; and from this festival originated the wakes of more modern times;—a name derived either from the verb *wicken*, to consecrate, or, as seems more probable, from the Saxon word for the vigil, by which the festival was preceded. The institution of these festivals is to be traced to Gregory the Great, who advised Mellito, whom he had sent as Abbot into Britain, to encourage the people to hold festivals around the churches on the days of their consecration, or of the commemoration of the martyrs whose relics were placed there, that he might prevent them from attending their idol feasts. An old English sermon states how the vigils were changed from feasts to fasts; how, "in the beginning of holy church, men and women coming to church over nyghts, with candelus, and other lyghte, and woken in the church alle nyghte in her devocynes;" but, "by process of tyme," they "turned the good, holy devocyon, into synne; wherefore holy faders ordeyned the people to leve that waking, and faste the evon, and so turned the waking into fastyng; but yett holdeth the olde name, and is called in Latin *vigilia*, that is, *wakyng* in English."—*Hampson*, ii. 125.

LITERARY NOTES.

Charles Knight's historical labours have materially affected his health, and the monthly-part issue of his "England" has been discontinued, to afford leisure for mature study.

Herbert Ingram, M.P., proprietor of the *Illustrated London News*—one of the self-made men of our age, was drowned in Lake Michigan, North America, in September.

Her literary labours, such as they are, are said to have enabled Miss Warner to purchase a bit of "The Wide, wide world," in the middle of the Hudson, for 11,000 dollars. It is to be called Warner's Island. This is both *Say and Seal*.

The Liverpool Free Library, the gift of William Brown, is opened. There are nearly 20,000 volumes upon its shelves. This is a volunteer movement, of which there is much need, and for which there ought to be much heartfelt praise and appreciation.

Mr. E. Landells, one of the original proprietors of *Punch*, and one of the most popular illustrators of the day, is dead.

Messrs. Chapman and Hall are to publish Mr. Peter Cunningham's new biographical and autobiographical work called "Father and Son."

A marble monument, by M. Strackee, has been erected in the New Park, Rotterdam, in honour of Tollens, the merchant poet,—a poet as well circumstanced as Rogers, as popular as Burns,—who died at Ryeenrick in 1854.

Under the auspices of the Prince Consort, Blanchard Jerrold is to issue a "History of Industrial Exhibitions."

The speeches and proclamations of Napoleon III. have been collected and published.

Hannay's contributions to the "Quarterly" are to be republished.

Eliza Cook's "Poems," illustrated by Gilbert, are to be issued as a Christmas book by Messrs. Routledge.

The gift-villa in the *Avenues de l'Imperatrice*, from the city of Paris to Lamartine, is now ready for occupancy.

A poem full of fine philosophy and of genuine poetry, "imagination all compact," bearing the name of "Merlin the Sorcerer," has been lately issued by Edgar Quinet, the historian philosopher, and is exciting a great deal of interest.

Since January, 1858, C. E. Mudie has added to his library of history and biography 87,210 vols.; travel and adventure, 50,572; fiction, 165,455; science, religion, reviews, and miscellaneous works, 87,856; total, 391,083 volumes.

In the third volume of Lamartine's own edition of his works, now publishing by subscription, a hitherto unpublished production, entitled "Saul," appears.

"Engineers and Engine-makers" is the new work undertaken by Mr. Smiles.

"The Mormons and their Territory" is a book creating much stir in France. The author is M. Jules Remy.

It is asserted that Dickens, Thackeray, and Trollope, will each come on the *tapis* with a new monthly serial novel.

The Harpers, of New York, are said to have paid £1,000 to Dickens for the American copyright of "Hunted Down."

Biographies of James Watt and George Stephenson have been issued in German.

The prose works of Hood, the humourist, are to be issued in monthly volumes by Derby and Jackson, New York.

"The Remains" of Daniel Manin, president of the republic of Venice, 1848—49, have been published at Paris, edited and revised by Madame Planat de la Faye.

The late Robert Stephenson is to have a bust beside his father, in the library of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Newcastle. Mr. Wyon sculptured the father, and has been commissioned to produce this bust of the son.

Oxenford is said to be about to resign the *baton* as *Times* dramatic-critic to Tom Taylor, who is also art-critic.

George G. Cunningham, author of "Lives of Eminent and Illustrious Englishmen," and editor of several useful geographical compositions, died at Windermere, on 25th of September.

"Temple-bar," a London Magazine, conducted by G. A. Sala, will appear in December.

H. Sutherland Edwards is engaged on a "History of the Opera and the Ballet," in two volumes.

"Two Black Masks" is to be the title of a new fiction by Mr. Blanchard Jerrold, so that G. A. Sala is not to be "Quite Alone" in that field of literary effort, though his expected fiction is to bear that name.

Rev. Alexander Fletcher, author of "Family Devotions," &c., expired September 30th.

M. Louis Blanc has been lecturing in Scotland, and in some towns of England, on Co-operation, Mysterious Personages, Labour-life in Paris, The Salons of Paris.

Victor Hugo is engaged on a new work, "*Les Misérables*," for the copyright of which, it is said, a Paris publisher has offered £8,000. The sixth volume of his son's translation of Shakespeare has been lately issued.

The Recorder of Birmingham, Mr. Commissioner Hill, has a biographical work ready for press.

A new novel, by Signor Ruffini, author of "Lorenzo Benoni," &c., is in the press of Messrs. Smith, Elder, and Co.

"The Origin and Succession of Life on the Earth," by the Oxford Professor of Geology, Mr. Philips, taking the anti-Darwin side of the question, is nearly ready.

C. W. Opzoomer is editing at Amsterdam a new annotated issue of Shakespeare in Dutch.

A translation of the New Testament from a MS. of the 14th century, in the Vatican Library, has just been published at Geneva.

A "Life of Smollett" is employing the time of the author of the "Life of Fielding,"—Frederic Lawrence.

José Guill y Renté, the celebrated Cuban poet, lawyer, novelist, essayist, and historian, is preparing for the press "A History of the Conquest of America."

"Boadicea" is the subject of Alfred Tennyson's new poem. It is to be ready in the spring.

"A Treatise on Ancient Oratory," found in the Island of Inchcolm, is to be edited by Professor Simpson.

Four thousand florins have been provided for in the budget of Holland this year, for the promotion and encouragement of literature.

A complete Dictionary of the Dutch language is to be compiled under the auspices of the Government of Holland.

A Shakespeare memorial is to be erected in Melbourne; the committee engaged in it have agreed to trust the selection of a fitting design to the discretion of Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, and Sir C. Eastlake.

A hitherto unknown poem of John Bunyan's is to be published by J. C. Hotten, under the editorship of the distinguished Bunyanist, George Offer, who is to supply, in an introduction, several new facts in the biography of the marvellous dreamer of Bedford.

Sir Henry Herbert's "Diary" of Plays licensed while he was Master of the Revels, viz., 1622—1640, from the MS. possessed by Lord Powis, which was copied by Malone when collecting materials for his "Historical Account of the Stage," is to be published.

John Hunter — 1726-1793 — the "gifted interpreter of the Divine power and wisdom at work in the laws of organic life," and "the founder of scientific surgery," is to have a statue of marble placed as a memorial in the Hunterian Museum by the members of the College of Surgeons.

A subscription is being raised in Glasgow and its neighbourhood to aid John Young, a local poet, who has met with a disabling accident by fire. The means proposed is to present him with an edition of his poems, consisting of a thousand copies, by the disposal of which he may eke out a living.

Speculative Thought.

THOUGHT is the force of forces. In the very heart of the most perfect mechanical invention thought pulsates, and teaches it to labour. At the very root of habit thought lies, and operates. In the most recondite—and, to the inapprehensive mind—unmeaning, mathematical *formulae* thought hides, and yet perks out. To the strange ciphers of the scroll of heaven thought imparts significance, and from the age-old characters with which the rock-volumes of nature are inscribed thought educes the history of otherwise unrecorded times. By thought steam has been harnessed to do the will of man, the electric fluid has been made his messenger, the ocean has been mapped into highways, and even the stars in the sky have been arranged into lighthouses and sea-guides, reckoners of time, and tests of chronology. Thought unites and disunites the elements, brings into effective nearness or connection differing powers, and causes them to work together in harmonious action in fulfilment of its predestination. Thought links in one, by the bonds of causation, long series of effects, and either originates or controls the manifestations of the latent powers of bodies. The thin air is dispossessed of its apparent unity by chemical elimination, and the solid brilliancy of the diamond is reduced to elemental tenuousness by the skill of the thinker. The might of mind constructs artificial explosives destructive as the lightning's flash, and its precautionary forethought disarms the thunderbolt of its deadly energy. Seizing the impalpable sunbeams, thought makes a pencil of light, and prisons for ever the artistic brilliancy it produces "as a thing of joy." Thought interpenetrates all matter with its intentions, and makes it subject and submissive; and thought interprets all the manifestations of material existence, making each phenomenon only a letter in the alphabet of science, to be read hereafter into new meanings and in new conjunctions, and to be used again as symbols of truths which have become precious to the soul. Matter is almost, as it were, vitalized by thought, and it is thereby gifted with energy, endowed with intelligence, moulded into grace, fashioned into new utilities, and made perdurably capable of reading to man lessons of wisdom.

Thought is the elixir of life. The far space-distances, orb-filled and glorious, have had projected into them the lives of many thinkers, so that they now live with the life and in the harmony of their thoughts, and the seeming chaos of immensity has been woven into form by the passing through it of thought—the shuttle of life. The hard rock-surfaces have had their hieroglyphic pages re-written and translated into living and vital speech by thought. The animate

spirit has even consented to shut itself up in the enclosure of an inanimate thing—a book—and yet retains its ancient prerogative of befriending and teaching, encouraging and delighting, its fellow-spirits. Years cannot dim the beauty of Homer's thought, destroy the potency of Plato's speculations, break the spell of entrancement with which Demosthenes enthralls, silence the imperial voice of Julius Cæsar, or impair the gaiety of Horace. The heart of man pulses yet with some of Harvey's life; the "old red sandstone" holds a lien of Hugh Miller's spirit; the skiey vault is even now beaming into our souls light gained from the intellect of Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton. Franklin still curbs the lightning, Watt still reins in the steam-steeds, Columbus guides to the Western world, and Vasco da Gama to the Eastern. Solon, Justinian, and Grotius superintend law, Euclid enspirits mathematics, Aristotle regulates thought, and Bacon holds an episcopate over experiment. The majestic domes of St. Peter's and St. Paul's enmonument and canonize the souls of Raphael, Michael Angelo, and Wren. The iron-ribbed earth is conscious of Stephenson, the waves are yet under the vicariate of Bell and Fulton. The trade and commerce of Britain are vital with Arkwright's inventiveness, Crompton's perseverance, Smith's thought, Peel's legislation. Hildebrand rules yet in the Vatican, William the Norman's sceptre is powerful still in England, Luther's voice is living even in this day, Washington preserves America, Clive governs India, Wesley informs the church with new life, Howard animates and organizes philanthropic effort, and Cromwell warns, and awes, and quells, even to this hour. Scaliger revivifies classical literature; Tell inspires Switzerland; Faust and Guttenberg give wings to words, making them indeed *πνευματώδη*; and Shakespeare, by his transcendent genius, makes, as Bacon says, *Dramatica poesis veluti Historia spectabilis*.

Of all vital things, the most vital is thought; it permeates and suffuses, works in, into, and over all things; it is the inner life of all—of discovery, invention, science, history, ethics, law, and religion.

"On earth, there is nothing great but man;
In man, there is nothing great but mind."

Thought is the key which admits to the jewel-casket of man, nature, and life—indeed, it is the very element in which life is—it is

"The pith and marrow of our attributes."

Of cunning, composite, mysterious man, the essential and the quintessence is thought. Out of that, and by that, the individual becomes manifest, grows, lives, and exerts its changeful being; it is the efflorescence of existence—life of our life. It is the energy by which happiness, improvement, knowledge, development, progress, civilization, and moral activity become possible; and all that is noble, laudable, good, is

"Won from the void and formless infinite"

of nescience, ignorance, or error. Without thought, science is but a rude and indigested mass of mere observation—of facts—

**"It is an army with no general,
An arch without a keystone:"**

worse than a blank leaf of nature's ledger, if reason has not been the accountant. Science derives its chief value from thought ;—the sages are not only the teachers, but the interpreters of the ages—they supply the solution to the great riddles of existence, the Past, the Present, and the Future. Thought is the might of seers ; it is the nerve of action, the spring at whose unwinding effects strike out into potentiality, and the series of affairs is set in motion. Statesmanship, diplomacy, trade, manufactures, navigation, war, literature, science, art, &c., are only the blossomings of human thought.

It is necessary, by repetition and reiteration, to emphasize this idea. A spurious practicality has invaded the mind of our age, and *thinking* has been lowered to a mere ensigny, while *doing* has been promoted to an undisputed captaincy and chieftainhood. Idealism is contemned, realism is the faith of the times. The genitor has been supplanted by the genatrix, and "the grey mare" has been regarded as "the better horse." The far-darting power of conceptiveness springs forth from thought, and requires to be nourished and brought to maturity by the concomitance and encirclement of practicality. Thought is the husband of experiment, experiment the mother of science and of art. By the marriage of thought and nature truth is born. The germs and influences, from which it gains birth, existed in us before. The old undergoes transformation to produce the new; but the new is old as nature and as thought, though the generative conjunction of both had not as yet taken place.

"Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise
 From outward things, whate'er you may believe:
 There is an inmost centre in us all,
 Where truth abides in fullness. Watch narrowly
 The demonstration of a truth, its birth,
 And you will trace the effluence to its spring
 And source within us, where broods radiance vast,
 To be elicited ray by ray."

The value of a thought cannot be told. Who can estimate the money-worth of Watt's inventions, of Jenner's discovery, of Hill's postage reform, of Wheatstone's telegraph, of Stephenson's railways, of Chambers' literature for the people, of Simpson's ameliorations of human suffering by chloroform, of Howard's philanthropic ideas, of Peel's free trade measures? Who could reckon the price due for pleasure and instruction received from the plays of Shakespeare, the poems of Milton, the novels of Scott, the histories of Macaulay, Grote, and Froude, the essays of Jeffrey, the songs of Burns, the wit of Jerrold, the philosophic speculations of Reid, Whately, and Hamilton, the moral treatises of Butler, Chalmers, and Whewell?

For what amount can we assess the discoveries of Newton, Herschell, and Hutton,—the chemical researches of Scheele, Liebig, and Faraday,—the glorious interpretations of the phenomena of heaven given to us by Ross, Halley, and Nichol—the systematizations of Nature by Linnæus, Jussieu, and Oken—the inventions of Telford, Hoe, and Cooke,—the art-products of Raphael, Hogarth, Scheffer,—the political improvements of Pitt, Peel, and Gladstone,—the moral efforts of Fry, Oberlin, and Miss Nightingale,—and the religious influences of Hall, Chalmers, and Foster? The indeterminable value of these items of civilization arises from the fact that they are the firstlings only of an infinite series of effects, whose manifestations are unceasing, yet whose root and birth-germ were once—a thought; small as a grain of mustard seed, and yet fruitful as Egyptian corn.

“’Tis in the advance of individual minds
That the slow crowd places its expectation,
Eventually to follow;—as the sea
Waits ages in its bed; till some one wave
Of all the multitudinous mass extends
The empire of the whole, some feet, perhaps,
Over the strip of land which could confine
Its fellows so long time: thenceforth the rest,
Even to the meanest, hurry in at once,
And so much is clear gained.”

If this lengthy exordium has effected its purpose, it will have supplied the basis of a belief in the worth of thought, and of the revealer of thought,—

“The master mind,
The thinker, the explorer, the creator.”

But it should do more; it should lead us to determine for ourselves that thought shall not always remain latent in us; but that, with the lit lamp of consciousness, we shall search through the chambers of the soul for the old chronicles that were written by the scribe Memory in the archives of the past, and read the daily record of clerkly experience regarding the present,—in order that we also may know the might of the secrets they contain, and the value of the thought within us—that we should, in short, each become the students and disciples of a genuine philosophy, and acquire the self-knowledge which results from the exercise of *speculative thought*.

It is often difficult to explain what is meant by a scientific phrase; but our minds always gain in precision of effort by establishing, or even endeavouring to establish, the determinate conception of which we intend any phrase to be expressive. “Speculative thought” we employ to signify the free use of reason for the attainment of wisdom. Not the dialectic use merely, but the cognitive as well; indeed, every faculty and capacity of the mind exercised according to its natural bent, under its natural excipients, in its usual forms, and for the fulfilment of its preordained purpose. The

results of speculative thought are called philosophy—the organon of wisdom. Reason may exercise itself either on the concrete or the abstract—its result in the former operations will constitute physical science, in the latter, metaphysical. In the one it is the artificer of truth; in the other it is the legislatrix;—the end, aim, and purpose of the artificer is determined by a plan and a constructed thought existent previous to his labours; the legislatrix has the fixing and enforcing of law upon all aims undertaken under her auspices and by her counsel. In this way reason is a law unto herself,—has her legislative functions inborn and native, and is incapable of making any exertion of her activity but in conformity, real or seeming, with the regulative principles which bind it and operate in it, making it what it is. The reason necessarily elaborates its results according to the laws which overrule its nature, but the matter upon which it may expend its elaborative energies is different; and hence arise the two distinct divisions of human effort in thought—bringing into being respectively, as we have said, physical and metaphysical science.

“Taken in its largest comprehension, as the knowledge of abstract and separate substances, Aristotle raises the philosophy of mind above all other parts of learning. He assigns to it the investigation of the principles and causes of things in general, and ranks it not only as superior, but also as prior, in the order of nature, to the whole tribe of arts and sciences. But what is first in nature is not first in man. Nature begins with causes which produce effects [*Deduction*]. Man begins with effects, and by them ascends to causes [*Induction*]. Thus all human study and investigation proceed, of necessity, in the reverse of the natural order of things, from sensible to intelligible; from body, the effect, to mind, which is both the first and final cause. Now *Physics*, being the name given by the Peripatetic to the philosophy of body, from the necessary course of human studies, some of his interpreters called that of mind *Metaphysics*, implying also by the term that its subject, being more sublime and difficult than any other as relating to universals, the study of it would come most properly and successfully after that of physics. Taking it, however, in its natural order, as furnishing the general principles of all other parts of learning, which descend from thence to the cultivation of particular subjects, Aristotle himself called this the First Philosophy; but as its subject is universal being, particularly mind, which is the highest and most universal, he gave it also the appellation of the Universal Science, common to all the rest; and, lastly, to finish his encomium of this first and universal philosophy, he honoured it with the exclusive name of *Wisdom*.*

Wisdom is the possession of truth. Truth may be either subjective or objective, referring to our own mental nature and capacities, or to the kinds and powers of all that lies beyond and

out of our own being. Beyond ourselves, however, we feel differing influences and impulses, and these we must learn to know, that we may use and enjoy, or repel and destroy them; these other things, like our own nature, dispart, we find, into two forms—material and intellectual; and so we are led again to recognise two great divisions of knowledge—the physical and the metaphysical.

Perhaps the words *physics* and *psychics*, if understood, would more readily keep before thought the contrast involved in these two *species* of reflective results. *Physics* we would then define as a knowledge of the existence, properties, powers (latent), capacities (active), of *unconscious* external nature; *psychics* we would employ to signify a knowledge of all *conscious* nature—in so far as the manifestations of consciousness were concerned. On these words, however, it is not necessary to insist; if it be remembered that all nature *may* be regarded as consisting of *existences*—which manifest themselves and perform their several functions in creation unconsciously, and are therefore physical or consciously, and are therefore *psychical* or metaphysical.

The interpretation, the utilizing, or the systematizing of unconscious existences constitutes the prime objects of the physical sciences and their resulting arts. The knowing, using, and improving of the capacities of human nature are (so far as man is concerned) the prime objects of metaphysical science, i. e., the investigation of consciousness in itself, its operations, its intents, and its results. Metaphysics have a value in and for themselves; physics attain their chief worth from their adaptability to gratify the wants—mental or material—of man. Metaphysics are legislative, productive, prophetic; physics is interpretive, inventive, instrumental; and the former lights and carries the torch-flame of thought for the latter. Out of the soul, the morphic or shaping spirit alike of theory and invention arises, and it becomes dynamic only so far as it lives by and with thought. So long as the soul-powers of man are unstirred, physical inquiry and discovery are impossible; for soul is formative, and nature plastic; so soon, however, as cognition in its faintest and almost image-less specific form operates, a metaphysic arises, and the soul develops from the unconscious into the conscious state. Excitation leads to intercourse, and then mind seeks to subdue matter to its will; and this is the moment of the birth of what we have ventured in this paper to designate Speculative Thought.

As soon as speculative thought exerts itself, it finds that the first and chief question for it is—What can I know?—what are the sphere and contents of the possibly knowable? Ignorance is an inevitable consequence of the limitation of our being, and that we cannot overleap; but error is the result of the wrong or partial exercise of our intellectual powers. Nature denies us the possession of full knowledge; but she does not occasion error, or make that inevitable. The exertion of the critical power is forced on us by the intensity of our own keenness to be, and to be active. In ourselves

we perceive a power of examinative, dialectic reasoning—consciousness awakes within us by the process of thinking. We become known to ourselves by the effects our organic activities produce in, upon, or about us. By noticing and noting these phenomena, we learn their causes, and become aware of our own special personality. In the course of this investigation, we feel that we are possessed of intuitive emotions and appetites—some of which we can control and guide, and others of which are inappeasable unless gratified and satisfied; we become sensible of having faculties, which we can employ or leave torpid, in a great measure, as and when we like; and we learn to know that we *are* voluntary agents, reposeless beings, craving continually the subjugation of all that is without us to our individuality, and brought by this desire into perpetual conflict with opposing forces, powers, inclinations, or phenomena—chances or changes. Besides this, we accept it as a law of being that every existence has a final cause; and we feel that the final cause of our being thinking agents is that we may know—and, of course, know the truth—the truth of what we are, of what things are, of what their causes are. The spontaneous life of mere being in this act of critical thought passes into a reflective life, and gives occasion to the efforts of speculative inferences, in its endeavour to discover—first, the sources of knowledge; second, the possibilities and utilities of knowledge; third, the limits of human reason in thought—in acquiring knowledge.

When we have so far consciously examined self, and investigated nature as to recognize the distinctions existing between our animal and our spiritual functions, the laws under which they act, and the kind and degree of claim they have upon our regard; when we have learned to distinguish the outward from the inward, and to make the former submissive to the latter; when, in short, we have become *egoistic*, i.e., self-conscious, endued with a perception of identity, influenced by and subject to the idea of personality—of being an individual essence, whose impulses, energies, activities, emotions, affections, inquisitiveness, is centred and concentrated in one being, though not *upon* it,—then we have a new outlook for thought. We feel each capacity—instinctive, sensitive, intellectual—yearning and working outwards to gratification, upwards to a course of development, progress, exertion, reality, and life, or inwards in mortifying self-weariness and distress. Thought finds its choicest occupation in seeking growth, development, activity, and, if it may be, ecstasy. Out of the soul of each attribute there springs some design, which may be faint and vapourous at first, but which ultimately becomes

"Like a smooth wave, o'ergilded by the morn,
High-heaving ere it cast itself ashore,
Buoyant, elate"—

and anxious to take the leap that would bring it into contact with its object; or,—varying the metaphor once more,—the thinker seems as if he

"Felt new roots
 Quicken within him; branches new, that sprung
 Aloft, and, with expanding energies,
 Tinged, and for immortal fruit prepared."

Feeling so, he cannot avoid entertaining the desire to know how far each aim, or hope, act, or preparative, is legitimated by the inner intimations of consciousness, and by the outer environments of circumstance; and so the idea of duty roots itself in the soul, and grows into a maturity of fruitful thought. At first with a strange, sad tremulousness, later with an eager earnestness, and later still with an unrelaxing emphasis and interest, the mind employs itself upon the question—What ought I to do?

To the heart's tumultuous beat, in asking this question, the appetites give an answer, and invite it to taste their delicate delights in fulness of participative joy—promising measureless happiness as the result; the faculties, with various energies, clamour for exercise for their vitality, and seem determined neither to be dormant nor subdued in the intensity of their ardour for recognition and for opportunity; the will, with penetrating influence and persistency, works all these tense and straining aspirants for leadership and action under the curb of its own purposes, and looses or restrains their energies according to its determinations—and now it listens to the music of the conscious nerves, jubilant at the immunity they are enjoying; again it hearkens to the throbbings of the excited heart, whose tides moan for a sleep that never comes to them in life; and then it feels the quivering pulses of the powers of thought, soul-fed, soul-led, rushing throughout nature with unresting speed, and finding flashful joy from its magnetic touch;—from all these there arises a rapturous sense of being, a jocund magic seems to sparkle throughout life, and the mind seems to become brimful of the delicious nectar of enjoyment. But this concentration of passionate effort soon exhausts the spirit, and brings a longing for some opiate to still the intense turbulence of life, and the blind whirl and dance of action. It is not long till man, outworn and overwearied, sighs after something that he has not succeeded in finding—happiness, and God, the source of it; and so the question arises again, What ought I to do? How are life's solid joys, useful powers, lasting hopes, to be acquired? By what course of life is life made truest, noblest, best? Here, again, is a field of effort for speculative thought, of which it would be well for man should the result be to make him use St. Augustine's prayer,—"*Fecisti nos tibi, et manet cor irrequietum donec reat in te.*" "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and the heart is restless till it rests in Thee."

The self-examining criticism to which thought leads the soul is not a halting-place for inquiry—it is a stage only on the journey of the reflective intellect. As we have seen, it passes from the query, What can I do? to that of, What ought I to do? being what and as I am. This arranged, there starts up the inevitable Why? If life be, as it is, short at best, uncertain at any time, why resign the

opportunity of indulging in those delights which our appetites and faculties make possible, even though the "voluptuous swell" of their indulgence may afterwards "ache along each nerve"?—Why cast aside the possible, with its headlong tides of disport, its hurrying mirth, its

"Delicious gambols and high phantasies;"

that the icy breath of the probable may cool the pleasure of the present with damp, dank issues from the future? There is in the secret well-springs of the heart a fountain of hope whose waters play into the bliss-thirsty being, and balm its life with fine lucidness. Hope's music sings of a perennial life continued and permanized in some subtler medium than that now ours, in which a perfect bliss and satisfying rapture may be found and used; and that the hour of sacrifice—when Death uplifts the high priest's knife to sheathe it in his victim—may but release the essence in which life dwells, much as the light which the Levite dropped into the censer only freed the subtle odours of the gums from the sifted ashes, and made them rise to heaven. If there are capacities within us on which earthly pleasure palls, that sigh for other joys, despise the body's desires, and spurn at the limits by which our earth-life is spanned and measured, then there must be cause for hope, though every hope comes shadowed by a fear. These hopes and fears—if we let the heart speak—will tell us why we ought to do those duties upon which our intellectual nature decides as the best homage to God, and of the holiest utility with regard to our own fate—as the best preparation for the life beyond life.

Thus man becomes a spiritualist by the mere growth of thought—if his thought be at all reflective rather than instinctive. His nature exerts a prophetic force upon him, and he feels that rust and disuse are not for him.

"To eyes, to ears,
To every organ of the copious mind,"

Nature offers proof that the control of time is not to be continuous over his soul; for he feels himself,

"At will, keep measure with his flight;
At will, outstrip it."

He cannot believe that the finely adjusted springs of life and sense, with all the rich treasure of the acquisitions he has made, are in a moment to become the objects of a disappointing and destructive disenchantment. Hope, a reasonable hope, glows in his ardent veins, and by-and-bye an intense faith (for hope is only the chrysalis of faith) mounts and soars and wings itself into the eternal lights of heaven.

The positivist may look on nature with an ardent eye—its sun-brown hills, its brooks, its groves, its vales of fertile farms, its skies of starry brilliancy, its myriads of phenomena, of life, and of law;

and may feel the joy of being amphitheatred in such a world of marvels—resonant with science, art, poetry, and enjoyment; but to him it must be crisp and dry—dull, dead-like, and inane—if only his little hour of life be given to search into and know its secrets and its sacredness. If he must prison his hope, and love, and life within the narrow rounds of the fast-fleeting years of animal existence; and, if he feels that there is no light to direct man

“To victory over life’s distress, and shew

The future path whose light runs through death’s glooms,”

that energetic being which he feels bounding with the pulsing play of intellectual life cannot be to him the high and holy possession which it ought; nor can his philosophy of life be fully satisfactory to any soul whose hopes are thrilling with the full passion of life. For him there need be no Why? Utility will give him an instant answer to his momentary query. But the melody of being is not dirge-like and funereal: it is vital and hopeful, aspiring and triumphal. Speculative thought would circumscribe the circuit of its range immensely, did it cease to regard the immortal yearnings of mortal men—the tremulous forth-stretching of the sight, to catch the sun-dawn on Futurity.

Being! Duty! Hope! three words of rare significance to man! These are the root-lying themes of philosophy. They comprise all the interests of man and life, time and eternity. Upon such topics philosophy expends her energies, and expands her powers. If these be worthy of human regard, if these possess an intensity of interest for man, if these deal with the highest problems of intellectuality, then there is worth, value, need, and scope for every exertion of speculative thought, not in psychics only but in physics—not regarding our own nature only, but regarding all Nature—its source, its energies, its operations, and its laws.

This is prescriptively the season of serious self-communing. The hidden but germinative powers of thought collect and aggregate themselves now, and impart their birth-essence to resolves. As the years roll on, and the circuit of the soul’s horizon widens as the Past contracts upon us, the Present flees from us, and the Future opens its embracing arms—of life or death—to us and for us, the voiceless teachings of time rise up—like the secret writing of a palimpsest—out of the fibres of our memory, and induce, as well as conduce, to thought. If these few pencillings of ours should shape themselves into articulate influences in the minds of our readers, and cause them at this season to raise again, and consciously the three grand queries of metaphysics—What can I know and do?—What ought I to do, become, and be?—What may I hope?—we shall rejoice. Let us each measure his idea of duty by the power he possesses, and the hopes he entertains; and whenever the new year of another being opens upon us, all is likely to be well. May *that* and all prior new years be happy—because made so by Duty done, Hope felt, and Faith securely founded. Adieu. S. N.

Philosophy.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

HAVING discussed, in last month's Number, the negative articles which had, prior to that time, appeared, we now close the affirmative side of the debate by replying to A. J.'s article. This we find to be a somewhat difficult matter; not, however, because of the force of his reasonings, but from the utter absence of any arguments whatever. He expresses his surprise at no definition of the word "development" having been given. If he re-peruse carefully our remarks, he will find that the theory, so named, is explained, which we imagine to be more to the purpose than would be the wanting verbal exegesis. He, however, attempts to supply our alleged deficiency by informing us that the "word development signifies an unfolding;" for which enlightenment we are sincerely grateful, and hope that, after the acquisition of such information, we shall not any longer be deemed merely "would-be-thought profound ones." Then follow a copious use of notes of exclamation—a pitiable attempt at jocoseness—the use of ridicule as "a lawful weapon"—and a forty-three-lines long ridiculous (literally so) quotation from a recent review,—all of which are sufficient indications of the writer's want of sound and logical objections to our arguments. We had thought the day was past in which sarcasm could be honestly pitted against science. We can excuse the dull wit of that Italian friar, who thought he was effectually opposing Galileo's doctrines by preaching from the words, "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven?" We can understand why Columbus, before his great discovery, should have been ridiculed as a dreamer. We can even conceive of the sneering and taunting reception accorded to the alleged facts of the earlier geologists;—all this seems only what might have been expected from those who were blinded by inveterate prejudice, and unenlightened by acquaintance with the subjects on which they affected to pass judgment. But that in this so oft-vaunted "nineteenth century," and in a Magazine so advanced in liberality of tone and opinion as the *British Controversialist*, a writer should bring forward would-be witticisms, and illogical sneers, worthy of the middle ages, in opposition to a scientific theory, entertained by distinguished savans, is strange indeed. If it be said that ours is but a pseudo-scientific theory, this should be confirmed by arguments, as no amount of sarcasm will prove it to be such a one.

A. J. summarily dismisses the believers in the Development Theory as "a few sceptical philosophers." Among the men so stigmatized, are the author of the "Vestiges," Professors Draper, Wallace, and Huxley, Dr. Hooker, and Mr. Darwin. The names of Lamarck and Oken are well-known in the scientific world as propounders of the theory. Though they may have been sceptical, they were certainly not deficient in scientific knowledge, or philosophical acumen. We cannot refrain from quoting the following facts, recorded by the great Cuvier, which decidedly favour the theory:—"A villous plant, transported to a moist place, becomes smooth. Beasts lose hair in hot countries, but gain hair in cold. Certain external parts, such as stamens, thorns, digits, teeth, spines, are subject to variation of number, both in the more and the less. Parts of minor importance, such as barbs of wheat, &c., vary as to their proportions; homologous parts (*des parties de nature analogue*) change into one another, i. e., stamens into petals, as in double flowers; wings into feet; feet into jaws; and we might add, adhesive into breathing organs." A distinguished modern divine, though an opponent of the theory, has yet thus admitted what we deem the Principle of Development:—"Man, and a small number of animals peculiarly serviceable to man, are endowed with a capacity of adaptation to all the differences of climate, and other circumstances, not indeed unlimited, but extending through a wide range. This capacity requires, for its complete development, a gradual proceeding in subjection to the agents of change; for which the life of no individual is sufficiently long, nor even the duration of several generations. The process must be carried on through many steps of descent, and in its course *considerable alterations of structure are slowly produced.*" *

Having considered what claims special attention in the articles of our opponents, we will, without recapitulating our arguments, recur in outline to the principal natural facts which favour the Development Theory; and for this purpose we cannot do better than make use of the following *resumé* from a recent number of the *Edinburgh Review*:—"The laws of irrelative or vegetative repetition, referred to at page 437 of Mr. Darwin's work; the law of unity of plan, or relations to an archetype; the analogies of transitory, embryonal stages in a higher animal, to the matured forms of lower animals; the phenomena of parthenogenesis; a certain parallelism in the laws governing the succession of forms throughout time and space; the progressive departure from type, or from the more generalised to the more specialized structures, exemplified in the series of species, from their first introduction, to the existing form." To these phenomena we may add the occurrence of hybrids, and other exceptional forms, proving that life, when exposed to new conditions, can and does assume new structures. When this and the foregoing facts are taken into consideration, and it is remembered

that each change of species, during the pre-Adamic ages, was immediately *preceded* by a geological convulsion, changing the physical conditions of the earth, we cannot but think that the intelligent and impartial reader will recognise the working of the natural laws of cause and effect, and give credence to the Development Theory accordingly, and will perceive, also, that this theory attributes to the Creator a more harmoniously and beautifully designed, and more efficiently executed creation, than does that hypothesis (for such it really is, as much as the one we advocate), which supposes Him to have separately formed each individual species.

E. M., JUN.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE are seriously impressed with the importance of the duty devolving upon us as we resume our consideration of this question. While our confidence in truth is great, and in the inherent power of truth to live and manifest itself in the world, we are exceedingly anxious that our small meed of influence should ever be on the side of truth. Perhaps no subject could possibly be more free from the vices of controversy than the one before us: this is to us a matter of felicitation, because we can pleasantly entertain opposing sentiments, without fear of destroying the bonds of good fellowship.

In our previous articles, we have observed that the greater portion of our experience, knowledge, and observation, prove the Development Theory a fallacy; the facts of every-day life, education, and history, contradict the theory; and hence the burden of proof lies with our opponents. In stating the peculiar features of the Development Theory, we remarked, that it affirms all nature to possess an inherent tendency to perfection, collaterally with a tendency to modification in all vital forces, for the most part of a favourable character, but not necessarily so. Thus, inanimate matter may possibly become animate, and this again may progress to the highest state of development possible in this sublunary sphere; or the whole, or parts, may become modified for good or evil by the associated circumstances connected with its being:—time, favourable circumstances, and the struggle for existence being the data for reasoning upon and deducing the efficient cause of development. In combating these views, we have remarked, that all bodies, whether animate or inanimate, have certain properties; that inorganic and organic matter are essentially distinct in their nature; and that organic matter is, farther, of two kinds, and these again are perfectly distinct, viz., the animal and vegetable kingdoms. We have shown that these three divisions of the physical world are essentially distinct in their natures and fundamental properties, and that no instance is recorded of any transitional link from either of these classes of being to the other, neither does any one class possess the power to furnish this transitional link. We have also shown that each class of beings has

assigned to it definite and invariable courses by which it is propagated, while no instance of the kind of change attributed to development is recorded on the pages of history or science.

We continued our remarks, by observing, that although the Development Theory and the transmutation of species had their origin in an age remarkable for scepticism, still our faith in truth leads us to believe that truth, and especially the Holy Scriptures, will prove equal to the conquest, and come off more than victorious. That Theory was seen to teach that the world, having been formed from nebulous matter, was originally metamorphic in its character; that by the process of natural laws the first forms of organic life were originated; that these forms were gradually developed and perfected, until the crowning act of creation was presented in the human shape divine, although still higher and more perfect development may be expected from the same natural laws during the course of vast enduring eons yet to come. All these assumptions we have shown to be either groundless or contrary to fact, or, at least, so purely hypothetical, as to be valueless for argument's sake. We have also shown reason to believe that, however much some forms of organic life may vary, still it is within such limits as must necessarily preserve the characteristic identity of the specific organism. This is manifest from the earliest embryonic condition to the latest moment of each individual life. We concluded our previous article with the observation, that the theory is a system of assumptions without proof, is contrary to fact; and that, in common with all theories, opposed to observation and the historic experiences of this world's life, demonstrable proof of each and every step must be produced by the advocates of the theory, from its foundation maxim to the most minute detail: until this is done, the permanence of species must be considered a truthful fact, and the theory of development remain an exploded fallacy or baseless hypothesis, alike opposed to reason, fact, and revelation.

In reply to these remarks, we have had articles from E. M., jun., and "Delta." We shall now proceed to analyze their advocacy of the theory, and either be convinced of their truthfulness, or prove their reasoning unsound, and baseless as the fabric of a vision.

E. M. has presented us with a syllogistic argument, to the effect, that it is more honourable to God, and more accordant with reason, to consider natural means as the order or law of creation; that the Development Theory is a natural means, accounting for the creation of species; and, consequently, the theory is true.

Thus E. M. puts the question plainly before us, by affirming that the Development Theory is true, because it is a natural means of accounting for creation; and all natural means of accounting for creation are more honourable to God, and more accordant with reason. He makes no effort to blink the question, and plainly indicates to us his reason for believing the theory true. How far he has succeeded in proving the theory true, we shall proceed to show. We think that E. M. has made some confusion in the terms

he has used and the ideas for which they stand, which vitiates the whole of *his reasoning* upon the theory. In the phrase, "explanation by natural means of the natural phenomenon of the creation of species," he purposes to convey to us his views respecting the mode of creation—that it is not a making out of nothing, but a modification of pre-existent materials. We know that biblical, classical, and common use justify us in characterizing E. M.'s use of the word "creation" in his argument as absurd, because unreasonable and contrary to fact: it is unreasonable, because modification is not creation; and is contrary to fact, because God created all things by the word of His power, and the things "that were not, were made to appear," not as a modification of old materials, but as existences originated by the Almighty fiat. Take, for example, the familiar instance in which the word is used in civil life—"a peerage is created." This intimates an exercise of royal power and prerogative, by which that which only existed in the royal mind is made an actual existence; and it is in a sense somewhat analogous to this, that the word "creation," and its cognate forms, are applied to the act of Deity with reference to all existences in the natural world. The terms employed by E. M. reduce all creation to a mere modification of pre-existent materials, and, pushed to its *ultima ratio*, makes matter eternal, and God a mere concatenation of material forces—a conclusion which, we opine, E. M. would be far from advocating, although he must be necessarily convinced that such is the consequence of his use of the terms and the arguments based upon them. We are thoroughly assured in our own mind that E. M. would be shocked to advocate such monstrous notions as implied by his line of argument; and his blindness to the consequences of his fallacies is caused by the confusion existing between the ideas in his mind and the terms he has employed to express to us those ideas. It cannot be validly objected to the foregoing remarks, that God has endowed the material forces of the universe with this power, or imposed upon them this law of development. This would be assuming that for true which requires to be proved—is, in fact, a *petitio principii*. Revelation, science, and observation prove incontestibly that God has endowed each particular class of existence with peculiarities, which may be considered essential properties of its being, with possible variations within certain ascertainable limits; which limits are nearer to, or more remote from, other individual classes, according to contingent circumstances affecting each individual organism. And no greater fallacy can, by any possibility, be entertained, than to suppose that God has made any parts of His created universe subject "to inherent and self-acting laws, which work with ceaseless, unerring, and immutable accuracy," to produce such changes in their organism or being, as to constitute such specific differences, as are properly designated new creations, new beings, differing essentially from those causes which bring them into existence. So far as we have been able to observe the laws of

nature, like does in all cases produce like, not with that apparent uniformity which man imposes upon his mechanical productions, but with that uniformity in all that is essential, combined with that beautiful variation in non-essentials, which philosophers, no less than poets, delight to descant upon. Besides, to suppose that God has imposed upon any existence inherent, self-acting, ceaseless, and immutable laws, is to make God to have created a being whose powers or nature is beyond His own control—which is an absurdity.

Moreover, E. M. says, "We honour God more by giving the preference to laws given to matter at its creation than to modification and impulse communicated from without to matter." This, we must admit, is rather amusing, considering that the most celebrated work of modern times is devoted entirely to the proof of "modification and impulse" from extraneous causes, as the law regulating the origin of species, or in E. M.'s phraseology, as creating new species. This is most certainly arguing in a circle, and the British Controversialists well know how to place confidence in such reasoning.

From considerations such as those we have now presented to the reader, it must be apparent that *it is not more honourable to God*, and not more in accordance with the intelligence of rational beings, to give the preference to natural than to *supernatural* means, in the explanation of phenomena connected with creation, and by consequence with the creation or origin of species, by development or natural selection.

That the creation of species by natural means is explained by the Development Theory is, if possible, a still more glaring fallacy than the preceding one, which we have seen is so easily and completely exploded. This will be apparent on the most cursory glance at its absurdities.

The creation of species by natural means—what a contradiction of ideas and terms! Natural laws to possess the power of making nature; the law to make its subject; the accident of being to be the cause of that being! Is it possible that such incongruous absurdities can obtain credence in this nineteenth century? To combat such assumptions with argument is useless; to see, is to condemn them. The first proposition of E. M. being a fallacy, and the second a glaring absurdity, the third proposition is necessarily unproven, and the Development Theory, according to E. M.'s reasoning, untrue.

"Delta," a little more conversant with the subject he discusses, is more fully aware of the weakness of the cause he advocates, and, consequently, he is more wary in the terms he employs. His argument is, that such great confusion exists among naturalists as to what is a species, that it would be unsafe to dogmatise on the subject; that careful observation and enlarged views must be brought to bear upon the question. He further observes, that the varieties existing between individuals of the same species are oftentimes more widely marked than the differences existing between

different species, and that these special varieties may continually diverge, until they become different species; hence, by this course of reasoning, we may prove that the same causes may produce different effects; one species may create, in E. M.'s phraseology, another species. Thus we perceive, however carefully our opponents may guard themselves in their reasoning, they cannot escape inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction; their reasoning must necessarily be a series of arguments in a circle.

The second article of E. M. is self-refuted; therefore to occupy further space in opposing its incongruities would be tedious to the reader, and answer no good purpose in the cause of truth.

In conclusion, we submit to the candid reader that our remarks tend to show, by the facts of science, history, and revelation, that the Development Theory, and the origin of species by natural selection, is unsound as a theory, contrary to fact, and opposed to reason. So far, we think, we have proved our thesis; the verdict, however, remains with the British Controversialists. L'OUVRIER.

Social Economy.

IS COUNSEL JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING FROM PUNISHMENT A CRIMINAL OF WHOSE GUILT HE HAS BEEN PROFESSIONALLY MADE COGNIZANT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It would not be easy to overrate the deep interest and eminently practical importance of the question before us, and yet we fear that few questions are ever so carelessly treated, or so unsatisfactorily answered and determined. Professional habit and professional interest are staunch and loud in behalf of an affirmative reply, oftentimes with arguments whose logic and morality are sorely wanting; while, on the other hand, unthinking Prejudice glibly theorizes, or abstract Morality, folding its hands, and closing both eyes and ears, preaches a homily, and descants on the enormity of that which it brands as an offence. A moment's glance at the nature and bearings of the question will at once show that it is really incumbent upon every man to form an opinion on the subject, and to endeavour to extend and enforce his opinion, if he would perform his duty as a citizen. The primary object of society is mutual aid—to become helpmeets of each other. The perfection of this principle—real community of interests—is to be found only in the domestic circle. Diversity of interests exists between family and family, between tribe and tribe. This diversity of interest, acting on man's fallen nature, rapidly turns to opposition and strife. With no arbiter between the contending individuals or

bodies, force and violence necessarily result; and from their occurrence, a sense of insecurity springs up. The next step in human society is association for mutual protection and defence: this is the institution of civil society and of nationality, as distinguished from the society of the family and of friendship—in a word, the institution of government. In its earliest and rudest form, government is the mere combination of men for warlike purposes, under the chieftainship of certain leaders. At every turn, however, the passions of mankind introduce confusion and strife. The freedom of each individual clashes with the freedom of his neighbour, and the limits of individual freedom are thus marked out by individual power. At every stage mankind feel the need, therefore, of some new modification of their modes of government and association, by which they may more nearly attain to that system of mutual restraint which we term justice. This justice we, in our day, divide into civil and criminal. Without descending to niceties, we may describe the object of civil justice to be the affording to every man the means of securing his rights; it is positive, and concerns the individual. Criminal justice, on the other hand, aims at punishing *wrongs*, and thereby deterring from their repetition; it is negative, and concerns the public rather than the individual. Civil justice, in point of fact, is in every case the public enforcement of a contract, or mutual agreement (either tacit or express), between man and man; it compels the fulfilment of those obligations which men *create* as between themselves; it secures alike to buyer and seller, employer and employed, the particular *quid pro quo* agreed upon in each case: and thus it secures that confidence in mutual dealings which is the soul of trade and commerce. Criminal justice is the enforcement of the fitting penalty for each breach of that bond of good conduct under which every man is bound towards the community of which he is a member; it punishes the breach of obligations which *exist* as the condition of citizenship; and thus it secures to all men alike security and protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. Criminal justice is the condition of the existence of societies and states; civil justice is the condition of their progress and growth. I give my labour, time, or money for a certain possession, and civil justice watches over the transaction, and guards it till that possession is mine; then criminal justice, by its penalties, deters the thief from taking away that which I have gained.

In the foregoing *résumé* we have had two objects in view. *First*, we trust that, while drawing a clear distinction between civil and criminal justice, we have shown that they have a mutual correspondence and parallelism, so that the same principles, as to the moral duty of an advocate, will apply alike in each case; and, consequently, that it is not only allowable but necessary to draw our arguments from, and to apply our reasonings to, both of these two divisions of justice, in order to ensure a sound and truthful conclusion. *Secondly*, we have endeavoured to impress upon the mind

of the reader the importance of the question, as affecting the very foundation upon which the existence and progress of human society and civil government rest. Now let us bring ourselves face to face with the real problem at issue, and fairly estimate the startling difficulties and irreconcilable contradictions which it apparently involves. The accurate definition of those restraints upon man's natural and physical liberty to do what he *will* as far as by any means he *can*, the transgression of which shall be deemed a crime punishable by the community; and the extent to which the fulfilment of civil contracts and obligations shall be deemed a right, enforceable at the option of each individual;—or, in other words, the determination of the boundaries and guiding principles of criminal and civil justice,—is the province of the legislature. With this we have no concern in the present debate; our topic concerns only the *administration* of law and justice. There are evidently three parties to be considered—the community, the accused, and the advocate. We might add a fourth, the individual complainant; but this is unnecessary, since (except in the case of a merely malicious prosecution or lawsuit) his interest is that of the community. Now the community demand the due administration of justice; whatever defeats, or seeks to defeat that end, is itself a crime. If a man will not pay, his creditor is left to sue him, and the matter ends there; but if he swear falsely that he has paid, and so try to defeat private and civil justice, he becomes liable to be indicted criminally for perjury. Again, as Bentham remarks in the quotation made by "L'Ouvrier" (p. 186), to aid an escape from justice is to become criminally liable as an accomplice. Now, to defend a prisoner, whose guilt is known to the advocate, is very like acting perjury; to protest a belief in that prisoner's innocence is moral perjury; and to succeed in defending such a prisoner is completely to defeat public law and justice. The same remarks apply where counsel appears in a civil court, either for plaintiff or defendant, knowing at the time that he has "no case"—that his success will be the defeat of justice. Again, our judges are selected from the bar; that is, from men who have thus deliberately assisted in defeating justice, if paid for so doing. Thus it may be said that a taint of dishonesty and impurity is introduced into the judicial office; the fount of justice is corrupted, as well as its stream obstructed and diverted. Then as to the result. It is evident that impunity will harden the criminal, and invite others to crime; the administration of law will be looked upon as partially a hollow sham, and punishment will be regarded as a matter of chance and lottery. Lastly, as regards the advocate. We need not follow "L'Ouvrier" through his homily, nor invoke the awful sanctions of religion, and—we speak with reverence—appeal to the sacred attributes and titles of the Deity, in order to establish the moral and personal obligation of truth and truth-speaking. It is waste time to prove by argument the moral degradation of allying oneself with the cause of guilt and the deliberate practice of falsehood.

We have put the case strongly, without any evasion. Our opponents will scarcely claim or wish for freer admissions. It would *appear* that the advocate who defends a prisoner, knowing him to be guilty, or who pleads or defends a cause knowing it to be bad, thereby sets at nought the laws of his country, does his best to sap the foundations of society, and utterly repudiates the obligations of moral duty.

Now, in the light of this *theory*, let us look upon the practice of the world around us. Does society instinctively and persistently denounce and endeavour to suppress or punish the custom of English advocates in this particular? Can we trace its results in the evident obstruction and defeat of justice to any serious extent? Do we find its baneful influence corrupting the judicial office? Has crime increased, and been emboldened, since it has been allowed the privilege of having counsel? Has it produced the inevitable result of destroying the honour, honesty, and moral sense of the English bar? Are the members of that profession behind all other classes in moral elevation, in virtue, and in religion? Common honesty and common *truthfulness* must compel every one to answer these questions in the negative. Here, then, is a patent contradiction between facts and theory. It may be said that counsel seldom are cognizant of the guilt of their clients; but we reply, that this is merely begging the question. They are *sometimes* cognizant of their clients' guilt in criminal cases, and they are often cognizant of the fact that truth and justice are opposed to them in civil cases. Besides, while the infrequency of such cases might lessen the indignation of society, it could not in the least affect the morality of the profession. Men who have established as a rule that they will set at nought the responsibilities and obligations of morality, whenever occasion offers, are no whit worse or better because those occasions are actually many or few. In morality, actions are little more than evidences and proofs of the existence of the principles and passions from which they spring.

We find ourselves thus involved in a sheer absurdity. Theory tells us that a certain principle or rule of conduct is inimical to society, is criminal, favours crime, and degrades those who adopt it; yet society disregard the matter, no evil social results follow, and the morality of those who adopt this principle does not suffer. Let us consider the consequences which would arise, if counsel were to renounce the present rules of their profession, and adopt the views of "L'Ouvrier" and R. T. G. Would society benefit? Clearly not; for as soon as it was known that no counsel would defend a client who acknowledged his guilt, the lips of every criminal and of every unjust litigant would be sealed against any admissions. Nor would the matter end there: it would immediately lead these classes to bend all their energies towards strengthening their cases; the help they now seek from the ability, legal skill, and eloquence of counsel, they would then endeavour to supply by the concoction of false evidence, perjury, and suborna-

tion of perjury, would fearfully increase. The remedy would thus introduce infinitely more and worse evils than the disease. We are not to do evil that good may come; but we ought certainly to hesitate before we pronounce a course of conduct to be good, the practice of which we find to result in the vast multiplication of evil. Society evidently would be a loser by the change. The effects, too, would be in every way evil as regards the accused. Debarred from a natural resource, they would become more desperate and unscrupulous in their efforts to put down truth by the upheaping of falsehoods and frauds; and they would be shut out from the honourable and candid advice often given to them now by their solicitors and counsel. The evils arising from the latter fact would be severely felt in civil causes. Numerous, indeed, are the cases which are now abandoned or compromised under the advice of counsel, but which would then be fought out *a l'outrance*. In all instances the just cause and the innocent would suffer increased costs and delays. Evil, and evil only, therefore, would result to society, to suitors, and to the accused, from the supposed change. How, then, would it affect counsel? For morality's sake, he is not to defend the man of whose wrong or guilt he is cognizant. What is *cognizance*? Suppose the man, who gave himself up as the murderer of Francis Saville Kent, had been brought to trial; would the knowledge of his previous confession have been cognizance of his guilt? Of course not, it will be said. It appears, then, that confession alone will not make counsel cognizant of the guilt confessed. A man having confessed has, therefore, nothing to do but turn round and deny his confession, and he will regain his right to counsel. It may be urged that there was no evidence to corroborate the self-crimination of the man alluded to. According to this, "L'Ouvrier" and R. T. G. would make counsel take the office of judge and jury: if facts tally with confession, he is to return a verdict of guilty, and refuse to defend. This leads us to the necessary consequences of the change advocated by our opponents. Every man must first convince his counsel that he is innocent, before he can get any one to undertake his cause. If he appear, therefore, at the bar undefended, he will thereby proclaim to the jury who are to try him that every advocate, to whom he had applied, was convinced of his guilt. And this result flows from abstract theory as certainly as from the practical adoption of the principle now in review. If it be immoral to defend that which is "known" to be a bad cause, it is equally so to defend that which we honestly believe to be a bad cause. It is impossible to draw the line between knowledge and belief as regards facts which we have not actually witnessed. As with personal morality, so with the advocate's duties to the community. We may extend the argument of Bentham, and say that the advocate, who defends a man he believes to be guilty, commits the same offence as the man who, believing him to be guilty, aids him in evading or escaping from punishment. Here, therefore, we find that the theory of our

opponents, whether adopted in practice or carried out in argument, necessarily leads to the uttermost absurdities and the most fearful evils. Vain and foolish, indeed, are our boastings that we assume innocence till guilt is proved; that no man is bound to criminate himself; that every one is warned against the consequences of making any admissions in the preliminary investigations of our police courts; that no man is put to interrogation, as abroad; that the province of the prosecutor is jealously guarded from that of the judge; that while one accuses and labours to convict, and the other determines and declares the law, a jury of twelve laymen alone shall decide the question of guilty or not guilty, and that solely upon the evidence then and there brought before them. Vain, indeed, we say, is it for us to plume ourselves upon these things, if we would have secret trials where he who is asked to aid sits only to judge, and, by refusing to help, proclaims to the jury and to the world that, knowing all from the lips of the accused, he verily believes him to be guilty. We leave the reader to draw the parallel, and to reflect upon the utter confusion and injustice which would arise from a similar practice in civil causes.

There are even further consequences still. Few men would accept the chance of counsel's aid on such terms as we have noticed; and no counsel could afford to give the time and thought which would be required, in order to ascertain in each case whether he was morally justified in accepting a brief for the defense. The profession of advocate would at once be narrowed down (in criminal matters, at least) to that of prosecutors. We should thus return to the old rule, forbidding persons tried for felony the privilege of counsel. In the name of morality and theory, we should retrace our steps back to a system "at which," says Sydney Smith, in words not more eloquent than true, "common sense and common feeling revolt; for it is full of brutal cruelty and of base inattention of those who make laws, to the happiness of those for whom laws are made. . . . Help is denied to all. Age cannot have it, nor ignorance, nor the modesty of women. One hard, uncharitable rule silences the defenders of the wretched, and at the bitterest of human moments mercy is blotted out from the ways of men." No one can candidly and intelligently consider this matter, without seeing that such would be the inevitable result of the dogma that counsel ought not to defend, when cognizant (i. e. morally convinced) of a prisoner's guilt. Moral theorizing and prejudice, when regardless of the facts and realities of life, may always be dragged into the service of injustice and oppression. What, for instance, is more easy than to raise a plea in behalf of that barbarous practice to which we have just alluded? To "allow" counsel to a prisoner may be denounced and hooted down as "an expedient contrived for selling impunity to such criminals as have wherewithal to purchase it." It is easy thus to reason and declaim. "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just," or his conscience clear; "therefore" innocence needs no advocate, and

"therefore" the allowance of counsel is only aiding the richer and more inexcusable criminals. The "therefores" would be well enough, if triple armour were a sure defence to the timid, the ignorant, and the wretched—if, in a word, man was not man, but a moral machine.

We have exposed the folly and injustice of the plain, unvarnished negative reply to the question in debate, and our earlier remarks showed that we were not prepared to support an unqualified affirmative in a theoretical point of view. Let us, therefore, consider the nature of an advocate's duties and office, and the principles which should guide a conscientious and upright man in the discharge of them. We have shown that the punishment of crime is the primary object of government; the efficient prosecution, or following up, of an offence, with a view to its due punishment, is therefore the duty of the State. Hence the necessity of employing prosecuting counsel; i. e., men thoroughly well versed in the law, and skilful in setting forth and eliciting facts. Now, no man can be at once the advocate of a particular conclusion and an impartial judge. His duty is to state the case against the prisoner, to narrate all its circumstances, and to link them together by argument into a proof of guilt. Having thus set the matter before (in England) the jury, he has to prove the circumstances he has narrated. Here a multitude of questions arise. Does the advocate know all facts connected with the case, and has he brought out all that are material? Can he, while doing his duty to the community, always judge aright, even if he try to do so, what facts are material to the accused? His connecting theory and argument may be honest; but are there no others more evidently true? He seeks certain replies. Can he, at the same time, conjecture or detect the animus that prompts them, or sift and expose the character of the witnesses who utter them? Can he view the case at once, on the suppositions that the accused is guilty and that he is innocent? Has he a moral right to put that question, or to put it in that particular form? A thousand similar questions arise, to show that the accused, if innocent, is struggling at a disadvantage against practised professional skill. The judge may interpose in his favour, but can he be on the alert for the prisoner, and maintain judicial impartiality? Judges, too, are fallible. As Sydney Smith wittily says, "the majority are upright and pure; but some have been selected for flexible politics—some are passionate—some are in a hurry—some resemble ancient females—some have the gout—some are eighty years old—some are blind, deaf, and have lost the power of smelling." If the innocent are to have a fair chance against the professional skill arrayed against them, the procedure of our courts must be conducted in the strictest accordance with philosophical and legal rules of evidence, and technical forms necessarily intricate and professional, and therefore, after all, of little avail, unless applied in their defence by professional skill. The duty of the defending counsel, therefore, is to act as a shield; to

elicit truths which would otherwise be overlooked; to discover facts and circumstances most material perhaps, and yet wholly forgotten, under the influence of terror and shame, or unmentioned, from an inability to see their bearing and influence. It is no less his duty, both to his client and to the community, to see that a *conviction, if gained, should be gained by strictly legal means and forms*. The State does not profess to punish *actual* guilt; it punishes *legally proven* guilt. Therefore an advocate is morally justified and socially justified in securing the acquittal of a man whom he knows to be really guilty, if the prosecution fail in *legal proof* of that fact. A counsel neither vouches to a falsehood, nor defeats the administration of justice, in such a case. The rules of evidence and of procedure are as real a part of the law as the penal code; and they are more important, for they are the restrictions found necessary to protect the safety of the innocent; and better far for the community, more righteous far in morality, that the wicked be allowed to escape, than that the innocent be condemned. Again: suppose no legal flaw, no insufficiency or faultiness of evidence occur, and that the prisoner's guilt is known to his counsel—it may be, that the damning testimony is that of an infamous witness, or of one who, though speaking truth, is actuated by malice and revenge; then we say that counsel morally is justified, and, for the sake of society, is in duty bound to elicit these matters, and, if possible, to secure an acquittal on these grounds. For the peace and happiness of society, and for the security of innocence, it is incumbent alike on jurymen and on counsel to allow the criminal to escape, rather than to convict on the evidence of the infamous or the malicious. We might multiply instances, especially if we turned, as we have a right to do, to illustrations drawn from civil proceedings; but we feel we have done enough to convince the reflecting. We, therefore, shall conclude by a brief statement of our view of the course which should be pursued by the advocate acting in obedience to the behests of a pure morality, and the dictates of an enlightened conscience.

The office of counsel is purely ministerial. When he accepts a brief for the defence of a prisoner, he becomes so far a servant of that prisoner. He is bound, as we have shown, to see that his client is acquitted, unless legally proved guilty of a legal offence, according to the laws of evidence and technical procedure. Actual guilt is not the question. He is also bound to see that the evidence brought before the jury is such as to justify *them* in pronouncing a verdict. The facts proved may bear another explanation; motives may be suggested which would account for apparently condemning acts. Now, suppose counsel suggests these motives, and offers these explanations, all the while knowing his client's guilt. Is that immoral? He does not bluster, and call Heaven to witness his client's innocence; he does not say his explanations and suggestions are true. He simply puts it to the jury—"Is there anything in what you have heard and learned in *this court*

which will justify *your* reasons and consciences in deciding that such explanations and suggestions are not true? If not, *you* are not justified in convicting my client. *You* are convicting upon insufficient grounds—on grounds which will render an innocent man liable to unjust condemnation." We say, that the man who would not thus act and thus speak is not discharging his *duty*. His knowledge is not the knowledge of the jury. They are bound to apply the most anxious and careful reflection and reasoning to that which *they* know, and not to that which *he* knows. If he is silent, because knowing the prisoner's guilt on other grounds, he acts as though (for morality's sake) he should countenance and aid an execution by Lynch law, because he saw the victim commit some crime punishable by death, according to the laws of the land. The purest morality and the highest devotion to truth demand that counsel, cognizant of the prisoner's guilt, should act as if he were ignorant, or else demand to be sworn, and then bring his knowledge before the jury as evidence. One of these alternatives is moral right; the middle course argued for by our opponents is moral cowardice, a miserable self-deception, the wretched compromise and the half truth which betray an uneasy conscience, a quibbling reason, and an unenlightened mind.

It scarcely needs any inquiry whether it would be the moral duty of counsel to volunteer as a witness against his client, and to detail the confession made to him under the seal of secrecy. The common sense of humanity, and the laws of all civilized countries, would brand such an act as an act of moral treachery and baseness, and would forbid its allowance. The duty of an advocate towards himself as a responsible moral being, towards his client, the court in which he pleads, and his country, is simply to act as if he were ignorant of his client's guilt, to conduct the case with all his ability and skill, *addressing himself solely to the evidence in court*. Conscience and morality condemn most severely any assertion that his client is innocent, or that he believes him to be so. That, of course, would be unvarnished falsehood and moral perjury. The fact of his client's innocence is not in evidence, or the trial would not be in process; his own beliefs are not in evidence, and therefore, by keeping to the rule we have laid down, he will neither be tempted to, nor commit, falsehood. Locking up the secret in his own breast, and allowing it to influence him only so far as to restrain his tongue in these respects, he will proceed with his cause. If all legal rules are satisfied, and the weight of evidence brought into court becomes irresistible, he will probably decline to proceed further with the defence, and throw his client on the mercy of the court. Or, if those rules are not satisfied, or that evidence fail in sufficiency, he will endeavour to secure an acquittal. In either case, we believe that he will act with an approving conscience, and will have performed his duty before God and man. B. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Veritas non recipit magis ac minus."

WE have often heard persons exclaim, "The courts of law are not courts of justice;" and there is one expression in the statement of the question now under debate, which would seem to give truthfulness to the assertion. "*Professionally made cognizant*:" what is meant by this? It seems to imply, that a man may hear of another having committed a murder, and must do all he can to bring the criminal to justice, if, when he was "made cognizant" thereof, he was at breakfast; but if he ascertained the fact in his "office," or "chambers," where he follows his profession, he must be quiet, and ignore the fact. Something of this kind seems to be implied in the question. We stumbled at the phrase, and we determined to try if we could not prove that "*the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,*" must prevail over any quibble brought forward to shade it.

We say, then, that "counsel" is *not* "justified in defending from punishment a criminal of whose guilt he has been professionally made cognizant." And in attempting to establish this position, we will notice the desire for information expressed by "Nona," on page 183, where he says, "We should like to know, if an advocate's conduct, in defending a guilty client, be unjustifiable, when did he cross the delicate line between right and wrong?" We reply, that "his transgression 'dates' from that time when he was 'professionally made cognizant' of the guilt of his client. It is important also to notice that the words used in the question are, "defending *from punishment*;" not, as "Nona" merely asserts, in his concluding clause, "defending a criminal." We may defend a friend, in the hope of *ameliorating* his punishment; but we should not be justified in *shielding* him from a just punishment. Taking the motto at the head of "Nona's" article, we ask, Do justice and mercy combine, when a prisoner, who is guilty, escapes unscathed from the bar? Is it justice to the public to allow mercy *alone* to rule in courts of equity? Then, indeed, were murderers happy beings, and robbers safer than princes.

We know truly—

"That, in the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation;"

yet in our salvation justice has had her due, and can now go hand in hand with mercy. Does "Nona" think, that had no death been endured for the sins of a world, the sword of justice would now be sheathed? It is only because such priceless blood has been shed, and that death's bonds have held so rich a treasure as that which slept in Joseph's tomb, that the stern brow of justice has softened into the smiling lineaments of almighty mercy. And as it is with Heaven's laws, so should it be with earth's. The soul that sinneth

shall be punished, saith God's law; man's law is an echo of it. As God's law demands justice, so should man's. As God's law is *tempered* by mercy, so also should man's be. Does "Nona" really think that, when a man has committed a murder, his counsel is justified in trying to screen him from the death he deserves? If an advocate has been professionally made cognizant of his client's guilt, he must know that his client deserves punishment; his conscience must, therefore, have some elasticity in it, if he attempt to evade the law. He may do what he can to have that punishment *softened*; he may exert his utmost influence to let *mercy* characterize the sentence of the judge; and he will be justified in so doing. Defending a guilty client from punishment ought to be considered equal to an evasion of the law; but recommending a guilty client to mercy is in every respect praiseworthy.

With regard to what "Nona" says (pp. 180, 181), we would ask, Is not a prisoner at the bar at liberty to call on what witnesses he thinks proper, to ask them any questions he thinks will throw light upon the darker hue of the group of suspicious circumstances linked together? Should the prisoner narrate his own side of the case, and say no more than the truth, and no less,—if he state the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, what of the quibbles brought to bear against him? We have been rejoiced to see the sly and ever-watchful lawyer put at bay by the simple, truthful assertion of upright lips; ay! by the steady gaze of a truthful eye. We will, however, admit that, when adverse circumstances are so grouped together as to throw a shade over truth, there is little hope for "any simple man," unless he has nerve enough to keep calm and undismayed. Let the prisoner, then, have his advocate; let him leave to his counsel the collecting of favourable incidents, the judicious arrangement of them, the cross-examination of the accusers, &c., and then let him make the best of the case he can. But if he try to defend his client from a punishment he professionally knows he deserves, then, we say, he is *not* justified in such a course, and we would rather be without his conscience.

"Nona" says, on page 183, "When requested to conduct a case, an advocate can hardly form such an opinion of the individual's guilt or innocence," &c. The question, however, we are discussing settles all that; it tells us that the advocate has no occasion to form any opinion, because he is "professionally made cognizant." He is told at the outset that his client is guilty; if he takes up the case, and attempt to defend his client from punishment, he must attempt to prove to a judge and jury that his client is "*not guilty*," although that client has told him he is! This is our way of viewing the matter, and "what the non-advocate is hanged for, the advocate is paid for and admired;" the *non-advocate* meets the death and fate of a dog, is forgotten by posterity, or held up as a warning; the *advocate* dies in peace and honour, is lauded by historians, and regarded as an honour to his country, and a model for imitation.

In coming to a conclusion, we feel that, although truth is on our

side, and, therefore, that we are strong, yet we have not defended our cause with a strength which might have been brought to bear on the subject. But we firmly believe that, in the course of this argument, should any quotations from the "Guide to all Truth" be made, they will appear in the negative articles. By its laws will man be tried, by its counsels is he preserved amid temptations, by its assurances is he consoled, and by its words of truth is he enabled to be the champion of truth.

BETA.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"Hear me, ye venerable core,
As counsel for poor mortals."—Burns.

It appears, from the course pursued by some of our opponents, that they must have expected us to adopt the argument of Paley,—that the assertion of an advocate, when he declares the innocence of a client whom he knows to be guilty, may be regarded as a simple falsehood,—i. e., a lie by which no one is deceived, and which is, on this account, divested of its criminality; since such declaration may be expected of him in the discharge of his duty. From this opinion we do, however, dissent; and, without taking other ground, we maintain that counsel is expected to speak truly; nay, Blackstone, in his "Commentaries," cites certain statutes by which counsel, *guilty of deceit or collusion*, are punishable with imprisonment for a year and a day, and perpetual silence in the courts; "a punishment," adds this famous writer, "still sometimes inflicted for gross misdemeanours in practice." However much, then, may be urged in extenuation of the advocate's conduct, who by artful, illusive colouring, or exaggeration of facts, seeks to snatch from the gallows some guilty, shrinking wretch, it must ever be acknowledged that a lie is a lie, whether uttered without or within the bar; and that the forensic gown and wig confer no license for invading the sacred domain of truth. We have, therefore, had the pleasure of setting out on the present inquiry, and of journeying, as far as the first stage, in company with our adversaries; but the road diverging immediately thereafter, we parted. Who has taken the right path? We shall see.

It is assumed by the writers on the other side that mendacity is the only means of defending a criminal known to be guilty; or, to state the case with more precision, that such defence involves a lie. For this assumption, not a shadow of proof is led; and on such sandy foundation no inconsiderable portion of the opposition argument is based. We might dismiss this part of our subject with a simple denial; but as our object is not to vanquish, but to convince, we prefer giving the point a full, and, we trust, impartial consideration.

"L'Ouvrier" has accused an advocate, circumstanced as he is supposed to be by this debate, of "acting a lie." What meaning is to be attached to the phrase in the present instance? The dumb

man of Manchester, in the play, portrays, by most expressive pantomimic action, his innocence of the murder with which he is accused; but we are sure our friend does not attribute to counsel any such dumb-show. That the mere appearance of counsel, in conducting the criminal's defence, cannot be construed into "acting a lie," is plain, when we reflect that no one ever forms any opinion of the guilt or innocence of a prisoner from the fact that, during his trial, he has professional assistance. The case would be quite altered if counsel were expected to defend those only whom they believed innocent of the act laid to their charge. Then to conduct a defence, such as we are considering, would indeed be acting a lie; for it could not be done without violating the confidence which the community would place in the members of the bar. But though lies cannot be acted on a client's behalf, they may be uttered. Yet let it not be supposed for one moment that any legal gentleman of principle would condescend to act in such a manner, much less that he must necessarily do so. Even some of the popular ideas regarding an advocate contradict this notion.

In the minds of the multitude, your lawyer is a clever, astute, sharp-witted fellow, who can see further into a mill-stone than most folks, and can, in the vulgar phrase, drive a coach and four through any Act of Parliament,—a figurative feat which, being interpreted, means that he can give to any statute a reading our legislators never dreamt of. Why these qualities should be required merely to affirm black to be white, is rather difficult to account for; though, if the conducting of delicate cases, with a due regard to truth, is supposed, the necessity of such qualification becomes quite apparent. Here it will be advisable to consider the object sought by a pleader, as well as the means by which this object is to be attained; since a proper conception regarding these points will rid our subject of any difficulty which may appear connected with it, and since our opponents have in these particulars found a little misrepresentation necessary to make their point good. S. E. L. informs us, and in doing so but echoes the opinion of his friends who precede him, that an attempt to prove a known criminal's innocence is "the only means of effecting the desired exemption from punishment." We pass over the impossibility of any such attempt succeeding, and proceed to show it to be unnecessary. The law holds every man innocent until convicted; and to convict, requires a chain of evidence in which there is no glaring imperfection. When a person, guiltless of the charge imputed to him, is tried, it may be easy to bring forward an *alibi*, or proof that, at the time the crime was committed, he was present elsewhere; or, according to the nature of the charge, indubitable evidence may be adduced to prove that the offence could not possibly be committed by him. This is proving a prisoner innocent, and can only be accomplished when such is indeed the case; not always, even then, and certainly never when the prisoner is guilty. This, however, is not the only condition upon which a discharge from the bar can be

demanded. As we formerly observed, the law must recognize and provide a penalty for every offence with which a culprit is charged; and not till the accusation has been legally proven in open court, can a verdict of guilty be returned. An ample field is here presented for the gentlemen of the long robe exercising their acumen in a legitimate manner, and exhibiting their professional abilities. On examination, an indictment may be found to be informal, or not in conformity with existing laws; hence we occasionally find, when a prisoner is arraigned on several counts, some of these counts are departed from, and the trial proceeds upon others of minor importance. This, then, is the duty of counsel:—to discover and declare those legal flaws; to scrutinize the criminating evidence, and note what about it is weak and incoherent; afterwards collecting together his observations, and laying them before the jury, to claim his client's acquittal,—not on the ground of his innocence, but because the prosecutor has not made out his case. The difference between the two courses of procedure is broad and well defined; the one is negative, the other positive; this rests upon truth, that has no other foundation than audacity and falsehood.

In proceeding to review, briefly, the negative articles, we trust these cardinal points will not be lost sight of,—that the advocate seeks the acquittal of his client without affirming his innocence; and that he avails himself of those means only which the law affords!

The larger portion of the introductory article is devoted to exhibiting the importance of truth in social intercourse, and, we need scarcely remark, receives an approving response from us. "L'Ouvrier" then declares the hero of this debate "an accomplice after the fact," which he might be, if his information were received under ordinary circumstances; but this is not the case. He acquires his knowledge in the character of a confidant, and cannot, therefore, declare anything to the prejudice of his client, without violating his sacred trust. On the committal of an offender, he is formally warned not to communicate what might afterwards be advanced against him; and we admire this generous spirit pervading our laws; but what shall we think of the man who, having insinuated himself into the confidence of some fallen brother, by appearing to hold out the ægis of protection, and wormed from him the secret, which he fain would conceal, will then, instead of improving his client by an example of inviolate honour, declare to the world his guilt, and seek his condemnation? How differently acted the world's great Advocate, when the erring woman was brought to Him in the temple! "Woman, where are those thine accusers? Hath no man condemned thee? She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more." "L'Ouvrier" holds that the duty incumbent upon counsel, as a citizen, ought to prevent him permitting a criminal to escape, when he can do so. To comply with this dictum, he would, of course, require to break the engagement with his client; and the question then presents itself, Whether ought his

general engagement to the state, as citizen, or his special engagement to the criminal, as his advocate, be observed? Paley resolves the difficulty in this manner: "Promises of secrecy ought not to be violated, although the public would derive advantage from the discovery. Such promises contain no unlawfulness in them to destroy their obligation, for as the information would not have been imparted upon any other condition, the public lose nothing by the promise which they would have gained without it."*

Proceeding now to the second article, we are treated to a trial burlesqued in the most approved fashion by R. T. G., in which a legal worthy, existing nowhere but in that gentleman's imagination, frightens the witnesses out of their wits, melts the hearts of the jurymen by pathetic appeals, or sets their hair on end by predicting the future attendance on them of an innocent man's shade, should they pronounce his client guilty; and by such noble efforts, not forgetting a profusion of lies, he succeeds in securing the safety of some atrocious malefactor. The best method of exposing such puerility is to place alongside the compressed report of a *bonâ fide* trial; and these lines being written in Glasgow, we select one from the cases before the last circuit court held there. A girl from Dumbartonshire, bearing a most romantic name, was accused of the murder of her mistress, by administering arsenic mixed in porridge at breakfast; the porridge was prepared and handed to her mistress by the girl; arsenic, the undoubted cause of death, was kept in the house, and lay within reach of the accused; suspicion fell upon the servant alone, and the victim herself at once and persistently accused her with the crime. Add to this, that accused made a statement regarding her master, which he, on oath, denied, and you have the facts of the case for the prosecution. For the defence it was alleged that no sufficient motive could be offered, nothing but a difference about some coppers with deceased, and that no administration could be proved. But what we wish to be noticed is, that the prisoner's counsel, after reviewing the evidence, made no assertion of his client's innocence, but, in the words of the report, "maintained that the case was not proven; and, therefore, he thought, the only conclusion the jury could come to was not to return a verdict of guilty, or even, *perhaps, of not guilty*, but certainly he thought they would find it to be their duty to adopt an intermediate course, and say—not proven:"† which they did.

Let the reader contrast this with the conduct of Sergeant Twister, and draw what conclusion he thinks proper. The principle which has been our loadstar throughout this debate is, that it is better to prefer the escape of the guilty, when proof or law is defective, than, disregarding the imperfection, to convict; because such shortcomings would most probably appear when an innocent person

* "Moral Philosophy."

† This, as our readers doubtless know, is a verdict peculiar to Scotland; and the case illustrates our principle better than an English one could.

happened to be arraigned; and if in the former case they were not respected, neither could they be in this. "The escape of one delinquent can never produce so much harm to the community as may arise from the infraction of a rule, upon which the purity of public justice, and the existence of civil liberty, essentially depend." Thus writes Paley; but R. T. G., cleverly shifting the weight of our argument from the above principle to the maxim incidentally quoted by us, that "it is better that ten guilty men should escape than an innocent man suffer," seeks to bring our case to the ground by an arrow from the quiver of "pigeon Paley." A moment's consideration will explain the maxim. If ten guilty men escape, nine must have done so from want of evidence, since if the first owed his safety to weakness of law, we are neither Medes nor Persians, and could alter that law; if a guilty man suffer, it cannot be from lack of proof, but because the penalty he undergoes is not sufficiently hedged round with safeguards. A legal system may be a terror to evil-doers, but cannot be called a protection to those who do well, if indiscriminate like this characterize it. One-half of its object, and that the more important, not being served, confidence could be no longer reposed in such a system of uncertainty; and on this confidence the foundations of society rest. Two risks would be run; of being injured by the violators of the law, and then by the law itself.

Towards the close of his article, "R. T. G." accuses us of endeavouring "to show that counsellors are philanthropic gentlemen," &c. We fancy our friend is caught napping here, as we are not aware of attempting anything of the sort; but, nevertheless, we see no necessity for "R. T. G." casting so much aspersions on the legal profession as he does; it contains, doubtless, good and bad, as does every calling, yet from its ranks may be collected a brilliant galaxy of names illustrious for learning, integrity, love of freedom, and untiring zeal in the people's cause, that can be matched with that of any other learned body.

"S. E. L.," whose paper must now be noticed, thinks we wrote wide of the mark; we only hope this number will convince him of our desire to stick to the point. He finds a difficulty in connecting with the text the sentences commencing "Not a week elapses but some one is accused upon suspicions almost groundless. Now it is a bank official," &c. Although this difficulty can scarcely have been experienced by other readers, still for "S. E. L.'s" special edification we will at least endeavour to explain what is meant, and show the connection. Our justification of *the* advocate, resting on the service he renders society by preventing any improper interpretation of law in a case where a guilty man was concerned, lest it might act prejudicially to the innocent afterwards, it appeared to us advisable to remind the reader that such cases occur frequently; hence the sentence in question, and the illustrations following, which could be easily recognized. Again, the writer cavils about our remarks regarding the result that would follow if an advocate

retired from a case on learning his client's guilt; he forgets that we entirely differ regarding the quality of the first advocate's act, supposing he had not abandoned the case. We hold it to be right; he maintains it to be wrong. The case of a thief who robs a man, that another, who intends both robbery and murder, may have no inducement for committing those crimes, is no parallel; because the act of the first thief both "S. B. L." and ourselves are agreed upon as being wrong. So we recommend our friend to wipe his spectacles, and take another look at the "photograph."

Here our limits compel us reluctantly to draw the line. More might have been added, but enough has been already written to exhibit our position clearly: "that the affirmative articles are characterized neither by "ridiculous absurdity" nor "blasphemous impiety"—epithets courteously bestowed upon our theme by a magnanimous opponent—we certainly believe; that they may serve a good end by inducing many to consider the question carefully, we sincerely trust; and now with our readers we leave the case, hopeful of obtaining at their hands a verdict favourable to our cause.

NONA.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE have been not a little amused by the erratic warfare of our opponents—their valour is somewhat akin to that of the warrior who shut his eyes while firing his gun, thinking that the surest way to hit his foe, because his attention was not then diverted by surrounding objects—a shadowy subterfuge, behind which he sought to hide his own cowardice.

"Nona" writes with amazing zeal, to prove that the intricacies of law and the interest of the community necessitate an order or profession devoted to the study of the law, and to the accusation and defence of persons charged with the commission of crime. More than three pages of his argument are engaged upon this topic, while scarcely one page has any shadow of reference to the subject of this debate. We admit the propriety of lawyers and counsel being allowed to exist in a highly civilized state of society like the present; the question implies this, as a condition ceded; what necessity, then, to prove it? R. D. R. occupies a considerable portion of his brief argument in the inquiry, How and when is the counsel made cognizant of the criminal's guilt? This one reply is no part of the question. We have not to prove how nor when this knowledge of guilt is communicated to counsel. The question assumes, as a condition of this debate, that counsel has been made professionally cognizant of the criminal's guilt as a part of his instructions to defend. Thus we perceive we have not to prove that counsel is necessary, nor to demonstrate how nor when the knowledge of guilt is communicated to counsel; neither have we to deal with the character of the crime, nor with the duration of the punishment. We have simply to consider whether counsel is justified in defending a criminal from all punishment who has confessed his guilt to him in confidence.

It is apparent, from these remarks, that nearly the whole of the papers written by our opponents are beside the question; and that we have placed the right construction upon the terms of the question will be evident, when it is considered that the words "counsel," "justified," "defending," "punishment," "criminal," "guilt," "professionally," and "cognizant," have no limitation imposed upon them by which less than *all* is signified of each term—each is universal in its application to its own particular category.

In our previous article we have shown that God is truth, and requires man to be truthful; He has impressed His anger against lying in His sentence upon the liar, "Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord;" that truth is an exact representation to others, by word or deed, of our communications to them; that truth is not altered by the character of the individual, although the individual is morally right or wrong in proportion as he is truthful or not; that in all times and all places truth has received the approbation, and falsehood the condemnation, of mankind; that the utility of truthfulness is apparent from the varied relations of life, which are supported by the confidence reposed in the truth of our fellow-men: it was thus shown that truth is demanded from all men, by the example and the nature of God, by His law, by the common consent of all men in all times and all places, by its moral propriety, by its utility in sustaining the multifarious relationships of society; and that nothing in the person, character, or office of the advocate relieves him of the necessity to be and do in all things truthfully. Besides, we have shown that it is the duty of all men, in any state, to bring the criminal to justice; and this universal duty is of paramount importance, and overrides that private duty owing to his client by the counsel. It is thus the duty of counsel to defend the guilty criminal from undue punishment, and to assist in enforcing due punishment. This is required by his duty to society; that by his duty to his client. "Nona" observes (page 183), that when counsel is "requested to conduct a case, he can hardly form such an opinion of the individual's innocence or guilt as would justify him in accepting or declining the duty." To this we reply, that the question under debate fully admits that counsel has such a knowledge of the innocence or guilt of the prisoner charged, as shall be sufficient to justify him in accepting or declining the position of advocate for the prisoner. The case supposed by our question is bad; the guilt of the criminal is clearly and distinctly known to the counsel; and our debate is upon the moral propriety or impropriety of defending a known criminal from punishment—that just punishment which the municipal and moral law equally inflicts. Appearances of guilt or innocence have nothing to do with the matter; it is fact that our question deals with. Is it morally and socially right for a professional advocate to defend a person from punishment of any kind or degree who, it is well known to him, has broken the laws of God and man? We think the hardihood of "Nona" is indeed great, if he advocate the affirmative of such a thesis as he

has undertaken. "Judicial errors" and "human fallibility" have nothing to do with the point at issue. It is the duty of all men, whether professional counsel or others, to uphold the majesty of law by advocating just punishment to every guilty criminal. Society demands it, the law theoretically enforces it, and God requires it. "Nona" again observes, that "the defence of the criminal does not imply his belief in that client's innocence;" but our question imposes upon us this condition, that the counsel knows the criminal's guilt, and defends him from any punishment as an innocent man: which necessitates that counsel should "willingly put forward a false statement," and perseveringly use deceit to effect the object he has in view. On the supposition that the advocate does "cut the connection," if the criminal goes to other counsel, and does conceal his guilt, that can be no valid reason in support of, or in opposition to, either view of the question now under debate. A careful examination of the pretentious paper of "Nona" will fully convince every reader that he has simply been writing about another and different matter altogether, and has never approached one single point of the matter at issue.

H. K. is entirely wrong in assuming that "this question is unfairly put." If it is not the subject upon which he wishes to write, so far well; he is perfectly at liberty to enjoy his opinion; but we presume the conductors of this Serial have the perfect right to put a question in any form pleasing to themselves, and acceptable to their readers, without being exposed to a charge of unfairness; but it is a *ruse* often adopted by those who feel the weakness of their position, to complain of the terms upon which they are admitted to the combat. If H. K. really believes the question unfairly put, why does he write upon the question at all? We have no choice in the form of the question ourselves, but simply accept it as it stands, and we support the negative. We were at liberty to do so or not; and we presume that H. K. was not *compelled* to write against his will. The supposition of a difference between legal punishment and moral guilt is simply beside the question. Our present duty is with the fact, and includes the knowledge of absolute guilt, with the certainty of its appropriate punishment marked out by the law, and active effort to enable the criminal to escape the just punishment due to his crime. And if H. K. affirms this, we fear he is hopelessly lost to all sense of justice and moral propriety.

That a criminal has the right to be defended from undue punishment by the employment of counsel, and that it is the duty of counsel to do and say all in his power to attain this end, is apparent on the merest glance at the question; but to suppose that it is the duty of counsel to defend a criminal from all punishment, that he may go forth into society as an innocent man, is not only preposterously absurd, but is subversive of all law, morals, and justice, and, from every point of view, must be considered subversive of civil society. Yet such is the unreasonable argument of our opponent.

As to the parade of the forms of criminal procedure, caricatured by H. K.'s description, it is simply an absurdity, and no argument. The case of Baron Martin and the young man, so pathetically dragged in by H. K. (p. 247), goes to show that the learned judge wished the prisoner to be tried, because he wished it to be proved what was the legal estimate of his guilt; he wished the responsibility of condemnation to rest with the jury, not with himself. If a prisoner pleads guilty to an indictment, it is the judge who takes upon himself the duty of determining the amount of guilt, and the amount of punishment also; but when not guilty is pleaded, it is the jury who estimate the guilt, and the judge only assigns the legal punishment for the crime designated by the verdict of the jury. All this is, however, beside the question; H. K. is completely *hors du combat*.

It is for the counsel to produce all the favourable and extenuating circumstances justly and prominently before the court, that undue punishment may not be inflicted; but it is a legal and moral wrong for counsel to aid the criminal to escape from punishment, or, in other words, from justice. In the case adduced of M. Bernard, we have yet to learn that counsel attempted to prove him innocent of a crime, after he had confessed to him the commission of that crime. The fact is, M. Bernard committed no crime against the laws of England, and, therefore, was not worthy of punishment. Having, therefore, committed no crime in the eyes of the law, he had none to confess, and counsel had no criminal to defend, but an innocent man—i. e., legally innocent. But this is a case not applicable to the subject of debate, unless it may be remotely considered as supporting our own view of the matter. It is folly to wander farther in search of argument in the paper of our friend H. K., for he appears to have become mystified with his subject; and he has so completely mystified the subject while under his hands, that we should become tedious to the reader, if we followed all his erratic vagaries.

Again we cross the lance with friend R. D. R.; the fates seem to favour our antagonism. We fully coincide with him in his statement, that he is neither barrister nor lawyer. It is, perhaps, a mercy to those poor wretches who fall into the hands of those learned professions, that friend R. D. R. is not possessed of a diploma, "to eat the oyster, and give the shells to his clients," for certainly they thereby escaped a fearful catastrophe; i. e., judging, at least, from his present effort.

The practical question, "How is counsel to know that a man is guilty?" as asked by R. D. R., we beg to inform him, is duly answered in the question at the head of this debate, in the words, "a criminal of whose guilt he has been *professionally made cognizant*." According to the old law maxim, a man is rightly to be considered innocent until he is proved guilty; but if he confesses his crime, there is no longer any doubt to his counsel. While H. K. laments that the question is unfairly put, R. D. R. boasts of

its purity ; for he exclaims, it is a pure hypothesis ; then he proceeds to hypothecate, to an alarming extent, upon subjects as far removed from the question as the antipodes. Sure Pelion was never heaped upon Ossa in such fearful confusion before. What, we would ask, has this question to do with Catholic priests, slanderous accusations, newspaper reports, or any nonsense of that character ? Is it by such means that counsel receive their instructions to defend their clients ? If not, what have they to do with this debate ? Such folly as these hypothecations insult the common sense of the reader, and must be worthy only universal contempt.

We indignantly repudiate the charge made by R. D. R. against the advocates of the negative in this debate. We do not imagine, neither is there any necessity for us "to imagine, that counsel generally are an unworthy class of persons." We believe the profession to be of the noblest among the sons of men ; we are proud to recognize them as, in the great majority of instances, the brightest ornaments of society, the most honourable, upright, and just men in the nation ; and we resent the foul stigma R. D. R. would, in a side wind, attempt to affix upon the character of so honourable a profession. As to one witness or twenty, that is not the question, nor has it any reference to the question. The simple matter we are called to give our opinion upon is this :—Is counsel to speak and act truly, or as an accomplice after the fact : to lie, in word and deed, purposely to effect the criminal's escape from justice ? To the latter we give a negative, to the former an affirmative reply, and feel assured the reader will approve and endorse our opinion, as morally and legally just and true.

L'OUVRIER.

The Essayist.

JAMES MILL: HISTORIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, AND ECONOMIST.

We do not think we shall greatly err if we judge that, among the intelligent readers of the *British Controversialist*, there may be some who feel interested in the life and writings of the historian of India, the friend of Bentham, the founder of the *Westminster Review*, and the father (we announce it, despite of its seeming anticlimax) of John Stuart Mill, the inheritor of the name, but the winner of a wider fame than that of his philosophical progenitor and predecessor.

To bespeak a thinking reader's interest, these connotatives will suffice ; and further preface is, therefore, unnecessary.

James Mill was born 6th April, 1773, in the parish of Logie and Pert, in the county of Forfar, N.B. The district is thinly peopled,

and agricultural, and the North Esk flows along the fields, while the laws (or hills) of Logie tower over it, and impart a degree of picturesqueness to the scenery. His father was a farmer on the estate of Tettercairn; and here, in the humble seclusion of a small plot of arable ground, worked principally by the members of the family, James Mill was reared upon "a little oatmeal." After a short attendance at the parish school, where his parts early manifested themselves, he was transferred, for the attainment of a higher course of instruction, to the grammar school of Montrose. Here he showed such aptitude, that it was determined that he should proceed to the University of Edinburgh, to study for the ministry of the national church.

Without creating any great stir, or figuring with much distinction under collegiate instruction, Mill seems to have made fair progress, judging, not from his works only, but from the fact that he was duly licensed, after examination in the several branches of the University curriculum, as a preacher in the Church of Scotland, and had every prospect of acquiring the topmost height of an intellectual Scotchman's ambition in those days—that of a country pastor, seated in a quiet manse, surrounded by a loving and reverential people, possessed of a little learned leisure and much practical power, exerting a highly beneficial influence on his flock, and perhaps, in due time, reigning as president-king of the visible church of the nation, under the title and with the power of a moderator. A clergyman then, in Scotland, was *ex officio* a gentleman, entitled to hold his own in any arena, with noble, gentleman, laird, or lawyer. The theology and ethics of the church, however, were unsatisfactory to his mind, much more highly imbued with "the dim splendour of Plato" than with the cold, logical brilliancy of Calvin's "Institutes," and the keen practicality of Knox's "Book of Discipline." Under the tutelage of Professor John Bruce—a disciple and friend of Adam Smith's—he did, indeed, study the philosophy of Bacon and Locke, in their application to Taste, Science, History, and Ethics, and he retained the influences of the teachings of that able man and dexterous sinecurist; but the genial enthusiasm of Andrew Dalzell, Professor of Greek, a most recondite scholar in the history, philosophy, poetry, eloquence, antiquities, literature, and language of which he was the teacher, seems to have completely won upon the mind of James Mill, and to have made him in sympathies a Platonist, while in intellectual tenets a pupil of Bruce, and so a Baconian. The influence of these and other teachers in the University, among others of Adam Ferguson, and his then assistant, the well-known Dugald Stewart, James Balfour of Pilrig, &c., as well as that of the literary society of Edinburgh towards the close of the last century, continued to have a great effect upon him during a great part of his life. There can be little doubt that the prevailing scepticism of that circle had touched and tinged his mind, and that led him, on reflection, to prefer the honourable resignation of all his world-prospects of position and power, to a latitudinarian confor-

mity, and a subvented subscription to articles of faith he did not honestly entertain. His determination, however moved, approved itself right in the end, and justified itself by its issues. His aptitudes were of a kind little fitted for the peculiar routine of ministerial duties, as they were performed in Scotland; and it was well that he chose a field of action which, though more precarious and less respected, opened up other paths to fame, competence, and power.

While pursuing his own studies, as was (and is) much the custom in Scotland, he superintended the intellectual culture of the family of Sir John Stuart, his father's landlord, and his own patron. In the capacity of tutor he accompanied that gentleman to London; and when there found himself inclined to adopt the life of a literary man in the great metropolis. Having set up his home in London, in 1800, he began to look about him for a task, such as might afford a fair hope of acquiring a position in his country's literature. The recent acquittal, in 1795, of Warren Hastings, from the impeachment and trial to which he had been subjected, had created a curiosity in the public mind to know something of that vast territory which the hardihood and skill of Clive had subjected to British influences, and the audacious unscrupulosity of Hastings had preserved and extended. This field Mill determined to occupy; and, with the most stubborn perseverance, commenced the serious studies which were requisite to its adequate performance.

Meanwhile, he required to live. He became, at first, a contributor to the *Monthly Review*, established in 1749, and the *British Critic* (1793). Shortly after the establishment of the *Edinburgh Review*, 1802, the *Eclectic*, 1806, he wrote articles of considerable value and importance. In a periodical called the "Philanthropist," the organ of the Quakers, his papers frequently appeared. By these and other hack-work labours, he is said to have been able to make about an average income of £300 a year; and about 1806, he thought himself competent to sustain the respectable position of an English householder by entering into "the holy state of matrimony."

Notwithstanding the difficulties surrounding a position such as that in which he found himself, Mills, while he was thus earning the precarious subsistence won from hack-labour for the press, went on, with the indomitable perseverance of a hero, to compose his *History of British India*. He had never been in India; knew nothing of the Eastern languages; had no personal friendship with eminent Anglo-Indian Nabobs. The vague, marvel-teeming notions of India, prevalent in his day, as a land almost magically endowed with the power of producing wealth; as a land sown with gold, studded with jewels, strewn with crores and lacs of rupees; whose monarchs were irresponsible and mighty as a Xerxes, and wealthy as a Giamschid, and whose natives were prodigal alike of salaams and the precious metals; where loot was plentiful for the soldier, and cent. per cent. at least was certain to the trader, and salaries were

the mere *honoraria*, not the incomes of the administrative agents, required to be forgotten or unlearned. The singular and varied geography of the district had to be mastered; the distinct and widely differing systems of native government and British management; the products of the soil, and of the rocks and rivers; the statistical facts of the different provinces and places; the discipline of the native and other country soldiery; the intrigues of politicians; the campaigns of warriors; the revolts of subjects; the amount and kind of taxation,—and a thousand other difficult and mind-distracting items of knowledge,—had to be got together, worked out of chaotic indistinctness to orderly clearness, and set into perfect unity and collateral intelligibility. The materials for this Herculean task were far-scattered and hard to get, especially if, as they required to be, authentic and trustworthy. A great collection of pamphlets, of parliamentary documents and speeches, of reports of trials and discussions, of notes acquired from oral examinations and from books; of old war despatches and commercial minutes, of abstracts of business in the India House; of resolutions of the directorate, and of counter-resolutions by the proprietary; of newspaper paragraphs, and of magazine papers; of excerpts from biographies, books of travel, gazetteers, and dictionaries;—these were the mass of elements, bulky, verbose, contradictory, detached, of differing value, both as to truthfulness and interest, which it was necessary for the first historian to fuse together into a new compound; and this he did, with consummate ability and success.

These are the points which Mr. Mill set before himself for a task:—

I. To describe the circumstances in which the intercourse of Britain and India commenced, and to detail the particulars of its early progress till the time at which it became fixed, firm, and durable.

II. To exhibit a view, as accurately as possible, of the people with whom the British then began to hold transactions; their character, history, manners, religion, arts, literature, and laws, as well as the physical circumstances of their soil, climate, and productions.

III. To narrate, till the time of writing, the history of the transactions of Britain with India.

Nearly sixteen years were occupied in the preliminary labours needed to produce this history, and in the composition of its various and minute details. Begun about 1800, it was published towards the close of 1817, and it brings down the narrative till 1805. In literary merit, it is inferior to the great classics of Gibbon and Hume. In painstaking research, it far excels the latter; and in acute, critical sagacity, worthily rivals the former, while it surpasses it in lucid expressions, and passionless impartiality. His delineation of Clive, though objected to by Macaulay, and some others of less authority, is keen, incisive, and able. His descriptive sketch of Hastings is severe, bold, discriminating, and honest;

and there is a dash, rapidity, and stir about the recital of the administration of Wellesley, which animates and fascinates the reader. His account of the aboriginal inhabitants, the ancient civilization, the condition and characters of the people, and the general lucidity of arrangement and style, are even yet remarkable; while the profound thought, the liberal views, the far-seeing policy, and the pure historic spirit of the writer, are admirable in every sense. The "History of British India" is a clear, compact, well-digested, and philosophical book,—a great work, nobly planned and worthily executed. It was issued first in three volumes quarto, but was almost immediately republished in five volumes octavo. At first of course it met with rancorous criticism, but at length it triumphed over the contented ignorance and apathy of Englishmen, and brought the interests of India within the circuit of the sympathies of his countrymen, and led, in no small measure, to the improvement and consolidation of the British Empire in India.

One of the most honourable and praiseworthy acts of the East India Court of Directors was the appointment, in 1819, of James Mill to the office of Examiner in the India House. Though he had advanced, boldly and honestly, with a straightforward candour, and an unflinching integrity, many criticisms hostile to the doings, or rather the misdoings, of this vast and overshadowing commercial company, and had not shrunk from exposing the craft, duplicity, and greediness with which many of their schemes were carried out, they acknowledged his ability, and recognized his worth by offering him (unsolicitedly) this most excellent and responsible situation,—a position nearly equivalent to the chief secretaryship of the Indian government.

No sooner had the onerous labours of his History been completed, than we find him at new and almost equally important work. About this time (1818—1824), Constable, the famous Edinburgh publisher, was re-issuing the Encyclopædia, with a supplement. Its editor was Professor Mackey Napier, and among the contributors were Arago, Biot, Jameson, Jeffrey, Leslie, Mackintosh, Malthus, Mill, Playfair, Ricardo, Scott, Steward, Thomson, Young, Wallace, &c.,—all men, not of British, but of European reputation. To it Mill contributed the articles, Colonies, Education, Government, Jurisprudence, Law of Nations, Liberty of the Press, Prison Discipline, &c.,—subjects of immense importance, and worthy of the ablest pen. It is saying little to say they were, in every line, full of the most palpable indications of a lofty and pure intellect, mighty of grasp, daring in aim, and bold in utterance. They were re-published separately, collectively, and as treatises, and they have had no small influence in changing the current of political action and social speculation upon these subjects. They are ripe in analytic skill and in ratiocinative power; their tone is liberal, kindly, and cultivated:—they are works of mark even to this day.

The heavy duties and the stern responsibilities of his official

position, and the grand intensities of thought requisite to compose those splendid treatises, did not overtask his energies; on the contrary, in 1821, he issued what he calls a "school book," entitled, "The Elements of Political Economy," whose object he states to be "to detach the essential principles of the science from all extraneous topics, to state the propositions clearly, and in their logical order, and to subjoin its demonstration to each." This is a plain, easily understood, carefully reasoned, and instructive work; not broad in its foundations, but compact, firm, and full of *thinking*.

In 1823, James Mill had the satisfaction of seeing his son, the now world-known John Stuart Mill—born 1806, and the eldest son of a family of nine, who had been carefully educated under his own supervising care—enter the service of the East India Company. Mr. Mill was one of the early converts to the principles of utility expounded by Jeremy Bentham. In 1824, the disciples of this school of moral philosophers started the *Westminster Review*, as an organ for the diffusion of their tenets. Bentham, it is said, furnished the capital, and Mr. Mill is reported to have been the virtual editor. Thereafter, he was a frequenter at the intellectual *réunions* of Queen-square-place, Westminster, the residence of Bentham. Abbot, Browning, Brougham, Burton, Dumont, Mr. Francis, Place, Dr. Southwood Smith, Colonel Thompson, Ricardo, Roebuck, Romilly, and others of the disciples and friends of Bentham were brought *en rapport* with the singularly philosophical mind which the utilitarian morals had fascinated, and the character of Bentham had captivated. For their contributions to the *Westminster* and the *London and Westminster Review*, Mill and his son, we have been told, could never be prevailed upon to accept any pecuniary remuneration. Many other contributors followed their example. In 1831 appeared the famous and *telling* article on the "Ballot," from the pen of James Mill. It is said to have produced a greater effect upon the public mind than any article in any periodical before or since. It was quoted in almost every newspaper, was separately reprinted, made converts by thousands, and added hundreds of new subscribers, for the time, to the *Westminster Review*.

It was in 1829, however, that the greatest and most original effort of James Mill's intellect was made available to the public. This work was entitled "An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind." It contains the most perfect, exhaustive, and complete exposition of the sensational metaphysics which has yet been produced. Order, brevity, and clearness distinguish and pervade the composition. The theorizing is bold, able, uncompromising. Starting from the principles of Locke, to go no further back—but in the special and modified form in which they were promulgated in the much more talked of than read "Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations," by David Hartley, M.D., the preface to the first edition of which is dated December, 1748—Mill regarded every feeling and idea of the mind belonging to or originated in the mind as being the products of sensations and asso-

ciations. The simple states of the mind are sensations—on the general matter of which the ordinary opinions are adhered to, except in a series of acute remarks upon the feeling of muscularity and the perceptions arising from the operations of the alimentary canal. Ideas he considers as copies, traces, impressions, and remembrances of sensations whose immediate power and presence have died away, and which depend upon memory for their resurrection. These form the whole material of thought, emotion, and intelligence. These materials, so soon as they have been deposited in or impressed upon the mind, come under the influence of the supreme law of human thinking—association. As they enter the mind synchronously or successively, so also do they reappear, and so give rise in the former case to complex ideas, or, in the latter case, to trains of thinking. The operation of *naming* is next expounded in a lengthy and luminous disquisition (chap. iv.) on the origin and nature of the parts of speech; and the chief processes of formal logic are explained in a section on predication. From these premised observations, Mill concludes that the whole elementary processes of thought may be reduced to these four, viz. :—Sensation, Ideation, Association, and Naming. Out of these elements he proceeds to elaborate a scheme of the more complex phenomena of the mind—Consciousness, Conception, Imagination, Classification, Abstraction, Memory, Belief, Ratiocination. After this the author tests the accuracy of his system, and rests the proof of it on an inductive investigation into the contents in signification of metaphysical terms, and explaining them in accordance with his theory, decides that his analysis is true, valid, and correct. This is not even an analysis of the Analysis; it is merely a roughly sketched outline of the items of the work. It would be unfair, without a much more extended and adequate notice, to enter into any criticism upon its teachings or its method. The power of the analyst's intellect is evident on every page. To be truly estimated, it should be read and thought over. Our own impression is, that it errs by eliminating from the mind all constructing energy and self-assertiveness—in narrowing the field of observation, and in leaving unnoticed the vitality of the intellect itself. It seems to be an anatomical analysis of a dead, not a living mind.

It ought to have been mentioned, that many of the best papers on education and jurisprudence in the earlier issues of the *Edinburgh Review* proceeded from the pen of James Mill. Some of his collaborateurs in that work, however, did not spare him in their criticisms; and he appears, eventually, to have declined to contribute farther: perhaps this fact had some latent effect in bringing the *Westminster Review* into being. Among the young adherents of the Liberal party, whose standard this journal upbore in literature, Mill was looked up to with scarcely less respect than Bentham himself. Of course, he excited the ire of the genuine Whigs by his Radicalism, which was of a very pronounced character. In his "Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy," Mackintosh had spoken with

some superciliousness, and in a considerably cavalier manner, of one of the philosophical idols of Mill, the great but decried Hobbes; he had ventured to criticize, with a good deal of asperity, and with some sophistical arguments, the Benthamite "Morals," and he had alluded to Mill's "Analysis" in a depreciating way in his text, reserving a word of laudation only for his notes; but he had added to all these offences the greater enormity of seeming to know what he really had not studied—at least, in this light it appeared to Mill. In a scathing and remorseless critique, entitled, "A Fragment on Mackintosh," James Mill reviewed this contribution to philosophical literature, and thereby seriously damaged the reputation of one of the great leaders of the Whigs, and one of the chief opponents of the school of metaphysics in which he believed. In it he speaks with great harshness and severity, though not passionately, of the deceptive appearance of extensive reading, varied learning, and scrupulous quotation, which he thought he noticed in Sir James Mackintosh's famous production.

We have heard of only one other work for which we are indebted to the genius of Mill; one of the works in which the disciple of Bentham has even been supposed by some to have outstripped his master in philosophical insight, definiteness of thought, and the union of abstract speculation with practical sagacity, "Observations on the Conditions of a Perfect Penal Code," appended to a report on that subject, presented to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Louisiana.

In 1835, his son, John Stuart Mill, succeeded him as conductor of the *Westminster Review*; he afterwards also succeeded to the Examinership in the India House, which his father had held so long. The latter part of James Mill's life was spent in Kensington, where, on the 23rd June, 1836, he died, in the sixty-fourth year of his age. His wife survived him; and at his death nine of his children were alive—five of these had, however, attained their majority.

A life of uncompromising integrity, honest effort, acute reflection, and beneficial exertion, ended in calmness; and the name of James Mill now worthily occupies a place of pre-eminence among Britain's self-made men.

Q. S.

The Reviewer.

The Men of the Scottish Reformation. By Rev. J. S. SMITH.
Edinburgh: Macphail. London: Simpkin & Co.

THE first General Assembly of the Church of the Scottish Reformation was holden at Edinburgh on the 20th December 1560, three centuries ago. The tri-centenary of that great, that

eventful day, is to be commemorated and reverentially kept by the Protestant evangelical churches of Scotland; and not a few of the Nonconformists of England will, it is understood, make use of that event in history as matter for discourse and practical suggestion on that same day. There is an aptness, therefore, in the publication of a work whose aim is "to elucidate the various questions involved in the history of the Scottish Reformation, which make it worthy both of note and comment." Yet it is not a mere get-money publication, it is an honest book, and an earnest one withal, erring, indeed, if anything, on the over-earnest side. The narrative is briefly and interestingly told; the sweep of events is graphically chronicled; the general form and tendency of the movement is plainly and attractively described. We are only sorry that so much of the critical element should have prevailed in the book, and that works are sometimes referred to in no measured terms of harshness, which some who may peruse this book may not have read. Yet there is a sort of *controversial* zest given by this means to the work, which keeps alive attention, and makes one feel a sense of briskness in the author's style. For our own part, we would have liked a more gallant mode of address had been used towards Miss Strickland in his various raids against her views. There is pith, power, vividness, and telling earnestness in the book; which, though disfigured with some uncouthness of phrase, is well worthy of perusal now when the commemoration days of the Scottish Reformation are so near at hand. We have little doubt the author will be heard of again in the ecclesiastico-historic fields of fight. *Au revoir!*

History of the British Empire. By W. F. COLLIER, B.A., Sion College, Dublin. London: Nelson & Sons.

THIS is a capital, clear, brief abridgment of the chief facts in Britain's glorious story. The outline is carefully sketched. The details are often touched with a spirit of life; the manners of the people at different times are fairly and fully described, and the literature of the periods is concisely noted. A great many tabular forms are given; chronological and synchronistic abstracts, &c., add much to its value. Though professedly written for schools, it contains quite as much history as the civil service, the middle-class degree, or the school of arts examinations require the student to know. Its orderly correctness ought to be a great help to the mastering of its contents easily, rapidly, and surely.

A History of Scotland. By Rev. JAMES MACKENZIE. London: Nelson & Sons.

THIS is a lively, attractive, readable book, likely to be the pride of boys. It is biographico-historic. It is a story of the people rather than the kings of Scotland, and has many finely toned chapters. It is, perhaps, a little too literary in its allusions for school children, but would delight youths, and even instruct men

who have not had the advantage of historic culture during their lesson days. If it had had a few of such tabular epitomes of chronology, &c., as the preceding volume has, it would have been considerably more useful.

On the Fundamental Causes of Diversity of Style. By Rev. D. BUNNIMAN, D.D. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black.

THESE 36 octavo pages, at the cost of one shilling, give a few critical observations on style and language, composed when the author was a student early in the century. They are composed after the manner of MacGill, Blair, Payne, &c., sententious, philosophical, but what would now be called dull. They are useful, plain, and clear, but the repose of twenty-five years they have already enjoyed ought scarcely to have been disturbed now.

The Early Closing Movement;—What can I do for it? By the Editor of *Chambers' Exeter Journal*. Exeter: W. Chambers.

THIS is an energetic, hearty, healthy pamphlet. Its text is, "We affirm that it is a sin against Nature, Providence, and the Gospel, to overwork ourselves, or to employ others in excessive toil." The writer expresses regret that amid his numerous avocations he has had "but little time to correct any errors in composition." For this we are sorry. It would have been much more efficacious had the *manner* equalled the *matter* of the essay. As a general tract, it ought to have been freed from its localizing allusions. It is clever, suggestive, and forcible, as the following sentences will show:—"Time alone is real capital. . . . This [ten instead of twelve hours' work] will give us for three hundred members [persons] six hundred hours a day. Taking six working days in the week, we find in each week 3,600 hours; multiplying this by 52, for the number of weeks in the year, gives us an annual loss of 187,200 hours. Let us divide these hours by ten,—and we have taken the time as ten hours daily, because it is those useful working hours that are wasted, we may say wantonly wasted,—and we now see that collectively the wasted hours amount to more than one man's average life, viz., 59 years 253 days in every year. It is for you, reader, to decide on the merits of the question. Do your shopping early, and you make one step towards redeeming the past, and securing better for the future." It ought to be a useful tract, and should be extensively read.

The History of France. Vols. I. and II. By EYRE EVANS CROWE. London: Longmans & Co.

IN the 131 volumes of Lardner's "Cabinet Cyclopaedia," no three were more valuable for clear condensation, and rapid, yet careful narrative, than those which supplied the history of France, from the earliest period to the abdication of Napoleon. That work has been re-issued from time to time, and held its place well as a manual for ordinary readers, and the general run of students. Our interest

in and about France has, since the first publication of that work, been much increased, and Mr. Eyre Evans Crowe has consented to re-write for us the annals of France, after a full, fair, and lengthened examination of authorities. The work is distinguished by careful and conscientious research, scrupulous exactness, candid and impartial analysis, rather than by brilliancy or pictorialism of style, by epigrammatic characterization, or sprightly detail. It is a thoughtful, painstaking, honest work, rather than a flashy and popular (in the *worst* sense—it is in the *better*) book. The first volume is occupied, of course, by the record of ancient and mediæval France, and is more an elaborate abstract, than, properly speaking, a history. But it contains a fund of well-told facts, acute thoughts, ingenious interpretations or elucidations, and a laboriously compiled collection of personal incident and ethnological detail. It closes with the scholastic era, and the second volume begins with the accession of Charles VI. in 1380, and goes on 180 years—to the death of Henry II. in 1559. For the next three centuries he reserves three volumes, and if they increase in graphic intensity as they do in interest, then no romance will equal in charm the work of this author. Those who desire to gain an acquaintance with the facts of early French history, and to trace the growing influence of France upon the European mind, can scarcely find a safer and surer guide than Mr. E. E. Crowe. We cannot even except Smyth and Stevens.

Italy in Transition. By W. ARTHUR, A.M. Third Edition.
London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co. 1860.

THE words "third edition," on the title-page of this book, indicate no less the fascination of the subject, than the ability with which the author has treated it. History constantly repeats itself: hence, while lovers of liberty all the world over rejoice at the recent march of events in Italy, Englishmen view, with intensified interest, the spectacle of a nation passing through substantially the same process of destruction and reconstruction as did this England in centuries gone by.

Since the date of Mr. Arthur's book, events have progressed with a rapidity almost beyond belief. The conquests of Sicily and Naples, then deemed scarcely possible, have since become realized facts. The information, however, it contains is still of great importance and interest as regards the conduct of the Italians in this, the great crisis of their history; and also as regards certain religious ecclesiastical problems, which only await solution till political matters have ceased to be so engrossing.

Mr. Arthur's qualifications as a traveller-author are many. Shrewd and discreet we should judge him always to be, having that temper of mind which preserves him from the undue familiarity which repels rather than invites confidence, and from that extreme reserve which prevents the acquisition of the very information most valuable and desired. Hence the opinions, feelings, and ideas embodied in his conversations with Italians of all ranks and parties

are of a very instructive and suggestive character. At the same time, greater care might have been exercised in avoiding reporting several times over conversations almost identical in matter and manner. One fault we have especially to complain of; we mean the constant reference to the extent and variety of his travels in all quarters of the globe. These references are so frequent, as to become quite offensive. Thus, his descent of Mont Cenis reminds him of his descent from the Neilgherries into the plains of Mysore; Turin reminds him of Carlsruhe and Philadelphia; the blessing of the national colours at Milan reminds him of a similar scene at Paris in 1848; a Sunday in Milan reminds him of a Sunday he spent at a swinging feast in India; here he calls upon images of the plain of Esdraelon, "with Bedouins, and pistols, and spears;" an election at Bologna suggests election experiences in the United States; and so on, *ad infinitum*. These reminiscences carry no meaning to the general reader, who is not particularly interested in knowing where Mr. Arthur has been, and, we submit, they are in very bad taste. With the exceptions we have stated, the book is exceedingly valuable; its style is kind and lively, and the information it embodies is of an important character. The headings of a few of its chapters will explain its title. "Savoy, pending Annexation." "Turin during the Voting upon Annexation." "Milan during the Rejoicing upon Annexation." "Bologna during the General Election," &c.

Mr. Arthur's information respecting Savoy will surprise many people, who have taken it for granted that the Savoyards would look with no favour upon the treaty, whereby they were handed over, like so many chattels, from the free government of Sardinia to the despotic government of France. This, it seems, is a mistake, the annexation being regarded with favour by the great majority of the inhabitants. The most of them seem to be pretty accurately stated in the following bit of conversation:—"Why should we be hooked across the mountains to those Piedmontese? They are not of our blood; they speak another tongue. And as to trade or intercourse! you consider the sea between France and England a barrier. What is that to Mont Cenis? You are across in an hour or two, to carry goods by shiploads; but to carry a thousand tons over Mont Cenis will take the transport corps of our army."

Mr. Arthur's account of the bearing and temper of the people of Central Italy, during their transition period, corresponds with those received from other sources. Instead of the wild excitement, which would not have been unnatural, order was everywhere preserved; a dignity of pride seems to have distinguished them, as though conscious of the responsibility which was laid upon them to behave as men deserving of freedom, as the eyes of all Europe were watching for opportunity of praise or blame. One thought absorbed all: Italy was at last united. The idea of nationality, so long nurtured in their bosoms, was now to be realized. "For the first time since ancient Rome, they could say, We are a nation."

Much curiosity has been felt by English Protestants as to how far the antagonism of the Italians to the temporal power of the Pope, and to the Romish priesthood generally, had prepared them for the reception of what we deem a purer form of Christianity. Mr. Arthur experienced this curiosity largely, and lost no opportunity of seeking the information which would enable him to come to something like a just conclusion. The result of his endeavours is very well summed up in the following paragraph:—

"One of the first things I heard in England on landing was a statement from a gentleman, who had just returned from Florence, to a lady in the railway carriage, that all Northern Italy was ripe for Protestantism. This is a rash saying. Northern Italy is nothing of the kind. The people are weary of the priests, alienated from the church, resolved to be free, and panting after the union and glory of their country. Many of them are convinced that in religion they have been imposed upon, and that the church edifice they see around them is not the solid building on the rock reared by Christ and His apostles, but a 'frail and whited clump of stones.' It can hardly be doubted that large numbers, perhaps a majority, of the people, and probably a considerable portion of the priesthood, would be not only ready but glad to join any national reform which would break off their yoke, and render religion more rational, as they know it; for in the benefits of this they might partake, without exposing themselves individually to persecution. If any great statesman or leading ecclesiastic could initiate such a movement, it is hard to say where it might be carried. Did Cavour and the King avow their independence of Rome, and solemnly regret the pretensions of the Pope to universal dominion, no doubt they would divide the kingdom into two parties; but there can be little question that the army and the intelligent portion of the country would be with them; and future generations of Italians would look upon the movement as do the present generations in countries where it has occurred, namely, as the turning-point of national vigour and life. Public events appear to lead to a position that will force the State to choose between spiritual independence and temporal degradation, and it is by this dilemma that Providence has again and again wrought out the rescue of nations."

"Assent and Consent." What does it Imply and Involve? What is my Position? What is my Duty? By an IRISH CLERGYMAN.
London: Nisbet and Co. 1860. Price 6d.

THIS is a temperate, and yet an emphatic, expression of dissent from several of the obligatory vows taken by English priests before their ordination in the Established Church. The Irish Clergyman sketches the history of the "assent and consent" to show, we presume, how almost hopeless it is to expect a repeal of passages which can lay claim to such hoar antiquity. The Irish Clergyman is dissatisfied with the service for the baptism of infants, and does not think it well that the minister should be obliged to say, "Dearly beloved brethren, seeing now that this child is regenerate," &c. The author of this startling tractate brings similar objections against kneeling when receiving the bread and wine at the Lord's Supper; against the absolution prayer in the "Order for the Visitation of the Sick;" also against some of the Thirty-nine Articles. There is an earnestness and catholicity of spirit pervading this pamphlet, which, for a controversial work, is much in its favour.

Altar Light: a Tribute to the Memory of the Rev. Alexander Fletcher, D.D. By the Rev. JOHN MACFARLANE, LL.D. London: Nisbet and Co.

THIS unpretending little volume is an affectionate memorial of a man who was highly and justly esteemed as a Christian minister of more than ordinary intelligence, consistency, and usefulness.

Its chief characteristics are, judicious thought, devout feeling, and a style adapted to its subject. The narrative portion is simple and serious, all that good sense and Christian piety would dictate as appropriate to such a theme. Dr. Fletcher was always an acceptable, if not an eloquent, preacher, but his chief forte, especially in later life, was as a preacher to the young; and Dr. Macfarlane beautifully recognizes this fact in the following passage:—"His renown is almost world-wide as a preacher to the lambs of the flock; consequently, we only obey the voice of a universal suffrage when we place this crown upon his hoary head, and summon a bereaved childhood to shed its tributary tear over his honoured grave."

We predict a wide circulation to this touching and appropriate *In memoriam*.

In reading books, observe this direction: consider the scope and design of the whole, and judge of the particular passages with reference to that; and if there be any single passage, which thou apprehendest not the meaning of, or which at the first reading seems to have another meaning than is agreeable to the author's design, build nothing upon such a passage, but wait awhile to see if the author will not explain himself; and if he does not, and thou canst not at last discern how that passage can, without some straining of words, be reconciled with others, then conclude however, and take for granted, that the author, if he appears a man of judgment, is consistent with himself, and consequently that in that passage (however the words may sound) he did not mean to thwart and contradict all the rest of his book.—*Dr. T. Fuller.*

Those grave sciences, logic and rhetoric, the one for judgment, the other for ornament, do suppose the learner ripe for both; else it is, as if one should learn to weigh, or measure, or to paint the wind. Those arts are the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose the matter: and if the mind be empty thereof, if it have not gathered that which Cicero calleth *sylva* and *expeller*, *stuff* and *variety*; to begin with those arts, it doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, will be made almost contemptible, and degenerate into childish sophistry.—*Bacon.*

The Topic.

IS SPIRITUALISM TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE.

"THE night side of nature" has always been felt to be full of mystery. The potent dreads which fill the soul of even the bravest, when the self-concentrativeness of darkness enables them to become sensible of the pressure of "the invisible world" upon their souls, is a proof written *a priori* in the human frame of the intense reality of spiritual manifestations—of the fact, that Spiritualism is true.—D. H.

We have no intention of pushing the *Home*-argument of the *Cornhill Magazine* upon our readers. What we have to say is much more palpable and plain, viz.,—the believers in Spiritualism have not hesitated to guarantee, by the publication of their names, &c., their statements and their faith. Its opponents have almost entirely shrouded themselves in the strictest, almost Junius-like, anonymity. Which, then, is most likely to be honest and trustworthy,—those who expose themselves to test and raillery, or those who merely gibe and rail behind the screen of a few types indicative of nothing, nobody, and nowhere?—QUID.

In the second book of Akenside's "Pleasures of the Imagination," the following query is put:—

"Is thy short span
Capacious of this universal frame?
Thy wisdom all-sufficient? Thou, alas!
Dost thou aspire to judge between the
Lord
Of nature, and His works?"

Unbelievers in Spiritualism, who wish to limit truth to the measure of their own single, unaided comprehensions, ought to ponder on this before they definitely dissent. The spiritual world has always been regarded as nearer man than can be told in human speech.

Inspiration, genius, seership, premonitions, visions, impressions, &c., are all forms of acknowledged spiritual agency. Why should these be its only forms? and man's acquaintance with the spirit not be like his knowledge of all things else, widened by the procession of the suns?—SPOT.

Socrates had his demon; Homer, his muse; Luther, his spiritual aids and enemies; Swedenborg, his angel attendants;—in fact, all great minds had their special forms of communion with the world beyond the grave; and it is still true, as George Herbert sang, two centuries ago:—

"More servants wait on man
Than he'll take notice of. In every path
He treads down that which doth
befriend him,
When sickness makes him pale and
wan.
Oh, mighty love! Man is one world,
and hath
Another to attend him."—Q. E. D.

"The philosophic mind" of the present age is decidedly one of doubt. The apparition, in some form or other, of spiritual agencies to human beings has been for ever a tradition among men; nor is there any feeling so widely or so vividly diffused as that which teaches us to believe that there are "ministering spirits" wandering on the missions of mercy of the One Divinity, over the earth, and among men, and making all things work together for the fulfilment of the sublime purposes with which he has entrusted the ages; and men, in olden times, have not unfrequently entertained angels unawares, until their blessing gave them knowledge of the fact. Homer concurs with Scripture in asserting that in the—

"Similitude of strangers oft
The gods, who can all forms with ease
assume,
Repair to populous cities."

If we have cast away the highest faculty of our soul—faith, which is "the evidence of things not seen," how can we hope to know the wondrous mysteries of nature, undreamt of as they are in the rationalizing faithlessness of modern philosophy? That such thinking abounds, is no proof that Spiritualism is untrue.—T. B. D.

The consciousness of man has two relationships, one to the material and outward world, another to the spiritual world, of which it is the intermediary organ. If man will find or make the sabbath of his soul in the world of objective existence, will close the eyes of his understanding upon all forms of higher being, and, microscope-like, looks only on the littleness that the world exhibits, it is impossible that he can see and know the higher relationships in which he stands to the universe of souls. In some so-called preternatural moment, his heart may be opened to emotions admonitory of nobler things; and in this so-called abnormal state, he feels that there are surrounding beings whose interests are knit with his; yet so soon as the hour of emotive excitement is past, he strives to persuade himself that all was dream and phantasy. It is not so, but through our blindness. The consciousness, when properly active and healthy, has a power of knowing far more widely and acutely than is ordinarily the case. This exquisite seeing is the revealer of the spirit-world. The soul diffuses itself into the sense of spiritual relations, and so becomes sensible of those finer, purer essences, whose lives mingle the forces of their being with those of men, and touch them into the harmonies of a diviner life. This double power of consciousness, by which the ordinary latencies of Spiritualism are made present to the knowing mind, is but rarely developed, now-a-days, among men.

Only one-half of man's mental capacity is brought into play, and the blindness of our own consciousness we make an argument against the possibility of light and being of a spiritual kind. Though a blind man deny colour and form, we do not believe him to be right. Spiritualism is only the use of the whole consciousness of man, and its revelations must be true.—SOCRATES.

The wonders of modern science have been so strangely productive of new and fresh sensations and excitements, that men have materialized the very spirits within them, or they would see at once that the new spirit manifestations now recognized among men as forming the embryotic elements of a science transcending the mere psychological school which is current among us, and rising into the region of a grand and world-pervading ontology, and a metaphysis inductively proven, is only the recoil and differential development of human thought, which has hitherto been over-weighted by the material only. There is nothing really "stranger than fiction" in the matter. Steam was once as unbelievable a sprite as any ever brought into communication with man by any medium. Electricity, with its semi-spiritual agency, and thought-flashing energy, was once no more thoroughly subjugated to the powers of ordinary men, than are the manifestations of the spiritual world. Men doubted and denied regarding these, but their reality is now attested. The arch wizard of our day—science—has now worked these marvels into undeniable demonstrability. If these were, in their early day, *a priori* as much matters of hesitance and unbelief, as are now the agencies of the universe of spirits, why should we cloud our own souls, or clog our own progress into higher regions of existence, by doubt and denial? Let us give the same experimental acceptance to this new power as we have given to others, and we may rest assured that not a long time will elapse till we have mountain masses of evidence that Spiritualism is true.—G. G.

"All newly discovered truths," says I. H. Fichte, one of the most celebrated living philosophers of Germany, "have, at first, the lot of struggling against the old beliefs; but in the end they are always victorious." This is a true induction from the history of human effort. Spiritualism is now going through this constantly recurring ordeal. It is rich in the demonstrative power of facts; unless our opponents are, like King David, "in his haste," prepared to say, "all men are liars." The responsibility of proving an affirmative has been undertaken by many well-known persons. Among these we may justifiably name Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, Wm. Howitt, Dr. Collyer, Mrs. E. B. Browning, Mrs. Crowe, Dr. Hoëfer, editor of the "Biographie Universelle," Tiedeman, the Metaphysician, &c.; and though these and many others have given the guarantee of their names to the genuineness of the several reports which have been issued, regarding spiritual intercourse, in which they have taken part, their opponents have never dared to charge them with "falsehood, fraud, and wilful imposition," but content themselves with uttering the contemptuous term *fudge!* and characterizing these persons as *dupes*. Even though an equal array of names could be given on the anti-spiritual side, they would not weigh like these. These are witnesses that they know and believe the truth; the others can only affirm that they know nothing, and believe little, of the matter. If there is any likelihood of error, let the opponents show it. The affirmation of the spiritualists is the strength of their cause.—L. D. P.

NEGATIVE.

To prove anything true, it is indispensable that we should understand the first principles of that which we investigate, the causes of its existence, its various operations, and its final results; and having all these clearly before our minds, we may nearly always judge of the truth or falsehood of any

matter that is brought before our attention. But with Spiritualism it is different; we know the effects which are produced, but upon their causes speculation runs wild, and the most extravagant hypotheses abound. And as to the mode of operation which produces these effects, as much mystery is connected with this as with the former. We nearly all believe that the air around us is filled with guardian spirits from the world of light, and tempting spirits from the pit of darkness; but to give full credence to the fact, that they are permitted to make us aware of their presence, by putting seeming life into inanimate objects, we do well to hesitate ere we uphold such belief. The late article in the *Cornhill Magazine*, coming, as the editor affirms, from a friend in whose good faith and honourable character he can confidently repose, is far too serious a statement to be lightly passed over. We can do nothing less, we think, than believe in the sincerity of the writer. We do not doubt for a moment that he saw what he narrates, although we believe that the excitement of his brain, during the last *séance* of which he writes (when Mr. Home played so prominent a part in the affair) created, and caused him to revel in, the splendid temple of imagination. We know a lady friend in whose statements we can fully rely, that was one of a party which gave table-turning a fair trial. She declares that the table did rise on *one* side, and that it went from one part of the room to another, without the smallest outward force that she was aware of; and this happened in the presence of no professional table-turner, but in that of friends equally curious on the popular subject. Nearly all of the party had headaches after the occurrence, but this may be traced to the excitement they were in. But for all this, were they *spiritual* manifestations? We believe not; but we do believe that they are the workings of phenomena with which we are yet unacquainted, and which may require another New-

ton to unveil. Until he had placed before the world his law of gravitation, philosophers were as greatly distressed to know the secret stirrings which kept the rolling orbs of heaven around their common centre, as men of science now are at a loss to know why a table moves of its own accord, and gives successive raps with its lifeless feet. Let us take care, however, not to laugh in our ignorance, but try, by all the means in our power, to elucidate the fact, and philosophically show that a table may move and talk without being possessed with an evil spirit.—IOTA.

"Spiritualism," or spirit-rapping, is not true. It is an imposition upon the credulous, used, in most cases, to make money, and in others to create awe. It appears that the region where spirits mostly manifest themselves is in a drawing-room; and that their principal freaks are conducted under tables, or in the dark. It seems singular that *spirits* should observe so much secrecy in the manifestations which it is alleged they make. If they themselves are invisible, whence their extreme anxiety to perform their operations hiddenly? Were spiritual communications necessary to the inhabitants of this world, is it likely that the spirits would make such fools of themselves as to rap, spin, and lift up tables? Some extraordinary articles upon this subject have appeared in "Once a Week." It will, indeed, be surprising if any one person, after a perusal of these articles, can have any doubt of Spiritualism being an imposture. From first to last, it is a successful cheat, and I sincerely hope that it will soon be universally treated with the contempt it deserves. In conclusion (quoting from the article above referred to):—"I cannot conceive a more accommodating audience for a conjuror's devices, nor, indeed, a much more ridiculous spectacle than a company of ladies and gentlemen, prepared for something out of the common, sitting exactly as the exhibitor himself has disposed them, credulous, if not already half convinced, in a state of breathless expecta-

tion, squeezed together in the dark. If my readers will really let their minds dwell on this combination for a moment, and if it does not tickle them, they must be deficient in a sense of humour."—J. C.

What! *pros* and *cons* on the question, "Is Spiritualism True?" Of all the subjects on which the mind of man can be suffered to dwell, none so barren and unproductive; and, after all, what is the result? Opinion, and little more. We believe that Spiritualism, in its intended signification, is a doctrine as erroneous as is Materialism. That we have an incorporeal essence, cannot be denied; but that it can be seen, independent of the material man, is a question, to the solution of which we will not pretend. With all deference to the giant *littérateur*, Dr. Johnson, we cannot believe in ghosts and hobgoblins. The Bible very pointedly informs us that God is a Spirit, and that no man hath seen Him at any time. Had the question, "Is Spirit-Rapping True?" been propounded, it would have been more applicable to the article, "Stranger than Fiction." The universally received definition of "Spirit-Rapping," notwithstanding the evidence of Mr. Thackeray's friend of *twenty-five years' standing*, is, that it is an "impudent cheat." "Ten thousand failures," says the author of "Stranger than Fiction," "do not disprove a single fact." True; but it shows that the science, in which he is so strong a believer, is either extremely embryotic or unprofitable. Ten thousand attempts for one success! That poor spider, and that unfortunate King Bruce—it would have been an alas-and-alackaday sort of a thing for both, had their success depended upon such scientific discipline. It is consolatory to readers of "Stranger than Fiction" to find, that the worthy editor allows them "to give or withhold their belief." And the writer's own scepticism only confirms the general discredit in which it is held:—"I refuse to believe such things on the evidence of other people's eyes; and I

may, possibly, go so far as to protest that I would *not believe them on the evidences of my own.*" How is he likely to gain proselytes?—J. R. P.

As long as spiritual manifestations are confined to mahogany movements, little faith can be placed in their reality; for though they can rap and make a noise forcibly enough, yet for the true test of their presence (and we ask it with all seriousness), have they ever performed a charitable action, or been the promulgators of a useful idea? It is no proof of their presence that we are unable to account for the phenomena which accompany their manifestations; for these may either be the result of some hidden law of nature, or perhaps some peculiar combination of electrical and magnetic influence. However, be this as it may, it does seem strange that these inhabitants of other worlds are such proficient in the art of music, and yet are unable to communicate any information, except through the medium of raps, that primitive and tedious system, which casts a doubt upon all their transactions, and leads us to suppose that all their phenomena are but magical tricks cleverly performed, or are the result of machinery artfully adapted for the purpose.—J. T. K.

All who have had the patience to read the article, "Stranger than Fiction," in the *Cornhill Magazine*, must have been compelled to hold, however much they may have been advocates of the theory of Spiritualism, that that article was a *little* too much overdrawn. When we hear of people floating in the air, without calling in the aid of a magic-lantern, and when musical instruments play of their own accord, without hidden springs, like a musical box, we must, were we to believe what we hear, have an idea that Dr. Cumming's "great tribulation" is already "coming on the earth." I will not enter into a long analysis of that article, nor am I prepared to do so. They who may wish, may find one in recent numbers of "Once a Week," in which Mr.

Home is discovered to be little more than a wizard of a *higher* scale, and whose tricks are found to be, if not spiritual, at least moonshine. I only wonder that the learned editor of the "*Cornhill Magazine*" did not put the MS. of the article in question into the waste-paper basket instead of his *Magazine*. If our friends on the affirmative will answer these questions, I will believe their statements:—1. Did they *themselves* ever see a ghost or spirit? or did they ever hear any sound that could not be accounted for naturally; and when? 2. Did they ever see a table move in such a manner, that looking under the table would not furnish the solution? 3. Did they ever hear any musical instrument play of itself, after it had been examined by them, and no machinery found?—F. S. MILLS.

Truth is the narrative of fact. And all that we know of the existence of spirits is from divine revelation. But that record of facts never, in one instance, represents those spirits and the denizens of this earth as holding communication through the medium of tables, nor at the bidding of professional media, nor yet for the gratification of the assembled curious. And whereas much of the phenomena can be accounted for by science, and nothing connected with table-turning clearly demonstrates the presence of spirits, it follows that, wanting a substratum of clearly defined fact, the superstructure, Spiritualism, is "baseless as the fabric of a dream."—LUTHER.

Is Spiritualism true? This is a question of interest and importance. When we think of the marvellous discoveries which have been made by the researches of men, surely it behoves us not rashly to deny even the most astounding phenomena. So far as Spiritualism refers to the turning of tables, and to the rapping out of direct answers to direct questions, we can give our own feeble testimony to its truth and reality. We have more than once seen this result. We can also

state, upon the authority of a lady of travel and experience, a fact which we have not seen elsewhere noticed. It is that, if the interrogators know the correct answer to the question, the table will rap out a correct answer. When, however, the interrogators are ignorant of the correct answer to their question, the table also evidences hesitation and uncertainty. As to the still more astonishing part of the narrative in the *Cornhill Magazine*, we feel a little doubt. Why should these strange manifestations take place in twilight dim, and under other circumstances likely to excite the imaginations of the beholders? We think, too, that "Spiritualism" is not a proper term to apply to these manifestations. We cannot think that spirits, if wishing to hold communication with mortals, *would choose such clumsy media as hats and tables*. Our own theory is, that the motion of the table is produced by the *involuntary* pressure of those whose hands are placed on it. This will also account for the correct number of raps being given, only when the operators themselves know the answer they wish to elicit.—T. L. P.

I have seen little, and read nothing, concerning Spiritualism; but the little I have seen has induced me to think that the *something*, whatever it may be, which moves tables, proceeds from the bodies or from the minds of those who place their hands upon the tables. A number of persons sit round a table, and place their hands upon the top of it; some time passes, and a trembling is felt by one or more of the operators. The table, spirit, or whatever else it may be called, is asked to knock three times, and it knocks once, twice, or thrice, but very *feebly*, and some one observes that "it is not strong enough yet;" a little more time passes, the knocks become louder, and it is said that "it (the something) is stronger." The rest of the phenomena now follow. Now, it appears to me, and I think it must appear to every one who considers the matter attentively, that this *some-*

thing, which manifests itself in so gradual a manner, must either be some physical property proceeding from the bodies of those whose hands are placed upon the table, or some portion of the mind of *each of them*, which, by the strong and long-continued *willing*, passes, or seems to pass, in some mysterious way, into the table, and there obeys, or seems to obey, the commands of any one of the operators who happens to be the spokesman. Therefore I think that Spiritualism, in the *usual* acceptance of the term, is not true.—T.

I cannot conceive how any man in his senses can believe in the so-called manifestations of Spiritualism. I do not doubt the veracity of those gentlemen who tell us that they have witnessed chairs and tables raised up from the ground, and men floating about in the air; I believe they have heard tunes played on accordions and guitars, and that they have seen and heard all the physical phenomena of Spiritualism, as described by them. All these ridiculous performances take place in almost total darkness, which fact alone is enough to raise suspicion, and incline us to believe that other than spiritual agencies are at work. It is simply absurd to fancy that the spirits of the dead can be influenced by the wishes of those on earth; and believers in this doctrine I look upon either as the dupes of some crafty medium, or their own disordered senses. Why not turn the spirits to some practical account in this matter-of-fact age? It would be interesting to know the ultimate fate of the *Great Eastern* or the Atlantic cable, and a great deal more sensible on the part of the spirits, than pulling young ladies' feet, or pinching old gentlemen's thighs.—J. W.

Those who take the affirmative side in this question have the whole *onus probandi*. They have to prove that the *miracles* of Spiritualism are genuine, real occurrences, not gross impositions, or, at least, mere delusions. They tell us that tables and chairs walk about

the room, and rise to the ceiling; that men are lifted up into the air, and carried about by some unseen agency; that a number of raps are heard at a table in a dark room. But what then? Do these wonderful occurrences take place publicly and openly? Do these spiritual communications appear to any who disbelieve in them? or are they confined to a few who are initiated in the mysteries, and are called media? Has anything ever been discovered by means of the spirits? Has any information ever been communicated on any subject by the rappers? A proposal was recently made in the papers that the spirits should be asked to discover the author of the Road murder. Has any medium accepted the challenge? There could not be a fairer test of the truth, or otherwise, of the pretensions of Spiritualism than the foregoing; yet none of those, who are most learned in ghostly science, will accept it. Is it possible that, in these days of enlightenment and civilization, any one can be found who will believe, on the bare unsupported *ipse dixit* of one or two interested individuals, the improbable, childish, and utterly incredible stories related in the recent article in the *Cornhill Magazine*?—J. G. J.

The hypothesis of spiritual manifestation is so flagrantly at variance with the present order of things, that it must necessarily be false in principle, therefore deceptive in result. The assumption, that man has power over departed spirits, cannot be true, for the following reasons:—1st. If there be two separate spheres of existence hereafter,—heaven and hell,—to the one or the other of which the spirits of all men go, there to remain *everlastingly*, without one moment's intermission of bliss or misery from that fixed and eternal state, it is impossible for a soul to be *absent* for however short a period; for then the everlasting character of the whole would be violated, and hereafter would not be eternity; for if it were possible spirits could be summoned, for a moment of time, they might be

for an age, and even throughout the world's duration, since they would be at the bidding of whoever liked to summon them. 2nd. The Almighty is said to have the keys of death and hell, or *Hades*; therefore man has no authority in respect to the unseen world, and could not summon one soul to quit its precincts, without the delegation of God. 3rd. If departed spirits did appear upon the old stage of their existence, they would manifest themselves in a manner and a mode, the reality of which should be demonstrable to the senses of mankind at large, and fully attested by creditable evidence, such as the Mosaic miracles, the appearance of the angels at the tomb of Christ, and the miracles which Christ wrought. All preternatural effects absolutely appeal to the senses. If the senses are not satisfied, the mind cannot be convinced, and the agency has failed to effect what it endeavoured to perform. 4th. The Almighty never wastes materials nor exhibits His power, either in the operations of nature or grace, unless there is a necessity for it; therefore we say, that preternatural agency being unneeded in the present day, we are not justified in expecting it. The economy under which we live does not require it. 5th. The object of preternatural interference has ever been to attest the truth of some assumption of power or declaration of doctrine foreign to the existing and conceived notions of mankind; e. g., Christ established His dispensation by the aid of those adjuncts. Spiritualism neither claims to establish or attest anything; it must necessarily be useless and futile, and cannot be, what it is asserted to be, "from above." 6th. We content ourselves on this head with one reference to Holy Writ—to the parable of Lazarus and Dives. A spirit in hell once craved permission to revisit the earth and his father's house, to tell of his torments and agonies. In the throes of his pain, he craved to testify to his brethren, lest they should endure like torments; but, alas! the prayer came

from the doomer, and it asked the impossible;—there was a great gulf, an impassable barrier, over which it were impossible the one or the other could pass. But could that tortured spirit have left for one short hour the prison of his perpetual doom, he would have gone and told his brethren of his

quenchless thirst, and of the gnawing agony of his unmitigable suffering. But he *could not*, "for they (his brethren) had Moses and the prophets; and if they would not hear them, neither would they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead."

The Societies' Section.

WORCESTERSHIRE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES.

THE Worcestershire Union of Institutes met at Stourbridge on Tuesday, the 13th of November. A considerable number of visitors from the various literary and educational institutes in the county attended. In the morning the Council of the Union met for the transaction of business; while a dinner at the Talbot Hotel, and a conversation, occupied the rest of the day.

The meeting of the Council of the Union was held in the Lecture-room of the Stourbridge Institute, J. S. Pakington, Esq., the President of the Union, in the chair. Lord Lyttelton, J. H. H. Foley, Esq., M.P., J. S. Isaacs, Esq., Rev. D. Melville, Rev. Dr. Williamson, W. Ackroyd, Esq., and other gentlemen, were present, as also were delegates from institutions in the following places:—Bromsgrove, Droitwich, Dudley, Evesham, Lye, Malvern, Nailsworth, Pershore, Redditch, Stourbridge, Stourport, and Worcester.

The first business was the election of officers for the ensuing year. J. S. Pakington, Esq., was again elected President; as also were the vice-presidents, Lord Lyttelton, the Hon. and Rev. W. H. Lyttelton, E. Holland, Esq., M.P., and Sir Edward Lechmere. J. S. Isaacs, Esq., was re-elected treasurer, J. Tree, Esq., was again elected honorary secretary, and the Rev. W. Walters joined with him in the office. The election of committee took place by ballot. From the delegates the five

following gentlemen were elected:—Messrs. Dark, Marcus, Elliott, Lowe, and New; and from the subscribers, the Revs. David Melville and W. Lee. The place fixed upon for the annual meeting next year was Malvern. The following institutions were duly admitted to the Union:—The Dudley Mechanics' Institution, the Kidderminster Mutual Improvement Society, the Worcester Early Closing Association, and the Nailsworth Literary and Mechanics' Institution. The annual report was then adopted. Examinations were conducted by the Rev. G. D. Boyle, of Hagley, and Mr. F. Marcus, of Bromsgrove. Four essays had been sent in for the gold medal offered by J. L. Marsden, Esq., M.D., of Malvern, "On the use and opportunity of recreation and amusement in connection with mechanics' institutions," but the award had not yet been made. For the elementary examinations there were eight candidates at Dudley, six at Kidderminster, and four at Stourport. Mr. Marcus had placed his services at the disposal of the Union as organizing master. After speaking of lectures, diagrams, and libraries, the question of placing the Union in connection with the Society of Arts was brought on; the Council decided on joining it. The treasurer's account showed an expenditure for the year, of £69 4s. 9d., and there was a balance due to the bank of £14 15s. 6d. Various votes of thanks were then passed, and after the Chairman had acknowledged the com-

pliment paid to him as president, the Council separated. The proceedings lasted four hours.

The dinner at the Talbot Hotel was attended by about 100 gentlemen. The President of the Union, J. S. Pakington, Esq., occupied the chair. The party soon separated, but again met a little later, in the Corn Exchange, where the *conversations* were held.

At this about 400 ladies and gentlemen, with the members of the Stourbridge Association, and delegates from others in the Union, were present. Tea was provided on the occasion. J. H. H. Foley, Esq., M.P., occupied the chair; and there were also present Lord Lyttelton, Sir John Pakington, Bart., M.P., Sir James Kay Shuttleworth, W. O. Foster, Esq., M.P., Sir Henry Lambert, the Hon. C. B. Adderley, M.P., Hon. F. H. W. G. Calthorpe, M.P., G. Holland, Esq., M.P., J. S. Pakington, Esq., the Revs. J. W. Grier, Hugh Sherrard, R. P. Turner, J. Whiteley, Mr. Barnett Blake, secretary to the Yorkshire Union of Institutes; Mr. A. Talbot, secretary to the South Staffordshire Union; and Mr. Free, secretary to the Worcester-shire Union of Institutions, &c.

In introducing the business of the evening, the chairman went through the history of the Stourbridge Institute. As regards the Union of Institutes, he thought it calculated to do much good. The examinations tended to this end, and had a stimulating effect, even on the members who did not at present take part in them. They were indebted to Mr. Pakington for introducing this Union.

The chairman afterwards distributed some prizes gained by the members of the Stourbridge Institute.

Lord Lyttelton then rose to move the first resolution—one referring to the advantages of the Union of Institutes. He said the general principles of the union of such institutes was the principle of the institutes themselves—union is strength. It was very encouraging to point in that neighbourhood to the fact that these institutions

were increasing in numbers and usefulness year by year. His lordship, after further remarks on the subject of the union of institutes, concluded by moving, "That the union of mechanics' institutions tends to increase their individual efficiency."

Sir J. K. Shuttleworth next addressed the meeting. He said that Lord Lyttelton had alluded to the degree of despondency with which the want of pre-eminently successful results from the operations of mechanics' institutes had too often been regarded, not only by the public, but by the earnest friends of education, who had almost despaired of seeing any great beneficial results from the deep interest they took in the social amelioration of the working classes. He (Sir J. Shuttleworth) had always been accustomed to attribute that despondency to early misconceptions as to the objects sought by those institutions. In the first instance it was put forth by Mr. Birkbeck—supported as he was by the genius and patriotism of Lord Brougham—that there were needed institutions to develop those latent powers of cultivation to be found amongst the working classes. Mr. Birkbeck said that a period would arrive when we should have to bring to bear the cultivation of high scientific knowledge. Scientific lectures were found to be beyond the few intellectual means of the working classes, who had neither leisure, nor time, nor education to follow them; consequently, they dwindled in extent, and from scientific they became popular, and from that they became simply amusing. Thence they came down, as was the case especially in Yorkshire, to a course of three or four lectures, or a single lecture, many of them being given gratuitously. The institutions the Worcestershire Union intended to group, however, were of a totally different order. For thirty years past they had been attempting to raise, upon the basis of the old Sunday school, the elementary school, but they had had to struggle with a great number of surrounding difficulties, and no an-

tagonist—as Mr. Birkbeck said—was greater than that of the workmaster. It was almost impossible for the working classes to find time for such education as was requisite. It was therefore to supply the disadvantages of elementary schools, to win young men from sensual gratification, to supply them after leaving school with the necessary rudimentary instruction, that their mechanics' institutions and evening schools principally aimed. That was a view of working men's institutes nearly opposite to that which Mr. Birkbeck dealt with; but it led step by step to a view much higher than the one taken by him. Sir J. K. Shuttleworth went on to say that unless government was prepared to follow up elementary schools by night schools, a very large proportion of the means now extended would be utterly wasted and thrown away. The sum now expended upon education was £2,000,000 per annum, of which government supplied £430,000, all of which very large expenditure was very much at stake unless the present means of education were extended by the formation of evening schools. After some remarks upon the relation of capital to labour, the speaker referred to the variety of political interests represented by the gentlemen present at the meeting, and said he could only regard their presence as a most significant phenomenon in the history of the education of the country, and concluded by eulogizing those exertions in the promotion of education.

Mr. Barnett Blake, of the Yorkshire Union of Institutes, supported the resolution, which was carried unanimously.

The next resolution, "That in order to secure the benefits of general examinations, every effort should be made to promote the establishment of classes at individual institutions," was moved by the Right Hon. Sir John Pakington, M.P. The right hon. baronet said that he did not rescind one iota of the opinion he had expressed in public and private, that the greatest boon they could ex-

tend to their countrymen was to organize, promote, and extend the systematic and sound education of the people. It was a large and comprehensive word, was education. Schools must be the foundation of all instruction, and all future education. They had all heard of the insufficiency of schools, and of the religious differences which unhappily had too long, and as he thought unnecessarily, beset the subject. There were also the financial difficulties; but all these important matters had been referred for consideration to a royal commission, and they hoped soon to receive a report; and he trusted that that report would show the mode in which several, if not all these difficulties were to be remedied. But he felt sure that however far the commission was successful in pointing out difficulties, they would tell us that in the present state of the population of England, looking to the necessities of the working classes, and the demands made upon them, the rudimentary education must cease at or about the age of twelve. Sir J. K. Shuttleworth had alluded to the admirable Act of Parliament, which required that a certain amount of education should be given to children up to the age of thirteen; but if he took twelve years of age as the age at which the education of the children of the working classes must cease, he placed it at rather a high standard. In agricultural districts it was lower. His belief was, that of all the various distinctions which existed in the social position of the richer and poorer classes of the country, there was none greater than that at which this education ceased. In the richer classes twelve years of age was considered to be the commencement rather than the termination of the period of education; but in the humbler classes, education, in the elementary sense, terminated altogether at twelve years of age. After expressing his satisfaction at the connection to be formed between this union and the Society of Arts, and expressing his conviction that such a connection

would increase the efficiency of the Worcestershire Union, the right hon. baronet concluded by assuring them that he should always continue to take the same interest in the object sought to be obtained that he had hitherto done.

The Hon. F. H. W. G. Calthorpe, M.P., seconded the resolution.

The Right Hon. C. B. Adderley, M.P., moved the third resolution:—"That periodical examinations are absolutely necessary for the development of the resources of mechanics' institutes," and in doing so made some practical remarks on education.

Mr. Holland, M.P., seconded the resolution.

Mr. J. P. Brown-Weasthead moved the next resolution:—"That manly exercises and other innocent recreations, both out of doors and in-doors, should be encouraged in mechanics' institutions."

The Rev. J. W. Grier seconded it, and it was carried unanimously.

The next resolution was moved by Mr. W. O. Foster:—"That the Worcestershire Union of Educational Institutes is eminently worthy of support."

It was seconded by Sir H. Lambert, and Mr. J. S. Pakington then moved a resolution thanking the officers of the Stourbridge Associated Institute for the cordial reception they had given to the gentlemen from the other institutes in union, on the occasion of this annual meeting.

Mr. Millward, of Redditch, seconded the resolution, and after a vote of thanks to Mr. Foley, for his conduct in the chair, the assembly broke up.

The Southampton Society for Mutual Education.—In this society lectures are delivered every Friday evening; readings and recitations, followed by critical remarks, take place on Monday and Thursday evenings; discussions are held on the last Thursday in each month; a manuscript magazine is circulated monthly; the library is one of great usefulness, and is accessible to the members on Monday and Friday evenings; the reading room is open

every evening from seven to ten o'clock, and is well supplied with periodicals; arrangements are made for playing at chess and draughts; a museum is in course of formation; and educational classes are conducted in connection with the society. The whole of the meetings are held at the society's rooms, No. 19, Hanover-buildings, commencing punctually at half-past eight o'clock. The following are the lectures delivered, or to be delivered, for the fourteenth session, during the quarter ending Christmas, 1860:—Oct. 26, Musical Entertainment; Nov. 2, Mr. W. Buckler, "The Volunteer Movement;" Nov. 9, Mr. Harvey, "Patriotism;" Nov. 16, Mr. J. A. Barling, "Manners and Customs of the Chinese;" Nov. 23, Mr. Maw, "An Evening with the Poets;" Nov. 30, Mr. Stott, Subject to be announced; Dec. 6, Mr. Cox, "The Earth;" Dec. 14, Mr. S. Winship, "John Pounds, the Founder of the Ragged Schools;" Dec. 21, Mr. W. Hebb, "Oliver Cromwell, and the Times in which he lived;" Dec. 28, Mr. C. V. Lewis, "Animal Life." The terms of membership are, an entrance fee of 1s., and a quarterly subscription of 2s. 6d., payable in advance. Members and their friends are admitted free to the lectures and readings. Secretary, Mr. E. Bance, No. 19, Hanover-buildings.

Seaton Delaval Mechanics' Institute.

—At the annual soirée, held Oct. 20, 1860, T. E. Forster, Esq., in the chair, the following report was read, viz., "In laying their report before the members and friends of this institute, the committee have great pleasure in stating that its progress during the last year has been satisfactory. The number of names now on the books is 54, an increase of 17 over last year. The number of books now in the library is 422. By amalgamation with the 'Northern Union of Mechanics' Institutions,' we now receive every two months a box, containing from 18 to 20 volumes of excellent books. The annual income has been £28 14s., including donations (which we thankfully acknowledge)

from the following gentlemen.—Mr. Green, of Gateshead, £1 1s.; Mr. Bagnall, of Newcastle, £1; and Messrs. Wilson and Son, of Newcastle, 10s; and the expenditure £25 7s. 7d., leaving a balance of £3 6s. 5d. The newspapers and periodicals received into the reading room are the *Northern Daily Express* and the *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, the *Leeds Mercury*, three times a week, the *Illustrated London News*, the *Alliance*, *Reynold's Newspaper*, and the *Morpeth Herald*; the *Family Herald*, *Cassell's Illustrated Family Paper*, *Leisure Hour*, *Chambers's Journal*, and *Punch*; also the *British Controversialist*, monthly, and the *Scottish Quarterly Review*. During the winter months we have had, in connection with the institute, a grammar class and a reading class. The former was well attended, and the committee give their cordial thanks to Mr. Edward Patterson for his kindness in officiating as teacher. Although we have made some progress during the last year, yet it is to be regretted that, out of about 600 working men and lads, there should only be found 54 names enrolled in the books of an institution that has for its object the dissemination of knowledge, and the elevation of the working classes." [Here follows a well-written and effective address to the inhabitants of the district, which we regret want of space does not permit us to give.] The report is signed, John Robinson, Sec.

Dialectic Section of the Evesham Institute.—The annual general meeting of the members of the section was held in the Council Chamber of the Town-hall, on Wednesday evening, Sept. 11th. About sixty persons sat down to an excellent supper, provided under the direction of Mr. Alfred Cox, the native secretary of the section; after supper, the president, Mr. Joseph Jones, called upon the secretary to read the report of the proceedings of the section during the past session, from which it appeared that a larger number of members had attended the debates, and greater interest had been manifested in the discus-

sions, than at any previous season; after some discussion as to the propriety of establishing the prize essay scheme as recommended by the committee, the report was adopted on the motion of Mr. A. New, seconded by Mr. G. Balingier. The president then proceeded to the election of the officers for the ensuing quarter, and the following gentlemen were elected; president, Anthony Martin, Esq.; vice-presidents, Messrs. C. Warrington and Roberts; secretary, Mr. A. Cox; committee, Messrs. Jones, Cole, and Kedwards. In the absence of the new president, Mr. C. Warrington, the senior vice-president, took the chair; and, after a short address, called upon the members to give in subjects for discussion. Several subjects were promised. Mr. Joseph Jones gave a summary of the debates of the past session, and urged the members to keep up in the ensuing season the same good tone and friendly feeling manifested during the past year. Herbert New, Esq., addressed the meeting upon the principle of free discussion, which was the foundation of the section; and the Rev. J. C. Lunn made a practical and interesting speech on the value of prize essays; the study of political economy; the respect due to honest, out-spoken opponents in debate, and the power of eloquent speaking, particularly instancing the oratory of the late Sir Robert Peel. The proceedings of the evening were much enlivened by the vocal performances of Messrs. Wheatley, F. Haynes, and H. Smith.

The Amateur Literary Society.—Gentlemen who have been debarred from joining this excellent society, by the largeness of the sum hitherto demanded annually of the members, will be glad to learn that in spite of considerable opposition, an "Act of Council" has been passed, wherein the fixed subscription is for ever abolished, and only an admission fee of 3s. 6d. is enforced. The A.L.S. is by no means exclusive, but comprehends persons of every age and rank. The president for the time being is John W. W. Penney, Esq., B.A.,

&c. &c.; and the following have accepted the title of *honorary fellows*, unanimously conferred on them:—Charles Dickens, Esq., W. M. Thackeray, Esq., Rev. George Giffillan, M.A., J. A. Cooper, Esq., F.R.S.L., Alfred Elwes, Esq., president of the B.L.S., author of "Frank and Andrea," &c. The Rev. George Iliff, M.A., *honorary president* for last session, and the ex-secretary, W. Whyte, Esq., have been placed in the list of *honorary associates*. The objects of the society have been frequently laid before the readers of the *Controversialist*, and such as wish to be better informed on the point will find *full particulars* in the *New Quarterly Magazine*, published by the society, by Mr. Hope, of Great Marlborough-street. Several numbers of this periodical are now out, containing essays, tales, sketches, poetry, &c.; and the press generally have been favourable to the undertaking. It is much to be regretted, however, that the sale as yet will not cover the heavy expenses unexpectedly incurred; and if the copies on hand are not speedily bought up, it is feared that the project will have to be prematurely abandoned. Prospectuses, rules, &c., may be obtained, on sending stamps to cover postage, of the secretary, J. Ezra Holmes, Esq., Middle-gate-street, Hartlepool.

Wakefield Mechanics' Institute.—The *soirée* of the above institution was held in the large room of the Wakefield Corn Exchange, on the 20th November. Mr. E. A. Leatham, M.P., was in the chair, and prominent amongst the gentlemen on the platform was Mr. John

Bright, M.P., Mr. Monckton Milnes, M.P., and Mr. Collins, M.P., were also present; as were also Mr. Charlesworth, and the Mayor of Wakefield. The chairman, in his speech, strove to persuade the audience of the fallacy of the idea that evil could result to society from the universal diffusion of knowledge among the people. Mr. Bright's lengthy oration was chiefly political. The following are specimens of his opinions:—"There is nothing more important in the education of all classes in the country than the consideration of the principles on which laws should be founded, and on which the permanent peace and greatness of the commonwealth were based." After this, by reference to wages, strikes, prices, &c., he proved the importance of directing education to the consideration of political questions, and concluded by saying that if these things were studied more, the people would be enabled to see that they might govern themselves more wisely; if they did so, they would raise mankind to a much higher level; they might bring greater glory to their country; they might dispense greater happiness amongst the families of which it was composed, and they might do something "to justify the ways of God to man." Messrs. Milnes, M.P., Collins, M.P., &c., also addressed the meeting.

Oxford Union Debating Society.—On Tuesday evening, Nov. 12th, it was affirmed, after debate, by 40 *ayes* to 28 *noes*, "that the general tone of the *Saturday Review* is subversive of the principles of true criticism."

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS TO WHICH ANSWERS ARE SOLICITED.

121. LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.—I am anxious to examine; with due collation of authorities, the important philosophical speculation regarding Li-

berty and Necessity. Perhaps some of your able contributors on psychological topics would not grudge to favour an inquiring mind with some help towards the attainment of a list of works on this matter, which would afford a fair and

impartial view of the question.—D. N. M.

122. Can you inform me of whom, or by what means, it is likely I could obtain a recommendation which is necessary as a voucher to entitle me to the privilege of a reader at the reading-room of the British Museum?—J. SARGENT.

123. Will any of your readers be kind enough to inform me where I can procure a first-class work on foreign words, with their English derivations and meanings? Also, say whose English dictionary is considered the best. Price no object.—S. S.

124. When, and by whom, was the variation of the compass discovered?—M. G.

125. What is meant by "Accepting the Chiltern Hundreds"?—Y. W.

126. I have seen it somewhere asserted that the philibeg, or short kilt, worn by the Highlanders, and which appears so picturesque in the London Scottish Volunteers, is an invention of the sixteenth century. Is this true or false?—ANGLO-SCOTUS.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

112. *The National Anthem.*—A definite and satisfactory answer cannot be afforded, I fear, to the question of J. Evans. The following excerpt may be of use to him. "Our National Anthem of 'God Save the King,' composed in the time of George I., has always been considered of English origin; but on reading the amusing 'Memoirs of Madame de Cregny,' it appears to have been almost a literal translation of the Cantique, which was always sung by the demoiselles de St. Cyr, when Louis XIV. entered the chapel of that establishment to hear morning prayer. The words were by M. de Brinon, and the music by the famous Lully:—

'Grand Dieu! sauve le Roi.
Grand Dieu! venge le Roi.
Vive le Roi!

Que toujours glorieux,
Louis victorieux!
Voye ses ennemis

Toujours soumis!

Grand Dieu! sauve le Roi.
Grand Dieu! venge le Roi.
Vive le Roi!

It appears to have been translated and adapted to the House of Hanover by Handel, the German composer. J. E. is doubtless aware of the antiquity of the expression, "God Save the King."—J. R. PAGE.

In answer to your correspondent who inquires about the "National Anthem," I refer him to "Notes and Queries" for October 10th, No. 151. It there states that it was composed by Dr. Henry Carey, a natural son of the Earl of Halifax; he was born about 1696, in London. The anthem, both words and music, were composed by him in honour of the birthday of George II. Henry Carey died, in 1744, by suicide. The article is signed, "Francis Dickens, Dusseldorf."—C.

118. I think the best works on the Isle of Wight are "The History, Topography, and Antiquities of the Isle of Wight," by W. Davenport Adams, price 25s.: Smith, Elder, and Co. And "The Isle of Wight," by the Rev. E. Venables, 7s. 6d. Stanford. Edward Knight.

121. The following list will supply D. N. M. with a collection of the chief works, chronologically and controversially arranged, which have appeared in English literature during the two previous centuries:—

LIBERTY.

Of Free Will, in Reply to Hobbes, 1838.

The Boyle Lecture Sermons, by Sam. Clarke, D.D., 1704.

Defence and Vindication of Human Liberty, by Rev. John Jackson, 1730.

Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Chap. VIII., Richard Price, D.D., 1769.

Origin of Evil, Book V., W. King, D.D., 1781.

Essays on the Active Powers, VIII., Thomas Reid, 1785.

Essays, Philosophical and Literary, by James Gregory, M.D., 1792.

Active and Moral Powers, by Dugald Stewart, 1828.

Review of Edwards on the Will, by H. P. Tappan, 1839.

Lectures, by Thomas Brown, 1820.

Elements of Morality, by Whewell, 1839.

On Human Nature, Rev. J. G. Mac-Vicar, 1853.

Moral Freedom, Cairns, 1838.

NECESSITY.

Treatise of Liberty and Necessity, by Thomas Hobbes, 1654.

Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty, Anthony Collins, 1717.

Observations on Man, by D. Hartley, LL.D., 1749.

Sketches of Man, Morality, and Religion, by Lord Kames, 1751 and 1774.

Essays and Treatise on Human Nature, D. Hume, 1777.

Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, by Jonathan Edwards, 1757.

Philos. Necess., Illustrated by Joseph Priestly, LL.D., 1778.

Essay on Philosophic Necessity, by Alexander Crombie, LL.D., 1793.

Political Justice, by Godwin, 1793.

Moral Philosophy, by T. Belshaw, 1801.

System of Logic, J. S. Mills, 1838.

Philosophy of Necessity, by Charles Bray, 1840.

An excellent essay on the general question will be found in Hazlitt's

"Remains," vol. i., worthy of study.—**NEMASIL.**

121. *Liberty and necessity.*—I find it stated in a work entitled "Notes to assist the Memory" (Murray, 1825) that "Among the necessarian writers, Hume, Hobbes, Collins, Hutchinson, Edwards, Hartley, Priestly, and, perhaps, Locke, may be classed. The principal advocates for philosophical liberty are Clarke, Beattie, Butler, Price, Law, Bryant, Wollaston, and Horseley." Perhaps this may be of use to your inquiring correspondent. If so, I shall be glad.—**T. L. B.**

123. We know of no *first-class* work of the kind desired. In Ogilvie's Dictionary (Blackie, £4 10s.), the greater part of the most common foreign words will be found explained. It is the best. Worcester's (by Bohn), 16s., is fair and useful.—**W. F.**

124. *Variation of the compass.*—The variation of the compass was first discovered by Sebastian Cabot, circa 1500; the variation of that variation by one Gillebrand, circa 1625; the dip or inclination of the needle was discovered by a Mr. Norman, circa 1576.

125. A Member of Parliament cannot resign his seat, but if he accepts an office in the gift of the Sovereign, he must vacate his seat. When, therefore, a member wishes to resign, the Sovereign bestows upon him the nominal office of Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds,—a range of chalk hills in Bedford and Buckingham, not far from Aylesbury, which are Crown lands; and so, by a convenient fiction, he gets quit of his M.P.-ship.—**WIGHT.**

LITERARY NOTES.

Robert Chambers has a third volume of "The Domestic Annals of Scotland" in the press.

MM. Pereire announces as in preparation a new Encyclopædia, among the contributors to which are to be Guizot, Cousin, Thiers, Villemain, Sand, Michelet, Pere Enfantin, Proudhon, &c.

At Leipzig there is now publishing, in the Russian language, a newspaper entitled "Budonahnosty" (*The Future*).

Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton is wintering, engaged in literary pursuits, in Corfu.

At Constantinople, a new journal in the Turkish tongue, called "The Trans-

lator of Events," has been lately started."

Wilkie Collins's "Woman in White" has been put upon the stage.

Two bronze doors, for the capitol of Washington, have just been finished in Munich. They are devoted to scenes in the life of Columbus, in compartments between which are niched busts of all those who have written his history. A fine head of Washington Irving is conspicuous.

The University of Naples has been reorganized.

A list of plays acted before the Court, in 1638, has been found. "The Merry Wives of Windsor," and "Julius Cæsar," were in the programme.

Henry Butterworth, law-publisher and literary man, died 2nd Nov.

"Prison-books, and their Authors," is the title of a book from the pen of J. A. Langford, now in the press.

A Biography of Beethoven is shortly to be issued.

Signor Ruffini, author of "Lorenzo Benoni," &c., has "Lavinia" nearly ready.

Meyerbeer's opera, "L'Africaine," is re-christened "Vasco di Gama," and is still promised, at an interval.

"Great expectations" of delight "all the year round," are entertained about Charles Dickens's new story. It is believed that this serial will not be an "uncommercial traveller," even though its *dénouement*, like "Oliver Twist," and "Little Dorrit," may be "hunted down" by some obscure dramatist before its author's *éclaircissement* has been put under cover.

The Anti-Hegelian philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, born at Dantzic in 1788, died in Frankfort-on-the-Maine, 21st September. His first work, entitled, "The World Regarded as Will and Thought," was published in 1818, and he revised, a few days before his decease, the proof sheets of the second edition of a work to be published by Brockhaus, of Leipzig, which discusses "The Two-fold Fundamental Problem of Ethics."

A genealogical tree, tracing the pedigree of Thomas Campbell to "the Bruce of Bannockburn," has been published.

Dr. Lankester's "Lectures on Food" are to be published at a low price.

Servian song is to find a translator in Owen Meredith (Balwer).

Mrs. Oliphant's new novel will bear the title of "The House on the Moor."

George Macdonald, author of the weird poem, "Phantastes," is engaged on a novel.

Wright's (Thomas) "Archæological Essays" are in the press of J. R. Smith.

"Paul the Pope, and Paul the Friar; the Story of an Interdict," is the subject of T. A. Trollope's new sketch of Italian History.

The tenth library edition of Alison's "History of Europe" is announced.

W. S. Landor's "Complete [?] Works" are issued by Ticknor and Field, New York.

"The Vestiges of Creation" has reached the 11th edition.

Theodosia Trollope, sister of Messrs. Anthony and T. A. Trollope, and Italian correspondent to the *Athenæum*, has in the press "The Last Eighteen Months in Italy."

The Messrs. Griffin promise the concluding portion of the Rev F. D. Maurice's "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy" this month.

Butt's "History of Italy," vol. iii, is to be issued in December.

Dr. Jos. Angus has in the press "A Handbook of the English Tongue."

The favourable reception which Mr. Neil's "Shakespeare Papers" received from several critics of *status* has induced him to extend and enlarge them, so as to form a small volume, which will be, at an early date, laid before the public.

Herchel's "Elements of Astronomy," and De Morgan's "Algebra," have been translated into Chinese, and published at Shanghai.

Dr. Roscher, Professor of Political Economy—the most profound Statist in Germany—as Rector, in succession to

Dr. Wachter, Professor of Jurisprudence of the Leipzig University, delivered an inaugural address on University education.

The *Caledonian Mercury*, a Scottish newspaper, published in Edinburgh, established 1724, is the property of Mr. Allen, the improver of the Electric Telegraph, and has been the property of his family since 1772.

A memoir of Kepler, by M. O. Struve, published in the "Memoirs of the Academy of St. Petersburg," contains many new facts regarding him, especially in his relations with Schiller's hero, *Wallenstein*.

The *Toronto Globe* has been printed on paper made from straw.

The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and the British and Foreign Bible Society, issue annually 38,000,000 Bibles, Testaments, and religious works, in about 150 languages.

Messrs. Williams and Norgate announce a quarterly "Natural History Review," to be an organ of biological science, and to have each department under able editorial superintendence.

A memoir of Professor George Wilson, the Technologist, by his sister, Jessie Aitken Wilson, is almost ready.

A second volume of Cooper's "Athens Cantabrigenses" is in the press.

Bancroft's "History of the United States," vol ix., is in the press.

"Cromwell, the Protector of the English Republic," is the title of a tragedy in verse, by A. de Masiere, published by Hachette and Co., Paris.

"Temple-Bar" makes its appearance this month.

J. W. Parker, junior, managing editor of "Fraser," died 10th ult.

The Earl of Airlie has been lecturing in Forfar on "Adam Smith."

"Scottish Life in the Last Century" is about to receive fresh illustration by the publication of the autobiographies of Rev. Alexander Carlyle, D.D., Inveresk, and Rev. Dr. Somerville, of Jedburgh. The record will extend from the '45 Rebellion till Napoleon's capture, and will be rich in anecdote of Hume, Home, Smith, Blair, Robertson, Burns, Dugald Stewart, Ferguson, &c.

Messrs. Mansel and Veitch are to superintend the completion of Sir William Hamilton's "Reid."

Hepworth Dixon's "Personal History of Lord Bacon" is to be published simultaneously in London and Boston. 1,400 were disposed of at Murray's sale.

"Songs of the Covenant Times," by an Ayrshire Minister (Rev. James Murray, of Crannock), are now in the press. Much of the author's MS. we have been privileged to see; and we can assure our readers that the "songs" have pith, power, and poetry in them, which are far from common.

A memoir of the Right Hon. James Wilson, the Neckar of India, appeared in a supplement to *The Economist* of 17th ult., from the pen of the present editor, Walter Bagehot, his son-in-law.

"The proverbs and sayings of Scotland" are to be edited by Mr. A. Hishop, of Glasgow.

Materials for a third volume of the late Lord Dundonald's memoirs are understood to exist.

Dr. Croly, Rector of St. Stephen's, Walbrook, author of "Salathiel," "Marston," &c., journalist, poet, novelist, dramatist, and popular preacher, died on 24th November, suddenly, aged 75.

INDEX.

	PAGE		PAGE
EPOCH MEN:— Socrates	1	Learn to Live	200
Adam Smith—Scientific Politics	73, 145	Lectures to Young Men	82
Philosophy of Socrates	217, 269	Men of the Scottish Reformation	404
Speculative Thought	361	Original Language of St. Matthew's Gospel	53
DEBATES:—		Report of the Yorkshire Union of Mechanics' Institutes	349
RELIGION:—Is the Catholic Rule of Faith true?		Seeds in Syria	277
Affirmative Articles 13, 85, 157, 223, 298		Teacher, The	52
Negative Articles 18, 93, 163, 228, 301		The Denominational Reason Why	196
PHILOSOPHY:— Is the Poetry of Tennyson as Healthy in its Tendencies as that of Longfellow?		The New Quarterly Magazine	199
Affirmative Articles	27, 101	The Student	349
Negative Articles	36, 114	The Best Safeguard for a Young Man	349
Are the Principles of the Development Theory true?		POETIC SECTION:— British Poetry	56
Affirmative Articles 100, 237, 310, 371		Leaves from the Olive Mount	270
Negative Articles	175, 240, 314, 373	Original Poetry	345
HISTORY:— Was Joan of Arc an Impostor?		THE INQUIRER:— Questions	60, 203, 278, 357, 423
Affirmative Articles	39, 117	A Curious Book	278
Negative Articles	44, 121	Age of the "Te Deum"	279
SOCIAL ECONOMY:— Is Counsel justified in defending from Punishment a Criminal of whose Guilt he has been professionally made cognizant?		Banking	61
Affirmative Articles 179, 246, 319, 377, 388		Bookbinding	204
Negative Articles 184, 249, 321, 386, 393		Encyclopedias	61
THE ESSAYIST:—		French Serials	61
Giovanni Battista Niccolini	46	Grammatical Difficulty	61
Shakespeare Facts, Fancies, Forgeries, and Fabrications	125, 187, 252, 324	Gyroscope	205
Notes on the Autobiography of William Cowper	263	History of the Popes	61
Hard Work	342	History of the Gipsies	204
A Vision of the Future	343	Laird of Logan	60
James Mill: Historian, Psychologist, and Economist	397	Latin and French Grammar	357
THE REVIEWER:—		Liberty and Necessity	424
Altar Light	410	Massada	204
"Assent and Consent"	409	Origin of Wakes	336
Bright (John) and his Calumniators	199	Quotations	278, 357
Calus Marius	277	Shakespeare's Works	61
Chatterton, The Life of	199	The Bampton Lecture	61
Diversity of Style, Fundamental Causes of	406	The Chiltern Hundreds	423
Early Closing Movement, The	406	The Isle of Wight	424
England and Missions	53	The Japanese Language	61
Gabriel de Mirabeau	199	The National Anthem	424
Historical Geography of Palestine	198	Theory of Civilization	206
History of France	406	Trollius, or Globe Flower	278
History of Scotland	406	Variation of the Compass	425
History of the British Empire	406	Works on the English Language	61
Industrial Labour	199	THE TOPIC:—	
Italy in Transition	407	Government appointing Official Auditors to examine Public Bodies	63
		House of Lords and Paper Duty	135
		Spiritualism	411
		The Expedition of Garibaldi	206
		The Government Scheme of Fortification	279
		The Use of Tobacco	350
		THE SOCIETIES' SECTION:—	
		Reports of Societies 68, 211, 285, 356, 418	
		Literary Notes 72, 144, 215, 287, 350, 425	

CONTRIBUTORS' SIGNATURES.

A. J.	43, 318	G. A. H. E.	124	Q. S.	404
A Layman	163	Gregory	93	R. M. A.	52
Anglo-Saxon	36	H. K.	249	R. T. G.	292
Beta	388	Ignatius	18, 301	R. D. R.	321
B. S.	114, 385	J. H.	236	S. E. L.	198, 323
Delta	39, 240	Lex Scripta	101, 237	S. N.	12, 84, 134, 164, 222, 266, 297, 341, 370
Edmund	116	L'Ouvrier 121, 179, 186, 246, 377, 397		Theophylact	37, 310
E. M., jun.	175, 314, 373	Montgomery	169	Vale	345
E. W. S.	270	Nona	184, 393	W. H. P.	46
F. G.	60, 277, 343				

